The following observation is interesting: if true evil truly knows itself then the resulting guilt must be more than what others may be imposed. (I use guilt as the cognitive-feeling acknowledgement of one’s wrong or evil acts and shame to refer to the cognitive-feeling response to the knowledge or assumption of the judgment of others. An interesting observation is that binding cognition and feeling simplifies the analysis in a trivial way because it seems that they are bound in inextricably bound in guilt and shame. Evil of the banal kind could be labeled normal evil and it is characteristic of this kind of evil that it recognizes itself and feels guilt and shame. That the safeguards of guilt and shame are suppressed do not make banal acts not evil but are essential to it.) Finally, regarding judgment and punishment, it seems that a number of practical questions are important. First, although the questions have theoretical dimensions, it seems that there are numerous concerns (variables) that cannot be estimated apart from actual contexts and, therefore, a theory of evil, guilt, shame, judgment and punishment can, at most, suggest guidelines. Second, in the question of pursuing judgment and punishment, may be tempered by questions of resources. It seems that societies swing between punitive and liberal extremes and it is therefore valid to think that at the punitive extreme the disvalue of judgment and punishment may exceed the value. I do not mean that there is a measure of value or that the net value may be calculated and optimized but, simply, that, at least, an awareness of the multidimensional and non-local (with regard to specific judgment contexts) character of the value should inform social choice and the structure of institutions

There is a way in which I have been taking my Theory too seriously. Many of the positions that I have used it to defend are positions that I might have had anyway. However, it does not seem to me that I have been fixed in my viewpoints. I have abandoned and modified many positions over the course of my life; perhaps they have just become abandoned without my agency: that is only partially true. Some positions are concrete but since my point is evaluation of my ‘attitude’ and not self-disclosure, I omit specific positions that I am tempted to include. I have held and abandoned at least two world views (that might be labeled physicalism and, then, evolutionism; and, later, a temporary and experimental form of idealism) that I thought to be ‘rational.’ I hold the Theory of being (essays) to be logic itself; but there is something lacking in this. I did not seek the Theory for reasons that were completely rational: that would be absurd for it would assume the rationality that might have been sought. The search was not based in mere feeling but in some combination of reason and feeling. I have argued, and found similar but different arguments in the literature, that feeling and reason are not merely complementary but must be tied together: feeling binds us to the world and such binding is necessary, symbolic expression (which permits reason and rationalism) gives freedom where freedom is possible and this combination may be good: without binding, freedom is merely lack of structure and connection; without freedom, binding, permits no choice, no expression of value. If logic is the analysis of necessary or constitutive form (which form is logos or, if the forms are plural, the logoi) these thoughts must find expression in logic: logic is truly more inclusive than its standard form

4. It is true that the Theory does not assist directly with regard to feasibility and realization. However, it does show that some goals often held to be impossible (and which would otherwise have high value but can therefore, it is thought, have no value) are possible and, so, have value. Then, even if the likelihood of success is remote, there is value in putting some effort into investigating and acting toward such goals because, provided the effort is not to excess, a high value compensates for remoteness of success and because likelihood is a function of awareness and investigation may (show how to) increase likelihood. Thus, indirectly by showing possibility, the Theory does encourage realization. Additionally, in combination with traditional knowledge (in the West: the sciences, the humanities, the symbolic disciplines of language, logic and mathematics and the professions) and modes of human transformation (psychoanalysis; mystic contemplation; shamanism and the various ways to induce vision; yoga in its contemplative yet disciplined and physical, rational, work as service, devotional, and esoteric modes; transformation through science and technology; and art, especially in performance of the dynamic modes of music and dance that are similar to the shamanic induction of vision…) the Theory may help directly in understanding feasibility and approaching realization. The individual disciplines may assist directly; however, by showing possibility and by illuminating and providing enhancements for the disciplines the direct assistance is (vastly) improved. This has been realized with great advantage in the area of knowledge and to a lesser extent in transformations now under way and described in these introductory pages and detailed in the essays… continue