2008 EDITION
Source material for Being
ANIL MITRA, COPYRIGHT © 2008
CONTENTS
The following has material that is new for 2008 and material from Journey in Being-New World-essence.html
The 2008 outline goes through Heading 4. This is a good place to start and to introduce finer levels later
Decisions need to be made: where to put the bulk of the discussion of meaning—probably here with the formal discussion in Logic and meaning—and of substance theory—here, in Being, or in Metaphysics with conclusions and outline of argument in the other chapter
Task. Incorporate material from Journey in Being-New World-essence.html that has been placed in this document
Being—Part I: the new material of 2008
World as substance versus being
The exhaustive options: world-as-world or being versus world-as-other or substance or essence. 6
The failure of substance and essence theories
Aims of the discussion of being
Origin of and reasons for the interest in Being
The problem of substance or essence—introduction
Substance theory is a strong thread in Western and Eastern philosophy
Levels of commitment to ontology—that there is an ontology and that there is some specific ontology
Metaphysics often begins by positing an ontology
There is an immense advantage to not making an initial ontological commitment
Absence of initial or a priori commitment does not rule out a posteriori commitment
The role of substance in understanding and explanation
It is effective to introduce being and existence at outset
The problem of the nature of Being
Being as existence—and the problem of this apparently ad hoc introduction
The problem of existence and its meaning—an introduction
The allegation that ‘existence’ is trivial, that it is not a concept
The present narrative will respond to the charges that being and existence are vacuous concepts
The problem of the non-existent object
The first existential problem of being—whether anything exists. Experience
The second existential problem of being—what exists. The forms of experience…
The tradition of the meaning of Being
Being—Part II: the material of 2007
A preliminary analysis of substance and essence
Two uses of ‘substance’—essence of being versus essences of particular beings
Ad hoc aspects of traditional approaches to substance
What might constitute a coherent approach? The nature and role of substance will fall out of study
Substance will be intelligible
Summary of the desirable characteristics of substance
Can any substance metaphysics have all three characteristics?
It appears that even if some characteristics are relinquished, there can be no substance
Even though Heidegger rejected substance, he did not take the further step of rejecting determinism
In metaphysics of immanence, form is not other than but is immanent in being
In metaphysics of immanence the foundation of the world is—may be seen to be—the world itself 29
Alternatives to substance as stuff—considered and shown unnecessary
Metaphysics will be shown, in appropriate domains, to be capable of the definiteness of science. 30
The aesthetic problem of substance
Let us therefore look at the world as the world
What it means to say something exists. The verb ‘to be’
The possibility of non-spatial existence. Number
The primitive character of existence
Local and global modes of description
The primitive character of the verb to be. Less primitive uses
The most primitive use of the verb to be indicates existence
The phrase ‘X is’ expresses the meaning of existence
Existence is trivial even if it is a concept
A sense in which existence is an immanent essence
The problem of Objects—of appearance and reality
The value of contemplation of certain issues that are trivial from a practical point of view.. 33
Concepts as generic andor significant ideas
Nature, necessity and fundamental character of intuition
Is the representation or depiction the concept?
The importance of mental content
Concepts, objects and existence
Three paradoxes of the concept of existence
Here, meaning is linguistic meaning
Interdependence of system meaning and of and among element meaning
Sense and reference in meaning
The power of an ontology based in existence. That existence does not quite go to the root
Some unanswered questions regarding existence
The first focus of the discussion will be on the nature of experience
The discussion will then show that there is experience
Experience and the external world
The significance of the forms of experience. Play. Fundamental source for variety of being
A classification. Necessary and contingent forms. Foundation for variety
The necessary forms of experience
The contingent forms of experience
Proofs of the existence of experience, of—some—being, and of the Universe…
Proof of the existence and properties of the void
A first collection of necessary objects
The complete set of necessary objects
Why Being? I.e., why is Being central to metaphysics?
Prior glimpses of the present metaphysics
Diligence in development of being and related concepts has been instrumental in these developments
The origins of the metaphysics and related developments
Experiments with ideas and systems
The outcome of experimentation with perspective has been the transcendence of perspective
What are the manifest characteristics of being that make it the basic concept of a metaphysics?. 66
Being is, at least at outset, analogous in its role to that of the unknown in algebra
Being transcends categorial distinctions
The triviality of Being is an essential source of its power
In the deployment of Being, the world is not referred to a part or to something else
Why these surprising developments may, at least in retrospect, be unsurprising
Similarity and dissimilarity with analytic thought
The upturning of depth and superficiality
Being is simultaneously symbolic and embedding
The word ‘Being’ encourages use of the strengths of the traditions—west and east
Being—Part I: the new material of 2008
Note that, in the Journey in Being-New World-essence.html version, the chapters Being and Metaphysics are perhaps excessively long. The problem may be resolved by (1) eliminating redundancy in each chapter, (2) eliminating repetition among the two chapters, (3) optimizing the expression and streamlining the flow of ideas, (4) marking topics and paragraphs that may be eliminated in a brief version
Task: since, Being is well developed in the 08 the material from the sources—below—should be synthesized and reduced and, if necessary, the outline of the chapter modified
What might be a focal concept for a metaphysics, for an understanding of the world? The following characterization can be exhaustive because it is extremely coarse grained
The focal concept would be either the world itself or something else—something behind or under the world… or some essence of the world
World-as-world is a ‘theory’ of world as what is there—as being, as what is. This idea is in fact not a theory for it posits nothing at outset
World as substance is a theory of world as something other than world—something under or behind the world… or part of the world… or as our knowledge or concept of the world…
World as part of the world is world-as-other
The distinction is not absolute for world-as-being is knowledge and in the form of substance… but it is not knowledge that commits to the nature of the world
The distinction is that world-as-world, i.e., world-as-being does not commit to anything other than world itself
The idea of something behind the world leads to the concepts of essence and substance—which have strong affinities
The world as itself versus the world as essence or substance are not exclusive. The world may be its own substance or essence. If substance or essence are regarded literally—think sub-stance, think essence as that which has the same effect—their linguistic meaning is metaphorical for there is no ultimate standing-under, no ultimate different thing that is identical to the thing. The world can be its own substance, its own essence—it must be its own substance though not necessarily in the exclusive sense that there can be no other substance
The search for simple understanding, however, may lead to the conception of a simple essence, a simple substance. This search has possible elements of power, aesthetics and hubris. Presently, however, concern is restricted to understanding. The extreme of simplicity might appear to lie in what may be labeled absolute monism—the world as a single substance that is uniform and unchanging but manifests as all variety and change
World as its own essence and absolute monism may appear to be exclusive but are not necessarily so; starting with world as its own essence or substance may—or may not—have monism as its outcome
However, to commit to simple substance at outset, especially to a specific substance such as matter, is to invite failure of understanding
On the other hand, world as its own essence—in an inclusive sense that allows substance—courts no failure for in the use in this sentence ‘essence’ and ‘substance’ are not other and therefore do not satisfy the true meaning or significance of substance. True substance—substances—may fall out of the lack of commitment in world as its own essence and, if so, substance theory will have been founded and strengthened. It will not be necessary to commit for substance theory will be manifest
It will turn out however, that substance or essence theories may have power in limited locales or contexts but that as foundation for metaphysics they are untenable
It would seem, then, that simple understanding shall not be forthcoming—that all that we shall ever have is the world with its variety and change as its own essence
It shall turn out, however, that the approach from world as essence leads to a metaphysics that is simpler and deeper than substance theory. It will be seen to be simpler in that it postulates no fundamental but hypothetical ground. It will be seen to be deeper in that it is generative of every valid local metaphysics. It will also be seen to be broader in that it explains not only every actual thing but in that it also shows every possible thing to be actual, i.e., that the universe could not be ‘greater’ than it is (the potential paradoxes, absurdities, and puzzlements that these assertions may seem to suggest will be defused)
Thus, world as essence is not only simpler, deeper, and broader… it is simplest, deepest, and broadest. It is simultaneously deep and superficial—the deepest and at the surface
World as essence is—will be seen to be—the basis of an ultimate metaphysics
World as its own essence suggests existence as the focal concept of metaphysics. It will be seen that the idea of existence as the focal concept asserts—almost—nothing; the concept will function as a container concept; its effective meaning will emerge as a result of investigation… and may, of course, be found to be remote or immediate—so immediate as to not require investigation
Investigate and establish the meaning of being and existence and clarify the phrase ‘has existence in its entirety’
Show that being as existence is not an empty idea and establish some very general and necessary objects that have being. From a practical point of view the demonstration that follows may seem to be a pointless proving of obvious and not particularly useful claims. However, it will emerge that the claims are not obvious and what is established will be pivotal to the theory of being—whose centerpiece is metaphysics of immanence—which is of great, if not ultimate, theoretical or conceptual and practical significance. Additionally, the exercise will be the occasion to—begin to—develop extremely powerful methods of demonstration
Note that a distinction is made here between demonstration and proof. In proof, a conclusion is shown to follow from premises. A demonstration requires no premise. An example is the ‘demonstration’ of tautologies—assertions that are true in virtue of their meaning, e.g., ‘2=2.’ Tautology, even ‘2=2’ may have premises regarding the existence and nature of meaning but these are not premises of simple fact. Is the demonstration of any non-tautological assertion possible? The answer is affirmative and—extremely significant—examples will be given and some general principles of demonstration established. Note that although possibility of such demonstration has affinity Kant’s assertion that there are synthetic a priori propositions, the kinds of truth here demonstrated are of a different kind than the propositions claimed to be synthetic a priori
Begin to show the relation of—the concept and universe of—being to the nature and necessity of human and other living presence in the world
To set up some preliminary concepts and conventions for the development of the theory of being and metaphysics of immanence
To set up some preliminary concepts and conventions for the development of the theory of being and metaphysics of immanence
If two entities, processes, scenes, contexts are similar then knowledge of one is, at least to some extent and in effect, knowledge of the other
Thus similarity enhances the efficiency of knowing and understanding. Formal identity has a similar outcome. When the contexts are practical the efficiency is a practical one. In fact the practical reason may be the underlying reason, for example an evolutionary reason, that human beings seek understanding, and thrill to the introduction of simplicity and efficiency in knowledge
What if the entire universe—all being—could be ‘reduced’ to something simple? This suggests itself as the source of essence or substance theory. The ideal case of substance theory from this perspective would be that of a single uniform and unchanging substrate that deterministically manifests as the world. The original notion of substance was perhaps that of ‘stuff;’ an early example, perhaps the first in Western philosophy, was Thales’ idea that the world is made of water. However a substance could process or relationship or, if we hesitate to say the world is as it appears, facts, ideas, or concepts could be regarded as substance
However, we prefer to not posit substance theory at the outset of investigation; reasons were given above—this approach is open to the real, i.e., to whether there is substance and if not then to what approach if any might address the goals of substance theory and if substance theory may obtain then in what form it may obtain
It will be seen below that substance of any kind, whether single or dual or many, is untenable except in the case that every entity at every instant is its own substance which is of course no explicit simplification and no true substance theory. It may be—and is—true, however, that there may be contexts in which substance may provide excellent practical understanding and power. An example, of course, is the domain of application of modern theoretical physics
What might be an alternative? While there is a strong tradition of substance theory there is also a history of opposition to substance. In modern times William Blake decried substance from a spiritual-romantic standpoint. Hume’s arguments were essentially anti-substance. As noted above Heidegger argued against substance—his actual arguments are one third of a repudiation since he did not exclude determinism which is an essential twin of substance theory, and though his insight into being may have been deep it did not go so far as to see the logic of a full theory of being as in the metaphysics of immanence. For this reason what has been called the fundamental problem of metaphysics remained refractory to Heidegger (as it does to the entire traditions of philosophy, east and west, until this ‘moment’)
Blake’s arguments decried the reduction of the world to mechanistic terms, the explanation of the world in terms of something else which in Blake’s vision diminished the world. Hume’s argument was logical; our reductions are based on limited observation and their practical utility—so far—is no guarantee of their logical—eternal—validity. Aristotle spoke of a science of being-as-being rather than, in effect, as a theory of things in terms of something else
Perhaps, then, instead of substance as standing behind the manifest world, we can see the world as the world, being-as-being. This perhaps a thought behind Wittgenstein’s well known attraction to ‘the world as I found it.’ That thought amounts to no theory or, more specifically, to no a priori theory or commitment. The thought involves no reduction and is not subject, therefore, to Blake’s aesthetic-spiritual critique. And it is not subject to the logical-reductionist critique
The thought to focus on the world and to engagement with or in the world, perhaps to adventure, is a thought that is neutral to substance theory
These thoughts are not at all an argument that the study of the world-as-the-world will introduce any positive understanding, any simplification, or any positive power of knowledge. All that has been said so far is that ‘world-as-world’ is not subject to the reductionist critique of substance (which includes the aesthetic critique as well as the logical critique of the untenability of substance.) At least, however, since ‘world-as-world’ says essentially nothing, it allows the possibility that some insight, some simplification, some power may emerge (it also allows for substance except, however, that substance is untenable)
On account of the trivial, even shallow character of ‘world-as-world’ it might be unreasonable to expect insight, simplification and power. However, as it turns out, it is precisely this shallowness, this trivial character, along with ‘necessary experience,’ diligence, and the ruthless eradication of all vestiges of substance and its correlates, that allows the emergence of a profound and powerful understanding of the world
The idea of Being is what exists, what is there. In talking of Being (-as-being,) there is no commitment. In talking of Being, we are talking of world-as-world. Provided that existence is understood properly, in talking of Being-as-existence, we are talking of world-as-world
This is then the origin of the thought to develop a theory of being. The problem of Being, then, is to develop the idea of Being so as to be true to the sentiment of the previous paragraphs—to avoid substance, to develop a theory of or around being that will provide the understanding to which allusion has been made. The phrase ‘to seek to develop a theory…’ might have been used instead of ‘to develop a theory…’ This was in fact the hope at the outset of study. However, now that the theory has been developed it is no longer to seek the theory itself. It remains true, of course, that there is a seeking—to further insight and use and to extend the journey into the realm of transformation
From the discussion it should be clear that ‘Being’ is at outset regarded as unknown as is existence and, therefore, introduction of the idea of Being is not an a priori commitment except of course to openness and journey
The problem of substance is an aspect of the problem of the nature of being
The approach of being uncommitted to essence at outset may be applied to itself and essence allowed a limited role
Though sometimes worse, a shaky bridge is sometimes better than none
The commitment to essence, even if in error, may be a valuable form of experimentation
If these thoughts have validity, what is the error in a foundation in an erroneous position? It is that in a contingent context, the function of a sentence or story is not always its literal content—but in the ultimate ‘context,’ the literal and the non-literal coincide
It is not the point to not have prejudice—which is unavoidable—but to recognize and overcome it
In one strong thread of Western and Eastern philosophy, metaphysics has been founded or based in an initial commitment to an ontology, e.g., to simple and enduring kinds of which the world—its variety and change—is ‘made.’ One such kind is substance which, in its simplest form, is uniform and unchanging. Some other kinds are, essence, process, relation, fact, property, and sense data. Note that there are kinds of kinds—substance, essence and process are entity-like; sense data are knowledge—like; and knowing and being intersect in the fact. In all cases the problems of the nature of entities (and relation and process,) knowledge, and their relations must be addressed even though it may seem that positing facts as fundamental cuts through the problem of the knowledge-world relation
There are two levels of commitment to ontology. At the general level there may be commitment to the idea of ontology—the idea that there is some kind that is the constitution of the world. There is also the possibility of a commitment to a specific kind (monism) or kinds (dualism.) A monism specifies that there is a kind but does not specify the kind itself is ‘neutral.’ Within the levels, various modes and degrees of commitment are possible
Metaphysics is often presented as though it is based in a posited ontology even though the ontology may have been the result of reflection
In the development of a metaphysics there is, as will become manifest, an immense advantage in not making any initial commitment to ontology
Note that absence of initial commitment does not rule out kinds. The commitment is that the question of kinds and of specific kind will not be a premise but may be a conclusion of investigation. In the ensuing developments, the question of ontology itself—over and above the choice of ontological kinds—is recognized and treated as a fundamental and explicit problem
There is an immense appeal to the idea of substance. The promise of substance is that the variety and the changes in the world have foundation and explanation that is ultimate in simplicity—in terms of something that is uniform and unchanging. The present approach does not reject that promise at outset and, if it is true, can only strengthen it
Substance is often thought to stand behind manifestation, appearance and change, In Western Philosophy, there is a tradition of explanation in terms of substance—and, more generally, in terms of kinds. An appeal of this kind of explanation is its attempt to see variety and change in terms of simple and enduring substances—perhaps even one uniform and unchanging substance. There is another tradition that is critical of depth philosophy—of the thought that the nature of things is behind rather than inherent in them, deep rather than superficial. It is not at all clear—though it is often taken as given—that these two strains of thought stand in opposition. An approach from being allows both and it will be seen in the metaphysics of immanence that all things can be equivalently considered to be their own substance and to derive from something that can be regarded as to be prior to substance—the void that is conceptually even simpler than substance and may be regarded as substance but only improperly and whose nature and role in the development will not be posited but will emerge as the result of investigation. It will be seen that these two interpretations—things as their own substance and things as having no substance—can be held simultaneously and that neither is a true ontology of kind; rather, the resulting ontology is one that requires no ultimate kind whatsoever—it does however permit local kinds, as in science, as practical modes of explanation. These observations barely hint at the nature and power of the metaphysics that is established in chapters Being and Metaphysics and whose elaboration and application begins in these two chapters and culminates in the remaining narrative
Being is introduced as existence—the quality of being is that of existence; the mark of a being will be that it exists—that it has existence in its entirety
This early introduction of being and its nature may seem to contradict the intent to not make any initial commitment to an ontology. However, as conceived here, existence—and therefore being—will be seen to be sufficiently non-specific that no actual commitment is entailed
Additionally, although it is effective to introduce being and existence as pivotal at the outset of the narrative, there is and need be no original commitment to being or to its nature
In the tradition, being has been seen as referring to being-in-itself rather than being perceived, as referring to deity… In the narrative, however, it will be seen that there is no special being or individual that is enduring in itself and that being and seeing—relationship or relating—are duals. This (again) shows the futility of preconception, e.g., of being as being-in-itself. Being has occasionally been seen as a special concept—as referring to deity… Here, being is not seen as special at the outset of study. Therefore, the traditional treatments must, in some sense, lie within the boundary defined by the present conception and may be useful to the present development. Investigation of the relation between the metaphysics developed here and traditional metaphysics (plural) is an occasion for application and elaboration of the present metaphysics and clarification—and correction—of the traditions
The problem of the nature of Being
Being as existence—and the problem of this apparently ad hoc introduction
The problem of substance or essence—introduction
The problem of existence and its meaning—an introduction
The problem of the nature being and existence is a problem of meaning. However, it must be understood that linguistic meaning is not merely analytic but also empirical
The problem of the non-existent object
The first existential problem of being. Does anything exist?
Experience and its nature
(What does it mean to ask whether something exists? This should already be in the meaning of being)
The second existential problem of being. What exists, i.e., what things exist?
The forms of experience
It is intended that being shall be the founding concept of the metaphysics of immanence. If matter—or mind and so on—is fundamental then matter is being. However it is not given that matter is fundamental. Matter is an example of substance—and it is not given that substance is fundamental
Although there is a problem of the nature of being, this first discussion will not do full justice to the problem or any resolution. It is perhaps impossible to set it all out in the beginning. In any case, it is most efficient to allude to the problem at outset and to let its definition—that of the problem—become clearer as the resolution of the problem and its application and elaboration emerge… and this process will not be that of a point by point conceptual analysis of the different concepts but will involve the elaboration of an articulated-system-in-process
What is fundamental is not given in advance of investigation—this is pivotal to the approach. Thus ‘being’ is a variable—the unknown as in algebra. This cuts out so much vacuous argument, so much commitment to limited positions. This is one of the sources of power of the idea of being—others being tradition and what is put into the concept through reflection, building up ideas and system, criticizing, breaking system, reflection, reconstruction…
The materialist, idealist, essentialist, determinist, anti-determinist… have no logical argument against this approach—they might argue that it is a waste of effort but they cannot argue that it is illogical—for if their position is correct it should fall out of analysis which would found the position rather having it be ad hoc or contingent upon limited experience
An essence of the position of the substance theorist—the materialist and so on—will be seen to be that ‘the world is as I experience it’ where ‘experience’ is not only immediate experience but also what ‘I learned from science and all the accumulated knowledge of the world.’ It is, of course, essential to this view that matter is something specific even if remote as in, for example, modern physical theory; without such specificity, commitment to matter is no commitment at all and materialism is an empty ontology. What is so limited about this position? Has not the materialist, after all, incorporated the entire world and knowledge of the world in his or her position? The limit is this. Experience, at least in this way of looking at it, goes to the edge of my world but is not known to go the edge of the world. Science is not known to extend to the edge of the universe, to the boundary of being. We create an illusion of experience and of science extending to the edge by using the phrase ‘the universe’ rather than the proper phrases ‘the known universe.’ It is, perhaps, a natural illusion born of what is perhaps a natural tendency to conflate ‘my world’ or ‘our world view’ with the world. Perhaps the world revealed in science—the inflationary big-bang cosmology of the local cosmos as one of many bubble-cosmological systems—is the world; this world is, after all, so much more vast than the world revealed by science of a hundred and fifty years ago which is so much more vast—we may think—than the worlds of ancient philosophy and primitive mythology
As discussed and as will be seen, this is not ad hoc. Being was not introduced at the outset of investigation but in the process after much experiment, reflection, reading and analysis. These experiments in ideas… will become apparent in the narrative. In presenting the ideas, however, it is convenient to introduce at the beginning what was found in process and to then justify what has been introduced. The advantage to exposition is that the reader is afforded a handle, a grasp on what is being discussed and is not required to retread the unsure process from indefinite to definite ideas. In fact, given that Being is initially treated as a variable, he or she is afforded at most a convenient name and is not asked to assume what is to be demonstrated. The process is analogous to naming the unknown in algebra. By introducing the symbol ‘x’ there is no assumption that the unknown in known; however, use of the symbol affords immense power over the struggle with the intuition of an unknown quantity
Note, though, that the introduction of being as existence is in the process of analysis and not at its end. After the justification of its introduction, the position is used to found the powerful developments and methods that follow, the elaboration of a world view in the union—as will be seen—of empirical, analytic and constructive method… and this gives further confirmation to existence as a logical fulcrum and at the center of the foundation of the metaphysics of immanence of ultimate depth and breadth—in the sense that it must contain all other metaphysics consistent with logic and experience—depth—and must contain all being—breadth
Being is introduced as existence. While this is suggested by tradition and meaning—the meaning of ‘to be’ is close to that of ‘to exist’—this is not at all enough to establish the primacy of this sense of being. The idea of being as existence as foundational is the result of a search in many directions, in the construction of many systems, in the adoption and refinement of many ideas. At the end—this point—of the analysis there results one set of ideas: a system centered on the idea of being. What follows is a systematic version, made possible in retrospect, of a trial and error development
Introducing being as existence requires the address of a variety of questions, first of which are the questions of whether the introduction—definition—is fundamental and not ad hoc and whether it is significant. Both questions will be answered affirmatively but the full answer lies in the developments that follow and not in imported meaning. Additional concerns include the variety of uses of being from the tradition and their significance and the claims of mind and matter to be fundamental substances. These concerns are addressed in the development
Being is that which exists. A being exists or has existence in its entirety. Existence is not exclusive—not an attribute—and this may seem to show up being as trivial but is in fact its power, e.g., over materialism or idealism and over substance and determinism
Discussion of existence and the verb to be, e.g., ‘is;’ discussion of local and global meanings of verb to be and so of existence. Although being as existence may appear to be a trivial characterization (1) in that, apparently, ‘everything exists’ and (2) nothing is proved, e.g. what appears to be proved is the tautology ‘being is,’ it will turn out that being / existence yields ultimate depth and existence—the fact and the existence of the object categories and their completeness—can and will be proved beginning in this chapter, with an essential complement in Metaphysics, and refinements in subsequent chapters of Theory of being
In the allegation, the argument is that since everything exists, existence and therefore being are trivial in content, perhaps not even concepts
There is a philosophical tradition in the analysis of being and existence in which the concepts have been argued, on the one hand, to be pivotal to metaphysics and, on the other hand, to be trivial and even paradoxical. The present development must respond to these charges of triviality and paradox—and doing so will be occasion for refinement of ideas and development of tools of analysis and demonstration (see the earlier comments on demonstration)
The allegation is true—existence is profoundly trivial… but this is the source of its depth—‘everything’ has being and, therefore, being makes no mistaken distinction as may matter
‘Is’ is simultaneously trivial and profound
In the immediacy of what exists, being makes no distinction between immediate and remote
The power of the concept of being depends, not only on what it allows, but what is put into it—by way of recognition of its empirical character, by way of analysis of its meaning… and what is excluded by way of over-specification, premature specification and in demanding that it conform to preconception instead of the conditions that it should satisfy emerging, along with the concept itself, as part of the analysis
Regarding the allegation that it is not a concept, note the two meanings of concept (1) mental content, (2) the significant concept defined in terms, e.g., of genera and difference—being is the intensional idea that recognizes no difference and universe is the corresponding extensional idea
The problem of the non-existent object—requires analysis of the meaning of ‘existence’ and, simultaneously, the meaning or concept of the ‘concept’
The simultaneous analysis of the meaning of some particular term and the meaning of ‘meaning’ is extremely useful and powerful. Acknowledgements of the importance of meaning and general analyses of meaning about but are often forgotten in the immediacy of analyzing meanings of particular terms and in such cases, the analysis of meaning remains theoretical. The simultaneous or dual, two-level analysis is powerful and practical—the analysis of the particular term benefits from the general reflections on meaning and the general reflections may be refined and errors cleaned up. In the absence of the two-level dual analysis the individual analyses tend to be static, dusty and error prone—achieving clarity and applicability of meaning is a process. As will be seen the simultaneous analysis of meanings at the practical level—reference to the world rather than reference to reference—is also powerful; since the world is a whole, it is reasonable to expect that the language used to describe the world will not be made up of terms whose meanings are altogether independent. Additionally, even if the world were static, since discovery is a process, it is to be expected that not all meanings will be timeless
Does anything exist? Experience as a first and important example
Although the problem appears to be trivial—we do not practically doubt existence, its resolution is one of the threads in the development of a powerful metaphysics and powerful tools of demonstration—of empirically founded analysis
Such foundation, attained at minimal cost, is simultaneously fluid and solid—unlike, as will be seen, the materialist foundation that appears to be rock solid but in its lack of fluidity has no adjustment of concept to world
In an alternate presentation, experience could be introduced at outset as—something like—our most immediate connection to the world
This might be a more direct approach to the study of being and it might be more instructive. However, it might suggest that being depends on experiencing. The latter is not the case for there is no dependence relationship; the relation is closer to that of identity
How would the discussion of experience go?
‘Experience’ has a number of meanings—is a number of symbols—and, so, as below, the first topic would be The present connotation of experience
In experiencing there is being. This is given at outset. How? Objections come fast. Experience of an object does not imply existence of the object! But that is not what is said. All that is said is that experience itself exists. Experience is the flimsiest of things; it cannot exist! There is no proof of the existence of experience—nor is proof necessary; experience is the name for the most immediate aspect my life. This reformulation at once ‘demonstrates’ the existence of experience, shows that it is only on other accounts that it is regarded as flimsy, and sweeps away all arguments that there is no experience
Is standalone experience possible? The suggestion is that experience lies only at the surface of being and that in standing alone it is only that which is superficial exists without material support. In thinking of standalone experience, therefore, there is already commitment to ontology—experience is of such and such character and that it requires support. If we start without commitment to ontology, with the idea that any ontology will emerge, then the idea that standalone experience is possible says nothing about the character of being or that it is or is not material in nature (to say that it is / is not material seems to suggest something but it does not unless the nature of the material is also explicit.) Experience entails distinction and relationship; experience is the inner aspect of relationship
If, now, a consistent metaphysics is developed it is seen that experience may extend to the root and is one face of being—another being the external / material aspect
With memory and symbol, experience and concept become identical. Original experience is a case of concept
What do we learn already? Through the example of experience we learn about being and about method. We learn that the study of being and the method of study arise together; are inseparable. We learn that the immediacy of our being lies above the conventional remoteness of science in the primacy of being. We learn that meaning is crucial. We learn that meanings are in flux. We learn that systems of ideas stand together and provide a greater completeness of meaning in their mutuality and extension to the root
The present connotation of experience is that of direct experience. When I see an object, the content of my immediate apprehension of it is experience. Experience is a joint product of perceiver and perceiver but it lies in the perceiver. If, as is the typical and unreflective case, experience is regarded as characterizing the object, experience can be correct (or mistaken.) In itself, experience, does not have the quality of correctness. It is not said of primary and original experience-in-itself that it is correct or that it is mistaken but, rather, that it is. In the object, shape, size, color, quality stand as equals; it is perhaps characteristic of experience that, in it, quality is primary
A remark will be made only when using a connotation of experience other than the one immediately above. Mention and use this practice as a general one
Somewhere, the following concern is to be addressed. Is a world of pure experience possible? Must not experience be a kind of relation? Is not difference required? Then, is not the idealist-solipsist puzzle defused by noting that it is only on some given—but perhaps tacit and dualist—ontology that it is a puzzle at all. Is not the puzzle dissolved in metaphysics of immanence in which there is no a priori (external) ontology at all
Enter a note on the ‘subject’
I see an apple. A primary question of the correctness of the perception is ‘is the apple there…’ or ‘does my experience of the apple guarantee the existence of the apple?’ The answer is that it normally does
However, from the fact of hallucination and illusion, the perception does not guarantee the—existence or characteristics of the—percept. The issue of distortion of perception has significance, e.g., in science but is not the primary concern here
Analysis introduces a further and fundamental doubt. The experience is not the apple and, so, it is reasonable even though not certain that something is there, how can I know that the apple-as-I-see-it is there—either as I see it or even at all?
The first interest in experience is that while its objects may be questioned, experience itself is given and is, therefore, in itself, a first and certain example of being—of something that exists
Concerns such as the issue of whether anything exists at all and the relation between the character of experience and the character of the object may have no great and immediate practical interest (except, e.g., as in science and measurement.) However, the importance of such issues is profound in a number of ways. There is a conceptual or philosophical interest in that the concern arises at the beginning of the analysis of being, i.e. at the beginning of metaphysics, and without a proper response metaphysics is doomed to having no connection to the world. Such concerns have been an Achilles Heel for metaphysics throughout its history and, in this narrative, their address leads to a real and—ultimately—metaphysics. The practical and human interest of such ‘theoretical’ issues is that their implication—the metaphysic, its elaboration and application in the remainder of the narrative—is of profound immediate and ultimate interest
Experience and concept
It is in experience that there is significance to being and transformation and significant knowledge; later this sense of experience will be extended, without loss of the experiential aspect of experience, to all knowledge and even being—the reader is asked to hold doubt regarding fact and meaning in abeyance till the conclusion of this division, Theory of Being—especially knowledge that is not—normally—encountered in experience or as conscious
Identity of being and knowing will be seen to lie consistently—and necessarily—in the sense of experience. This sense will be an extension of the sense of ‘experience’ to the root of being
Determine placement of the following—To deny being is to misunderstand experience and existence
The necessarily empirical character refers to the fact but not the object of experience. I.e., the given character is and therefore necessarily entails existence or being—the being of experience—but not that of the external world, of external objects
One exception to the absence of necessary entailment of the necessary entailment of the object regards experience itself. I.e., experience is a necessary object
A necessary object is one whose existence follows from experience
Are there necessary objects other than experience itself? The ‘necessary forms of experience,’ below, will be shown to entail the existence of corresponding necessary objects
A contingent or conventionally empirical object is one whose existence requires evidence or argument beyond the experience of an object. It will be seen in Metaphysics that the distinction between necessary and contingent objects breaks down. This breakdown occurs regarding the conceptual distinction, i.e., relative to all being; a practical distinction—relative to a context or locale—will remain
The common objects of our world are contingent objects
…or, what concepts are faithful to some object?
Requires elaborating the analysis of the meaning of ‘to exist’
What exists, or, what concepts have objects faithfully? Experience and the other necessary objects—the existence of these objects can be established immediately; the necessary objects and the necessary limits of experience… practical objects and Kantian and post-Kantian resolutions—the existence of the practical objects including that of the external world, the categories of the world including that of object, space, time, causation is not immediate and begins and is significantly completed in Metaphysics and has a contingent and probabilistic aspect as well as—surprisingly—a necessary aspect… critique of knowledge as knowing and subsumption of the general case of the concept under the practical object… the empirical character of the developments and, next, of meaning
Contemplation of what things exist may begin with a discussion of the forms of experience
The patterns of experience—spatio-temporal and other—are its forms
The patterns of experience are the first place of meaning (as significance.) It is not necessary to go beyond the forms or patterns of experience to find meaning
The forms of being can be derived from the forms of experience
Some forms of experience entail the existence of a corresponding object. Such forms of experience are necessary forms of experience and the corresponding objects, external or identical to the experience or external to it, are necessary forms of being. A necessary object was conceived one whose existence is entailed by experience. The necessary forms of being are necessary objects; i.e., the necessary forms of experience entail necessary objects. A first example of a necessary object has been seen to be Being—since experience is a case of being. Further examples of necessary forms are all experience, experience of difference and duration, and experience of parts. The corresponding necessary objects are universe, space and time, and domain. It should be noted that the objecthood of space and time does not at all entail the objecthood of space and time as characterized by the space and time of our cosmological system
The necessary objects follow of necessity, without further argument, from the forms of experience. Demonstration is founded in necessary empirical fact—which employs analysis of meaning—and derived rationally. Such objects are known indirectly—without the objects, the necessary forms of experience could not exist. Such indirect knowledge is necessary because of the logical foundation from necessary fact. Such kinds of argument have also been labeled ‘transcendental.’ It is remarkable that knowledge from indirect or transcendental argument may be clearer and more certain than direct knowledge, e.g., perception and overlaid conception. Examples of the necessary objects are: experience—being, all being—the universe, difference and duration, domain, absence of being—the void
It has not been shown that the necessary objects are external objects or that there is an external world. This demonstration will be undertaken in Metaphysics. The value of such demonstration is not showing ‘what we already know’ but in the consequences and implications as, e.g., elaborated in the narrative
…
Here, the universe is defined as all being. Talk of parallel universes, of our cosmos as the universe, of bubble universes… invokes another meaning of ‘universe.’ Although the point is near trivial, it will be seen to be crucial in its consequences. In this essay, ‘universe’ shall mean all being
It follows that the universe must contain not only all things but, also, all objects, all creation and creators, all form, all pattern, all law
From universe and domain, it follows that the complement of domain is a necessary object
Conceiving the void as the complement of the universe relative to itself, it follows that the void is a necessary object
It follows of necessity that the void contains no things, no objects, no creation or creators, no form or pattern or law
…
Even when the word universe is formally treated as all being—all that there was, is or will be—the intuition may continue to function differently. The idea that the universe has a creator is a logical commitment to there being something outside the universe. In the meaning of universe of this essay the universe includes creators and creations. Whether there is god depends on the meaning ‘god;’ however, regardless of the meaning, all gods lie within the universe. If it is paradoxical for the universe to have created itself from an absence of being, then it is also paradoxical for any god to have created it
What is the meaning—in the sense of significance rather than of linguistic meaning—of our being? Surely, in this sense, the meaning of being does not—cannot—lie outside being. However, the loss of meaning experienced in the nineteenth through twenty-first centuries is the result of an attribution of meaning to something else. The thought parallels the idea that there is something outside all being, outside the universe
The—significant—meaning of being must lie in being itself. Celebration is not the celebration of something else; celebration is the recognition of intrinsic meaning. In the narrative an understanding of intrinsic meaning will emerge
The universe contains all significant meaning. Literally, the void contains no significant meaning. Metaphorically, however, it will emerge that significant meaning may be assigned to the void
The establishment of these objects or forms of being requires further argument. The probability of their——objecthood immense, the difference from certainty infinitesimal; however their external being is not necessary
The treatment of these forms and objects must be deferred until the main theses of the metaphysics of immanence has been established in the chapter Metaphysics
They may be necessary on certain conditions, e.g., given the physical structure of this world
Review the following examples—the self and the external world, the common objects, identity, the intuition: sense through concept, this cosmos, the human condition, inference, category, and judgment
Identity and external world are contingent forms relative to particular cases but necessary to the universe
Should the following be done here? Raise the question of the distinction between the contingent and the necessary and whether it is contingent upon restriction to the known universe. Observe that it may turn out that all consistent concepts may have objects in some worlds and that this would eliminate the distinction—with profound consequences. Briefly note that this will be established in Metaphysics
In the sense of linguistic meaning, ‘meaning’ is a crucial element in many of the analyses of the narrative. In fact, in recent thought ‘analysis’ and ‘meaning’ are closely connected
There is a formal discussion of meaning in Logic and meaning. However, because attention to meaning has been and remains crucial to the developments, a preliminary discussion of meaning may be critical to understanding
When a sign—a word, a phrase and so on—is experienced as a linguistic element it is a symbol, i.e., has meaning which may be regarded as sense, the concept, and reference or object. The bare sign is not a linguistic element and has and can have no meaning. One sign can correspond to more than one—to many—symbols or meanings. The meanings may be related, i.e. come in groups or families and shadings. There may also be entirely distinct families corresponding to one sign
It should be noted that while attention to meaning is critical, such attention cannot be the mere analysis of meaning in terms of meaning for there must come a point where meaning comes face to face with the empirical. Analysis and synthesis cannot be ever discrete. Therefore, when it may seem that analysis of meaning has resulted in positive conclusions about the world, those conclusions are empirical or, rather, contain elements of the empirical
The concepts of the concept—the ‘concept’ is a concept—and its object are instrumental to the discussion of meaning
Modern education may have left the reader with the impression that lexical or dictionary meaning is all there is to linguistic meaning. Despite their uses, dictionaries have essential limitations as defining meaning
Regarding a dictionary as absolute or thinking ‘I know the meaning of X for all time’ is a form of substance thinking
The system of meaning in a dictionary is ultimately circular; the stability and change of meaning lies in use—in life—and the function of the dictionary is to attempt to capture this system. A dictionary is an experiment
The best dictionaries show some of the limitations. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary shows not only current uses of words but also their historical uses. From the history of use, it becomes clear that the ‘meanings’ of words change over time. Why is that? It is because environments of meaning—contexts—change: sometimes there is growth, sometimes narrowing, and sometimes ‘lateral’ shift. Occasionally the growth or shift is so significant that the new meaning could not be contained in the old. Further, in the transition to the environment, it is use that defines new meaning—language must have degrees of adaptation. A good dictionary is, therefore, an ongoing project and while it will, of course, be exquisite in its capture of current use, it will also show its limits
A dictionary may show the multiple families corresponding to each sign, e.g., word. Since we are in a process of discovery and learning, words come and go, new words are added, some words and forms dropped, and words that are retained may undergo transformation in meaning
It might seem that final meaning may never be achieved. That would likely be true if an ultimate understanding of the world could never be achieved at all—even at the coarsest level of description. However, we do not know that ultimate understanding cannot be achieved. The traditional wisdom that it cannot is based in the apparent fact that it has not. However, it is invalid to conclude a necessity from what is contingent (this was the basis of Hume’s critique of any logical foundation of science.) Additionally, as has been remarked and as will be seen, an ultimate metaphysics is possible—not only will this be demonstrated but various objections, e.g. the Humean, will be raised and countered
Meaning and metaphysics are not independent
Another aspect of meaning is that it is not contained in words alone. The meaning of ‘apple’ derives from the meaning of ‘fruit’ which derives from ‘plant.’ Meaning forms a web and total meaning lies in the total system. This is seen very clearly in science, whose power derives partly though significantly from treating the elements of systems as interrelated / interacting in space and—when dynamic—over time and whose theories are, therefore, interactive webs of concepts whose significance become full only in the system as whole
Another aspect of system meaning lies in grammar. Consider the sentence ‘The boy kicked the ball.’ In another language the order of words might be different, e.g., ‘Boy ball hit’ which, though it sounds awkward in English, is grammatical and this shows that grammar may have arbitrary conventions as far as meaning is concerned—note, of course, that the ‘arbitrary’ conventions may be determined by cultural factors according to whether a particular society is action oriented and so on. However, beyond the differences, the forms have common elements and these include action, subject—the agent of action, and the object of action. This structure of grammar reveals a structure of the world—which is of course marked by a degree of relativism for in a culture that was less focused on instrumental concerns, the distinction between subject and object might be muted and the language of things and actions might have some degree of fusion. The subject-predicate form should not be regarded as universally representing the form of the world. It should be noted that in this paragraph, ‘subject’ and ‘object’ have meanings that are local to the immediate discussion and do not pertain to the remainder of the narrative
It is thus seen that, while there may be arbitrariness to its rules, grammar is not merely about the arrangements of sentences. Just as individual words may refer to things in the world, so grammatical forms may have reference to, may depict, things or states of being—including process… and the meaning of a word is not necessarily independent of a sentence in which it is found. It would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for a dictionary to make explicit the perhaps infinite range of possibilities
In a stable context, meanings have a degree of stability and the idea of absolute atomism or independence of meaning is not debilitating; use carries on happily without excess regard for theories of use. In attempting to understand all being, the situation is different. In the stable context, it is use and its adaptations that may be stabilizing. In the universal or otherwise new context, adaptation is not given but is sought. Here it is crucial to recognize that existing meanings may be inadequate, that meanings are experimental and interconnected, and that, while new terms may be introduced, it is natural to use old terms in extended senses of meaning—which may be a source of confusion
That there can be stability of meaning in the universal and that this meaning has empirical ground and immediate application is one of the foci of this narrative
The idea of concept and object is critical to meaning. When it is recognized that the concept and object are distinct and that the concept is rarely fully faithful—in any sense—to the object, the following ideas are seen as natural: the idea that meaning should be in flux when environments or contexts are changing, either laterally or in time, that, since the world has interconnection, meaning should lie in system
The German nineteenth century logician, Gottlob Frege, suggested that meaning lies in sense and in reference. Clearly, sense is related to concept or experience and reference to object. This brief reference to the structure of meaning is taken up further in Logic and meaning
It is important for the reader to be aware that the discussion of meaning is very pertinent to an understanding of the present narrative. First, it is necessary to be aware that while the words used are often common words or words that have established technical uses, the meanings here may be shifted, expanded or otherwise altered. It is therefore necessary to give attention to the sense of the terms as used here. Of course, other meanings may be a source of insight and suggestion and an awareness of the variety of meanings that have been attached to a term may be useful in various ways. Second, it is important to recognize that the terms of the narrative constitute a system and that this system is necessary to the development, elaboration and application of the Metaphysics. The system has been experimental and thus it is not necessary to tie down every meaning but as the system matures further, the degree of specificity of the general terms may increase
Discussion of meaning is not non-empirical; this follows if meaning—sense—has structure to which the object must have conformation if there is to be reference
Being—that which exists. In this generic use, the grammatical form of ‘being’ is similar to that of ‘matter.’ The grammatical form in which something may be said to be of being is the same as the form in which something may be said to be of matter
A being is an entity that exists or has existence in its entirety. Two aspects of this idea require explanation. The first, ‘has existence’ suggests that existence is a property but not that in having the property some class of entities, those that do not possess the property, are excluded—for all entities possess the ‘property.’ The second, ‘in its entirety’ is made clear from the conceptual side of meaning—a concept that has only partial reference does not specify an entity even though the partial reference, if isolated, would do so. This apparently trivial point will have profound consequences in the study of meaning, grammar, objects and logic
If ‘X exists,’ means that, to X, there corresponds an object then ‘everything exists’ does not mean that to every concept there does or even can correspond an object for there can be no object that corresponds to an illogical concept
The following interesting question arises—does every consistent concept have a corresponding object? It would seem not but how would one prove this? Logical and analytical proof is ruled out by the nature of the case; empirical proof is ruled out by the fact that we do not know the end of the universe or its variety. Thus it must be admitted that it may be true that every consistent concept specifies an actual object even if that object is not found so far in the empirical universe. This question is of the deepest importance and will be taken up in Metaphysics where the conclusion will be surprising and of momentous consequence
There is a rich variety of meaning of being in the traditions. Since clarity of meaning is important, should traditional meanings, meanings that could detract from precision, be rejected? The tradition of meaning will be retained for its richness and suggestive character. However, there must be care regarding its use. While a traditional meaning cannot have automatic use in the system that is developed, when the system encounters difficulty or an open area of investigation the tradition may be a source of insight
Being—Part II: the material of 2007
The primary objectives of this section are to lay out and motivate some basic ideas for a foundation / framework for an ultimate journey into understanding and transformation and to explain why, from among these, the idea of being is fundamental to the development. Here, understanding includes knowledge but is more than knowledge of the world—the universe—or even the nature of knowledge itself. Understanding includes a sense of the nature of being-in-the-world and what is important to it—or, at least, a recognition that this sense is significant together with an intent to develop the sense and a habit of being concerned with it
Concepts for a foundation. Development of the foundational framework
This chapter introduces ideas or concepts for a foundational framework for an ultimate journey into knowledge, understanding and transformation
The core of the framework is developed in Metaphysics and its elaboration continues in the remaining chapters of the division Theory of Being
The framework did not arise at once but is the result of an iteration of insight and criticism
Reasons and motives for adoption of some ideas and rejection are given. However, a fuller understanding of the concepts and reasons for retention or rejection of the concepts is developed subsequently in Theory of Being and especially in Metaphysics
Some basic concepts of the narrative are essence, substance, mind and matter, existence, concept and object, experience and forms of experience, being, meaning, sense and reference
The primary and foundational concepts are, perhaps, experience and being. Experience is fundamental in that it is immediate—that experience is immediate is, perhaps, an understatement for while the experience of an external object is different from the object—it is an experience, the experience of experience is an experience
In Heideggerian terms, experience refers to the essential skeleton—abstraction—of Da-sein that reveals the skeletal and so universal aspect of being… and as explained earlier, permits ultimate richness of the proximate being that is Heidegger’s Da-sein
Substance is not a central concept of the narrative but is important because it has been so significant in the tradition. Here, substance as foundational is rejected—it is found that substance must be rejected as a foundation for any ultimate understanding of the world and what is learned in seeing the necessity of this rejection is immense. Essence, mind, and matter have a similar ‘negative’ importance to the development
What now follows is an early stage of the systematic and precise development of the meaning and significance of the concepts. A more complete development occurs in the subsequent chapters of Theory of Being in which the concepts are developed and elaborated as the basis of a coherent system of understanding. The development follows in the subsequent divisions of the narrative, in which the system is further elaborated and is applied to topics of interest the goals of the journey
Essences. In attempting to provide a foundation the question of the essence of things—of the world—may arise. What is essence—or, since concepts do not arise in final form at once and for all time, what may it be? Is the essence of a thing distinct from the thing? Are there essences?
Substance. The history of the idea of substance—primarily in western thought—may be seen as an extended and varied investigation into essences
There are two broad uses of the word ‘substance’ in philosophy. The first is a general use in which substance is the ground, being, or essence of things. Thales of Miletus suggested that the fundamental substance was water and the idea of ‘stuff,’ of which water is a kind, is a primary instance of substance as the essence of all things. Thales, of course, did not anticipate that water would be found to be ‘made’ of even more basic entities. The second use of substance arises in asking, for example, what the essence of a particular thing may be, e.g., what is the essence of being a mountain. The two meanings of substance are, of course, connected and an adequate development of the first kind may, if it is possible to do so, found a development of the second kind. In developing the metaphysics of immanence it is it is primarily the first meaning of substance that is of interest—but as counterpoint for, as ground of all being, substance will, of necessity, be rejected altogether
There have been a variety of reasons for an interest in substance theory and, accordingly, substance has been held to have a variety of characteristics. Reasoned lists of such characteristics have occasionally been regarded as marking the criteria that any conception of substance should satisfy. This approach is rather ad hoc and is against the spirit of the idea of substance. It is, perhaps, only by accident that such an approach would result in a coherent concept of substance and a proper substance theory. Since substance is rejected, ‘proper substance theory’ is not a constituent concept of the present approach
If the idea of substance is to be significant in revealing the nature of the world, it will be a constituent concept of a coherent metaphysics that would stand or fall not only on the criteria of coherence but also on applicability. That is, the metaphysics would say something about the world, what it would say would be true and nothing that it said would be untrue; of course, as metaphysics, it would be required to speak of the entire world—the universe, all being. Would it say everything that can be said about the world? The extent of what can be said would be integral to the theory and not something outside it—just as Logic, although it has some origin in proof, is, as will be seen, not something separate from or pasted on to talk of what is real. As will be seen ‘world’ is also a concept whose meaning will be specified even if the specification is simple. The notion of substance and its nature will fall out of study and therefore the characteristics that mark substance must be variables—perhaps only implicitly—of the theory
A primary motivation to metaphysics—substance or otherwise—is to understand the world. If the terms of the metaphysics, explanatory or predictive, are more complex than the world itself, the metaphysics can hardly be regarded as understanding. Therefore, substance should be simple
From simplicity, it does not follow that substance will be known or even knowable. However, if substance were not even intelligible, e.g. through intuition andor conception, the resulting metaphysics would hardly count as understanding. So it was or may have been that Plato suggested that actual things are rough copies of forms that resided in a world whose ideal character made the forms intelligible or knowable even if not available to sense perception
The thought that sense perception constitutes evidence but not knowledge may be one motive to explaining knowledge in terms of an ideal world. However, though Plato’s theory is elegant, it introduces two kinds—the form and the thing even if it does not go so far as to introduce a separate world of ideal forms. Understanding would be better served if there were but one kind, one world, in terms of which the problem of knowability or intelligibility could be resolved. Therefore, another desirable characteristic of substance—of the terms of any satisfactory metaphysics—is that there should at most one kind which, since there are actual things, must be the actual kind. Another way of saying this is that substance should be of the one world
The desirable characteristics of substance, then, are simplicity, intelligibility and worldliness
The characteristics are not necessarily independent—worldliness may enhance, though not guarantee, intelligibility and simplicity. Their formal interdependence will vary according to metaphysics and, therefore, the true interdependence will depend on—what emerges as—true metaphysics
It is not clear that any metaphysics can satisfy all three characteristics—especially since a metaphysics that were not comprehensive over all things would hardly be a metaphysics. In the extreme of simplicity, it seems that there would be but one substance that would be uniform and unchanging. The world and its variety would come from that substance. However, the becoming itself should be simple or intelligible and, it is perhaps deterministic rather than indeterministic becoming that satisfies both simplicity and intelligibility
However, that variety and change should be the deterministic result of uniformity and stasis is incoherent
Although Heidegger’s insight into the untenable character of substance theory is intense, in neglecting to note that determinism is the implicit twin of substance, the rejection of substance as foundational remained incomplete. Despite the explicit rejection of substance, the habit of substance thinking was retained—although Da-sein may be at the beginning of metaphysics, not all metaphysics flows from the Heideggerian Da-sein. On account of the implicit determinism, a complete metaphysics cannot flow from Da-sein. Despite the fundamental character of Heidegger’s Da-sein, some of its most cherished characteristics have to be given up for it to be the full source of metaphysics. This is not a loss, for as has been seen in other—logical—terms, the skeletal version of Da-sein—the bare account of experience—permits all that is cherished in the full-bodied Da-sein and more, perhaps infinitely more
Is there a metaphysics that can replace substance thinking and still be counted as foundational—and simple, intelligible, and fully within the one world? The metaphysics of immanence developed in Metaphysics satisfies these criteria. It rejects substance in any strict sense but is foundational—it will be seen that while foundations and rejection of substance have been traditionally regarded as incompatible, the alleged incompatibility is the result of an assumption of a deterministic universe and that a non-substance is possible and is developed as metaphysics of immanence in Metaphysics. The rejection of substance is not a hypothesis but the consequence of an empirically founded metaphysics which is therefore of the world. Although demonstration waits until Metaphysics, the idea of the universe as all being is empirical and this idea among other demonstrated empirical ideas results in a metaphysics that is ultimately simple, yet ultimate in depth. Further, the depth is a result of the simplicity
That no infinite regress of explanation is required is a consequence of the simultaneous and absolute empirical and rational foundation
The metaphysics of immanence retains the idea of form but not of form of being as a kind that is other than being or residing in another world; it is a metaphysics of immanent form—of form as being of what is formed. The metaphysics eliminates need for and—logical—possibility of substance of substratum and sortal kind, which are the two kinds noted earlier
In the metaphysics of immanence, the foundation of the world is the world itself. Thus it is not an idealism or materialism or any kind of restricted-ism. How such a metaphysics may—and does—count as metaphysics and how it is simple awaits Metaphysics
The demonstration that the metaphysics of immanence yields intelligibility while referring to—and only to—the one universe begins in Metaphysics and is completed in Objects
In Metaphysics it is shown that the idea of the—one—universe as all being is more than a definition in that there can be no part of all that there is that cannot interact with any other part
For further treatment of substance, see Substance, Journey in Being-New World, and the discussion of substance in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
In the foregoing, the notions of property, impression or sense data, and event as alternatives to substance or, in a loose interpretation, other kinds of substance, have not been taken up. However, as in the case of substance, it is preferable, as far as possible, to develop the metaphysics and see what falls out of it as fundamental rather than to set up a system of ad hoc even if reasonable explanation—including criteria for explanations—in advance. In the present time, philosophy is often taken to have the characteristic—perhaps among others—that its content is conceptual rather than merely empirical and the concepts and their subject have not yet become definite as, for example, in science. Therefore, there may not be the luxury of criteria that are more than ad hoc and reasonable, i.e., it is not given that a philosophy or a metaphysics may be systematic and realistic. It is remarkable, therefore, that the metaphysics of immanence is systematic and realistic and that its formulation and concepts permit its own evaluation as well as an evaluation of the concepts of substance—whether abstract or in the mode of ‘stuff,’ property, trope, impression, fact and event
In metaphysics of immanence these alternative interpretations of substance are shown to be unnecessary
The foregoing discussion suggests that mind and matter cannot be substances. In Metaphysics it is seen that in their common meanings mind and matter are too restricted and definite to serve as universal substances even though they may be substantial to this cosmological system. However, it will also be seen that if the common meanings of mind and matter are sufficiently loosened then either mind or matter may be foundational but to regard them as universal substances would also require a loosening of the concept of substance. Further, although these possibilities illuminate the character of the metaphysics, they do not particularly illuminate understanding of the world and might be confusing on account of the possibility of conflation of common and extended meanings
The treatment of the problem of substance is left to Metaphysics where, as noted, it is found that there are and can be no fundamental substances in the stricter meanings of substance. If there are no substances there remains the—potential—problem that there are no simple explanations. Of course, if this is the way things are then it is not a true problem. What, however, could function as a basis of explanation yet not be a simple substance?
Reflections on the nature of philosophy and metaphysics in the later chapters, Philosophy and metaphysics and Problems in metaphysics, show that while it is natural that metaphysics encompasses philosophy and that while there should be domains within it that are not characterized by the nature or definiteness of science, the thought that all metaphysics and all areas within philosophy should lack such definiteness cannot obtain
The discussion so far has considered substance, the idea that, despite or because of the desirable characteristics of simplicity, intelligibility and worldliness, the world is something other than what it is. In the best of substance scenarios, the world is a part of itself—perhaps an unchanging part. Putting aside the logical difficulty of determinism, while this has the attraction of simplicity, it has also the character that the world is rather less than its richness and variety. In a substance scenario of somewhat lower grade, the world is other than what it is even if that other has the purity of uniformity and changelessness
The idea of substance has logical impossibility and an aspect of a lesser aesthetic
Perhaps, then, we might look at the idea of the world as just the world—neither more nor less than that which it is. This is immediately obvious, even tautologous and trivial. The charge is granted for it is precisely these aspects of triviality that, as will be seen, lead to ultimate depth and breadth. That the assertion is valid, how it may be shown, and the character of the resulting depth and breadth are not at all obvious; they are the result of a journey in ideas
Perhaps the most immediate and basic character of things is that they are—that they exist, i.e., that they are or have being. It is not at all clear, however, that existence—being—can form the basis of a simple system of explanation. The possibility is shown and realized in Metaphysics. Here, it will be appropriate to discuss existence and to consider some problems that have been associated with the concept of existence and its possibility as the basis of an explanatory system
To say something exists is to say that it is there. To say that something ‘is there’ appears to suggest that it exists in space. However the use of ‘there’ in ‘there is a mountain called Everest’ is not spatial but is used to avoid the awkward construction ‘is a mountain called Everest.’ Allowing some awkwardness of construction, to say ‘Mt. Everest exists’ is to say ‘Mt. Everest is’
In the previous paragraph it is not of course being said that Mt. Everest is not in space but, instead, that the idea of existence does not a priori entail existence in space
Although it may seem that everything that exists must exist in space—and time—this is not necessarily the case. For example one apple exists in space but where does the number one exist? Does it exist? The machinery with which to answer these questions is developed in Metaphysics and Objects and therefore question of whether there are non-spatial objects is deferred to those chapters. However, it may be important to keep the possibility of non-spatial existence open at this point in the narrative because objects that exist in a non-spatial framework and objects that exist but in no framework at all have not been ruled out. Therefore, the grammatical form ‘X is’ is important to indicate, first, existence and, second, to indicate the possibility of existence in non-spatial frameworks
Therefore, existence is a very simple and immediate concept. It is associated with one of the most primitive of language constructs, the verb to be one of whose forms is ‘is’
Before proceeding further with the analysis of existence it is useful to mention the local and global modes of description. The freedom to talk in both local and global terms introduces a great efficiency into the discussion
The history of the universe may be viewed as having a trajectory through time or as being a trajectory over time. In the first view, the history is seen as a ‘motion;’ in the second view it is seen as an object. Spatial description is implicit in the term trajectory—the trajectory is that of a spatial distribution. It is convenient to switch among the coordinate or spatio-temporal description and the non-coordinate description in which the history of the universe is seen as an object. An immediate concern with this thought is that it is not clear that spatio-temporal description is possible for every part of the universe or that space and time are the only possible coordinates of description. From the coordinate point of view, the universe could be seen as different patches. From the non-coordinate view, the universe would be the collection of patches. In view of the indeterminacy and possible incompleteness of description in terms of space and time, the terms coordinate and non- or supra-coordinate may be replaced by the terms local and global, respectively. The global mode allows for objects or domains that are not and, perhaps, cannot be coordinated in terms of—other—objects
In the above most primitive use, ‘is’ indicates nothing other than existence. Other uses are less primitive. In saying, the mountain is its atoms, it is meant that the mountain is ‘made’ of its atoms—that the atoms constitute the mountain. In saying that the mountain is tall, ‘is’ functions to connect the mountain to its property of tallness. The less primitive uses may be regarded as asserting existence and something else, e.g., constitution or having a property. The uses are related—they may seen as having a common stem-use, that of being. In ‘X is itself’ the constitutive use reduces to the stem. Bundle theory is the view, attributed to the philosopher David Hume but not adopted here, that an object is precisely its collection of properties; on this view, ‘X is its properties,’ e.g., the mountain is its mass and its shape and its color… It is clear that there is a difference between the kinds of property—mass is thought to inhere in the object but an object has color only in interaction and, if it were the intent to discuss or argue bundle theory, it would be necessary to make this distinction
As noted, the use of ‘is’ that indicates being or existence is—perhaps—its most primitive use. That existence has the meaning of the most primitive use of a most primitive linguistic construct points to the primitive character of existence, i.e., of being. The depth of the concept of existence or being lies, not in remoteness or esotericism, but in this primitive and immediate character
It is not being said that the grammatical form, ‘X is,’ implies existence but that it expresses the linguistic meaning of the concept of existence
That existence is simple and immediate does not imply that it will be easy to explain its meaning. What does it mean that something should exist? It is the very immediacy of existence that makes it hard to explain. There are—perhaps—no simpler and more immediate concepts in terms of which it can be explained. Many fundamental ideas are like that. They can be known—it seems—but not explained and therefore knowledge of them is doubted. Often, however, the reason for the difficulty with explanation or definition is that there is nothing more fundamental in terms of which to explain or define the idea. This upturns the order of things. What is less immediate is thought to be known or understood because it can be defined. What is most immediately known is thought to be difficult to know because it is hard to define. Existence is like that. It ought to be sufficient to say that ‘Mt. Everest exists’ means ‘Mt. Everest is’
That is not to say that there are no issues or concerns regarding the concept of existence
Since ‘everything exists’ it has been argued that existence is not a concept—it says nothing. This concern is addressed below under the topic concepts and objects
Another concern is that though existence may be a concept it is trivial. In a sense it is trivial—everything exists—existence makes no distinctions as, for example does redness: some things are red, others are not. Existence is profoundly trivial and profoundly shallow and it is seen in Metaphysics that this triviality is the source of its depth—that makes it suitable as foundational for a metaphysics of ultimate breadth and depth
In a sense, existence is essence but this essence is one that is immanent, that is not separate from things
In saying that something is rather than seems to be, it is suggested that it exists independently of being perceived or known. This is implicit in the idea of existence but the discussion of concept and object below will clarify the idea and make it more explicit. Immediately the question arises, does anything that is seen exist as it is seen? This is the problem of appearance and reality which is taken up in the topic concept and object below but whose treatment continues through Objects
This question is distinct from the issue of whether anything exists as it is known. To doubt all existence as an intrinsic dimension of the psyche may be a neurotic condition
Of course there is existence—or else, for example, these words would be neither written nor read. Even if it is thought that the perception of the world is an illusion, the illusion exists. The fact of existence is empirical. It is not required to further check existence—it is in the meaning of existence that the existence of perception, whether ‘real’ or ‘illusion,’ is given
However, the philosophical contemplation of the question whether anything exists—and related questions, especially—will be seen to contribute to, first, clarification of the nature of knowledge and of existence and, second, to the development of powerful tools of analysis
The question has at least two aspects—may be seen to contain two questions
In asking whether Mt Everest exists, it is being questioned whether there is a concrete—particular—thing named ‘Mt. Everest.’ An important aspect of this question is the sub-question ‘What does it mean to say or know that Mt. Everest exists.’ Earlier, it was suggested that existence may not be analyzable. However, an analysis is taken up in the discussion below of concepts and objects. The discussion will show that the question whether something exists, at least for particular or concrete things, is primarily a question of the meaning of ‘existence.’ That Mt. Everest is ‘made’ of various elementary particles is a clarification of the nature of material things but does not typically confirm existence
The second question concerns the existence of such non-particular, non-concrete or non-material ‘things’ such as number and morals. Where is the number ‘one?’ Where is the value ‘justice’ or the color ‘red?’ It might appear that these abstract things do not exist in space—but if they do not exist in space, do they exist at all or are they merely ideas? The meaning of the question is not yet clear—what could it mean that something does not exist in space but may exist as an idea? There is a vagueness behind these issues. The machinery of concept and object whose discussion begins shortly is instrumental in the analysis of abstract objects but real clarification awaits Objects
It is perhaps useful to note that in pondering the existence of abstract objects it is possible to begin a chain of reasoning that covers ‘worlds of ideas,’ ‘mental space,’ whether something that exists must be material… It will turn out that such reflections might take the thinker into much vagueness without satisfactory resolution. Such speculation will not be indulged here because it is unnecessary. In Objects, the nature of abstract objects—and whether they reside in space, whether they have material nature—will be resolved. ‘Worlds of ideas’ and ‘mental space,’ could be given meaning but this will not be done as the ideas are not particularly significant or useful. What is significant is that while some elucidation of the nature of particular—concrete—objects is relatively simple, the treatment of abstract objects must await the development, in Metaphysics, of the metaphysics of immanence. The outcome, however, may be stated simply enough—the distinction between particular and abstract objects is not one of kind but is according to whether the object is—most conveniently—studied empirically or conceptually
Note: reference to ‘elementary particles’ simply acknowledges modern physics but generally makes no further use of it. Occasionally, reference may be made to the indeterminism of quantum theory. Elsewhere, deeper references to modern science are made. It should be noted, however, that the metaphysics has no logical dependence on science even though science has provided a number of points of inspiration
In the history of thought the following distinctions have been made. Existence is the mode of being in interaction, e.g., in being known. Essence or ens is the mode of being of a thing in itself—of being without qualification. To be clear about these meanings and their distinctions it would be necessary to clarify ‘being’ without reference to either existence or essence. The line of thought leads to what may be experienced as freely morphing meanings that have no final stability. In the absence of a picture of the world, a metaphysics, nothing more can be expected; and for any ‘something more’ to be certainly grounded—valid—the metaphysics would have to be necessary. In the metaphysics of immanence, which, with its necessary and ultimate character, are developed in Metaphysics, the distinction of existence and essence is seen to vanish
‘Being’ is derived from the verb to be, i.e., being is, roughly, that which is or which exists. The word ‘roughly’ was used because the source of a word does not necessarily indicate the range of uses that a word may come to have. Since being is a core term of the metaphysics that will be developed in the next chapter, what it shall signify in this narrative is at least as much a result of the development as it may be of what is received from the history of use. Roughly, however, it may be said that the ideas of existence and being have near identity. This identity implies that what has been said about existence carries over to being. However, it will be convenient to discuss concepts, objects and experience before introduction of being
The philosophical contemplation of the questions ‘Does anything exist?’ ‘What has being?’ is be taken up in the discussions, below, of concepts and objects, and of experience and continued throughout the narrative. The ideas of the concept and of experience are related and the term ‘experience’ will be used informally in discussing concepts before its more formal consideration
Among meanings of concept are the following two. (1) Something conceived in the mind, i.e., mental content. (2) An idea that may be more or less abstract and that may either refer to a genera in being generalized from particular instances andor specialized by differences among entities of a group or class or, (2a) a single significant entity
While these families of meaning are well established, the traditional versions above have significant augmentations
In the first meaning ‘mental content’ is a term often used in modern cognitive science and its inclusion here emphasizes that concepts include what is very basic—the most primitive experience is conceptual; this is important in that if talk of concepts is to be a basis of experience and meaning, the concept should, at root, be primitive and inclusive
In the second meaning the phrase ‘significant single entity’ has been added to the traditional generic idea because, e.g., the idea of ‘universe,’ which is crucial to the present narrative, is not generalized from instances (it may be seen as abstracted from the sense-feeling of all things or, specifically, all-things-as-one.) It is the second meaning that includes the significant ideas from the history of thought—including the idea of concept of the concept itself
The primary connotation of (1) may be iconic conception and that of (2) may be symbolic. However, these connotations are not necessary. Therefore, (2) is a case of (1)
The significance of the inclusion is that the significant and the esoteric are not seen as essentially distinct from the primitive and the immediate. Significant concepts may be seen as articulated systems of primitive concepts
‘Concept’ has the occasional connotation of intentional concept. Intentionality is an important modern term that characterizes the way in which a mental state has reference to—an object in—the external world. A concept is intentional when it is about something. In the immediately following discussion it is taken for granted that there are things regarding which there can be a mental aboutness, i.e., it is taken as given that there is an external world. The existence of the external world is taken up later—as is usual for such concerns the doubt is not a serious practical doubt but, rather, one that has or may have important conceptual andor methodological conclusions and clarifications that may in turn have practical consequences of great moment—but, here, it is taken as given. Also, for the present, perfect faithfulness of the intentional concept is not a concern; it is enough that there is some degree and kind of faithfulness which must, of course, follow from the fact that concepts have some efficacy in negotiation of the world
In recent philosophy there have been a number of areas of disagreement about intentionality. One issue is whether intentionality is especially mental—whether it can or cannot be recognized in matter or, perhaps more precisely, in material descriptions. Although these concerns are not of primary interest to this narrative, subsequent reflections, especially in Mind, may provide some resolution. There appears to be a natural if sometimes unreflective tendency to assign various kinds of special status to mind that is a consequence of characteristics such as having subjectivity and making intentional reference that, it appears, mental states have but material ones do not. The argument that material states cannot have aboutness appears to stem from the thought that the primitive material elements, the elementary particles of today’s physics, do not have aboutness in their relations with one another. It is, however, not at all clear that the interaction between two electrons is not an aboutness for is it not possible that their relation is a result of mutual creation, intrinsic, rather than abstract and imposed. All that can be said is that, obviously, any such elementary aboutness is much simpler than aboutness at the level of animal-human thought
From the natural tendency as well as from the explanatory efficacy of such assignments—‘material states do not have an aboutness about them,’ it does not follow that there are no alternative, valid, descriptions that do not invoke any special status to mind, e.g., that are neutral with regard to any mind / matter distinction. Particularly, whether intentionality can be understood in material terms depends on what conception of matter is used and what powers of analysis are available. If there is some future final conception of matter, i.e. one that at least implicitly contains a description of the universe, it would have to contain account, perhaps implicit, of intentionality. It is not clear, though, whether today’s—quantum—physics is anywhere close to a final physical theory or, at least, one that contains intentionality or whether the ‘matter’ of such physical theories would be recognizable as matter in today’s terms. Related concerns will be further discussed in Mind
Since there have been proposals that mind is, effectively, a computer program or algorithm running in the brain, a question discussed in the recent literature is whether a—running—computer program is capable of intentionality or even consciousness. Since the set of states of a computer that are implicated in the implementation of a program are a minute fraction of the physical states of the machine, the thesis that mind is a computer program appears to imply that mental states are a very superficial function of material states—the ‘mental’ states of a computer would be a superficial function its material states and the mental states of an animal would be a superficial of its brain—body—states. It seems, however, that the mental states in the brain / body of an animal are far deeper in terms of layering, far more varied with regard to mode, and far closer to detailed physical structure than are the differences in physical state of a computer that define a running algorithm
This argues that machine implementation of algorithms are at most minimally mental in nature and that, it seems likely, the ‘actual’ mental content is far from identical to the assigned mental content. In other words, while the positions taken in the literature appear to be that mind is / is not a computer program, the proper ascription of mental states to material states may, in addition to complexity, depend on the factors of layering, depth, variation and there may also be thresholds below which it might be said ‘there is no recognizable mind here.’ Simply, if computer programs are minds—mental—they are massively primitive minds-as-minds, disconnected from environment and one or minimally dimensional
A corollary to this conclusion is that real minds—those that are instrumental in negotiating and being creative in a complex environment—have deep embedding in or are high level manifestations of a complex material organization, e.g., a brain. Additionally, real or intrinsic intentionality grows out of the organism in evolution and in growth and is not imposed or built in by an external agent. These thoughts regarding embedding, here illustrative and without proof, has resonances and proofs in Mind where it will be seen that the apparent polar opposites—mind is / is not a computer programs and computer programs do / do not have deep embedding—are points on a continuum
In relation to concepts, the present concern with intentionality is that some but not all concepts have intentionality, i.e. intrinsic reference to objects. Pre-conception is conception evoked in mind or marked on some medium from past experience, i.e., from memory and that is be intended or hoped to have future reference to an object—is thought to have potential reference (and therefore potential efficacy as an instrument of understanding and negotiation of the world.) Preconception is also conception but is not intentional. What may be called free conception, e.g. pure expression without a present or future intentional object, is also conception. Intentional conception, preconception, and pure expression all fall under conception and their distinctions are, in fact, neither precise nor eternal, e.g. what is conceived freely may become a pre-concept and a pre-concept may become intentional
These becomings may be experienced as andor thought to be intrinsic when they have arisen in evolution or primordial thought; they may be thought of as constructed when the transition from free to preconception or the transition from preconception to conception is not hidden from view
The instruments of knowledge have been regarded as perception and reason (thought) and these have an interpretation in the modes of concept and their interplay. It has sometimes been thought that knowledge may be constructed from primitive perception and thought. Here primitive perception is regarded as perception of parts rather than wholes; a building is made of walls, floors and so on; a wall has an inside and an outside surface and a body; a surface has a color, a texture and a shape; and if the shape is anything other than flat it may have very many parts. On the primitive account, even flatness is made up of may parts that stand in a certain relation. On this account, knowledge, if at all possible, would be immensely primitive; for human—animal—knowledge they require placement within a biological framework of that enables perception of and reason about the forms of the world. This framework has been called intuition
A percept is a concept. While not all concepts are percepts, the recollection of past experience is, perhaps, part of all conception; and perhaps, all conception, is an elaboration of immediate perception, recollection and perceptual reconstruction. When past experience—concepts including perceptions—are laid down in memory, they are not laid down invariably as wholes or parts but in gradations of such. There are wholes but not all wholes are indivisible, and therefore constructed concepts may contain combinations of parts of a number of ‘experiences.’ Although perception is instigated by present experience including internal experience or free conception, past experience—memory—may be and probably usually is involved in the production of the percept as exemplified by the forms of perception which are acquired in growth and by the perception of wholes from data that is partial (most data is partial)
In both meanings—items 1 and 2 above—concepts shall here refer primarily to mental content and secondarily to marks, iconic or symbolic, on other ‘media’ such as paper, canvas, dirt, and computer memory or screen. While the first meaning evokes the fact of mental content or of marks on recording media, the second meaning evokes the structure of the mental content or marks
It may be said, initially, that mental content is the true concept while the marks on other media are aids of various kinds—memory aids, evocative aids, aids to communication, aids to ‘computation.’ Here, though, aid to computation simply means that the marks may be moved around the non-mental media to envisage new possibilities in the world or new conceptual possibilities; the mathematical text is a special case of such computation. Perhaps, however, the true concept may be seen as the entire system of body (mind) and artifact
The first meaning, that of mental content is the meaning emphasized here but, because of the inclusion, the discussion also applies to the second meaning. However, the present discussion is not especially about significant concepts
The discussion of concepts and what they refer to—objects—is important to the analysis of meaning which is significant to understanding the present narrative because of the empirical foundation of meaning, the fluidity of meaning and the interrelatedness of individual meanings and, as a result of the wholeness of the world, a certain wholeness of meaning as a system that is not entirely constructed out of individual meanings. While there are a few novel terms, many terms of the present narrative are words taken from common use—everyday and philosophical—that take on enhanced andor altered meaning. Much of the power of the narrative lies in the recognition of the empirical character of meaning and in the enhancement and alteration, in the recombination, and in the interrelatedness of meaning. The discussion is also important because it contributes to the idea of meaning which has a formal place in Metaphysics. However, the discussion is introduced at the present point because it is pivotal in clarifying the concept of existence and in clarifying the meaning of and, then, addressing the questions ‘Does anything exist?’ and ‘What things exist?’
What does it mean to say ‘Mt. Everest exists?’
If a person is looking at the mountain and has an image of it then ‘Mt. Everest exists’ means that there is something real that corresponds to and has some kind and some degree of likeness to the image or concept
The individual may have seen Mt. Everest or read about it and seen pictures of it. Then the idea or concept of Mt. Everest is a recall of its image or picture. When the mountain is not in view, saying ‘Mt. Everest exists’ means that there is something real that corresponds to and has some kind and some degree of likeness to the idea or concept
To say that an object ‘X’ exists is to say that there is a concept ‘x’ and there is an object ‘X’ that corresponds to and has some kind and degree of likeness to ‘x’
In day to day affairs it is typically unnecessary to distinguish concept and object—and instead of using X and x, it is typical to use one sign, ‘X’ to refer to both concept and object or, even one sign to refer to a symbol whose constituents are word or name and concept and object. In fact, the conflation of word, concept and object is common and usually results in economy of thought and communication. Occasionally, the same word may refer to distinct concepts and, therefore, distinct objects and, while this may be confusing, it is an aspect of language competency to normally straddle such potential confusions. However, there are confusions and paradoxes that arise when the distinction of word and object or concept and object is not made
Paradox of the concept of non-existence
Paradox of faithfulness
Paradox of the logical possibility of non-existence of an external world, i.e., solipsism
The unicorn is a mythological animal referred to in the myths of many cultures. Since there are some people who believe in unicorns it should be noted that for the purpose of this discussion unicorns are taken to be non-existent. Now consider the statement ‘unicorns do not exist.’ An obvious response is ‘precisely what is it that is asserted to not exist?’ In other words, since there are no unicorns, ‘unicorn’ appears to have no meaning and therefore ‘unicorns do not exist’ also appears to have no meaning. This is the paradox of non-existence that is frequently raised in discussions of the concept of existence. It should be noted that, regarding any hypothetical creature, X, the assertions ‘X does not exist’ and ‘X exists’ are equally paradoxical—equal in meaning or lack of meaning status. Even if a creature X is actual, ‘X exists,’ on these terms, though not paradoxical, appears to be meaningless because ‘X exists’ seems to be saying some equivalent of ‘an object, X, that exists, exists.’ The paradox, which for non-existence is one of absurdity and for existence is one of triviality of meaning, is resolved quite easily in terms of the concepts of concept and object. The meaning of ‘X exists’ is that there is an object ‘X’ that corresponds to the concept ‘X’—the same symbol is used for concept and object in a convenient but occasionally misleading conflation. Similarly, the meaning of ‘X does not exist’ is that there is no object ‘X’ that corresponds to the concept ‘X’
Except on the view that there is no external world the concept is not the object. A problem that then arises is whether concepts are faithful to objects. Since the concept is not the object, i.e., since there is no identity of concept and object, every attempt to verify faithfulness is and must be in terms of some further concept which is or includes some enhanced concept of the object but whose faithfulness must also be in question. It therefore appears that—even if there is faithfulness—faithfulness of concepts to objects cannot be established or known
It may be unnecessary to observe that concept and external object are or may be different in kind. Therefore the question of the meaning of faithfulness of concept to object arises. This is the reason for the phrase ‘some kind and some degree of likeness’ of external object to concept used a few paragraphs earlier. However our recollection of ‘the object’ is in fact the concept. The concept stands for the object. This is the subjective reason that, even without drawing and photographs, we think we know the likeness of the object (we will see better reasons)
One resolution to this question was given by Alexius Meinong who argued from the absence of faithfulness that there is no object in the world of sense experience even though objects have properties. Thus the concept was identified by Meinong as the object and labeled the concept-object. This is also suggested by the fact that we permit the concept to stand for the object. What was thought to be the object is in fact the noumenon of Kant which does not exist in sense experience
Meinong’s explanation is appealing. In making a conflation of concept and object, the problem of faithfulness is eliminated. However, unless it is necessary to resort to this explanation to confront the problem of faithfulness, it cannot be the most satisfactory resolution
Kant’s earlier resolution to the problem—discussed in greater detail in Objects—suggests the line of approach adopted here. Kant’s solution may have been suggested by the thought that, in attempting to verify faithfulness, it is impossible to get ‘outside’ concepts. Yet, the individual is able to negotiate and be creative in the world via concepts and, therefore, there must be some intrinsic adaptation of cognition—and, perhaps, of emotion and of any other function of psyche—to the world. From the vast and precise success of the mechanics and the geometry of his day, Kant assumed that Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics had encapsulated the forms of space, time and motion or causation. Further, since the individual perceives the world in these terms, Kant thought that the intrinsic adaptation of perception is a precise intuition of the forms of space, time and motion or causation. Then, the sciences of geometry and mechanics were developed in logical terms, which are also a capability, from the intuition
It is known, today, that the mechanics and geometry of the world are only approximated by the science of Kant’s time and, therefore, the intuition is only approximate. However, the interpretation of this approximate character as a limit can be turned around. First, it may be recognized, from the non-identity of concept and object, that no absolute faithfulness can be guaranteed. However, even though an absolute faithfulness of knowledge has been an ideal of human knowledge perhaps since a time before history, it is neither to be expected nor in any way necessary. Therefore, especially on account of the gap between concept and object, faithfulness seems to be a near impossible ideal and what is impossible cannot be an ideal
Although the ideal appears to be impossible, it makes for the possibility that knowledge may have advance and, depending on perspective, this reflect a nicer world than one in which knowledge is already ideal
Thus while Kant overstated the abilities of cognition, the actual lesser ability may be seen as positive—it is an embedding in the world rather than an absolute capability from a vantage point that is experienced as external to the world
Use of terms ‘lesser’ and ‘greater ability’ have a value driven component that has irrelevance to the individual / society-in-the-world
Although there may be no absolute faithfulness to the object, there is a practical and sufficient faithfulness. In saying this, it may be noted that, even in practical terms, there is an arbitrariness to the question ‘what is the object?’ It is typical to think of two mountains as two objects. However, cannot two mountains not be thought of as a single object? This freedom exists and depending on circumstances, many ‘objects’ can be regarded, even seen, as one or one as many; this freedom is itself a form of practical and useful faithfulness that may, according to perspective, be seen as lack of faithfulness or a kind of adaptable faithfulness. Perhaps one half of one mountain and one half of the other can be seen as a single object. The possibility exists but appears to lack utility. There is in fact a theoretical arbitrariness to the identity of the object that, however, is resolved by adaptability in the actual situation. If flying between two close near vertical walls, it may be useful to see them as one canyon. In entering a very unfamiliar situation it may be required to negotiate the new environment, to experiment with it, before the arbitrary combinations resolve into definiteness of objects—the process of resolution is adaptation of cognition in process and the theoretical arbitrariness of objects may be seen as a feature of the world which has no intrinsic value but which is deployed to cognitive advantage
The embedding of the organism in the world addresses the questions of the meaning of faithfulness and accuracy
It remains true, though, that there is, in general, a necessary and absolute gap between concept and object. Are there any objects that exist as conceived? It will be shown below that there are necessary—and significant—objects whose being conforms to their conception. The practical faithfulness of concepts—of experience—and the necessary faithfulness of concepts of the necessary objects provide reasons for not adopting Meinong’s concept-object to the problem of faithfulness and for not limiting metaphysics, as did Kant and Wittgenstein, to a metaphysic of experience
Kant’s noumenon can be conceived but not, according to Kant, experienced and is therefore, as far as is known, lacking in differentiation—some thinkers have taken this to imply that the noumenon itself is lacking in differentiation. In Metaphysics, it will be possible to go beyond this degree of knowledge of the noumenon. The essential point to this possibility is that in experiencing there is experience of the noumenon. This claim appears to be paradoxical for what has been said above amounts to experience being phenomenal and not noumenal. The error in the paradox is that while it holds for detail, it does not hold for what is general, i.e., what is necessary in experience, i.e., in experiencing a world, the phenomenon and noumenon are identical
I.e., in this way, experience transcends the concept
Solipsism is the position that the entire world is the mental space of the individual—that this position is logically possible. That is, if the reader were a solipsist he or she would think, ‘there are no things as such, there are no other minds, there is just my experience.’ (If the solipsist’s position were true, it is not clear how or ‘where’ he or she would arrive at the concept ‘mind,’ ‘other mind,’ ‘my mind,’ ‘me’…) To be consistent, that reader would not think ‘I have a body’ but ‘there is an experience of a body that is an experience labeled ‘this body’;’ he or she would not think ‘there are others who have bodies and minds’ but ‘other and others' minds and bodies are but points in experience’—it would be invalid to think ‘points in my experience’ as factual the phrase would refer, merely, to certain regions of experience. In fact the solipsist would think ‘what is labeled the world is the set of points in experience’ and ‘what is labeled the external world is a subset of points in experience.’ I.e. the solipsist is committed to the non-existence of an external world. To be solipsist in fact, would be a psychopathological condition; however, to entertain solipsism is useful as a challenge to realism as belief in a world independent of mind and, in addressing this challenge, to be an occasion to sharpen the concept of realism and commitment to it as well as occasion to develop powers and tools of analysis. Solipsism is taken up in Metaphysics where it is seen that solipsism may be consistent with the properties of very simple worlds, immensely improbable in this world—but logically impossible only if certain properties of this world are taken as given
…
The comments on meaning in this chapter are preliminary. However, a primary concern here is that an understanding of meaning is important to understanding of the way in which words and concepts are used in the narrative. As an example, the importance of paying attention to meaning was evident above in discussing existence
Another objective of the discussion is to set up the later formal treatment of meaning in Logic and meaning—and, therefore, the discussion is more complete than it would need to be in order to guide a reader through the narrative. In the later treatment, meaning is given a place in the metaphysics
‘Meaning’ itself has a number of meanings as in ‘I have been meaning to tell you how much I value your friendship,’ ‘The meaning of a human life is a function of human freedoms, especially the freedoms of choice, action, and symbolic thought,’ and ‘Specifying the meaning of the word existence is difficult even though we feel we know intuitively what it is for something to exist.’ The meaning of ‘meaning’ is its use in the last of these examples, i.e., word or, more generally, linguistic meaning. In this discussion meaning centers around linguistic meaning but, as will be seen later, in order to specify linguistic meaning it will be necessary but not sufficient to focus on language
A problem encountered in setting up a system of thought is that elements of the system are interdependent and it may be necessary to raise the level of understanding of each element iteratively. This particular concern would not be resolved by a formal axiomatic development for as long as development is ongoing, an axiomatic expression might require iterative modification
It may be natural to place some preliminary observations on meaning immediately after discussing concepts and objects for the relations between concepts and objects is one of meaning. However, what is said immediately below on meaning learns from the development of the system of ideas of the narrative and the reader will find confirmation of the comments on meaning in the subsequent developments. However, although these comments may depend, in part, on the subsequent developments for their inspiration, the validity of the comments stands independently
The placement of the discussion of concepts and objects is necessary in order to avoid conflict that may otherwise arise in the use of the important terms, especially ‘experience,’ ‘existence,’ ‘being,’ ‘universe’ and so on. One significance of this point is that it is essential to be aware of the meanings of terms as used here in order to understand the development and appreciate its power and significance
When may it be said that a concept is understood? Even though a concept refers to an object—a class of objects may be regarded as a complex object and so the singular term ‘object’ is appropriate—it has sense. Roughly, sense is what the concept connotes to the conceiver. Although the sense may seem to be different from the object, perhaps sense is nothing other than the intuition that is built up in using the concept in formal and informal contexts. E.g., in reflecting what sense the sense of a particular concept may be the individual may have a variety of mental pictures that contribute to the sense. In Logic and meaning, sense will come to mean potential or possible reference; however, at present the idea of sense is left with the foregoing intuitive specification. The meaning of a concept is often regarded as sense as just described. However, in the present specification, sense is open ended and clearly not definite. The meaning of the meaning of a concept would become definite if the class of objects to which it refers were specified. Thus it was Frege’s thought that meaning should be as a combination of sense and reference
This specification of meaning may appear to be an awkward combination of different kinds. However, as noted, the kinds are not different if sense means potential or possible reference and, so, sense and reference need not be understood as different kinds
Some observations on meaning now follow
In any context meaning resides in the system of concepts and in their possibilities of combination, i.e., grammar
…For example, since a context in which there are only actions or processes is imaginable, the grammar of ‘verbs’ must surely depend on the language in which it occurs
…In a language in which there are things and processes, the possibilities of meaning must depend on the kinds of relation that thing and process are allowed
…Although it is a mistake to think that system meaning implies all rules of grammar—since the same content has different forms in different languages—there must, for stability and faithfulness, be some invariants of grammatical form
…The residence of meaning in a system of concepts is perhaps most evident in axiomatic systems in logic and mathematics and in scientific theories
…Is the meaning of the term ‘Mt. Everest’ dependent on the environment? Ask, ‘is the peak of Mt. Everest white?’ If the peak appears pink at sunset, is it a fact or a convention that the peak should be regarded as white—if it is so regarded. And, is its color part of the concept of ‘Mt. Everest?’ Although the example is trivial, cosmology suggests that the properties of local objects may depend on the structure and extent of the cosmological system but, as long the effect is relatively constant, the local objects will appear to be constant in their fundamental physical properties
…Therefore, individual concepts are not completely understood in isolation
…However, metaphorically, meaning may be focused in the concepts while it also resides in the system
…That meaning is focused in the concepts is effective and may be a result of selection of perceivers and perception within a selected environment. There may also be selection or experimentation in the formation of free concepts
…There is no implication that in having a system of meaning, ‘perfection’ has been achieved or has significance
There are different contexts of meaning. The same word in different contexts has a different meaning. It might be more accurate to say that the different contextual meanings of the ‘same’ word have no basis of comparison
…If the contexts overlap, it may be possible to formulate a basis of comparison of meanings in the different contexts
As a context changes or moves, meaning shifts. The change in context may be a ‘lateral drift,’ or, perhaps, a broadening of context
…As contexts change, old terms take on new though perhaps ‘similar’ meaning. New terms with previously unrecognized meaning may be introduced as a result of introduction of new objects of reference andor experiment with sense
…There is a variety of ways in which contexts ‘change.’ A community that is subject to new circumstances beyond or in their control may face conditions that require new concepts or the shift of old ones. As Wittgenstein pointed out, language has a multiplicity of contextual uses that he referred to as ‘language games.’ Wittgenstein was especially interested in non-propositional uses of language. This emphasis may have mislead some recent thinkers into believing that the propositional use is altogether unstable; this contrasts with the present discussion in which this use is seen as having stabilities-within-a-context-of-flux. Wittgenstein’s interest in non-propositional use may also have lead some thinkers into marginalizing the proposition and the fact; however, this marginalization is not entailed by an emphasis on the other uses—it is, of course, not being asserted that there are no issues with the idea of the proposition or its ‘standard’ forms and this concern receives some attention in later discussions of language in this narrative
…In acquiring new domains of knowledge, context is significantly extended. Contexts ‘change’ from individual to individual and from one occasion or time in the life of an individual to another. Naturally, these differing contexts, except in the case of fracture or extreme shift, must have an effective similarity that permits stable communication and stable identity. However, the variability, which may be at least partially driven by the individual, may be a source of adaptation to new contexts whether imposed or created
…It may be thought in the extension it is only the range of known reference of the concept that changes. However, potential reference also changes—in Objects and in Logic and meaning it is seen that sense may be identified with potential reference. It could be argued that, once a concept is established, its potential reference, especially against the background of any ultimate metaphysics, is fixed. However, a distinction may be made between potential reference that is merely possible and having a grasp of the possibilities and range of possibilities of reference
…Net meaning, i.e., system meaning shifts
…Thus meaning has a fluid aspect but must also have stability in order to be usable
…It appears that there are times of stability in meaning and times of rapid change whether the context is limited or ‘general.’ A study of the occasions and factors of change may be interesting but—except for suggestions that may be implicit in the discussion—will not be taken up here
…Generally, etymology, provides no more than clues to meaning. This is true, perhaps, even of ‘dictionaries.’ Though dictionaries are useful and etymology may be enlightening, they may be misleading if employed as definitive
The word ‘progress’ may refer to cases in which a new context includes an old one
…In progress, the context of reference grows
Even in its valid context, the old system is not the same as the new. However, in that context, the two systems may have equivalence. By taking into account the characteristics of the old context, the new may ‘reduce’ to the old in the old context
…Scientific theories are a prime example of such progress. The domain of application of relativistic mechanics is broader than that of classical mechanics and the classical theory is the low velocity limit of the relativistic theory. Although the meaning of the basic terms (concepts) of the mechanics are not identical in the classical and relativistic theories, the reduction provides some basis of comparison. This stands against Thomas Kuhn’s thought that successive theories of science are incommensurable—what may be the case is that the new theories have a sense of incomprehensibility to some scientists who were educated under the older paradigm
…From the reduction of a new scientific theory to an older one, it does not follow that such reduction is possible for all expansions of context and even if possible, the reduction in one case may not show how the reduction is to be accomplished in another
If one context includes another, the meaning of the contained system may be derived from the containing system. However, if there is no containing system, there is no other system in terms of which meaning may be derived. That is, without a containing system, meaning cannot be specified lexically
…In absence of a containing system, meaning is implicit in use which must mean application or deployment
…Application anchors meaning and is its source of stability
…However, even though there is no containing system for the given context, the context may be capable of growth and therefore, stability of meaning does not imply finality of meaning
…Since a metaphysics intends to be a system that has no present containing system, these thoughts definitely apply to metaphysics
…Even in the common arena of meaning, there is change. This may be seen most clearly in small communities that must continually adapt to changing contexts and in the origin of pidgin dialects
…Given an isolated community, there is no, larger, containing or inclusive community. The agents of linguistic change are the members of the community and their experience
…In the modern world, all individuals have the potential to participate in change, even though change may be concentrated in a few individuals and in institutions
…Explicit rules of language—e.g. grammar—must have come after language even though they may be implicitly present at the ‘beginning’ of language in—non-uniquely—expressing necessities of meaning. Formal rules may be necessary to stabilize meaning in large societies where context is isolated from necessity and in order to standardize communication. However, the value of standardization may be an illusion. Further, standardization may be an impediment to growth and change, and may encourage stagnation and degeneration and a mechanical view of meaning
The stability of meaning-as-reference is confused by meaning-as-power, i.e., by appropriation of meaning to political ends that include influence by one individual or group over another
It was earlier seen that the concept of substance cannot be the basis of a foundation of a framework for an ultimate understanding of things and the idea of existence was suggested as an alternative. Existence is recommended, not only by its inclusion of what is immediate but also by its lack of distinction of the immediate and the remote, the esoteric and the mundane—i.e., by its shallow or trivial character. An appeal to existence is, in effect, an explanation of things in terms of the things themselves—i.e., of the universe in terms of itself. It is trivially clear that this explanation will be successful—every thing is itself. It seems equally clear that this explanation should be uninformative; however, it has been noted that existence can form the basis of a metaphysics of ultimate depth and breadth. While there are some thoughts toward the development of the metaphysics in this chapter, especially in what follows, the systematic development is deferred to Metaphysics
The questions ‘Does anything exist?’ and ‘What things exist?’ were pointed out as significant but have not yet been fully addressed. It was suggested that perception of things is a form of existence even if the ‘thing’ perceived is a hallucination or there is an illusion involved in the perception for the percept itself exists regardless whether it is real or illusory or hallucinatory
The concept of experience will be used to strengthen and elaborate the earlier argument. In their primitive meanings, experience and concept are near identical. However, the idea of ‘concept’ is used to suggest that there may be an object that corresponds to the concept but experience focuses on the concept itself, on what is sometimes called the subjective side of knowing
The discussion will first focus on experience itself—on what it is. Then, even though there appears to be no doubt that there is experience, that doubt will be raised—for two reasons. The primary reason is that expressing and resolving doubt takes the argument further from the level of the ad hoc and into reason and so improves confidence in the argument itself and reinforces demonstrative tools—the analysis of meaning and what is given and the use of proof. The analysis of meaning and of what is given is especially important for, while it is often neglected or assumed without question, focus on it will, in the present discussion, show clearly what may be regarded as given and will resolve ‘foundation’ in showing it is not limited to the alternatives of substance that is not capable of further analysis and infinite regress, i.e., in going toward showing a foundation without substance but that terminates without regress. The second reason to raise the doubt regarding the existence of experience—of consciousness—is that the doubt has been raised in the recent literature on the philosophy of mind and that resolution of the doubt will need to analyze the reasons for the doubt and, in this discussion, resolve those reasons and show the doubt regarding experience to based in confusion of the nature of matter—i.e. that what is not seen or not explicit in theory must be absent
The discussion will show that there is experience, i.e., that something does indeed exist. Then, experience will be used to address the question ‘What things exist?’ At this point, the existence of experience itself will have been established but, except for experience itself, the existence of the seeming objects of experience will not have been established. The idea of the forms of experience will be used to investigate ‘what exists.’ It will be seen to be possible to properly class the forms as two kinds—the necessary forms of experience and the contingent forms. It will be shown in the discussion that the necessary forms do and must correspond faithfully to objects that may be labeled ‘necessary’ objects. One of these forms is experience itself; some others are the universe—all that exists—and the void or absence of existence. The study of the necessary forms and their consequences is developed at length in Metaphysics. The contingent forms concern the external world—the world that exists independently of its being experienced but that exists, roughly, as experienced—and its variety of things or objects. In Metaphysics it is shown that although the contingent forms of experience do not invariably have corresponding intentional objects, there must, provided that no inconsistency is entailed, be ‘corresponding’ objects somewhere in the universe. The existence of objects that correspond to the contingent forms is taken up in Objects where it is argued that it is normal—i.e., roughly speaking, immensely probable—for the contingent forms to be practically faithful to objects
The external world is not experience but includes it, e.g. in regarding one’s own mind as an object or in other minds—the question of ‘other minds’ and their existence as instrumental in removing doubt and in sharpening demonstrative tools is introduced above and discussed further in Metaphysics and Objects. It was just said that the external world is not experience. However, in metaphysical idealism, perhaps the significant alternative to materialism in the history of thought, mind is thought to be a more fundamental feature of the universe than is matter—e.g. everything is mind and that ‘matter’ is one of its forms. Idealism and its denial, e.g. that the world is not experience, are not meaningful unless the nature of matter and mind are carefully specified. There is a common concept of matter as in modern physical science and a common concept of mind as in the seat of mental content or experience. In the common concepts, it is frequently thought that it is difficult to see how mind could be a form of matter because mind is so seemingly immaterial. However, it is not unreasonable to think that if sufficient powers of calculation were available that mind could fit into a quantum mechanical framework and that the subjective or apparently immaterial aspect of mind is an implicit aspect that framework—subjectivity is not excluded in the material description but its absence is often taken as exclusion. If mind cannot fit into the present quantum theoretical framework, there must be some extended framework—it does not follow that normal human powers are sufficient to its discovery—that does; this follows from the necessity of the existence of experience / mind that is addressed in this chapter. In Mind it will be seen that, although in its common concept, experience is only a part of being, there is and must be an extended concept of experience or mind that extends to the root of being, that includes all being including matter and its forms. In the dual extension to the root of both mind and matter the two concepts are—will be—seen as identical, the extension of meanings results in neither true idealism—or pan-psychism—nor true materialism. Instead, what is revealed is that there is no more fundamental character of things than the things themselves which, as noted earlier, will be seen, perhaps against expectation and common sense, to be the basis of an ultimate metaphysics
In Mind, experience is seen to be fundamental to the nature of mind. Independently, it will be seen below to be fundamental to clarifying the nature of existence and therefore of being. Since it is in mind that things and therefore existence is perceived, the connection to experience is not unexpected
The connotation of the word ‘experience’ in this narrative is introduced immediately below. Here, experience is a simple function of mind. However, in the present connotation, experience is an aspect of—at least—every conscious function of mind. It is therefore easy to mistake one or more of these other, more complex functions, for experience. There is a use of experience in which it connotes familiarity with a field that is the result of repeated exposure and practice. This connotation is marginally related to the present one
Experience is fundamental to the development and it is therefore essential to understand the present meaning of experience and to differentiate it from the more complex functions of mind. Therefore, after introducing the present meaning of experience it will be further clarified
It is often the case that it is difficult to explain the meaning of a fundamental concept. This is because there no other concepts in terms of which it is to be explained. This leads to the erroneous conclusions that the derived concepts are more precisely known than the fundamental ones. The partial resolution of the point is that, at least in the case of experience, its meaning is given by use or in intuition which are somewhat beyond words especially as a result of its fundamental nature. The clarification of this point in what follows should assist the reader in realizing that despite difficulties of verbal precision, the understanding of experience is not imprecise provided the effort has been put in to see precisely the mental function to which reference is being made (similar remarks may apply to the understanding of other fundamental concepts)
The approach through use or intuition to the clarification of the meaning of fundamental terms was labeled partial. This is because the clarification of meaning in general by pointing to the objects of the world including intuition (this has been called ostensive definition) or by reduction to other terms is itself partial. In axiomatic systems the various terms stand in relation to one another and these relationships are constitutive of the meaning. However the verification of such meaning occurs, in a sense, in the success of the axiomatic system. The case of common meaning is not different. The various words of our common vocabulary stand in relation to one another. The success, perhaps a partial and ongoing endeavor, of language as a system is verified by the success of language as an instrument. The preceding statement requires modification. In day to day use we do not think of the ‘success’ of language; that is the function of the classroom and the student of language. In the world, language and its use or application evolve together and this occurs (perhaps) without conscious thought of correctness or success; it is perhaps the case that the student of language—the linguist and the teacher—come after language rather than before it. That too may have only a degree of truth for it has been suggested that in the small community the origin and use of language is marked simultaneously by use and by reflection on use even though, perhaps, the reflection is primarily done by individuals who are gifted in language
In Mind, the meaning of experience will be extended and further clarified
A prototype of experience is the experience of an object. In seeing a rose one has experience of its shape, its color, its fragrance—and these constitute the experience of the rose. Experience is the qualitative, or subjective or feeling side of things. It should be noted, though, that, here, ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ or ‘quality’ and ‘definite form’ or ‘mathematical form’ are not in the least exclusive—exclusion arises from the use of a distinct if related meaning of ‘quality.’ Experience is equally present in emotion, e.g. the feeling of happiness, in the perception of things both small—a rose—and grand, e.g. a sunset over the ocean, and in the sense of a presence, e.g., awe or wonder at the mystery and power of the universe. In the previous sentence ‘feeling’ is used in a common meaning; later, feeling will be used in a more inclusive sense in which perception also involves feeling, i.e., feeling will be used as nearly identical in sense to the present use of experience—the distinction will be that feeling will connote elementary experience; therefore, experience will—may—be thought of as integrated feeling. Experience is immediate but, perhaps, that is an understatement for experience is not what is most immediately known, it is the form and mode of knowing
As noted earlier, experience and concept have near identity except that the concept is typically associated intentionally with an object but, in its meaning or sense, experience has no intended association with an object. Experience is not something that is other than the concept—it is part / mode of concept. However, just as a concept may have intentional correspondence to an object, may lack actual correspondence but may have potential correspondence to an object, may have no intentional correspondence actual or potential, may be a perception, a recall, a reconstruction from recall—iconic as in imagery or symbolic as in thought or compound as in symbolic-imagistic thought—experience may also be all these things
It is possible to talk of concepts from an objective point of view as, e.g. a structure in the body—brain—of an organism and, experience seems to not lend itself to this kind of description and there is thus an apparent gulf between experience and this way of seeing concepts; however, this apparent distinction will be dissolved in the subsequent narrative, especially in Mind
In attempting to explain what experience is the terms employed are terms of experience—experience itself, perception, feeling, the subjective side… This is because experience is so fundamental that there is no more fundamental thing in terms of which to define it; and, experience does not seem to be like the objects of the external world and, so, it seemingly cannot be defined in terms of external objects. Some things can be defined in terms of experience—given experience, it may be possible to define kinds of experience such as the experience of sadness, of warmth, of color and so on. As a result, in the paradigm of definition in linguistic terms, sadness, warmth, color and so on may seem to be clearer in their nature than experience itself. Although we know what experience is it is difficult to define
The case is similar for many fundamental concepts—the fundamental concept is difficult to define because there is nothing other or more fundamental in terms of which to define it and so, while the more ‘advanced’ concepts may be defined the fundamental concepts are difficult to define. When thinking analytically, then, there may be vagueness attached to what is fundamental. In fact, however, to think this way is to be deceived by the clarity of analytic thought: whatever is vague about the fundamental concept is also vague about the derived concepts but, because they may be defined analytically, it may be thought that they are clearly understood. The habit of analytic thought upturns the order of clarity and makes the perception of the particular seem clearer than the form of perception which is so immediate that it escapes notice
This is perhaps most extreme for experience for which there are alternative terms, feeling and so on, but no terms that are more fundamental and therefore it is not merely difficult to define experience analytically, it is perhaps, as a result of its most immediate character, impossible to define it analytically—and while this may result, under the analytic paradigm, in a feeling of vagueness about its character and questions about its existence, this feeling is misplaced: among all ‘things’ experience is most immediate, most clear, most real
It may be thought that existence of things is being made to depend on being experienced. That, however, is not the case. Experience is identified as a fundamental mode of existence, though not the only mode. For a sentient being, experience is the way of knowing existence but not as the condition of existence of objects; and experience will be the basis of demonstration of the existence of necessary and contingent objects—below in discussing the forms of experience—but not the condition of their existence. The argument has concerned, not the dependence of existence on being experienced, but the reality of experience itself
In saying that experience is not the whole of existence, i.e., that there is also the object of experience—the external world, it is not being said that the external world is devoid of experience for, other individuals have experience and, when the individual experiences his or her own experience of the external world, the experience itself becomes or is part of the external world. It is also not being said that there is no extended concept of experience and, perhaps, no extended understanding of the world as object, in which experience and object become identical, or, at least, different modes of description of the universe
The reality of experience is emphasized by the fact that while the experience or concept of an object is in a different category than the object, experience and experience of experience are in the same category. Or, since experience of experience is experience but is also experience of an object, when experience is the object, experience and object are not in different categories
Thus it is in the meaning of experience and existence that experience exists—the meanings of experience and existence are intertwined though, of course, they are not identical for it is not being suggested that experience is the only thing that exists. (If experience were all, the meanings of experience and existence would be intertwined; which shows that while there is some similarity to their senses, the reference of ‘experience’ lies within the range of reference of ‘existence.’). In a sense, the fact of experience demonstrates its existence—i.e., that something exists. The demonstration is, of course, not a proof from premise to conclusion but in the analysis of what is most immediate—given—and of meaning, i.e., there is an analytic component to the demonstration that, however, lies in the analysis of a linguistic meaning and not in the construction of one
The content of the previous paragraph may be stated formally. It was seen that the meaning of ‘X exists’ where X is a concept is that there is an object X to which the concept is faithful. So far only the practical faithfulness of concepts to objects has been established and this faithfulness obtains when the concepts have a certain usefulness. However, experience is conceptual and thus the concept of experience is of the same kind as experience and thus in conceiving experience there is no absolute gap between concept and object as there is between concept and external object
Thus, although, on account of its apparently immaterial nature, and on account of a natural tendency to doubt the subjective, it may be natural to doubt that there is experience, this doubt is now revealed as unreasonable. Experience is the fundamental case of definite existence and this fact is not capable of further analysis although, of course, it is capable of illumination
That is, experience is itself, the first necessary concept and the first necessary object
Still, for the reasons stated earlier, the existence of experience will be subject to doubt
Demonstration of the existence of experience has been given. Therefore, to address doubt all that is necessary is to allay it—this will be accomplished by identifying doubts and refuting them
A first reason for doubt is, as stated above, the apparently immaterial nature of experience, of feeling. The question may arise ‘Where does experience exist?’ This question may be elaborated ‘The brain occupies certain states and undergoes certain processes in having a concept but where is the experience itself?’ Materialism itself has not been established and, as will be shown, it cannot be established—except erroneously—and, therefore, the immaterial nature of experience, whether apparent or real, is not an argument against the existence of experience; this point is elaborated in Mind. The resolution of any paradox regarding objects that do not have location or clear location is left to Objects, and the question of the location of experience itself is left to Mind
There is, therefore, no principled objection to the existence of experience from the apparently immaterial character of experience
A second set of reasons to doubt the existence of experience comes from scientific materialism. (In talking of scientific materialism, it is not asserted that a commitment to science is a commitment to materialism even though the majority of scientists are, perhaps, materialists. In fact, the commitment of persons is not a logical factor at all but the point is mentioned here because it is often treated as though it is)
From the fact that certain features of mind have no demonstrated explanation in terms of modern theoretical physics it is often assumed that they cannot fit into a materialist framework and therefore they do not exist or, perhaps, even if they exist, have little significance in the working of the world. Such features include intentionality, the causal efficacy of mind, and experience—mind itself. This objection has been addressed above and is treated and defused in greater depth and detail in Mind. I.e., the objection from scientific materialism do not hold. A part of the argument will be that experience is not other than brain / body process and there is therefore no logical argument from materialism to non-existence or insignificance of the features of mind
It appears to be the case that human beings vary significantly in the richness and variety of their inner lives. Perhaps it is not that some persons have a necessary poverty of experience but that they attach less significance to it. It is not clear how the truth of the claim might be demonstrated but it has been suggested as an explanation of the quickness with which some thinkers are persuaded by the materialist argument to deny experience. There is an argument from power to the denial of experience and it is not clear how the power motive might be distinguished from poverty of experience. Perhaps power is a substitute for poverty of experience—an aspect of the introvert / extravert continuum. Perhaps the power motive may overcome richness of experience. The point being made in the present paragraph is not a logical one but is an attempt to explain the puzzling aspects of the denials by some of something that seems to others to be central to human being—and, it may be noted, those who deny experience and consciousness have explanations as to why others might entertain such beliefs. The logical point to this paragraph, then, is that psychological analysis of belief does not—generally—prove or disprove the belief and has no place in logical argument even though it may be used as an instrument of persuasion
Having dealt with objections to the existence of experience, it no longer remains to demonstrate existence for demonstration has already been given. However, there may be ways to further secure and illuminate the demonstration. The fundamental principle of metaphysics from Metaphysics, shows the necessity of experience since it is possible and the concept of the normal from the same chapter shows that it is immensely likely that human and other animals have experience. As proof, this approach is empirically less secure but rationally more so than the demonstration given above; however, it clearly and definitely defuses any disproof of experience on materialist / scientific grounds; further, it may be useful as a source for further reflection / demonstration
Concepts include percepts whether real of illusory, and recollected images whether whole or part or reconstructed, whether iconic or symbolic, i.e. imagery and thought, and whether real, potential or delusional. Concepts may be simple as in a sensation in a single sensory mode, complex as in percepts and thought, and compound as in hypotheses and theories and, even, entire narratives, even the entire tradition of thought. Thus it is typical—illusions and delusions being exceptional—that concepts correspond intentionally to an object whether actual or potential. Experience and concept are identical except, first, that experience emphasizes the concept without particular reference to an object and, second, that in talking of experience the subjective aspect is emphasized where as in talking of the concept there is no preference for the subjective or first person aspect or the objective or third person point of view. The forms of experience are the contents of experience or concepts regarded in their experiential aspect. That is, in talking of the forms of experience reference is being made to mental content, to concepts, but without regard to whether the concepts in question have any kind of reference to something else—to an object. That is, the forms of experience are regarded in themselves and as of interest in themselves
The forms of experience may therefore be regarded as a form of play, a theatre, in which the constraint of ‘reality,’ if present at all, is not in the foreground. The variety of the forms of experience is at least as rich as the sum of human knowledge and imagination. The first significance of the forms of experience is that they are, as play, a source of creation. I.e., the forms of experience are pre-critical. However, if all forms of mental content are to be included, criticism itself is included but, primarily, as play. Figuratively, criticism is permitted among the forms of experience but it does not typically wear a stern face—to yield to a temptation to say that criticism is never stern when regarded as a form of experience would, perhaps, be rather stern. This process of equivocation could be unending but judgment intervenes at some point and finds that other avenues of play with the forms of experience may be more productive. Thus, criticism is never altogether absent and this raises an interesting question whether it is possible to be altogether uncritical
The present idea of the forms of experience is similar to Husserl’s insight that the study of foundations must or should begin with an analysis of experience. At present, the forms of experience are not, however, sufficiently developed to be regarded as a ground for metaphysics but may, instead, be regarded as a source. It is interesting that the idea of the forms of experience occurred independently of any recollection of Husserl’s thought and this suggests that there is convergence in realistic thought that stems from the real itself, from intuition of the real and from immersion in traditional thought
The present narrative has many points of contact with the tradition—some of whose representatives are Kant, Schopenhauer, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger—that attempts to straddle the empiricism / rationalism dichotomy. A number of these points of contact may be found in the concept and variety of the forms of experience
The forms of experience may be classed, at outset, as necessary versus contingent versus impossible. The following contains a preliminary discussion of necessary and contingent forms of experience; the impossible forms are discussed in Metaphysics and in Objects which continue the discussion of necessary and contingent forms. Cosmology emphasizes necessary forms—general cosmology—as well as contingent forms—local or physical cosmology and Human World emphasizes the interaction of the necessary / universal forms with the contingent forms of the human world
The necessary forms of experience are those whose intentional correspondence to an object follows from the form itself. I.e. the correspondence to an object is determined by logic where logic is understood to include necessary analysis of meaning. The objects to which the necessary forms of experience correspond necessarily exist and are therefore called necessary objects. Since the necessary form of experience—necessarily—corresponds to a necessary object, it suffices to use the word ‘necessary’ to refer to both form and object. As has been seen it is in the meanings of experience and existence that there is experience and experience is necessary; similarly, existence is necessary. It is not being said that there must be existence (being—see the discussion of being below) but the necessity of existence (being)—i.e., there cannot be eternities of nothing—will be demonstrated in Metaphysics. The other primary necessary forms include the following. From existence (being) it follows that there is the universe, i.e., all existence (all being;) from the experience of difference and change it follows that there are difference and change which must be necessary; the necessity of extension / duration follows from the necessity of difference / change; from difference, it follows that domains are necessary and from domains, it follows that domains necessarily have complements, i.e. all that is not in the domain
The necessity of the void or absence of existence (being) may now be demonstrated. (i) Since the universe is all being it must contain all objects—all Form, Pattern and Law which, from the concept of the universe, cannot lie outside it. (ii) Define the void as the complement of the universe. (iii) If the void exists it contains no Object—no Form, Pattern or Law. (iv) The universe is a domain and therefore it has a complement which must exist. Since, from item ii, the complement of the universe is the void, the void exists. Combining this with item iii, it follows that The Void Exists and Contains no Object—no Form, Pattern or Law
It will be seen in Metaphysics that there is a necessary character to the contingent forms in that even though they may not reside in any particular world—domain of the universe—they must, of logical necessity, reside somewhere and when in the universe
(A) There is experience of ‘I’ or ‘this’ center of experience. However, it does not follow from the experience of ‘I’ that there is an ‘I.’ More generally, it does not follow from the existence of an external world that there is an external world. Doubting the existence of an—the—external world or an ‘I’ is not a practical doubt but serves to clarify the concept of the external world, the nature of domains in which there must (practically) / need not be an external world, and to develop tools of demonstration and analysis. In Objects, identity—personal and general—will be developed as an object in a way that reveals the merging of individual identity in higher / universal identity without relinquishing individual identity
(B) Concepts of particular entities whether particular—concrete—entities or things such as rocks or abstract such as number and other mathematical objects. The nature of the particular object has been introduced above and it is further clarified in Metaphysics and in Objects. Particular or concrete objects include not only ‘things’ but also relative intangibles such as air, parts and collections-as-entities. Events, processes and facts are also particular. While there are some preliminary considerations of the particular / abstract distinction in this chapter and in Metaphysics, the distinction is taken up and a number of issues regarding the abstract object resolved in Objects. It will be seen that the distinction is more one of convenience of study rather than, as is usually thought, one of kind. As will be seen the approaches to study of facts, Forms, Patterns and Laws straddle the particular / abstract distinction
The developments will also take up the identity of entities
The form of experience include (C) sense and feeling, percept and concept, intuition (in the sense of Kant) and explicit knowledge, acquaintance and description (due to Russell,) iconic and symbolic (including verbal) knowledge. These forms are pertinent to questions of epistemology. In Human being, the forms of intuition are extended to include symbol, reason and humor. As the capacity to respond to what is unknown and what may be unexpected, humor is especially significant for it is a form of transcendence of the limits of reason and encompasses all being in potential / principle though not in fact / detail. Humor includes the idea that if encompassing all being in fact and in detail is logically inaccessible to a mode of being then encompassing all being in fact and in detail cannot be desirable to that mode of being. Death ‘makes sense’ in a variety of ways; in humor death is accepted without its making sense; alternatively, in humor, death makes sense without there being explicit sense
Also recognized among the forms of experience are those that are significant in science and that arise in consideration of (D) ‘this’ cosmological system. As will be subsequently seen, this cosmos is a highly localized and specific form of being relative to the universe (all being.) Therefore the objects of science—as well as those of common knowledge from which science stems by experiment and criticism, and by discovery and concept and law formation—are contingent objects and the questions of their being and nature are both theoretical and practical
Another local form of experience, (E) may be called ‘the human condition.’ In addition to the detailed particulars, the phrase sometimes connotes the affective rather than the cognitive side, the limits rather than the possibilities, frailty rather than strength, context over time and history… Such connotations are included but their contrary forms are not excluded. The representation of D and like forms and E is found not only in the sciences but also in the humanities—in philosophy, in history, in art, in literature, in drama and music. Exploration, adventure and transformation are expressions of the form E. Aesthetics and ethics, in human being, as well as in the human comprehension of any ultimate form to aesthetics and ethics, are contained in the form E. In Objects, it will be seen how value may be understood to be an object
Included for completeness. Includes the human condition
If the archetypes were to be used directly to make inferences regarding being, it would appear that only those archetypal elements that appear in consciousness should be used. However, since consciousness is the place of all discussion, this limitation is not severe
For other purposes, e.g. as an instrument of experiment, the limit to consciousness would be unnecessary—would be contrary to the nature and uses of the archetype. However, as will be seen in the discussion of consciousness in Mind, the limit to consciousness is not a significant limit
The archetypes are also known as collective forms… these are the universal ‘Jungian’ archetypes or motifs and since they are universal they cannot, according to the Jungian argument, arise from individual experience. Jung was concerned with symbols, especially mythic symbols for these are symbols at least common to a community and if trans-communal or trans-cultural and even found across hunter-gatherers and agriculturalists—including modern civilization—they are collective over the human race. There may also be symbols common to various collections from the species to the class of animals
In the Transformation phase of the journey, use may be made of the idea of the archetype and may therefore be useful to discuss the idea
Are there archetypes? And since they reside in the unconscious, do they or may they count as forms of experience?
From the arguments in Mind and in Human being, below, the conscious-unconscious dimension is best seen as a continuum of acuity, intensity and other factors rather than a polarity of opposites. Therefore, if there are archetypes, they are forms of experience. What is more, by the arguments cited, these forms go down, not only to the animal kingdom, but also to plants and lower ‘substrates’
The categories discussed in Human being, count as archetypal. For example, the animal capacity for spatio-temporal perception is not the product of individual experience alone
Therefore, the issue that remains to be addressed is whether there are Jungian archetypes. At present, this narrative has no contribution to this issue over and above Jung’s powerful arguments in, for example, The Structure of the Psyche~1927, Instinct and the Unconscious~1919, and The Concept of the Collective Unconscious~1936
Since the concept of the archetype and the collective unconscious may be regarded in a mystical light, it is important to pay attention to Jung’s definition of the archetype and the collective unconscious and to his arguments for their existence—and significance to human being and society
Two further ‘kinds’ may be mentioned—their explicit definition and elaboration as forms or experience… and related conclusions will be taken up later. These kinds are (F) inference and (G) category as in, e.g., Kant, Schopenhauer and the present narrative; while these topics have been taken up in themselves it is their elaboration as forms of experience and any related conclusions that are left for further reflection. Regarding G, since there are facts beyond assumption—as will be seen, existence cannot be eternally non-manifest—it will be interesting to see whether there are rules of inference beyond assumption
(H) Judgment is a form of experience that may be instrumental in a transition between experience as play and experience that would have an intentional object
Being is that which exists—in its entirety, or has existence—in its entirety
The phrase ‘in its entirety’ is important on account of the fact that objects are known via concepts
The phrase ‘in its entirety’ is used so that a compound concept will not be granted existential status under the definition when only some of its parts exist. The need to not have any ‘dangling non-reference’ will be further explained in Logic
Given that existence is entire, there is no distinction between existing and having existence—between being and having being
Although there is an identity between existence and being as used here, it was desirable, before revealing the identity: to discuss and resolve some problems of existence; to introduce the symbol triad of word, concept and object; to introduce experience; and to introduce the necessary forms of experience
The following topics, discussed earlier, are pertinent to discussion of being and could be placed here: the verb to be including ‘is’ and its uses—existential, constitutive, and connective; that the character of existence—being—may be regarded as primitive to meaning and that the form ‘X is’ or ‘X is / has being’ do not imply existence but express the linguistic meaning of existence / being which, on account of their necessity, require no further semantic regress; the possibility of spatio-temporal and non-spatio-temporal existence, of particular or concrete and abstract objects—later, in Objects, the question of ‘where’ abstract objects reside and whether they are indeed non-spatial andor non-temporal will be taken up and resolved; local and global modes of description; the immediacy of existence; that the deep character of existence / being lies in its immediate / trivial character and not in any esoteric sense—being / existence is not esoteric but must contain whatever may be esoteric, i.e., being makes no distinction between the esoteric and the mundane; introductions to the questions ‘Does anything exist?’ and ‘What things exist?’ and their significance; existence versus essence; concepts and objects—and symbols; meaning, sense and reference; the paradoxes regarding the concept of existence; experience, the forms of experience and the necessary forms of experience
The preliminary discussions enable a first answer but a full—more complete—answer continues through Metaphysics, Objects, Logic and Meaning, Mind, and Cosmology
While experience (concept) and object are generally different kinds, in the case of experience of experience the kind is the same. Affirmation of experience and denial of experience are both experiences. Experience is the condition of argument, of discussion, of being-in. It is, therefore, indubitable that there is Experience which is a form of being—therefore:
There is Being—therefore:
There is All Being… the Universe that contains all Form, Pattern, and Law
There is Experience of difference. Without difference, there cannot be experience of difference. Therefore:
There is Difference. Therefore:
There are Domains. I.e. domains exist
Define the complement of a domain A, relative to a domain B, as what is in B but not in A. The unqualified complement or, simply, the complement of A is the complement of A relative to the universe
I.e., the complement of a domain is the part of the universe that is not part of the domain. Therefore:
Every domain has a complement that exists. I.e. if a domain exists, its Complement exists. Now:
(1) Define the void as the complement of the universe
(2) Since the universe contains all Form, Pattern and Law, if the void exists, it contains no Form pattern or Law
The universe is a domain and therefore it has a complement that exists. Since, from item (1), the complement of the universe is the void, the Void exists. Combining this with item (2), it follows that:
The void exists and contains no Form, Pattern or Law
Or, in terms of
the idea— introduced later—i.e., of the Object
the void contains no Object
Note than the proof existence and properties of the void could be done in terms of arbitrary domains A and B and this approach might be less transparent but more instructive
Observe that experience, being, universe, experience of difference, difference, domain, complement, and void necessarily exist. In the sense of ‘object’, to be introduced later, they are Necessary Objects. Form, pattern and law will also be shown to be necessary objects
Also observe that the existence of these necessary objects is empirical. First note that their conceptual character is not at all a mark of existence—this issue has been resolved earlier in discussing concept and object and the paradoxes of the concept of existence. Second, whereas the empirical character of objects in general may be in question, the empirical character of the necessary objects follows from experience—and experience itself is empirical even though its intentional objects need not be. Prior to the analysis it might, as is often the case, be thought that the source of the—alleged—empirical character of the objects of the world must be uniform; however, the analysis shows that the empirical character of the necessary objects lies in their meaning
Are the objects listed in this first collection the only necessary objects?
Note that while the notion of object has not been clearly specified yet, the existence of the first set of necessary objects—above—is necessary. These objects are so abstracted—though not abstract—from immediate experience that it is not necessary to be careful about the concept of objecthood in order to know their objecthood
Any object derived logically, i.e. in terms of consistent definition, from the first list of necessary objects will also be necessary. It may be useful, in contemplating this thought, to recall that the ‘first list’ is not at all an ad hoc list but starts with fundamental aspects of experience—experience itself whose fundamental character as a mode of being has been shown, then all being, difference and so on…
A far greater variety of necessarily existing objects will be shown in Metaphysics. One characterization of this variety is that the one universe of all being cannot have greater variety than the actual variety. This could be construed to mean that the universe of all being is limited to the empirically known variety, perhaps with extensions that are roughly ‘more of the same.’ The actual significance, as will turn out, is that Logic is the only limit to actual being. The reader may wonder at something as sparse as Logic in the qualitative-human dimension should define the limit of being—does not that make for poverty of being… as if the limit of being was defined by a stern and austere God?
The response is Logic defines ‘what does not have being’ and it is what is excluded that is sparse—implying that what is included is rich in variety. Secondly, the ideas involved define rather than derive from Logic and the notion of Logic employed here is not the logic of Aristotle or of mathematical or symbolic logic or of the textbooks and therefore Logic is indeed rich. Instead of constantly seeking new words to escape the negative burden of prior thought it may be of greater advantage to educate our thinking rather than our vocabulary
At once a host of concerns arises. Are the common (not logical) necessities of our world, its regularities, not necessary after all? Hume argued that case and his argument has of course become commonplace. The developments in Metaphysics will leave Hume’s argument intact but will up end the conclusions that are typically drawn from it. Instead of concluding a poverty of laws, the conclusion will be an infinite richness of Law, of which the apparently contingent physical law of this cosmos will be but one example out of an infinity. Various logical and scientific objections may be entertained. If Logic is the only limit, what is the status of science? What is the real characterization, then, of the variety of being? What are the relations among being, metaphysics, logic, objects, and cosmology?
The appreciation and address of these and other concerns is many-faceted and must await the various discussions of this division, Theory of being
The necessary existence of an infinite variety of objects—including objects such as those that appear to exist in this cosmological system—will be shown in Metaphysics. Of course, not all appearances will correspond to immediate realities. Knowledge of objects and the question of appearance and reality is further taken up in Objects. Objects and Cosmology will complete the discussion of the variety of objects
That is, why does the metaphysics to be developed take being as its core concept? A number of ‘reasons’ may be given. Some justification of the choice of being has been given. Being is the most intimate, most grounded of concepts; additionally, Being connects to the tradition—of course, in drawing from the strength of traditions, care is required to avoid pitfalls
But, in the end, while pre-justification is important, post-justification is perhaps more important
However, it is important to note that, at least at a theoretical level that deploys explicit concepts, it is the development of the metaphysics—the possibility of the metaphysics, its ultimate yet empirical character—that, over and above extra-metaphysical reasons, that justifies adoption of being and gives final elucidation to its character. While the idea of being is fundamental since it is at the core of our presence in the world, what is put into its elaboration and clarification, e.g. the elimination of substance and determinism and clear thinking about its nature and the ideas of all and absence of being, is as important as the received fundamental character of being
In the previous paragraph, reference was made to ‘a theoretical level that deploys explicit concepts’ because there is a pre-theoretical level at which the organism that is immersed in being has an experience of being and, necessarily of all-being, without recourse to symbolic concepts. If that organism does not possess the symbolic capability, it has no need for the symbolic-conceptual level. If it does possess symbolic capability, it should have no compulsory need for the symbolic-conceptual level to have and experience being-in-the-world-of-all-being
It is significant that while there is a certain pre-theoretical power to the idea of being, that power alone is not the source of the metaphysics. Rather, it is a variety of areas of diligence in imagination and criticism that are especially instrumental in the development of the metaphysics. These include imagination and criticism, in seeing the various aspects of the metaphysics—suggested, perhaps, by the history of thought and by paradigms from science; in bringing various divisions of knowledge into the fold of the metaphysics; in seeing that the metaphysics reveals limits of other and not only prior divisions of thought and knowledge but also agrees with those domains within their limits; and in eradicating pre-judicial and limiting habits of thought such as substance thinking and determinism and other kinds of essentialism with regard to common categories of thought such as the nature of the object versus the property and the subject-predicate form and its implied distinctions
Thus, in Metaphysics, the metaphysics of immanence, follows, first from experience and its forms, to the existence of certain necessary objects—especially being, the universe, the void and the domain—and their characteristics, and from these, by logic, to the develop of the ‘pure’ aspects of the metaphysics. The pure metaphysics that reveals a universe with far greater variety than might otherwise be even reasonably imagined or hypothesized—which in turn has implications for the nature of actuality, possibility and necessity and for the causal versus non-causal and deterministic versus indeterministic character of the universe. In parallel with development of the pure side there has been a study of the pure metaphysics in interaction with specific domains of knowledge such as physical cosmology, the theory of evolution, and the nature of human being. In the interactive study or ‘applied’ metaphysics, the specific domains of study suggest but are not instrumental in demonstration of the pure metaphysics while the pure metaphysics has implications for foundation and content of the specific domains
The ultimate character of the present development is evident, then, in its having an empirical and a logical side that are marked by certain characteristics. In beginning with experience, the empirical side does not require the existence of an external object for its foundation and, therefore, there is no room for empirical error. The characteristic of the logical side is not merely that the development is derived logically from the empirical foundation but that it founds a new concept of Logic as the one law of the universe—of which the traditional concept of logic is an interpretation and the different logics chapters. A question that may arise and that is addressed in the narrative is the apparent circularity that it must be some kind of logic that lies at the root of the metaphysics that the metaphysics founds Logic
The recognition that the fundamental concepts are dually empirical and logical lies at the core of the success of the metaphysics
The discussion, here, talks around the ultimate character of the metaphysics. This ultimate character of the metaphysics is manifest in Metaphysics and Objects
The metaphysics has been brought to an ultimate level—one that has been glimpsed in the history of thought e.g. by Leibniz, Hume and Wittgenstein who saw some aspect of it but provided neither demonstration nor systematic development of a whole system nor development of a system of implications. Some aspects of the system have been imagined in Indian Philosophy, especially in Vedanta, but, here too, what has been seen is similarly though not identically deficient
It turns out that although the metaphysics implies the existence of an immense variety of objects, the pure side is empty with regard to the intentional location of the objects with respect to an individual perceiver. This intentional location is one of the topics of Objects. The metaphysics demonstrates the necessity of such location but not with regard to every individual—thus the metaphysics is partially instrumental in addressing topics on which it is initially silent. Another topic addressed by Objects is the question of the nature and differences between particular and abstract objects. Here, the metaphysics is instrumental in a definitive and rather surprising resolution to the nature of the particular versus the abstract and the ultimate character of the metaphysics is essential to this development, i.e., while the result may be imagined or conceived independently, it cannot be demonstrated without the metaphysics or an equivalent
Thus in bringing the metaphysics to an ultimate level, the theory of objects, has, in consequence, been brought to a level that exceeds its status in the history of thought
If these claims are true, and it is the intent of the narrative that the truth of the claims should be manifest in it, then not only is the metaphysics ultimate but, since they have been raised to the same level, there must also be an ultimate character to the present study of Objects, of Logic and Meaning, of Mind, and of Cosmology—and other lesser but significant topics
The topics of Logic and meaning, Mind, Cosmology, Human World, and Method, have, in fundamental directions, also been brought to levels that exceed their prior status. The level achieved is ultimate in certain directions and these developments include conceptualizations or re-conceptualizations of Logic, Mind, Cosmos, Human being—especially the nature of freedom, and Method that have an ultimate character and incorporate and validate the valid aspects of older conceptions
Thus, while being—being-in-the-world as well as the received concept—have power, being, as developed in this narrative, is also a receptacle for diligent and critical imagination regarding the universe and its variety
It is interesting to inquire about the sources of the ideas adopted in the narrative
A fundamental source—perhaps the original one—is, of course, the common traditions—those of everyday use and the history of ideas and thought. However, the meanings to be established here are not—and, as will be seen, cannot be—precisely those of the traditions. The question about the origin of the present forms of the ideas can be sharpened to a question about the entire selection of ideas—what is included, what is excluded, what is new—and about the arrangement, the meshing and the unfolding of the ideas
The simple answer is that what has been arrived at is the result of experiment and tinkering with ideas, reading and reflection, putting ideas together as interactive systems, attempting to understand and resolve both peripheral and central issues of philosophy and other disciplines, attempting to come up with a comprehensive system of understanding. Ideas and systems have come, some gone, some remained. The character of the ‘system’ has morphed through several incarnations or perspectives or world views. There have been experiments with materialism, evolutionism, idealism, and a vague absolutism, each worked out systematically. There has been tinkering with lesser ‘isms’ from the tradition. Each development has been rejected, not so much as wrong but as slanted andor inadequate. The present view which may be seen, in some ways, as amounting to the idea that foundations are not hidden or remote required the establishment of an conceptual apparatus that allowed the world as its own foundation to be ultimately simple—while allowing complexity. It is not impossible, of course, that the present development should suffer the fate of the previous ones; however, its necessity is—or appears to be—manifest in the development itself and not referred to something else or to some unfounded foundation
This present perspective may therefore be described as an anti-perspective—the world, not something else, is foundation—and has gone through roughly seven versions in which, along with new insights and applications, the entire system of ideas has gone through incremental and interactive revision that entailed bringing the level of precision and depth of each of the major topics up to the level of the fundamental metaphysical core
The question of the power in the received concept of being is now addressed
It may be noted that there is no precise distinction between what is received and what has been developed; the following characteristics are contained in the idea of being but, typically, become manifest only after dedicated reflection
Because of the lack of intrinsic distinction, being plays the role of unknown in the metaphysics. That is, the role of being in metaphysics is analogous to the role of the unknown in algebra, i.e. being permits talk of the unknown without having to trace the perimeter of the unknown. The power in the idea of being includes that it enables an analytic or symbolic treatment of metaphysics over a merely iconic treatment
Whereas in algebra the kind of the unknown is generally known; in metaphysics, even the kind is not known. This concern is resolved in transcending kinds
Being does not distinguish between immediate and ultimate or between appearance and reality, or between categories such as process and state or the particular and the abstract
Because being makes no distinction of mode or category, it encourages and makes possible transcendence of mere perspective at the core of the metaphysics
Therefore, being is not a dedicated concept in the way that—the common conceptions of—mind and matter are categorially dedicated
While the idea of being has been criticized as being flat, shallow or trivial, it is the very triviality that is a source of its depth and its inclusive character
The depth lies, at least in part, in that the world is not referred, for its understanding, to a part of the world or to something other than the world. That reference to itself—which is not self-referentiality of a concept—should permit the development of the metaphysics of ultimate simplicity that emerges in Metaphysics may be surprising
However, it is not surprising in that reference to something else already necessitates infinite regress of explanation for explanation without dissatisfaction. It may also be surprising that, as will be seen in Metaphysics, that reference to all being is instrumental in the development of the power of the metaphysics. However, as has already been seen, this reference is empirical. Even though the empirical character is innate, its recognition required diligent reflection on the meaning of being and of all being
In its superficiality, the metaphysics of immanence is similar to the thought in analytic philosophy that it is desirable to seek explanations in superficial terms—and not necessarily, as in some parts of science, in terms of ‘depth.’ However, in developing metaphysics of immanence it will be seen that what is superficial is not necessarily obvious. That what is not obvious may be superficial has already been seen to be implicit in the idea of being
The dissimilarity with analytic thought is that the latter remains—largely—exclusively analytical and therefore has not seen the join of analysis with experience and the ultimate lack of distinction among proximate categories. These issues may be described as the remoteness of language from fact and, in analysis’ own terms, the often-time preoccupation with piecemeal analysis
In the present deployment, it is superficiality that is deep while extreme depth—in the sense of distance—of explanation, even when it confers power and provides understanding of an aspect of being, is remote from being-as-being and from the core of human-being
Although it is sometimes regarded as esoteric, being is in fact both conceptual and empirical. I.e., being is a low level concept and the empirical / low level character together with its lack of distinction that make for its power
The idea is simultaneously symbolic and embedding. That is, being is instrumental in seeing human being as in and of the world rather than alien to or remote from the world in its mundane and esoteric aspects. Use of the idea of being, rather than the ideas of mind or matter, is a return to robust being-in-the-world—a return to a robust view of the real that contrasts what has been called the hypothetico-deductive character of science without rejecting what is powerful in science
Finally, use of the word ‘being’ encourages adoption or adaptation of what may be seen as valuable from the tradition of thought on the real nature of things that falls under the idea of being
In the developments, connection with Western and Eastern traditions will be made and pointed out