3. The significance of the actual identity of individuals and of an individual with all being is explained and demonstrated in the theory of identity that is developed in the 2005 version of the essay, ‘Journey in Being’ (Home.) The strivings, concerns, loves and enjoyment of the individual are meaningful within normal reality as are the strivings of those (Vedanta, Christianity, Buddha, Marx: in some incarnations or interpretations) who deny this ‘reality.’ In other words this reality is a phase of being (the practical meaning of this claim is not negated by the idea, for example, that the categories of intuition are merely at the intersection of the intuition and the object.) That this phase is a phase means: there is an opportunity for integration which may be treated as an opportunity rather than a moral obligation; and there may be costs to living completely in this world but, as the Theory shows, and to the probable irritation to the devout, the obsessive, and the controlling and the overly moralistic, there is and can be no final cost. Of course, temporal pain is real pain; but temporary pleasure is real pleasure: which means, ‘there is no final solution to the problems and inherent meaning of this life,’ which means: ‘this is good for it means that there is no end to opportunity’

Now consider that ‘good and evil are realized equally.’ The concern with good and evil is one about which it is possible to say much without saying anything but I will avoid that problem by saying that I intend only to address the fact (or some facts) but not the ‘problem of good and evil.’ The first fact is that of the existence of good and evil. An individual may experience good and evil but the existence of good and evil has been called into question with regard to objectivity and universality. However, the Theory shows that even though the character of human experience of good and evil may be limited, the fact is not; however it shows that the universality of the fact is normal (probable) rather than absolute but this limitation on universality may not be significant except that it may sometimes though not always be the source of a way out of evil. Is evil ‘banal,’ as argued by Hannah Arendt, does it depend on ‘normalizing’ the unthinkable, on the failure of good, ordinary people to take risks; is evil accidental?

My point here may be naïve, but the failure of good, ordinary people to take risks is evil; it is a convenient even if near universal mechanism of defense but that does not mean it is not simple evil, i.e. evil without qualification: banality. I intend no moral superiority: I am subject to the same principle. Perhaps, in the stretch of time we may overlook, forgive and forget all evil but that does not make it not evil. If overcoming evil is good, then evil is evil. I am being perhaps uncharacteristically assertive but there are two points that I want to make. The first point, regarding which it is possible to be ‘too serious,’ is that ‘banal evil,’ despite its explanatory power, is just as evil as ‘pure evil.’ I may not be as condemnatory about the banal form and justice may not be as harsh but there is no moral exit. Especially if morals are man-made should there be no exit, for morals are not merely about judgment but also about action. Also: no exit does not mean no forgiveness. The less doubt I have about morals, the more I may forgive…

Why or how is it possible to be too serious about morals? I.e. what does the phrase ‘too serious’ mean? Firstly, what I say about seriousness is a sentiment. Secondly, no one wants to be regarded as too serious about their own views. But why not? Is there nothing important in the world? Seriousness is important and there is a place for too much of it. But, there is, simultaneously, an excess of seriousness that is destructive (of many things.) If I am too serious about moral judgment, someone (my child) may act out in rebellion; if I am not serious enough, she may act out (they say) to find structure: there is a balance… The Theory of Being that has been developed includes a foundation for, in addition to the classical categories of intuition, the category of humor which is the capacity to accept what may be altogether unexpected, even in the heart of one’s most serious endeavor

The second fact: evil is a fact. This means: even though my version of morals may be man made: the presence of morals is a necessary fact. The Theory and its developments in the study of mind show that while I find no objective framework for my morals, it is precisely this lack of (complete) objectivity in moral facts that is due to the objective presence of freedom and makes morals objective as guides to being in the world (and: it is the lack of objectivity in moral facts that makes the boundary between mere cultural expression and ‘proper’ morals impossible but also unnecessary to identify with precision.) Metaphorically, we are floating in a fluid world where to find our way we must (continue to) create it. Perhaps, this makes the instruments of creation lack in reality: there are no moral facts. However, this is also in the nature of the origin of being (from the void) which is similarly lacking in reality: the element of being poised at the crux of becoming is similarly lacking in factual character. Or: at root, the existential status (what kind of being does it have) of morals and electrons is identical. This point is argued in the most recent versions of ‘Journey in Being’ (essays: Home) where the precursor to moral choice (and to knowledge in embodied, iconic and symbolic forms) in the elements of being is laid bare… continue