JOURNEY IN BEING
ANIL MITRA
COPYRIGHT © 2007, April 2008 VERSION
CONTENTS
Sketch… On publication… Reading the narrative… The audience. 15
Being… Metaphysics… Objects… Logic and meaning… Mind… Cosmology
Introduction… Human being… Social world… War and peace. 175… Civilization and history… The highest ideal… Faith
An individual journey… Ambition… Journey in being… Narrative
Introduction… Principles of thought and action… Philosophy and metaphysics… Problems in metaphysics… A system of human knowledge
Introduction… History of transformation… Basis and theory of transformation… System of experiments… Transformations so far and their further Design
Program of research and experiment in the modes and means of transformation… Design… The way ahead
Since the present edition is in transition, a few thoughts regarding change in the style of the present paragraph are in included in the text
This section is in-process and therefore at present some sections are stems
The journey is an adventure whose aims include experience and knowledge (understanding) of the world. The approach includes ideas or concepts and transformation of individual identity
In the process of discovery and experiment, the idea or concept of being was found to be pivotal to the adventures in ideas and in transformation
This introduction describes origins, nature and scope of the journey. It then introduces the concept of being and its fundamental character
Emphasizes ideas and action
One of the connotations of being in the tradition of thought is that which is most fundamental to understanding the world or some aspect of the world
It is natural, then, that being should also be fundamental to transformation and action
This is the connotation of interest in selecting Being as the central concept in a system of thought that is fundamental to the journey and to thought and action
The idea that being is most fundamental… is an implicit and perhaps partial specification of the concept of being
The semantic or linguistic origin of the word being is the verb to be. Of course, this observation does not exhaust the concept of being. Additionally, there are subtleties to the use of the verb to be—not all uses of the verb connote be-ing. These concerns are taken up later
A connotation of ‘to be’ is ‘to exist.’ Can being be equated to existence? There is a line of thought in which existence is ‘the mode of being which consists in interaction with other things’ while being includes the connotation of independent or pure being or being-in-itself. Thus it is conceivable that existence and being are not identical. However, not every connotation corresponds to something actual. Therefore, distinctions in connotation do not necessarily correspond to actual distinctions. That the—apparently—distinct thoughts ‘being-in-interaction’ and ‘being-in-itself’ can be had does not imply that there is a corresponding actual or real distinction. Therefore, without further analysis, it cannot be concluded that being and existence are distinct
It will emerge later that being and existence are identical
Existence will found to be ‘objective’ but objectivity requires some kind of grounding
The grounding of existence, of being-in-itself and of being-in-interaction, of existing and knowing, will be in—the concept of—experience
These assertions require demonstration. The meanings of the terms being, to be, existence, experience require clarification. There are a number of problems and paradoxes, some well known, that are associated with the terms. These concerns deferred to Foundation where it will be seen that demonstration, meaning, resolution of problem and paradox are intimately related
It may be said that everything in the universe exists or has being. Thus existing or being does not distinguish one thing from another. In using being as fundamental the character of things is not referred to something more fundamental or simpler. In contrast, in substance theory which will be considered in detail later, the character of things is explained in terms of something simpler. For example in materialism there are explanations in terms of matter. For these reasons, it might appear that an explanation in terms of being might be trivially true but also unenlightening
However, in substance theory, things are explained in terms of something else, something that stands behind or under. This ‘something else’ cannot be truly outside the world but is something else in that it is not on the surface andor in that it is a part of the variety of things. Thus while substance theory may be powerful, it is also open to error—it is not given that the world will be explainable in terms of what is below the surface of phenomena or that the whole will be explainable in terms of a part of it. The nature of substance theory, its potential, and its ultimate untenability as the basis as an understanding of the world will be taken up later
On account of its trivial character, explanation in terms of being cannot be in error. Explanation in terms of being is, in effect, an explanation of the world in terms of itself. The idea to explain the world in its own terms may be seen as including the position that at the outset of study, of investigation, the nature of the world is regarded as unknown. Thus the approach from being is similar to the use and naming of the unknown in algebra and the approach from being has powers that are similar to those of the algebraic approach
It will emerge that, despite this trivial character, explanation via being is ultimately profound. First, such explanation cannot be in error. More importantly, however, the use of being encourages and permits the formulation of a system of understanding of the world in terms of its most general and universal of characteristics such as being, all being and absence of being which will be found to be capable being the basis of a powerful system of understanding (metaphysics, theory of being.) This system does not say anything about the particular and detailed aspects of our world. However, when used in interaction with detailed understanding, the general enhances and corrects understanding of the particular and the particular provides details and examples of the general. While the result is indeed profound and unexpected, what has been said so far is but a glimmer of the actual developments
The section Introduction to a new picture of the world below provides some account of these developments
The idea of a theory of being is explicitly mentioned in Aristotle’s work. In the particular sciences, things are studied in some aspect or other—material aspects in physics, the living aspect in biology. Aristotle’s idea, in metaphysics, was to study ‘things as such,’ i.e., that things as they are
In the history of thought, being has numerous connotations. Some of these will be excluded from the meaning of being developed in this narrative. This might lead to confusion that, however, may be avoided by attending to the meaning as developed here. The gain in suggestive power from the tradition is worth the care that is required. It is probably true that the every significant concept has a rich multiplicity connotations. Therefore careful attention to meaning is not necessary only to avoid confusion but also to productive and creative thought
The present section is excessively long. It will be shortened in two ways. The first is by simple excision of excess material: the objective is a brief and simple introduction to the picture and its significance. The second way is essential and depends on a new insight of April 2008 regarding the fundamental logic and the nature of logic. There are a number of new insights regarding logic since this version was written. In this version logic was conceived as follows and contains traditional logic. The first conception was to see Logic as the one law of the universe; a second was to see Logic as the theory of the entire system of consistent descriptions. ‘The entire system of consistent descriptions’ is conceptually awkward and the first insight of the 2008 edition is to regard the idea of the entire system as immanent in Logic; consequently it is not required to think of or generate any such system—even in principle. A second insight of 2008 is to show the equivalence of the following universes: the join of the empirical universes of all sentient or experiential beings, the Universe of all being, the universe of the possible, and the Universe of Logic. The insight of April 2008 is to see that Logic is encompassed in perception and conception; that Logic is the one law; that traditional (formal, symbolic) logic, the theory of descriptions—no relation to the idea of Russell—is not Logic but may be named para-logic as lying on the boundary of Logic and as needed only by a finite and limited being whose locutions may contain ‘logic’ errors because of limited powers of pre-conception, i.e. conception independently of the object, which includes pre-perception, i.e. imagery
It is unlikely that any picture or metaphysics will be entirely new—aspects of the view have been in a variety of traditions. However, the picture has, apparently, not been seen before as a dynamic whole, with a rational-empirical foundation, as a foundation that has no infinite regress and yet no substance, and with a breadth of scope such that all being is implicit in it, and with the breadth of application covered in the narrative
The narrative, especially Foundation, paints and grounds or justifies a picture of being—of the universe. This picture has been glimpsed in the history of ideas but has not previously given a foundation or developed and elaborated systematically. A reader who is not aware that a new picture is being developed—whose elements appear in Being and whose main development is in Metaphysics, may feel disoriented by the distance between the sense of being in this narrative and the common picture of being in the modern world. While the picture is grounded in Metaphysics, reference is made to it throughout the narrative and the following orientation to its context will be useful in understanding the picture and the narrative:
…The ‘picture’ is a formal metaphysics and its elaboration. However, it is pertinent that it has not been the primary goal of the journey to develop a picture—formal or otherwise. The remaining comments of this paragraph are intended to assist readers in negotiating the dual objectives that result from having more than one goal and therefore more than one set of criteria for Foundation. The first goal is transformation of being—of realization of ultimates or, at least, to have a vision of ultimates and to travel in that direction. Understanding and knowing are part of transformation and, therefore, development of the Foundation has been part of the journey. However, actual—physical and other—transformation is the overarching goal. In pursuit of this goal, the question, not new in the history of thought, has come to the forefront whether understanding can andor should be independent of transformation or action
Even though the ideas will be shown to have an ultimate character relative to ideas, they are, as ideas, necessarily an incomplete part of being. Yet, the idea—experience—is the place of appreciation of being and becoming
It is not been a goal to base the Foundation in some medium between the needs of understanding and knowledge on one hand and transformation on the other. Instead, there have been two rather parallel tracks of development. In one, it has been sought to keep the topics of Foundation as independent of its uses as possible
What of experience—of the empirical? In the development it will be seen that knowledge—knowing—the world and knowledge of knowing itself emerge as a unified subject and not as separate divisions of knowledge. In this process it will be seen that reason and analysis on the one hand are not distinct at root from perception and empirical process on the other hand. The analysis will require recognition of the root case of perception and its necessities
In the second, the needs of transformation and action have informed the developments within Foundation and attitudes toward it in particular and knowledge and understanding in general. This track is not a pragmatic system for it is not asserted that use is the final measure of validity of knowledge but that knowledge and use remain in interaction and are so interwoven that the notion of validity may have no universal application…
Platonism includes the view that a perfect system of understanding may be achieved—that knowledge need not ever be in a process of development, that it may be independent of action and context. This view, which is often tacitly assumed and tacitly encouraged by the concept of authority in education, has been held in critical light in the modern period of philosophy—especially, since Wittgenstein’s influence in analytic philosophy. However, it is difficult to overcome tacit habits of thought and modern and recent philosophy—especially analytic philosophy—remain, significantly, worlds unto themselves. One aspect of the ‘system’ of this narrative is that it should not remain a system unto itself
The picture of the universe developed and grounded is, if valid, one of an infinitely deeper truth and greater variety than is normally assigned to the universe, e.g., in religious, modern physical, or even metaphysical cosmologies. However, it is not the intent here to invalidate or, particularly, to validate those cosmologies. Instead, the new picture or cosmology locates the valid parts of the received cosmologies in within its boundaries. If the intent of a religious cosmology is to be metaphorical and the content of a physical cosmology is regarded as real, then, although those cosmologies have validity within certain imprecisely defined boundaries, the depth of their truth is an infinitesimal fraction of depth of Metaphysics and their domains of validity infinitesimal in relation to the ultimate domain revealed in Cosmology
The grounding of the picture of the universe developed here is a necessary or logical grounding. This grounding does not invalidate the received pictures or cosmologies but places them in a larger, ultimate context and helps to show the origins and limits of the systems they describe. The reader is invited to follow the arguments, to challenge them, to verify or disverify them to his or her satisfaction. The narrative itself raises challenges to its own arguments and the status of these challenges is taken up in the narrative
…for it requires a re-conception of logic that lies within the system of ideas (and being)
While the development required reconceptualization of ideas from the history of thought, the words used to refer to the reconceived ideas and even new ideas are usually older words. Therefore, careful attention to the meanings introduced in the narrative is essential to its understanding
The primitive concepts of the logical part of the metaphysics are being—whatever exists, universe or all being, the void or absence of being, and form. Being and Metaphysics develop the metaphysics around these ideas. Here, a suggestion of the power of the ideas may be illuminating; demonstration, elaboration and application, and development of meaning and significance is taken up in the body of the narrative
It is common, especially in scientific cosmology, for the word ‘universe’ to refer to the known universe and, perhaps, extrapolations from it. As all being, the present concept of the universe is rather different. The question of how it is possible to talk of and know the universe in its present conception is discussed in Being, Metaphysics and Objects
In the present conception of universe, there is nothing outside it. This implies, first, that everything—including all form, pattern and law—and not just every thing is in the universe and, second, that any foundation for secure knowledge of the universe must lie in it. Being has and can have no further foundation and, therefore, requires no further foundation; the universe has and can have no external creator
As corollary to the inclusion of all form, pattern and law in the universe, the void—whose existence is shown later—contains no form, pattern or law. Therefore, since the exclusion of a logical possibility would be a law of the void, the variety of being in the universe must contain every logical possibility and this fact is constitutive of the ultimate breadth of the metaphysics. Every form must have being and is immanent in being but there is and can be no Platonic world of forms outside the one universe. It also follows that the void may be regarded as the source of all being and, though this is a rough and incomplete statement of the truth and provides no more than a hint of its power, it is here that the ultimate depth of the metaphysics lies
…The metaphysics that grounds these developments is one of ultimate depth and breadth
The discussion above suggests that there is power in meaning. If meaning is convention, how is this possible? It must be that though meaning involves convention, meaning is not mere convention. Words and grammar have conventional aspects. However, they refer to the world. Although, to some extent, we receive the empirical content of meaning that does not make it any less empirical. To suggest that meaning is not empirical is to confuse the analytic with the explicit. Meaning has, at least, implicit empirical content. This of course does not meaning is above analysis or that it cannot benefit from analysis
The axiomatic approach suggests that at the root of any system of thought lies unproven propositions. This is deceiving. It is clear that not just any system of axioms should prove fruitful in understanding. What is it that makes the successful systems successful? The development of the system must mesh (logically) with other systems and empirically in, at least, providing a ground—as in mathematics—for realism if not realism itself—as in science
In Being and Metaphysics, it will be seen that the fundamental terms of the system will be based in (1) necessary aspects of experience—e.g. that there is experience and (2) logical consequences of the necessary aspects, e.g., that there is all experience and part of experience
This shows that absolute demonstration is possible—that some general propositions may be shown. It shows that not all proof is relative to axioms that have no foundation
The system to be developed will have ultimate power. Though fortuitous in its occasion, the development is necessary in its character. Of necessity, a necessary development of this kind has no external foundation. It is ‘its own’ foundation. The system shows the development of such foundation; and that it is not circular
Where does the local cosmology fit into the general metaphysics? (1) The infinite variety of the entire universe—all being—revealed in the metaphysics does not appear to be characteristic of this—local—world. I.e., the variety of being and behavior under the known / putative laws of this cosmos, is a—very small, even infinitesimal—subset of the total variety of being and behavior. According to the metaphysics, the behavior of the universe is not limited to that of this—local—cosmos and, further, there is, against the background of the entire universe, no distinction between the meaning or fact of ‘is not limited to’ and that of ‘is necessarily not limited to.’ The observed behavior of this cosmos is an example of normal behavior—within its context, deviant behavior, which would be impossible if the observed laws of the cosmos were the laws of the universe, are merely but highly improbable; and, within that context, it is merely but highly probable that the observed laws will describe all behavior. (2) Within the one universe, an event occurs or it does not; if it does it is possible; if it does not, there is no other comparison world where it could occur and, therefore, it is impossible. Therefore, the possible and the actual—over all time and space—are identical; from the previous paragraph, possibility is logical possibility—comparison with other meanings of possibility is taken up later. (3) The individual is immediately tied into the world via his or her experience; it may seem tenuous to suggest that experience is all that ties… however, experience is and will be shown to be a much more robust thing than is the flimsy notion that lies behind the idea of mere experience. These points and others will be discussed in demonstrative detail the body of the narrative. For now, they may be summarized by acknowledging that the concepts of the normal, of the identity of the actual and the possible, and of experience are among the concepts that reveal the place of the local cosmos in the universe
As a result of the development of the metaphysics, it has been possible to raise the understanding of substance and form, objects—particular or concrete and abstract—and identity, logic, meaning, mind, cosmology, human world, morals and ethics, faith, real possibilities in the transformations of being and identity, as well as a number topics of lesser significance or breadth to new levels relative to the history of thought. These levels are often ultimate in nature
These developments have derived inspiration from and employed analogy with many disciplines from the history of human knowledge—and, in turn, have implications for these disciplines which include not only the philosophical such as metaphysics and logic. The sources include the entire range of knowledge—the sciences including the sciences of physics, biology, and mind; the symbolic systems—language, logic, and mathematics; and art, history, faith and religion; the extent of study has not been uniform over these disciplines. It is relevant to understanding the development here that the exposure described constitutes a resource that has provided an intuitive background for the development that has made it possible to proceed without reference to or use of specific examples. While this does not at all constitute a formal deficiency of the developments, the reader who lacks the exposure may experience an absence of context and orientation in reading the narrative
The greater inspiration, however, is, directly from experience, and then from being
It should not be thought that the entire inspiration is from the history of thought. To think that thought as necessary would be to elevate our thought to a level of primacy over being. It is in the nature of novel, powerful and realist thought that transcends its roots
Regarding the metaphysics and the other topics, elaboration of its application and refinement of the levels continues
The beliefs of the present time may be regarded as roughly defined by science, religion, and secular humanism—the latter is a way of thinking based in human values that accepts scientific cosmology and is a modern replacement for religion. These beliefs do not form a coherent system and, where they intersect, may stand in conflict with regard to fact, significance and value. Assertions of the preceding kind are subject to lack in the definiteness of the meanings of the terms—science and so on. The present metaphysics allows a clarification of the ultimate possibilities of meaning of the terms. The ‘literal’ truth of present science need not be contested provided that it is seen as an infinitesimal faction of the truth. The apparent absurdity that may mark the religions is placed in context; except when the absurdity is actual, use of literal form to point to higher truth results in absurdity. Of course, there is no suggestion here that absurdity standing alone is any mark of truth or value. The figurative or evocative value of the forms of expression of spirituality, myth, and religion stand beyond their actual literal or factual form but, from the metaphysics, may be given literal interpretation
The metaphysics may be seen as standing above and giving context and significance to the factual and figurative expression of this and of any age, of any context. In so doing, the metaphysics may be seen as complementing such expression; contradiction should arise only in cases of literal interpretation of actual absurdity. In the direction of fact, there can be no greater complement. The figurative aspects of the expressions of the ages may be seen as intuition, perhaps only groping, of the metaphysics. If art points to truth, seeing truth eliminates—one—need for art, i.e., in this way, perception is greater than art (and religion and thought)
While careful definition is taken up later, cosmology and metaphysics may be seen as the study of the universe and its nature—and whether there are natures or essences. Epistemology may be seen as the study of the origin, justification, nature, and limits of human knowledge. There is a clear sense in which concern with knowledge cannot be more important than concern with the universe. However, in a world in which knowledge is regarded as problematic, epistemology may assume a greater importance than metaphysics and this has been the case in western philosophy—even the possibility of metaphysics has been in question—roughly since the time of Kant. Metaphysics provides logical construction of an ultimate metaphysics from firm empirical ground and, so, shows far more than the possibility of metaphysics
It is characteristic of these developments that, even though they may appear strange on account of their unfamiliarity and even though a reading of the narrative may be difficult because of the breadth of vision and knowledge encompassed, the core developments are essentially transparent and simple. The present development of the concept of being—and of existence—shows it to be shallow, superficial and trivial… and that it is precisely these characteristics that, along with diligent care in their consistent application and in the eradication of erroneous habits of earlier thought, enable the ultimate character of the metaphysics
Thus the developments show that epistemology may—and, as will be argued in the narrative, in the goal of realization of what is desirable and possible, should—once again take second place to metaphysics. However, the concerns of epistemology remain important. Such concerns are raised in Metaphysics and are addressed there and in subsequent topics, especially Objects and Faith. The concept of faith includes religious faith only as a special case and under the special circumstance that it has basis in reason or intuition but makes no incredulous or merely dogmatic appeal. If concern is with having secure knowledge then, since even in the heart of science and reason and logic there is no final certainty, and since—human—rationality has bounds, the application of knowledge must invariably involve faith even though that faith may be implicit. From another point of view, one that is perhaps revealed in animal behavior, faith-in-less-than-perfectly-secure-knowledge is an approximation to a mode-of-being-in-the-world that requires and can have no absolute certainty in the absolute presence of degrees of uncertainty. Parenthetically this may be set against Heidegger’s concept of Angst; which may be seen as being founded in a false concept of being-in-the-world that Heidegger’s thought retains even as it rejects substance ontology… of course, where Heidegger’s thought is and must be a groping—since, in allowing determinism, it cannot have completely eradicated substance thought—the present metaphysics is in a sense its own author rising above the ego and aspirations of its human author
In the analysis of the nature of being, of meaning, of what may be doubted and what may not—of empirical knowledge, and of logic, there is no other context to which Foundation may or need refer for justification. Still, various kinds of doubt—e.g. doubt regarding the logic of the metaphysics and doubt about how it may apply and its consequences in this world—are raised and addressed and what doubt remains may be seen as residing, not in limits, but in the nature of being. An at element of faith—even if only implicit—is and must be present in application Theory of Being, e.g. in undertaking transformation and, more immediately, in locating the ultimate objects of the metaphysics in the world of experience—that these objects can be located in experience of normal individuals may be seen to be a rather Wittgensteinian doubt. This is just as there is at least implicit faith in the application of or trust in any knowledge and which faith in explicit form is often suppressed perhaps to allow security and to promote function. The thought that in the contingent realm this is required or desirable to be or can be overcome is delusional and the cultivation of this view is a form of slavery, i.e., that there is some implicit authority or institution that owns the overcoming
Rock solid understanding is possible only in fluidity
Even though the variety revealed in the metaphysics is ultimate, the variety is implicit in the metaphysics. This leaves open infinite vistas and possibilities of discovery and transformation and suggests that variety is more interesting and basic than depth
A consequence of the metaphysics that is developed is a theory of identity that shows that an individual must experience all identities. Limits and law-like behavior—regarding but not limited to identity— within this cosmos are an example of what is termed ‘normal.’ The concept of the normal is developed in a way that shows that what is often thought to be contingently impossible is merely—extremely—improbable within a normal system and, similarly, what is thought to be contingently necessary is merely probable. The contingent necessities and impossibilities correspond to the laws of the normal system but are not logically necessary or logically impossible. It is shown that there must be infinitely many normal systems against a background of absolute indeterminism, that the variety is limited only by logical necessity, and that under absolute indeterminism, all logical possibilities including the normal systems must be realized. The experience of singular identity of the individual is normal behavior that is and must be transcended when the boundaries—e.g., in space and time—of this normal cosmos are not the limits of the domain of consideration. The possible and necessary experience of variety of identity is infinite and these identities are experienced in singular and integral form. It is unlikely and difficult though not impossible for an individual starting from normal circumstances to design and undertake the experience of universal identity. Death is a certain gate to the infinite
This section has overlap with the previous. However the intent here is to discuss significance. The two sections may be joined
…and action, process and relationship
The earlier sections present the nature but not a map of the journey. The present section is, tentatively, a sketch of the journey and an outline of the narrative
The narrative contains a deepening—in significant ways ultimate—of foundations of knowledge and being and may therefore present difficulties of understanding. Although some difficulties may be technical, a significant difficulty may lie in recognizing that a new picture of the world—a metaphysics—is painted and in grasping the logical foundation and quality of that picture and of the immense variety of being portrayed within and shown necessary by it. This difficulty may be especially acute for those immersed in the traditional pictures, e.g., from Western philosophy, metaphysics and science—i.e., for academics and experts
When a narrative is expected to present difficulties of understanding, it is helpful to the reader to have some acquaintance with the presence of the difficulties and their nature
The main suggestions are as follows. (1) Recognize that standard terms from the history of thought may be used with variant—new and often significantly deepened—meaning and therefore it is crucial to pay attention to meaning as specified here. (2) Since the narrative is not a compilation of ideas from the history of thought but is essentially new in the sense of an advance, even readers experienced with the territories under investigation may find themselves in unfamiliar terrain and. Therefore assimilation of the ideas and the relationships among them is unlikely to be a linear process. The ideas are not only new but may be experienced as strange in a number of ways of which one is that the view of the world or universe goes far beyond the standard views from the history of thought including modern day secular scientific humanism and modern day religion whether fundamentalist or liberal. Further, the ideas are not a speculative system but developed in cold logic. The modern reader conditioned to the notion of progress in all endeavors may be shocked to find that the view of the world is ultimate in a number of ways; that this is demonstrated; that logic and demonstration are not foreign to the system—are not as in standard developments studied and developed in separate and to some extent ad hoc endeavor—but are integral parts of it. Given that all this—and more—is new, the reader may even flounder in a first reading. Therefore, the narrative may be approached as an open journey rather than a trip with a preset itinerary. The reader may wish to stop, reflect, absorb, reread, integrate… If the narrative is worth this effort, and this is of course submitted to be the case, the reader will be rewarded with a new vision of the world. This vision will include at least many of the valid elements of all other visions including that of science and religion. In the end the reader will, it is hoped, be rewarded with a simplicity and unity of ultimate vision
The reader who is prepared to tentatively accept the foregoing claims may wonder if there is any adventure left in the world. The answer is that even though the vision is ultimate there is indeed adventure. The vision is ultimate in two ways. First, it is ultimate in depth; this means a foundation for the understanding of all being has been provided that has no primitive undefined terms, e.g. no substance, but despite this is not dependent on an infinite regress of definition or demonstration. For proof of this claim the reader must read at least complete the chapter Metaphysics. In the next writing the present and next section will outline a simpler and still more powerful (in the sense of grounding and clarity) demonstration. The ultimate in depth implies an ultimate in breadth. The ultimate in breadth is equivalent to the claim that every being in the universe—over all extension and duration—is implicit in the metaphysics. It is implicit in the sense that no sequence of descriptions or conceptions, finite or infinite, can contain a specification of all beings or entities in the universe. That is, for a finite being at least, there is an endless vista of discovery and adventure and, as will be seen, an endless world of becoming and transformation of individual form and identity
Instead of ‘I,’ which may suggest mere self-promotion and intrusion of ego, ‘they’ or, perhaps, fictional names may be used to encourage powers of self
The main units of the essay are ‘parts’ whose headings are bold and capitalized. Parts are divided into divisions (bold and Title Case) and then chapters (underlined, First letter capitalized.) Chapters may be divided into sections that are indicated by an italicized heading or by italicizing the first sentence of the section
Italics are used to refer to a unit from within the text; for example, the main parts are Foundation, Journey, and Map. Italics are also used to indicate emphasis
Words have variant and potential meaning. It is crucial to the logic and understanding of the essay that the meanings of fundamental words such as Being, Universe and Void should be defined explicitly and used and read consistently. Capitalization of the first letters of words indicates that a concept is being used as defined in the essay. However, it is not necessary to be compulsive about this convention
Competent language use is comfortable with conflating concepts with the objects to which they refer. However, the distinction is often crucial to clarity; capitalization is a reminder that the distinction may be significant
In a common convention, quotes are used to refer to a word or phrase. Thus, ‘tree’ refers to the word while tree refers to the object. This convention may be a reminder that word and object are being distinguished
There is an interest in the journey itself, its nature, its ways and means, its ambitions and goals
Interest is typically in the treatment of a specific topic or discipline from the point of view of the Journey—the Foundation or the ways of Transformation. The interest in the topic may be technical and for further study and research. Typical topics may be found in Program of research and experiment in the modes and means of transformation
In Foundation, the focus is on ideas which are thought to have achieved some maturity. Transformation, which is in process, is taken up in the second part, Journey
Ideas are taken up first since they are fundamental to understanding the nature of the journey and to determining possibilities of—and approaches to—transformation
Although Foundation is not in the form of a journey, development of its ideas has been and remains a journey—a part of a larger journey in transformation of being. The ideas seek to be a contribution to thought. The first purpose of the ideas is to provide a vision of the world that will be critical and, as far as possible, ultimate. The vision will be a foundation for transformation and further developments in ideas and thought
This brief division talks of the nature of the journey. It makes a suggestion for reading the narrative. In the next version it is expanded
‘Journey in Being’ is an exploration in possibility. Its means and ends are in ideas or knowledge and in transformation—in transformation of individual and identity, of society, and, later, of the world—of being
Early goals were diffuse—to be adventurous, to experience mystery and retain wonder, and to make a fundamental contribution. Along the way, being emerged as a basic to a system of concepts that enabled ultimates in ideas and the possibility of ultimates in transformation—as well as approaches to transformation. A diligent use of the idea of Being over other concepts such as matter, mind and process enabled not only foundation and proof but also analysis of what foundation there may be
‘Journey’ refers, first, to an individual exploration that began in adventure and sense of mystery and, through study and reflection, grew into a journey of being
While the journey has a personal aspect, there is, also, along the way, exploration and discovery in ideas and foundations, of what foundation is possible, and in being and identity
Since doubt served the exploration well, since there remain questions about the foundation, and since the approaches to transformation remain experimental, the regard for the foundation is that it may be best thought of as what foundation has been found along the way
The narrative seeks to be a contribution to ideas in the topics—chapters—and their foundation, and to transformation
Although acceptance is determined in the course of a contribution in the stream of ideas and action, it is thought that the contribution includes an estimate of what directions in ideas are capable of ultimate foundation, that such ultimates have been sketched and proved, that knowledge has been pushed to a number of its boundaries, and that the envelope of transformation is traced and shown
In developing a new system of thought, new meaning is introduced. In the narrative, most new and altered concepts are designated by existing words that may already have a variety—sometimes a profusion—of general and specialized uses
In order to understand the narrative it is crucial to be aware of new meaning as it is introduced
This is the first of two divisions on ‘ideas’
It is the intent of any theory of being to be a framework to understand all things without reference to any special discipline such as physics or psychology or particular category such as mind or matter. The substance theorist may interject ‘but it is obvious beyond question that all things are this or that category,’ e.g., mind or matter or, for the dualist, mind and matter. The response is that the substance theorist’s contention is not at all obvious and certainly not necessary and, indeed, the contrary will be shown—there are and can be no universal substances. Further, even if substance theory is true the framework that begins without categories can only strengthen its argument
A theory of being is about being and not about particular beings, not even the collection of beings. A theory of being may abstract what is common to all beings; if this turns out to be the case it will fall out of investigation. The theory will, of course, illuminate the nature of particular beings
A valid theory of being may begin with some, perhaps elemental perhaps immediate, aspects of being as we know and experience it—material, animal, and or human and so on… However the theory, especially if complete, will not entirely flow from such considerations. But what lies outside individual experience? To get ‘outside’ individual experience it will be necessary to abstract from it and see if what is abstracted has universality. The chapter Being has a foundation in experience—it does not transcend experience or locate individual experience in (all) being. Metaphysics abstracts and finds what is universal. That is where Metaphysics begins; in the metaphysics, named metaphysics of immanence, an approach is developed from which it is able to demonstrate necessary and universal conclusions which are used to ground individual being in being, and to develop and elaborate a cosmology
The metaphysics of immanence thus transcends its beginnings in a preliminary analysis of being and experience. The metaphysics of immanence shows and gives meaning to the integral wholeness of the universe—of all being
A valid and complete theory of being must contain any other theory of being in its domain of validity; and it must be ultimate in depth of understanding and variety of being encompassed. Theory of Being develops and elaborates such a framework. It is hoped that Theory of Being is a contribution to thought
With Human World, Theory of Being denotes what foundation in ideas has arisen along the way—a framework for transformation. The topics for Theory of Being are Being, Metaphysics, Objects, Logic and meaning, Mind, and Cosmology; the topics for Human World are Human being, Social world, War and peace, Civilization and history, The highest ideal, and Faith
These topics constitute a complete cosmological—and logical—framework for all being, all aspiring, all process and becoming, and all experience
The primary objectives of this section are to lay out and motivate some basic ideas for a foundation / framework for an ultimate journey into understanding and transformation and to explain why, from among these, the idea of being is fundamental to the development. Here, understanding includes knowledge but is more than knowledge of the world—the universe—or even the nature of knowledge itself. Understanding includes a sense of the nature of being-in-the-world and what is important to it—or, at least, a recognition that this sense is significant together with an intent to develop the sense and a habit of being concerned with it
Concepts for a foundation. Development of the foundational framework
This chapter introduces ideas or concepts for a foundational framework for an ultimate journey into knowledge, understanding and transformation
The core of the framework is developed in Metaphysics and its elaboration continues in the remaining chapters of the division Theory of Being
The framework did not arise at once but is the result of an iteration of insight and criticism
Reasons and motives for adoption of some ideas and rejection are given. However, a fuller understanding of the concepts and reasons for retention or rejection of the concepts is developed subsequently in Theory of Being and especially in Metaphysics
Some basic concepts of the narrative are essence, substance, mind and matter, existence, concept and object, experience and forms of experience, being, meaning, sense and reference
The primary and foundational concepts are, perhaps, experience and being. Experience is fundamental in that it is immediate—that experience is immediate is, perhaps, an understatement for while the experience of an external object is different from the object—it is an experience, the experience of experience is an experience
In Heideggerian terms, experience refers to the essential skeleton—abstraction—of Da-sein that reveals the skeletal and so universal aspect of being… and as explained earlier, permits ultimate richness of the proximate being that is Heidegger’s Da-sein
Substance is not a central concept of the narrative but is important because it has been so significant in the tradition. Here, substance as foundational is rejected—it is found that substance must be rejected as a foundation for any ultimate understanding of the world and what is learned in seeing the necessity of this rejection is immense. Essence, mind, and matter have a similar ‘negative’ importance to the development
What now follows is an early stage of the systematic and precise development of the meaning and significance of the concepts. A more complete development occurs in the subsequent chapters of Theory of Being in which the concepts are developed and elaborated as the basis of a coherent system of understanding. The development follows in the subsequent divisions of the narrative, in which the system is further elaborated and is applied to topics of interest the goals of the journey
Essences. In attempting to provide a foundation the question of the essence of things—of the world—may arise. What is essence—or, since concepts do not arise in final form at once and for all time, what may it be? Is the essence of a thing distinct from the thing? Are there essences?
Substance. The history of the idea of substance—primarily in western thought—may be seen as an extended and varied investigation into essences
There are two broad uses of the word ‘substance’ in philosophy. The first is a general use in which substance is the ground, being, or essence of things. Thales of Miletus suggested that the fundamental substance was water and the idea of ‘stuff,’ of which water is a kind, is a primary instance of substance as the essence of all things. Thales, of course, did not anticipate that water would be found to be ‘made’ of even more basic entities. The second use of substance arises in asking, for example, what the essence of a particular thing may be, e.g., what is the essence of being a mountain. The two meanings of substance are, of course, connected and an adequate development of the first kind may, if it is possible to do so, found a development of the second kind. In developing the metaphysics of immanence it is it is primarily the first meaning of substance that is of interest—but as counterpoint for, as ground of all being, substance will, of necessity, be rejected altogether
There have been a variety of reasons for an interest in substance theory and, accordingly, substance has been held to have a variety of characteristics. Reasoned lists of such characteristics have occasionally been regarded as marking the criteria that any conception of substance should satisfy. This approach is rather ad hoc and is against the spirit of the idea of substance. It is, perhaps, only by accident that such an approach would result in a coherent concept of substance and a proper substance theory. Since substance is rejected, ‘proper substance theory’ is not a constituent concept of the present approach
If the idea of substance is to be significant in revealing the nature of the world, it will be a constituent concept of a coherent metaphysics that would stand or fall not only on the criteria of coherence but also on applicability. That is, the metaphysics would say something about the world, what it would say would be true and nothing that it said would be untrue; of course, as metaphysics, it would be required to speak of the entire world—the universe, all being. Would it say everything that can be said about the world? The extent of what can be said would be integral to the theory and not something outside it—just as Logic, although it has some origin in proof, is, as will be seen, not something separate from or pasted on to talk of what is real. As will be seen ‘world’ is also a concept whose meaning will be specified even if the specification is simple. The notion of substance and its nature will fall out of study and therefore the characteristics that mark substance must be variables—perhaps only implicitly—of the theory
A primary motivation to metaphysics—substance or otherwise—is to understand the world. If the terms of the metaphysics, explanatory or predictive, are more complex than the world itself, the metaphysics can hardly be regarded as understanding. Therefore, substance should be simple
From simplicity, it does not follow that substance will be known or even knowable. However, if substance were not even intelligible, e.g. through intuition andor conception, the resulting metaphysics would hardly count as understanding. So it was or may have been that Plato suggested that actual things are rough copies of forms that resided in a world whose ideal character made the forms intelligible or knowable even if not available to sense perception
The thought that sense perception constitutes evidence but not knowledge may be one motive to explaining knowledge in terms of an ideal world. However, though Plato’s theory is elegant, it introduces two kinds—the form and the thing even if it does not go so far as to introduce a separate world of ideal forms. Understanding would be better served if there were but one kind, one world, in terms of which the problem of knowability or intelligibility could be resolved. Therefore, another desirable characteristic of substance—of the terms of any satisfactory metaphysics—is that there should at most one kind which, since there are actual things, must be the actual kind. Another way of saying this is that substance should be of the one world
The desirable characteristics of substance, then, are simplicity, intelligibility and worldliness
The characteristics are not necessarily independent—worldliness may enhance, though not guarantee, intelligibility and simplicity. Their formal interdependence will vary according to metaphysics and, therefore, the true interdependence will depend on—what emerges as—true metaphysics
It is not clear that any metaphysics can satisfy all three characteristics—especially since a metaphysics that were not comprehensive over all things would hardly be a metaphysics. In the extreme of simplicity, it seems that there would be but one substance that would be uniform and unchanging. The world and its variety would come from that substance. However, the becoming itself should be simple or intelligible and, it is perhaps deterministic rather than indeterministic becoming that satisfies both simplicity and intelligibility
However, that variety and change should be the deterministic result of uniformity and stasis is incoherent
Although Heidegger’s insight into the untenable character of substance theory is intense, in neglecting to note that determinism is the implicit twin of substance, the rejection of substance as foundational remained incomplete. Despite the explicit rejection of substance, the habit of substance thinking was retained—although Da-sein may be at the beginning of metaphysics, not all metaphysics flows from the Heideggerian Da-sein. On account of the implicit determinism, a complete metaphysics cannot flow from Da-sein. Despite the fundamental character of Heidegger’s Da-sein, some of its most cherished characteristics have to be given up for it to be the full source of metaphysics. This is not a loss, for as has been seen in other—logical—terms, the skeletal version of Da-sein—the bare account of experience—permits all that is cherished in the full-bodied Da-sein and more, perhaps infinitely more
Is there a metaphysics that can replace substance thinking and still be counted as foundational—and simple, intelligible, and fully within the one world? The metaphysics of immanence developed in Metaphysics satisfies these criteria. It rejects substance in any strict sense but is foundational—it will be seen that while foundations and rejection of substance have been traditionally regarded as incompatible, the alleged incompatibility is the result of an assumption of a deterministic universe and that a non-substance is possible and is developed as metaphysics of immanence in Metaphysics. The rejection of substance is not a hypothesis but the consequence of an empirically founded metaphysics which is therefore of the world. Although demonstration waits until Metaphysics, the idea of the universe as all being is empirical and this idea among other demonstrated empirical ideas results in a metaphysics that is ultimately simple, yet ultimate in depth. Further, the depth is a result of the simplicity