The purpose of the following notes is to discuss some implications of the developments of the Theory for knowledge: its nature and possibility. The discussion will include (a) general statements about the possibility of knowledge and (b) specific comments regarding human (and animal) knowledge and are ‘theories of knowledge.’ The general statements will include assertions of the form ‘knowledge of kind A about objects of class B is possible’ but may not provide any estimate of the remoteness or feasibility of such knowledge. The question arises whether there is any use to knowing that knowledge of such kinds is possible. The uses include the following

(1) Knowledge that certain things exist may affect an individual’s attitude to life, to the world in which he or she lives; thus, it might be positive to know that the kinds of knowledge in question are possible

(2) When it is said, here, that it is possible to have knowledge of objects of class B, that tacitly implies that objects of that class exist; and this, too, may affect attitudes. (What can it mean for an object to not exist for what is the object that does not exist? It means that there is a concept or description that does not correspond to an actual object. Therefore, when it is said that an object does exist, especially when the existence may be in question, the more precise meaning of the assertion is that there is a concept corresponding to which there is an object.) It does not follow that attitudes will always be affected positively but this does not imply that the knowledge in question has a negative value. The actual value regarding any kind of knowledge may be discussed from a number of perspectives. In a practical perspective it may be argued that certain kinds of knowledge are used to harmful effect and the practical question is whether such kinds should be pursued and disseminated. There is always an economic limitation on what can be pursued but this discussion concerns the effect on the quality of life. Given that theoretical physics has been used to build bombs, should it be pursued? Perhaps not but it seems to me (in terms of my rather democratic values) that, assuming that it is possible to have restraint in such matters, restraint should be based in consensus. Another reason for consensus regarding behavior is the difficulty regarding consensus on values. A further concern: what form should the consensus position take and what level or kind of enforcement would be appropriate? And: are the questions that are being considered intrinsically conceptual, i.e., can they be decided in thought alone or do practical concerns, e.g. the nature of group and institutional making have any impact, not just on the outcome, but also on value?

I think that the solution to the issue must include consideration of the fact that certainty in moral judgment is an illusion (except, perhaps, in obvious cases; and were certainty definite and universally obvious, there would be no moral question.) The value of knowledge in general can be also addressed in an affective framework; here there is no universal affective outcome but unless the outcome is universally positive or universally negative it is not clear what bearing this should have on decision or consensus. I.e., if something upsets me, I may argue against it but that is no reason for someone else to argue against it. A final perspective in which to view the value of knowledge, i.e., of a particular kinds or fields of knowledge is one in which specific concerns are seen in a universal context. I am not thinking of the idea that while my human concerns loom large in my own awareness they are trivial in a larger scope (I do not think that those concerns that are important to me are trivial in any objective framework even though they cannot be given weight in the larger scope.) If my identity is what it immediately appears to be, my own pleasure and pain will loom large as long as I have feeling. However, if my identity is only temporarily my identity, then my pleasure and pain is not quite so significant to Me

(Since i will die, I will either cease or transform, and so my identity is temporary. I may say, ‘i am significant to me,’ ‘I am significant to Me,’ but ‘i am not quite so significant to Me.’ How do all these perspectives which almost everyone has at some level of awareness sum or intersect to result in having a position on important concerns? Given the complexity of mental states, that what I believe, what I say I believe, and what I think I believe are distinct and variable: what do I believe? I have wondered, somewhat facetiously, whether a state of belief is like a quantum superposition of all possible states of belief and that pure states are realized only in interaction with the world, especially social interactions)

(3) The utility of the kinds of knowledge asserted in the essays is not restricted to its effect on attitudes but has been used, in the essays, toward actual conclusions. While ultimates have not been obtained, the movement is in that direction. (4) The more general statements form a framework for evaluating specific issues including the more specific assertions ‘regarding human knowledge’

The first assertion regarding the possibility of knowledge from the Theory (of Being) developed in the essays is that no state is absolutely hidden. If it exists in the temporal sense, it is not hidden; if it is so transitory that is not known then it is not known but still (trivially) not hidden. I.e., there is no significant object that cannot be known. In the non-temporal or supra-temporal sense, there is no significant object that is not known

What is the nature of knowledge? Every individual is so immersed in his or her own subjective states that it is difficult to get outside of those states to see what they are. (This is distinct from the idea of getting outside of a state of knowledge to confirm what is thought to be known.) Also: if I do obtain insight into what states of knowledge are, I am invariably drawn back into my subjectivity when I think about the nature of knowledge. And: even in the subjective case - is knowledge about an object or is it its function in action? This is related to the question of coherence vs. pragmatic theories of truth but the question here is ‘what is knowledge?’ There is a well known criterion of knowledge, sometimes attributed to Aristotle, which I will call ‘Aristotle’s dictum,’ that knowledge is justified true belief. Regardless of the validity of the ‘dictum,’ it addresses the question ‘when does a belief count as knowledge?’ Instead, the question here is ‘what kind of thing is knowledge?’… continue