Aristotle’s dictum, then, is not an answer to this question but ‘an item of knowledge is a brick’ is an answer to the question. Obviously, though, it is not a candidate for a ‘right’ answer. However, it’s close because an assertion that I shall make is ‘knowledge is a thing.’ This is a particular case of the general conclusion from the Theory: the abstract concepts of (classical) metaphysics refer, in fact, to concrete things (even though they do not seem to so refer.) I am not altogether sure of that conclusion and it depends in part on noting that the kinds of concept in question may have several kinds of meaning and selecting one kind; this is not arbitrary for I select the kind that universalizes the meanings of the concepts and enables the system of concepts to lie in a structured and coherent relationship within the Theory of Being (so that they form a completed metaphysics.) Still, however, I am not altogether sure of my conclusion regarding the concreteness of abstract concepts (meaning that they refer to concrete things) even though, given the framework of meaning just discussed, I have demonstrated it. (Fortunately, doubts regarding the specific conclusion do not affect the status of the Theory which does not imply the conclusion except when the framework of meaning is adopted)

It does not follow and there is no intention that it should follow from the assertion that (an item of) knowledge is an object that the content of knowledge is objective. However, it does follow that we may sometimes take our subjectivity too seriously as in ‘since every attempt to found knowledge is a picture or a picture of a picture and so on, so that there is no objective foundation to knowledge.’ Or as in, ‘given that illusions occur, how can I know that I actually know something I think I know?’ Of course, the criticisms sharpen our understanding. Against the criticisms: along with different pictures of knowledge there are and should be differing criteria: therefore it is a mistake to evaluate knowledge in one picture with criteria from another. But what picture and what system of criteria are the ‘correct ones?’ And are there any? And, should there be any? In the largest framework there cannot be any for there is no getting outside that framework; but in smaller contexts, it may be possible to isolate a framework either practically or theoretically and so have or establish criteria! Perhaps what is required is experimentation with the ideas: what collection of ideas regarding the concerns will fit together as a coherent system. And regarding illusion, obviously not everything is illusion because illusion can only have significance if some things are not illusory. But that does not guarantee that any specific thing seen is not an illusion. Against that: we determine that something is not an illusion (usually only when discussing illusions, or when certainty is important, or when we think that we might be subject to an illusion) by seeking corroborating data: I know (practically) I am not having a visual hallucination when my other senses corroborate what I see. But note the word ‘practically’ in the previous sentence: despite corroboration, my certainty is practical and not absolute

But, if nothing is certain does that not mean, simply, that certainty is a false criterion or ideal? It certainly seems so and, one of the conclusions from the Theory of Being is that, at least in the temporal mode of living (where we seem to spend a lot of time) and temporal action (I do not mean that there is another kind but I do mean that action cannot wait for certainty or final clarity even as much as might be ideally possible,) while concern with validity is not unimportant, as far as certainty is concerned, knowledge comes with degrees of it and does not achieve 100% in certainty (there are qualifications to this statement even for empirical knowledge but they are not important to the present discussion.) More than that: action under a paradigm of knowledge that is not certain is not only psychologically and socially ‘health’ but also productive of the greatest outcome. That of course, does not end the discussion. Yet, it needs to be noted that the concern with certainty (perhaps this concern is a function of the cultural tradition within which I live) is rooted in the subjective character of experience (it is motivated by practical ends but the preoccupation with it is suggested by the character of experience that seems to make certainty something that is in the nature knowledge.) This discussion could continue but it should be noted that it is not about knowledge but a picture of it. Some of the greatest thoughts on human knowledge throughout the history of ideas are based in ‘pictures’ of knowledge: Kant’s transcendental idealism in which he shows the existence of objects by redefining them as objects-of-experience or intuition and then justifying the effectiveness of the intuition as knowledge and Wittgenstein’s concern with the limits of language and the significance of those limits for human knowledge are examples

Those reflections were based in notions of what knowledge is. There have been suggestions in the recent literature (c.2000 AD) that despite the subjectivity of appearance, the universe may be subject to a symbolic and objective description. This is confirmed by the Theory of Being although not at the level of detailed fact (‘knowing’ all the micro-facts of the universe would not be knowledge) but regarding the necessity and general nature of being. A theory of knowledge such as Kant’s regards a particular kind of knowledge and becomes a theory of all knowledge only by virtue of specific ends and values that are imputed to knowledge. It is this that, in light of the Theory of Being, that makes possible the assertion: real metaphysics is possible. And, as I have observed in other notes, the Theory, in combination with specific disciplines leads to mutual foundation, illumination and advance: one important example is the introduction of humor as one of the categories of intuition… end of the introductory pages to this site – continue in at depth at the home page