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JOURNEY IN BEING NEW WORLD |
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ANIL MITRA, COPYRIGHT © 2006, December 2006 WEB VERSION |
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FOUNDATION: Ambition*. The narrative. Journey*. Being*. Metaphysics: Theory of Being*. Objects. Logic. Mind*. Cosmology*. Human being*. Morals and society*. Ethics and objectivity. Action and politics*. Civilization and history. The Highest Ideal*. Faith
JOURNEY IN BEING: Journey*. Principles of thought*. Understanding and Transformation*. Philosophy and Metaphysics. Problems in Metaphysics. A System of Human Knowledge. History of Transformation*. Transformation. Bases and Theory*. System of experiments*. Transformation so far. Designs*. Further investigation. The Future*. Index. The Author
The Journey is an exploration of being, especially of its nature, depth, variety, and possibilities. The ways of exploration are in ideas and in realization – and in interaction among ideas and realization. Realization includes transformation of all modes of identity with emphasis on individual and physical identity. The journey is an exploration of individual (human) possibility, of the possibilities of all being and of relationships and identities among individual and all being
The foundation is a system of ideas but is not intended to be an independently standing foundation for the journey. Instead, it may be seen as whatever foundation has arisen so far – development of the foundation has been part of the journey. Still, it has been possible to develop a foundation in ideas and concepts far beyond original hopes and dreams. The foundation is –and will be shown to be– an ultimate realization in ideas. The possibility and necessity of an ultimate realization in being is secured by the foundation. The foundation also develops reasonable approaches to the realization of the ultimate; however, it has not so far certainly shown how that ultimate may be realized. The journey in realization remains in process and what has been realized of the ultimate ambition is described in the second division ‘Journey in Being.’ It remains to be seen whether some future version of this narrative will tell of an ultimate in realization in being and identity and whether some fundamental new idea or exercise is productive of or necessary to that end
The foundation is placed at the beginning even though its development has been intertwined with the Journey – with process; the character of the Journey is described early in ‘Foundation’ but its narrative is taken up in the second division ‘Journey in Being’
The sections within the foundation develop a description of the Universe, a Metaphysics whose character is ultimate in necessity, depth and variety. The heart or core of the metaphysics is developed in the section, ‘Metaphysics: Theory of Being.’ This core is based in logic and in what is given i.e. that there is being. However, reason and fact alone are insufficient. Experience is required to ground the development; feeling provides force; and imagination is necessary for the vision that is shown by reason to be real. One form of experience is a study of human traditions of knowledge and action in varying degrees of depth and detail. The experience inspires the core metaphysics and, consequently, a rich picture (a cosmology) of the variety of being; a mutual illumination and inspiration of foundation and experience remains in process. Looking back, the development of the foundation may be given a logical form; however it would be extremely unlikely without experience of world and tradition. In the later sections, interactive implications of the metaphysics and a number of topics of core interest to (human) being are explored with regard to fundamental principles and detail. The meanings the systems of concepts are often revised and the disciplines acquire an enhanced foundation. These developments did not occur in a single step but occurred incrementally in a number of iterative passes through the entire system. The metaphysics and its ‘applications’ provide the contours of an entire system of (human) knowledge that is outlined in the second division ‘Journey in Being’
If claims made regarding the ideas are true and proofs given valid, the relationship between the ideas, especially the metaphysics and the cosmology, developed in this narrative and earlier ideas and metaphysical systems has similarities to relationships between mature systems of ideas and their primitive forms or earlier mature systems. There is, almost of necessity, both dependence and independence. Many words used in new systems are old but their meanings new or, at least, significantly extended in sense and range of application. Ideas that stood independently and with unclear or conflicting relations fall into coherent relation and receive clearer understanding. If there are earlier conceptually coherent systems, their limits of application may be clearly shown. Broader ranges of phenomena are revealed, understood and explained by the new system. As a result of a new way of seeing, the world may take on a new appearance that may be a source of wonder and reaction
A primary purpose to the acknowledgement of earlier ideas is to place a system of thought in context. It is not primarily giving recognition where it is due, for behind recorded thought lie the very phenomena of ideas and language whose original arts and artists, though unacknowledged, stand ever present in their effects. Nor is such acknowledgment an essential humility or honesty – it is also a human-centered hubris in an implied emphasis on the magnitude of human understanding and a focus on the individual over the understanding itself. For even further behind (or below) human language and thought lies the vault of being that is and makes all possibility and ambition
In the present narrative, the influence of earlier ideas is indicated by interspersing the text with brief discussions of the thought of those individuals whose contributions are seen as significant and whose names may be read from the section, Names, of the System of concepts. However, the primary purpose to inclusion of these discussions is as described in the previous paragraph
The ambition that provided force for the process was at first inspired by the traditions of discovery and based in diffuse ideas and feeling. The development of the metaphysics permitted and realized the ambition in explicit form
The Journey is an exploration whose ambition is knowledge and experience of All Being. The exploration is especially concerned with the possibilities and limits of being
If the ambition is realized, the story of the Individual will be that of all being. An outcome of this narrative is that there is one story that has infinite variety
The actual paths and achievements are channeled by interest, which includes the present, and subject to limits. In an extended journey interests and Understanding of limits may change as a result of experience and reflection. One goal of the ‘Foundation’ is to understand limitation and Possibility. The nature of limits and distinctions between theoretical limits (possibility, Necessity and actuality) and practical limits (feasibility) is a central concern that is introduced in the section ‘Metaphysics: Theory of Being’
Even though moral concerns are fundamental, their explicit consideration and their relations to limits and interest are taken up later. This is because the concept of Ethics that is developed provides a more comprehensive foundation than the previous topics that include metaphysics, object (knowledge,) and cosmology
The central ideas of the narrative have names that may be familiar from the history of thought; however, many of the ideas –the concepts– are given new interpretation, their meaning deepened, their range of application broadened. The objective has been to achieve ultimate depth and breadth for the individual concepts and the system of thought
The resulting picture is shown to be explicitly ultimate in depth: it is shown that the picture is (logically) necessary and that further depth is neither possible nor required as foundation for understanding of all being
In breadth, the picture is implicitly ultimate: it provides an approach to describing and experiencing the Variety of being. However, that the picture is implicit for variety means that it is not possible to describe the variety of being in its entirety. This is true because the number of actual states of being is an order of infinity that is too large to be placed in even an infinite sequence of descriptions…
… A Variety of being is ever open to discovery and exploration!
The picture or metaphysics, its foundation and implications are developed in this division, ‘Foundation.’ It forms, in part, a foundation for the exploration and experiments in (all) being taken up in the second division ‘Journey in Being.’ ‘The narrative’ immediately below provides an introduction to these developments
It will be useful to the reader know at the outset that the primary intent in publication of the present narrative is the presentation of new ideas and discoveries and their relations to and bases in the traditions of human endeavor including thought. It is not a direct goal to present here an overview or synthesis of the traditions… Novelty is not a virtue in itself but, to have significance, also requires the qualities of validity and fruitfulness of consequences. The narrative endeavors to achieve and to make clear these qualities. They wrote because they felt that there was something of value to say. The new ideas are found at the most general level –the metaphysics and the logic– and at various levels of detail and pains have been taken to point out what is new. Further, the main system of ideas forms a view of the world or universe as an integral whole whose description begins in the section ‘Metaphysics: Theory of Being.’ The fruitfulness of this view is implicit in the following fact that is demonstrated and whose meaning is elaborated in the narrative: it forms a foundation for understanding of the world without infinite regress and for which there can be no further or more comprehensive foundation (although logically unnecessary to this conclusion, further indications of its significance include, first, comparison with the tradition of philosophical metaphysics and, second, the subsequently developed applications to the traditions of thought.) While the logic of the metaphysics is laid out in the section ‘Metaphysics: Theory of Being,’ the picture of the universe that emerges from the interactions of the metaphysics and prior understanding of the variety of being is developed in the remaining sections; the interactions are manifold and the picture emerges slowly. The transition from traditional pictures e.g. myth and science may occur stepwise and process may be necessary for the full picture to emerge in the mind of the reader. Therefore, the typical reader will not expect to absorb the ideas and their interrelations on a first or casual reading; and while acquaintance with a variety of world views may help the reader, rigid adherence to any one world view will be an impediment. Since, in order to maintain adequate continuity with the traditions, the new ideas are almost invariably marked by existing words, careful attention to the use in the narrative will reward the reader with a more complete understanding. The reader may wonder how it is that words that appear to have relatively fixed meanings can be as fluid in their meaning as is suggested here. This concern is addressed throughout the narrative and especially in the section ‘Being’
The brevity of the narrative relative to its breadth of content is a feature of its design. An attempt has been made to bring together in a dynamic and encapsulated unity, a set of features that serves the purpose of the exploration and briefly tells its story. The features include a picture painted in broad strokes of a system that builds upon the traditions of human thought, experience and action. In this aspect of its design the narrative stands in contrast and in complement and relation to the also valid, loosely interwoven, incrementally developing tradition of ideas. If the tradition is a net, the narrative is a spear. The details that have been included here serve the purposes of proof, instructive example, and (occasional) illustration
A purpose of the first division, ‘Foundation’ is to serve as conceptual base for the exploration through Understanding and transformations of Being and Identity (Theories of Being and of Identity are developed in the Foundation.) It is not in the nature of the foundation that it determines the exploration; instead the Foundation may be seen as ‘what conceptual foundation may have been found on the way.’ The arrangement of the topics in the foundation occurs in a natural order from general to particular that is further refined to suggest paths to the exploration
The exploration is narrated in the second division, ‘Journey in Being’ whose overlapping phases are understanding and transformation. The Foundation is part of understanding and understanding part of transformation; however transformation also includes physical change and transformation of identity. It is expected that the transformations will suggest revisions in the foundation. While foundation serves as conceptual base, it is expected that experience (in transformation) will independently suggest further possibilities for transformation. The second division contains practical material regarding foundation for and ‘methods’ of transformation
Section headings are indicated by bold print and, within the sections, topics are underlined; such topic headings occasionally mark the conclusion of a discussion. Sections marked with a star or asterisk (*) constitute the main or central narrative; these sections develop the main concepts and results. In the unmarked sections, certain topics may be marked as central
Being, Knowledge, and Value converge in the sections ‘Objects’ and ‘Ethics and objectivity;’ however, they are not marked as central. This is because the developments in these sections are somewhat unfinished and because the Ambitions do not require those developments (even though they introduce symmetry among being, knowledge and value.) The case of Knowledge is significant; focus on knowledge itself –its nature and conditions for validity– has been central and regarded as empowering to thought in the modern period. However, preoccupation with knowledge and conditions for knowledge is seen, here, as distracting to the pursuit of the ambition. This is not sufficient to relegate concern with the conditions knowledge to a secondary status; instead, it is shown that the depth of being may be understood without appeal to the niceties of the theory of knowledge (epistemology.) Further, the narrative endeavors to see –conceptualize– knowledge as integral to being and becoming rather than as driving the endeavor of being
The narrative is designed, as far as possible, to appeal to general and specialist readers; it may call to readers who have an interest in the journey itself –the understanding and realization of the identity of the individual story and that of all being– or in the many discoveries and excursions –often unplanned yet significant– on the way. Some of the areas of potential interest are in Metaphysics including the depth and variety of being and of Identity, knowledge and conditions that knowledge should satisfy, Logic, Cosmology, Mind, the nature of Human being, Ethics, society, politics, civilization and history, the highest ideal, faith and religion, principles of thought and the dynamics of being, the nature of philosophy and metaphysics, and experiments in the transformation of being and identity
There are discussions of the nature of meaning and concepts; of Form and universals; the ultimate in depth and variety of being (the theory of being developed implicitly includes all possible physical and natural law;) substance and its elimination; mechanisms of becoming and the necessity of indeterminism (systems or states that though possibly related, are not determined by one another; usually temporal in which a later state e.g. of the universe is not determined by earlier ones even if related to them) with first inspiration from evolutionary biology, its necessity derived from the concept of novelty –what is new is not and cannot be contained in or determined by what came before– and with application in the Theory of Being, science, cosmology and originality in thought; objects, the real; fact and theory, science and induction, mathematics, deduction and the nature of mathematics; originality and consciousness; atomism, life; psychology, human freedom versus determinism, growth and personality, language, exceptional achievement and disorder; war and peace, charisma, civilization and history
The place in the narrative of these and further topics may be seen in the table of contents and the System of concepts
Although the important concepts of the narrative are defined, the meanings of the ideas are revealed in developing them and not by definition alone. Therefore, ‘definitions’ are suggestive rather than authoritative. Definitions are not necessarily placed at the beginning of the narrative or the beginning of a section in which a concept is discussed
In the text, an entire paragraph placed in brackets marks elaboration or a peripheral issue that is not essential to but may help illuminate the main narrative
The text introduces a number of ‘theories.’ The reader may refer to the discussion of the concept of Theory in the section ‘Logic’ where in the present meaning, Fact and theory are not distinct and the factual character of theories (over appropriate domains) is made clear
When referring to such theories as are developed here, the narrative may employ capitalization e.g. the Theory of Being. Typically, when names Logic, Cosmology and so on are capitalized the reference is to the meaning as defined or specified here; when capitalization is not used, reference is to common meaning(s.) It is often advantageous to provide definition with a later rather than the first occurrence of a concept. When the name occurs frequently in one paragraph or the space of a few paragraphs, not every instance is capitalized. Capitalization has another use: to distinguish the use of a word as a concept from an incidental narrative use of the same word; in this case, the conceptual use may be capitalized. There are other incidental uses of capitalization
They searched for the Real, for what is true – for the ultimate and the meaning of ‘the ultimate’
They searched for the ultimate in the Real and the Good
A source of inspiration was the thought from a time when ideas and action were woven together in individual lives
Their ambition was the ultimate and its realization in the present
They felt that direct contact with the Real was of the essence and that immersion in the traditions was essential; that immersion in the immediate was (a way to the) real
Many paths were taken, many abandoned. Some paths were taken to their (known) end and then beyond the edge to the interior of new landscapes where footing was (initially) insecure
They had and followed ideas about the true and the great and thought they had arrived – again and again. Early, they thought they could arrive through perception and ideas – through knowledge and Understanding. Later, they saw that action and transformation of being –of Identity– were also essential
It was sought to translate the indefinite end of the ‘ultimate’ into more definite terms. Toward this end they found the traditions of learning and experience –even when limited– to be invaluable; these provided some foundation, some inspiration upon which to build. As understanding and experience grew, so did their recognition of what is possible. The goals of their endeavor changed as their understanding grew
The undertaking assumed the character of a journey
They wrote of their travel in Being. They wrote because they felt that there was something of value to say. They experienced attachment to their ideas and words. The attachments became a burden. They sought to retain only what was of essence and what suggested essence: so as to be clear, to be open to understanding and criticism, to bring closure to a phase. In shedding excess, what might have been an expedition became travel, what might have been only diffuse acquired also clarity
Yet, writing and reading are or may be ‘linear’ acts and bare in form while understanding is or aims at being whole and occurs within a universe of context. The expression of a whole in linear form is itself a creative labor – and so it is with reading: a single reading may be insufficient for comprehension as a whole or to build up a universe of context. The contextual world evoked for a reader may be quite different than that of a writer
From the traditions ‘Being’ is a central idea that has, as part of a system of ideas, been used in an attempt to express the essence of the Real in words. The idea of being is not esoteric. The root is the verb ‘to be’ whose forms include ‘is,’ ‘was,’ ‘will be,’ ‘am’ and so on. Whatever is – is or has being. The idea knows no discrimination of esoteric or mundane, of Matter or Mind, of state or process or relationship, of near or far, of higher or lower Form, or of form or Formlessness. Being is immediate and remote. These thoughts, they found, recommend being
It is precisely the fact that ‘being’ refers without commitment as to kind that makes the idea useful. In contrast, use of committed and therefore prejudicial, and so possibly limited, specialized concepts e.g. of ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ may be inadequate to capture what lies open to discovery, to capture, in a concept, the nature of the entire Universe. (It will be seen later that, in their usual meanings mind and matter are limited and that their application to the entire range of being entails paradox; see the discussion of ‘Extension’ under the topic, ‘Meaning in general. Concepts,’ below.) In other words, the power of the word ‘being’ derives, in part, from naming (all of) what is unknown (and known.) In this there is an analogy to the power of naming the unknown in the algebraic approach in mathematics
The use of the concept of being will enable an evaluation of ‘foundationalism,’ the thesis that knowledge (and action) is capable of ultimate foundation
Although they used ‘being’ to connect to tradition, this was not the primary reason for the choice. ‘Being,’ was the idea that they found capable of adaptation toward touching what is real, to channeling their understanding of the real, of what is good, of what is true and great – and ultimate
So far, the meaning of ‘being’ has not been specified even though there is a connection with ‘existence’
Here, ‘Being’ shall be that which exists or has existence
What does it mean to exist? What ‘things’ exist? Defer these questions until the understanding that permits reasonable answers has been developed. I.e., in identifying being with existence nothing (except generality) has yet been specified
The following acknowledges a familiar distinction. The verb to be indicates existence as in ‘I think therefore I am.’ However, some forms of the verb have other senses e.g. to show a property as in ‘grass is green’ rather than existence. The point also illustrates variant and family Meaning that are significant immediately below and subsequently. Variant meaning can also be understood by saying that the different symbols, corresponding to the variant meanings, have the same sign
Typically, ‘is’ means ‘exists at the present.’ They found it convenient to use an alternative and extended connotation in which ‘is’ stands for ‘was,’ ‘is,’ or ‘will be.’ In English, ‘is’ does not distinguish ‘is here’ or ‘is there.’ The use of ‘is’ and ‘exists’ may be used to cover such variant connotations. It is not clear that space and Time –extension and duration– are appropriate to coordination of all being. The terms phase or manifold may be used to refer to generalized coordination. Then, ‘exists’ may refer a point, a region, or to the entire manifold of being (universe.) These two uses of ‘is,’ ‘being,’ and ‘exist’ may be referred to as the temporal and the atemporal. However, more than time (and space) may be implicated in coordination of being; the uses of being shall therefore be referred to as coordinate (or local) and global (or supra-coordinate)
It is in the nature of concepts that in deploying them in the Understanding (in the present case of all being,) their meaning shall continue to be revealed. Excepting final revelation of all things, meaning shall continue to shift and change
In actual situations, analysis of a concept does not occur in isolation – the comprehension of a context or domain of being typically requires a number of concepts. The entire meaning lies in a dynamic and mutually adjusting system or field of concepts whose understanding requires that all concepts be understood in relation to the context and to one another (since the aspects of the world are interwoven.) This is clearly seen in an axiomatic system even though it might not be so clear in common use because the sense of each common concept may seem to stand independently as a result of familiarity. Meaning is distributed non-uniquely among the system (which is distinct from incomplete determination of a system in relation to understanding the world.) It is commonly thought that such revelation must be unending. However, that is not necessarily the case. That growth in understanding has not ended does not imply that it is unending. A point may come when the understanding is recognizably complete
‘Meaning’ may be regarded as being specified by ‘Sense’ and ‘Reference.’ This was emphasized by the German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege (b. 1848, Wismar, Germany.) The idea of sense (which is similar to connotation, intension) is conveyed by the intuitive grasp of its use and significance associated with a Concept; there are various ways in which the sense of a concept can be formalized but it is perhaps essential to have a fixed system of meaning. The idea of reference (similar to denotation, Extension) is conveyed by the collection of ‘things’ to which the concept refers. In a given system, e.g. an axiomatic system, reference is sufficient to specify meaning. However, in an open system (‘real life’) sense is required to supplement reference. There are a number of sources in the change or shift in the sense of a concept in use and over time, some of which have to do with interest and fashion; a primary and essential source of change in meaning is the growth of knowledge or ‘shifting knowledge contexts.’ As knowledge grows, the meaning of a concept may expand or shift even though the idea remains the same (similar.) The sense of a concept is required to effectively use it in varying contexts of reference. As will be seen in the section ‘Logic,’ an interpretation of mathematics is one of certain structures that axiomatic systems attempt to represent or capture. There is no guarantee that the structure that is needed will be captured even if the axiomatic system captures some structure with elegance. Here, too, the intuition (and Sense) of the concept is significant. There is a relation among intuition of Form, concept (Language,) and world. As noted later, the forms are as if Platonic but there is no separate Platonic world. In the developments that follow, it is seen that the depiction of being in general is identical to the mathematical case except that the conceptual system is not always as neat as it is in mathematics. I.e. depiction of the world involves relations among form, intuition of form and concepts
Above, the questions ‘What does it mean to exist?’ and ‘What things exist?’ were mentioned. These questions are equivalent to the question ‘What is the sense and reference of ‘to exist’ or ‘existence’?’
Relations between use and meaning are taken up later in the topic ‘Further analysis of being,’ below, and later in the section ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’
What they found is completion that is possible in some directions e.g. depth but perhaps not in other directions e.g. variety – i.e. completion is explicitly Possible with regard to depth but its possibility appears to be at most implicit with regard to variety
The idea of the concept itself has a variety of meanings. What is the significance of the concept? Start with an example. There are many wolves whose membership in the same class is recognized not because the individual has available a definition of the wolf but rather an intuitive concept of the wolf. In a world that contained just one wolf, would there be a concept of ‘wolf?’ There might not be a need for a distinct name but the concept would be possible as in ‘that animal is distinct from zebras, lions and so on and has characteristics that may be noted and recalled.’ Thus a ‘wolf’ could be a concept even if there was only one actual wolf (or even if there were no wolves but it would be improbable that in the absence of wolves the imagination would produce the wolf in all detail.) One idea of the concept is that it is a mental content – perhaps a definite and recognizable one; later it will be seen that the mental content may be referred to as the ‘concept-object.’ Generally, the named concepts are those that have significance. There are (at least) two kinds of significance in relation to concepts. A first is when the concept corresponds to many or common entities and a second is when there is only one entity (e.g. the universe) or few entities that have especial significance. Commonly when talking of concepts, concern is with the significant concept. The (significant) concept has the significance that it enables (is or encodes) recognition of patterns, repetition, significance, behavior and, so, makes organized perception and thought efficient. The significant concept is a common element of theories; however, recognition of facts also requires concepts and significance results in focus, attention and prominence. The mental content and the significant concept are not distinct in their fundamental kind
That (non human) animals recognize distinct entities shows first, that a percept is a concept and, second, that non human animals are capable of concepts
The system of concepts unfolds with the narrative. The reader who wishes to see the concepts collected together in one place may refer to the System of concepts
There is a classical theory of definition due to Aristotle that involves ‘genus’ and ‘difference’ and a variety of modern theories of definition that include definition as a part of the formalization of axiomatic systems
More illuminating to the present narrative is a concern with limits of clarity that may be achieved by definition
Human artifacts are generally difficult to define. Consider, ‘a table is an item of furniture consisting of a smooth flat slab fixed on legs.’ Adopt (initially) an attitude that all objects and only those that satisfy the definition shall be tables. It follows then that a stool is a table, that a highway sign may be considered to be a table, and that a flat slab on a block is not a table. As an alternative approach an artifact may be defined in terms of its function e.g. a table is an elevated horizontal surface that is used to make objects more easily accessible. With this definition, a shelf is a table and if a ‘table’ is never used as a table it is not a table. This process of pinning down and finding exceptions could continue but it is soon recognized that artifacts have multiple and changing forms and uses, and that objects that are generally used for one function (or that have had no function) may be adapted to many others. In the realm of artifacts, then, it is clear that (variable) meaning lies in (variable) use and that definition has limited use or value. It seems that definition is contrary to the idea of artifact. Attention shall therefore shortly turn to ‘natural’ objects. Before taking up the natural object, consider a dramatization of the difficulty in defining artifacts – the story of a god creating a cosmos for her or his own pleasure. This god looks at an earlier creation, cosmos x, the one that human beings call home and has a number of thoughts. ‘Perhaps if I alter the values of some of the fundamental physical constants,’ thinks the god, ‘the place might last a little longer. Why stop at the constants… why not change the nature of the forces and particles to give the cosmos more color and variety? What shall I do about suffering? I think I’ll take language away from human beings so that they will lose malice and cunning; or perhaps I’ll just take feeling away so that beings may destroy one another but no one will feel hurt. Good!’ Aeons upon aeons later the god reflects ‘cosmos xi was disappointing. It brought me no real pleasure. Certainly it provided an improved physical display but human being xi was rather mechanical! I think I’ll revive cosmos x and experiment with it a little more…’ The god asks a philosophical acquaintance, ‘What’s a cosmos anyway? What is an electron if one cosmos has point electrons and another has ‘electrons’ with manifest structure? What should a human being be?’ The apprentice responds ‘You can’t really define the things you create when you know you can change the design and the uses to which you put your creations…’
The discussion now focuses on the difficulty in defining natural objects. It may be thought that the difficulty will be merely one of recognizing or conceptualizing given objects i.e. that the concept may change (shift and perhaps improve) while the object itself is definite. However, definitions of natural objects face difficulties that are similar to definitions of artifacts. First, as noted, the content of the definition regards the idea of the entity – the best knowledge that is had of the entity; this is in process which may be hoped to be ‘improvement.’ Second, as knowledge of the entire universe grows, i.e. as the boundary of the known changes, the context of understanding changes. Finally, it is usually thought that human being has no influence on the nature of the fundamental natural objects. One can affect an electron or a wolf, it is thought, but one cannot change the nature of the electron or a wolf. In fact, human being can affect the wolf and the outcome (not necessarily an improvement) is the dog. In anticipating what shall be called the normal view in the next section ‘Metaphysics: Theory of Being,’ it is true that human being does not normally affect the nature of the electron. The implication that there is a supra-normal circumstance in which the nature of nature can be affected by the denizens of nature and the quality of the possible effect (improbability rather than impossibility) is taken up in the subsequent sections
It is a common observation that entities that are easy to recognize (except boundary cases) may be difficult to define satisfactorily – may lack any satisfactory definition altogether. Why is this?
The conceptual-perceptual apparatus of human and other animals is adapted (attuned) to their world. In consequence, the recognition of common natural and social objects is, typically, effortless – for familiar objects the recognition itself does not occur at a conscious level. This adaptation covers not only the entities but the frameworks of perception including space and Time. ‘Intuition’ (which has other shades of Meaning – the sense here is that of Immanuel Kant, b. 1724, Königsberg, Prussia) is one name for these more or less automatic and pre-linguistic elements of cognition (which may require familiarization during development of the organism.) Translating the multi-dimensional, multi-faceted intuition into a linear definition in symbols (Language) is expected to be difficult and incomplete. Here, then, is one source of the incompleteness of definition. It becomes clear, however, that in common use there is no compelling need to definition – except perhaps in boundary cases; but what boundary cases show is that tight distinctions do not always obtain and are therefore unnatural to maintain
The concept of intuition is developed in the later section ‘Objects’
The intuition of an object may be clear but if there are no similar or alternative terms available for comparison, definition may be difficult. An example is the concept of consciousness that is discussed in the later section ‘Mind.’ Consciousness is so central to human experience –it may be said to be experience of the world– that there is in moment-to-moment experience no question of its being and quality. It is difficult, perhaps because it appears to occupy (is) all experience, to explain what it is except to indicate its presence – it is not the world but it is (the quality of the) experience of the world. It is relatively easy to talk of the varieties of conscious experience – of pleasure and pain, of color, of taste and so on. However, consciousness itself, though central and familiar appears to be like nothing else. Hence it is possible to talk around it but difficult to address its nature directly. If, however, it were possible and reasonable to identify a primitive and elementary consciousness among e.g. the elements of matter, human or animal consciousness might then be defined as combinations of the primitive or elementary forms at a number of levels and degrees of focus. These thoughts will be developed further in the discussion of ‘Mind’
Another source of difficulty in definition is in the fact that relative to human experience, the world (universe) is an ‘open system.’ This is true of day-to-day experience and of science. In physics, for example, the concept of ‘force’ has been central. The concept has origins in animal and human experience and has been adapted to quantitative use in mechanics – the branch of physics concerned with motion and causes of motion of material objects. The history of the concept of force dates back (at least) to Greek times and received interpretation and reinterpretation in the modern era before Isaac Newton (b. 1643, Woolsthorpe, England,) by Newton himself, in the abstract formalizations of Newton’s system, in the field theories of electromagnetism, in the quantum theories and in the relativistic theories of space, time and gravitation. The precise character and significance of the concept of force varies according to the theoretical context or environment. The case is similar with other common, scientific (and theological and philosophical) concepts
The following brief historical information may provide context but its reading may be omitted as incidental to the progression of the narrative. The original relativistic theory of gravitation –the general theory of relativity of 1916– was the work of Albert Einstein, b. 1879, Ulm, Württemberg, Germany and, the German mathematician David Hilbert, b. 1862, Königsberg, Prussia. It is remarkable that Hilbert who was in communication with Einstein and other physicists was primarily a pure mathematician. There are disputed claims that Hilbert arrived at the field equations five days earlier than Einstein. The general or standard view gives Einstein priority for both general and special theories. There is also a dispute regarding the earlier (1905) special theory of relativity: the French mathematician Henri Poincaré, b. 1854, Nancy, France and the Dutch physicist Hendrik Antoon Lorentz, b. 1853, Arnhem, Netherlands both published results formally similar to Einstein’s special theory. Einstein is generally given priority for the ‘relativity of different frames of reference’ that enabled an understanding of the relative nature of simultaneity at different locations, a new geometry of space-time, the significance of the constancy of the speed of light, a writing of the equations in ‘covariant form’ that empowered understanding, and, generally, the physical significance of the theory. These views may be called the ‘standard position;’ acrimonious debate continues among specialists and partisans. The history of science has a number of famous priority debates: Newton versus Leibniz regarding the discovery (creation) of the differential calculus and Darwin versus Alfred Russell Wallace, b. 1823, Usk, Monmouthshire, Wales, regarding the Origin of the Species. Reasonable conclusions from such priority debates include: when dispute exists, priority is difficult to establish with precision; in addition to debate about content, disputes sometimes appear to concern the roles of ‘hero,’ ‘antihero’ and ‘destroyer of icons;’ there is sometimes a standard view that gives one individual priority which may be related to public image and to non-formal but important aspects of the work; in other cases, equal priority may be assigned as is the case regarding the discovery of calculus; that discovery is both communal and the work of ‘genius;’ and, perhaps most importantly, the often remarked thought there are times in the history of ideas where certain developments are natural… Quantum theory comes in a number of versions – the theories of particles and the theories of fields and in relativistic and non-relativistic versions. Although not associated with the discovery of quantum mechanics, the name of P. A. M. Dirac b. 1902, Bristol, Gloucestershire, England, for his introduction of relativity into quantum mechanics, for work in the field theories, for his interpretations, and for the introduction of powerful techniques and solution of important problems in quantum theory, lies at the convergence of the various threads in quantum theory… It is further remarkable that the work of Hilbert on certain kinds of ‘linear space of infinite dimension’ (hence the name ‘Hilbert space’) was also significant to the mathematical foundations and interpretation of quantum theory
That an intuition may develop regarding formal (e.g. scientific) concepts and systems makes re-conceptualizing and re-definition difficult
Although closed theoretical systems may give concepts precise meaning, the world is open and as long as its Understanding is incomplete, the meanings of concepts remain in-process and definitions remain tentative. After a closed system has been developed, definitions may be placed at the beginning. In the open case, definition and investigation remain in interaction
Seeing a system (a text, a life) as closed may result in an impression of a (definite) beginning and end. ‘Beginnings’ and ‘endings’ are, perhaps, no more than stopping points…
This strand of thought is taken up again under ‘Mathematics’ in the section ‘Logic’
Although this topic could be omitted without loss to the main development, it reveals some aspects of the conceptual character of being (existence)
Analytically inclined thinkers have identified some problems with the idea of existence. Everything exists. But if everything exists then fictional characters such as unicorns exist. The source of the problem is that the same word may be used to refer to an entity –concrete or abstract– and the idea or concept of the entity… and, in English at least, the grammatical form in which there is talk of unicorns need not indicate that a unicorn is fictional. A consistent use could be obtained by regarding existence as a property of a Concept or an idea. Then ‘x exists’ would mean ‘there is an actual thing to which the idea x refers’ and ‘x does not exist’ would mean ‘there is no actual thing to which the idea x corresponds.’ However, such a usage is not necessary for the analytic contradiction is easy to avoid and the example suggests that over-formalization of incompletely determined concepts may be misleading as to depth of understanding
A unicorn may be thought of as a ‘non existent’ Object (on the assumption that there are no unicorns.) Since, in common use, an object is something that does exist, what could ‘non existent object’ mean? Is not the idea self-contradictory? Objects are seen – but what is it that is seen? What is seen is not the actual thing-as-it-is for the impression that an individual has, though of the thing is also of the Mind. It is not a copy but perhaps a reconstruction. Picture the world. Of all the combinations of its elements only some can be seen as objects (in vision the inside of the mountain is not seen even though it could be seen with special techniques and is known conceptually.) Of all the possible visible objects only some are seen as such (two birds may be seen as two objects or as one object e.g. when flying in unison but the feather of a bird and a blade of grass are not usually seen as an object.) Thus object-as-seen partakes of a perceptual-conceptual character. This is the meaning of ‘object’ used in this paragraph. Further, until it is established that the concept as object or concept-object corresponds faithfully to the external object it is the only significant meaning (if it were to be established that the correspondence were impossible, it would necessarily be the only meaning.) Here ‘non existent object’ means that there is no entity that corresponds to the idea or concept. There are, by usual definition and in typical geometries, no square circles. That is, a square circle is a self-contradictory concept. Can a square circle be considered to be a non existent object? In that the word-concept ‘square circle’ (an attempt to form a picture of a square circle would bend the imagination) refers to no object, it is not inconsistent to say that a square circle is a non existent object. Similarly a golden mountain is a non existent object. Whereas a square circle is necessarily non existent (everywhere except in unusual geometries,) a golden mountain is contingently non existent (e.g. non existent on earth but possibly existent.) The idea of non existent objects was introduced by the philosopher Alexius Meinong (b. 1853, Lemberg, Austrian Empire) in attempting to clarify the relation between ideas and things. It was Meinong who first suggested and formulated the idea of concept-object introduced earlier in this paragraph. It appears that the concept of the non existent object makes the concept of object more symmetric but not necessarily deeper. The purposes to inclusion of these thoughts here are (1) they encourage abstract or ‘algebraic’ thought regarding being, (2) for possible post-narrative use in clarifying the meaning of the ‘Void’ (the term is introduced later) e.g. the void may be thought of as containing all non existent objects
Note that unless reasonable care is taken it is likely that confusion among the various senses of object will occur. The common sense of object has not been shown to be tenable. These issues will receive further attention in the section, ‘Objects,’ where the object will be further analyzed and circumstances under which the concept-object and the common use of object coincide, at least as facsimiles, will be clarified
The discussion permits some comments on analytic philosophy which has been a source of clarification of the concepts of this narrative. The discussion of analytic philosophy is taken up below and continued in the later sections, ‘Principles of thought’ and ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’
An analytic approach to understanding the world is subject to a number of corrupting temptations. The first is to avoid the world itself, to assume or behave as though it is barred to talk of the world in any terms other than the formal and the critical. Thus the world of the analytic approach may be (and often is) impoverished and flat. The critical approach that bars talk of the world (of metaphysics) is itself based on models of knowledge (e.g. empiricism, i.e. reducibility to or construction –supervenience– upon experience) and values, e.g. certainty, in relation to knowledge. In a critical perspective, the burden of proof should be on the metaphysician but the critical-analytic approach tends to disallow talk to begin. If there were an absolute impossibility proof then metaphysical talk would be futile. However, as noted, proofs of impossibility (due, e.g., to Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein, b. 1889, Vienna) are based on conceptions of knowledge (discussed e.g. in the later section ‘Objects’) and in order to address the possibility of metaphysics it may be desirable to develop a tentative metaphysics and to then subject it to criticism. The classic arguments against metaphysics appear reasonable but it will be seen that metaphysics by construction is Possible. The analyst turns the reasonable idea that thought cannot get outside itself into an absolute and must therefore focus ‘within’ e.g. on ‘use.’ This focus has tended, even while it enhances insight, to also allow under-conceptualizing to match a tendency to over-formalization. The resulting tendency to piecemeal analysis, even though not devoid of productivity, yields rings of concepts locked together in mutual error –each piece inherits and so absorbs and propagates errors of the other pieces– and shallowness but cloaked in sophistication i.e. presented in a language of formal sophistication
These corruptions are not necessary; however when they are yielded to or practiced naïvely, analytic philosophy falls short of its own potential. Not all analytic philosophers succumb to the corruptions and the analyses of such thinkers may yield significant insight into such topics as ‘mind’ and ‘language.’ It remains true that the thrust of analysis trades the whole world for explicitness and (relative) security. This is not an endeavor without value. Still, two concerns remain. First, when this mode of philosophy is regarded as philosophy, philosophical thought tends to be isolated cut off from human nature and possibility – and from human concerns. While analysis is important, it is not at all clear that it deserves the commitment of resources that it receives in modern academic philosophy…
These have been some initial thoughts on analysis and analytic philosophy is taken up again in greater detail in the later sections ‘Principles of thought’ and ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics.’ In this narrative there is no intent to suppress or abandon analysis but rather to see what a full and robust deployment, one without the standard paradigmatic limitations and distortions (identified in the narrative,) one that does not exclude (what analysts regard as ‘messy’) difficult topics such as the world itself, the whole world, the limits of the materialist or physicalist paradigm, emotion… As will be seen this approach allows a suggestion of paradise – a vision of the depth and variety of being as infinitely greater than that contained in the usual narratives of fact and fiction
Early, they turned to analytic philosophy for inspiration where they saw promise. Later, they found that the promise they had imagined was unrealized. They continued to value the principle of analysis but turned away from analysis as its own end; they became reflexively critical of the analytic criticism of other endeavors – the analysis of systems and of depth and the criticism of metaphysics based in restricted pictures and values of knowledge and in taking the self-indulgent metaphysical systems of the past as capturing the essence of any metaphysics of things – of the real (over experience)
Metaphysics is concerned with understanding the world. In one meaning, metaphysics is a study of the most general aspects of things – the way they are in virtue of their existence. The entity studied may be an object, the universe, the real, or (in a less conventional interpretation) a method of demonstration. The Theory of Being as developed here is concerned not only with what there is in the local cosmological system but what there is in the entire universe: what is actual? The Theory of Being is concerned with depth (foundation, issues of substance) and variety or cosmology. It is found that what is possible is (in the global sense of ‘is’) realized in the universe i.e. the actual and the possible are identical. However what is possible in terms of the patterns of behavior of the local cosmological system has a far lesser variety than what is possible without qualification i.e. in the universe. What is locally possible is an example of the concept of the normal e.g. of normal behavior. The idea of the ‘normal’ is developed below
They were able to show a picture of the Universe that is demonstrably deeper than that of the tradition of ideas and of greater variety than that of science, Faith, myth and fiction. Their picture of depth (metaphysics and Logic) was explicitly ultimate. Their picture of variety (cosmology) was only implicitly ultimate but still explicitly greater by an infinite factor than that of science, faith, myth and fiction
In the present section, the metaphysics will be developed and an exploration of its significance will be begun and continued in subsequent sections. Further meanings and formalizations of metaphysics will be taken up in division ‘Journey in Being,’ sections ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’ and ‘Problems in Metaphysics’
The essential concepts of their metaphysics were ‘being,’ ‘Universe,’ ‘Void,’ ‘Logos’ (or Logic,) and the ‘Normal’
These concepts arose as crucial to their attempt at understanding all being. In earlier endeavors they attempted to understand all being from science and experience i.e. from the local cosmological system i.e. the ‘empirical universe.’ Suggestions from modern science (that origin of the universe out of the void may conserve energy,) from philosophy and from intuition led to a concern with the relation of the empirical universe to the void; however, the early reflections lacked a logical character. What was later revealed as the decisive inspiration –seen in the shadow of mountains– was the thought to focus on the void itself and its characteristics rather than on the empirical universe and this, since consideration of the void entails consideration of all being, permitted the logical foundation (that follows) of metaphysics
They said that it is essential to understand the meanings that they attached to these terms and to exclude all other meanings in order to follow their development of the depth and variety of being (while remaining open to the suggestive power of variant meanings)
Being is that which exists or has existence. Being includes not just things but also laws, patterns, and forms (the concept of Form is clarified in the discussion ‘Form…’ below and in the next section ‘Objects.’) Typically, laws are thought to be read into being. However, the concept of the Universe is that of all being – the manifold of All Being. There is nothing outside the Universe; therefore, laws, patterns, and forms are not outside the universe: they are immanent in (all) being. (It will become clear that talk of distinct universes is without content.) Therefore, while laws, forms and patterns may be read, Laws, Forms, and Patterns are immanent in being. They did not need to further distinguish law from Law, form from Form… The Void is the absence of being and Logos is the form –or law– of all being
Perhaps the most basic fact or given is that there is being. If there were no being, these words would be neither written nor read; nor would there be an impression, delusion, illusion or hallucination of their being written or read
Consideration of the natures of being, Universe and Void make possible the development of a metaphysics or Theory of Being. The general aspects of the theory are treated in the present section, ‘Metaphysics: The Theory of Being’ and a variety of special concerns are taken up in ‘Objects,’ ‘Logic,’ ‘Mind,’ and ‘Cosmology.’ The sections ‘Human Being’ through ‘Faith’ include implications of the theory for the specific topics
As the complement of any entity relative to itself, or the complement of the universe relative to itself, the void exists
The existence of the void is a fundamental fact that, as will be seen, has enabled development of the metaphysics, the logic, the cosmology and more immediate subjects that follow. Thus it is essential to question that existence. The universe exists – it is all being. The existence of a part of the universe may be questioned since ‘part’ is conceptual. However, ‘part’ is conceptual only when specified implicitly by a concept such as a property. However, if the existence of parts is merely the recognition of variety or difference then ‘part’ is not merely conceptual. The void is the part whose ‘magnitudes’ vanish. How can a ‘zero’ part be said to exist? This is where doubt regarding the existence of the void may be seen as lying. An additional doubt arises because the intended proof of existence –the single sentence italicized paragraph above– is terse and transparent. The following semi-arguments are intended not as proof –they may serve as ideas for alternative proofs– but to assist in allaying doubt. (1) The complement of a part exists. As the part approaches the whole, the complement exists at every stage of the approach and its limit is the void. (2) The existence of the void should be equivalent to its non-existence; therefore the void may be taken to exist. (3) Attaching the void to an entity makes no difference to the constitution of the entity; therefore the void may be taken to exist. (4) In physics the zero force may be said to exist; it is the force that does not change uniform motion; this of course is not a proof of the existence of the void but shows that existence may be assigned to a quantity of zero magnitude. (5) If the universe has a non-manifest phase, that phase will be the void; of course this final item does not at all prove existence of the void but provides one way to see how it may be real rather than merely a conceptual fiction; later it will be shown that while the void may be regarded as being ‘attached’ to any entity it must also be a phase through which the universe passes… Discussion now turns to development of the metaphysics
Since all pattern and law is immanent in its complement, the void can contain no pattern, no law. Consider a description that if realized would be the description of a state of affairs. If that state was never realized from the void, the non-realization would constitute a law. Therefore every consistent description –or conception or picture of a state of affairs– must be realized (there is no connection of the present use of ‘description’ to Russell’s theory of descriptions.) More accurately, the entire system of consistent descriptions must be realized. (‘The entire system of consistent …’ is a topic for further investigation. ‘An apple that is fully red and fully not red’ is not consistent. This inconsistency may be labeled ‘internal.’ External inconsistency must also be excluded. Known facts and necessities may not be contradicted. ‘It is raining everywhere –or nowhere– in the universe’ would constitute a law of the void and is an external contradiction. ‘It is raining here and now’ when it is not contradicts a fact… The statement regarding realization may be rendered, ‘Subject to mutual consistency, every system of consistent descriptions is realized.’) These necessities have the following immediate consequences. Every element of being (entity) must interact with every other element of being. There is one universe (there are no isolated ‘universes.’) The void is equivalent to the Universe and to every entity. It makes no difference whether there are many voids or one; the many are equivalent to one. The manifest universe may be seen as having repeated ‘origin’ in the void; equally, any state may be seen as having origin in (equivalence to) any state of the universe – there are no ‘special’ states of the universe. Any entity including the manifest universe may be annihilated at any ‘time’ and this annihilation may be spontaneous ‘self-annihilation’ or the outcome of the ‘effect’ of the void – or any other state. The void is an actual state i.e. the universe ‘occupies’ the state of ‘no manifest being’ repeatedly in its trajectory or ‘travel’ between states of manifest being. The void is not outside the universe; it is the universe in its non-manifest states. The relationships between the manifest and the non-manifest states are neither causal nor deterministic. The equivalence of the void and the universe is equivalent to complete indeterminism. Essential indeterminism necessarily results in structure. There is no universal determinism and whatever causation there may be is either not universal or vastly different (perhaps weaker and less regular but simultaneously longer in its reach) from the causation of common experience and science (classical or modern)
The fundamental principle of the Theory of Being, just shown to be true, is the assertion that the entire system of consistent descriptions is (must be) realized
I.e. the only universal fictions are the logical contradictions (fact is stranger than fiction)
That, in the Theory of Being developed here, the possible and the actual are identical shows that the theory is ultimate with regard to breadth or variety of being. This follows e.g. from the existence of the void and its equivalence –in the sense that it is generative of– to every state except the logically contradictory states. That this ultimate character is implicit has been shown earlier
There are thoughts in the writings of Leibniz (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, b. July 1, 1646, Leipzig,) of David Hume (b. May 7, 1711, Edinburgh, Scotland) and of Wittgenstein that have similarity to the theory developed here. Leibniz suggested that the only impossibilities were logical contradictions. However, it appears that Leibniz did not take this thought to its possible conclusion – the necessity of the realization of the entire system of consistent descriptions and the possibility of proof and actual proof of this necessity; Leibniz may, in fact have disagreed with the conclusions being made here – he wrote that ‘Nothing arises from nothing.’ In the subsequent topic ‘Second proof of the ‘fundamental principle’ of the Theory of Being,’ use is made of the idea of Hume and Wittgenstein that ‘from the truth of one atomic proposition the truth of another does not follow’ (the word ‘atomic’ does not occur in Hume’s version.) These writers, as well, did not take their thoughts to their possible conclusions; they were anti-metaphysical; and the statement ‘from the truth…’ may have had among its intents to show a lack of metaphysical (causal) connections in the world… It is interesting to note that the fundamental principle –proven above– may be used to demonstrate Wittgenstein’s idea
A number of objections to the foregoing analysis may be raised. Some foci for the objections are (1) what may appear to be the use of mere concepts to demonstrate actual or real consequences and (2) that the laws of quantum theory imply the absence of actual things (the ‘ground state’ of the local cosmological system) will be the quantum vacuum which is a state that is far from being (the) void or absence of being but is a seat of enormous amounts of energy and a place of continuous creation and destruction of particle pairs, and (3) the violation of common sense in the idea of ‘something from nothing’ and, in physics, possible violations of the principle of conservation of energy. Responses to the objections follow
(1) All being and the absence of being –the void– are concepts but not mere concepts i.e. the fact of their reference is above question in a way that the reference to e.g. atoms and apples cannot be: whereas there is always some question about the existence of an atom or an apple (are they precisely captured in a concept) there is no question, not even a logical one about the concept of being or the void – the fact of being for a reader or a writer is given just as the absence of being consists in the absence of all givens, entities, patterns and laws. (2) The quantum vacuum is the seat of patterns of behavior that are laws. The void contains no law and is therefore ‘below’ the quantum vacuum in simplicity and fundamental character. The void ‘generates’ the quantum laws of this (our) cosmological system as well as the laws and entities of all cosmological systems. (3) Common sense and intuition –at least for some persons– is indeed violated; there is nothing, it may appear, in common day-to-day life that suggests the origin of a cosmos out of a void. However, common sense, experience, and intuition are situated in the everyday world. That they (may) show no origin of being from absence does not imply that such origin is impossible or that it does not occur. Self-aware empirical common sense is silent on such issues and, should it desire to know, will seek to follow the analysis. It appears to be a fact of human variety that some individuals are bound to their experience more than others. Such binding is important e.g. in survival; however, freedom from binding is also important in growth and, perhaps, in survival (such issues are discussed in detail in the subsequent section ‘Human being.’) It is interesting that the integration of intuition and analysis is similar to what occurs in mathematics, especially e.g. in the use of algebra (which emphasizes the symbol) in geometry (whose forms are initially known intuition.) The power of the algebraic approach reveals itself in the analysis of geometric forms and even concepts that are not amenable to the intuition… Attention now turns to the issue of violation of the principle of conservation of energy. It is an immediate consequence of the fundamental principle that, regarding the entire universe, conservation of energy does not (and cannot) obtain; (near) conservation laws are perhaps features of (relatively) stable worlds. However, since, in terms of physical theory, energies can be positive as well as (e.g. gravitational field energy) negative, spontaneous creation of ‘a universe’ from nothing need not violate the physical principle of conservation of energy
Since the void is equivalent to all being, there is no substance and no explanatory need for substance. Being may be regarded as having (Necessary) origin in the void. Explanation terminates in the void without need for explanatory regress. (These assertions and their meaning are further shown and elaborated in what follows)
An alternate statement is that the void may be considered to be the substance and it may play that role in view of the complete indeterminism of the void. The purposes of classical substance theory include the explanation of complexity from simplicity – of the Form and Variety of the world in substance which is uniform (formless) and unchanging. The difficulties of the classical forms of substance theory arise on account of a (tacit) association of determinism with substance. This tacit determinism is apparently consistent with the purpose to explain complexity from simplicity. However, given determinism it is not merely difficult but impossible to explain form, variety and change from uniform and unchanging substance. This is so because determinism and true novelty –not determined by e.g. a previous state– are exclusive. Regarding sub-stance, it is clear that determinism is the imposition or immanence of law but absence of any such imposition or immanence is equivalent to indeterminism; therefore indeterminism of substance is conceptually simpler than determinism
It would be interesting to review the history of substance theories, the meaning of substance, the way in which successive substance theories arose in response to the problems identified with earlier ones, the increasing sophistication of substance theories. However this temptation is avoided in this version of the present narrative, whose intents include brevity, since all substance theories remain problematic and since it is here demonstrated that the primary objective of substance theory can be achieved without substance. It will be useful, though, to carefully define the problems of substance theories. It is often thought that philosophical explanation requires substance because it is essential to making sense of the world. A non relativist philosophical system is one whose system of explanation terminates at some definite point with some kind of entity taken as fundamental; the motive to such systems is that in the alternative relativist systems there is (can be) no foundation or terminating explanation. It is thought that non relativist philosophical system must acknowledge substances in the most generic sense of that term, for that is only to acknowledge some fundamental entities in the system. A fundamental entity or a system of fundamental entities must be simpler than what is to be generated or explained for otherwise it or they would not be fundamental. This, combined with the tacit assumption of determinism (due either to this being the classic mode of explanation or to the thought that determinism is simpler than indeterminism and therefore inherent in substance) makes generation or explanation of novel Variety and complexity in terms of simplicity impossible. Apparently, therefore, there is a paradox of explanation: relativist systems do not provide (non-terminating) explanations and non relativist systems can not. The source of the paradox is the tacit assumption of determinism (and the tacit assumption that determinism is conceptually simpler than indeterminism.) If the requirement of determinism is lifted, non relativism is possible but does not require substance. Lifting of the requirement is necessary to non relativism and efficient in the production of the ultimates in depth and variety
If simplicity is taken to be the criterion of proper or good metaphysical explanation, metaphysics based in the void and therefore also in absolute indeterminism is necessary
Since classical substance theory and determinism are bound together –substance theory has significance only if determinism obtains– it is possible but not proper to consider the void to be a substance
The concept of the Void is ultimate in simplicity; it is this simplicity that allows for its actual generative power – the ‘simplicity’ of classical substance is an illusion for it contains the constraint of determinism that the void lacks. Therefore regarding the classical sense of substance, it is proper to not regard the ontology based in the void as substance ontology. The dogmas of substance and determinism have equivalence: without determinism, substance can have no significance; without substance there is no need for determinism
The system of explanation based in the void terminates in it. Further the existence and properties of the void are derived from the existence of the world. Thus this form of ontology provides explanation that terminates and posits no arbitrary fundamental substance or given – except the world (being) itself
In the present Theory of Being the void or absence of being has the following character that constitutes the explicit and ultimate depth of the theory. It is ultimate in simplicity. If the requirement of determinism is eliminated, the void may be regarded as the substance of all being. It provides an explanatory system for the necessity of all being without assumption and without explanatory regress
As an alternate to the void, in view of the essential indeterminism of being (since manifest being is equivalent to the void,) any state of the universe may be taken as fundamental and every state be seen as equivalent to it – the universe has no special states (these observations have been made earlier)
The following concern may have occurred to the reader. What has been said so far may be stated in the simple form (omitting logical niceties) ‘anything is possible.’ How is this consistent with the experience of the world of laws and limits? To answer this question it is required to show how form and structure must arise out of the void in indeterministic process (the origin of form and structure in indeterministic process may seem to be counterintuitive if not paradoxical.) It may also be useful to provide a plausible or probabilistic explanation or suggestion that the universe is dominated by formed systems – or at least that such systems will dominate observation. These issues are addressed in what follows
It has been seen that the fact of being is given. In a local perspective (the terms local and global have been defined earlier) the fact of being is given at some –perhaps most– times; in the global view the fact of being is, simply, given
In every metaphysics the fact of being is given
A metaphysics that preserves, as necessary, features of this world or local cosmological system beyond the fact of being is conservative
An (the) ultimate metaphysics is one that does not a priori preserve specific features of this world. In ultimate metaphysics, as has been seen, possibility and actuality are identical. The that the possible is actual provides one ‘definition’ of ultimate metaphysics – for what is impossible must lie outside metaphysics (alternatively but equivalently, in the view of Meinong the world of the impossible may be said to occupy a null manifold)
It is inherent in the concept of metaphysics that any implementation of it should be ultimate
Most traditional metaphysics contain conservative elements. This is perhaps a result of an (unconscious) intent or expectation to see the character of this world reflected in the ultimate. That in the present metaphysics what is possible is actual shows its ultimate character. Here the fact and therefore the possibility of ultimate metaphysics has been shown
That form and structure are conceivable (describable) implies that they must arise (chaos and indeterminism are distinct –absolute chaos i.e. the ruling out of form and structure is a form of determinism– it may be seen to be deterministic with respect to appropriately chosen descriptive variables… chaos is not essential indeterminism.) No mechanism is universally necessary (unless essentially indeterministic processes are regarded as mechanisms.) However it would appear that adaptation (origin) of near symmetric forms by relative stability (and therefore durability) would dominate the population of the Universe. Such systems are ‘normal’ in that they have laws and limits, in that not all logical possibilities are allowed under normal or lawlike behavior. The emergence of normal systems is necessary. This emergence (as is the emergence of any system) is necessarily indeterministic; their durability is an expression of their ‘Form’ or ‘Forms’ which is another word for the net adaptation that arises out of their near symmetry and, therefore relative stability; this durability is a factor in the domination of the population of the universe by normal systems; perfect symmetry is ‘frozen’ and therefore does not arise but if it were to, would not, of itself, decay; their emergence in a single step is possible and therefore occasionally necessary but the likelihood of such emergence is infinitesimal; incremental emergence with net adaptation at each increment is much more likely and is therefore another factor in the population of the universe by normality; incremental emergence may therefore be called ‘normal’ emergence; since normal emergence is possible it necessarily occurs; normal emergence is the dominant but not universal form of emergence – but not all emergence is normal
While normal systems cannot be entirely deterministic or causal, deterministic-like and causal-like phases of behavior arise (as an expression of their form i.e. relative stability.) This (our local) cosmological system is normal. The laws of a normal system apply with near necessity to its inhabitants. The necessity of the emergence of normal systems explains the emergence of ‘law-like’ cosmological systems in a universe that is (constitutively) devoid of law. The apparent ‘impossibilities’ of a normal system (except Logical impossibilities) are improbabilities; its limits are difficult for its inhabitants to transcend. Such improbabilities and limits are relative to the state of being which includes states of knowledge. Therefore, the realization of every description may violate normal behavior from one perspective but not from all perspectives… There is no distinction between Possibility and actuality (whatever is actual is obviously possible, what is possible must be logically possible and therefore actual.) The practical but limited common use (even in modern logic) of the concept of possibility refers to a restricted domain and concerns what is actual in a similar (constitutively identical) domain. (It is for example possible that some individual A in this cosmological system will die at the age of ninety. It is therefore actual that the same (i.e. corresponding) individual in some (near) identical cosmos will die at age ninety. Possibility implies necessity but not local necessity.) Necessity concerns constitutive form. (The realization of every consistent system of descriptions is Necessary.) The Theory of Being is ultimate with regard to depth (every state of the universe is equivalent to the void)
They saw that there were identities among Metaphysics, Logic and Cosmology; that there was arbitrariness to the distinctions. They saw that in metaphysics, the focus was being itself; in Logic, Form; and in cosmology, Variety. The developments of Logic and cosmology, below, are continuations of the development of the metaphysics. A Logos is in the process of revelation
Before derivation came constitution e.g. ‘Being includes not only entities but also Patterns, Forms, Laws and Logos (universal law.) Entities are Forms.’ The derivations or inferences are of a number of kinds that follow. (1) General logical derivations such as ‘The entire system of consistent descriptions is realized,’ ‘There is no distinction between possibility and actuality’ and so on. (2) Logical characterizations of particular concepts e.g. Power, Form and Number (below.) (3) Normal or probabilistic considerations e.g. the formations of domains by ‘normal mechanisms’ and with ‘normal behavior;’ it is not necessary that all domains be normal and be formed by normal mechanisms (incremental change and durability of relatively stable forms) but the normal domains dominate the population of being and their formation is dominated by normal mechanisms; it is necessary, however, that some normal domains be formed by normal mechanisms. (4) Finally there is interaction between the Theory and special topics as included e.g. in the sections ‘Human being’ and ‘Faith’ in which the particular topic is illuminated and enhanced by and provides elaboration of the Theory of Being
The ‘logical’ character of these developments may be limited by the precision and certainty of the particular topic. When the development is an enhancement of the foundation of the special topic, the previous limits of that topic are no longer applicable and certain of the resulting conclusions may be necessary. Examples of necessary special developments include that evolution must involve both indeterminism and selection for (adapted or relatively stable) Form; that there are necessities of the Extension of the concept of Mind (below) to the root of being; that there must be both bound and free symbols; that there be symbols (and images) that have degrees of binding to action (emotion;) that constructive thought cannot be entirely deterministic. Other developments are not necessary; some developments are reasonable e.g. when what is normal and therefore extremely probable –an example being mechanisms of origins– is taken as obtaining in a specific and apparently normal domain; other developments may be more speculative e.g. in assuming that something that is necessary in some domain applies in a given normal domain (speculation is included when it seems useful.) There is no intent to exclude significant content. Rather, an objective is to make clear the degree of confidence (from certainty to mere speculation) and significance of content
They recalled Plato’s suggestion that power (having an effect) is ‘the’ measure of being (‘the measure of being is being.’) They may have started with this idea but, instead, they found it more convenient to development of the understanding of being to start from the concept of being (and therefore the Void) itself. Thus it follows from the theory that there is power between every two entities and power among any (every) collection of entities. ‘Being is the measure of being.’ This is similar to the idea that knowability is essential to being (this is not the idea that being known gives or is being.) However, the idea seems suspect. Why would something have to be known to a particular individual in order to have being? That is not the claim – a better form of the claim might be that it must be knowable to some being (the Theory of Being then implies that it is known – Possibility is actuality.) Still, it seems suspect to suggest that some organism must (know or) be capable of knowing an entity for that entity to exist. That, again, is not the claim. The ‘causal’ order is reversed: if an entity exists it is known. Again, a question arises: if knowing is a mark of Mind why, when mind is a special kind or aspect of being, should being known be (in effect) a mark of being? The answer will be taken up in the discussion of mind below. They distinguished mind-as-they-experienced-it-at-first-hand from Mind in general. They showed that the concept of mind may be consistently extended to the root of being and that this extension was Necessary; i.e. without the extension, the ‘paradoxes’ of Mind and Matter would continually arise. They forestalled the objection e.g. of the materialist who would say that mind-at-the-root (pan-psychism) is absurd. They did this by identifying the nature of the doubt: it is a doubt that thinks that the claim is that the mind at the root is like animal or human mind – possessed of a variety of functions and elaborations, capable of understanding and so on. Instead, mind-at-the-root is shown to be coeval and equi-primitive with primal manifest being. There is a remaining doubt. What is it at or about the primitive level that allows identification with mind and where does (the concept of) matter fit into this scheme? In discussing mind (below) they were able to address this doubt as well
Being known (knowable) e.g. by human beings does not confer existence although it does show existence. However, existence necessitates knowability. This implies that there are no entities that are unknowable. This may appear to be an excessive claim. Yet, any claim to knowledge or knowability must be based on some concept of knowledge. In the following, the claim that existence necessitates knowability is investigated in terms of a number of conceptions of knowledge that start with the naïve case in which knowledge is thought to be knowledge-of the entity and proceeds to consider alternative conceptions of knowledge, the nature of truth and of the real
Here, the object is what is known – as known
The word ‘object’ has been used informally in earlier sections; it now takes on the meaning just specified
The problems of the object are (1) to analyze the relationship between object and being – this may be called the ‘dual problem of being and object’ (or being and knowledge,) and (2) to identify the nature of the real and to see what objects are real
It is important to see the issues of being and object as dual rather than independent
Phenomenalism is or includes the view that ‘appearance is reality’ i.e. that there is no real world behind appearances (naturally, ‘appearance’ must receive appropriate interpretation.) Here, however, being and object are distinct concepts. Are objects and entities necessarily distinct in a view that regards the concepts as distinct? I.e. although the sense of ‘being’ is different from that of ‘object’ is the reference distinct? This is a central subject of this section
The part of this section that is directly relevant to the narrative is the development of various objects –particular and abstract e.g. Individual and identity, form and law and pattern– and Form and Law and Pattern, universe, and, of course, the Object itself… and the Real
The discussion of the nature and conditions of knowledge are not essential to achievement of the primary ambition. Although interesting the discussion could be omitted. However, the discussion does show support for the narrative in a traditional knowledge centered perspective
A tentative conclusion of the discussion shall be that having being and objecthood are identical
A first, naïve, concept of knowledge is knowledge as knowledge-of the entity
Here, ‘entity’ encompasses not only ‘things’ but also states of affairs (and will be later extended to patterns, laws, Forms and other ‘abstract’ objects)
Although it is at first going to be seen that, naïvely, there is no knowledge-of the entity it will be seen to what extent this negative claim may be revised
Here, identity has the sense of ‘sameness’ and is different from though related to the sense in the later topic ‘Identity’ that discusses the enduring identity and sense of identity of objects and the enduring sense of self-identity of individuals
Obviously, in the naïve sense, what is known is not identical to the thing-itself. Therefore, replace identity by faithfulness. However, even faithfulness falls short of what might be meant by knowledge. The image of a mountain is clearly not the mountain but in measuring what the mountain is, all that is available is the image (including visual, tactile and other components.) (Even the well known metaphor of the hologram is lacking because the concern is not with the relation between a brain state and the world but with the image and the world)
The absence of naïve identity and faithfulness motivates a definition of the object as the concept-object. That is the object is the concept; which includes all aspects of cognition
In the case a concept occurs without the external object (e.g. a unicorn) the labels ‘fictional object’ or ‘non-existent object’ may apply. A unicorn is a contingently non-existent object (as far as is known, in the local cosmological system.) An apple that is (fully) red and not red is a necessarily non-existent object
A rock is a prototype for concrete objects. It is however, as prototype, neither complete nor, in the usual image of a ro