The third fact is that good and evil normally have the same root: the fact of good and the fact of evil, the ability to see good and to see evil, and the capacity for doing good and for doing evil are bound together in the capacity for choice and in its human expression in the ‘free symbolic capability.’ Depending on one’s temperament and experience one may find oneself becoming oppressed by suffering or by evil; it is good even if not altogether useful to then remember that good and evil are twins; closing down to evil is normally shutting down to good. If good and evil are twin facts and this is recognized as true, it is then a mistake to seek absence of evil or to make absolute judgments based on the presence of evil actions; even though these mistakes are ‘normal.’ This does not mean acquiescence to evil; the option always exists to move toward evil and away from good, to resist evil and to promote good. The Theory has been helpful in making these clarifications and just as it may assist in showing the reality of good and evil and the importance of taking them seriously, it also shows that they may be taken too seriously

I have made some rather strident statements about good and evil which I can now review. Is there ‘evil?’ From the Theory, there must be where ‘evil,’ ‘wrong’ and so on are values associated with choices in the moral realm. At the human level, a search for the meaning of evil is not only a search for what is there but, within the bounds of the guiding idea, also involves creation of the idea and its working out (unless the researcher thinks that he or she is out of the loop of action.) The constraints are to remain true to the guiding idea (which may also change although change in the guiding idea is likely to be adjusted frequently than the details of the concept or concepts) regarding the specific concept and to work out an articulated system of concepts (including meta-concepts which includes considerations of the nature of conceptual systems, which means that a proper meta-ethics may require to be informed by the nature of ‘theory-in-practice’) in interaction with practice. Thus the ‘search’ is simultaneous search and creation in interaction with practice

What is the relation between wrong and evil: is evil something that is very wrong and repugnant to the moral sense. Does consensus make an act evil? Is evil a characteristic of a person (or group) or of acts or both. What is the connection between evil (acts or persons) and punishment? I assume that in a humane world, punishment does not mean retribution but its aim is to prevent or minimize further harm. If punishment is an expression of morals then it seems reasonable that that (the claim of the previous sentence) is the case on the assumption that there is a connection between morals and avoiding harm. Even if one cannot see the connection between specific morals and prevention of harm, there might be a connection so it is not a certain argument against morals that there is no identified certain harm. Not everything can be examined in clear rational light; which does not mean that the attempt should not be made. Sometimes the connections seems fairly clear and sometimes not: there are boundary cases. Sometimes, it may seem that a system of morals or punishment may promote more harm than good even though it satisfies some kind of need, e.g., ‘law and order,’  ‘righteousness’ in negative and positive senses, or ‘retribution.’ Although it is sometimes held that it is acts that are evil, mere physical action separated from the associated mental state (especially intentions) is not an act in the intended sense of ‘act.’ The mental state determines the kind of act or attempted act and is therefore strongly associated with wrong and evil. What conclusion shall be made about an individual with a history of or propensity toward ‘evil’ acts. A common theory of severe personality disturbance is that it is the result of unfortunate circumstances, especially in development, that adversely affect an individual who is biologically disposed to disturbance, e.g., lacking in feeling or having excessive reactivity of feeling. Thus an individual with antisocial personality traits may know right and wrong intellectually but does not truly know their meaning because the feeling component is highly diminished. In saying this, I am not intending to derive consequences for moral / legal judgment or punishment. I am looking for the ‘location’ of wrong or evil. It appears that, as far as repugnant acts are the pure result of an antisocial personality, they are evil only on the existence of a kind of evil that is not associated with choice On the human level, this may be called (or be an example of) pure evil. The case is analogous to self-injurious behavior that occurs for those (rare) individuals who feel no physical pain: proper human behavior cannot be the result of cognitive control alone

It seems to me, then, that it is banality that proves the real point regarding the existence of (human) evil because the banal acts are carried out by persons do know right and wrong; however, it seems that normal people might actually enjoy some cruelty, especially when the humanity of the victim has been diminished and that it is the individual with a highly developed feeling or moral sense who may resist. What kind of judgment (cognitive-feeling) may be passed on the individual who has participated in evil? It may be said that the banal kind of evil is worse than the pure case. Still, it might be remembered that, if evil is brought out in normal and good people, then we are all potentially evil and, so, I suppose that judgment is tempered but not absent: this is a proper function of guilt. Evil and punishment? Evilness of act and person enter into both (legal) judgment and punishment and the connection, if everything could be known and calculated, would be rational because the humane function of punishment is curtailment of freedom to minimize harm. That not everything can be rational is an argument in favor of a system of laws and legal safeguards… continue