The purpose of Words is to list a set of words adequate to the purposes of Journey in Being. Language is a window on reality or, more accurately, a window on reality as known to the bearers of language. A second, implicit and related purpose is to formulate principles – critical and imaginative – by which such a list may be formulated

Journey in Being has a number of levels – from the personal to the universal and it includes the human “enterprise” of being and of knowledge. Thus the purpose of Words is to write principles for formulation of a system of “words” adequate to the being and knowledge “purpose.”

What is the purpose behind the purpose? It is not that such a list would be a complete specification of the possibilities of the Journey or of a metaphysics. Rather, such a list would be a contribution toward such purposes that would need supplement and correction according to occasions. Additionally, I expect to learn about the Journey, the world and metaphysics by study of linguistic possibility and the relation between word and world – between language, metaphysics and metaphysical possibility

It is clear that, regarded as a formal or logical task, the formulation and specification of a complete list of words is difficult if not impossible. The best that can be hoped for is to have a partial list that is otherwise open and would be adjusted to the needs as they arise. The purpose includes but is not primarily focused on the formal aspects of the enterprise

General Considerations

Accordingly, Words begins with a standard western metaphysics, the substance ontology, and its relation to a standard western form of truth expression, the subject-predicate form of the proposition or assertion. This is immediately generalized to the variety of kinds of speech act regarded as relation between word [or mind] and world. This system has a number of limitations which are considered next

On the side of metaphysics, I consider other metaphysical systems in which certain narrowing assumptions of the substance ontology are relinquished. On the side of language, I consider that thought is not restricted to language as conventionally understood and that the relationship between language and metaphysics is not as tight as may have been presupposed in the development based on the substance ontology. To some extent this is anticipated by allowing kinds of speech act beyond the proposition. Implicit here, since the other kinds of speech act are not directly about the world, is the consideration that not all meanings and uses can be specified by a dictionary, i.e., a listing of words and the ‘objects’ to which they refer. Some words have no direct referents but have effects upon the listener; language is also a vehicle of communication. Additionally, any system of words, regardless of its rational basis is in some ways no more than suggestive – formal language is [analogous to] a growing axiomatic system; this is because any actual system of metaphysics cannot pretend to completeness and because language, again, as usually understood, is not the only vehicle of thought. Is language [or its possibilities] adequate to the possibilities of thought, thought adequate to the possibilities of metaphysics and metaphysics adequate to the possibilities and actualities of being?

The standard metaphysics suggests a basic set of words and the alternative considerations suggest additions and refinements. The working out of a basic set requires some elaborations of metaphysics and occasions

Detailed Systems

Variety is built up by considering a variety of occasions

Plan for detailed systems

Eliminate this section

Gather all ideas and execute – including the following

Word System 1. Categories and Generators

WORDS AND THEIR GENERATORS

BASIC / BEING WORDS

Word categories, parts of speech – elements of metaphysics, e.g

Substance Ontology

A system of Being Words [see]

What is the basis of Being words?

Syntax – metaphysical possibility

Existence – being, becoming

Alternate systems

USE [fills in details, the practical side of theory for basic / being words]

Survival

Growth… culture, exploration… growth into all being

~~MIND WORDS~~

Generators of mind words

Mind Words: Words for the study and philosophy of mind | Words that are used to communicate mental function

~~Quality~~

~~Knowledge and concepts of knowledge~~

~~Vision and transformation~~

TRANSFORMATION WORDS

The system of Experiments in Transformation of Being

SYSTEMS OF KNOWLEDGE

Formal systems – including descriptions, specifications of informal systems

Content and theory or concepts

Practical arts

Outline and Plan for Words

Change this section title to “Outline;” eliminate the heading in “Plan” MS Word-Style

Words begins with the substance ontology and its relation to the subject-predicate form of the proposition. The five standard forms of speech act are introduced as functions of propositional content and illocutionary force. Various interpretations of the substance ontology are considered. This system forms a foundation for the standard vocabulary and syntax

Alternatives are based in [1] alternative metaphysics, [2] use and [3] thought that is not in language as conventionally understood

More on metaphysics and its relation to kinds of words and combinations [syntax…]

More on word construction and forms – alphabets, syllabaries, phonemes…

A variety of specialized systems is introduced as outlined above in Detailed Systems from Vision and the Words documents

1 SUBSTANCE ONTOLOGY

I start with substance ontology because, despite its recognized inadequacies, it remains in the background. It is ever present; when we forget it enters into our intuitive thinking; it is present in language in the often implicit presupposition that the ‘subject-predicate’ form of proposition embodies the finally adequate mode of statement about the actual world [Whitehead.]

1.1 Substance Ontology

On a simple substance metaphysics, the world is made up of objects with the following nature or predication:

Constitution. Each object has a constitution that is either elementary or compound. [Can an elementary object have interactions?]

Properties. The features that define an object and distinguish one from another are its properties. Properties are sometimes distinguished as primary and secondary. The primary properties are intrinsic, objective or true properties – simply the properties. The secondary properties are apparent, subjective qualities. However, the distinction is not clear. Thus, simply, the features that define and distinguish objects are properties. This leads to the Leibniz principle of indescernibles: for all objects x, y and properties φ, if φ(x) = φ(y) for all φ then x = y

Examples of properties are mass, position, temperature. Constitution may be regarded as a property. Examples of qualities are color and taste

Change. Objects may change with respect to constitution, properties [and qualities.]

Interaction. Objects have effects upon one other. ‘Effects’ cause ‘change.’ [If origins are regarded as effects, then effects determine the [properties of] the object.]

Examples of effects are force, heat transfer, creation/transfer of constituent objects

Objects have various types of relationship. They may be near or far, one object may be hotter than another… Relationships are expressed through comparison and difference of properties. Relationships among constituent objects constitute properties of the object

1.2 Agents, mind… and metaphysics

The point regarding truth and propositions can be expressed as follows: there are sentient beings or objects that perceive objects… and this may be generalized:

There are beings or agents that know [feel, perceive, and conceive,] think and decide, intend and execute action. Agents are effectual

Thus agents have

§ Objecthood

§ Sentience – experiencing, feeling and perceiving

Feeling is a form of perception

In the basic use perception is limited to direct awareness through sensation. Of course, to perceive a objects as such requires some degree of conception. There is another use of “perception” includes cognition and contemplation

§ Cognition – knowing and conceiving

Cognition includes perception and contemplation

Just as feeling is a form of perception, so feeling and emotion are forms of cognition

§ Contemplation – thought and decision

§ Communication

When an agent shares the contents of its mind with other agents, he or she communicates. Talking, gesturing, writing, acting are usually intentional communication. Body language, tone of voice, facial expression are often non-intentional communication. In ‘acting,’ however, behaviors that are often or normally not intentional may be used intentionally. This kind of acting is, obviously, not limited to plays. Some actions that are not primarily communication may result in a communication, e.g., not going to someone’s birthday party; and such cases of communication may be intentional or incidental

§ Agency – intention, choice, will and execution

In this use, intentionality is distinct from intensionality; intentionality, however, is commonly used in the sense of intensionality

Agents have mind, that is, the characteristics of mind are among those of agent hood. To what extent do/must the above appear in combination and how does that affect metaphysics…

In the present state of human knowledge, there appears to be no universally accepted given or fixed simple set of categories or poles in terms of which all states, aspects and processes of mind can be specified. In the set of characteristics above, decision is a part of contemplation [which itself has multiple uses] and is a necessary part of the knowledge/judgment process even though it seems that it would also fit under agency. A tentative set of poles [Samuel Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 1994] is:

1.2.1 Experience, attitude and agency as characterizing ‘dimensions’ of mind

Here, “agency” is somewhat different than above. These pure poles do not, perhaps, exist in themselves. Pure experience is close to feeling and, in itself, is not about the world; attitudes are about the world and are close to “intensionality…” they include propositional attitudes such as belief, knowledge… and other attitudes that correspond, more or less in their kind, to the Speech Acts below; some of the speech acts other than the propositional are “on the way” to agency which is acting or doing

§ Experience

Phenomenal consciousness is close to being identical to experience but what is called “access consciousness” is attitudinal in some measure. Awareness, pain, are very close to pure experience. The emotions are largely experiential but are also, as being about the world, attitudinal. Among emotions, feelings about the closest to pure experience; and anger has a higher agency content than most emotions since anger is conducive to action

§ Attitude

Thinking, belief, desire, knowledge are highly attitudinal

§ Agency

As an example, reaching is very close to being pure agency. Intending, willing, inferring, deciding, choosing are characterized highly by agency

1.2.2 Communication

Communication is, perhaps, roughly equidistant from experience, attitude and agency. There is clearly an action; and what is communicated may be an experience and/or an attitude

Communication is not necessarily about the world; communication does not necessarily indicate, in itself, a mind-world or symbol-world relationship. Imagine early communication: an animal is about to run from, say, a threat. First, the threat is registered. Then, perhaps, the autonomous system is engaged. Between the engagement of the autonomous system – adrenaline is pumped into the bloodstream – and the action, running, there may be preparatory signs – a tensing of muscles, a larger inhalation, a grunt as part of the effort and getting ready for effort. All this is rapid and yet noticed by others of the group; and it is part of what galvanizes action in the others. There is communication but it is in the world and not about the world. We may, perhaps, say that the system of the group and the communication is, in the action from first observation to the group in running motion, about the world… but the communication, itself, is about the world. It is with later development that the communication itself is about the world

1.3 Examples of some word forms

Above is the source of some word forms. ‘I’ the agent as agent, as subject; ‘me’ the agent as object. I is the nominative or subjective case; me is objective. The possessive case ‘mine’ is more complex and requires the relationship of possession – a social construct

The object and agent [of the subject ontology] and their predicates form the foundation for common word forms – the parts of speech

Systematic treatment will come later

1.4 Materialism

There are objects that have none of the features of agency except objecthood. These are ‘material’ objects

The world is made up of material objects. According to materialism ‘I’, ‘mind’ are constituted by material objects

1.4.1 An Agent-Metaphysics

While materialism is a substance ontology, substance ontology is not necessarily materialism. In materialism, agents are material even if the that is difficult to see. The agent can also be the basis of a substance ontology

An agent has a ‘body’ but the agency is not the body. In materialism, the agency is the organizing-processing of the body or it otherwise reduces to the body as in behaviorism and functionalism

If the agent is understood as above, the agent-metaphysics would seem to be a dualism because agency and objecthood are distinct and to be a true monism, the substance must be simple, i.e., it must have no features. From a theoretical point of view, this dualism is simpler because there is less to explain. However, monism, is aesthetically pleasing and efficient because the assumptions in a monistic theory are fewer than in dualism. However, aesthetics is subjective and efficiency is secondary to truth

Further, the metaphysics of A Fundamental Principle of Metaphysics is simpler, even, than monism

At the present, I leave the question of dualism vs. monism in the local metaphysics open. From the practical point of view the agent as object plus agency is a reasonable basis for ontology

2 LANGUAGE

2.1 Propositions

A claim to truth [about an object] is a proposition and the expression of a proposition is an assertion or, in language, a propositional sentence. A propositional sentence is often, conveniently, called an assertion or proposition

Colloquially, when propositions and propositional sentences are not distinguished, a proposition is the expression of a claim to truth

[‘Declaration’ is sometimes used to mean ‘assertion;’ however, ‘declaration’ has another use and will not be used, here, as synonymous to ‘assertion.’]

2.2 Speech Acts

Language has uses other than expression of truth assertions. There are five forms of speech act [for details see Kinds of Knowledge, Origins of Language] each of which has propositional content and illocutionary force. By varying the illocutionary force the five kinds of speech act are obtained: assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, declarative

2.3 Words, Meaning, and the Subject-Predicate form

A proposition is about the world. The world is mad