JOURNEY IN BEING
2008 EDITION
Elements of the narrative
The essentials—the main goal and
supporting objectives, the means; problems, concepts, and theories;
truths—formal and common, charismatic elements, propositions, and hypotheses;
arguments, demonstrations, and method or methods; objections and
counterarguments—and argumentative devices; and interconnections and outlines
Contents
Truths. Ad hominem and other objections not based in reason. The parental and social critic. Response to the parental critic. Introduction—concepts
Journey in being. The narrative
Introduction. Theory of being. Human world
Introduction. Ideas. Transformation
The Future. Reference. Index. The Author
Integrate most comment style paragraphs
The elements
The essential: outlines, problems and truths, concepts and theories, theories, propositions and hypotheses, arguments and demonstrations, objections and counterarguments, and interconnections
On the impossible
What is usually thought to be impossible is merely difficult
What is difficult depends on what we know and where and when we live. Many truths of modern science, for example, would have been regarded as fantastic even one hundred and fifty years ago…
Except for logical contradiction, there is no impossibility. Otherwise the meaning of impossible is ‘difficult’ or ‘infeasible.’ However, what is feasible is context and knowledge dependent. Two approaches to realization are the incremental and the saltation. Choice may be governed by the moral provided that it is adequately understood
Quality of being consists in individual and shared (help, care) realization of the feasible and the moral and their nature
Every atom of being knows all being in its own way. For sentient being the related goal is experience and realization of this knowledge (gnosis)
On the path, these are important: openness of perception—neither rejecting nor accepting contingent paradigms or limitations, emergence and flow over false
The purpose is to know and be what is real
The purpose is to know and be what is real
The title would be The purpose of life. But saying life might suggest a restricted meaning
It is important to understand ‘purpose’ properly. It is not merely a goal set up by an individual. If I do not understand the universe which includes myself, then my understanding of ‘purpose’ and even any ‘correct’ statement of it will be at odds with purpose
No comment at present
‘What is there?’ as the fundamental problem of philosophy
‘What is there?’ Is suggested as the fundamental problem
Kant is said to have considered that the business of philosophy is to answer the three questions ‘What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope for?’ He considered, however, that the answers to the second and third depended on the answer to the second
We may therefore think that the fundamental philosophical question according to Kant was ‘What can I know?’
Before Descartes, however, the fundamental question of philosophy may have been thought to be ‘What is there in the world or universe?’
In one way of looking at the concern, ‘What can I know?’ versus ‘What is there?’, each contains or implies the other, and the choice of emphasis is one of context
In a critical era we may emphasize the epistemological question. However, even in a critical era the question ‘What can I know?’ remains ever open ended without some answer to the metaphysical question ‘What is there?’ Firstly, the instruments of the knowledge are part of ‘What is there?’ and, secondly, the emphasis on epistemology may lead to rather morbid preoccupations
The critical philosopher would respond that the preoccupation is necessary and might add that his or her approach will reveal that there is not all that much to be known so we might as well be happy with our concern with knowledge
This approach has the following problems. It has the presupposition that knowing is the only way to truth. However, even its own canons might admit that experiment is an essential ingredient of knowing. To which it may be added that in the realm of being-in-the-world, action is the counterpart of experiment and may add essentially to truth since, even on its own account, the approach from epistemology must have limits (that it tends to keep in the dark)
The critical philosopher who says that we might as well be happy with our concern with knowledge suggest that what is outside the realm of knowledge but not outside being is not of interest. However, there is a distinction between the realm of knowledge and any theory of the realm of knowledge; and there is another distinction between certain knowledge and probable knowledge (and theories thereof.) Because the critical philosopher correctly thinks he or she is doing us a service he may be deluded into thinking that his or her theory of limits shows the real limits and that his or her application of the theory is without error. However as seen in the development of the idea of what is necessary and empirical (Kant called this the synthetic a priori) there are fundamental errors made in not seeing what is empirical and how the empirical is necessarily built into—certain aspects of—meaning (it should be noted that these errors are not the ones Kant made in thinking Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics to be necessary and are errors that do not appear to have been noticed in prior thought)
The main problem with any a priori commitment is that it excludes domains of being-experience at outset and before a grasp on those domains has been acquired. A priori commitment, therefore, runs the risk of being self-limiting
Such a priori commitments are often part of a zeitgeist, a special contextual way of looking that has some critical appeal or some limited success
The question ‘What is there?’ understood as the question of being is, as noted, not a commitment. It is therefore, when undertaken in the appropriate spirit, not self-limiting and not limiting to kind or emphasis
The approach does not disallow criticism and is neutral to its role and to the extent of its domain
Aldous Huxley, following Leibniz, finds a Perennial Philosophy that appears in every age and civilization and that can be summarized in three statements: (1) there is an infinite, changeless reality beneath the world of change; (2) this same reality lies at the core of every human personality; (3) the purpose of life is to discover this reality experientially
That seems good as far as it goes. What problems do I have with it? How might I change it?
A first concern—even though prescriptions have value there is something perverse about them… This thought is just a ‘question’ and a ‘caution’
The idea of the infinite, uniform, changeless substance might equally be ‘an emptiness’ or ‘absolute emptiness’
Although there is appeal to the idea that the real is at the core of the individual we do not want to exclude those who suffer on account of ignorance
The purpose of life? Experientially? I would rather say that being may reside in Being—but may equally reside in finitude. That requires correction. It is a temporal statement. In the atemporal aspect being is Being
At the core? It lies in every part, central and peripheral! And ‘peripheral’ is used in a certain way! Where is the center? In a moment of perception, in an appropriate ‘state of mind,’ there is no felt distinction between the individual and the sky
Content based objections are considered later
‘Eh,’ ‘eh’
This is stupid
Thee argooments are obhbhiously phaulty and whai yoo cannot see?
You are an idiot
Your life is messed up
You are not a philosopher / you have no training in these topics
This is pan-psychism raising its ugly head
This is a waste of time—people are starving
This is classical philosophy with new clothes
I used to be interested in philosophy but abandoned it for want of something that has relevance. This ‘argument’ would not be unreasonable if it were correct. First, the work is not philosophical by intent. Reflection that has the style or form of some philosophy is a tool. Second, while some philosophical reflection may not have ‘relevance’ some, even ‘pure’ thought, does. What the complaint is concerned with is immediate relevance. The counterargument will be that even when philosophical reflection does not have immediate relevance its long term relevance may be immense. There are no guarantees; even attention to concerns of immediate relevance may be destructive despite the best of intentions—and this may be countered by reflection. What’s more, the kind of reflection undertaken in ‘journey’ includes provision of reasons to live—over and above the intrinsic reasons that enjoyment of life itself is good; such reasons address the tension between enjoyment / suffering and self / other. Although reason may be criticized with regard to its value and its validity, it is valid to inquire why such an ability should exist—why there may be even the ability to have an illusion of reason. Here it should be said that while there are lines of criticism e.g. that of Wittgenstein that suggest that metaphysical reason is pure illusion, the existence of such criticism is not proof and that ‘journey’ provides intrinsic or logical counterarguments as well as content or results based counters to the critique of reason and its limits. ‘Journey’ provides or is an extended counterargument. Here it may be noted that the Wittgensteinian and post-modern critiques appeal subconsciously to what may be labeled a secular humanism, to a flat and unfounded view of the world, the world of the consumers of intellectual and economic goods, to a view whose psychic justification is its social purchase rather than its validity or any intrinsic worth or justification. Let’s remember that the Wittgensteinian and post-modern critiques are, in their claims to absolutism, based in contingent failures of system, contingent arguments of its impossibility, sub-conscious appeal to adolescent and post-adolescent thought—post-adolescent thought is the continuation of adolescent style thought in the putatively mature adult made possible by various circumstances of the modern and post-modern worlds, and implicit appeals to thought whose essential criterion is what may be labeled ‘democratic thought,’ i.e., that enough people thinking that something is obvious, even if the reasons are merely self-serving, makes it true
The self-confidence that derives from a trivial but materially / professionally ‘successful’ life… or from living and breathing the standard reactionary / liberal paradigms… and the tacit assumption of being in a privileged position to instruct, advise and judge
‘I don’t want to change’
You have lost confidence in yourself. You were a human being with immense physical and intellectual talent. You are dissipative and never realized either talent. You do not have a job worthy of your abilities and are working in a low position that offers neither competition nor challenge. You don’t have the courage to have real friends, real relationships, real interests and real commitments. You abandoned your country, your parents, your daughter, your family, your commitments, your relation to being, and your self. You buttress up your self-esteem with your ‘writing.’ However your writing is nothing but fluff and air. This alleged philosophical writing is neither philosophy nor science nor literature. The basis is empty and consists in high sounding words without reason, without connection to reality. The external form is that of a tour of the history of ideas but is nothing. The central arguments are weak or empty. There is no connection to real human concerns. And have you not noticed that no one has noticed your work. I have a friend who is a philosopher at the University of London who says that your work is trivial, lacking in material content or cogent reasons and would not even be accepted, even if it were condensed to a brief essay, as the production of a first year philosophy undergraduate. You are a sorry human specimen who pumps consoles himself with trivial entertainment, trips to the ‘mountains,’ isolation, self-congratulation, trivial accomplishments in a trivial job, something you call ‘computer programming’ of healthcare solutions, cooking, overcoming alleged trials… You are nothing
My achievements. I have long believed that what one actually achieves is not important. What is important is the maximal use of opportunity and ability directed to one’s highest ideal. This dual process—of ideal and ability—undertaken by a sufficient number of persons leads to the greatest realization of possibility and it is necessary that the net process will be marked by both ‘success’ and ‘failure.’ It is to this end that I have made enormous sacrifices of a number of kinds. This has required courage and persistent diligence in the journey of discovery in ideas
I do not think that everyone should live that kind of life; society and civilization require a number of kinds of individuals and a number of kinds of commitments. This is quite in contrast to the narrow minded view of limited success in the standard walks of life that you seem to espouse. I do not criticize this view when regarded as one of a number but I do criticize it as empty when promoted as the view. Applied to any given individual such as you, this way of life may be seen as empty and an abandonment of your abilities and responsibilities. I do not judge you by my intrinsic standards as though the one standard fit all; this, however, is what you appear to do. Even when you talk as though you are liberal on the issue you have a subconscious adherence to the conservative way and this is manifest in your life choices. Whether you are a loser or not depends on various internal factors to which I do not have access. You may or may not care to reflect on the issue. You have some time left in your life to estimate and make amends to your responsibilities to the world. As I said, I do not judge you by my standards. I have inside me many parts and therefore I can mostly enjoy you as you are. However, if I were to judge you—indeed most people whose standards are those of the ‘bourgeoisie,’ which term I know you would like to apply to others—by the standards and values and energies and commitments of my life you would be less than nothing; you would be a consuming piece of flesh. Even if I were inclined that way I should refrain from such judgment because its result is that I would be living in a world where I would see most others as sorry and miserable and this would not be a good world in which to live
I do not, however, follow my values because I see them as values. I followed them in the first place because, in the end, they give me the most enjoyment and happiness. Secondly I follow them, not because the values are intrinsic, but because I see my pursuit as ultimately useful and a realization of my best ability. Ultimate satisfaction and ‘responsibility’ are thus combined
It is occasionally troublesome to live with people like you. I want to respect you but you do not respect me. This causes trouble because I want to respect you, to have your opinions have meaning to me… but your opinions are lacking in final substance or anything near final substance. This is difficult because of my desire to have your respect but also because of my desire to respect you. I must live with this. However, I often wonder why I should continue to associate with such people. In any case, it is the weakness of your vision that you do not see what there is, what are the possibilities, what is the potential and the weakness of your ego, not that you do not follow that path because it is supremely difficult from both vision and ego concerns, but that you do not even see beyond your narrow world. Marks of the weakness of your vision are (1) ‘everyone’ has it, (2) its one-dimensional character, (3) its lack of basis in a whole vision of the world, (4) instead its basis in mass survival and mere survival in a world in which economics is raised to the proportion of a military campaign, (5) that you and so many have no trouble with it at all—that it is not forged. This is the problem that I have had with my father, that I have struggled for mutual respect and you cannot or do not even respect your self. We live in a world where because of the weakness of our egos we drag or would drag everyone down to our level so that we can feel as good as everyone else
You should know, however, that you are in no special position of achievement, ability, knowledge or insight to judge me. As someone I love, you have a special position of course; as a human being you need no special right to judge—of course… You should know that your negative judgments have more to do with you than with me. Why? Is your judgment not what the common judgment would be? Perhaps; but that does not make the judgment correct for it must assume that my psychology is the common psychology; that my life would mirror the common life. Of course, there are commonalities to psychological profiles—but there are also variations from the center or perhaps from the ‘herd’ (which is not intended as a negative appellation but refers a natural tendency to sameness. You should know that I do not judge you by my standards but if I did you would be severely lacking. That would of course not be an objective judgment, not in that the value lacks objectivity, but in that it is applicable and must be applied but not universally. I must live in a world where I will be judged but cannot judge and this is sometimes difficult. I do suspect, however, that your minimization of my life is based on some interaction of essential ignorance or essential insecurity and, trivially, some desire to bolster your own ego with quick but unfounded judgment
The Main concepts sections will contain a small number of essential concepts
Secondary concepts and so on will contain concepts for possible inclusion in the section andor concepts that are supplementary; these concepts may be main or secondary concepts for other sections
If a section of concepts is labeled ‘supplementary’ the concepts are intended for definite inclusion in the section but are not as central as the main concepts. Supplementary concepts may be derived
journey, becoming, experiment, discovery, action, diffuse action, single-minded action, transformation, world, experience, idea, immediate, ultimate, identity, meaning, ideal, vision, goal, possibility, feasibility, the right, the good, individual, relationship, commitment, sharing, significance, society
Here the meaning of ‘significance’ is that of ‘meaning’ in the phrase ‘the meaning of life.’ The word ‘meaning’ is generally reserved for the family of uses centered around linguistic meaning
The two modes of adventure, becoming, transformation, and discovery are the idea and the identity of an individual or a being. ‘Meaning’ and ‘use’ are especially important because of the tendency of meaning to be fixed by contexts of use rather than by lexical fiat. Even though a good dictionary may provide variant meanings for a concept, it cannot anticipate all meanings of a concept or concept family. Awareness of meaning is important in changing contexts of use, first, in order that what is being said refers to something definite and, second, to avoid confusion between new and other uses of the same word. A new system of understanding of the world is developed in Foundation where requirements of continuity of meaning dictate that whatever new meaning emerges shall often be attached to existing words and therefore attention to meaning is necessary for the reasons just stated. The adventure in transformation includes adventure in meaning
See concepts under the title Journey in being, section Main concepts
What is a theory? Theories in science and philosophy, i.e., in empirical-conceptual endeavors
Note. It is useful to place this problem here. It may also be placed in Logic and meaning
Colloquial uses of ‘theory’
Although ‘theory’ is often used colloquially to mean ‘guess,’ ‘suspicion,’ or ‘hypothesis’ there is another meaning or family of meanings—especially in science and philosophy
In science and philosophy theory often has some of the following connotations
1. A scientific theory is a body knowledge expressed in terms of concepts, simple facts and laws that permits the summary representation of the patterns and behaviors of a significant field of phenomena. Thus a theory usually permits prediction. It is not a mere collection of facts
Hypothetical scientific theories
2. A relatively scientific new theory is often regarded as hypothetical—until a time arrives that the ‘theory’ has been sufficiently subject to and survived conceptual and empirical scrutiny and, typically, has been applied successfully to broad ranges of phenomena
3. When sufficiently mature a theory may be regarded as factual. While it is true, for example, that physical theories are often replace by newer ones that agree with the old in its domain of validity but also apply outside that domain of validity. The new theories may have new concepts which includes reinterpretations of the concepts of the older theory. However the old theory remains factual within its domain of validity. For many phenomena, the mechanics of Newton remains valid; its use is factual and not merely probable. The theory of evolution is often regarded as factual and final because, unlike physical theories, its only domain of application (so far) is to life on earth and its domain does not extend (has not yet extended) outward as physics sees further into large and small scale phenomena
Theories in philosophy. Conceptual systems with logical necessity. Significant factual theories that are also necessary
4. Facts may be necessary (as in logic) and contingent (as in observation)—at any rate that is the conventional distinction (which is seen to break down in the narrative.) A system of necessary facts may add up to a philosophical theory that may be expressed in terms of concepts and necessary propositions. Such theories are typically logical theories corresponding to areas and kinds of logic. It is typically thought that the facts of necessary theories are tautologies, i.e., their truth follows from the structure of the propositions and not from the proposition asserting something about the world (in a sense, of course, even a tautology says something—it says of symbolic forms, which are part of the world, that it is possible for truth to follow from form.) In the present narrative, as noted, the distinction between fact and necessity breaks down (in some circumstances) and therefore the possibility of theories that apply to the world (are empirical) and are yet necessary arises. These theories include metaphysics of immanence, aspects of the cosmology, and aspects of the study of identity labeled the theory of identity
intuition, foundationalism, being, object, experience, reference, understanding—verstand, meaning, empirical, idea—vernunft, rational, demonstration, proof, all, universe, difference, mode of difference, part, domain, form, immanence, normal
Note that in Kantianism, verstand—understanding—is ‘thinking the object of sensual intuition,’ the source of concepts; vernunft—the ideas of pure reason—are the ideas of pure metaphysics, regulative in that they point to general objects, but traditionally thought to be outside experience and therefore impossible to know
Being may be derived from experience and would be omitted above if the aim were to be minimal
‘Difference’ is questionable as a main concept because of its primitive character; main concepts—especially those of Foundation—should be immediate. In any case, difference may be regarded as included in form. One way of looking at empiricism is that it is distinguished, not by not having conceptual content, but by having its concepts-as-concepts be as primitive as possible
Approach to concepts
Careful analysis and formulation of use—to be in-process, in-extension, in the careful reflection of common things, in unforced relation… seeing the universe in the most elementary concept—the concept itself
Theory of being
Substance theory. I—motivation: simplicity, explanation, worldliness. II—includes determinism. III—is untenable
A theory to replace or rename
Theory of the electron
Problems
What is a theory of being?
Theories
The following could also be placed in Metaphysics or Logic and meaning
Theory of definition
General problems
The problem of appearance and reality
The trivial character of the concept of being
The problem of the meaning and nature of being… and of existence
The nature of demonstration and proof—this problem belongs also in Metaphysics, Logic and meaning, and Method
Paradoxes and problems regarding the concepts of being and existence. I. The problem of the non-existent object
The problem of explaining the world on its own terms—of the explanatory-determinative power of the concept of being
The existential problems of being. I—whether anything exists. II—what exists, i.e., what things exist… III—problem of the existence of the external world and external objects (problem of solipsism.) IV—the problem of the nature of the world and its variety
The problems of experience. I—the meaning of experience; this is not a true problem but is important, trivially, because there are a number of meanings of ‘experience’ and, importantly, because there are confusions about the present meaning. These confusions include the precise reference of term and, once the reference is identified, confusions about its existential character, e.g., that it is non-material, non-causal, epiphenomenal. The source of these confusions. The problem of the interpretation of scientific materialism / empiricism. II—the problem of the root meaning of experience. III—the problem of the forms of experience and the use of these forms in the development
The problems of meaning and, especially, of (1) dictionary meaning versus use, (2) the idea that meaning is non empirical, and (3) the separation of syntax and meaning. The problem of defining fundamental concepts
The problem of understanding and action
Detailed consideration—does anything exist?
In seeing objects we experience them. However, the objects of experience could be illusory. This is a source of the question ‘Does anything exist?’
I assert that even though I may have an illusion, surely the experience itself exists. Surely we can all agree on that
It could be doubted that there is experience but, to progress with understanding the world, there has to be some point of agreement. We agree that having experience is the common ground of human being, of sentient beings
Here, then, is the common and necessary empirical ground—there is experience
Yet, perhaps perversely, we can still ask ‘But how do I know that there is experience’
Point. There is experience
Counterpoint. But, perhaps, the having of experience is itself an illusion
Point. The illusion of experience is experience
Point. To say that experience is illusion is to rename experience but not to say that it does not exist
Elaboration. I can experience an experience but there that is different from the experience of an external object. The experience of experience and experience are the same kind; experience of an object and object are different kinds. Therefore the objection that the experience of an external object may be illusory does not apply to the experience of experience or to the argument regarding the renaming of experience
Whether anything exists is not a practical question. In asking such questions the intent is not to ask a practical question but to ask a conceptual one whose outcome may be the clarification of concepts. What is clarified here? First, the nature of experience; although it can be an object it is not the typical external object—experience of experience and experience are the same kind; experience of a typical object and the object are different kinds. Second, that the expression of a doubt can be, and often is, merely the renaming of the object of doubt. Third, that it is in the meaning of experience that experience exists, i.e., meaning is not devoid of empirical content; this is the basis of a powerful tool of investigation
The asking of such fundamental questions serves not only to clarify important concepts but, in this narrative, will be one—though not the only—necessary ground for the development of a powerful theory of being of immense conceptual and real significance
The first question regarding existence was
1. Does anything exist?
In asserting that there is experience it was allowed that the alleged objects of experience—the external objects— might be illusory. Therefore a question that arises is ‘What exists?’ or ‘What objects exist?’ A special and important case of this question is ‘Is there an external world?’ or is everything mere experience. Note, again, that questions such as these are important for their conceptual and very real consequences and not because there should be doubt regarding the existence of a world independent of experience. Later, however—and this will take us a fair distance from this early discussion of the immediate, perhaps even an immense distance—we will extend the understanding and so the meaning of ‘experience’ to see that there is no such thing as mere thing-hood. However, note that on account of the extended meaning of experience what will be said will not be that something must be perceived in order to exist; the ‘causal’ direction will be reversed: it will be concluded that in existing there is experience (this will of course require significant conceptual development and various clarifications including that of how existence entails experience and what is meant by ‘causation’)
The discussion above has suggested the following problems
2. The problem of the external world
Which is a special but important case of the next problem
3. What exists? I.e. what experiences or concepts correspond to objects?
The near identity of experience and concept is elaborated in the narrative. The formulation of the question as ‘What experiences correspond to objects’ elaborates the meaning of ‘What exists?’
Now, it was observed above that the experience and ‘the external object’ are different in kind. Over and above questions of accuracy, there is the question whether anything can exist as perceived. This suggests the following problem
4. What objects, if any, exist as perceived?
The discussion now takes up problems 2 through 4
Detailed consideration—the problem of the external world and the related problem of solipsism
The name of the problem has been enhanced because the problem of the external world has often been associate with the problem of solipsism
The problem is it is alleged that from experience, which is admitted as given, the existence of an external world cannot be logically demonstrated
The source of the problem may be the solipsist thought that arises as follows. I am the source of some power and possessor of some knowledge. Perhaps, though, ‘I’ am the sole author of power and knowledge
The resolution of the problem is as follows
Either
(a) The entire universe is seen as experience in which case experience is merely a label for being—the problem of something material e.g. a table being ‘experience’ is resolved in Mind,
or
(b) The solipsist claim involves some factual distinction from the ‘standard’ view of the world which is that there appears to be an external world because there is one and that in the perception of the external world perception is not mistaken even though it may be mistaken about the details of the external world (note that ‘external’ does not mean outside mind or body but existing independently of being perceived)
Since the function of the solipsist is to question the standard view, an argument for the standard view cannot demand that the solipsist prove his or her position to be valid or correct—the argument must prove the solipsist to be wrong
However, it remains true that the solipsist must say something. If he or she is merely saying (a) above then they are essentially reframing the standard view but not contradicting it. What could the solipsist be saying? It is up to the solipsist to stake his claim. However, the debate between solipsism and the standard view is not a real debate. Solipsism is in fact a tool of the standard view to establish (or discredit) itself in the face of the obvious conceptual doubt that stands in its way—at any rate, solipsism may be assigned this function (there may be some who practically advocate solipsism even though, as the argument will imply, such persons would be either ‘cranks’ or subject to some neurotic or other disorder)
What, to repeat the question, could the solipsist be saying that would be factually distinct from the standard view? The origin of the solipsist thought may be as follows. An individual experience him or herself as a center of perception and power or action. He or she does not see or know everything and has some power but does not control everything. The philosophically oriented individual may, however, have the thought ‘How do I know that my experience corresponds to some thing real? Perhaps all there is happens to be my experience. Perhaps my mind or brain creates the world of experience.’ The neophyte solipsist is of course assigning the existence of a body. However, he-she will recognize that a limited awareness or knowledge—his-her knowledge—is claiming, in effect, to have knowledge of something that he or she recognizes as much greater—that of a universe. The essential claim of the solipsist is that a ‘function’ of limited capacity generates a universe of—much and perhaps infinitely—greater detail. The thought that a ‘demon’ or computer is stimulating the brain so as to generate experience is also a case of limited capacity
The conclusion is patently absurd
However it does not appear to be logically impossible
On the standard scientific cosmology with some 1078 or so particles it is probably logically impossible that that immensity be generated by the 1011 neurons of the solipsist (true the number of interconnections is exponentially greater than the number of neurons but that is also true of the number of particle interconnections and formations.) The reader may perceive similarities between this argument and Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of language without the context of language
Still, however the argument against solipsism is not a knock down argument. The impossibility was noted to be merely improbable—it is of course probably colossally improbable but the task of showing the impossibility of solipsism is a logical task. Perhaps, given the structure of the cosmos and its particles and laws it may be demonstrated that the solipsist position is impossible (in real time.) However, it still remains that the scientific cosmology itself is not absolutely certain even if it is colossally probable—at least in the local context
Conclusions from the Metaphysics of immanence
If the discussion is placed in Being, then a note of the conclusions below should be added to Metaphysics
The metaphysics of immanence developed in Metaphysics will have the normal consequence that the solipsist position (b) is logically impossible. Why is that? In the normal case the solipsist is the limited organism that he or she is normally taken to be. Finite has the connotation that the organism is a collection of a certain number of particles that can occupy a certain number of states. Then, since even normally, the universe is infinite unbounded the solipsist cannot create his or her own experience. However, if the solipsist is liberated from the normal then from the theory of identity to be developed is the universe and therefore (b) is logically necessary
Detailed consideration—what exists? I.e. what experiences or concepts correspond to objects?
The objects or forms of experience
In experience there is experience of I and you, of common material objects, of desire, of nations…
In general, experience does not imply an object
The necessary forms of experience
Consider all being. If that refers to what is there but not to the details of what is there then ‘all being’ necessarily exists. ‘All being’ is what may be called a necessary form or object-of-experience because the experience corresponds to something that exists and that requires no further empirical demonstration. The empirical character of the existence of all being is part of the experience of all being
Examples of necessary forms or objects of experience are experience, existence, all being, absence of being, difference (in duration and extension)
The contingent forms of experience
To these correspond the common and not so common but not necessary objects
It is convenient to discuss these under the next problem
Detailed consideration—what objects, if any, exist as perceived?
This problem has strong affinity with the previous problem
It is clear however that the necessary objects exist as perceived or conceived (conception as understood in the narrative includes perception)
In Metaphysics, the existence of the contingent objects (and infinitely more) is demonstrated
In Objects the meaning of the correspondence of a contingent object to a form or object-of-experience will be developed
The existence of contingent objects corresponding to objects-of-experience will not be given a logical demonstration. It will have already been shown in Metaphysics that there are and must be systems in the universe where there are contingent objects corresponding to objects-of-experience. However, that this cosmological system is one of those is only true with what is probably an immense degree of probability
That is necessarily true. It is beyond sense to hold necessity in negative regard. It can not be other than neutral or positive. Even the neutrality is positive in that it permits the leaving behind of what becomes a neurotic concern and a moving on to what is significant
Problem of substance: the terms of understanding
Reconsider the wording—terms of understanding
Relation to other problems such as Nature of understanding (essential though not necessarily essentialist and simple terms) and Nature of being, significance for understanding and other reasons for interest in being
To be simple, it seems that the world would be understood in terms of something else—an essential part, something under or behind… The idea of simplicity suggests substance. For substance to have significance, the way it manifests as the world will be deterministic for without determinism anything can manifest as anything else
Although simple in intent, the idea of such terms of understanding is a form of complication in itself
The alternative is to consider understanding the world-as-world, i.e., not in other terms. This is the understanding in terms of Being—what is rather than what may be behind
Problem of substance: the nature of substance. Substance is untenable
The discussion of terms of understanding shows that substance must be deterministic. The ideal of world-substance is that of a uniform and unchanging, i.e., pervasive and eternal ‘stuff.’ If the stuff is something that is of the world, even better. Thus Thales’ idea that the world is of water that has the virtues of simplicity and worldliness
The documents have further reflection on the nature of substance. Also discussed is the thought to turn other worldly kinds e.g. process, property and relation and knowledge kinds as substance e.g. fact, idea, sense-data…, property which lies on either side according to interpretation. As other than world these have no purchase unless deterministic… and the same applies to the more mundane notion of each essential kind having its own substance for which there is further critique from reason and from biology
Because of the requirement of determinism—invariably ignored even by Heidegger—substance is untenable
Problem of being as foundation for understanding
But what understanding can be provided by world-as-world? This is the problem
The resolution lies in looking at the broad and necessarily empirical features of the world—all being, absence of being, domain… These form the basis of a rational-empirical metaphysics, a pure metaphysics of ultimate depth and breadth that together with knowledge of specific domains provides, in interaction, a profound practical metaphysics
Main and primitive concepts
being, the verb ‘to be,’ existence, experience, forms of experience, empirical, logical, para-logical
existing versus having existence, existence in entirety
Supplementary concepts
Uses of the verb to be, of ‘is’…
essence, substance, atomism, ontological commitment, supervenience, monism, idealism, materialism, dualism, mass terms, sortal terms, epistemic terms, understanding, action
The mass versus sortal distinction of substance is that of eternal, uniform, deterministic substrate versus Aristotle’s substance of a genera
Consider the following sets
change, inhomogeneous, relation, process, fact, matter, mind, spirit, soul, god, sacred
all, universe, pattern, form, law, concept, object, absence, void, difference, some, part, domain, mode of difference, extension, duration, local description, global description, frame, patch
non-existent objects, external world
Linguistic meaning
meaning, family, description, fiction, use, empirical, logical, para-logical, demonstration, proof, axiom, axiomatic system, definition
Concept and object
concept-object, sense-reference, intension-extension, connotation-denotation
Use
stability, field of meaning, axiomatic system, holism in meaning, system of description
Use is the anchor of meaning… the final anchor of meaning is use—not further meaning, description or definition… meaning is immanent in use—not outside use—and therefore in context, i.e., meaning is relative to context… yet there may be absolute meaning (1) due to empirical necessity—when the form of experience is precise and accurate and the word names the experience, which is an example of (2) possession of—ultimate—metaphysics
Theory of being
Theory of descriptions
This theory of descriptions is not related to Russell’s
Theory of the possibl