Journey in Being

Anil Mitra © SEPTEMBER 2009, LATEST REVISION May 18, 2010

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INTRODUCTION.. 1

I. IDEAS. 31

Intuition. 31…     Metaphysics. 53…     Objects. 97…     Cosmology. 123…     Worlds. 156

II. TRANSFORMATION.. 193

Journey. 193…     Being. 236

III. METHOD.. 240

Introduction. 241…     Knowledge and its nature. 251…     Elements of method. 254…     Themes. 276…     Implications for the tradition. 281

IV. GUIDE AND REFERENCE.. 308

Contribution. 308…     Reference. 322

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

Preliminary

The journey of the title of this narrative is an exploration in ideas and transformation of being. Regarding ideas as a kind of being, the journey is an exploration of the range of being. It is grounded in the immediate. It began as the adventure of an individual but via the emergence of a powerful system of ideas, it became clear that the journey of an individual may become—merge with the—universal. Journey in being undertaken in light of this insight. Its ambition is the greatest realization that it may fall to the author to achieve and is, therefore, an individual and a universal journey

The Introduction tells readers what to expect of Journey in being.

It discusses the meaning and nature of the journey, the ambitions, the essential ideas and their interrelations, sources for the developments, and it provides an overview of the work. Demonstrations and proofs are not given but the introduction presents something of what is demonstrated and the means of demonstration. This introductory overview is especially important for this essay since it may be unusual in a number of ways—in the particular contents and in their juxtaposition and interactions. Here are some ways in which the narrative is unusual:

First, while there is a personal or individual side that is pertinent to the narrative thread, there is also the development of a formal metaphysics that is claimed to go significantly beyond prior metaphysics in the conception of metaphysics, and the depth and scope of the metaphysics. Second, I believe there is more than personal significance to and therefore I provide a brief account of the exploration in ideas that resulted in the metaphysics. Third, the exploration does not stop at ideas but continues as a journey in being—which undertakes, first, to estimate from the ideas what may be realized and, second, to undertake the realization. Finally, and though this activity is not unusual its conclusions are significant, I elaborate and found the metaphysics, and work out its implications the human endeavor and attempt to evaluate the contribution. The areas of endeavor include realization—what are the limits and necessities of human and animal being; revaluation of religion, spirit, and the possible and necessary trajectories of human being; application to and evaluation of the nature of science and the sciences; and critical development of concepts and contents of metaphysics and general or philosophical cosmology, epistemology—the theory and nature of knowledge, logic and mathematics, and the theory of transformation of being

The development has a fair amount of detail. Purposes of the detail include (1) use in or as a part of the journey—these include details of content as well as details of rigorous or careful development which adds confidence where possible or shows limits where necessary (necessary limits should not be regarded as limiting since they are really the boundaries of being,) (2) showing the power of the ideas and means of transformation, and (3) their significance to the human endeavor and history of ideas

I write to express and communicate my thought and experience. The entire narrative is for the author and the reader. However, the essay is unusual in a number of respects. Therefore, in addition to the general introduction, a final section, For the reader, addresses two special concerns. The first of these concerns is the audience to whom the essay may appeal. This is addressed in the subsection The audience that also suggests preparation that may guide the reader through the work. The second subsection is titled On meaning. Linguistic meaning is particularly important to the understanding of this narrative and is taken up in the chapter Intuition. On meaning is an informal discussion of some aspects of meaning that may greatly assist the reader in understanding the developments of the narrative

The main narrative is developed in a roughly linear manner. In the introduction, however, nonlinear development—including use of words before or without definition—will enhance clarity and brevity and may assist the reader in understanding. The chapter Metaphysics develops a world view based in what is called the Universal metaphysics. This metaphysics is a late development of my ideas. However, it shows what is possible and necessary in the way of a journey in being and so justifies certain hopes and ambitions regarding the journey as, at least, not unrealistic. The metaphysics anchors and holds together the system of ideas and transformations of the narrative. Should the reader want to know the basis of numerous arguments and claims, the metaphysics provides the foundation. Therefore, in beginning the introduction with a discussion of the Universal metaphysics, the reader is provided with an orientation to its character, magnitude, and dimensions

Some conventions

English has a number of Capitalization rules. In this narrative Capitalization is also used to designate a particular meaning of a term. Thus Logic refers to a distinct conception of the common term logic. It is not the case that the particular use, Logic, is specialized. Though, distinct from logic because it is a specific redefinition, the redefinition allows Logic to be broader (and more precise.) When combined, Italicization with capitalization generally refers to titles of parts, chapters, and sections of the narrative

Introduction to the Universal metaphysics

This section has the following aims. (1) Since the metaphysics is likely to be unanticipated by most readers to provide them with some preparation for it, and (2) Especially to inform the reader that the depth and breadth of the picture of the Universe provided by the metaphysics is absolute. Here, ‘depth’ refers to foundation. The reader will naturally have reservations regarding the claim of depth but will appreciate that if the claim is true it should be enormous in magnitude and consequence. The reader who is aware of the history of relativism versus non-relativism in foundations in metaphysics will especially appreciate the revolutionary character of the claim: if there is a finite foundation, what is the basis of its first step and if the foundation is not finite there is no first step (this may be called the paradox of foundation.) Naturally, if my assertions are to have any claims to validity they should have basis in reason and I assert that I have indeed provided demonstration of the claims. What is the resolution of the apparent paradox of foundation? It is to find foundation in objects so simple that the ‘first step’ shall be evident while the objects be sufficiently universal that the developments shall not be trivial; for the actual development I refer the reader to the text and ask that judgment be reserved until it may be applied to the arguments. In the foregoing, ‘breadth’ refers to the magnitudes, of the extension, duration, and variety of being revealed. That the breadth revealed is absolute means there is no limit to these magnitudes. Roughly, what allows the demonstration to go through is that existence of the magnitudes is demonstrated even though complete direct knowledge is absent. I.e., the metaphysics allows us to know, roughly, what is there even if we do not directly know all of that which is there. What does this mean; how is it precisely specified; how is it shown; what are its consequences; what are its implications for philosophy, Logic, metaphysics, cosmology, human destiny or lack of destiny; for these and many other concerns the reader is referred to the developments. Readers who are familiar with the history of philosophy will know that ‘systematic philosophy’ peaked in the nineteenth century with the speculative systems of philosophers of that era (of which the most speculative and perhaps the greatest was that of Hegel;) that those philosophies were mostly idealistic and typically based in some particular intuition raised to a universal level; and that philosophical thought has since that time become concerned with topics that are of relatively local concern and or sufficiently transparent that there development is based in evidence and reason rather than speculation. This reader may think that my claims concern a speculative, systematic, and Universal metaphysics and the terms of this thought may be those of doubt or instinctual rejection (which may be practical from the modern perspective but cannot be reasoned until the arguments have been read and followed.) To such doubts I will respond as follows. Regarding speculation I should say that imagination, feeling, experience, and analogical reasoning have revealed to me where I should look and what I may find. However, once I have an idea of what it is that I may be looking for, that ‘picture’ is subject to evidence and reason and accepted or rejected. This has not been a single step process but, instead, a the metaphysics has been built up incrementally in steps of imagination and reason, sometimes held together with intuition and doubt and incompleteness have been tolerated until a final picture was arrived at that was satisfactory with regard to evidence and reason. Regarding objections to ‘systematic’ metaphysics I respond, first, that it is the merely speculative side of such metaphysics that is the occasion for doubt but as just noted the present metaphysics has been subject to the criteria of evidence and reason; and, second, I have sought Universal understanding over mere system and it has been rather surprising even though delightfully surprising that some system has emerged. Of course the claim that I did not seek system is not tendered as proof but since the proof was by evidence and reason it does not need to be proof; the suggestion is that, first, if system is to be sought, this is one good way to seek it and, second, that it may after all be valid to seek system. The reader should have the doubt that surely the entire system of phenomena of being with its great and magnificent structures and its decay and probable chaos and indeterminism cannot be subject to system. The objection would indeed be good if I did indeed make the implied claim. The actual claim however is that a framework of understanding for the Universe has been found and that within this framework there may be structure and indeterminism. What has been shown is in fact more: within the framework there must be structure and indeterminism (I shall not say randomness for the term is vague) and that, contrary to the expectation of certain strands of thought, structure and indeterminism are not only consistent but the indeterminism of the picture is absolute indeterminism and that this extreme indeterminism implies structure for if access to any state is ruled the indeterminism cannot be absolute

. ‘Depth’ refers to foundation—in reason and with absolute yet finite depth (the reader who understands the distinction between

The main narrative is developed in a roughly linear manner. In this Introduction, however, nonlinear development will enhance clarity and brevity and may assist the reader in understanding

It is effective to begin the Introduction to the narrative with the Universal metaphysics which is one of the main developments of the narrative. In what follows in this Introduction, precise statement, development, detail, and all demonstration (roughly, proof) will be deferred to the narrative

Thus the discussion in the Introduction will not bring out the full power and broad range of consequences of the metaphysics. However, the brief discussion of the Introduction will show readers (1) that the Universe is of immensely greater magnitude and variety than it is commonly conceived to be, (2) that the individual has access via ideas and being to the magnitude and variety of the Universe but not that actual access is without effort, (3) something of the magnitude and nature of the journey narrated, and (4) that these and related claims are demonstrated—not mere guesses—and that, contrary to what might be thought, there is no violation of the tradition of knowledge including science and reason they do not

The metaphysics

Metaphysics is, roughly, knowledge of objects (being) as they are. In the main narrative, a metaphysics is developed from ground up, the issue of the possibility of metaphysics addressed, consequences are drawn. This metaphysics is called the Universal metaphysics; its detailed development, elaboration, and demonstration is deferred. General cosmology or, simply, cosmology is the study of the variety of being and has been conflated with physical cosmology in modern times but we shall see that cosmology is immensely broader than physical cosmology. Cosmology may be regarded as a topic in metaphysics. In thinking of metaphysics we may also think of the cosmology that it entails. Then, (the Universal) metaphysics is knowledge of the Universe as it is

Preliminary comments on metaphysics

Metaphysics is, roughly, knowledge of being as it is

In modern thought the very possibility of metaphysics has been criticized and so one objective of this essay must be to demonstrate that metaphysics is indeed possible and that the Universal metaphysics is indeed what is claimed

What is the meaning of ‘possibility’ in an assertion that metaphysics is or is not possible? First, metaphysics must be defined a little more explicitly: metaphysics is, roughly, knowledge of objects (being) as they are, expressed in symbolic terms (e.g. language.) That metaphysics is possible means that there is some being that is capable of developing metaphysics. It does not mean that human being is capable of developing metaphysics or, if capable, will develop metaphysics. There are two kinds of demonstration of possibility. The first is abstract and consists in showing that some being is capable of developing metaphysics. In the second, consists in producing a symbolic system and showing that it is metaphysics; this kind of demonstration is ‘concrete’ and is more satisfactory. The first kind of demonstration is valuable when a concrete demonstration has not been accomplished for it shows that the search is not useless. The demonstration in this narrative is given in chapters Intuition and Metaphysics and consolidated in Objects… and is of the concrete kind. Intuition shows the possibility of metaphysics by demonstrating our knowledge of certain universal Objects. In Metaphysics this knowledge is developed as a metaphysical system—i.e., the Universal metaphysics. In Objects the nature of the Object is clarified and all Objects are found to be of a single fundamental kind and in doing this the variety of Objects accessible to (human) being is broadened

It is seen in the development that far from being suspect, metaphysics is the most precise and in some sense most real of all knowledge. The foundation is provided in Intuition and developed in Metaphysics. In Metaphysics it is shown that the Universal metaphysics has the certainty of Logic. Here, Logic is capitalized to distinguish it from logic. The Logic is the ideal version of the logics wherein it is realized that Logic does not have some remote and absolute status but is itself empirical at core. What can be said is that Logic is the discipline that has the highest certainty and precision and that this is therefore also true of the Universal metaphysics

Two other criticisms have been leveled at the metaphysical systems of the past. Here, we entertain these criticisms to enquire whether they apply to the Universal metaphysics. The first criticism concerns the imposition of some grand system as the structure of the Universe. The pinnacle of these is perhaps the Hegelian-Marxist system. Detailed discussion of these criticisms is taken up later but two points may be mentioned here. First, such systems are widely regarded as having failed—Hegel’s thought for its imposition of a grand idealism (absolute spirit) upon what science reveals as material and Marx’s thought for its failure as a description of political economy. These failures have led to widespread abandonment of system—the small local narratives of Continental thought and the piece-meal approach of analytic philosophy (most current Western philosophy falls under the labels Continental and analytic.) However, nowhere has system been demonstrated impossible. What has emerged is that imposed system, especially of the grand style, is immensely improbable. In contrast, the Universal metaphysics is not imposed but emerges from investigation and even though some of its conclusions may be seen as ‘grand’ the inputs to the metaphysics are elementary. A second criticism of the systems of Western philosophy is that they are idealistic in nature—mind is imposed upon the Universe as its fundamental kind. Such thought may have seemed more reasonable in the nineteenth century and earlier. However, in the twentieth century a view of the world as essentially material emerged and idealism generally appeared irrelevant and absurd. The Universal metaphysics imposes no such kinds and cannot therefore be subject to a criticism of being idealist or materialist. It does not postulate any substance but is not against substance. It emerges from analysis that the Universe can have no fundamental substance but it allows that matter as we know it may be regarded for some practical concerns to be treated as a local substance. Later, the metaphysics will be one of the instruments that we use to develop a deeper understanding of matter and mind, not from prejudgment as substance, but by beginning with reflection on the function of the terms ‘matter’ and ‘mind’ in our vocabulary and on the functional relation between the referents of the terms

The Universal metaphysics

The following statements of, regarding, or related to the Universal metaphysics are demonstrated in subsequent chapters

There is one and only one metaphysics. The metaphysics may be developed in more than one form and in varying lesser degree of detail

There is no limit to variety of being and the population of beings in the Universe. Without violation of Logic, a greater universe cannot be conceived. These are in fact forms of what will be called the fundamental principle of metaphysics that is one of the main founding propositions of the metaphysics

The Universal metaphysics is ultimate with regard to breadth. This means, simply, that it is shown in the metaphysics that there is no limit to the variety of being in the Universe. However, it is reasonably certain that the variety of being can be explicitly specified (written down) in symbolic or iconic terms. I.e., the metaphysics is implicitly ultimate with regard to breadth. This is a definite achievement for it has been speculated but not demonstrated in prior thought that there is no limit to variety. The implicit character of the breadth may be thought to be a limit of the metaphysics but it is reasonable to think that truth cannot be a real limit but only a limit relative to what might have otherwise been expected. Once discovered, truth that seems limiting may be empowering. In this case it is. A journey into unforeseeable variety is a greater adventure than travel through a predefined itinerary

The reader may be familiar with the idea that axiomatic systems must contain unfounded axioms. A simple form of the reply to this concern regarding the metaphysics is to consider the definition The Universe is all being and the proposition The Universe exists. The natural objection is that the experience is an illusion. That is not a good objection for, if it is true, then being includes illusions and therefore there is a Universe. This proof is may be unsatisfying in that it suggests that the Universe may be nothing but a collection of psychoses. However, the argument of the narrative is more direct—it does not depend on illusion as being—and it will entertain and counter numerous objections

It should be useful to enquire how the Universal metaphysics is different from, say, geometry. The axioms of Euclidean geometry require undefined terms and unproved postulates. Why is the metaphysics not subject to the same requirement? The answer, repeated below, is that the proposition The Universe exists is too general or course grained to be capable of being incorrect. The real question is What is in the Universe? Is it merely a collection of illusions (of illusions…)? This is taken up in chapters Intuition through Worlds. Thus even though the claim must be strengthened, it is simultaneously empirical and necessary. Perhaps that is reasonable enough but then there is the immediate response—since this is so trivially true, how can anything of significance follow from it? The answer is deferred to the main narrative which develops the ‘how’ and shows the significance to be immense. What the present discussion points to, and what will be shown, is that there is a foundation of metaphysics and cosmology—knowledge of all being—in experience (in contrast, experience suggests but does not found geometry.) Because most axiomatic systems have undefined terms, prior metaphysics is ‘founded’ either in infinite regress or undefined substance. The present foundation is finite, will be seen to neither require nor allow substance, and regards all being and is therefore a foundation that is explicitly ultimate with regard to depth. It is dependent on the fact that the meaning of ‘being’ has not been specified. In this lies power—foundation and variety—and openness or unending non-specifiable variety

Individual identity does and must merge with the identity of all being or Universal identity. The narrative elaborates the meaning of this merging. However, the merging is not the discovery of a final place of nirvanic or other rest of some disembodied form of my spirit in harmony with all being. I do not conceive the particular of the merging but regardless of its form it must dissolve again into discrete beings with strivings. Endless adventure awaits the explorer in being

The metaphysics, in interaction with traditional disciplines, suggests but provides no sure approaches to realization. These approaches begin in the present. The suggestions include that some degree of search will improve appreciation and directness of the process. The process is not one of linear progression through higher and more inclusive stages of being but an unending adventure with Universal peaks and dissolutions. The individual can perhaps choose to not engage in the adventure but cannot, even in death, choose to not be in it

It may seem as though some of the assertions about the Universal metaphysics violate science, reason, and common sense. However the sum of the human traditions—including science and reason as well as reasoned common sense—does not define the Universe. Instead, the traditions entail or suggest only that the actual Universe must lie in a certain range. The inner boundary of the range is the view of the Universe that is positively revealed by the tradition—I call this Cosmos. The current scientific picture of Cosmos, which I mention as illustration rather than definite fact, is that of collection of fundamental entities or particles and fields, knowledge of which extends about fourteen billion years into the past, whose behavior is described by some combination of quantum theory and a relativistic theory of gravitation. While the picture is not held steadfastly, it is reasonable. To explain the improbable aspects of some features of the picture, some physical cosmologists hypothesize an infinity of bubble cosmological systems, beyond the edge of our cosmos that do not have causal interaction with one another. It seems to be common, especially among academics, to think that the Universe is Cosmos. The outer boundary is the view of the Universe that is allowed by the tradition—and since Logic is the only further restriction on this view, I call it Logos. Logos is the view defined by the Universal metaphysics and demonstrated in its development and therefore the Universal metaphysics and its consequences do not contradict science or common sense

Doubt and faith

The doubt regarding contradiction of the tradition of thought is one of two main doubts and though the resolution is stated above, the process and argument of the resolution are left for the narrative. The doubt is insidious and arises in many ways that require address; the recurrence of doubt and address serves to bring the Universal metaphysics from the realm of the esoteric toward the realm of the exoteric. The second main doubt—the doubt from reason—concerns the validity of the demonstration and the address of this doubt is, likewise, left for the narrative. This doubt does not disable the metaphysics but it lingers; it is enhanced by the immense magnitude of the conclusions of the metaphysics. An approach in the face of lingering doubt is an appeal to faith as the attitude that results in the best (good) action in the presence of doubt (and is not faith in absurd propositions or mere claims.) Our knowledge of the details of our world is never certain and neurotic doubt might be crippling; therefore faith is important—faith is action as though a reasonable proposition is true. A rather different approach is perhaps one that is ‘Logically’ more satisfying. It is the recognition, whose explanation and demonstration is deferred, that all knowledge and therefore even Logic is empirical in nature but Logic is perhaps the closest to certain truth (clarification of meaning and demonstration awaits the main narrative)

Development of the metaphysics

The Universal metaphysics is developed later. Here, I point to some the essential elements of the development

In my early thought, I looked to the details of the world; later, I saw that I should step back from detail and examine an abstract of the world. If sufficiently abstract, what is conceived is too general to be capable of distortion (how this enables knowledge of significance is shown in the development.) The essential concepts were Universe seen as a whole, Void or absence of being, Domain or part of the Universe, and Logos or the Universe in all its detail but without specification of the detail

It was essential that the Universe was not seen as the empirical or the physical universe but as all that there is—or was or will be (concerns about time and its universality versus non-universality are addressed in the development.) Clearly there is more to the Universe than is known to us; therefore we object to any thought that the Universe is the empirically known universe. Is the Universe physical? Perhaps, but not assuming it to be physical may strengthen the argument for its physical nature. It will turn out that the Universe is not entirely physical unless we loosen the meaning of the word so that ‘is physical’ and ‘exists’ have the same meaning

What kinds of thing does the Universe have in it? Since our knowledge is not the object in itself there arises a question of what an Object is and an extreme case of this question is whether there are Objects; this issue is deferred. Therefore, we may say that the Universe contains common objects such as bricks and solar systems. Are the laws of nature in the Universe—since we conceive them, perhaps the laws are not truly in the Universe. Trivially, laws are in the Universe because our minds or what we take as our minds are in the Universe. But there is a better approach to the question regarding laws and it is one with far reaching consequences. A law is read by human beings; but in the world there is some real pattern or behavior to which the law refers (perhaps approximately.) The actual pattern is the Law. The Law itself must be in the Universe because it even if it is not a ‘thing’ it is a property of things and not something that is merely perceived and the Universe is all that there is. Later we will see that Laws and things are kinds of Object. The Universe contains no Objects

The Void is defined as complete absence. I.e., the Void contains no Objects and therefore no Laws. In the chapter Metaphysics, a demonstration of the existence of the Void is given and then the fact that it contains no Law leads to the Universal metaphysics

Thus two essential elements of the development are abstraction of a certain kind, and careful definition of fundamental concepts such as Universe and Void

Some simple but powerful consequences of the conception of the Universe can be given. A first consequence is that if a creator is other than what is created, the Universe can have no creator because there is nothing other than it (if the Universe were all physical things, it might have a non-physical creator; and, even though the Universe has no creator, one domain may be creative with respect to another.) As a second consequence consider the notion of possibility. If something does in fact obtain it is obviously possible. What does it mean that something is possible when it does not obtain? It typically means that it could obtain. How do we know it could obtain? If circumstances were different it would obtain! Suppose something never obtains in the Universe—past, present, or future. Is it possible? It is possible under other circumstances. But, in the Universe, there are no other circumstances—what does not obtain in the Universe is not possible. For the Universe only what actually obtains is possible. This is a powerful conclusion. The argument, however, has some deficiencies of which one is that the conception of possibility is not clear. These deficiencies will be remedied in the chapter Metaphysics where it will be seen that there is a family of conceptions of the possible

A third essential element of the development is the concept of being which will be considered in the next section

Journey in being

Journey

Discussion of the Universal metaphysics gives universal significance to the meaning and use of ‘journey’ which will be further brought out in the narrative. This section describes a personal or individual meaning of ‘journey’

I have always had the ambition to do great work where greatness emphasizes contribution and adventure over recognition. Early, the ambition was implicit

The experience and thought behind the narrative has traversed much terrain; a love of nature, and people and ideas has led to much travel in the worlds of geography, and culture and learning. Although I have not done one million and one things I have had a number of career paths, enjoyed all, been fully satisfied by none. These paths include research and teaching and consulting in engineering, running all phases of a restaurant, psychiatric and other healthcare, and, informally, though perhaps most extensively and with the greatest depth, engagement with ideas. As a student from undergraduate through graduate (PhD) phases I experienced much of the required curriculum as stifling and hardly attended to it except frantic last minute late night efforts. Instead, I found myself talking with friends over midnight coffee, avoiding lectures to drink morning coffee with my mother, sports, reading and thinking in a wide range of disciplines—mathematics, natural science—especially theoretical physics and evolutionary biology, philosophy, religion: university libraries were my church. As a graduate student in engineering, interest led me to take took many doctoral courses in mathematics and most doctoral level courses in physics. As a university teacher in engineering I taught and wanted to teach essentially all the basic courses in my discipline as well as courses from the advanced undergraduate level to seminars for faculty. I did not care too much for the ‘publish or perish’ attitude in academia but, still, my research had gained international recognition when I left the University to seek other experience. This academic experience has had great influence in terms of breadth of exposure and developing deep skills in reasoning and understanding what it means to approach ideas with rigor and imagination (without imagination thought suffers poverty, without care it suffers irrelevance.) The variety of paradigms that I absorbed have been metaphor and more than metaphor for many of the developments in the narrative—the main as well as special developments. The emphasis on reasoning and rigor makes it imperative to prove claims when I can (and note the absence of sure demonstration when all I have is plausible but useful explanation… and to recognize the distinction between the plausible and the necessary.) The insistence on proof and detail makes my work difficult to perform and difficult to read. The simultaneous insistence on imagination makes my work harder for it means that my task is to prove great if not the greatest results; interestingly the greatest results have not been difficult to demonstrate—the difficulty has been in the slow transformation from vague to precise ideas, in seeing what systems of ideas to use, and in seeing how to prove, and in seeing the interrelations among systems of ideas and proofs. But, the simultaneous insistence on reason and imagination has had immense benefits. From reason and experience, we can of course have confidence in results but, even more, the attention to reason has led to powerful tools of demonstration. And I have found that the interaction between imagination and reason is far more powerful than imagination alone; demonstration itself suggests what to imagine, which occasions demonstration or disproof and a cycle continues and spirals on

That I left the academic environment has also been instrumental. The world of work has provided a realism. Criticism—as well as support and real criticism is a form of support—from intelligent non-academic persons has been immensely useful. I know directly the concerns of ‘everyman’ and ‘everywoman.’ I experience these concerns myself, in some ways more intensely than most; I am different and unique but not other. It means that in my everyday life I have been engaged in a journey, engaged with the world rather than academic nicety. Although I have a natural inclination to want to be concerned with the ‘greatest thing,’ overcoming various adversities has strengthened resolve and given it meaning. I have emphasized the importance of reason and proof. In my academic career I recognized that there is often an over concern with rigor and precision. The extra-academic experience has emphasized this point. In the fast paced environment of acute psychiatric care there is occasion for reason and occasion to enter the state of ‘no mind.’ This is true in so much of life; for me it became emphatic in the face of threat and care. The most effective action seems to come from some appropriate combination of mind and no mind. In the journey, I face the following question. When I have pushed ideas to my limit, and perhaps their limit at least in certain directions, and the ideas show outcomes of action but not precisely how to act—what then? I turn to ‘no mind’ for which another term is faith used in the sense of the attitude that is most conducive to the greatest outcome (and not belief in absurd claims.) The greatest insistence on reason requires that we reflect upon the place of reason… and we find, not so much that reason has limits—of course it does and it is important from the truth perspective to not claim reason where it is absent—but that our attitudes to reason—neurotic clinging which sometimes parades as machismo logic—are limiting. The reader will find this theme weaving through the narrative

I have traveled in India, the United States, Canada and Mexico—spending time in cities, primitive areas—across the United States and in Mexico—sleeping under the stars for weeks and months at a time, and rural places. This experience is contributory: through contact with people I feel a far ranging connection with humankind. The hiking and living in wild places is especially significant (1) for here have I felt great contact with being and inspiration to experience the magnitude of being, and (2) solitude, beauty, and the rhythm of hiking have been the ground of inspiration for some of my best ideas

Here and in what follows, I am reminded of the immense interaction of ranges of experience, ranges of ideas, and ranges of imagination-criticism. Done well, this interaction may result in immense creativity. In noticing myself engaged in this process, I came to think that this is an immense source of creation; this point is elaborated, later, in the chapter on Method as a generalized notion of reflexivity

Much thought has led up to the present form of my ideas—many previous paradigms assumed with a goal of a metaphysical understanding of the Universe. Why assume a paradigm? Practically, although a materialist or other paradigm may be criticized, getting somewhere for a developing thinker requires or at least may require some foundation or ground. One can be a practical idealist or materialist without subscribing to materialism or idealism. If materialism holds, the approach may lead to deep foundation of materialism. If not, the result may be deep rather criticism rather than shallow rejection. In either case, general understanding deepens in preparation for constructive understanding. I believe that the work with paradigm prepared me for deep understanding of ‘no paradigm’ and we have seen how the approach from being is not a paradigm. Of course work and development and imagination and discovery do not end with a realization of the significance of the approach from being. First, the approach dawns; dawn comes before daybreak which comes before the sun at its zenith. I believe, also, that the earlier experience has greatly promoted tying my thought into and providing some foundation for prior thought

The various paradigms include an evolutionary and material framework, an idealist framework, a framework that integrated world and mind, and a framework that attempted to see the Universe as a single or absolute consciousness (but rather different in nature from Hegel’s approach.) The frameworks were written as extensive essays, roughly seven essays altogether, and discarded—I learned much in the process. The essential dissatisfaction was the thought that mind, matter, and similar terms are too particular. They are particular in nature, they are tied in to our forms of understanding, they assume a spatiotemporal framework, and since, e.g., substance is simultaneously taken as given and fundamental, it may well be impossible to find a foundation for it. I later realized that if mind or matter are interpreted liberally, the particular connotations may be technically eliminated but the terms continue to suggest their particular connotations. The present development began when I abandoned the approach from substance (e.g. mind or matter) in favor of an approach from being. This abandonment was gradual but near forced by my attempts at universal understanding in terms of particular paradigms. In 2002, I had a fundamental insight, described later, that enabled an (the) approach from being. The approach was first written in 2002-2003, and has now gone through over ten versions. What has changed in these versions is not the foundation of the approach but its maturation, its expression in a number of alternate terms, its subsumption of more and more concepts and areas of metaphysical thought and of practical thought (modern academic disciplines and essential cultural practices.) Thought and experience have contributed to the outcome, to the present place of the ideas and of my being. Unlike purists who prefer that their discipline has no application, I have always been interested in application. Later, under the influence of my developing ideas, I realized that the entire system of knowing merges with and is incomplete without action and therefore application (the ‘purest’ areas of knowledge, as will be seen, are complete without action but still have application.) My engagement with the world, and being in it, combined with the foregoing insights led to search for the ‘the greatest realization.’ The journey has an individual side that merges via its own process with the Universal (side)

Being

‘Being’ arises in the Universal metaphysics as the fundamental kind of thing in the Universe. Roughly, ‘being’ is what is there. Thus the fundamental kind is, after all, no particular kind. This rather qualitative statement is made more precise in the narrative. Unlike the notions of matter and mind, being is characterized by extreme generality (no particular kind.) Since everything has being, we may wonder how it might be instrumental in the development of an ultimate and Universal metaphysics. The response is that the generality, the absence of commitment (e.g., as in mind, matter, or relation, or fact and so on) is at outset of investigation. Commitment may enter in the process of discovery; at outset we have no commitment to commitment or its absence (we may want commitment but hold back; we may want to remain ever open but we begin to see that ever openness may shut down in some directions, remain so in others.) Perhaps matter will emerge as fundamental and if it does so our understanding will be more powerful than it would have been by assuming matter as fundamental in the beginning. What does emerge is that there is and can be no fundamental substance, that this is part of a powerful Universal metaphysics that shows the existence of an immense variety of kinds of being populated by beings (the kinds may be thought of as local substances but this is naturally not particularly illuminating)

The approach from being encourages focus on things as they are rather than what we have thought them to be. At outset we do not think of things as matter or mind; this leads to powerful understanding of the nature of things—except that they are, there is no nature to things. Instead, it will emerge that there are varieties without end but there may be local and practical kinds. If all being is regarded as thing and other, and if matter is identified as thing and mind as interaction with other, it would seem that there is no third or more kind beyond matter and mind (Spinoza, in thinking of mind and matter as substances thought that there is no reason to not suppose an infinite number of such kinds.) Even if this argument is valid it still allows a great variety within mind and within matter and it also suggests the source of the affinity of mind and matter. The argument was encouraged by the focus on things as they are rather than our preconceptions—e.g., matter as a kind of stuff, mind as another kind of stuff. Again, the approach from being—no preconception—encouraged the experiment with the concepts of Universe, Void and so on until conceptions were found that enable the emergence of the power that was potential but not realized. Is not no preconception a preconception? Sometimes we must move forward and an occasional preconception may be empowering. Thus, even though science may lack final foundation, it may have power. On a personal level we ask ‘what is important to me?’ It is in being open with regard to this that great possibilities emerge (and the balance is that some people are committed early in life and this too may lead to great accomplishment)

But Universe, Void and so on are abstract and removed! There is no foundation to a claim of knowledge—it might seem. The problem here is the conception of the abstract. We are generally conditioned to think of the abstract as remote. That is a preconceived notion of abstraction. If we think of our perceptions, and think also of a subset of all the sensa that constitute a perception that is so bare that it cannot suffer distortion—that defines knowing that is abstract and immediate. But this knowledge is trivial comes an objection. The objection suffers from the preconception—the trivial is impotent and it will be seen in what follows that the trivial and the profound are occasionally, though obviously not invariably, bound together

Throughout the narrative, examples of the approach from being—as such and by analogy—will proliferate

A final thought regarding the significance of being for a journey. Being signifies that exploration is not mere travel: there is transformation and it is not limited to individual growth or technological or social or other limited kinds of change. It may be essential (without implication of final essence.) However, only a—minute—fraction is known of what kinds of change are possible and what may be desirable—especially at the outset. Being suggests that change may reach depths and kinds that are not anticipated

A journey in being

Individual and Universal

The journey is individual and Universal

It is based in an ultimate Universal metaphysics… that demonstrates identity of the individual and the Universe and, together with traditional disciplines, suggests realization that may be efficient and enjoyed or appreciated

It is in ideas and transformation

I use the term ideas to refer to all kinds of mental content that provides us with a vector map of the terrain—i.e., the Universe. The term vector as used here refers simply to direction—e.g., a sense of direction that may be taken and which may range from possible to compulsive in intensity. Especially included under ideas are (1) individual experience, learning, research, ambitions… and (2) the human traditions of knowledge of world, spirit, and transformation. A transformation refers to the transformation of an Object or individual

We sometimes think of ideas as ephemeral. However, an idea invariably has a trace in the body. Thus having or developing an idea is a transformation. In the normal conception, ideas constitute a fraction of the transformations available to the individual. Still, ideas are essential in that they are the place of recognition and appreciation of being and transformation. And, ideas are instrumental in mapping and navigating the Universe

From the Universal metaphysics there are no limits to transformation (of an Object or individual.) I.e., the individual may—and will—experience universal identity (a typical formulation invokes union with universal identity.) In conceiving transformations and road maps, Logic is to be respected. However, there is no intrinsic limit. In any given experience of identity, there is always dissolution and higher forms of such identity. It is an endless adventure of pleasure, knowledge, and pain. The process is important; the loveliness of our world is essential for it is not a lesser world even though it may be ‘smaller;’ and it is the ground for our journey at this time. What of conventional limits? The Universal metaphysics shows that physical and common certainties must be reinterpreted as very probable. And it is significant that what is probable depends not only on the state of the world but also on the state of our knowledge (witness the transformations made available by science.)

Ideas may suggest approaches but do not and cannot show the way or anticipate the variety of experience that may occur. The way or path is therefore an adventure. Exploration is essential to know and arrive at any ultimates

To undertake the exploration is to undertake a journey in being—a journey in ideas and identity

Other phases

The ideas and the transformations are the main phases of the journey. The journey of the spirit that is intertwined with the journey through the world, especially the world of nature as sacred, invokes interweaving of idea and general transformation

Two further specialized phases of interest to the author are (1) Society, ideas, and action; and (2) Theory, design, simulation, construction of a variety of being—physical, psychological, social, and technological

Sources for the journey

Sources in my life—ambition, experience, and thought

An outline of some sources in my ambition, thought and experience is provided in the sections Journey and Being. Further detail is implicit in the narrative

Sources in the history of ideas

Because of the breadth of the topics of the essay and because much of my reading has been without specific aim, I cannot provide a comprehensive listing of sources that may have influenced my thought. I kept a record of my reading till 1992—see Bibliographies for Evolution and Design—but have not done so since then. This makes it impossible to be comprehensive with regard to the most recent and perhaps important sources. However, it might be more useful to provide a general account of the sources for the most important concepts—this is done below but I remind the reader that my work is original and not a synthesis. The reader may also find the information on sources in Part IV of the essay Guide and Reference

The primary sources concern the concepts of being, the Void, of Logic, of identities of individual and Universe, and of the principle of variety

Being, the Void and Logic. I am indebted to Aristotle and Heidegger for their emphasis on being but not so indebted regarding their treatments of being. Plato’s thoughts on the concept of being were influential in the development of my sense of that concept. Heidegger calls the question ‘Why is there being at all—i.e. why is there being rather than absence of being?’ the fundamental problem of metaphysics. This ‘problem,’ commonly regarded as unsolved today and speculatively unsolvable, is proved in the narrative (as a consequence of the fundamental principle of metaphysics.) The main recent sources regarding the Void and Logic, even though necessarily indirect since their speculations stopped far short of my demonstrated conclusions, are found in the ideas of Leibniz, Hume, Frege, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. I am indebted to Leibniz and Wittgenstein for their insights into the identity of metaphysics and logic and am fortunate to have been able to provide an immense advance over their reflections—including proof of the identity, and use of the identity to develop a metaphysics of ultimate depth and breadth while simultaneously showing the empirical character of Logic. Wittgenstein, Hume and Leibniz implicitly skirt the idea of the Void in their suggestions that the only impossibilities are logical impossibilities—for which they provide neither clear meaning nor proof (in this essay, clear meanings are giving to the concept of possibility and it is proved that that all Logical possibilities are actual.) There are species of ‘voidism’ in Judaic, Islamic, Buddhist and Indian thought but I am not indebted to these sources for the philosophy of the Void. Later, I may use such reflections as a source in the transformations of chapter Journey. Provided it is clear that by the word ‘spiritual’ I do not imply another realm but a place, entirely in the one realm of being, between the unknown and what is invested in the known, the religious sources may encourage and inspire a spiritual journey; art, architecture, music, ritual, and the secular literature may also provide inspiration regarding spirit. I may identify Ian Baker’s The Heart of the World: A Journey to Tibet’s Lost Paradise, 2004, as one paradigm—though far from being the paradigm—of the kind of guide that may be useful in the transformations. The metaphysics, which has been brought to an ultimate level, has been also been glimpsed in the history of thought e.g. by Leibniz, Hume and Wittgenstein who saw some aspect of it but provided neither demonstration nor systematic development of a whole system nor development of a system of implications

Identities of individual and Universe. The identity of individual and Universe—Atman and Brahman—has been imagined in Indian Philosophy, especially in Vedanta. However, the Vedanta provides no proof and it therefore lacks a vision of the dynamic character of the identity and the probable lack of a greatest being

The principle of variety. The principle of variety and other forms of the fundamental principle of metaphysics and their proofs were discovered in the development of the ideas of this essay. It was later that I looked in detail at the idea that no possibilities that remain eternally possible will go unrealized which has been called the principle of plenitude by the philosopher Arthur O. Lovejoy, 1873-1962. The principle has been referred to and deployed in the thought of Augustine, St Anselm—in ontological arguments for the existence of God, Thomas Aquinas, and Giordano Bruno. Kant believed in the principle but not in possibility of its empirical verification. However since prior conceptions of possibility are quite deficient, the very statement of the principle of plenitude is unclear and deficient; and while the principle is clearly plausible, no earlier author has provided proof

The narrative

Main divisions of the essay and their interactions

There are three main parts—Ideas, Transformation, and Method; and an auxiliary part

Ideas and Transformation

The journey has been described as an exploration in ideas and transformation of being. In using the term ‘idea’ I refer to such notions as science, humanities including philosophy, imagination, poetry, reason and experience, and the development and use of ideas. The development of an idea is a form of transformation. However, the most complete form of transformation is transformation of being. The aim of the journey is adventure in thought and transformation whose trajectory will attempt to traverse higher forms without limit

Although ideas are incomplete they are instrumental in transformation (however blind experiment has its place.) Ideas are essential as the place of appreciation of being and its change. There is a wider notion of idea in which idea and identity are interwoven in process

The main phases of the journey are ideas and transformation

The first two parts of the narrative correspond to the main phases, Ideas and Transformations, of the journey. As we have seen these phases have interaction: the ideas are developed in the context of action which is a special case of transformation and, in turn, the ideas illuminate and guide transformation. The interaction of thought and action, and the notion that thought should have application is not new (not all thinkers subscribe to this notion.) What is perhaps an illumination are the necessity of the interaction even when not intended and the necessary incompleteness of ideas without transformation. As noted earlier some ideas are complete without transformation; one of the characteristics of the present development is its fine grained character—there is no universalization of the kinds all ideas are incomplete. In contrast to an academic purity of ideas, the present development suggests that engagement in the world, even with its suffering and dirt and apparent corruption of the pure, is no less pure than the crystal purity of any academic thought

The range of the paradigm of ideas and transformation in action

The theme of Ideas and Transformation or Action as interacting is common. Science remains in interaction with social change, philosophy in interaction with living… In everyday life ideas are instrumental in action; and it is in ideas that we appreciate our lives and the world. It is essential to recognize that the ideas drive but do not determine change; nor are they the only driver. There is also ambition and practice

Method

In developing the ideas, and in considering the transformations, it became clear that novel content was an occasion for novel method. In all development, even when method is not a formal issue, there is some informal concern with method—How am I doing this, how may I best do this? I came to see that method and content are bound together, that method arises informally as we develop ideas and knowledge, that method and content are not distinct (not only because content concerns what is in the world and method concerns how we investigate but investigation is also in the world.) The formal expression of the interaction of content and method is realized in the identity of Universe and Logos, of metaphysics and Logic. The developments in method, their articulation and elaboration, are collected together in the part on Method. It is to be expected that, on account of the inseparability of content and method, novel content should occasion novel method and ultimate content may occasion ultimate method. It is not surprising, therefore, that the developments in method should subsume, illuminate and have implications for the classical ‘methods’ of science and deduction and the part on method develops these thoughts

First part: The Ideas

The nature and role of the ideas

Ideas are a form of transformation but, an incomplete form. Ideas are instrumental in transformation—transformation in interaction is more effective than blind experiment (still there is a place for blind experiment.) Ideas are essential as the place of appreciation of transformation

In providing a map of the Universe, ideas are useful. My earliest sense of adventure was in nature and then in ideas. Upon achieving depth, the ideas suggested certain possibilities of being that go beyond what is commonly regarded as reasonable. Because received ideas from the traditions are found to be limited in either reasoning or scope, the exploration of ideas emerged as essential

Aspects of the ideas are developed in all chapters. Chapters devoted primarily to ideas are Intuition through Worlds and Method

Outline of the ideas

The goal of the ideas is to develop, demonstrate and apply a metaphysical-cosmology—i.e., a metaphysics and its associated general cosmology. The system developed is ultimate and Universal in a number of ways stated and elaborated and demonstrated in the main narrative

Of these chapters Metaphysics is fundamental in developing a fundamental picture of being and a global picture of the Universe; Worlds develops local pictures that are not strict metaphysics but may be considered ‘applied metaphysics’ in which specialization, approximation and distortion are allowed (it is shown that framing the local disciplines that constitute the applied metaphysics allows approach to the intrinsic limit of the disciplines that is achieved in some important cases.) Intuition provides foundation for the Universal metaphysics in our intimate knowledge of being. Objects and Cosmology complete the metaphysics with regard to depth and variety, respectively

Except chapter Method, which is deferred to a later section, these chapters are now outlined

Intuition

The main objective of Intuition is to show that the individual has perfectly faithful knowledge of the basic necessary Objects of the Universal metaphysics in intuition. It is important that intuition is understood as intimate and direct knowledge that we (may) know that we have even though it may be difficult to describe how we have such knowledge—e.g., in neurophysiological terms. There is another use of intuition that refers to extraordinary knowledge of remote events. The present use refers to a mode of common—though remarkable—knowledge of objects for which the distinction of immediate versus remote is not of particular importance

Intuition begins with a discussion of knowledge. This is because (1) intuition is a kind of knowledge, (2) a significant part of the ideas concerns the development of a system or systems of knowledge, (3) knowledge is immensely important to human culture and, therefore, (4) understanding and critiquing knowledge is important in the present narrative and in the modern world. This understanding and critique begins in the section Knowledge but its completion as far as the narrative is concerned must be deferred until the developments in Metaphysics and is deferred to Objects. The section on Knowledge provides some preliminaries for the whole development as well as specifically for the discussion of intuition. This section also takes up the idea of linguistic meaning which is crucial to the development

The next section, Intuition, is primarily devoted to the main objective of the chapter as described above. The section points out the close relation of the present meaning of intuition to Kant’s use. Kant’s development of our understanding of the Universe is critiqued as preliminary to the present development. In the present development intuition is used in a related but broader sense than that of Kant; and it is applied at a deeper level of knowing; these factors enable the use of Kant’s insights while avoiding his errors. Kant assumed the science and geometry to be necessary and faithful descriptions of the world. The present development uses a kind of abstraction to show that knowledge of certain but certainly not all Objects is empirical and necessarily faithful. These are called necessary Objects and the final section introduces a set of Objects that are necessary and the basis of the Universal metaphysics. The system of necessary Objects did not emerge from the study of intuition. Rather, the metaphysics was developed before the foundation in intuition and it was the abstract foundation of the metaphysics that occasioned the search for a more grounded foundation

The final section is a preview of the Universal metaphysics which develops the metaphysics from the necessary and Universal Objects. Although some demonstration is given, rigor, completeness, and level of generality are less than for the full development. I think that a preview may help understanding of the full development. However, this section is not essential to the continuity of the narrative

Metaphysics

The main goal of the chapter is to develop and demonstrate a metaphysics. The metaphysics developed shows that there are no limits to the variety of being in the Universe and provides a symbolic approach to generating this variety. However, no list of the variety is able to capture the entire unlimited variety. Thus the metaphysics is implicitly ultimate with regard to variety or breadth. It is this variety that is foundation for the journey as an adventure without end. The conclusion regarding breadth is immense in its significance (although glimpsed there is no prior proof) and implication (again, although glimpsed there is no prior proof and even though the metaphysics implicitly generates the entire variety, there is no prior anticipation of what may be explicitly shown)

The metaphysics has foundation without merely posited elements and is thus explicitly ultimate with regard to depth. The metaphysics is called the Universal metaphysics. This conclusion is immense in not being anticipated and (therefore) also in not having prior proof. Its essential methods include what may be labeled Imagination and Logic; and analysis of meaning (and, since experience is built in to Logic and meaning, the metaphysics has basis in experience.) It is also shown that there is one metaphysics which may be developed in variant formulations (the existence of the Void, the principle of variety, the principle of reference and so on) and to greater or lesser degree (extension and detail.) Universal metaphysics is ultimate with regard to extension (Universe) but not detail

Because there is but one metaphysics the terms ‘Universal’ and ‘ultimate’ are redundant except for the ultimacy with regard to extension. And except for this aspect of the ultimate character, the ‘price’ for the ultimate character with regard to breadth and depth is that the discovery of Method (Logic) and Content (in the unlimited region beyond the explicit) must be empirical. To this extent there is no absolute certainty in any realm. Thus Logic is brought down from the realm of the a priori but Content is brought up from the merely empirical. It may be said, however, that Logic is (perhaps) the highest of our certainties

I now elaborate on the foregoing summary of the metaphysics

The main goal of this chapter is to develop and demonstrate the Universal metaphysics. The metaphysics is capable of abstract foundation which in turn may be expressed in terms of intuition. The foundation of this chapter goes deeper than the foundation from intuition by beginning with an analysis of experience. The sense of experience used here is that of immediate experience as in the experience of red in the color of a rose. Experience is used to further develop grounding of the metaphysics in what is given beyond question. The foundation also develops the concept of being which provides the first essential concept of the metaphysics from which the concepts of Universe, Domain, and Void are developed. The fundamental principle of metaphysics, described earlier and shortly, is developed from the properties of the Void

It is remarkable that the individual already knows the Universe, Domain, and Void in intuition. The fundamental principle of metaphysics, below, which is key to the entire development, is developed from these concept via simple logic. Then, criticism, of the development is used to turn the argument around and define the concept of Logic as a concept rather than as a practice; and this concept is shown to be far from empty even though it starts as a definition. Perhaps we do not have logic as a primitive intuition. However, the ideas of logic and especially of Logic, it may be tentatively argued, are or become intuitive. If we accept the argument, the entire Universal metaphysics is intuitive; otherwise its foundation in Universe, Domain and Void is intuitive and the remaining development is Logical. I have always had some sense that I have some intuition, even if not entirely conscious, of the extent of being. Overemphasis of intuition in the other sense of esoteric insight insists the truth of the insight; overemphasis on reason and empiricism before we have gotten out of the crawling stage of insight aborts discovery; holding intuition and reason in balance has permitted immense discovery. What is called mystic knowledge is perhaps insight coupled with a sense of knowing without proof (which does not imply that there is or can be no proof of mystic knowledge.) It is emphasized that the remarks in this paragraph are peripheral to the demonstration of the Universal metaphysics though pertinent to its significance

The demonstrated claims of the metaphysics, some stated earlier, include the following

The Void which is the absence of being exists and contains no Object. The concept of Object is developed later but it includes not only what may be roughly described as ‘thing’ but also pattern and natural Law (and Platonic form as immanent in being rather than as in another world… and much else)

There is no limit to the variety of being and the population of being in the Universe. There is no Universal Law; the only Universal law is Logic (recall that Law is the immanent pattern, law is our expression of Law.) Subject to Logic every concept has reference. The Logos is the Universe in all its detail which, though we apparently do not know, we know of; Logic is the concept of the Logos. These are four of the six forms—thus far developed—of the fundamental principle of metaphysics

The Universal metaphysics is ultimate with regard to depth and breadth (the meanings of depth and breadth are explained earlier and further developed in the narrative)

There is one metaphysics that may have alternate formulations and be developed in greater or lesser degree. One dimension of degree of development is extent. The Universal metaphysics encompasses Universe and Void and cannot be exceeded in extent. Any particular development of detail can necessarily be exceeded in detail by another development

Since there is one metaphysics, in the phases ‘the Universal metaphysics’ or ‘the metaphysics’ the descriptive words ‘the’ and ‘Universal’ are redundant. Since there is one metaphysics, the description that it is ‘ultimate with regard to depth and breadth’ is redundant. What is ultimate just is; it appears ultimate to prior abortive attempts in which the abortion is perhaps due to giving up as a result of loss of nerve or being too impressed by lesser achievement. When I use the descriptor immense it is perhaps a relative term and I could call the metaphysics ordinary and prior metaphysics not metaphysics at all. I am all too aware of these points and of the serendipitous aspect of the development of the metaphysics. Therefore, the simple term metaphysics may be used instead of the Universal metaphysics; however, the descriptors bring out what would otherwise be implicit

The reader may formulate an idea of the immense variety and magnitude of the consequences of the development by perusing the contents of the narrative. Here I mention a few of those consequences

From the development of the metaphysics—metaphysics is possible

The Universal metaphysics is instrumental in the resolution of an entire catalog of problems of classical through recent metaphysics. These include the problems of mind and body, the nature of general and personal identity, the problem of substance—there can be no fundamental substance, the fundamental problem of metaphysics (so called by Heidegger) of why there is something rather than nothing

In the narrative there are developed powerful enhancements to the concept of method in metaphysics and science. In metaphysics, the foundation in intuition and abstraction and the necessity of the conclusions. In science and other local disciplines, the metaphysics and disciplinary review encourage approach to the intrinsic limits of the disciplines. In science, two complementary views of the nature of its laws and theories—as hypothetical with regard to the Universe or as factual to some limited domain (the factual aspect shows that the theoretical or hypothetical aspect is not empty of fact and dismisses the notion of the great theories are ‘mere theories’)

There are consequences for the relation between metaphysics and science. As seen earlier, science and the Universal metaphysics are not incompatible. Perhaps the primary distinction between the practices of science and metaphysics is that metaphysics proper avoids the detail that makes science tentative, approximate, and of immediate practical use; and that in avoiding this detail metaphysics is perfectly faithful (depth) and, in turn, demonstrative of unending variety of which local science is an approximate illustration. Allowing approximation, local science—the science of our cosmos—may be seen as a chapter or atom of metaphysics

The reader may refer forward to discussions of variety to see the immense variety of being revealed by the metaphysics. Here is a sample of variety. Every individual will experience Universal Identity; there is no ultimate Universal Identity but instead an unending variety of such Identity; and thus being is engaged in an unending adventure

Metaphysics and Logic are identical. In the literature, this has been remarked before; but nowhere has it been seen as clearly; and nowhere has it been shown that the variety of facts allowed under Logic is without limit; or that herein lies a definition of Logic so that facts and logics are in dual discovery. The consequences for the concept of Logic and the nature of the logics are immense. The logics are empirical though, perhaps, distinguished by having a high order of certainty

The consequences for religion and the concept of religion are immense. At outset of this brief discussion of the consequences it is allowed that the stories of religion and myth which may seem absurd when taken literally may still have powerful meaning for the human psyche, i.e. the internal dimensions of spirit. And it is of course allowed that traditional religion has social bonding and ethical dimensions. But the principle of variety shows that subject to the minimal requirements of Logic, the stories are realized somewhere. This does not imply they are realized here; and it may be argued that the absurdity of those stories that are absurd as literal implies that they are immensely improbable anywhere. The real consequences for religion are as follows. There is no distinction between world and spirit. The only distinction is perhaps between what is seen and unseen; what is actual and what is to be realized; between a limited concept of matter and a final concept of matter in which it is not other than being; between a distinction of the immediate as practical and the ultimate as pertaining only to (spiritual) psyche and the lack of such distinction… And religion and spiritual search are in their perhaps ultimate form an unending adventure through variety with peaks and dissolutions through pain without seeking pain and through peak or nirvanic experience without final nirvana and without exclusive emphasis on moments or phases of inclusiveness. The essential disservice of much dogma is the abortion of this endless experiment. True religion may include an understanding of this situation coupled with ongoing experiment perhaps illustrated and illuminates by great imagination in story, art, and ritual and guided by the metaphysics

Perhaps the greatest implication of the metaphysics is demonstration of what we know. This appears to upset established attitudes to metaphysics—that metaphysics is impossible because what we know can only be in experience (to be true the claim should perhaps allow ‘experience’ to include evolution.) We have not actually upset this attitude but, rather, shown the true breadth of experience via intuition, abstraction and the analysis of experience

The outlines of the remaining sections add to these consequences

Objects

Enabled by the metaphysics the chapter first completes the concept of the Object that was begun in Intuition. The general Object is a dual construct, primarily due to the knower, at the intersection of knower and known. Thus the notion of Object is somewhat removed from the common notion of thing. There is, in general, a limit beyond which Objecthood cannot further approach what we think of as objectivity—i.e. being of the thing. However, if this is in principle not possible it cannot be reasonably desirable. In the practical case, knowledge may be sufficiently precise; and there are cases, especially in physical science, where precision and accuracy are good beyond expectation. There is, however, a class of necessary Objects for which knowledge is perfectly faithful—there is a thing and the knowledge is of the thing. The necessary Objects form the foundation of metaphysics. When the set of necessary Objects is ‘universal’ the result is the Universal metaphysics

The second accomplishment of the chapter is to shed light on the kinds of Object. Perhaps the main division is particular versus abstract. It is shown that while this distinction is practical it is not essential. The distinction is according to mode of study—symbolic versus empirical. The same Object may be empirical at one phase of study, symbolic at another, and mixed at a third. The principle of reference developed in Metaphysics which is one form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics is instrumental in bridging the divide between abstract and particular. Under the particular Objects, there is found to be practical but no essential distinction among concrete things such as bricks, perhaps less than concrete things such as processes and interactions, and seemingly non-concrete things such as ideas and instances of redness. The principle of reference enables an extremely satisfactory treatment of mathematical and logical Objects, values, and universals such as the property of redness

The unified conception of Objects just discussed shows and reaffirms that there is one Universe or World. We may conceive multiple worlds such as a world of material Objects, a world of mental Objects and a world of ideal Forms. However, all Objects lie in the Universe and there is no need for another world of Forms. There are Forms; they are not seen to be particularly important; and they are in the same World / Universe as bricks as are numbers and so on

A result of the unification of Objects adds immensely to the variety of essentially real Objects shown in Metaphysics and further developed in Cosmology

As a secondary topic in Cosmology we will look at the idea of an individual inhabiting what are thought of as abstract Objects. The idea is interesting but a clear notion of what it would be like and whether it would be ‘useful’ has not been developed. The development may be conceptual and experimental

Cosmology

The topic of this chapter is general cosmology or, simply, cosmology provided that cosmology is not conflated with physical cosmology. The cosmological topics studied in Cosmology are those that are metaphysical—i.e. those that may be suggested by our direct knowledge of the Universe but studied at a level at which there is perfect faithfulness

The first section of Cosmology, The concept and principles of cosmology, introduces cosmology as the study of the variety of being. Direct study of the Universe and imagination are sources of ideas regarding variety. The main principles are the already established principles of variety and of reference which are forms of the fundamental principle of metaphysics. From Objects we have seen that this includes interaction and process

The next two sections, Variety and its origins and Process are general in nature. In Variety, the topics A variety, Exploring Objects via the categories of intuition, Inhabiting abstract Objects, and Origins of variety and structure have novelty. Process first shows the necessity of process—a Universe without process is impossible (without extension there can be no being of any significance.) Special topics are Mechanism and indeterminism, Evolution, Causation, and Dynamics. It is necessary that the special kinds of process should obtain in phases of the Universe but they cannot be Universal

Cosmology then looks at the relatively specialized topics of Mind; Identity and death; and Space, time and being. Mind looks at mind in general; human / animal mind is taken up later in Worlds. Deployment of the Universal metaphysics permits and encourages a general treatment of these topics at a root level and that is not limited by the scientific treatment of the topics. Details are left for the development; following are some points of interest. It is remarkable that the following assertions are demonstrated. A unified study of mind is possible in terms of a single primitive kind (experience) and its elaboration; this enables a satisfactory treatment of the question of the dimensions of mind, of mind and consciousness and of free will; resolutions of well known problems in these areas are given. A current view of mind is that it has experience, attitude, and action as its ‘dimensions;’ here it is shown that experience is primary while attitude and action are derivative. If being is what is there, mind is seen as relation between ‘what is here’ and ‘what is there;’ thus even if mind or matter are fundamental, Spinoza’s claim that there could be other such attributes is shown false (there may of course be kinds of matter and kinds of mind.) Although neither mind nor matter as we know them is fundamental, mind can go to the root of being. The study of identity explores the relation between individual and universal identity; the individual will experience universal identities of higher and higher forms without limit; all forms dissolve; birth and death are among the gateways to identity and Identity. Analysis of origin and dissolution of cosmological systems suggests some preservation of identity across singularities

Some notes on mind. The discussion of mind is important (1) as our window on being—it is where the knowing world coalesces as unity, and (2) because it is taken to a fundamental level at which we are able to arrive at clarification of the nature of mind and resolve a number of the fundamental problems of mind. The discussion of mind in Cosmology is general; details of the aspects and organization of human and animal mind is taken up in chapter Worlds. In order to not let the length of discussion out of hand I will avoid analysis but simply say that the development in Cosmology uses analysis of explanation and meaning in light of the Universal metaphysics to discover and invent the nature of mind which then enables determination of what phenomena are mental, and definitive discussion of important topics, especially of consciousness and free will where it becomes possible to resolve the classic issues associated with these topics—especially those of nature of mind, mind-body, mental causation, identity, and free will

Some notes on space, time and being. This section develops the nature of space and time in the context of the Universe. Space and time are founded in the necessary concepts of extension and duration which are interwoven. Space and time are found to be non universal and relative (immanent in being rather than a framework for being.) It is shown however that space and time may be locally as-if absolute (form a local framework for being.) In our cosmos there appears a well defined space-time manifold (which perhaps breaks down at very small lengths.) In the Universal case there is much more freedom including multiple times, there is no universal space and time, no single universal signal or ‘light’ speed. A cosmos may effectively have a global space-time continuum, a dominant time, a single fundamental signal speed; but that is not the universal case

The considerations on extension and duration are applied to discuss ‘island cosmoses’ as islands of strong interaction with weak interactions with other cosmological systems; to the conveyance of information across birth and death of cosmoses; to the emergence of dominant times and signal speeds; to the incomplete loss of information for individuals across ‘death’ of person and cosmos

Worlds

The final chapter for the ideas is Worlds. The subject is the study of our local world (cosmos) for its intrinsic interest and as a set of examples of the study of a local world. Worlds provides a platform for the journey

The approach, outlined earlier, is an intersection of the Universal metaphysics with its method and the local (e.g. academic) disciplines and their methods. The approach is capable of enhancing knowledge to the intrinsic limit of the discipline and is not a true limit in so far as what is approached is the degree of definiteness of the Objects. On the side of the disciplines, the method includes search for elements and kinds that, via conceptual experiment and comparison with experience and actual experiment, approach the intrinsic limit. This is not new except perhaps in the freedom that is recognized in the selection of the elements. On a model of being that includes extension, duration, and relation or interaction, the element kinds may include unit entities, unit processes, unit interactions, relationships among these; search for mode of explanation and description. Naturally, there must be some continuity with the elements of previous thought, first since those elements provide some validity and, second, because they are sources of imagination. The topics are local (physical) cosmology which is treated briefly; life and organism which is brief; an extensive study of human being which emphasizes human mind and whose interest is intrinsic as well as that of platform for the transformations; society which focuses on the institution and a variety of institutions—economic and so on… and on the foundation of such study; civilization as such and as a repeated networked structure over the Universe which is of course necessary inference rather than manifest fact; and the human endeavor and its normal limits. The latter section is an elaboration and demonstration of the earlier observation that the cumulative tradition does not specify a shape and size and variety for the Universe but instead specifies a range from Cosmos to Logos

Second part: The Transformations

The transformations are the heart of the journey. Development of Ideas is a necessary but incomplete mode of transformation. Completeness requires transformation of the whole being. This essential phase of the journey is a search for ultimate realization founded in the interacting elements—experience, tradition, and ideas, especially the Universal metaphysics and the study of the local world

Although I aim at a high level of realization I do not know what I will achieve (in ‘this form.’) Note that there is no highest but only higher realizations

The transformations are discussed in the chapters Journey and Being.

Journey has five sections

The section A journey in being elaborates the dimensions and clarifies the nature of the journey

Method whose title should perhaps be Approach, focuses on approaches to realization; its bases are my experience and the traditions—e.g. psychoanalysis, meditation, shamanism, and Yoga, which are developed in light of the Universal metaphysics, imagination, and experiment

The transformations, describes a minimal set of transformations toward realization of ultimate Identity; the way is incremental and rooted in the immediate world; it encourages adventure and enjoyment of process

This is the essential phase of realization as a process

The transformations are not as mature as the ideas. In comparison to the potential, the transformations are not well developed. However, the development is not insignificant even when ideas as transformation are omitted from consideration. Some areas of interest that in which I have had some success are in Identity, personality, and charisma; Dynamics of the mental functions; and Body, healing and medicine

Additionally and significantly, my travels in nature have been a form of spiritual journey in which I learn from special places and which form inspiration for my life and ideas

It may be useful give the reader a preview of what I mean by ‘spiritual journey.’ Interpretations of the spiritual include (1) a literal but remote and in some sense higher dimension and (2) an indirect map and guide for the realms of the psyche. From the Universal metaphysics, there is but one realm; experience is connection of individual with the world which includes the individual; the literal—but not the absurd, and the exploration of world and psyche may coalesce in a journey. In that meaning is provided in psyche, a journey may be called spiritual

If—in this form and life—I am limited to one mode of transformation it will be a dual journey through experience and world and in meaning in the sense of significance

Investigation…, describes four areas of investigation that are auxiliary to the journey and may also be of general interest

In the final section, The future, I describe hopes for my future as a finite being

The next chapter, Being, complements Journey. Journey is about realization as a process; Being describes a phase of realization in the present—one that will complement my experiments in process. The two sections of Being, History and Pure being, correspond to two approaches to realization in the present. The first section employs history as a tool to appreciate the present; the second section, Pure being, is a mode of living in the present as realization

Third part: Method

The foci of the narrative are knowledge and transformation and ‘method’ translates roughly as the ‘how’ of these endeavors. Methods for transformation depend significantly on the discussion of method for knowledge. Therefore the primary concern is method in relation to knowledge

In a school setting a teacher may instruct a pupil on how to do a problem in algebra. However, at the forefront of ideas, in negotiating the unknown, there is no universal teacher, and there can be no algorithm for discovery. That would be rather like ‘how to do what we do not know how to do.’ Still, the unknown has been encountered before and some general thoughts on discovery and justification may be received from the tradition and enhanced by reflection on experience

Further, the critical position of this narrative is non-essentialist with regard to knowledge and method. In general the concept is not perfectly faithful to an Object; in general Objects are indistinctly identified; in general establishing the nature of the Object and the connection to it of the subject is tenuous. Non-essentialism in this context allows that some Objects shall be perfectly defined and be known perfectly by appropriate concepts and that there shall be a definite method for establishing the connection of concept to Object; the Universal metaphysics provides an important example. Science and everyday practical knowledge do not generally provide examples even when immensely precise in their domains of validity

Consequently, the development of the narrative has strong implications for method in relation to metaphysics. The narrative also develops secondary (and other) implications for method in relation to a variety of disciplines. Articulation of these developments is the primary aim of the part on method. An Introduction elaborates these purposes and discusses relations among the present development and method in the history of thought. This Introduction also points out that development of knowledge is both creative and critical and therefore canonically involves two phases: discovery and justification (later discussion takes up interactions of the phases and whether, when, and to what degree they may be separable.) The following paragraphs outline the remaining chapters of this part

Knowledge and its nature is preliminary to discussion of method. If we properly identify the sources of knowledge then a discussion of method may be conducted in terms of these sources. This chapter identifies kinds of knowledge, the kinds of interest here, and the sources of such knowledge. The kind of knowledge is, roughly, conceptual (in the sense of mental content) and the sources are observation and inference. It is remarkable that these sources are not posited ad hoc but had been earlier established being in and completing the nature of knowing

Elements of method takes up discovery and justification in relation to both observation (and experience and experiment) and inference (induction and deduction.) There are of course going to be differences of criteria of and approach to justification and relative emphasis of experiment, induction, and deduction among disciplines. However, the prior analysis of knowledge and its sources sets up a connected approach to development of knowledge in a variety of fields. This chapter shows develops the general theme of mutual implications among method / approach for the Universal metaphysics and other disciplines, emphasizing those disciplines in which knowledge of the Objects is not perfectly faithful. Reflexivity is a ‘practice’ that, on looking back, I found to have been immensely useful in the development of my ideas (and in the journey.) A final section on Faith, hypothesis and action is concerned with attitudes that are conducive to effective action and living in presence of illuminating ideas that, though not paradoxical, are neither complete nor certain

A section, Themes, collects some thoughts on aspects of method that may benefit from synthesis, elaboration, or illustration

In Implications for the tradition develops consequences of the method of the metaphysics for a variety of disciplines and human endeavors. These developments are significantly enhanced by reflection on the disciplines themselves. For example, implications for science and philosophy are prefaced by reflection on science and philosophy where I find agreement and dissent in relation to received notions of the nature of these disciplines and their activity. I have not limited discussion to activities that strictly fall under knowledge. Art is one such activity and I should add that I do not consider myself to be knowledgeable in the field of art criticism. I have undertaken reflection on art more to learn about the notion of method (and perhaps a little regarding art) than to suggest that there is a method for art or to make a contribution to criticism

An auxiliary part: Meta-tools or Guide and Reference

The two chapters of the Guide are Contribution, and Reference. This Introduction may be considered to be part of the Guide

It may be of interest for readers to know to what extent common as well as academic views are affected—to what extent the views are broadened. Contribution paints a broad picture of what is accomplished and what is potential, shows the reader what is new, and the relation to the tradition; this chapter invites the reader to enter into adventure

Contribution is an attempt to assess and state the contributions of the essay—its topics are (1) Criteria for significance; (2) Major contributions in epistemology, metaphysics, theory of Objects, cosmology, the destiny of humankind, and method; (3) Significance for the history of ideas with focus on philosophy and metaphysics which necessarily includes revaluation of the nature of philosophy and metaphysics in the light of the Universal metaphysics and what that entails for an assessment of the state of modern and current philosophy, the problems of metaphysics, method, and systematic classification of human knowledge; and (4) Significance for the academic disciplines; and Potential contributions

Contribution is not a mere list of topics that I believe may be contributions to thought. It briefly looks at criteria for significance which recognizes limits to evaluation—especially to evaluation of one’s own work. It provides reasons for thinking that the listed topics are contributions and it evaluates the significance of the contributions (assessments of the contribution are also found in the main narrative.) In discussing contributions to philosophy and metaphysics, the narrative assesses the nature of philosophy and metaphysics with reference to the history of the disciplines and the Universal metaphysics. The Universal metaphysics entails modifications to any systematic classification of knowledge and such modifications are incorporated into an explicit outline

Reference has the following parts (1) A list of writers (thinkers) whose ideas I recognize as having influenced my thought (2) An index of concepts and names, and (3) Experience—a section on creating a net of experience similar to the experience behind the narrative

For the reader

The audience

The journey is undertaken in light of a view of the world developed primarily in the chapter Metaphysics. This development occurred quite after the ‘beginning’ but is pivotal in understanding the journey as it is and as it is conceived today and, perhaps, in what is close to its final conception. This view, the Universal metaphysics, demonstrated in Metaphysics, reveals the Universe as immensely greater than commonly revealed in the traditions of knowledge—and assertions of knowledge—including science, reason, and religion. The reader cannot be expected to accept these claims regarding the Universal metaphysics at present—demonstration is provided later in Metaphysics. However, the reader should know that these claims are made and are claimed to have been demonstrated and that the world view that emerges illuminates and guides the journey. Having this awareness is the primary prerequisite for the general reader. It is expected that some general readers will have an interest in the journey. The narrative does have some rather technical developments but these are functional: they provide confidence as well as tools for the journey. The only real requisite in following the technical parts is time and determination. The view of the world that is developed here includes what is valid in the common traditional views—including religious and scientific world views—but is vastly more inclusive than them. The Introduction provides a preview so that the reader does not suffer the confusion of expecting a variation of common approaches and so that he or she is able to maintain orientation while reading detail and demonstration. But it is not expected that every interested reader shall or thought that such readers should be interested in demonstration and detail. The narrative provides a thread of general thematic comments that may assist readers to understand what is essential to the development without have to read proofs

There is much of interest to specialist readers—especially in metaphysics, cosmology, epistemology, and logic. The development addresses fundamental issues of these disciplines as well as special problems. The treatment of metaphysics is especially broad and deep—it is shown that the Universal metaphysics is ultimate in depth and breadth (the meaning of the phrase ‘ultimate in depth and breadth’ is clarified in the narrative.) An entire catalog of classical through recent problems of metaphysics is resolved. There is also material of interest to researchers in the natural and social sciences and to makers of policy. Regarding prerequisite, what holds for the general reader is true for the specialist

On meaning

The great importance of being clear about linguistic meaning was emphasized in the section Development of the metaphysics. The chosen meaning of the terms was essential to the development. Many concepts that are important to the development in this essay are designated by common words whose general use is not fixed. The same term has different meaning in different contexts (the statement that a term has the same meaning in different contexts requires that the contexts should have sufficient similarity.) Context varies over time and within a society within a common natural language over a variety of localized and specialist cultures. These uses are insufficient to fix the meanings of the terms of the metaphysics. Therefore, it will be helpful to the reader to pay careful attention to the use of the concept-terms in this essay. Because the metaphysics is new, its terms and structure embody a new language; because the metaphysics is ultimate, the language is ultimate in certain directions. Naturally, since the metaphysics has basis in experience and since it intersects the world of experience, its language intersects common language and is also naturally dependent on the inspiration of common language within which the metaphysics lies dormant and implicit but whose bringing to surface requires seeing as much as invention

The Universal metaphysics is an articulated and coherent system. It is not a collection of terms thrown together (the articulation and coherence as well as meaning arose through experiment.) Therefore, meaning lies not only in the individual terms but in their interrelations; meaning lies in the metaphysics as a whole system. The absorption of this meaning will not occur at once but by degree; the path to building the whole (the Gestalt) is likely to be incremental. Therefore readers will benefit by allowing themselves patience. The case is not different from that of any significant development—the art student does not be become a mature artist in a moment, the student of calculus requires time and experience to absorb and understand the concepts of calculus and their application

Specialists face a further challenge in that (a) they may need to reeducate themselves in a new system that is broader than extant systems without contradicting what is valid in those systems, (b) old terms, technical and common, are used with new meaning and which are often significantly different from the old; and hesitation to accept the new meanings will impede understanding. New words could have been coined, but that is often sterile. There is no logical conflict with altered meaning for, formally, all meaning may be regarded as relative to a context. Alternatively, a given sign with multiple meanings may be regarded as multiple symbols. Many meanings of the narrative refer to the Universe and therefore have a certain universality which is not given, however, to extend to the details of particular contexts. As far as possible the new meanings are reasonable extensions of older meanings; the narrative argues that the new meanings have sense and mutual coherence, and that the new system or view of being and the variety of being subsumes what is valid in prior thought. Finally, I repeat an earlier caution in emphatic form: since many meanings are immensely altered in sense and expanded in reference, the reader who does not pay attention to this fact may read through the entire narrative without seeing the greater Universe that is discovered herein

I. IDEAS

Intuition

Knowledge

Significance

1.            Knowledge. Knowledge is an instrument of negotiation and transformation of the world; knowledge enables appreciation of the Universe. The nature of knowledge and some of its kinds are discussed in what follows. It is not inherent in the idea of knowledge that it is a perfect instrument; or that it lacks any perfection at all. An individual may have and a culture may share knowledge of the world. The knowledge possessed by the individual may be in intuition in a sense discussed in the next section, Intuition. Knowledge in intuition is not essentially symbolic or linguistic but may be so expressed. Additionally, there is a cultural store of knowledge, expressed primarily in language and related symbolic forms, and this store may become available to individuals, to the culture and to other cultures

2.            The extent of knowledge. The traditions of mankind include stores of knowledge of various kinds. Science is a significant repository of knowledge for our civilization; and all of technology, art, music, religion, myth, and literature may be seen as embodying certain kinds of knowing. Although it is a less than primary objective, this narrative includes a discussion of the range of human knowledge via the development of ideas; and there is a very brief wide angle view of the scope of human knowledge in chapter Contribution, section A system of human knowledge.

3.            A worldview from the sum of human knowledge. The sum of human knowledge, i.e. from the histories of all traditions, does not define a coherent picture. However, a little reasoning applied to the traditions enables the extraction of such a picture. The questions of interest here are What is the view of the Universe as a whole provided by such an extraction? Is there a single picture? The common view within most cultures is, even if we do not know the details, the cultural view provides a single picture. However, this is not true. We might look at the picture of our cosmos from modern science—here we see a single cosmos that began in a singularity (big-bang) and perhaps a collection of such systems that are causally isolated. There is good though not perfect evidence for the singularity; but there is little to no direct evidence for the causally isolated systems. These systems are hypothesized because our cosmos has very special properties that may be seen as reasonable if very many such systems are postulated; then our cosmos just happens to be the one that has the ‘special’ properties. A little imagination applied to our cosmos shows that the view is far from necessary from the evidence: far from home the space-time continuum may well billow out into an infinity; science has not ruled out other cosmological systems floating through ours with infinitesimal interaction with ours; and at these edges the speed of light need not be unitary—there can be more than one—or fixed by our light speed. These imagined examples are not hypothesized; it is merely claimed that they are not inconsistent with science. Further, they are not necessary but simple aids to imagination. For, the Scottish philosopher, David Hume, already showed in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, of 1748, that while the inductions—i.e. generalizations from data sets via hypotheses to theories—of science may be the best knowledge available, there is no necessity to them. If we call the scientific world view Cosmos and we call Logos the maximal view of the Universe that is consistent with Cosmos then what science implies is that the Universe lies somewhere between Cosmos and Logos… and, in so far as a coherent system can be extracted from the human tradition of knowledge, the same conclusion holds. Now, even if the reader agrees with this conclusion, he or she may be wondering—Of what use is it? Surely, the reader may think, it is knowledge of the ‘world’ that we know exists and its structure that is useful rather than ‘knowledge’ of worlds that may exist. The importance of the conclusion is that it may open up our minds so that if it is at some later time shown that the Universe is much larger than Cosmos, we will not fall back on the argument that what has been demonstrated is inconsistent with the science of today… with the sum of the human traditions of knowledge. That conclusion is still rather on the speculative side and therefore I should reassure the reader that the present exercise in the stretching of imagination and perhaps even of credulity shall not be in vain for it will be shown in Metaphysics that the Universe is Logos as defined above

Nature of knowledge: replica or correspondence view

Knowing that

Replica or correspondence view

4.            Replica or correspondence view. Here, a correspondence view of knowledge is adopted and will be placed in a context that is adequate to general understanding of knowledge and to its use in the narrative. The naïve correspondence view is that the individual has an idea that is a replica of the known Object. It is not inherent in the view that the ‘replica’ is precise or that if, for example, the Object should be geometrical the replica will be geometrical. The correspondence may be rough and there is no inherence in the view that any part of the range from no correspondence to perfect correspondence is ruled out. Initially, therefore, ‘replica’ may be regarded as suggestive or metaphorical; this should not be problematic; a vocabulary is being set up; the vocabulary will enable a literal metaphysics of immense power; and the metaphysics may clarify and literalize the vocabulary… This naïve view will be criticized and improved; the critiques will be drawn from the history of thought and enhanced by further reflection. The result will be a realm of perfect correspondence, another realm of sufficient correspondence or faithfulness, a realm where correspondence may perhaps be found, and a realm where correspondence may be without possibility or significance and which is a realm of action that may be undertaken for the quality rather than certainty of outcome. The replica may receive the formal label CONCEPT as explained below; the CONCEPT will refer to the replica as an object as well as to the subject side or experience

Concepts

5.            Concepts. ‘Concept’ has two meanings that are used in this narrative. In the first a concept is, roughly, a unit of meaning. This is perhaps the original meaning of concept and received treatment by Aristotle in defining a species by its genus—what it falls under—and differentia or what distinguishes it. Under this family of meaning there are a variety views and therefore no consensus on the concept of concepts—i.e., unit of meaning—and constitution of concepts—e.g., mental representation versus abstract Object. Further, there can be no definitive resolution of the nature of the concept until such notions as ‘mental representation’ and ‘abstract Object’ are clarified; and it is endemic to any piece-meal approach, e.g. that of analytic and of post-modern philosophy, that such clarification will not be forthcoming. The Universal metaphysics developed and demonstrated in Metaphysics enables both clarification and diffusion of the unnecessary distinction of mental representation versus abstract Object; the clarification and unification of this first family of meanings of the concept is completed in Objects. The second and more recent use of ‘concept’ is that of mental content; thus cognitions, dreams, emotions, experiences without immediate Objects, and intentions and mental states that are part of the constitution of action states are all conceptual in this second meaning. It is clear that in this use not every concept has an Object; later, conditions for having an Object will be developed. This second meaning is used formally in this narrative and therefore the sign CONCEPT will be used here for mental content; the first meaning is used less formally and is designated in the usual way—i.e., concept. Every concept may be a CONCEPT; however, the form CONCEPT will be used for a unit of meaning only when it is desired emphasize that it is also mental content

The elements of the correspondence view: Word, CONCEPT and Object

Importance of separation

6.            Word, CONCEPT, and Object. Some CONCEPTS correspond to Objects. Words evoke CONCEPTS and when the CONCEPT refers to an Object, the word may evoke both CONCEPT and Object. A word may have multiple meanings or uses: this is sometimes formally expressed by saying that though there is one word there are multiple symbols. Therefore it is sometimes important to distinguish word, CONCEPT, and Object. Such distinction will be immensely important in this narrative

Conflation and magic

7.            Conflation and magic. In everyday use it is typically efficient to conflate words, CONCEPTS and Objects. This efficient use is natural: a word evokes an image, an idea, an action; the philosophical distinction would be practically burdensome. The conflation is also a source of the magical: a word evokes a world of wonder; an orator may move a crowd or a nation to action. The conflation is a part of the natural psychology of language, and the occasional confusions arising out of it are perhaps balanced by its magic and efficiency. The exquisite human sensitivity to context minimizes such confusion

Mind and symbol

8.            Mind and symbol. The written word appears to be neat in comparison to mental content and there can be no doubt regarding the power of, e.g. Euclid’s Geometry. Does the proper nature of knowledge and reason lie in the analysis of mental content or in symbolic representations? The development of symbolic representation is of immense importance in the twin development of knowledge and its and inter and cross generational communication. However, it will be seen in Objects that there is no essential distinction between mental content and symbolic representation: putative distinctions are based in confusions regarding the nature of mental content; and some such distinctions are due to the unduly special—different rather than superior—status we instinctively assign to experience. It may be said that mental content has been understood in confused terms due to vagueness in its symbolic representation

Nature of the Object

9.            Nature of the Object. For knowledge to be useful we would expect faithfulness to its Object. The CONCEPT is not the Object and therefore faithfulness of the CONCEPT cannot be a priori to analysis. The Object as cognized—and there is no ultimate going beyond cognition—is a joint product of knower and known and there is therefore nothing inherent in the Object that guarantees faithfulness, perfect or otherwise, or even that faithfulness should have a meaning, explicit or implicit. For example, one sees a block in the shape of a cube and thinks that is a cube; but is the cubical shape inherent in the block? Common sense may suggest of course the block is cubical. However, even if we did not know of limits to inherent forms of space and time, we would still know that since shape is not entirely of the thing-itself, there may be some error or distortion in the perception. That kind of lack of faithfulness concerns the framework of cognition; there are versions of it in the thought of Plato and Kant. There is another lack of faithfulness that concerns the character of the ‘thing:’ Even when we see a surface as smooth we know that the apparent smoothness is a result of the fact that visual resolution is coarser than the particulate graininess; later we will see that there is always a cosmos within every element of being. Perhaps, though, any distortion in shape is small and any unperceived graininess is not relevant to at least some practical purposes. It may then be asked why there should be an interest in perfect faithfulness! The response may be as follows. Practically, for example, the small error in a precise law science can be enormously magnified in application to complex systems or long term prediction. Aesthetically—in terms of our being in the Universe—we might like to know the real nature of the world; and such insight may be ‘spiritually’ as well as practically empowering (and this will turn out to be the case… the practical and the aesthetic are not entirely distinct even if we desire to distinguish them.) However, it remains open that while remaining within cognition, there may be some means of showing the meaning and fact of perfect faithfulness—at least for some Objects: familiarity with error, distortion, illusion, and the incompleteness of science reminds us that there is no faithfulness in general. In summary, that the CONCEPT is not the Object allows that claims to knowledge may range from absence of faithfulness to perfect faithfulness

10.        A preliminary critique of knowledge of the Object. In this narrative a critique will be a criticism and a response. There is a naïve tendency to all or nothing responses. However we find, as has been found in the history of thought, that the response will come in grades, i.e. that certain ‘Objects’ may allow no CONCEPT and that the disallowance may be contingent or necessary, that other Objects may have a sufficiently good concept, that yet others may have a very precise concept without achieving perfect faithfulness, and that perhaps some Objects will be known perfectly; examples follow. We negotiate the world with some success—there is adaptation between knower and known—and therefore there must be some at least implicit and likely imperfect faithfulness that is sufficient for some purposes: a faithfulness even of perhaps surprisingly good precision as in the visual perception of some things. And there is often an amazingly high precision and or astonishing conceptual understanding in some areas of science. Of course, there could be some super-being pulling strings behind the scene so that we are deceived into thinking that we know but not only is this explanation more fantastic than the direct one, this kind of explanation will later be logically discounted. From the discussion so far—on account of the gap between knower and known and especially on account of the imperfect faithfulness of the most precise science—it is sometimes rapidly concluded that there is no perfect knowledge even allowing for high precision in some domains. The conclusion is not valid and the most that can be concluded is that so far there has been no demonstration of perfect faithfulness. While examples of sufficient and good faithfulness have been seen, further search and analysis will be required to establish perfect faithfulness for any Objects

11.        Possibility versus Impossibility of perfect knowledge. What has been said so far in the previous paragraph amounts to some criticism of the possibility and meaning of faithfulness. It is important to be clear regarding critical thought. An analysis of one approach to faithfulness is closed. In general the CONCEPT as ‘objective’ was found wanting. However, this does not imply that there can be no approach to the meaning of the Objective as objective at least for some Objects; and it does not mean that no Objects can be known faithfully. Therefore the criticism amounts to a doubt about the possibility of any perfect knowledge and not to an assertion that there can be no perfect knowledge or that there can be no demonstration of such knowledge. The point is crucial in two ways. First, in this chapter such perfect knowledge will be demonstrated for a class of important Objects; this will found Metaphysics through Cosmology and will provide partial foundation for Worlds. Second, critical theorists often assert the impossibility of certain kinds of knowing when what has been done is to either show that certain approaches are either unviable or doubtful (and of course the practical conclusion should not then be that the knowing in question cannot be used at all but should not be regarded as certain or used if certainty is necessary until a satisfactory approach to demonstration of certainty has been found.) It has been seen that the attempt to go outside cognition to some absolute foundation is doomed to failure (unless some God were to inform us otherwise and we can count this out because we would then want to understand how the God could have this perfect knowledge and if we could understand that we would not need the actual God)

12.        Reflections from quantum theory. Quantum mechanics is commonly thought via the Heisenberg uncertainty principle to demonstrate the impossibility precise measurement of conjugate variables—e.g., position and momentum of a particle. In this chapter and in Metaphysics we will see that the domain of all physical science must be extremely limited (the arguments will be of a different character than the arguments made in science by some scientists and philosophers that the lack of coherence to the conceptual character of quantum theory imply that it cannot be final.) However, even allowing quantum mechanics, the greatest negative conclusion that the uncertainty principle allows is the impossibility of complete perfect knowledge in the realm that quantum theory is applicable: still perfect knowledge of position or momentum is allowed. But even this conclusion is open to question because it is not clear whether there is an uncertainty that pertains to the position and momentum of a point particle or there is a lack of definiteness because the ‘particle’ is not localized. In the latter the uncertainty is not the result of a principle but is in the nature of an inherently non-localized object

13.        CONCEPT as Object. Some philosophies of meaning use the difficulty of separation of CONCEPT and Object to conflate the two. However, it has just been seen that there is a class of Objects for which there is perfect faithfulness; and there are the practical Objects of science and common-everyday-knowing which are known with sufficient faithfulness. Therefore the conflation of CONCEPT and Object is not necessary: it would perhaps be reasonable and useful if disentanglement were absolutely impossible

Framework for knowing: fact and deduction

So far some elements of knowing and knowledge have been considered. Discussion now takes up a framework for knowledge. It is emphasized that the elements and framework are preliminary in that they set up a vocabulary that will the starting point for rigorous development and demonstration of perfect faithfulness for a system of Objects that lie at the foundation of the Universal metaphysics. Since the history of thought has seen a number of knowledge frameworks—in the form of attempted foundation—it is pertinent to ask a particular framework has been chosen and why a certain foundation has been arrived at. For example why not focus on a decomposition of facts into subjects and predicates and the latter into sensations. A part answer is that frameworks have been adopted and rejected or abandoned and it was only when a foundation was found that the search reached some stasis (still however, I continue to have critical doubt and think that perhaps there may be flaws in the demonstration of finality.) It is important to emphasize that the final foundation starts but does not end with ideas from the prior history of thought

Fact or state of affairs

Pattern. Induction and science. Deduction

Pattern as fact. Significance for science: fact and logic

14.        Framework for knowing: fact and deduction. That some state of affairs obtains is a fact. There is no special significance to the decomposition or lack of decomposition of facts: later, subjects, predicates, and facts will be seen to be kinds of Objects. Facts are often perceived or, more generally, cognized as arranged in patterns which may also be seen as facts. Scientific theories may be seen as kinds of patterns that are generalized from data, i.e. facts or collections of facts (in practice the generalization is often indirect, data may suggest laws, which suggest various concepts, which may be articulated in tentative theories that may be disconfirmed or found to have such predictive power that they are generally accepted as describing a domain of phenomena even though later disconfirmation for a larger domain remains possible.) If a scientific theory would claim generality or universality it is then subject to various doubts and criticisms especially of the type that while the theory might be the most obvious or simplest generalization, generalizations are not unique. It has thus come about that one of the most prevalent philosophies of science is that of Karl Popper according to which the criterion for a theory to be scientific is it be testable—Popper’s original term was falsifiable—i.e., that there should be experiments that could falsify a theory even if no finite number of experiments can verify it. However, anyone who has worked with scientific theories knows that there is something factual about the best theories even though any given theory might not project into the future and may be even unlikely to project over expanding experimental or phenomenal domains. In this sense scientific theories are patterns that can be seen as facts—e.g., there is no doubt that Newton’s mechanics has immense precision over many known phenomena even though its phenomenal and temporal domains may be limited. The generalization from data to patterns has been called ‘induction’ and there was a phase in the history of thought that sought a science or method of induction; we now know—it is perhaps safer to say that we now think—that is no method to induction, i.e. that induction involves acts of creation. On the other hand it is often possible to make deductions from a scientific theory, e.g. given Newton’s laws of momentum and of action and reaction the momentum and angular momentum of an isolated system remains constant and the energy of a conservative system, e.g. some systems without friction, remains constant. Deduction is thought to be logical in that conclusions necessarily follow from premises. The narrative will have frequent and significant occasion make critical reference to the ideas of fact (that some state of affairs obtains) and logic—that from some facts, e.g. a fact and a theory seen as a fact, other facts necessarily follow. In this framework the formal role of induction or creativity is suppressed even though it is practically significant and often regarded as having much value. Later, in Metaphysics and as formalized in Method, Logic (the capitalization signifies that a—novel—conception of logic will be introduced) will be seen as a necessary fact and this will reduce all knowing to fact. This surprising conclusion is at odds with common thought, e.g. Wittgenstein regarded logic as having no Object but here Logic will be seen as having the Logos or the Universe in all its detail as its Object, and requires and will be given demonstration and clarification. Until that demonstration, these claims regarding knowing, Logic and Logos will have no definite meaning

Faithfulness

Note that concerns regarding the meaning and possibility of faithfulness have already been addressed

Faithfulness and the Object: categorial divide

Referral to something else—the substance approach to foundation—is not viable

Adaptation and the practical Objects: common knowledge; science and precision

Critique

Recall that in this narrative a critique is a criticism and a response. If a criticism has no response, the object of criticism requires to be dispensed with and given no further consideration. Therefore any criticism that enters the tradition of thought should be part of a critique; at least that should be the case if we were not subject to the folly of repeating errors revealed as egregious

The narrative is now ready to begin formal criticism of the framework for knowing that leads to the Universal metaphysics. It is perhaps necessary to acknowledge and briefly respond to the Humean and the Humanistic critiques. The critiques that are constituted by empiricism and rationalism are significant in that we recognize their concerns and are able to address their concerns by going somewhat around them—by defusing them as does Kant in his transcendental approach. And pragmatism is significant in suggesting a realm in which the significance of concept and Object dissolve in action and transformation

Kant’s critique will be shown—some of the arguments and positions are well known—to fall short of its claims; however there remains a core of insight that has provided some inspiration for the present development. It has taken insight and analysis to see that core; and as a result of the criticisms of Kant’s thought it has been possible to avoid his errors (which are not egregious since identification of the errors depends in part on developments in science that occurred beginning about one hundred and thirty five years after the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781.) However, it will take further development of the basic ideas and formulation and demonstration of a system before claim can be made, first, to metaphysics at all, and, second, to the Universal metaphysics its constituent claims which will include uniqueness, universality, finality, and ultimate depth and breadth

15.        The criticism of Hume—science versus necessity. Hume’s argument has already been encountered. It’s significance is that in his time, the immense success of science had led to a belief that Newton’s Mechanics and the Geometry of Euclid were necessarily true descriptions of space, time, and cause. Hume did not criticize the usefulness, the precision, or the practical application of these sciences. His argument was that those sciences and their entailments such as the nature of causation were not logical conclusions from data because as generalizations they could not be logical conclusions. Hume’s arguments were of immense significance because of the belief in the necessity of the science of causation and because the now well known limits of that science had not yet been encountered. It is significant that Hume’s argument does not disconfirm science but only claims that it has not been shown to be necessary. It is interesting that the logic of Hume’s argument is agnostic toward miracles defined as phenomena that are exceptions to scientific theory or law or commonly observed behavior; the happening and the non-happening of miracles are consistent with the argument. Hume also makes an argument that since science is the best summation of our experience we should not believe in miracles and that we should at least doubt reports of miracles. It is further interesting that the revelations of a later science would appear miraculous in the stated sense as well as in the sense of wonder. However, the idea of the miracle is imbued with a certain sense of paradox: if a ‘miracle’ is a common event then it is no longer a miracle. The Universal metaphysics will enable address of the question of the miraculous. Response—the necessity of the Universal metaphysics (of any knowledge) will have to not depend on inductive generalization from empirical data. Criticism of Hume’s argument. There is a variety of levels or degrees of detail with which the Universe can be described. Hume’s argument need not apply when the level of detail is within grasp of the powers of mind. Further, it is not inconceivable that a rational argument should show that only a Universe with certain properties could result in the world as we experience it, even Hume’s empirical world; therefore the argument that the conclusions such as the one regarding causation is not logical does not imply that there can be no such logical conclusion

16.        A humanistic critique—the barrenness and alienation of metaphysics and science. Response—the humanistic critique does not apply to the thought of this narrative. Hume’s argument applies to modern science as much as it did to the science of his time: all science so far has practical validity in its domain but lacks demonstration of necessity altogether and lacks demonstration of its application to the entire Universe. Still, the positivist strain of thought that what is not described in science does not exist has a strong influence and it is this positivist interpretation that appears barren. In the absence of another paradigm it is natural to interpret the Universe in terms of the science of the day and from there it is a short if unconscious step to the thought that that interpretation defines the scope of the Universe. However, in an earlier time the same attitude led to a view of the Universe as described by Euclid and Newton; today that view is replaced by one from the thought of Darwin, Einstein, and quantum theory and the thought that today’s physics may be far in kind and not just in fact from any final physics appears to have little influence on prevailing paradigms: the familiar absence of knowledge being taken as knowledge of absence is at play. Now consider metaphysics—from the positivist paradigm, modern thought often eschews metaphysics and when metaphysics is allowed it tends to be bare and skeletal. However, it will be seen that the Universal metaphysics is infinitely rich in variety

17.        Other critiques—there are implicit critiques in empiricism—without experience there is no knowledge; in rationalism—without the ability to have knowledge there is no knowledge; in intuitionism—e.g., without intuition there can be no ability to have knowledge and so the process of knowing is essentially hidden from view; revelation as foundation—human being is incapable of knowledge; constructivism—there is no justification of knowledge for justification and knowing have no intersection; pragmatism—there is no intrinsic truth or justification. The suggestive power of some of the critiques is occasionally deployed in the narrative. However, these critiques neither block nor contribute directly to the developments and there is therefore no logical need for response

The Kantian critiques will be taken up below

Response—approach

No a priori commitment to or against faithfulness

18.        Foundation in the immanent—referral to something else typically something simpler than the Object, e.g. substance is the dominant mode of foundation from the history of thought. Through experimentation with ideas a role for foundation in immanent rather than remote Objects has come to light and been developed. Immanent Objects will found the metaphysics which will therefore not need further foundation in something else—a pertinent question for referential foundation may concern the foundation of the Object to which reference is made, e.g. substance in older metaphysics and a divine Object in religion… and the immanence of intuition and experience will ground the metaphysics in (our) being and (our) being in the Universe

Critique and demonstration in the present narrative

Perhaps the most significant of the critiques above is the essential gap between CONCEPT and Object. As a result of the gap the CONCEPT is not intrinsically known to be faithful to the Object; faithfulness must therefore be referred to another means which however does not escape being tinged by the idea of the concept; there is therefore no perfect faithfulness inherent in the nature of the CONCEPT

Here the argument will be that (1) the fact of an essential gap does not imply absence of faithfulness, (2) the lack of intrinsic knowledge of faithfulness is a broad and plausible statement rather than necessary—for there is no generic statement or exhaustive examination of cases, (3) therefore the critique may suggest but does not show universal or logical absence of faithfulness

19.        An approach to metaphysics. The present approach to metaphysics is worked out below: find Objects so simple that they are known faithfully and sufficiently universal that they are capable of supporting a non-trivial metaphysics. It is remarkable that such a system is found and is capable of supporting the Universal metaphysics of ultimate breadth and depth (the italicized phrase will be given precise meaning and demonstrated.) The approach to the simple Objects will be an abstraction of detail. It is remarkable that abstraction applied to intuition will be part of a method that is empirical and that has rationalist consequences in the metaphysics and pragmatic-empirical elements regarding the traditional disciplines that apply to our world

20.        Framing of the traditional disciplines. It is further remarkable that this metaphysics will frame the traditional knowledge disciplines regarding the local cosmological system and our world in such a way as to enhance elimination of their ad hoc elements and to approach their intrinsic limits of faithfulness

The remaining critiques find a place and suggestive sense within the present approach but do not shake the foundations

Meaning

Meaning, sense, and reference

21.        Meaning, sense, and reference. The relations among word, CONCEPT, and Object provide a neat analysis of meaning. The same word can refer to different ideas. Sometimes the difference is so great that it might be better to use different words and use of the same word may be the result of accident or divergence; at other times the word refers to similar ideas. An example of the latter is the word ‘concept.’ Therefore we cannot invariably talk of the meaning of a word. Even when meanings are similar they may be exclusive or have degrees of exclusivity. Therefore, while the gathering of different meanings may be suggestive, there can be no general distillation to a single meaning. In fact as an isolated sign, a word does not have meaning. It is only in evoking an idea that a word has—becomes associated with—meaning. A CONCEPT has meaning. The CONCEPT is in the mind: that is its sense; and it refers to ‘an’ Object: that is its reference. It was perhaps thus that Frege conceived of meaning in terms of sense and reference. Of course, possession of a CONCEPT does not guarantee that there is or should be a corresponding Object. Therefore clarification may be necessary. But sense and therefore CONCEPTS change according to context; as do Objects. Generally there is vagueness to contexts—they are not altogether clear, they are changing, perhaps growing—and therefore to sense and CONCEPTS. In a precise context, e.g. a mathematical system, there may be some definiteness of sense and therefore of CONCEPTS. The Universal metaphysics will provide at least some definiteness of meaning in the most general of contexts that is the Universe and therefore rather non-contextual. Generally, because of multiple uses, word meanings may be gathered; then a decision as to which meaning or family is pertinent to the situation must be made—all meanings are potentially suggestive but not all are necessarily relevant. At that point clarification of meaning may begin: either by analysis in terms of a formal context or the common context; however it would be in error to derive something from every usage. At some point in analysis it may be possible to say that the meaning of word ‘w’ is that it refers via concept ‘c’ to Object ‘O.’ That may be relatively easy in a formal context but perhaps not so easy in the general context; in vague contexts it may be especially difficult even when there is significance to it

The word pair sense-reference is similar to concept-object, connotation-denotation, and intension-extension

Stability of meaning. Use

22.        Stability of meaning and use. It is probably therefore that Wittgenstein argued that there is—generally—no final arbitration of meaning outside use (and that use is practice in a context which may of course be specific or general.) That should not spell the death of lexicography; rather it implies that lexicography is discovery and communication as much as it is definition; that lexicography aids rather than instructs. These thoughts also have significance for formal contexts for formal contexts may evolve; and even in a given formal context meanings are not determined by fiat but must have gone through a process of adjustment as articulation and coherence emerged. This is especially true of the concepts of the Universal metaphysics

23.        More on the triad of word, concept and Object. The word or sign which may be abstract and the concept may be regarded as constituting the complete concept. In some cases the complete concept may reduce to a concept and in other cases to the bare word, but in all cases there must be some resemblance—implicit if not explicit, implied if not immediate—for recognition. The complete concept must resemble the Object in some sense. Of course there are problems with the idea of the concept resembling the Object (which are not entirely refractory to resolution.) What is meant here, however, may be taken to be that the complete concept (which is an experience) has resemblance to the Object for without some resemblance there can be no recognition (a concept-stem may have no immediate resemblance but it may evoke a concept at a subconscious level that enables recognition thus giving the impression that there is no resemblance.) As an example, you are meeting some friends in the woods see an arrow on the trail and a mile further down see another arrow; both arrows point to a mountain and you conclude that you are to meet at the mountain. This seems to stand against ‘resemblance’ for did either arrow in any way resemble the mountain? Regarding the two arrows as a composite sign, they determine a location—that of the mountain. Thus, if there is resemblance it is not of the topography of the mountain but of its location; but location is an aspect of the mountain and therefore the ‘resemblance’ is partial. But is it resemblance at all? Well, at least the two arrows taken together contain information that enables determination of location. In that information regarding the mountain is contained in the composite sign, it is not too far a stretch to think that there is re-semblance. This point aside however, it remains that absolute abstraction tells nothing; there must always be some relation between complete concept and Object for re-cognition (which does not seem to need to be a physical relation or an intention but should perhaps be sufficient to create or re-create an intention.) In figurative meaning, the association is tenuous. No that is not quite correct; we are ‘wired’ for figurative meaning, we make large connections out of something partial and subtle; it is the analysis of figurative meaning that makes it seem tenuous, not the figurative association itself (the strong connection may require enculturation and so on  but it is true that we have the capacity for such enculturation whereas a cat probably has at most little of the human kind of enculturation and a stone has not any)

In some cases there may be no present or immediate Object. In this case there is the sign and the concept—or, simply, the (complete) concept—or pure experience. Such concepts may have potential Objects—i.e., Objects that exist but are not yet discovered or Objects that may come into existence; the already existing Objects may be regarded as Objects of the concept in the sense that there is ‘resemblance’ but not in the sense of connection or intention

24.        Associations are not fixed—no substance theory for Objects. Objects are not ‘things;’ but include states, processes, interactions; and ‘abstract’ Objects. Many Objects change over time. The ‘reference’ of a concept is doubly flexible and may change in ways not driven by Object change per se and these are context changes (which include culture, time, specialty group and individual)

25.        System meaning. There are various forms of system meaning—a theory, a sentence. System meaning does not follow from the meanings of the parts—because system meaning lies in a formula, e.g. grammar, that is not part of the meanings of the parts (therefore in this case at least, it is logically impossible for system meaning to follow from the meanings of the parts.) Also, a system may begin to acquire characteristics of a composite sign. System meaning contributes to individual meaning. This follows, in one way, from individual meanings standing in relation (the meaning of a term in a theory depends on the theory which provides interpretation that is simply not present in the bare individual Object.) Therefore the problem of the specialist or piece-meal philosopher who is sophisticated in his or her domain of expertise but uses old, inadequate, corrupt meanings for neighboring domains with which the domain is interactive... I.e., the specialist’s meanings will be corrupt and so on unless the problem is overcome by luck, intuition, or attention to meaning

In some places in his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein seems to be arguing that the resemblance theory breaks down. Enough has been said to show that, taken flexibly, the resemblance theory is necessary and adequate. It might be counter-argued that this requires a very non-specific interpretation of resemblance. Subject to further analysis, that may be the case but it is perhaps importantly the case for while it may be necessary to be concrete for a formal language, in the case of actual thought we rarely get to the rock bed of the literal even if it is in fact there (I have argued elsewhere that all meaning could be literal but there is a variety of reasons that we do not typically get there and there are other reasons that make it often undesirable or inefficient to get there.) The argument against ‘resemblance’ depends on concretization of resemblance, i.e. in too strictly requiring that resemblance should resemble

The inclusive realm of action and faith

The original context of knowing

26.        The original context of knowing. It becomes clear that a theory of meaning is a theory of knowing. Meaning and knowing and doing evolve together. Meaning, knowledge, and action separate out; meaning informs knowing and knowing informs action. However, at root they remain in interaction stabilized by adaptation. There was perhaps a time and there is a realm that is prior to the separation

The realm of action and faith

27.        The realm of action and faith. In this prior realm proto-meaning, proto-knowing, and proto-action remain bound. But why proto-action? It is because pure ‘physical’ process is not action; action is action as the physical-in-binding-with-the-experiential that includes knowing and willing (and choosing.) In this realm there is perhaps no final knowing; even as we have confidence in our common knowing, in our sciences, in our tradition, in our institutions we also doubt them. And the doubts are neither merely academic nor merely neurotic; they are born of at least occasional failure. This is and will be seen to be true even of the heart of reason: logic. And it will be seen that even though the Universal metaphysics has been designed to be above empirical and logical error that there remains doubt which is in the nature of being. It is therefore that the narrative introduces and the journey has some appeal to the idea of natural faith as the set of attitudes that are—most—conducive to be-ing (the idea will be made more specific later)

Intuition

The idea of intuition

28.        The idea of intuition. A family of meanings of ‘intuition’ is that of knowing without fully explicit or conscious processing or reasoning. The knowing or knowledge itself may or may not itself be fully conscious but the cases of interest include those in which the knowing may be conscious and may be recognized as such. Intuition can be common or unusual with regard to the process of knowing and esoteric or immediate with regard to what is known. If someone claims to have intuition of a supernatural God, that would be unusual with regard to process (most people do not have that intuition) and esoteric with regard to what is known (a supernatural God is remote from the familiar world.) Scientific intuition is somewhat unusual in that it may be highly developed in certain (creative) individuals but its subject is not esoteric—i.e. even if unfamiliar and remote the subject is of this world. The kind of intuition that is of interest in this narrative is common and its subject is immediate

Kant’s use of intuition, mathematics, science, metaphysics and logic

29.        The constructive Kantian critique. Kant accepts Hume’s criticism and responds as follows

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is regarded as one of the most influential thinkers in the history of Western philosophy. It is his Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, that is of interest in this part of the narrative. Kant had read and wanted to respond to Hume’s criticism that science was mere empirical description that lacked necessity. Instead of attempting to found knowledge or to criticize its foundations from empiricism as Hume and others had done or to approach knowledge from the rationalist point of view of continental philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz, Kant started from the reasonable point of view that we clearly have some knowledge. In fact it was commonly felt that we have much more than ‘some’ knowledge: in Kant’s time the sciences of space, time and cause—Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics which, for brevity, are referred to as ‘geometry and mechanics’ in the following paragraphs—appeared to be imbued with necessity in the manner of what was regarded as the necessity of the ‘science’ of deduction, i.e. the Aristotelian logic that had stood for two thousand years

Kant did not regard these apparent necessities as actual necessities or justification; the success of geometry and mechanics was motivation for belief in their necessity but was not to be justification of that belief. In order to provide justification he enquired into the nature of this knowledge and how it is possible. He wanted to argue that, contrary to Hume, the geometry, the mechanics of his time are necessary—the logic was of course regarded as necessary and had been untouched by Hume or others. He first considers analytic knowledge, roughly knowledge that is true solely on account of the meanings of the propositions. An example is the syllogism: all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is immortal. The conclusion follows from the premises; it is not necessary to go out into the world and wait for men to die; perhaps it is not true that all men are mortal but that is not the point: the point is that if the premises are true then the conclusion is true and that this follows from the meanings of the terms of the premises and not from experiment or observation. This is the model of necessary knowledge: the necessity is prior to or independent of observation and is therefore a priori knowledge, i.e. it is a priori to experience or observation. In summation, Kant’s ideal is analytic a priori knowledge. Logic appears to be analytic and a priori. He wants to model geometry and mechanics after this knowledge; that knowledge, however, is not true from meaning alone and, in contrast to the analytic it is synthetic. It seems that synthetic knowledge must be empirical but Kant now wonders whether there is synthetic a priori knowledge, i.e. knowledge that lies within and refers to but is not dependent on experience. Kant will argue that there is such knowledge and that sciences of geometry and mechanics, i.e. of space, time, and causation, are examples of it

The argument begins with an analyses perception of which he observed that while we do experience the world in terms of space, time and cause, we do not see or justify the underlying process—i.e., perception in terms of space, time and cause occur in intuition. Given, he argues, that geometry and mechanics have revealed the true categories of nature, it follows that those categories are built into perceptual intuition. I.e. although within experience, geometry and mechanics are not dependent on experience: they are examples of synthetic a priori knowledge. Kant then looks at the process of elaboration of knowledge: the systematic elaboration of the consequences of the sciences via deductive logic which is the natural category of reason. That is, the entire development of geometry and mechanics has the necessity that the empiricists with Hume as their champion argued against (and for which the rationalists argued but without clear necessity.) What Kant has done is to find a justification in their synthetic a priori character for the necessity of propositions of the natural science of his time, i.e. of geometry and mechanics

In addition to the synthetic a priori propositions of science, Kant also enquired into the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions in mathematics and metaphysics. In this essay the propositions of mathematics are not important to the main development; they do however receive a brief treatment, at least superficially different from Kant’s, in Objects. Regarding the synthetic a priori propositions of metaphysics, Kant argues that since the metaphysical Objects do not lie within experience there are no synthetic a priori metaphysical propositions. This does not imply, as Kant says, that there are no true metaphysical propositions but simply that we do not know—the necessity of—their truth. Regarding metaphysics the argument of this essay will diverge from that of Kant. As did Kant, the narrative will distinguish general metaphysics from special metaphysics. The general metaphysics will concern concepts such as experience, being, the Universe or all being and the Void or absence of being. For these topics experience and reality will be shown to be identical (equivalent.) Perhaps the most amazing conclusion from the general metaphysics will be the truth of the propositions of special metaphysics even though the latter may lie outside experience (it is shown that not only are they not excluded from all experience but that they must ‘at some time’ enter experience.) The special metaphysics concerns topics such as the existence of infinitely many cosmological systems of which some may have laws that diverge widely from the laws of our cosmos and even more specialized topics such as those from myth, religion, and fictional literature. The theory finds that subject to Logic, all ‘fiction’ is realized. That does not imply that they are realized in my immediate experience. The conclusion is remarkably similar to that of Kant’s in that while here their realization motivates a journey Kant finds that (special) metaphysics is inherently dialectical; he also finds general metaphysics to be dialectical but that is because he did not analyze the general Objects—e.g. Being, Universe, Void, and Logos—as analyzed here (below.) This narrative diverges from Kant and almost all Western philosophical and secular thought in showing the immense variety of being—the variety is subject only to Logic—and the necessity of its entering experience via, e.g., the transformation of the identity of the individual. And there is divergence from much myth and religion in showing their limits in a normal sense but also their poverty in a universal sense (the notions of ‘normal’ and ‘universal’ will become clear later)

Criticism of Kant

In this narrative which is not a history of ideas, the goal of criticism is primarily point out the negative so that movement can proceed without unnecessary hindrance and to accept what is positive for possible incorporation to movement. We learn from error and success and the space devoted to Kant is a measure of the quality and quantity of what the narrative has learned from his thought

30.        Criticism from Kant’s vantage point. It may be said that Kant gave plausible but not necessary arguments against Hume’s argument which therefore still stands—except for criticism of Hume above

31.        Criticism from a modern perspective. Three pillars of Kantian thought Euclidean Geometry, Newtonian mechanics, and deduction are now known to not define necessities of the nature of the Universe and of—deductive or logical—thought. The story regarding geometry and mechanics and therefore of space, time and cause is well known from the twentieth century developments in physics. The story regarding logic is perhaps not so well known but in outline which will be elaborated later it is this: the necessity of every axiom of logic stands questioned and it appears that even logic has a empirical character not only in its constitution but also in its justification

Kant’s contribution. The transcendental approach, i.e. analysis rather than foundation, the thought to start with the fact of knowledge, and the use of intuition are insights of a high order. An argument can be made that necessity should not be the only criterion of good philosophy. The argument becomes especially good in a critical era in which all necessities are doubted for if there are no necessities then our actions, the paths we choose for our lives and societies cannot depend on necessity. A role of philosophy would then be to illuminate regions that lack the aura of necessity. Kant’s approach continues to provide and remains an immensely promising avenue for the development of illumination

This highly selective and abbreviated interpretation of Kant’s Critique may be used as a starting point for the present use and analysis of intuition (the actual starting point was in fact quite different: it was motivated by the discovery of the general Objects mentioned above and the subsequent realization and then analysis that they did not lie outside experience)

Intuition in this narrative

32.        In this narrative all CONCEPTS lie within intuition

The discussion so far entails the following conclusion: there is so far no knowing or process of knowledge that is transparent and necessary or rational in its entirety. In perception the percept may present in awareness but the process of the presentation lies largely outside cognition. The application of science may be transparent but neither its truth is neither transparent nor necessary. Deduction—logic—alone has some appearance of necessity. However, as we have seen even logic lacks full necessity. And while the process of deduction is classically transparent the source of the rules of deduction is not; and that lack of transparency is significant for there are doubts regarding every logical axiom despite their apparent necessity (tautological character.) Even the classical transparency of the process of deduction has been lost now that computer aided proofs are admitted and proofs are so complex that human verification of those proofs is difficult. Therefore all cognition is tinged with the non-transparent arational character of intuition

Later we will see that emotion has an Object and that that process also lacks transparency and rationality (we normally think that emotion cannot have these qualities but if we show that emotion has an Object it then becomes meaningful to say that the process of Object formation is non-transparent and has arational elements)

It will be shown that all mental content, i.e. the entire range of the CONCEPT, is defined by emotion and cognition (cognition corresponds primarily to cognition of the world outside the body and emotion to an aspect of mental content regarding the body.) Therefore all CONCEPTS are characterized by intuition

All CONCEPTS are reigned in under intuition. The purpose of doing so is strategic. In not arguing any a priori character to any objectivity of concepts, it is allowed that the faithfulness of some concepts may be perfectly faithful to their Object and that this may emerge from investigation. Therefore there is no error in reigning in all concepts under intuition even if it should be in the constitution of some CONCEPTS to transcend intuition

33.        That all concepts lie within intuition does not imply that there are no concepts that are perfectly faithful to Objects (perfect faithfulness is precisely a case in which the Object can be regarded as the object-in-itself)

Intuition, abstraction, and the empirical

Now that it has been allowed that all CONCEPTION is intuitive, it may be asked whether there are any perfectly faithful CONCEPTS

Since all concepts and therefore all knowing lies within intuition, no concept can be referred to another to determine its faithfulness; this point has been argued earlier. I.e., it is in the nature of the presenting situation that the standard approach to foundation is ruled out. Some other way of ‘foundationalism’ will be required in order to provide foundation

In Newtonian mechanics the real—whatever it may be—is represented as a collection of point particles and forces. However, there is every reason to believe that the real is not a collection of point particles and forces. There is a positivistic tendency to regard current science as defining the ultimate real; one reason for that is the immersion of the scientist in the ideas of science; another is the lack of another realm to which to refer. However since success is not a reason to believe that a science defines the real, there is no reason to think that today’s combination of quantum theory and theories of forces of various kinds (the four fundamental forces) define the real and there are historical reasons as well as hints from within science itself that the real has not been captured. Later, the Universal metaphysics will reveal that no science of detail can capture all of reality. The sciences proceed by abstraction that may be called token abstraction: the Object is approximated by a token Object whose CONCEPT is simple

Looking beyond the CONCEPTION, beyond knowing is incapable of providing foundation. Perhaps then, looking within is a way

It was observed in connection with Hume’s thought that his criticism of necessity of science rests on the fact that generalization—induction, free or creative concept formation—is not necessarily true when there the empirical facts do not constitute all the facts

Therefore, perhaps, objectivity of the concept will result for simple Objects. Since the goal is a Universal metaphysics, the Objects should also be universal

This suggestive paving of the way for the present development has been fabricated for the convenience of an audience. The original way was more haphazard, more intuitive, based on insights that followed extended search, far more exciting. The actual development was experienced as an adventure

34.        Abstraction. By eliminating sufficient detail from the CONCEPT it may be possible to have perfect empirical knowledge. For example we might not know the precise difference between two states of affairs but we can know with perfect faithfulness that there are differences. In contrast to scientific abstraction where the ‘Object’ corresponding to the abstract concept is other than the real, the Object of the present kind of abstraction is immanent in the real. This process of abstraction could be called abstraction to the immanent. This a source of Metaphysics of immanence as an alternate name to Universal metaphysics

Necessary Objects

35.        Necessary Objects. Any Object that is known perfectly will be called a necessary Object; in calling an Object necessary, it is implicit that the knowledge is known to be faithful. For the necessary Objects, concept and Object may be conflated. Some Objects are perfectly known as a result of abstraction.

Already, in analyzing the idea of the universe, it has been seen that not only is there correspondence between knower and known but there is also a hint of a power to abstraction. This suggestion will be made manifest below

Universal Objects

If we think of an experience as concept and Object, we might think of it as trivially necessary however it would not constitute knowledge for there is no real Object

Some Platonists think that the number ‘one’ is an Object. More precisely, the thought is that the concept ‘one’ is the—perhaps incomplete or imprecise—of a real number One that, however, does not lie in this mundane or physical world but lies in an Ideal or Platonic universe. Since the number One lies in an Ideal universe it may be thought of as lying everywhere in this world. Given the Platonism, One may be thought of as constituting a universal Object. In Objects we will see that One is indeed an Object but that it lies in this world, i.e. in the Universe, and that it is simultaneously necessary and of the world

The notion of Universal Object introduced here is somewhat different. The Universal Objects are those necessary Objects that are capable of forming the basis of the Universal metaphysics that will be developed in Metaphysics and is previewed below. Some of the Universal Objects that lie at the foundation of the metaphysics and Logic of Metaphysics, and the general cosmology of Cosmology are Universe, Domain, Void, and Logos. Extension and duration are also Universal in this sense provided that we do not think of them as defined in terms of a metric or any detail of quality or quantity that might make them subject to distortion in the concept

A preview of the Universal metaphysics

The following preview is not intended to be complete with respect to content or method

The Universe

Consider the idea of the Universe which is here taken to be all that exists or, as we will see later, all being (existence and being are important concepts and their meaning should be analyzed; the analysis should be adequate to the present purpose and should also acknowledge their known difficulties; the analysis is deferred to Metaphysics.) More precisely the Universe will be thought of as all that existed, all that exists, or all that will exist; this defines an atemporal sense of ‘exist,’ of the verb to be ‘is,’ and of ‘being;’ the common use of ‘is’ as in ‘is at the present time’ is a temporal sense; problems regarding the idea that time spans the Universe are left for later clarification. It is important to note that in this narrative ‘Universe’ is distinct from (a) ‘cosmos’ for, as conceived, the Universe may contain infinitely many cosmological systems, (b) the physical Universe for this allows that there are non-physical Objects in the Universe and this is important because it allows analysis to determine whether there are such Objects and if there are not then the case for physicalism is proved and if there are—in whatever sense—then we will not have ruled out truth by prejudice, (c) the ‘empirically known universe,’ for conflation of the empirically known universe with the Universe is often tacit even though it is explicit primarily in positivistic thinking

Consider the following CONCEPT: my experience of a cube of metal. The CONCEPT may be reasonably faithful to some ‘thing’ but the faithfulness is certainly not perfect. If I do not perfectly know a simple Object such as a cube, surely I cannot claim perfect knowledge of the Universe. However, if all detail is abstracted out of the Universe which is then regarded in its oneness, it is perfectly known as such. Since it is perfectly known it is not problematic to not distinguish the Universe and its CONCEPT

If we recognize the Universe as having detail without precise specification, e.g. in saying there are concepts that have rough correspondence to things, perfect faithfulness is not destroyed. We can say: there are patterns and laws without destroying perfect faithfulness

Whether a general idea such as Universe is necessary depends not only on the idea but the specific way in which it is used. One way to make ‘universe’ necessary is to abstract out all detail. Another way is to regard detail abstractly as in the fact of detail (or pattern or law.) In Metaphysics the ideas of domain, duration, and extension will be introduced. Provided that it is not required to precisely specify or quantify domains, durations, or extensions under consideration, ideas may allow definition necessary Objects

It may be useful to recall the earlier discussion of law as fact versus law as hypothesis (tentative.) A generalization (law) may have significant application but is still tentative if thought of as extending beyond its domain of application; restricted to its phenomenal domain (space, time, and other parameters such as scale and tolerance) the law or pattern is a fact. We can think of the Universe as divided into domains; then, over a limited domain a law is a fact. Later, when the Universal metaphysics has been developed, we will see that there are infinitely many cosmological systems that provide cases of domains with local laws as facts (there will also be an infinite variety of laws)

Consider the nature of a law. It is our reading of a pattern, i.e. a law is a CONCEPT (and may also be conceptual andor involve concepts.) There is some the pattern or law that we read corresponds to some actual pattern or immanent version of the law; this immanent version of the law is labeled Law. Therefore

The Universe is all being and contains all Law

Consider the concept of a creator of the Universe. If a creator is external to what is created the Universe can have no creator. This is because there is nothing ‘outside’ the Universe. And this, in turn, is not because there is, e.g., an empty space and time outside the Universe but because as all being the Universe cannot and does not have an outside. Similarly, the Universe has neither beginning nor end. However, a manifest phase of the Universe may have a beginning and an end

The Universe has no creator

If the Universe had been conceived as the physical universe there would be the possibility of its having a non-physical creator

Foregoing discussion immediately suggests that space and time are—whatever their domain may be—immanent in the Universe and do not constitute absolute frameworks as a stage for the play of being. Space andor time are called absolute if there existence is independent of the being of the Universe and its parts. On the other hand if space and time are part and parcel of being and owe their being to being, they are relative. Space and time must then be part of the play of being. This is the point of view that from for the entire Universe space and time are relative (the contrary viewpoint would be that space and time are absolute in that they constitute a scaffolding for the play of being.) This point of view allows that there may be domains in which space and time are as if absolute. It does not imply that a Universal or global space and time framework exists or that where local frameworks exist they are continuous or infinitely divisible

In Metaphysics and in Cosmology improved analysis of space and time will be preceded by analysis of extension and duration

For the Universe, space and time are immanent in being—and are not externally imposed

The power of abstraction from intuition begins to become evident; however the power revealed so far is a minute fraction of what is to come

Introduction to logos and logic

If we define the logos as the universe of logically possible states then the logos includes the Universe

It does not appear that satisfaction of the principles of logic implies existence. With an indefinite notion of the universe some state whose concept satisfied logic might or might not exist. However, the Universe is all being. What is the significance of a state whose concept is logical but does not exist? That state lies out all actuality; in a not unreasonable sense it could not exist. But this appears to contradict the fact that the state satisfies the principles of logic. Perhaps, then, satisfaction of the principles of logic does imply existence. If that is true every state in the logos is in the Universe and therefore the logos and the Universe in all its details are identical. In considering the Void, this will be seen to be true but will require introduction of an alternative conception of logic

The Void

The Void is the absence of any existing things, i.e. it is the absence of being. In Metaphysics the existence of the Void is demonstrated. In this preview its existence is taken as given. Therefore since all Law is in the Universe:

The Void which is the absence of being exists and contains no Law

This is the fundamental result of Metaphysics and it is the logical anchor of the Universal metaphysics that may act as framework and sieve for imaginative or constructive endeavor. It should therefore be the subject of intense doubt and criticism which is taken up in Metaphysics

Now consider the CONCEPT or description of a state of affairs. If the state does not emerge from the Void, that would be a Law of the Void. Therefore every state of affairs must emerge from the Void. Since the Void exists, every state of affairs must obtain or exist (somewhere and when)

There is an obvious exception. Consider the state of affairs ‘An apple that is fully green and fully not green at the same time rests on a table.’ Such a state violates the logical principle called the principle of non-contradiction and it is reasonably obvious that state of affairs described cannot obtain. Therefore the assertion of the previous paragraph must be modified: every concept of a state that does not violate any principle of logic, the state must exist

The only states that do not exist are those that cannot exist in principle, i.e. those that violate the principles of logic. I.e., the Universe has the greatest logically possible variety of being

It was noted earlier that every axiom or principle of logic has been questioned. The thinking is therefore inverted and Logic (capitalized) is defined as the principle of being. A state of affairs exists if and only if it is ‘Logical:’ if it is Logical it must exist, if it exists it must be Logical

The principle of reference now follows:

Subject to Logic every concept has an Object

Or

Subject to Logic every concept has reference

The principle of reference is the basis of the unified theory of Objects developed in Objects

Even though Logic is introduced as a definition the conclusion is far from empty because the known logical principles are at least approximations to Logic

The fundamental principle of metaphysics now follows:

The Universe has the greatest Logically possible variety of being

And

The only Universal law is Logic

There is no Universal Law

It now becomes clear why the Universe defined as all being is an efficient idea

The immense power of abstraction from intuition now becomes evident. Subject only to Logic the following are true it follows that our system of physical laws is one among infinitely many; for each physical law there are infinitely many cosmological systems of immense variety; and for each cosmological system there are infinitely many identical as well as infinitely many similar systems… Further variety is taken up in Metaphysics, Objects, and Cosmology

The Logos

Now define the Logos as the Object of Logic: as the collection of Logically possible states. Earlier it was seen that the logos must contain the Universe. It is now seen that:

The Logos is the Object of Logic; it is the Universe in all its variety

There is no universal Law. All Law is immanent in the Logos

The power of abstraction is evident once more. There is no need for some vague notion of a Logos. The Logos is the Universe; that the Logos is the Universe is reference to the absolutely unlimited variety of being; there are Logical limits to the concepts or description of the variety but no limits to the variety itself

Development of the metaphysics

Although the development above is foundational, it does not go to (what will be seen to be) the root. This ‘return’ will be undertaken in the preliminary discussion in Metaphysics, section The Universal metaphysics, topics The concept of metaphysics, The Universal metaphysics, Existence, Experience, External world, Being

The variety in the foregoing hints at the factual power revealed. The invocation of Logic hints at the conceptual power. However, much in the way of foundation is so far absent—what is existence, what is being and what are there necessary foundation? How shall we articulate a system of necessary Objects that enable a full Universal metaphysics? What is metaphysics? How may we address the paradox apparently immanent in the allowances of an imagination that sees the infinite variety described above? And what of relevance? And how shall we address the critics austere and generous—we may begin by formulating and addressing doubt—regarding credulity and formal doubt that may arise, for example, in the proof of the existence of the Void—ad hoc at first, then systematically?

The systematic elaboration of foundation and articulation of concepts and ideas, and of the factual and conceptual powers begins in Metaphysics; Objects focuses on the conceptual power; and Cosmology focuses on the factual power (which includes Pattern and Law.) We would like to know more about the immense variety of being that has been revealed: how can that be done? That last question is of intense interest but not overtly foundational. It is however foundational to observe that while we can now say that we know that the elements of the variety exist we do not know them (except the local elements.) The question arises, how can we come to know them—i.e., how may we ground the knowledge? The problem is anticipated in the earlier distinction of general and special metaphysics. Although we know from the foregoing that the Objects of the metaphysics exist, it is only the general Objects that we know. As observed, the situation as it stands is an immense advance for the analysis has shown the existence of entire ‘universes’ of Objects that in their reach exceed what had been earlier imagined. It remains to ground or know the Objects of special metaphysics—how might this be done? A response is twofold: from the side of the knower, grounding is via intuition as explained above and experience as in Metaphysics; and from the side of the known it is open—via discovery and the journey. It could be argued that the knowledge in question is useless but that is not true for it illuminates the Universe and provides practical motivation for search and knowledge of the necessity of realization (it is probable that search makes outcome more likely and better appreciated)

Elaboration and address of these concerns are among the topics of Metaphysics and subsequent chapters

Metaphysics

Introduction

What is metaphysics?

Although it seems naïve from a modern perspective, Thales’ idea that the world is made of water is a metaphysics. Perhaps the earlier Greek mythology in which the Gods are forces in this world could be called metaphysics. However, the significance of Thales’ idea includes (1) the basis of explanation—water—is simpler than what is explained—the world—and (2) the basis or foundation is of the world. There is little in Thales work that deserves to be called ‘explanation.’ However, there is little in the prior history of metaphysics outside science that deserves to be called explanation if it is required that explanation springs from the same soil as the explained. And Thales’ idea does not appear to be significantly self-conscious

An interesting side-note to the present discussion is the way in which ideas develop. Supernaturalism gives way to a groping naturalism and then to a self-conscious naturalism that paves the way for science and the sweeping away of metaphysics. Then, however, metaphysics makes a return but restricted in its outlook but sophisticated in its vision. Now, in the present narrative, first by a groping, then via self-conscious development, and finally by relinquishing substance in favor of the inherent force of ideas a final, dynamic and mature metaphysics emerges

A self-conscious notion of metaphysics stems from Aristotle—it is the study of being-as-being or, colloquially though not as precisely, the study of things-as-they-are. The use and significance of ‘being-as-being’ is clarified below in section Universal metaphysics

Clearly any metaphysics that shall be instrumental toward the goals and intents of this essay shall lie in the family defined by this meaning

There is a familiar story regarding the origin of the name ‘metaphysics’ that runs rather as follows (from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Metaphysics.) ‘Metaphysics’ was not Aristotle’s term; it stems from later Greek authors who use the term ‘Ta meta ta phusika’ meaning approximately ‘the ones after the physicals’ and referring to the books that are now thought of as containing Aristotle’s metaphysics. Thus metaphysics was not Aristotle’s term was not intended to mean ‘the subject beyond the subject of physics’ but may have been intended to suggest that the books on metaphysics should be read after the ones on physics. And, even though ‘beyond the subject of physics’ may be suggestive it is not accurate for as will be seen in relation to physics, metaphysics is neither after nor before. It is before ‘science’ in being more fundamental and ‘after’ science in reaching to the edge of cosmology. The subject matter of metaphysics encompasses but is not limited to that of physics or science; but ‘encompassing’ may be misleading for the actual study is different in method and uses distinct even if related concepts

The original motive may have been that there are various special sciences which study ‘divisions’ of the world, e.g. matter and life and so on. Metaphysics, however, is reserved for the study of the world without regard to any special nature. Perhaps there is nothing to study beyond the special sciences; if that is true then metaphysics may allow confirmation rather than mere assumption of its truth; and if it is not true then metaphysics may allow emergence of its truth. The use of ‘being’ i.e. what is there is not especially illuminating at outset for it says essentially nothing. However, that turns out to be a power of its meaning—it allows the investigation to emerge rather than have it be stamped at outset: and since we are seeking illumination allowing a stamp at outset may be to allow the stamp of darkness and absence of knowledge

The study of being-as-being now appears quite clear in intent and, allowing for the necessary lack of specification, in meaning. However, this crystal clarity gives way to clouding when we look deeper

There is a popular use of metaphysics as the study or science of the occult or hidden. Which use is the true metaphysics? The question is not meaningful for the two ‘metaphysics’ correspond to distinct meanings and it would perhaps be more efficient to use different words. The question is closely analogous to asking Of biology and physics, which one is Science? The present use of metaphysics, then, is the study of being-as-being and it is significantly distinct from the study of the occult because it does not distinguish the (apparently) occult from the manifest, the remote from the immediate, or the opaque from the transparent

A second source of equivocation regarding the meaning of metaphysics is more serious. It is the question Since what is known is known in experience, how can we know things-as-they-are? Or, Since all knowledge is CONCEPTUAL, how can we know Objects as ‘pure’ Objects? This is the source of the modern use of metaphysics as metaphysics-of-experience; it is the source of the Kantian tradition of the criticism of pure metaphysics. This concern has already received address. Pure metaphysics is broken down into general and special metaphysics. The Objects of general metaphysics are known faithfully even though they are known in experience; although the CONCEPT of general metaphysics not the Object it is known empirically or experientially and faithfully. Then: from the general metaphysics we know that the Objects of Special metaphysics (the cosmological variety and so on) exist even though we do not know them (experientially.) We know some of those special Objects: they are the Objects of our world: cosmos, Earth, life, human society and culture… However, though we know them with degrees of faithfulness—sometimes just well enough to have illumination, sometimes sufficiently well as in visual perception, and sometimes with immense precision as in certain branches of physics; still, that knowledge is not perfect (in general.) Pure metaphysics may be used to illuminate these Objects. If the Objects are studied at a sufficiently general or abstract level, they may be known with perfect faithfulness; such Objects will fall under general Cosmology

Applied metaphysics studies those Objects that we do not know faithfully and that perhaps cannot be known faithfully. However, the term Applied metaphysics is used because metaphysics can be used to enhance the study of these Objects. The principles of the approach are taken up in the section Applied metaphysics below and summarized in chapter Method. The principles are applied to the study of normal worlds, i.e. worlds such as ours in chapter Worlds. which covers physical cosmology and human being. The study in Worlds is not metaphysics at all even though we allow it under Applied metaphysics. The motive to that allowance is that the pure metaphysics enables the approach to the intrinsic limit of the special disciplines

These reflections confirm the earlier suggestion that understanding the nature of metaphysics may remain unclear until metaphysics itself reaches some sufficient degree of completion. Early metaphysics proceeded naïvely without reflection on the nature and possibility of knowledge. Perhaps even Plato’s metaphor of the cave did not get to the core of the divide between knower and known. In the modern era, the ascent of reason brought the gap into clear view and Kant thought he had shown it to be eternal. This stage of metaphysics must remain without clarity regarding the nature of metaphysics and the kind and possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Abstraction from intuition shows a way out; and this way is executed here; which simultaneously provides a map of knowledge that includes metaphysics and understanding of an ultimate nature of metaphysics

Another concern regarding the nature of metaphysics is the various characterizations of it from the tradition of metaphysics in the overarching sense of the study of being-as-being. In the searching of the tradition many characterizations of metaphysics arise: here are some: an inquiry into what exists, the science of ultimate reality, the science of the world as a whole, and the science of first principles. How do these relate to the study of being-as-being? In the present narrative it is seen that the first three are perhaps different aspects of what falls under metaphysics as being-as-being (supplemented by the treatments in Objects and Cosmology which of course are metaphysics) while from the developments in Intuition we see that there are no first principles that come before all investigation and we have begun to see—and this will be confirmed and elaborated in Method—that knowledge of content and knowledge of principles emerge together and are not distinct categories even though there are practical differences. The incompleteness of thought suggested by the various notions of metaphysics and method from the tradition stems from the incompleteness of metaphysics as science developed via demonstration and its reliance on imagination. Imagination (and perception) as we have seen and will continue to see is essential because it seeks to know and because it provides the material that can be the subject of criticism and demonstration. In the present narrative interaction of construction (imagination) and criticism has permitted a maturity that results in metaphysics and understanding of the nature of metaphysics

The simplest conception of metaphysics

Although there is a history of criticism and doubt regarding metaphysics as the direct study of being—i.e., being-as-being—it is seen that in this conception metaphysics is possible and most powerful

While we learn and owe some debt to the tradition and perhaps even to etymology, truth is not bound by tradition and even less by etymology

The significance of present development of metaphysics

In common knowledge including science the aim must include the practical

In metaphysics however, the first aim is truth. In the modern tradition however metaphysics as conceived here has been regarded as futile because of the supposed impossibility of perfect faithfulness

Here, however, metaphysics is shown possible and a metaphysics whose Object is the Universe is developed and demonstrated

An immense significance for thought and its application to practical concerns and to meaning-in-the-sense-of-significance is developed in this essay. The developments include approach and systematic laying out of possibilities for further work

There is at most one metaphysics

Metaphysics is the study of being-as-being. Implications include (1) being is not studied with regard to special kind and (2) the CONCEPT is perfectly faithful to the Object

Therefore except for variant formulations, degree of detail of the development, and range of being there can be at most one metaphysics

Pure and applied metaphysics

If the divisions of metaphysics into pure and applied metaphysics and so on seem unnecessarily fine in their distinctions, the following may be regarded as response. First, the entire Universe has been mapped. All knowledge, received and potential lie within; and, in this narrative, what is outside the received is seen as immensely larger in magnitude than the received (while remaining somewhat neutral to any question of ‘importance.’) Second, the number of divisions is not unduly large: the following lie under the broad topic Universe / Knowledge

Pure metaphysics

General metaphysics

Special metaphysics. Includes general cosmology

Applied metaphysics—application to special disciplines as in Worlds. General cosmology could be placed under applied metaphysics but this is not done here

Systematic approach from Intuition

The following formal aspects are crucial. Care in selecting the fundamental Objects—the basic concepts—for faithfulness, articulation, and universality. Inclusion of Logos—the fundamental Object that straddles the rational and the empirical: this amounts to bringing deduction or logic from the a priori and perhaps tinged with mystery to the clear plane of Object or content; which is natural since the Object of deduction, i.e. relationship between facts, is in the world

Finally, sequence of development has flexibility but is significant for efficiency and understanding. The preliminary ideas are foundation, existence, experience, external world, being, and metaphysics. The sequence of the main necessary Objects is Universe, Domain, Void, and Logos. Universe is placed before Domain because the former frames the development of the latter; and it is natural for Law, Extension and Duration to follow Universe. There are doubts regarding the nature of the Void so it is placed where the doubts will not cloud development of Universe and Domain. The Logos is placed last because its development is dependent on the existence and properties of the Void—and on the fundamental principle of metaphysics. The remaining topics are important but do not anchor the development. The sequence of development may be as follows

Foundation in the necessary Objects — Existence —Experience — External world — Being — The concept of metaphysics — The Universal metaphysics — Universe — The ideas of law and Law — Possibility and actuality — Introduction to logic and logos — Domain and Complement. Cause, creation and duration — Extension and Duration — The Void — The fundamental principle of metaphysics and Logic — Logos — Form — The equivalent forms of the metaphysics —Proof and interpretation: token proof — Space, time and space-time-being — Doubt. Formal doubts: doubts regarding the deduction; doubts from science and common sense — Doubt. Subjective doubts: the metaphysics as artifice; the metaphysics yields so much from so little — Humanistic doubt from the austerity of Logic: the metaphysics is dehumanizing — Doubt: residual doubt. Doubt and faith. Metaphysics and animal faith — Properties of the Void — Being and existing — The possibility of metaphysics — A metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth. The problem of substance. Determinism and indeterminism. The habit of substance thinking — A metaphysics that is implicitly ultimate in breadth. Cosmological consequences. Adventure. Absolute indeterminism and structure — Problems of metaphysics — Preliminary comments on method — Metaphysics and action

The Universal metaphysics

The Universal metaphysics entails Objects and Cosmology. These constitute the first core of the system of ideas

The foundation of the Universal metaphysics lies in the necessary Objects

The development of the Universal metaphysics begins with a discussion of the nature of existence, experience, external world, and being. It will be significant that they are necessary Objects

This is the point at which it will be efficient to review the concept of metaphysics and define the Universal metaphysics in terms of the necessary and Universal Objects

The main such Objects are Universe, Law, Extension and Duration, Domain and Complement, The Void, and the Logos. The development of the Universe begins with the development of the nature and properties of these Objects and fundamental implications that show the Universal metaphysics as an articulated system that has ultimate depth or foundation and breadth or variety

The remaining topics are elaborations of the metaphysics, application to some important problems of metaphysics, and anticipation of doubts and criticisms to which responses are given

Being

Existence — Experience — External world — Being

Existence

Consider the statement ‘There is an apple whose color is green’ in which the italicization of ‘is’ indicates that it is emphasized. The phrase ‘There is an apple’ is equivalent to ‘An apple exists’

Here, ‘is’ is used as a form of the verb to be. Something exists or has the property of existence if it may be said to be—if it has being

Reasons for deferring the introduction of ‘being’ will become clear below

In the history of thought existence has been contrasted with essence. Roughly, essence is identity—if something lost identity it would not be that thing; existence has been called the mode of being which consists in interaction with other things—e.g. sentient or knowing individuals. That distinction is analogous to essence as reality and existence as appearance

What has been seen so far in Intuition and the present chapter clouds the distinction. It has been seen that the Object is neither thing nor mere appearance; that there is a class of things, the necessary Objects, for which the distinction breaks down; and that there is another class of things whose ‘being’ is so interwoven with the concept that there is no thing-in-itself. The latter class of things includes the practical Objects—the Objects of adaptation for which the concept is ‘sufficiently’ faithful and which, it makes sense to say, may be taken to behave as given in the concept for certain practical purposes but not all purposes. Although ‘There is an apple…’ must clearly refer, first of all, to a thing-as-cognized, we start at that point with full awareness that neither pure not applied aspects of the metaphysics are affected by the choice since in the pure case the cognized versus in-itself distinction is without consequence and in the practical case we tolerate the distinction

Does anything exist? Practically speaking, of course—if nothing existed these words would not be written! However, such questions may be asked in order to clarify or illuminate some issue such as the meaning of terms the meaning of terms. Perhaps ‘the words of this narrative’ are an illusion but if so the illusion exists

Further clarification may depend on elucidation of ‘existence.’ However, some terms must be fundamental or primitive; this does not mean that they have no meaning or that their meaning is unfounded. The fundamental character of ‘existence’ is part of our being! But do we have being? Even if we have no being as we think we do there is at least an illusion

The fundamental concern regarding existence is not whether anything exists at all but rather, What exists? It is practically obvious from our sense of being in the world that there must be experience—this is taken up below where the meaning of experience is clarified and it is shown that there is experience. Then in the sub-section External world it is established that there is an external world, i.e. not all experience is illusion and some experience has an Object

Because ‘everything exists’ existence has been argued to be trivial or not a concept. That it is trivial does not imply that it is not a concept. The phrase ‘red or not red’ is trivially true of everything but is conceptual. However, ‘red or not red’ is not a useful property. Perhaps, then, ‘exists’ is superfluous when applied to something. The claim is valid: existence is a trivial property and superfluous when used to describe something. However, it is precisely the triviality in the case of existence that will be a source of the power of the metaphysics. Clarification of the nature of existence will lead to deep answers to the question ‘What things and kinds of thing exist?’

The problem of the non-existent Object. What is the meaning of ‘Unicorns do not exist’? The problem is that if there are no unicorns, what is it that is being said to not exist? There is at least a confusion. However, the confusion arises because a principle of meaning already discussed has been ignored. Before appealing to that principle consider first the meaning of the phrase on medieval maps ‘Here be dragons.’ What could that mean if intended literally but if there were no dragons or if no one had seen one? Many people might have seen drawings or paintings or have heard stories of dragons as large, dangerous, reptilian, flying, fire-exhaling creatures. The literal meaning, then, of ‘Here be dragons’ would be that ‘Here there are in fact creatures that are like the drawings or paintings or as described in the legends.’ Next consider, ‘Horses exist!’ What would that convey if there are no horses present and the listener had never seen a horse or even a picture of one? The speaker could perhaps produce a picture of a horse and show it to the listener and explain ‘That’s a picture of a horse. In my country there are creatures just like that.’ Even when something exists a concept is necessary to be able to talk about it. Although there are no unicorns, I have an idea or a CONCEPT of a Unicorn. The meaning, then, of ‘Unicorns do not exist’ is that there are no creatures that correspond to my concept or that look like the images of unicorns from books

Experience

‘Experience’ has a number of meanings. The meaning here is so primal that it is not conveyed in terms of something else but by pointing out by way of example and generalization The example of the following paragraph specifies the meaning of ‘experience’ that is being used here

Bricks have a color that by convention is named ‘red.’ If another person says ‘that brick is red’ I know what to expect; I look at the brick and see that it is indeed red. Thus there are two ways knowing the world: the intensely personal way when, for example, I experience the brick as red and a second way which may be labeled ‘description,’ ‘convention,’ ‘public’ or ‘objective’

Experience need not be simple; corresponding to every complex intuition—in the sense used here—there is a (complex) experience

How is it known that there is experience? It is the primal and immediate character of experience. Experience is a name for the most immediate aspect of our being and as such requires no proof

In a higher animal such as human being, in addition to ‘pure’ experience there is experience of experience. Experience is the phenomenon for which CONCEPT and Object are the same kind of ‘thing.’ This does not prove that there is experience but enables to recognize and point out the ‘proof’

Experience is a necessary Object: there is experience

Experience: detail

Experience and intuition ground knowledge in the individual. Experience is the ‘substance’ and intuition the ‘form’ of the grounding. ‘Substance’ and ‘form’ are not entirely distinct for there is experience of experience, i.e. experience is a necessary element or Object of intuition: experience is the substance of intuition

Because experience is private, it may be the case that my experience of red is the same as your experience of green; this is the problem of the inverted color spectrum. If an individual’s physical (brain) state corresponds to red we do not expect that the same state for the same individual could also correspond to green. However it has been argued that the same brain state may correspond to both red and green without violating logic. Since the correspondence between the physical state of the brain and the experience does not appear to be logical, this certainly appears to be true. Then from the lack of logical connection between physical / brain state and experience, the argument continues, it follows that (a) that experience exists and is not physical and, alternately, (b) since experience is not physical it does not exist. Option (a) is a dualist option in which there is both mind (experience) and matter (the physical) which do not interact (if they do interact mind and matter do not constitute true duals.) This option is fraught with difficulty: how do mind and matter interact? Option (b) is the physicalist or materialist option—a monism in which the single substance is matter which is the subject matter of physical science. This option is fraught with absurdity: experience does not exist. ‘To bad for your belief in experience,’ the proponents of the view say as if making a moral admonishment ‘but all experience is illusion.’ The motive to the claim appears to be the problem of experience in a material world. The problem is as follows: material description—e.g. the sensation of water flowing over the skin or the description of water according to physical science—excludes the mental. Therefore, given that the world is physical, experience cannot exist

What is the connection between physical state and experience? The possibilities are (1) There is no connection: matter and mind are distinct and have no interaction. The absurdity of this is pointed out above and is manifest. A modification that mind-matter interaction is weaker than matter-matter or mind-mind violates the thought that mind and matter are distinct. The Cartesian explanation that the interaction is mediated by God also violates the distinction in addition to the introduction of an enormous complexity (which may have seemed natural in a time dominated by religious belief.) (2) Matter causes mind. What is the nature of the cause? It must be that mind somehow arises in the cumulative behavior of matter in process via collective process, elaboration, interaction, and layering. The difficulty of this resolution is that it explains the complex function of mind (in principle) but not the simple fact of mind, i.e. of experience. In the recent literature the explanation of the fact of mind from matter has been called ‘the hard problem’ of mind (in the literature on consciousness it is the hard problem of consciousness while explanation of the complex function has been called the scientific problem of consciousness.) The assumption behind the hardness of the hard problem is that matter excludes mind. On this assumption, the harness is not merely hard but impossible. Therefore we consider a third option that might have been suggested in the first place if we were not burdened with the history of thought on the issue which is burdened with the paradigmatic assumptions of its eras. (3) Matter and mind—particles and feelings—are sides of the same entity. The first difficulty is that material distinction excludes mind / experience. The response is that material description does not explicitly include the mental but it does explicitly exclude it either. The Newtonian picture of the world as inert particles in motion under their mutual influences seems very devoid of mind. However, in the quantum view neither the particles themselves nor their (non-local, probabilistic, disorder to structure) interactions seem inert. Although mind is not explicit, the quantum view seems much more hospitable to mind (and the quantum view is even on its own merits likely incomplete.) What is matter? The very fact that we see a block of wood as devoid of life and mind suggests its inertness and exclusion of mind. However, the material view itself destroys this view. If matter is all there is then mind must be material and therefore the inertness of the block of wood is at most apparent. The view under consideration is close to what has been called the identity theory: mind and matter are the same. This view faces the difficulty that a dead organism loses its mental side but not the material side. The error of the objection is as follows. That mind and matter are sides of the same entity is introduced because we are forced to that conclusion from failure of the alternatives. Therefore, at the level of matter as matter, e.g. atoms and molecules, elements of mind must be present. When organized in the brain processes of a living being, the result is mind-as-we-know-it from two directions: the external and the internal. The external is, e.g., how we experience the intelligence of another individual; this is the result of the complex organization and layering. The internal is my own experience which is the primitive feeling that, in addition to the complexity, is also amplified via collective process. The view is forced by the initial view that matter is all there is regardless of theory of matter (classical or modern) but subject only to the thought that mind is not explicit in matter

Let us approach the mind-matter issue from a slightly different perspective. One apparently reasonable solution to the problem of experience in a material world is to say that it is the organization and processes of matter in brains that results in experience. However, perhaps this explanation is not all that reasonable after all. For the organization of matter would seem to explain the organization of experience into intuition and cognition and emotion but not experience itself

Another explanation suggested by Thomas Nagel in addition to experience and physicality, there is some third element that shall be implicated in the explanation

That third element could be something we know in modern physics (but are not able to compute—or have not yet computed or seen how to compute) or something that is missing from physics so far. In this case of course there is not truly a third element

The following explanation is entirely possible. Primal physical behavior, e.g. at the level of elementary particles, can be described ‘objectively’ e.g. the motion of two particles under their mutual interaction. However, ask What is the interaction? How is it felt by one of the particles? Answer as follows: the interaction at an elementary level is elementary experience. Complex organization described ‘objectively’ is physical; complex organization of elementary interaction results in feeling at the animal-human level. In this explanation experience and physical or objective description are two sides of the same phenomenon. There is no problem of the origin of experience in the physical. It could be said that the physical causes the mental or is correlated with it but those are very weak versions of what is happening: one phenomenon, two sides. Objection. This is pan-psychism: little atomic minds. In fact it is not; it is not said that there are ‘little’ minds but simply that the mark of relationship in the elementary particle is primitive to what manifests via complex organization as human level experience. Objection. It is anti-materialist and anti-physicalist. In fact it is not; all it says is that (perhaps) elementary feeling already is an aspect of ‘matter’

Now the foregoing is an explanation and not a proof. However the alternative is that matter excludes the mental and therefore (1) there is no such thing as experience or (2) some third element is involved

The argument that there is no such thing as experience is absurd. Experience is primal and needs no explanation. Therefore the alternatives are that the mental and the material are two sides of one phenomenon or, two, a third unknown element is involved. It is unnecessary to invoke a third element. Tentatively then the mental and the material are two aspects of the same phenomenon and there is experience; this argument will be improved in Cosmology. For now however, we conclude from the primal character of experience and the fact that there is no necessary or reasonable argument against experience that there is experience

Stated simply a somewhat modified argument is: we have experience of experience just as we have experience of Objects; doubting an Object is an experience therefore doubt confirms experience; the materialist arguments against experience are not valid but lead to two alternatives of which simplicity tentatively suggests that experience and material description are two sides of the same phenomenon and that the two sides go to the root level of the phenomenon; final resolution—regarding the alternatives—is given in Cosmology. The final resolution will confirm that:

There is experience

Experience and intuition ground knowledge in the individual. Experience is the ‘substance’ and intuition the ‘form’ of the grounding. ‘Substance’ and ‘form’ are not entirely distinct for there is experience of experience, i.e. experience is a necessary element or Object of intuition: experience is the substance of intuition

External world

The idea of the external world is that it exists independently of being experienced; it is not literally external to anything.

We experience Objects but there may be error in the experience—illusion, hallucination, distortion, selection and so on. The possibility arises that all experience is in absolute error—that there is nothing that experience corresponds to. Surely some experience has an Object but we entertain the thought that all experience is in error so that we can assess the objectivity especially of perception but also of cognition generally. We would like to know, first of all that experience has some Objects even if the faithfulness is not perfect. That is, we would like to know that there is a world that exists independently of experience. This world is labeled the ‘external world.’ We know that there is experience, therefore experience is part of the external world: however it is experience as Object that is part of the external world. The body, if it exists, is also part of the external world. The external world is not literally external to anything

Our interest in showing that there is an external world stems from the philosophical desire to have a secure foundation. Since significant claims are going to be made in developing a metaphysics, it is important that the foundation should be secure. After establishing that there is an external world we may then investigate its structure

Solipsism is the position that there is nothing but experience—that experience has no Object (except perhaps experience itself and this admission must be made because the solipsism admits that there is experience.) Solipsism, then, is the position that experience is the entire world. If we can disprove solipsism, it will follow that there is an external world. The extreme skeptical position regarding existence would be that there is no world at all. Therefore solipsism is already somewhat compromised as a skeptical position

There is a common sense argument against solipsism: it is that the Universe is far too varied and complex to be merely the content of the mind of a single individual. Let us say the individual knows some mathematics but also knows that there is much more mathematics than he or she knows. All that unknown knowledge—and infinitely more—must be latent in the individual’s experience; and this is in contrast to the normal position in which the individual does not have full knowledge of the Universe but comes to know parts of it by coming into contact with them

The common sense argument does not work because solipsism simply says that experience is all there is; it does not assert that that experience is someone’s experience. However, the common sense argument suggests a logical argument

The system of solipsist experience is either limited or it is not

If it is limited the solipsist stance fails

If it is not the system is a renaming of the phenomenal world and is not a true solipsist stance

Being

Being—what is there, what exists

In the history of thought being has sometimes been used in the sense of being-in-itself while existence has been used to signify being-in-relation. Since knowledge is a relation, what is known is existence. Consider, on the other hand a concept and an Object. The Object is the dual product of knower and known and therefore has some relation to being as being-in-itself. Therefore there is some relation between being-in-itself and being-in-relation. It has been seen that there is no essential distinction for the necessary Objects. In this chapter, however, the plan is to develop the properties of the necessary Objects and their consequences. It will be seen that the class of necessary Objects is immense. In the later section Being and existing of this chapter, it will be seen that the lack of distinction between being and existing extends to practical Objects. Therefore there will be no need to distinguish being and existing

In the phrase what is there, the verb to be ‘is’ is employed in the atemporal sense

In the previous sections various concerns have arisen regarding existence—that it is fundamental therefore not referred to another more basic concept, that it is trivial, the distinction from essence, the problem or paradox of the non-existent Object… These concerns need not be addressed again

There are two ‘sides’ to existence: experience and the external world that are not distinct. These therefore have unity within being; and they show being to be robust. Of course the fundamental question ‘What has existence?’ is imported as ‘What has being?’ and developing the kinds and Objects that have being is a central concern of Metaphysics through Worlds

A concern regarding use—shall being refer to ‘things’ or to the common quality of all things that exist… or shall being refer to ‘process’ or ‘relationship’ or the common qualities of all processes or all relationships. We typically think of being as rather thing-like or noun-like. However, this is not given; as a common quality being is adjective or adverb-like. These are interesting concerns but not as important as might be supposed. Final resolution appears in Objects. It is significant that resolution should emerge rather than be taken as given

One reason for the choice of ‘being’ is the neutrality just described. Also it is fundamental to language via its root form ‘to be’ and is therefore more immediate than ‘existence;’ and this immediacy brings puts on display the fundamental character. There is interest in being because of the tradition behind the word: provided we do not import confusions and provided that we are clear about the meaning used here, the tradition is a source of suggestions

From the variety of uses in the tradition it might appear that the concept of being is vague or indefinite. Reading the tradition supports this view. And until metaphysics is definite the understanding of being must remain indefinite. It is this that renders the concepts of being indefinite. In the present narrative a final and ultimate metaphysics is developed: this is manifest in the form of the metaphysics—readers may question the demonstration of the metaphysics but the metaphysics is manifestly ultimate. Therefore it has been possible to remove indefiniteness, to show that when alternative interpretations arise there is either a clear choice or the distinctions are merely apparent

The idea of being is trivial; this is a part of the power of the idea. It permits the nature or the aspects of the nature of being to emerge rather than be assumed at outset. An analogy may be made between the use of ‘being’ in conceptual thought and the use of unknowns in algebra. In conceptual thought, however, the unknown elements regarding being include not only measure or quantity but also kind—e.g. it is not supposed at outset that being is mental or material or that there is any substance or set of substances that ‘constitute’ being

The nature of being and its power. Thus being is what is there. In conceptual thought this empowers a metaphysics. In life, in a journey it empowers realization by a dual openness, first to the powers of the individual and second to the metaphysical dimensions and magnitudes of transformation that may be available

Although the details of being may be imperfectly known, that there is being is without question: there is being—i.e., being is a necessary Object

At this early stage of development of metaphysics, being may be regarded as a marker that is open to discovery

Introduction to the metaphysics

The concept of metaphysics — The Universal metaphysics — Plan of development

The concept of metaphysics

36.        Metaphysics is the study of being

The Universal metaphysics

The Universal metaphysics is the metaphysics that emerges from the study of the universal necessary Objects. It is the system of consequences entailed by those necessary Objects and their properties

The foundation of the metaphysics is in the necessary Objects

Except for variant formulations and degree of detail of the development there is one Universal metaphysics

Plan of development

The Universal metaphysics will be developed from the necessary and Universal Objects and their properties

Universe

The Universe and its characteristics: the Universe is defined to be all being — The atemporal sense of ‘being’ — There is exactly one Universe — The Universe has neither cause nor creator — The ideas of law and Law — Possibility and actuality — Introduction to logic and logos

The Universe and its characteristics: the Universe is defined to be all being

The Universe is all being

As all being with all detail abstracted out so that what is left cannot be simpler, the Universe is a necessary Object

The atemporal sense of ‘being’

In the definition of ‘Universe’ being is used atemporally—i.e. the Universe is all that existed, exists, or will exist. The atemporal or global sense of existence and being is extended and clarified in the section Extension and duration below

The essential points regarding the definition is that it refers to being and not just physical being, it refers to all being and not just our cosmological system or to the known universe. The openness allowed at outset allows that the restricted cases will be confirmed or a greater truth revealed. The justification of the definition, then, is that it is one of an articulated system of concepts that makes the Universal metaphysics ultimate, i.e. the choice is conceptually efficient. This approach required that the entire system of concepts shall be the subject of conceptual experiment—whose variables included choice and nature of the concepts—in the search for an effective scheme. It is worth pointing out that the Universal metaphysics and the recognition of its ultimate and necessary character was not anticipated but emerged from numerous trials

There is exactly one Universe

37.        Since the Universe is all being there is exactly one Universe

The Universe has neither cause nor creator

If a creator is external to what is created the Universe can have no creator. This is because there is nothing ‘outside’ the Universe. And this, in turn, is not because there is, e.g., an empty space and time outside the Universe but because as all being the Universe cannot and does not have an outside. Similarly, the Universe has neither beginning nor end. However, a manifest phase of the Universe may have a beginning and an end

If a cause must be at least partially external to the effect the Universe is not caused. A creator is an example of a cause

38.        The Universe has neither cause nor creator. There is and can be no God who is the creator of the Universe

If the Universe had been conceived in the mold of a category, e.g. the physical universe, there would be the possibility of another category, e.g. a non-physical category, as cause or creator. If the Universe is conceived of as our cosmos or as the known universe, there is the possibility that it would have been caused or created by something else, e.g. another cosmos

39.        The Universe contains all its creative powers—i.e., there are no creative powers outside the Universe

The ideas of law and Law

If we recognize the Universe as having detail without precise specification, e.g. in saying there are concepts that have rough correspondence to things, perfect faithfulness is not destroyed (‘New York is 2800 miles from Los Angeles’ may be practically true; that New York is about 2800 miles from Los Angeles is perfectly true.) We can say that there are patterns and laws without destroying perfect faithfulness

It may be useful to recall the earlier discussion of law as fact versus law as hypothesis (tentative.) A generalization (law) may have significant application but is still tentative if thought of as extending beyond its domain of application; restricted to its phenomenal domain (space, time, and other parameters such as scale and tolerance) the law or pattern is a fact. We can think of the Universe as divided into domains; then, over a limited domain a law is a fact. Later, when the Universal metaphysics has been developed, we will see that there are infinitely many cosmological systems that provide cases of domains with local laws as facts (there will also be an infinite variety of laws)

Consider the nature of a law. It is our reading of a pattern, i.e. a law is a CONCEPT (and may also be conceptual andor involve concepts.) There is some the pattern or law that we read corresponds to some actual pattern or immanent version of the law; this immanent version of the law is labeled Law. Therefore

40.        The Universe is all being and contains all Law

This is a primitive form of what will be introduced as the fundamental principle of metaphysics

The foregoing suggests that a Law is Object-like; later we will see that Laws are Objects. We will also see that the Universe contains all Objects. Put another way, all Objects lie within the Universe. From the definition of ‘Universe’ above it may seem obvious that the Universe should contain all Objects. However, if we accept that there are abstract Objects such as numbers we may ask where in the Universe is a number and how does the notion of number decompose into CONCEPT and Object? The view that such things such as number are real is called realism or, after Plato, Platonic realism—or, sometimes, Platonic idealism (not other than realism since in that idealism an idea is real in fact more real than the mundane stuff of the material world.) A contrary view is that of nominalism which holds that an abstract idea may have a name but does not correspond to a real thing. Nominalism is perhaps less problematic but it leaves unanswered the question of the real nature of abstract ideas and names—are they ethereal, are they fictions or figments, and do they have location? These issues are addressed in Objects, where a powerful analysis of the idea of Object will lead to a unification of all kinds of Objects—there are differences but they are not essential or categorial—which is both surprising and against mainstream

41.        (In the chapter Objects it will be seen that) The Universe contains all Objects, specifically all Law and Form

I.e. the Universe contains all things and kinds: things, abstract kinds, all mental content—in addition to having mental content we have experience of it, and all concepts—although the CONCEPT is usually seen as lying on the ‘subject’ side, it may also be seen as lying on the object side

Possibility and actuality

Consider the concept of the possible. If a state of affairs obtains, i.e. if it is actual, it is possible (if were not possible it could not obtain.) A preliminary thought is that something that does not obtain is possible if it could obtain. That thought is indefinite because, (1) even if we are certain that something does not obtain, the meaning of ‘could obtain’ is not clear, and (2) if something does in fact obtain but is not known to obtain, the meaning of ‘could obtain’ is irrelevant. Therefore possibility may be defined as follows:

42.        Relative to a defined context, a state of affairs is possible if it could obtain

It is trivial that an actual state of affairs could obtain. Except for that case, the meaning of ‘could’ obtain remains indefinite. Accordingly different kinds of possibility may be introduced

In thinking of some context, e.g. a nation or a family, a state of affairs is practically possible—feasible—if it can be brought about without excessive difficulty or burden on the resources of the context (e.g. nation)

A state of affairs is physically possible if in obtaining the laws of physics are not violated

A more restrictive definition of physical possibility results if it is required that the state of affairs should, in addition to satisfying the laws of physics, be realizable in our cosmos

A state of affairs is logically possible if in obtaining no logical principle is violated

There is an intrinsic context regarding logical possibility: the laws of logic itself. Given that we do not know the laws of logic perfectly, we cannot not perfectly know what is logically possible. And, only if there is perfect logic can there be perfect knowledge of logical possibility (the condition is necessary; the problem of computation of the logically possible states would remain.) Significant clarification of these issues will be given in discussing the Void below

Now consider possibility when the context is the Universe. What does it mean that it is possible for a state of affairs to obtain in the Universe—i.e. what is possible when the context of possibility is the Universe? Since the Universe is all being, there are no ‘other circumstances.’ For the Universe, then, the only possible states are the actual states (where ‘are’ is used in the atemporal sense.) It is obvious that the actual is possible. Therefore: With the Universe as context the possible and the actual are identical—or:

43.        For the Universe the possible and the actual are identical

We may think of possibility when the Universe is the context as absolute possibility and then: the absolutely possible and the actual are identical

Relative to the Universe, whatever does not obtain is trivially not actual but also not possible

Remembering that every context occurs within the Universe—in Objects it will be seen that this is true even of imagined contexts—it can be said that: if a state of affairs is possible in a given context it must be actual in some context

It is interesting to ask What can it mean for a state of affairs to be logically possible but not obtain in the Universe. This suggests a connection between logic and possibility relative to the Universe; this is taken up in the section Void, below, where a more complete treatment is possible

Introduction to logic and logos

Now it is reasonable to assert that if a state exists it must satisfy the principles of logic. What this really means is that the concept or description of the state must satisfy the principles of logic (it is implicit of course that the principles are all ‘the’ relevant correct principles.) Therefore:

If we define the logos as the universe of logically possible states then the logos includes the Universe

It does not appear that satisfaction of the principles of logic implies existence. With an indefinite notion of the universe some state whose concept satisfied logic might or might not exist. However, the Universe is all being. What is the significance of a state whose concept is logical but does not exist? That state lies out all actuality; in a not unreasonable sense it could not exist. But this appears to contradict the fact that the state satisfies the principles of logic. Perhaps, then, satisfaction of the principles of logic does imply existence. If that is true every state in the logos is in the Universe and therefore the logos and the Universe in all its details are identical. In considering the Void, this will be seen to be true but will require introduction of an alternative conception of logic

Domains

Domains and complements — Cause, creation and infusion. Limited gods — Extension and duration — Space, time, and being

Domains and complements

A Domain is a part of the Universe. That the Universe is more than a single point implies that there are parts. Therefore Domains are necessary Objects. The Complement of a Domain, also a domain, and the Domain together make up the Universe

If a Domain exists, it has a Complement. Complements are necessary Objects

Cause, creation and infusion. Limited gods

One domain may effect change in another: that is logically possible. The effect may be called causal but the actual assignment of cause will depend on factors that include the meaning of cause. The origin of mind or matter will be taken up later; however, if one domain has mind it may infuse mind into another

While there can be no creator of the Universe, it is logically possible for one Domain to create another. Limited gods are logically possible

Extension and duration

The existence of domains is a sign of Extension; Extension is a necessary Object

The experience or CONCEPT of Duration is a sign of Duration; Duration is a necessary Object

Extension and Duration are immanent in the Universe

Space and time can be set up as measures of extension and duration

From the immanence of Extension and Duration, universality of space and time does not follow—in the large or in the small. Measures of extension and duration may be foamy in the small (as in quantum gravitation) and patchy—e.g., from one cosmos to another

The dimensionality of space does not appear to be a logical feature

In the Universe, space and time are immanent and therefore relative

The effective space and time for a limited Domain may be set up by another domain; therefore local space and time may be as if absolute

From the manner of the introduction of space and time it appears that there are no further measures of difference. However, this is not a logical conclusion; it may reflect lack of perception or imagination

Although Extension is Universal (Duration will be seen to be Universal) it does not follow that there is a Universal space and time. For the Universe, therefore, there may be at most a space and time patchwork

Local description is in terms of the space and time patchwork. The history of a spatial Object may be seen as a ‘historical Object.’ The view of the Universe as an historical Object is the global view

Space, time, and being. It is efficient to discuss this topic after the sections on the Void. However, it is possible to say already that for the Universe as a whole, space and time are immanent in being and therefore relative

The effect of one domain may be such as to erect an as-if absolute space and time in another domain. After deriving implications from the existence of the Void it will be easy to show that there are and must be domains that erect as-if absolute spaces and times for other domains

The Void

The Void and its characteristics — The first form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics: The Void exists and contains no Law — The concepts of logic and Logic — The fundamental principle of metaphysics expressed in terms of Logic — Necessity — Some properties of the Void — Being and existing — The cosmological form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics — A preliminary development of the variety of being — The fundamental principle of metaphysics in terms of Law — The Object of the concept of all being is the greatest possible Universe

The Void and its characteristics

The Void is conceived as the absence of being

The first form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics: The Void exists and contains no Law

Proof of existence. The Void is the complement of the Universe (relative to itself.) Since complements exist, the Void exists

The Existence of the Void is the pivotal result from which the essence of the Universal metaphysics flows. It is crucial to subject it to doubt and criticism. This most important concern as well as other doubts and criticisms are taken up in six sections on doubt below

Since the Universe contains all Laws the Void contains no Law. The conclusions regarding the Void may be summarized in the first and original form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics:

44.        The Void which is the absence of being exists and contains no Law

This is the fundamental result and logical anchor of the Universal metaphysics that may act as framework and sieve for imaginative or constructive endeavor. It is therefore the subject of intense doubt and criticism taken up below

45.        (In the chapter Objects it will be seen that) The void contains no Object

Now consider the CONCEPT or description of a state of affairs. If the state does not emerge from the Void, that would be a Law of the Void. Therefore every state of affairs must emerge from the Void. Since the Void exists, every state of affairs must obtain or exist (somewhere and when)

There is an obvious objection. Consider the state of affairs ‘An apple that is fully green and fully not green at the same time rests on a table.’ Such a state violates the logical principle called the principle of non-contradiction and it is reasonably obvious that state of affairs described cannot obtain. Therefore the assertion of the previous paragraph must be modified: every concept of a state that does not violate any principle of logic, the state must exist

The only states that do not exist are those that cannot exist in principle, i.e. those that violate the principles of logic. I.e., the Universe has the greatest logically possible variety of being

The concepts of logic and Logic

It was noted earlier that every axiom or principle of logic has been subject to reasonable doubt regarding its universality. The thinking is therefore inverted and Logic (capitalized) is defined as the principle of being. The concept of Logic is that it is the set of sufficient and necessary conditions that the conception of a state of affairs must satisfy for that state to exist. A state of affairs exists if and only if it is ‘Logical:’ if it is Logical it must exist, if it exists it must be Logical

The fundamental principle of metaphysics expressed in terms of Logic

The second form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics or principle of reference now follows:

46.        Subject to Logic every concept has reference

The principle of reference is the basis of the unified theory of Objects developed in Objects

An obvious system of objections arises. What is the reference of a system of ‘laws of physics’ that are consistent but quite different from the laws of our cosmological system? It will be seen later that corresponding to every consistent set of laws there must be a cosmological system. Next consider that the principle suggests that the laws of physics of our cosmological system do not have necessary or eternal purchase: this should not be an objection for it is consistent with what we know for our laws to be contingent and of finite duration. However, since our laws are ‘a concept’ it is necessary from the system that they should have some purchase as for example in our cosmological system so far and so far as is known. Thus although the principle hints at contradiction, it is not contradictory and although it hints at chaos over law it actually supports law. Thus the Normal behavior of our cosmological system and others is supported by the principle. The concept of the Normal as used here will be developed below; it may be emphasized that it will not receive meaning such as a statistical or functional or normative meaning

That every concept should have reference appears to not make grammatical sense, e.g. what is the Object of the concept of ‘redness.’ The resolution of this concern is addressed in Objects. In anticipation of the later development:

47.        Subject to Logic every concept has an Object

Even though Logic is introduced as a definition the conclusion is far from empty because the known logical principles are at least approximations to Logic

Necessity

In the literature, logical possibility is called a logical modality in that possibility is a judgment and logical possibility is the logical mode of possibility. Another logical modality is that of logical necessity. A proposition is logically necessary if it is not logically possible for it to be false. It is common to regard logical necessity as necessity

The development so far has clear implications for the concept of logical necessity

Every Logical concept of a state obtains. If such a concept obtains it must be Logical. If ‘Logical concept’ and ‘necessary concept’ are equated, then a state is necessary if and only if it obtains. Therefore with Universe as context the actual, the possible, and the necessary are identical

Relative to the Universe, the classical distinction between necessity and possibility dissolves. However, regarding a local world such as this cosmos as context the distinction remains

Consider a state of affairs that satisfies all applicable laws belonging to Logic and to the physics of this cosmos (in this paragraph it is assumed that the laws of physics of this cosmos are known precisely.) What distinguishes Logic? The general laws of Logic are those that obtain in every context. Special divisions of Logic may be specified by specializing focus to classes of context

Some properties of the Void

There is at least one Void. The number of Voids is without further relevance. This follows from the fact that multiple Voids must be equivalent to a single Void

Every particle of being may be regarded as having a Void attached to it—for such multiple Voids are equivalent to a single Void. A particle may therefore self-annihilate at any time

An infinity of Voids may be taken to exist and occupy every ‘corner’ of being. Spontaneous creation of particles and Universes is possible and necessary

The Void is equivalent to every state of affairs, to every Domain, to the Universe—it is under the reign of the Normal that there comes to be a divide that disallows the emergence of some states from a given state. This disallowance, however, is not necessary but may be thought of as highly probable (the concept of the Normal is further developed in the discussions of doubts and objections below

Being and existing

In the history of thought a contrast has been drawn between being and existing. Earlier in the section Existence, essence was seen to have been equated with identity or being-in-itself or being-as-such; this is the idea that has been equated to being. In contrast existence has been equated to being-in-relation of which an example is being-as-known or appearance

In Intuition the necessary Objects were seen to be those for which the concept is perfectly faithful to the Object. For these ‘things’ the distinction between being and existing breaks down

Since the introduction of the idea of the distinction between being and existing was introduced an immense class of necessary Objects has emerged: the Logos which is the Universe in all its details. Thus for the entire Universe there is this sense in which being and existing are not distinguished

We know that these Objects exist even though a small number of them are known

In the practical case the Object is not the thing in itself but is a joint product of knower and known or world. In this case the Object behaves as thing for practical purposes—i.e. with sufficient faithfulness over a limited range of states of affairs. It is only in a desire to regard practical Objects as perfectly known that a divide between being and existing occurs. However, once it is established that there are Objects that are essentially practical there is no reason to regard them as perfectly known. Practically the distinction between being and existing breaks down

The cosmological form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics

The third and cosmological form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics makes the power of the metaphysics manifest. This form follows:

48.        The variety of being in the Universe is the greatest that is Logically possible

Or, since the Logically possible is the greatest Logically possible

49.        The variety of being in the Universe is the Logically possible

A preliminary development of the variety of being

The fundamental principle implies at once that the variety of being in the Universe and the extent of the Universe are without limit. As an example, it every concept has an Object (in this and the following examples the phrase ‘subject to Logic’ is implicit.) This implies that all literature has an Object. As a second example every actual state recurs infinitely

This variety is elaborated in section A variety of Cosmology (a full variety is deferred primarily because subsequent developments will make the cataloging of variety more systematic and more full and secondarily to avoid repetition)

Systematic understanding and cataloging of variety is taken up in the section Applied metaphysics of this chapter and chapters Objects, Cosmology and Worlds below

The fundamental principle of metaphysics in terms of Law

The fourth form of the fundamental principle follows from the third or cosmological form

50.        Law. There is no Universal Law. The one Universal law is that being is limited only by Logic

It now becomes clearer why the Universe defined as all being is an efficient idea

The Object of the concept of all being is the greatest possible Universe

Johannes Scotus Eriugena conceived of the Universe as all that exists and all that does not (in the atemporal senses of ‘exists’ and ‘does.’) There are a number of possible motivations to this conception even though it does not appear to define an actual Universe. A conceptual motive may be its abstract ‘neatness.’ A practical motive is that though the concept is different from the standard ones, it may be instrumental in understanding the actual one; another practical motive is the quantum mechanical effect of non-existent states on actual ones. What has been revealed here is that the only ‘states’ that do not exist are the Logically impossible ones. Therefore, unless these are considered to be states, Eriugena’s concept is equivalent to the concept of the Universe present narrative; further, even if the Logically impossible states are allowed in concept, the Objects corresponding to the different concepts are identical. Also since the only ‘states’ omitted from the present conception are the ones that violate Logic, the quantum mechanical effect of ‘non-existent’ states appears to be void. The present conception appears to be most efficient, most transparent and most comprehensive

Logos

Logos — Form

Logos

Now define the Logos as the Object of Logic: as the collection of Logically possible states. Earlier it was seen that the logos must contain the Universe. What follows now is a fifth and computational form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics:

51.        The Logos is the Object of Logic; it is the Universe in all its variety and detail

52.        There is no universal Law. All Law is immanent in the Logos

The power of abstraction is evident once more. There is no need for some vague notion of a Logos. The Logos is the Universe; that the Logos is the Universe is reference to the absolutely unlimited variety of being; there are Logical limits to the concepts or description of the variety but no limits to the variety itself

There is a variety of interesting questions opened up regarding Logic that center around two main concerns—What are the implications for the logics? and What are the implications for the actual, i.e. for the Universe? Is and can there be a Logic that has examples such as the logics and the physics that can frame or generate understanding of all being? From the history of logic there must be immense doubt about the possibility of such an endeavor and the sources of doubt are conceptual (completeness) and practical or computational

Form

In classical thought Logos and Form are linked. In the present metaphysics Logos is a fundamental concept while Form will be seen without especial significance. The inclusion of Form in the discussion is due in part to its classical importance. A second reason for inclusion, clarified below in this section, is to compare the two classical concepts—Form and substance—that vied for the role of ‘essence’ of things. In the present Universal metaphysics, there are no ultimate essences even though proximate or practical essence may be allowed and this is the reason that neither Form nor substance is important. However, Form will be found viable as a concept while substance will be found untenable. Roughly, that is because in the present Universal metaphysics all ‘things’ are immanent in being and while Form has immanence, substance ‘stands below.’ The meaning of these assertions will be clarified and their truth established in Objects

The idea of form is similar to that of pattern. Some examples are: a shape has the form of a triangle, a pattern of clouds is a form, all the patterns of behavior that satisfy a law or a theory are a form

If a form is what is read—i.e., the concept—then there must by the principle of reference be a corresponding Object that is called the Form and from the properties of Universe the Form must lie in the Universe

Clearly, a Form is not a thing, i.e. it is not an Object in any naïve sense. However, a thing can be regarded as its own form / Form and therefore some Forms are Objects in a naïve sense. Later, in Objects, we will see what kind of an Object a Form is

Whatever a Form is, it lies in the Universe. Unlike Plato’s ‘Forms,’ in the present use of Form, Forms lie in the one Universe, are immanent in being even though they have the role here that Plato’s ‘Forms’ have in Plato’s theory of Ideas. The kind of thing that a Form is will be clarified in Objects as will be the meaning of the fact—it is a fact in the context of the present metaphysics but on account of the universality of the metaphysics that fact is not relative to any particular context—that there is one Universe

What is a form in the present sense and where does it lie? Clearly forms are concepts and must also lie in the Universe. What is a concept? That has already been specified as, e.g. mental content but as ‘thing’ what is mental content… and in what sense is it thing-like? Clarifications are needed and these too will be given in Objects

The idea of Form is not particularly significant in this narrative. However, it is interesting because it is one of two candidates that classical thought held as the essence of a thing as an Object: the idea of Form and the idea of substance. In this narrative, Form will be seen to be trivial and substance untenable. In this narrative, therefore Form is preferred as essence but it is not particularly important because (1) it will be subsumed in another broader class—the abstract objects and (2) the present metaphysics does without essences altogether—i.e. it allows essences but sees them as special and trivial

The equivalent forms of the—fundamental principle of—metaphysics

Introduction — Forms of the fundamental principle — Characterizations of the metaphysics

Introduction

A gathering of equivalent forms of the metaphysics suggests enhancements in form and articulation; encourages improved understanding and deployment of the metaphysics

Note that the use of ‘form’ below is informal and may be regarded as abbreviation for ‘formulation.’ That this section should follow a section devoted to Form is coincidental

The equivalent forms of the metaphysics correspond, in the first place, to forms of the fundamental principle: the eight forms of the principle below are a primitive form, six major forms, and a tentative form. The remaining (two) items are direct characterizations of the metaphysics

When a concept is perfectly faithful it is not necessary to distinguish it from its Object. Therefore, Universe, Void, and Logos are may be regarded as perfectly faithful Objects of intuition. That is, the developments have shown that these ideas are given in intuition rather than received and this is especially emphasized for the Logos. It follows that the foundation for Universe, Void and Logos is clear even if their origin is remote. Universe and Void are primarily perceptual and for these the same symbol designates concept and Object. The idea of Logic stems from the logics: although there is a variety of logics, the concept of logic in the tradition is not clear. It is Logic that has been shown to be a desired and ultimate form of the sense or concept of logic. The Object of Logic is the Logos

Forms of the fundamental principle

I.                    Primitive form—based in the concept of the Universe. The Universe is all being and contains all Objects, specifically all particular and abstract entities and all Law and Form

The reference to ‘Objects’ rather than just Law is clarified in Objects

II.                 First and original form and original anchor of the metaphysics—basis: the Void. The Void which is the absence of being exists and contains no Object

Therefore, the Void may be regarded as a universal generator of being—the Universal metaphysics is explicitly ultimate with regard to variety

III.               Second form—basis: reference. The principle of reference: Subject to Logic every concept has reference—i.e., an Object

This defines Logic which, in its approximate forms as the logics, is far from empty. The definition of Logic is equivalently the theory of the possible and the actual and, since the classical and modern logics are approximations to it, is far from empty. It is not given that Logic may be formulated explicitly; and it is likely that it may not

IV.              Third and cosmological form—basis: variety. The principle of variety: The variety of being in the Universe is the (greatest Logically) possible (the Universal metaphysics is implicitly ultimate with regard to variety)

The Logically possible is the greatest Logically possible

The variety of the Universe is at least as much as that of any conceivable universe. Suggestively, the Universe is one of maximum freedom or variety; being fills every niche; this has been called the principle of plenitude

V.                 Fourth form—basis: Law. There is no Universal Law. The one Universal law is that being is limited only by Logic

VI.              Fifth and computational form—basis: Logos. The Logos is the Object of Logic—it is the Universe in all its variety and detail. All Law is immanent in the Logos

This form of the fundamental principle makes clear that the principle may be a computational tool via the approximation to Logic by the logics

VII.            Sixth form—basis: determinism. The Universe is absolutely indeterministic

This form is developed later in the section A metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth. However its truth can be seen from the fact that of the Logically possible states none is unrealized; every state is accessible—accessed—from every other state. Similarly, since all possible states are realized the Universe is absolutely deterministic (this determinism is distinct from the usual temporal notion of determinism)

VIII.         Seventh tentative form—basis: actuality—The principle of actuality. Note: the formulation is tentative. Preliminary. The notion of what is possible must be relative to a context—e.g., some event is physically possible in a laboratory. Relative to all being, the only measure of possibility is actuality. The principle. The Logically possible is the actual

Further characterizations of the metaphysics

IX.              Uniqueness of the Universal metaphysics. Since the foregoing are necessary in intuition there is exactly one Universal metaphysics that is the metaphysics which may have more than one formulation and may be developed in different degrees of detail

X.                 The Universalization of metaphysics. The variety of cosmological systems is without limit; there is and can be no typical cosmological system (an atom is a cosmos) and the Universe does not have the form of any finite or normal or given cosmos. The Universe is absolutely non-cosmomorphic—it has no universal form

This conclusion is the endpoint of a sequence of universalizations of viewpoint in which special vantage points are relinquished and is discussed in detail later in this chapter. The shedding of special vantage points or paradigms such as ethnocentrism, anthrocentrism and anthropomorphism may be seen as continuing on through the shedding of a view of the Universe in the image of any given cosmos. This is the source of the term ‘non-cosmomorphism.’ However, the essence of the universalization is that the Universe has no universal form; this is equivalent to the statement that there is no Universal Law (a Law may be seen as a Form and a Form as a Law)

The one metaphysics

The following words from the Introduction now acquire meaning and evidence

The metaphysics developed shows that there are no limits to the variety of being in the Universe and provides a symbolic approach to generating this variety. However, no list of the variety is able to capture the entire unlimited variety. Thus the metaphysics is implicitly ultimate with regard to variety or breadth. The conclusions regarding breadth is immense in its significance (although glimpsed there is no prior proof) and implication (again, although glimpsed there is no prior proof and even though the metaphysics implicitly generates the entire variety, there is no prior anticipation of what may be explicitly shown.) The metaphysics has foundation without merely posited elements and is thus explicitly ultimate with regard to depth. The metaphysics is called the Universal metaphysics. This conclusion is immense in not being anticipated and (therefore) also in not having proof. Its essential methods include what may be labeled Imagination and Logic

…there is one metaphysics which may be developed in variant formulations (the existence of the Void, the principle of variety, the principle of reference and so on) and to greater or lesser degree (extension and detail.) The Universal metaphysics is ultimate with regard to extension (Universe) but not detail. Because there is but one metaphysics the terms ‘Universal’ and ‘ultimate’ are redundant except for the ultimacy with regard to extension. And except for this aspect of the ultimate character, the ‘price’ for the ultimate character with regard to breadth and depth is that the discovery of Method (Logic) and Content (in the unlimited region beyond the explicit) must be empirical. To this extent there is no absolute certainty in any realm. Thus Logic is brought down from the realm of the a priori but Content is brought up from the merely empirical. It may be said, however, that Logic is (perhaps) the highest of our certainties

Proof and interpretation

The proofs of many results are similar and simple in nature

The proofs of the forms of the fundamental principle are trivial—it is already noted that it is the founding and development of the Universal metaphysics that is non-trivial

The proofs of further results generally require simple application of a form of the fundamental principle to the case in question. However, there is a non-trivial aspect to the results. It lies in the meaning and clarification of the results; it is in the appreciation of their consequences and significance for this world; and it is in the clearing up of apparent contradictions and paradoxes; and it lies in the interpretation of lesser paradigms of understanding in terms of the new and ultimate paradigm

The arguments of chapter Worlds are often non-trivial but even here there is no particular complexity of demonstration. Rather, what is required from the special topic in question is clarification of the nature of the concepts in question and, especially, lifting of a variety of inherited prejudices and, sometimes, further analysis in light of the Universal metaphysics

Space, time, and being

The metaphysics so far has significant implications for the nature of space and time. These include the ubiquity of duration and time; a meaning and necessity to multiple times in some cosmological systems; the interwoven nature of space, time and being; possible sources of the apparent universality of time within our cosmological system and others

The development of such implications will be more effective and complete if taken up after Objects. This is because the treatment of Objects introduces (a) a sophistication of thought regarding abstractions from intuition and (b) clarity of thought regarding the ‘concrete’ Objects that reside in space and time… and a description of a variety of concrete and concrete-like Objects—the particular Objects, and (c) a great variety of ‘non-concrete’ Objects that also have some residence in space and time. The additional Objects of item (c) are the abstract Objects that are generally regarded as being unchanging, acausal and not existing in space. However, in Objects it is shown that the abstract Objects are not constitutionally non-spatial but are Objects for which spatiality is more or less significant (meaning and demonstration is in Objects.) Thus while some abstract Objects effectively lack spatiality, others may have some degree of effective spatiality

Treatment of space, time, and being is therefore deferred to the final section of Cosmology

Doubts, objections and responses

Formal doubt regarding the deduction of the fundamental principle — Formal doubt regarding consistency — Formal doubt from science and reflective common sense. The concept of the Normal — Subjective doubt that sees the metaphysics as artifice—the metaphysics is as if a deus ex machina — Subjective doubt that so much appears to have been derived from so little — Humanistic doubt regarding the austerity of Logic. The objection that the Universal metaphysics is ‘dehumanizing’ — Alfred P. Sloan’s objection — Residual doubt

Formal doubt regarding the deduction of the fundamental principle

Insofar as truth is important—it is a matter of principle to doubt and to criticize a new theory, a metaphysics. For it is by doubt and criticism that error is uncovered and it is by resolving doubt and by passing criticism that confidence in the truth grows

What must be the essential doubt regarding the fundamental principle? Since a demonstration has been given, the doubt is not the doubt regarding a scientific theory which invariably (perhaps) contains an element of the hypothetical. The essential doubt regarding the fundamental principle must concern the validity of its demonstration

There is a further motive to doubt. The fundamental principle of metaphysics is fulcrum of the metaphysics. It is the pivot point that provides the leverage for the immense power of the Ultimate metaphysics. It is this immense power that is a significant motive to doubt the fundamental principle. In the standard paradigm a scientific theory gains in confidence by the slow incremental expansion of its domain of application (more than incremental expansion may be allowed as, e.g. in ‘big-bang’ cosmology, but such extrapolation is associated with more than usual doubt.) However, the Universal metaphysics arrives without announcement but is immediately heralded via proof to be of Universal application. This motive intensifies the significance of doubt regarding the proof of the fundamental principle

An early doubt regarding the fundamental principle was that its demonstration was (apparently) purely logical; nothing is derived by logic alone—a premise is required. However, the appearance that the proof is purely logical stemmed from an incompletely thought out foundation of what later became called the necessary Objects—i.e., those for which the concept is perfectly faithful. This early doubt spurred the development of a foundation in intuition—essentially the entire formal content of chapter Intuition (an intuitive version of some aspects of it had been developed earlier.) Thus the early doubt was resolved and in doing so resulted in a theory of intuition that is an essential advance over what is received from the history of thought and enables the ultimate metaphysics

What is the weakest point of the proof of the fundamental principle? There is no significant doubt regarding the existence of the Universe as all being and the thought that the Universe contains all Laws (there may be lingering doubt due need for formal clarification of ‘Law’ but such clarification is given in Objects.) Then, the Void is defined as the absence of being; therefore, if the Void exists it contains no Law. It is the proof of existence of the Void regarding which there is doubt: every domain has a complement; the complement of the Universe is the Void; therefore the Void exists. Encountered by itself, the statement ‘for every domain, there is a complement’ generates no doubt. However, when we consider that when the domain is the Universe, the complement is the Void doubt arises. In analogy consider a crescent; generally there is no question regarding the existence of the crescent; but when the thickness of the crescent becomes zero, does the crescent exist? We may of course give reasonable arguments that the crescent does exist but the fact that we feel obliged to argue the case indicates reasonable doubt. The existence of this doubt does not mean that it cannot be removed; however it does imply that until removed, the doubt will remain

The task, therefore, is to remove the doubt regarding the existence of the Void. A first proof of existence that addresses the doubt regarding the existence of ‘absence of being’ also clarifies the nature of the doubt. Think of a domain defined by a boundary. The boundary expands so that more of the Universe is within it and the boundary at all previous stages lies within it. Now think of the domain expanding so to occupy the Universe. As long as the domain is not the Universe, there is no doubt that the complement exists; it is only when the domain is the Universe that there is doubt regarding the existence of the complement. The argument is as follows: the limit of the expanding sequence of domains is the Universe and exists, therefore the limit of the contracting sequence of domains exists and is the Void. However, doubt remains because each complement prior to the limit of the Void is ‘substantial’ whereas the Void is insubstantial. The argument may improve our confidence in the existence of the Void but on account of the transition to insubstantiality at the limit doubt is not entirely removed. In mathematical set theory the empty set is thought to exist just as much as non-empty sets do; however, sets are abstract. The concept of the Universe exists, and the concept of the Void exists; but the existence of the Void cannot be concluded from the existence of the concept of the Void (in the case of the Universe it was argued that the Universe exists and from simplicity the concept of the Universe exists; in the case of the Void the existence argument would flow from concept to Object.) And it should be obvious that it cannot be argued that from the concept of the Void there must be a corresponding Object because the principle assumed follows from the existence of the Void

The strategy, therefore, shall be to provide alternative proofs. The following are alternative proofs

The Void is the absence of being. If there is being there is absence of being; therefore the Void exists

There is no logical or material distinction between the following (1) the Void exists and (2) the Void does not exist. Therefore, the proposition that the Void exists has no Logical or material consequence and may validly be considered to exist

Another approach is. to examine the nature of existence and to further examine whether it is inherent in existence that the Void exists (rather than to prove the existence of the Void from the existence of the Universe.) If there is a time of no manifest being, the Void exists. If there is a time of manifest being, the Void exists alongside or even within it in extensions and durations that amount to zero. In either case the Void exists. Additionally, and interestingly if not altogether satisfactorily, this provides basis of an alternative proof that there is an infinite number of Voids (even though there is no particular consequence to fact.) Second, the properties of the Void are shown to imply that there is no manifest Universe at some time, i.e. if at that time only the Void exists, then a manifest Universe must have merged into and will emerge from the Void. So there are two possibilities (a) there is never a time when only the Void exists and (b) there is such a time. If there is such a time then a manifest Universe must emerge. In either case, there will be times when there is something and this resolves the problem of why there shall be being that Heidegger called the fundamental problem of metaphysics… And so we see an important reason to doubt—beyond not making untrue claims and the occasion for adventure and faith: entertaining doubt, as famously noted by Descartes, leads to discovery of truth

The strategy, therefore, shall be to provide plausibility arguments so as to defuse doubt. The following are plausibility arguments

The original proof and its ‘improvement’ via a boundary that approaches the boundary of the Universe

That any quantum state may have a non-zero probability of transition to any other quantum state

That any eternally possible state shall be realized (a form of the principle of plenitude of which a perhaps stronger form omits the word ‘eternally’)

‘What’ is not in the Universe? Apply a minimalist argument to the question: only those concepts disallowed by logic are not in the Universe. The principle of variety which is an alternate form of the fundamental principle follows. The minimalist argument is a form of Ockham’s principle applied to what does not exist rather than to what does exist

The working through a number of alternate forms of the fundamental principle. The forms are (1) Subject to Logic every concept has reference. (2) The variety of being in the Universe is the (greatest Logically) possible. (3) There is no Universal Law. The one Universal law is that being is limited only by Logic. (4) The Universe is absolutely indeterministic. (5) The Logos is the Object of Logic—it is the Universe in all its variety and detail. All Law is immanent in the Logos. Each of these forms has an intuitive appeal and therefore adds plausibility

Plausibility arguments may increase familiarity and confidence but are not proofs (they may suggest proofs)

The strategy, therefore, may now to appeal to faith as the attitude that is conducive to the greatest outcome

The idea of faith and its role has been discussed in chapters Introduction and Intuition and is formalized in the section Metaphysics and action below. Here therefore comment is limited to significance: (1) Faith is the attitude—cognitive as well as emotive—that is conducive to the greatest outcome. This suggests that on account of limits to rationality and computational power of mind andor machine, action under uncertainty is essential and multivalent. I.e., resources should be devoted to the immediate and the practical and the remote but immensely valuable. (2) The fact of doubt has suggested and required working out a notion of faith and its consequences for action

Still there are doubts regarding the fundamental principle on other accounts as noted and addressed in what follows. These doubts include inconsistency associated with the idea of all being and absurdity associated with the idea of anything is possible (even if restricted by Logic.) However, these doubts are satisfactorily addressed. It may be therefore observed that the fundamental principle is of such power and interest—already established and to be greatly amplified—that given that it entails no essential paradox or absurdity it would be of immense value to pursue its conceptual and action implications even if it lacked proof altogether

Perhaps it is the appearance of inconsistency and absurdity in some of the traditional religions that helps engage the faith of the believer—perversely as in the ability to faith even in the absurd or reasonably as in the service of a higher truth

Formal doubt regarding consistency

Concepts such as ‘all being’ are notoriously associated with indefiniteness and potential for inconsistency

The response is that the Object—the Universe—is already given and not specified via a concept. It may be specified via a concept, the Universe free of detail or the Logos in which detail is implicit which therefore entail no inconsistency

Formal doubt from science and reflective common sense. The concept of the Normal

It is clear that the Universal metaphysics appears to violate science and common sense. It implies that within the constraints of Logic, there is an infinity of cosmological systems with an infinite and unlimited variety of physical laws. There are winds of ‘ghost’ cosmological systems blowing ‘through’ ours at this moment but without a whisper. However, there is no violation. In the first place it may be reflexive to think of physics extending to the entire Universe; however that is not entailed by the methods of science: science is known to hold in its empirical domain and it is likely that it extends beyond that domain but unlikely, by its own principles, that the extension is without limit; and extension without limit is without necessity. Second, from the point of view of the Universal metaphysics what is actual is necessary: therefore the Universal metaphysics requires the actual, i.e., our cosmological system

Amid the immense variety entailed by the metaphysics, the immensely limited variety that is our cosmological system is necessary. Cosmological systems such as ours with defined structure and patterned behavior are examples of what is termed Normal

The Normal and the probable are related but not at all identical

The Normal is a function of the world but also of our knowledge. Energy from atoms, curvature of space and time are now known to be Normal; two hundred years ago these features of today’s science would have been regarded as fantastic

The edge of the Normal is not definite

The Normal includes the Logical. Except Logical limits, Normal limits are contingent: they are so but not necessarily so and not eternally given to be so. Logical limits are necessary

The Universal metaphysics as a scientific theory. The metaphysics is not a scientific theory in that it does not unify a mass of detail and laws into a coherent framework. Instead it starts with simple, empirical, universal, and necessary Objects. The Objects are so simple that Hume’s objection to the necessity of generalization does not apply. Therefore the metaphysics is necessary. It may, then, be seen as a theory of the Universe based on the necessary Objects. Further, it includes all scientific theories in their realms of validity but goes beyond those realms. This progression is analogous, for example, to the progression from the Newtonian framework to Einstein’s general theory of relativity. The Universal metaphysics is—perhaps—not immediately testable in the sense of critical experiment but the progression of scientific theories suggest its verification; and it is testable in the sense of chapter Journey. The progression is analogous to the progression of scientific theories in that special vantage points are relinquished in favor of universal vantage points:

53.        The Universe is absolutely non-cosmomorphic

In detail:

The Universalization of metaphysics. The variety of cosmological systems is without limit; there is and can be no typical cosmological system (an atom is a cosmos) and the Universe does not have the form of any finite or normal or given cosmos. The Universe is absolutely non-cosmomorphic—it has no universal form

The shedding of special vantage points or paradigms such as ethnocentrism, anthrocentrism and anthropomorphism may be seen as continuing on through the shedding of a view of the Universe in the image of any given cosmos. This is the source of the term ‘non-cosmomorphism.’ However, the essence of the universalization is that the Universe has no universal form; this is equivalent to the statement that there is no Universal Law (a Law may be seen as a Form and a Form as a Law)

Subjective doubt that sees the metaphysics as artifice—the metaphysics is as if a deus ex machina

A deus ex machina is a device ‘pulled out of the blue’ to overcome the seemingly insolvable. It may appear as though aspects of the Universal metaphysics are such a device. This concern is now addressed

The cosmological form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics: The variety of being in the Universe is the greatest Logically possible

This view is atemporal: it may include duration but is not of or about duration. It has an absolute character: subject to Logic every concept has reference; the Universe is absolutely indeterministic…

My early views were temporal, material and non-absolute: I sought understanding in terms of an evolutionary paradigm; the world was taken as it is without attempt to encompass all being. I may add that while I worked with this view I did not think it complete

After the temporal view was worked out I sought a more complete and timeless view. Along the way I came to think that equivalence of the world to absence of being might generate the new still unformed view that I sought. In 2002 it occurred to look at the Void and its properties rather than at the world-as-I-knew it. That was the transformational insight

Thus while it may appear that the Universal metaphysics is a deus ex machina—a contrivance—it may be said that it is well motivated. And further, it has emerged via demonstration as robust in that it is consistent, coherent, founded, and consistent with what is valid in what came before

Subjective doubt that so much appears to have been derived from so little

The doubt is that the sources and argument that found and generate the Universal metaphysics are ‘so little’ but the consequences so immense that we are forced to wonder how the immense result may be possible. This doubt is now addressed

First, although the results are immense in the foundation and immense variety revealed, they are not unreasonable, they contradict no truth, and they are founded. Further, various plausibility arguments make the demonstrated but austere metaphysics reasonable

Second, in that what is revealed is not immediately in experience and in that an immense journey of transformation is required for realizations the results are not ‘so much’ after all

Finally, review the inputs to the developments—intuition and its analysis, insight into and definition and selection of the necessary Objects so that proof becomes trivial, articulation of the system of universal and necessary Objects so that the system achieves universality… These inputs are not ‘so little’ after all

Humanistic doubt regarding the austerity of Logic. The objection that the Universal metaphysics is ‘dehumanizing’

Response. Since the only disallowed states are those that violate Logic, the metaphysics is the richest possible—even perhaps to the point of embarrassment: the remaining states are not merely allowed but are necessary

Alfred P. Sloan’s objection

This section is partially in humor

If an auto-manufacturer is too good, it runs the risk of putting itself out of business. That is not entirely true but if product life were the only consumer criterion it might be. This thought may be seen at the basis of planned obsolescence that Alfred P. Sloan introduced as president and chairman to General Motors; it resulted in General Motors’ ascendancy over competitors—especially the Ford Motor Company… and it is likely that Sloan’s lie among the root causes of the failures of General Motors

Similarly, too good a metaphysics would resolve all the classical problems of metaphysics. Even more it would put an end to the endless debates regarding piece-meal concepts considered in isolation and perhaps even necessarily considered in isolation because there is no framework of coherence or interconnectivity. Too good a metaphysics would put an entire industry of thinkers—e.g., academics—out of work and would dash the aspirations—the trials, promise, and comforts of an academic life—of an entire cadre of apprentices—e.g., students

Residual doubt

Although demonstration has been given, doubt has remained. Although doubts regarding the demonstration have been addressed with heuristic argument, doubt remains

Recall the following forms fundamental principle of metaphysics—The variety of being in the Universe is the greatest that is Logically possible and Being is limited only by Logic. Immediately from the first form, there is an infinity of physical laws and for each there is an infinity of cosmological systems; among these is ours and infinitely many similar to ours in which what is possible in ours is realized; and such formed systems do not exhaust the actual. Immediately from the second form the individual will experience Ultimate Identity via his or her own identity

Even if there were no demonstration and no plausibility argument, the lack of disproof would make pursuit of the implications of worth. Doubt would not dispel this worth

It could be argued that resources should be devoted to more immediate and practical ends. However, the application of some resources to the ultimate need not detract from the immediate. If values were attached to the immediate and to the ultimate and expected outcome maximized then for some numbers devotion of some resources to the ultimate would be indicated. The purpose of the instrumental approach to choice is not to determine choice but to argue against any necessity to application of all resources to practical ends. The actual choice will ever have some personal element. These arguments have not taken into account the thought that the ultimate is not essentially impractical, that it may have practical implications, and that it may give value—though not all value—to the immediate

This indicates, even in the absence of demonstration and heuristics, an appeal to faith as the attitude that is most conducive to action in the presence of possibility and doubt

That there is demonstration and plausibility strengthens the argument for faith

Although the Universal metaphysics requires ultimate realization and may suggest approaches it does not show a path—which is good if unending adventure is good. While traditional practical and disciplinary knowledge including the sciences may help in search for and construction of ways but do not determine them. Even if the demonstration of the metaphysics is perfect, experiment and faith remain essential

The possibility and magnitude of the Universal metaphysics

The possibility of metaphysics — A metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth — A metaphysics that is implicitly ultimate in breadth — Implications for the problems of metaphysics

The possibility of metaphysics

The possibility of metaphysics has been an important philosophical concern at least since Hume and Kant. Consequently one modern approach to metaphysics has been to focus on what has been called a metaphysic of experience

The general metaphysics of the present narrative first concerns the simple Objects Universe, Domain and Void. For these Objects experience is perfectly faithful and therefore metaphysics of experience is metaphysics. The analysis extends metaphysics to Logos ‘the Universe in all its variety which is shown to be the greatest Logically possible variety.’ We know of the variety, we know of immensely many of the Objects even though we do not know all of them.

That metaphysics is possible is understatement. The Universal metaphysics has been demonstrated; it has an empirical scaffolding that supports an infinite and true conceptual core; it is ultimate in variety and depth. Metaphysics is not merely possible for the Universal metaphysics is necessary, empirical in its framework, ultimate, and actual

A metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth

Substance and determinism. In seeing the world as water, Thales introduces water as substance. The world manifests with variety or non-uniformity and change or non-constancy. One form of understanding is to see the complex in terms of the simple. The ultimate in simplicity might be a substance that is uniform and unchanging. How might the world be seen in such terms? The world will emerge from substance. How will this emergence occur? If the emergence is completely random or indeterministic there is no explanation (a process is deterministic when the outcome or trajectory is already determined in initial states.) The greatest in simplicity of emergence or process is deterministic process. Therefore the ultimate in substance explanation would appear to occur when the world can be seen as emerging deterministically from a single uniform unchanging substance. Substance and determinism are ‘twins.’ Heidegger’s argument against substance did not explicitly extend to determinism

Monism is the term applied to a metaphysics in which a single substance is sufficient. Monism appears to be the simplest understanding of the world

It is characteristic of understanding in terms of substance that the understanding of all Objects is referred to a simple Object. Thus a problem of substance metaphysics is the nature of the substance itself

If it is possible to understand the world in terms of substance, a foundation may be said to have been given. Foundation need not be in terms of substances as understood in science but in terms of other kinds such as process or, in linguistic or mental modes of thinking, in terms of sentences or concepts. These kinds could be thought of as generalized substance. In all cases of substance metaphysics it appears that the world is founded in the unfounded

If a metaphysics is to be non-relativist, i.e. to require no further explanation, it appears that it must be founded in substance. In the alternative, i.e. relativist metaphysics, it appears that understanding does not terminate: any attempt at foundation will require infinite regress

If substance is determinist, uniform and unchanging there can be no emergence of change or variety. The idea that such a substance can yield complexity involves implicit appeal to some other element and violates the thought that understanding is substance understanding. Substance explanation must yield on some point of the simplicity requirements and therefore there can be no true substance understanding. While absolute simplicity cannot yield complexity there is no paradox the thought that relative simplicity may yield complexity. When some point or points of non-simplicity are allowed but the ‘substance’ is still relatively simple, a ‘substance’ understanding may be possible but would not be true substance understanding. Such ‘substances’ may be called practical substances and these include apparent monism, dualism, process, language, and science

Universal metaphysics and substance. In this metaphysics, the Universe may be seen as being generated by the Void (or by any state.) In fact, from the fundamental principle the Universe must pass through the Void state (and every state.) Perhaps then the Void may be seen as substance. However, the emergence of manifest states from the Void cannot be deterministic—see subsequent discussion—and therefore the Void cannot be regarded as substance in the traditional sense. The Void cannot even be regarded as causing the manifest states in the usual meanings of causation even though the Universe emerges from the Void

However, though the Void is not the classically simple substance par excellence, it is supremely simple in another sense. Substance contains determinism which is a form of Law. The Void is the absence of being and contains no Law. The Void does not even contain Law—viewed this way the Void is simpler than classical or traditional substance. In positing substance as simple some hypotheses are made about it (determinism.) No hypothesis is made about constraint or non-constraint regarding the Void. From this point of view, then, the Void is the ultimate in simplicity

Since the Void may be seen as generating the manifest phases of the Universe, it may be seen as foundation. Since it need not refer to anything else here, then, is a non-relativist foundation without substance. This is an observation of immense significance, first, in itself, and second in that it stands against the standard thought that there is no non-relativist metaphysics without substance. However, any state of being may substitute for the Void as ‘pseudo-substance’

The understanding of the Universal metaphysics—the foundation—is ultimately shallow: every state may be understood in terms of itself (as well as in terms of any other including the Void.) Though ultimate in depth as non-relativist without substance, that depth is ultimately shallow. Being is its own foundation—without substance or unending regress—or, in another sense, the Universal metaphysics is a move away from foundationalism

In a sense to be seen, the ‘depth’ of the Universal metaphysics lies in variety rather than depth of understanding

Determinism versus indeterminism. It is seen that every state emerges from the Void. Therefore the annihilator state of any state must also emerge from the Void. It follows that every state is accessed from any state. The sixth form of the fundamental principle follows:

54.        The Universe is absolutely indeterministic

I.e. of the Logically possible states, none is unrealized; every state is accessible—accessed—from every other state

Similarly, since all possible states are realized the Universe is absolutely deterministic (this determinism is distinct from the usual notion of determinism as temporal determinism)

The Sortal. In the use of substance so far, a substance is the fundamental ‘thing’ of the Universe. Another meaning, one used by Aristotle, is that of the kind of the various species of thing—including but not at all limited to biological species. A sortal is roughly such a kind seen as essence. The sortal horse is the mold for all horses. The fundamental principle of metaphysics clearly denies any ultimate foundational need for sortal. However, the sortal may be practically tenable—for example as gene material

The habit of substance thinking. The motive to substance may be seen as search for simplicity regarding the world manifested in enduring Objects. This approach to understanding manifests in other areas of thought and may be called the habit of substance thinking. As a practical approach the ‘habit’ has a natural and useful side. Taking the practical as the ultimate leads to error, aborts development

In the examples that follow the assertions are instances of the habit of substance thinking. These assertions are intended to point to the absurd consequences that follow from the habit

Epistemology. CONCEPT-Object: uniformity across all Objects, e.g. perfect knowledge of all Objects or no knowledge. Uniformity over elements of cognition: no empirical data can be necessary; only tautology can be necessary—and tautology must be necessary; emotion has no Object. The received as tacit a priori. Critical doubt as theory. Positivism: absence of proof as proof of absence. Word-Object: current limits of demonstrated understanding as limits of the world; my limits of understanding as the limits of understanding

Ethics. Separability of context; universalization of ethical meanings; universalization of principles of justification

Aesthetics. What is essential in art can be captured by a formula. But if the essential cannot be captured that does not mean that there can be no objectivity

Civilization. What is essential in a civilization can be captured by a formula

Meaning. Meaning as fixed; dictionary theory

Traditional metaphysics. The options are monism or dualism; ‘zero’ substance either as thing or terminal point of explanation is not an option. Monism versus dualism: idealism and materialism as essentially different—ideas and things as different; if matter is Object, idea must be subject. Experience is experienced as ‘different;’ therefore experience is essentially different and cannot be conceived otherwise

A metaphysics that is implicitly ultimate in breadth

The fourth form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics is The one Universal law is that being is limited only by Logic—that is, there is no Law on the limit to the variety of being

A preliminary variety has been given earlier. A more full variety is developed in Cosmology. The limitation of Logic implies that the actual variety is uncountable; therefore a catalog of the variety cannot be given. It follows that experience of the variety of being is the ultimate variety; as noted earlier the true depth of being lies in variety and not in foundation

Clarification. It might appear from the variety that there is a contradiction: Jesus Christ exists and does not exist. There is in fact no contradiction. There is an infinity of cosmological systems. On some there is a figure whose life and biology is identical to the Biblical story of Jesus; on others there is identity. In some of these the name of that figure is ‘Jesus Christ;’ on others it is something else (an immense variety of names.) Then there are other cosmological systems on which there is no Christ-like figure

A possible paradox regarding structure. The fundamental indeterminism inherent in the fundamental principle of metaphysics suggests a paradox: from indeterminism there can be no structure. That thought is clearly erroneous. The indeterminism in question has been seen to be absolute indeterminism: from any given state there is no unaccessed state. Therefore given absence of structure, structure must emerge. The principle does not show how structure will emerge. Mechanisms of emergence are discussed in Cosmology

Implications for the classical and modern problems of metaphysics

If the Universal metaphysics is ultimate there should be implications for the traditional and modern problems of metaphysics. It should not be unreasonable to expect that (a) Metaphysics shall be understood in new ways, (b) The question of the possibility of metaphysics shall receive resolution, (c) The traditional and modern problems of metaphysics shall receive illumination which will include resolutions and dissolution

In chapter Contribution these issues will be addressed with immense but not unexpected success. A concern of that chapter will be to systematically define and catalog the problems of metaphysics

This section provides a taste of the problems and resolutions

The problem of absolute versus relative space and time. The problem has been addressed in the earlier section Space, time and being

The problem of substance. The problem has been addressed in the section A metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth

The fundamental problem of metaphysics. Heidegger called the problem of why there is being—why there is something rather than nothing—the fundamental problem of metaphysics. Recall the fourth form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics: The one Universal law is that being is limited only by Logic. Therefore (1) the Universe must enter into the Void state in which there is no manifest being and (2) ‘when’ the Universe is in the Void state, manifest states of being will and must emerge. What has been called the fundamental problem of being is trivially resolved. A true fundamental problem of being is the twin problem What is being? and What has being? The first part is addressed earlier. The second part of the problem has been partially addressed earlier and a more full treatment is given in Cosmology where it is shown that there is and can be no complete treatment in the sense of a cataloging of all Objects

A many worlds metaphysics

The metaphysics that has been developed is the metaphysics of the one Universe which has no limit. The notion of ‘limit’ is not qualified—e.g. as limit on spatial or temporal extent or variety and so on. The Universe can be conceived in principle but not in practice—i.e. the breadth is implicitly known. However understanding of the absence of limit without qualification can be expressed in the by now familiar term ‘subject only to Logic…’

A number of doubts and objections—belonging to a variety of kinds of doubt / objection—have been entertained and addressed. The discussion of critical doubt ended with an assertion—However there is residual doubt

The residual doubt has a significant psychological (rather than formal) content

Therefore, although I prefer to regard the Universal metaphysics as real, I will give it a many worlds interpretation

This interpretation may appeal to others who retain phases of psychological andor formal doubt (the term ‘phases’ refers to the fact that the doubt may not obtain at all times and for all purposes)

The many worlds metaphysics

Consider the concept whose only limits are those of logic. This defines a conceptual universe or conceptual metaphysics. For this section alone define this conceptual metaphysics to be the universe

Regard the World as the known World of modern science; and let the world be its concept. Of course that world is not perfectly defined because, first, there are alternate projections from current science and, second, because (with near certainty) more remains to be revealed. This incompleteness of definition is not relevant to the present purpose because the concern is with a limited world whose character is rather like that revealed by conceptual-empirical science

Then the world lies within the universe. However, there are many other (conceptual) worlds that lie within the universe but do not have an object world

A significant part of the foregoing and subsequent developments have interpretation in terms of this conceptual metaphysics

Preliminary comments on method

It may be useful to recapitulate the method or approach taken so far. The thoughts that follow will be the basis for a more complete and formal treatment in chapter Method. Although the history of ideas suggests that even in very special disciplines there are typically no general algorithms we shall avoid a priori claims regarding the possibility of algorithm in relation to metaphysics—the study itself rather than pre-judgment shall determine this issue. In this section, however, method is approach. The approach to the Universal metaphysics has been as follows

At the outset some uncertainty is admitted with regard to all aspects of knowing. (although it has not been emphasized this uncertainty extends to the nature and possibility of knowledge itself.) However there is no commitment to faithfulness or its lack. Judgment may emerge from the process of investigation

At outset some uncertainty of lack of faithfulness is admitted for all aspects of knowing and coming to know. However, there is no commitment to faithfulness or its absence. All that shall be said at outset is that there are general schemes of analysis according to which perfect faithfulness is universally questioned and often absent but is not universally disconfirmed. From this lack of confirmed faithfulness according to a scheme of analysis, some critics conclude that all knowledge is suspect and others go further to conclude that no knowledge is possible at all. However the conclusion from the general analysis ranges from the negative to the neutral and this leaves open the possibility that more particular schemes that may confirm perfect faithfulness in some cases

Model or framework for knowing. It is true that the model of knowing selected was one in which faithfulness has meaning. Had this model turned out to be inadequate, it would have had to be abandoned

Realm of acting-knowing; faith. As it turns out there is a realm in which knowing-according-to-this-model is without significance and therefore the model is outside its realm of applicability. In this realm of inapplicability mental content (which may be experienced as knowing) and acting are bound together. In this realm, faith is an attitude that is conducive to maximal outcome. In the absence of outcomes, faith is implicit though not blind trust in the present (we are aware of the possibility danger but not unduly influenced by it)

Intuition—tentative reigning in of all knowing under intuition. Intuitive knowledge is knowledge that is the result of biological or cultural conformity of knower to known. The process by which intuitive knowing presents is opaque to the knower. Therefore intuitive knowledge does not come with any explicit mark of its degree of faithfulness. Perfect faithfulness is neither natural to nor generally desirable for intuition. At outset all knowing—perceiving and conceiving which includes deduction—is reigned in under intuition

How may metaphysics be possible from intuition? For metaphysics to be possible via intuition there must be some Objects for which intuition is perfect. These Objects are called necessary. For metaphysics to be potent, the necessary Objects should include Universal Objects

Origin of metaphysics and Logic in analysis of intuition. Analysis of perception shows the following to be necessary: Universe as all-being-in-its-unity, the fact of detail though even though knowledge of detail is not necessary, Law as mode of being, Domain, and Void as absence of being and therefore of Law. Conceptual analysis of the Void reveals the Logos as the Universe-in-all-its-detail to the Object of Logic as an abstract ideal of the logics. Universe, Domain, Void are empirical because they lie in perception. Logos is empirical because it is defined implicitly to correspond to the world. The actual working out of logos via logic is a program that is driven by with experience with conceptual understanding and its linguistic formulation. That logic appears to be a priori is a result of its origin being remote and therefore obscured from view

The Universal metaphysics and its fundamental principle result from the foregoing

The ultimate variety or breadth and the ultimate foundation or depth now result

This leads to General metaphysics—the known necessary Objects, and special metaphysics—the inferred Objects

A summary of the observations on method—so far. The method of deriving the Universal metaphysics starts by reigning in all knowing under intuition. One source of the success of this approach is that it relinquishes a priori commitments regarding the nature—empirical, rational and so on—and justification of claims to knowledge. The Objects of perception are not precisely known in general. However, abstraction results in certain simple Objects that are necessary, i.e. necessarily known with perfect faithfulness. Analysis of these Objects results in the Universal metaphysics as well as the concept of Logic. The laws of Logic are, however, empirical in their origin. Intuition is analyzed as concept and Object. Here, then, in intuition—at the intersection of concept and Object, at the intersection of knower and known—lies the dual and coeval origin of content and method. These comments on method do not exhaust the extent of its development in this narrative; method is further extended in Applied metaphysics, Objects, Worlds and, finally, in chapter Method

Concerning psychologism. What has been done may sound as if it is a psychologism. Psychologism is the identification of psychological with non-psychological entities. For example, it is a psychologism to identify logical laws with psychological laws or a subset of psychological laws. Many thinkers, especially logicians, think that it is a mistake to think that logic can be founded in psychology. Frege argued that whereas logic and mathematics are precise, psychology is imprecise and vague—Psychologism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.) It could be said—logical systems are precise, brains are messy. The label ‘psychologism’ is commonly a term of rebuke. However, the argument here is not that logic is founded in human psychology as such

The source of Logic in the present development. Precisely what is the relation of the Universal metaphysics and Logic to intuition? We can think of the intuition—brains—as messy. However, there is a precise net within the ‘mess’ that corresponds to the Universal metaphysics / Logic. Think of the precision of formal logic as the precision of symbolic definition relations between symbols so defined—this is a precise net within the set of all iconic / symbolic conceptions. Think of unending random scribbling on an unending piece of paper. Somewhere in the scribbling this essay will be reproduced; and somewhere it will be possible to see this essay by removing parts of the scribbles—this is a form of the ‘infinite monkey theorem’ that if a monkey hits keys on a typewriter for an infinite amount of time the probability of typing any given novel approaches certainty as time approaches infinity. Similarly, any precise logic will fall out of the messy scribbles. Thus the present approach is not a psychologism in the sense of foundation in terms of fuzzy laws or concepts any more than logic is nothing but random typing or scribbling. It is true that in Platonism the mathematical symbolic systems are thought to capture real mathematical Objects in some ideal space or world. The Objects of the Universal metaphysics could be thought of as residing in an ideal world but we have seen that they lie intensely in the one Universe. In Objects it will be seen that mathematical Objects and Logic are Objects but though ideal in some sense of perfection they, too, lie in this Universe—i.e. they are not ideal in the sense of being mental Objects or in the sense of lying in an ideal world

Cosmology—i.e., general cosmology—lies at the intersection of the metaphysics and those special objects that permit perfect faithfulness

Identity. These developments show the identity of the individual and Universal Identity. They suggest but do not show how this identity is realized

Applied metaphysics lies at the intersection of the metaphysics and disciplines for those special Objects that have not so far or will never allow perfect faithfulness. This includes the sciences including physics and physical cosmology and anthropology

Applied metaphysics further illuminates realization but only incompletely

Faith and method. The journey and other application require experiment and trial and their maximal enhancements require faith

Metaphysics and action

To count as action, process must be bound to experience as conceiving-selecting (here ‘conceiving’ includes cognition and emotion.) However, action is not limited to body-as-body process or the effect of the body of the individual on the environment. It may also be thought provided that the thinking is itself at least partially driven by conceiving-selecting

Inaction is action that has no body-environment-process

The process of action is not invariably unique. Lack of uniqueness may be the result of doubt regarding knowledge or its cognitive consequences or lack of unique determination. It is not necessary for the process that is selected to be unique; more than one path of action may be undertaken simultaneously. Whether single or multiple paths are chosen, action occurs under doubt, uncertainty, or indefiniteness. Faith is the attitude that is conducive of sufficiently confident or productive action; at minimum faith is the attitude that permits action in the presence of alternatives and doubt

Such faith may be seen as imposed on or appended to metaphysics. Alternatively there is a larger metaphysics that encompasses action and faith

Faith and the Universal metaphysics

The main doubts regarding the Universal metaphysics are the doubts regarding absurdity which have been adequately resolved and the doubt regarding the proof. The doubt regarding the proof is not a disproof of the proof—i.e., it is not one regarding a logical error in the proof but one regarding a premise. Although arguments for the premise and alternative proofs without the premise have been given, doubt remains

As an alternative to regarding the Universal metaphysics as true I therefore consider the following ‘action’ approach: regard that there is plausible argument in favor of the Universal metaphysics but no definite proof; but since there is also no disproof, the Universal metaphysics may be regarded as a hypothesis to be explored

The exploration would be a conceptual and, especially, an experimental (journey, transformation) exploration into the entire reach of being (see The equivalent forms of the—fundamental principle of—metaphysics for a variety of useful expressions of the metaphysics)

A question that arises, perhaps the principle question, is whether such exploration may be of value. Some arguments regarding the case may be, pro: there is value to search into the reaches of being—especially given the magnitude of what may be discovered; and con: the vast problems of the world today are far more important and pressing, let us not waste precious resources and, besides, our great scientific and technological endeavor is all that we need in the way of exploration. The pro and con approach is typical of ‘either or’ or ‘black and white’ or, as seen later, ‘substance’ thinking. In the present case it is possible to use an ‘and’ approach: we can continue on with science and we can also undertake the exploration of the reach being. First, however, consider the objection that science is that exploration. The counter-argument is that science is, perhaps, an exploration of being but it restricts itself to the relatively immediate—i.e., the empirical as revealed in direct and instrumental observation (on which is overlaid conceptual-theoretical interpretation with the caveat that though concept and theory are hypothetical, they have survived empirical and rational test.) There are, as revealed later, ways of investigation into the reaches of being. Both endeavors are of value; science—and other practical endeavors including the economic, the political and the humanitarian—into the immediate and the methods of ‘journey’ into the far reaches. Since it is immediate, the ‘practical’ endeavors will of course receive most of our resources; since it illuminates our life and has great potential, exploration of the reaches will receive some resources. There is perhaps another argument against the use of resources in the full exploration of being—it is that this exploration is already the function of the institution labeled ‘religion.’ In so far as the argument has meaning its force is diminished by the fact that ‘experimental and conceptual exploration of all being’ and ‘religion’ have overlap and, further, as I have argued, the traditional religions (especially in becoming institutionalized and in presenting premature but fixed views) have essentially abandoned exploration of being (in liberal and humanistic interpretations the pertinent department of religion—history and metaphysics according to religion—functions as symbolic of the human psyche.) What kind of resources shall we apply to the exploration of all being? Shall we apply for grants from governmental agencies or private foundations? Perhaps, but it may be in the nature of the case the search shall most effectively be undertaken by a few individuals—privately, as experimental activities under the umbrella of traditional religions and practices, and occasionally as students of being (researchers) in schools and universities…

One of the concerns of a modern view of philosophy—or aspect to philosophy—in a therapeutic role is the idea of the end of philosophy—that we see here in the idea of faith, simple animal faith as much as the attitude that is conducive to good action, and in action itself

Applied metaphysics

The first core of the system of ideas is the Universal metaphysics and its further clarification and elaboration in Objects and Cosmology. Partial foundation for the metaphysics is in Intuition

The Applied metaphysics and its detailed development in Worlds constitute the second core of the system of ideas. The Applied metaphysics lies at the intersection of the Universal metaphysics and disciplines for those special Objects that have not so far or will never allow perfect faithfulness. This includes the sciences including physics and physical cosmology and anthropology

What follows is a brief discussion and foundation for Applied metaphysics. The foundation is further elaborated in Worlds and in Method

What is applied metaphysics?

Applied metaphysics is the working out of consequences, not necessarily precise, of the intersection of the general metaphysics and the disciplines

The methods of applied metaphysics

Pure metaphysics—knowledge of the universal Objects—frames practical knowledge and may enhance it (1) Because there are analogs of the practical Objects in the metaphysics—i.e. the metaphysics frames practical knowledge, (2) By enabling analysis of the fundamental elements of the practical knowledge as or in terms of absolutely fundamental Objects, and (3) By encouraging revision of the conceptual elements of the practical systems in light of the metaphysics

When the limit of faithfulness is obtained, further faithfulness cannot be desirable. That is not merely the practical viewpoint

Applied metaphysics and the normal

The fundamental principle of metaphysics immediately suggests paradox—the only fictions are Logical, i.e., every work of fiction is realized subject to Logic

A first question—how shall we bring all thought, all literature all formal and technical treatises… into coherence? This concern motivates the definition of Logic

Secondly, what is the significance for our—and other—worlds… worlds of apparently definite behavior and patterns and laws that are not merely Logical?

The resolution of this second concern is in the concept of the Normal. This concern combined with the fact of our world suggests the concept of the Normal. However, the concept of the Normal is not merely an intuited idea

The fundamental principle requires Normal worlds—e.g. ours—of patterned, regular-like, law-like, stable-like, symmetry-like behavior. Mechanism is not required for the existence of such worlds even though the vast majority of such worlds may be the result of mechanism making mechanism immensely probable

It is implicit here that there is a precise side even—subject to Logic every concept has an Object—to applied metaphysics that is a consequence of the fundamental principle and is brought out further in Objects and Cosmology

Discussion of Normal worlds is continued in the chapter Worlds

Science

There is the fact of science—the practice, the scientists, the academies-publications-universities-theories-and-so-on—and the concept of science. Science is sufficiently indefinite—its complexity, its transformations—that it is unlikely to be captured by a fixed concept. Perhaps every specific philosophy of science captures at most an aspect of science

What is science? Here, the focus is on the nature of the theories of science. The production of scientific theories—intuition, hypothesis, law, concept formation, theory—is deemphasized. We have seen two viewpoints regarding theories. In the first, a theory is seen to aim at the universal. From this point of view every theory has a tentative or hypothetical aspect: new data may overturn the theory (limits to this viewpoint have been mentioned but those limits are not relevant in this section.) There is something remarkable about scientific theories that is not brought out by this viewpoint: the major scientific theories are applicable to immense precision over vast domains (the domains are vast in relation to the immediate.) That is, there are domains over which such theories may be regarded as facts. This is the second viewpoint: that scientific theories are facts; the limitation to certain domains does not separate scientific theories from simple facts such as the fact of the existence of an electron—an electron is not a universal Object

Metaphysics and science

The Universal metaphysics reveals a Universe that is infinitely larger than the world of traditional science. However, within the Universal metaphysics the scientific theories are facts: they are very special facts. The fundamental principle of metaphysics requires these facts

Miracles

If miracles are exceptions to Normal knowing—e.g., reflective common sense, science—miracles are obviously necessary

In the Normal ‘realm’ it is not reasonable to depend on miracles

The two previous statements are in agreement with Hume’s view. The following is neutral with regard to Hume’s view on miracles:

Outside the Normal realm, miracles are common and necessary. However, they lose their sense as miraculous. Still, though there is no loss of adventure or wonder

Developments in Applied metaphysics

The main developments in applied metaphysics are among the contents of chapter Worlds. Cosmology may also be regarded as applied metaphysics—the chapter Cosmology takes up those aspects of a variety of being suggested by experience but still amenable to faithfulness

Objects

In the development so far, the first and naïve prototype of the Object is the ‘concrete thing’

In contrast to particular things Plato introduced the idea of Form that does not reside in the world of sensible things. Plato regarded the Forms as more real than the things of the sensible world

While there is no precise knowing of the practical Objects of the world, the ‘Objects’ of mathematics are defined with precision and ‘live’ and appear, within mathematical systems and intuition, to have independent existence that is in some ways more real than the existence of practical Objects

The Platonic Forms and the ‘Objects’ of mathematics are among the sources of the idea that there are such things as abstract Objects. In contrast to the abstract Objects, the Objects of the previous chapters are labeled concrete; the concrete will be generalized as the particular

The first contribution of this chapter is as follows. Here, a broader view of Objects is developed by showing that the abstract Objects are indeed Objects. I.e., the basis of their being Objects is not mere intuition and it is not the force of any thought that abstract Objects appear to have a higher reality. Instead the existence of the abstract Objects is demonstrated

A second contribution is that the traditional divide between the abstract and the particular Objects is dissolved. A uniform theory of Objects is developed. This unified view is most powerful in that the existential status of the variety of Objects is resolved. The view is also most surprising in that it is perhaps counter intuitive and in that it stands against the mainstream view that the abstract and the particular are essentially different. The development further solidifies the idea that there is one Universe: the thought that there is a variety of worlds—a physical world, a world of mental things, a world of ideal Forms and so on—is shown to have no hold on the real

The Universal metaphysics lays foundation for a theory of variety that is developed in Cosmology. A further contribution of Objects is an immense broadening of our knowledge of variety

Objects—a review

Concept and Object

Let us begin with a selective review what has so far been learned about concepts and Objects

When a knower has a concept of an Object the Object is a product of knower and known

The concept is not the Object but there are cases in which the concept is perfectly faithful to the Object; in this case we know the Object; and there are cases in which the concept is perfectly faithful to some Object; in this case we know of the Object. In both cases the Object is called necessary and for instrumental purposes we may conflate concept and Object

In practical cases the concept is sufficiently faithful for some instrumental purposes. Here, we may conflate concept and Object for practical purposes (care is necessary because—for example—a chain of practical reasoning does not necessarily yield a practical result)

The foregoing ‘unifies’ the necessary and the practical

The principle of reference

From Metaphysics, Forms of the fundamental principle: Subject to Logic every concept has reference—i.e., an Object. This is the principle of reference. Not all those Objects lie in this cosmological system. It is via this principle that we know of the Objects of special metaphysics—e.g., gods—which includes the variety in Cosmology

We know the Objects of general metaphysics—these include the Universe, Domain, Void, and Logos; these are empirical Objects. We know of the Objects of special metaphysics—e.g., gods; knowledge of these Objects is generally a consequence of the principle of reference—i.e. deductive consequence from the empirical (in special cases the knowledge may be directly empirical)

Particular Objects

General

The naïve prototype of the Object is the ‘thing.’ A brick is a ‘thing’ and therefore the first view of Objects is that Objects are ‘concrete.’ While bricks are practical Objects, consider the concept of a brick. According to the principle of reference, this concept has real necessary Objects—perhaps in other cosmological systems—that approximate our real bricks. The collection of references could be called ‘universal’ and an actual brick that is known empirically may be regarded as local

Similarly, the concepts of a specific process and a specific relation have necessary references that approximate real processes and relations of interaction or, simply, relations

Thus while we may prefer to not think of processes and relations as things—we do not usually experience them as concrete—they are aspects of things. We can conceive of processes and relations and they are aspects of things. When a number of atoms make a body the causality of the body may naïvely be the sum of the atomic causes. Similarly process and relation may be regarded as formally causal and spatial and therefore physical and, further, since they fit the concept-reference mold, they are Objects. A reason to not suppose them to be Objects is that they do not seem to be complete. The same charge, however, may be leveled against the concrete Object. It is the particular place of the concrete Object in our psychology that makes process and relation less immediate; however, there is no formal reason to not consider them to be Objects

Some states of affairs are composites of thing-relation-process or, more precisely, of {concrete Object}-{relation Object}-{process Object.} These, too, may be considered to be Objects. A solar system—a system of planets orbiting a sun under their mutual influences; a fluid system—an atmosphere moving under the dynamic system of internal fluid-fluid and external forces are typical example of such state-relation-process Objects

In this section the examples of Objects so far lie ‘solidly’ in the physical world. Objects need not be physical. A university, for example, has a physical aspect but is not a physical entity—at least not entirely: a university has buildings and perhaps lawns but the university is more about the people, the knowledge, the education, and the research: an appropriately structured online community could be a university

Similarly, a person may perhaps be considered to be an Object. There are special concerns regarding persons: persons will be taken up under Personal identity below

All such Objects, though not altogether thing-like, are (composite) singulars and their nature is naïvely rooted in their physicality and thus labeled particular Objects. From the examples given it appears that a particular Object has location and may undergo change

The first notion of particular Object or, simply, particular is defined by (1) A particular is singular—the concept is regarded as corresponding to a single Object (even though may via the principle of reference be seen as corresponding to many Objects) and (2) A particular is rooted in the physical, it has location (in space) and may change and be implicated in cause and effect

Concrete Objects are prototypically causal. While other particulars are do not satisfy all aspects of paradigms of causality they are implicated in causality

A pattern may be seen as a particular Object: it is the particular Object that has the pattern minus certain details. Similarly, forms and Laws may also be seen as particular Objects. However, as will be seen, this is not the only way to regard patterns, forms, and Laws (it might be more precise to capitalize ‘pattern’ and ‘form;’ and from a practical point of view it might be seen as unnecessary to capitalize ‘Law’)

Identity

The primary sense of identity in philosophy is that the identity of an Object is what it is. This is suggestive even though circular. Clearly though and talking roughly, different Objects must have different identities and the same Object cannot have two identities. The idea of sameness and difference are used below to show a way out of the circularity. Because there is a one-one correspondence between Objects and identities, identity may be regarded as a particular Object. Identity is an important concept in philosophical thought

The study of identity will have the following secondary but significant outcomes: its analysis will result in a clarification of the nature of the Object and of meaning; analysis of identity will be an occasion to reflect on holism and reflexive versus piece meal approaches to thought… and consequently to reflect on the idea, possibility, and actualities of systematic philosophy; and, finally, personal identity is important in Cosmology

The sense of the term identity in philosophy centers on the question What makes an Object the Object that it is? If there were essences (sortals) then identity would be closely related to the idea of essence (sortal.) One way to approach the idea of identity is via difference. Suppose that there is a box with a number of Objects in it. Each of two observers selects an Object and calls out its properties—shape, size, position, color, mass and so on. If a single property is different then, we think, they Objects selected are different. Suppose all the Objects have the same finite number of properties. If every property is the same then the observers have selected the same Object. If the number of properties is infinite then the list does not end but if property after property turns out to be the same, we begin to suspect that the Objects are the same. Although there is a practical difficulty of verifying that each of an infinite number of properties is the same we may perhaps generalize: the Objects are the same if all their properties are the same. This view, originally formulated by Leibniz, suggests: identity is sameness. In addition to the problem of an infinite number of properties there is also the problem that the principle equates an Object with its set of properties

Some problems facing this view of identity follow. If a wall in a house is removed is it the same house? If all the cells as well as the matter in the cells in a living organism are replaced after a number of cell divisions is it the same organism? Or, generally, when an Object changes over time how do we judge that it is the same Object or that its identity does not change? In particular how do we judge that an individual is the same person from childhood to adulthood?

The issues are addressed here by first asking What is the Object? That is, if a house material composition in a certain definite arrangement or if it is a definite collection of walls, doors, windows and so on in a definite arrangement then certainly removing a wall makes it a different house. We resist that conclusion but the reason that we resist it is that we do not think of a house as a definite arrangement but rather as a dwelling. Of course houses need not be dwellings and location and design are not irrelevant. A key issue now comes into perspective. The idea of ‘house’ may be held rather intuitively but the intuition is not fixed across cultures, individuals, times or other contexts. A house is a human artifact and its designs and uses are malleable and therefore the concept of ‘house’ is also malleable the boundary between ‘house’ and ‘not-house’ sufficiently indefinite that no pre-script for ‘house’ can be given. Thinking of a house as a home—as an example—removing the wall does not necessarily make the house different. We probably cannot specify in advance what changes will make a house a different house and what changes will not and that is because we do not have—and do not need to have—a definite concept of house or of any particular house. And the judgment may depend on culture, person and other contextual variables and this need not be occasion for puzzlement or debate even though it may be occasion for illumination of the ideas of Object and identity. There is something special about ‘Objects’ such as houses and hammers: it is part of their conception that they are not—merely—natural Object but they are artifacts and have functions: and the function is one additional parameter that is at least implicit in their conception. The concept for a natural Object such as an electron does not have the same kinds of freedoms and malleabilities as do the concepts for artifacts. However, even for natural Objects there may be freedoms in conceptualization. If there are competing theories regarding the nature of matter at a sub-atomic level then there may be different but equally acceptable conceptions of the electron: the electron is typically thought of as a point particle but some physicists believe that this conception is the result of an incompleteness in fundamental physics. In technology, a cube may be a cubical block of wood; in mathematics a cube is an idealized form of the block of wood. Thus an Object may be regarded as its physical structure, its function as artifact, of its form. In all of these kinds there may be play (whether physical structure includes the idea of physical constituent, whether form is taken geometrically or topologically.) And the identity will vary accordingly and contextually; and so it is not mark against the concept of identity that judgments of identity will vary; but such variance will not be altogether fluid or arbitrary: regarding the question of whether changes to a house change its identity there will be a core set of changes that will not normally be regarded as change, an extreme set of changes that will normally be thought of as change, and an in-between continuum of mixed judgment; and there is or should be nothing puzzling or remarkable about that

On the other hand, the concepts of some Objects are fixed. The Universe is all being. Someone may differ and say ‘No, the Universe is the known physical universe.’ Earlier analysis revealed that the apparent disagreement does not point to vagueness in identity; rather the same word ‘Universe’ is used in two different meanings... and while a similar analysis could perhaps be given for artifacts the judgment here is that each of the two different analyses is most efficient for its domain of Object

Fixed Objects are identical in being the same in all aspects; incompletely defined Objects are identical in having the relevant aspects the same

The notion of substance thinking arises again: the problem of identity that we have been contemplating arises from thinking that there are essences to things that do not have essences or, perhaps more precisely, from thinking that things have a greater degree or greater fixity of essence than is inherent in them

Personal identity

We are interested in personal identity of its immense importance in this narrative; the topic will be taken up again in Identity and death in Cosmology. Personal identity is also a significant concern in philosophy

Personal identity concerns an individual’s sense of who he or she is: what makes me ‘me’ or I ‘I.’ We begin discussion of personal identity with a brief discussion of how we judge that another person is the same person over his or life span. This discussion will lead into analysis of personal identity

In the present discussion concern is primarily with judgments of identity from the point of view of the individual and from the point of view of other persons. What constitutes personal identity is touched upon in Worlds but is not of direct interest here

We judge that another person is the same person over his or her life span from a diverse and diffuse set of data. The judgment over the whole span from newborn to death probably requires some approximation to continuous acquaintance: this is because appearance and patterns of behavior change so much from, say, newborn to even childhood and again, sometimes, in infirmity and death. Over the span of childhood to old age, however, there are recognizable features of appearance and behavior (personality) that remain fixed even during change; it is not necessary that we should be able to specify what these features are in order to recognize them or in order to trust them: it is true that error is possible but the essential concern here must be with the normal and usual case

What are the constituents of the sense of identity of the person from his or her own viewpoint? A first set of constituents concern memory: the individual recollects his or her life as a progression or stream through time—a stream that is constantly being added to but for which regions prior to the present contain a recognizable, familiar even if strange, and unchanging core. A second set of constituents concerns extension. What do I consider to be myself? The normal core of ‘me’ and ‘I’ would include the body and a set of personal experiences and attitudes (this is perhaps a normal modern western core)

The Object ‘I’ or ‘me’, in so far as it may be definite, is constituted of a sufficiently abstract and roughly defined set of experiences that I can validly think of my personal identity as fixed even through great change

What happens to personal identity in severe brain damage or end stage dementia? It may be reasonably surmised that there is a loss of identity in the Normal sense (this judgment does not determine ethical judgment.) However, while the judgment may be reasonable it is hard to know whether the absence of communication or whether absence of brain activity implies complete loss of mind including the ability to feel pain

Perhaps I see myself as a lonely isolated accident. If I do that would probably be the result of adoption of some materialist world view. There is no theoretical reason to think that way; even if materialism holds in some sense the question ‘What is matter?’ should have no fixed response that excludes ‘mind.’ (See, especially, the discussion of Mind in Cosmology.) We have and will see that the modern cosmological picture is immensely limited with regard to extension, duration, variety, and nature (what is the nature of the atom…) Even on the view of modern cosmology: the atoms in my body were forged in an ancient fire called the original singularity or big-bang and sequelae; although I have typically experienced my ‘being’ as limited temporally and spatially, these limits are not at all required by the non-local aspects of quantum theory. Those who respond to modern science—including prominent scientists and thinkers—with a sense that their identity is alien, accidental, and insignificant are responding to positivistic cultural interpretations of science and not to its necessities. Sometimes when I respond to self-negating experiences in life my sense of self becomes very limited. Other times, when in an expansive mood I have a sense of a larger self: one that includes the potential as well as the actual. And that potential is not merely what is culturally defined. The present narrative has shown the immense limits of the—western—cultural definition. I wonder at the limits of my personal extent even though I know that when I command the world to move it is only my own limbs that are under direct neural control. I wonder what comes after death. I know that there was a ‘before birth’ that resulted in an ‘I.’ If it happened once, there is no necessity to its not happening again and there is no necessity to its happening again in the same form. And occasionally I sense infinity—especially in nature. And I know from the principle of variety that these relatively subjective thoughts and feelings are an infinitesimal fraction of what is necessary and will be taken up in Identity and death in Cosmology

In preparation for the discussion of Identity in Cosmology it is possible to say that since my sense of identity remains fixed through great change it not unreasonable to think that some of that sense of identity may continue if my identity were to merge with another’s or with some Universal Identity. Should the loss of identity in death constitute a problem for this possibility? Perhaps some non-local quantum explanation may be possible. However, from its necessity from the principle of variety we conclude that there is a problem in the Normal sphere but not in the ultimate and that it is not necessary to find or know a mechanism of explanation (the variety of ‘physical’ law infinitely exceeds the physics of our cosmological system)

Some general reflections

In introducing identity it was noted that ‘its analysis will result in a clarification of the nature of the Object and of meaning; analysis of identity will be an occasion to reflect on holism and reflexive versus piece meal approaches to thought… and consequently to reflect on the idea, possibility, and actualities of systematic philosophy’

The analysis of identity reemphasizes the importance of the dual analysis of concept and Object and the clear specification of the concept. Adherence to these principles of meaning have permitted the realization that clarification of the identity of an Object is already present in the understanding of the Object and therefore that a theory of identity lies within the theory of Objects

It has been seen that this conclusion required the simultaneous reflection on Object and Identity within the framework of the Universal metaphysics that has been seen to be the metaphysics

The simultaneous analysis of ideas is thus seen as immensely important. A holistic approach to philosophy and thought in general is therefore revealed as immensely important. This is of course not the synergistic holism of the world according to which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts (nor is it alien to this synergism.) Rather it concerns the reflexivity of ideas that is taken up as an aspect of method in chapter Method

What are the implications for systematic philosophy? That depends on what is understood by systematic philosophy—the term has numerous connotations. Aristotle’s thought may be regarded as systematic in that he considered topics that ranged over the entire world as he knew it and that the topics were bound together in reason and implication. In another meaning systematic philosophy has been used to refer to the grand and speculative schemes of thinkers such as Hegel and Schopenhauer. These themes are grand in that they seek synoptic vision of all being; they are speculative in that they seek a unified vision according to a central and prescribed metaphysical insight or category. The philosopher Nietzsche derided system as weakness; the failures of system on intellectual and political fronts has led to the abandonment of system in modern analytic philosophy and its widespread rejection in continental thought

Reflection—rather than reaction—suggests that the failures of specific speculative systematic schemes of metaphysics and political philosophy do not constitute a failure of system as such

The position in the present narrative has been that whatever system there may be shall be the result of rather than imposed upon investigation. There will have to be guesses for without creation there is no thought. But these hypothetical elements will be subject to the critical edge of reason and experience and therefore, any final position will agree with both experience and reason (or there will be no final position at all.) Even the crystallization of this position, whose elements are not my invention but seem to have been ignored amid the polemic regarding system, is the result of experience for I have viewed system with a combination of interest and a critical attitude and the crystallization occurs now only after the Universal metaphysics as developed in Intuition through Method has emerged as a comprehensive, articulated and demonstrated account of being and Universe

A foundation is provided in Intuition and developed systematically in Intuition through Worlds. In what manner is the resulting metaphysics and cosmology systematic? It is not systematic in imposing one single grand theme on the Universe. However, subject only to Logic every theme will be found somewhere and somewhen—and will suffer dissolution for to not suffer dissolution is shown to violate Logic. It is not a system that places any particular being at the pinnacle of being; but it requires that every being will participate in all being (only to recede from the height to local smallness that will occasionally be squalid and occasionally exquisite.) It is not an idealism—mind as substance is not imposed on the Universe; nor is matter as substance… as understood in some materialism or in science. It does not cast being as a kind. However, if we regard matter as the simple what is there, and mind as a relation—a signature of one simple in another—then matter lies at the root (since matter is now another word for being this does not say anything) and mind can and must extend to the root (this is significant.) Thinking mind and matter to be substances, Spinoza argued that there may be an infinity of substances and that mind and matter are but the two that we know. However, regarding matter as simple and mind as signature, there is no sequence (of course there may be an infinite variety of kinds of matter and kinds of mind.) In this view, the origin of mind is in elementary matter (this is very similar to Leibniz thought on the issue.) A very common position in analytic philosophy is that mind has its origin in the elaborate organization and processing of matter (e.g. in a brain.) In the present view the elaborate organization is the source of the elaborate structures and processes of animal mind but not the source of mind itself. In the Universal metaphysics there is implicit system that is greater than any Hegelian system except that such system is not a pinnacle and is not eternal. There is always chaos waiting upon system; and system upon chaos. What there is—system and chaos—emerges from the Universal metaphysics and is not imposed upon it

Summary of the main ideas

For necessary Objects identity is understood perfectly. In the case of practical Objects, identity is not purely ‘objective.’ However, it is in the nature of the practical Object that perfect objectivity should not Obtain (in addition to the fact that it does not and perhaps cannot obtain.) Therefore, since the Object is a dual construct of knower and world, identity is inherent in the Object

55.        The first notion of particular Object or, simply, particular is defined by (1) A particular is singular—the concept is regarded as corresponding to a single Object (even though may via the principle of reference be seen as corresponding to many Objects) and (2) A particular is rooted in the physical, it has location (in space) and may change and be implicated in cause and effect

56.        Identity is inherent in the Object

57.        A limited being can know the identities of Objects to the extent that such identities obtain

An abstraction

In generalizing from concrete to particular Objects there is some abstraction but the abstraction has not been sufficient to consider the particular Objects to be essentially non-concrete

Abstract Objects

The kinds of Objects considered in the previous section have what may be roughly described as tangible or palpable reality. In this section we study Objects that do not have or do not seem to have that kind of reality. The sequence of development will be to (1) introduce the idea of abstract Objects, (2) to introduce a variety of examples, (3) to define the concept of the abstract Object and to characterize the abstract Objects

In appealing to example, I do not arrive at theory by generalization. Instead, examples are useful as suggestive and as occasions to test theory

In the next section we develop a unified theory of particular and abstract Objects and in doing so, we show that abstract Objects lie in this world (this is surprising and contrary to received opinion.) This leads, in a subsequent section, to a strengthening of the meaning of the assertion that there is precisely one Universe

The outcome will be that the theory of Objects developed here is consistent and the most powerful and universal that is possible (the sense ‘powerful’ and ‘universal’ will be explicit)

Introduction

Consider the idea of number. The number five is distinct from five oranges. The five oranges are tangible, concrete. However, five seems to be intangible, abstract. Is there but one five or many? In the mathematics of number, five has a clear definition so that we may perhaps suppose that there is only one five. And, recalling the conceptual abyss between the concept and the Object regarding five oranges, the character of number in number theory appears in fact to be more certain and more precise than the five oranges. Therefore thinkers have felt and suggested that numbers are real. Still, we think, if the number five is real it is a different kind of reality than the reality of five oranges. Perhaps, it has often been thought, there is another world—a world of pure ideas and laid out in precision—and that ‘things’ such as numbers reside in that world. But we have seen that there is one Universe that is all being. Perhaps we are faced with some contradiction—perhaps there is another world. But while this thought of other worlds arises we do not wish to ascribe it any finality without further analysis (it will be found that one world is sufficient and, of course, necessary)

Now consider the idea of Platonic Form. Faced with the difficulty of the nature of the reality of the common Objects of the tangible world, Plato introduced the idea of an ideal world of Forms. According to Plato, the forms that we see mimic Forms just as shadows mimic Objects. An example of a Platonic Form would be the number Five and five oranges mimic Five in having Five-ness. According to Plato the Forms have the highest and most fundamental reality

Regardless of the truth of the ideas just discussed and of our agreement with them, there is a clear motive to think that there are Objects that are not concrete (particular) and that are not of the sensible world. Such Objects, whose reality status so far in the history of thought and so far in this narrative remains open, shall, in keeping with their apparent nature, be labeled abstract

Alternatives the idea that there are abstract Objects are the thoughts that what is involved are mere ideas—perhaps a kind of idealism—or mere names or nominalism with regard to abstraction

There is no final resolution of these alternative positions in the history of thought up to the present time. Although abstract Objects are in the present era widely regarded as existing, there is no agreement as to their nature. And of course resolutions and agreements are unlikely and perhaps even impossible in the absence of a coherent view of being and Universe

Since, in this narrative, the resolution of such concerns will be novel and very different to the standard accounts there is no need to carefully lay out the various positions and histories of debate. Instead, the Universal metaphysics provides a (the) coherent view that skirts the debates on the way to a clear view of the varieties of Object and their natures

In what follows it will be found that the widely held divide between concrete (particular) and abstracts is not an essential divide and that there is but one fundamental kind—the Object. The differences that are thought to be fundamental in the literature are revealed as practical rather than essential distinctions

It will be helpful to first look at some further examples of abstract Objects

Examples of abstract Objects

Concepts as abstract Objects. An apple has spatiality but where is the concept of an apple? As seen in Intuition, a concept-as-unit-of-meaning has been regarded as a mental representation and, alternatively, as an abstract Object. A mental representation resides in the brain or mind and is an example of concept-as-mental-content; in this view concept-as-unit-of-meaning is a case of concept-as-mental-content. There are problems with that view but we have seen a tentative resolution in Intuition and that resolution will be confirmed in Cosmology. Those problems have been one motivation for the view of concepts as abstract Objects; we sacrifice the messy view of concepts as residing in the brain for a rational or rationalistic view of concepts as un-messy abstract Objects: the mess of the brain and its mix of mental elements—including emotion—is replaced by the clean logic in a ‘space’ whose nature is unspecified but untouched by blood and organs

Propositions and facts as abstract Objects. Propositions and facts are examples of concepts and therefore their analysis falls under that of the foregoing so far unresolved analysis. Since propositions and facts are not elementary concepts but have structure in terms of elementary concepts that may be designated as symbols. A formal analysis of this structure is possible and this give further credence to the view of concepts as abstract Objects. However, the question regarding the nature of the abstract space of concepts is not removed

Universals as abstract Objects. Here is a concrete Object: a red apple. Red is an instance of redness. But what is redness? In metaphysics a universal is, roughly and to begin with, something that particular Objects have in common. Thus redness is a universal. But that does not tell us what redness is; rather it places the onus of the question on the idea of the universal. The standard views are (a) Realism of universals often abbreviated as ‘realism’: universals are real but abstract Objects and (b) Nominalism: universals are mere names that do not actually name some thing. It is clear that a universal is a concept and that (i) as such the analysis of concepts above applies and (ii) nominalism applies roughly as much to concepts in general as it applies to universals. There a further analysis of universals. Redness is a property and properties are one kind of universal. A red apple has redness. What is the redness of a particular red apple? Perhaps, the thought occurs, there is no such thing—or perhaps there is no such abstract thing. Let us analyze the redness of the apple in terms of concept and Object. Both concept and Object have the same name ‘the redness of the apple.’ The concept can be decomposed into ‘redness’ and other elements. The ‘redness’ is a concept, the mental content that is redness whose Object is not universal-redness but the particular apple’s redness. In this way, redness is a particular. Other major kinds of universal are types or kinds and relations. These kinds of universal and perhaps universals in general are capable of analysis similar to that of the property

Note that in asking such questions such as ‘What is redness?’ we are implicating a further question What does it mean to ask the question? Particularly we wonder whether we are finding or constructing the notion of, e.g. redness, or doing both—i.e. finding by constructing which may be open ended or occasionally closed and which may be closed by being initially open. This meta-reflection or meta-question is a theme that threads through this essay and is or may be efficiently present in all thought even if not recognized and is taken up formally in Method

Abstract Objects from particular Objects. Consider a cat. A cat is a mammal. A particular cat exemplifies the universal mammal—there is no concrete thing that is a mammal and not something further. Consider a specific cat. From the principle of reference there is an infinity of identical cats. This infinity has a concept whose Object is the infinity but could also be seen as a single abstract Object; this kind of concept is similar to the universal

Tropes as abstract Objects. In metaphysics, the idea of the trope is that it is an instance of a universal, e.g. the redness of the last apple on that tree. The idea of the trope is not new but its deployment to develop metaphysics free of abstract Objects and universals appears to be a recent source of interest (see Tropes—Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.) Tropes are particular much in the same way that a process or a relation is particular; and supporters of ‘trope metaphysics’ argue that the resulting metaphysics is built on the most immediate and evident of ‘things.’ However, an abstract Object can be built from a trope. From the foregoing article “Tropes have been variously called ‘property (and relation) instances’, ‘abstract particulars’, ‘concrete properties’, ‘unit properties (and relations)’, ‘quality (and relation) bits’, ‘individual accidents’, and (in German) ‘Momente’.” It is becoming evident that the distinction between the abstract and the particular is not as strict as it seems and though practical distinctions will remain the standard categorial distinctions such as spatiality versus non-spatiality will be cataloged and dissolved in what follows

Clearly the foregoing discussions have included concern with examples of tropes and their relations to abstract Objects and universals and in fact to the abstract-universal versus particular nature of tropes. From the foregoing article “Tropes have been variously called ‘property (and relation) instances’, ‘abstract particulars’, ‘concrete properties’, ‘unit properties (and relations)’, ‘quality (and relation) bits’, ‘individual accidents’, and (in German) ‘Momente’.” It is becoming evident that the distinction between the abstract and the particular is not as strict as it seems and though practical distinctions will remain the standard categorial distinctions such as spatiality versus non-spatiality will be cataloged and dissolved in what follows

The house of abstract Objects is not in order—so far in this narrative and so far in the history of thought external to the narrative. What are the abstract Objects? Should metaphysics, a standard question goes, be built upon concrete particulars… relations… processes… tropes… ? And then what is the place of the abstract Objects? But order has not been the objective of the discussion of abstract Objects so far: so far the purpose of discussion has been to motivate the abstract Object and to provide a variety of possibly abstract Objects. So far, from the fundamental principle of metaphysics it is clear that since any state of being is equivalent to every state of being, the selection of concrete, versus process, versus relation, versus trope is without metaphysical relevance. The Void or any other state may be taken as fundamental; it is not necessary to take any state as fundamental—substance theory is not only untenable but has been rendered irrelevant. In the following the metaphysical relevance of the distinction between the abstract and the particular will be dissolved

What are the abstract Objects? This question has not been answered so far in the present development and indeed there is no standard answer in the literature: in the history of the tradition of thought there is no clear concept of the abstract Object and therefore the entire tradition of thought regarding abstract Objects must remain incomplete… and as will become apparent no clear concept of the abstract Object is likely to emerge in the absence of any complete and articulated Universal metaphysics (which suggests as will be seen that that metaphysics shall be the occasion to develop a clear concept of the abstract Object.) The examples considered above suggest that non-spatiality, non-causality, and eternality may be characteristics of abstract Objects. These are in fact among the standard ways of conceiving the abstract Object. They are not without problem for while some abstract Objects e.g. number are non-spatial others are only partially non-spatial. What is more, these characterizations are derived by example and are not given to be either necessary or sufficient: the concept of the abstract Object has not yet been grasped although it has been intuited in the history of thought and so far in this narrative. In what follows the Universal metaphysics is deployed to cut the Gordian Knot of nature of the abstract Object. Therefore, we now leave the presentation of example and conclusion from example even though there is scope for elaboration (there is further discussion, much of it implicit in what has been discussed so far, in Abstract Objects—Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Numbers as abstract Objects: further analysis

In order to see a way into the nature of abstract Objects let us consider a specific example. This may perhaps shed more—initial—light than reflection on abstract Objects in general. Let us consider the abstraction involved in number

It may be impossible to reconstruct an entire history of number, especially the very early theory. Let us therefore hypothesize that acquaintance with numbers did not begin with pure number but with collections of things, e.g. the ideas of things, some things—some oranges, a few oranges, more oranges… and then perhaps one orange, two oranges… and finally perhaps no oranges. Perhaps then come the operations—addition: two oranges and three oranges make five oranges, subtraction, multiplication and so on. Although abstraction probably comes very late there may be some early halting abstraction and perhaps abstraction to number comes before the study of the operations. The precise history probably cannot be reconstructed even though there may be some archaeology and some reconstruction may be possible from studies of developmental phases in children. But precise reconstruction is not needed here. What is significant is that in the early phase the use of number is not of number in isolation or abstraction but the empirical study of collections. It is later that abstraction occurs and this abstraction is abstraction from the empirical. It is not necessary to abstract everything. Initially the study of number as abstract may be experimental but very late along the way Giuseppe Peano formulates the standard axiomatization of the natural numbers is named in his honor from which flows all of arithmetic (save of course for the Gödelian incompleteness)

In summary the study of number starts with an empirical phase that deals with number as particular and empirical since number-as-such does not appear by itself but is always attached to a collection of things, from which emerges number itself as an abstract Object of (a) perhaps intuition and (b) an axiomatic system. The axiomatization shows a process of abstraction. However, it still does not show what the numbers-as-abstract are or where they are. Regarding what they are, models can be built but these are not determinative but push the question of being back a step. Axiomatization does suggest that numbers may be symbolic Objects that reside in symbolic space; there will be occasion to refer back to this thought but it will not be used in the theory of abstract Objects developed below

The theory of abstract Objects

The theory of abstract Objects is remarkably simple. It uses the principle of reference. In every case of abstraction that tentatively defines an abstract Object the point of definition invokes a concept. Whether the concept is a ‘pure creation’ or derives from experience as in the case of number is significant but not relevant to the definition of the abstract Object to be given

The principle of reference states that Subject to Logic, every concept has reference. In the case of the particular Object it is not necessary to show that the reference lies in the Universe because it was a ‘thing’ in the Universe that was the occasion for the concept. However, in the case of abstraction the concept derives from things either indirectly or not at all. But the principle of reference implies that the concept by abstraction must, subject to Logic, have reference in the Universe

What is the reference in the case of numbers? Given the axiomatization of numbers we presume that it entails no violations of Logic. It may be possible to derive symbolic models but the principle of reference says that the axiomatization must have reference in the Universe itself. The precise nature of the reference is not of immediate interest. It is probable that the number five is some appropriately abstracted aspect of all collections of five things

From this it can be concluded that (1) the concept ‘five’ has an Object ‘five’ that is in the Universe (likewise the entire axiomatization,) (2) the Object ‘five’ is not some simple thing but on the other hand it—most definitely—does not lie or need to be conceived as lying in some ideal or abstract space other than the spaces of the Universe, (3) however, ‘five’ does not lie entirely in our cosmological or any restricted domain, (4) ‘five’ is not inherently non-spatial or timeless but has spatiality and temporality ‘abstracted out’ of it, (5) and therefore ‘five’ is a necessary Object whose necessity is derived in a manner similar to that of the necessity of Universe, Domain, Void, Logos and so on

The analysis of other abstract Objects follows the same template: subject to Logic the abstraction or abstract concept defines an actual though perhaps non-simple Object that lies in the Universe

Consider ‘this red apple.’ It is a concept that derives empirically from this red apple. However, the concept also defines the object this-red-apple-as-an-abstract-Object. The example shows that (1) abstract Objects are not inherently non-spatial or atemporal, (2) abstract Objects can lie in restricted domains, (3) in so far as they are necessary, the necessity of abstract Objects may be local though it seems on reflection that the necessity of the abstract-Objects-of-interest-as-abstract will be more than merely singular or local

The theory of abstract Objects. Generally then, an abstract Object is the Object that corresponds to a concept that entails no violation of Logic

We may perhaps even allow non-Logical concepts but then the Object would be the ‘zero’ Object, or the ‘non-existent’ Object: these Objects may be Logically pleasing to entertain and may perhaps add symmetry to the theory of abstract Objects but I will not use further use the notion until I find some efficient use for it

Characteristics of abstract Objects and their theory. Abstract Objects, then, have the following characteristics (a) they exist—i.e., they reside in the one Universe, i.e. the Universe in which the particular Objects reside or exist, (b) they need not be seen as distinct from the particular Objects—just as the concrete Objects may be regarded as abstract and the further particular Objects may be seen as having some degree of abstraction and some lesser degree of ‘thing-hood,’ so, abstract Objects generally involve some degree of abstraction and greater or lesser remove from thing-hood, (c) they are not inherently non-spatial or atemporal but have spatiality andor temporality abstracted out to a degree that lies somewhere in the range from no abstraction to full abstraction, (d) they are not inherently acausal but a degree of causality abstracted out that may range from no abstraction to full abstraction

The theory of abstract Objects turns out to be trivial but as will be seen it is simultaneously momentous in that (f) it enables the contributions noted in the introduction to this chapter (which may include some of the following,) (g) it provides a definitive theory of the abstract Object, (g) there is no fundamental distinction among the abstract and the particular or concrete—there is no essential distinction in their reality status: instead of a clear cut divide, many Objects may be seen as consistently straddling a particular-abstract continuum

This suggests a unified theory of Objects in which the distinctions are perhaps practical and psychological-adaptive but not universal. It also suggests an immense clarification and simplification in that there is and need be no proliferation of kinds and worlds: all Objects lie in this world (in which this world is the Universe that is all being)

A unified theory of Objects

The unified theory

Every Object lies in the Universe. Subject to Logic, every concept defines an Object

The abstract-particular distinction is not one of kind but one of mode of study. In the particular it is the Object side that is the approach to study; in the abstract side the concept side is the approach

In the case of number, study presumably originated in the empirical and the particular. With the ability to abstract came the idea of number as such: the study of number entered a symbolic-conceptual phase that reached a peak with axiomatization and with growing understanding of the nature of logic and formal systems. With computation, however, the study of number reenters an empirical or particular phase. Since computation is used as adjunct to conceptual study number may perhaps be thought of as dual particular-abstract

Distinctions

There are of course practical or psychological distinctions. Consider a cube. It is ‘made’ of a number of ‘elements:’ six faces and twelve edges. However, we typically experience a cube as a cube and perhaps also as a number of edges and faces but atypically as a mere collection of elements. How does the perceptual system accomplish this? This is the problem of object binding. Consider the cube in translating and rotating motion. As it moves toward us its size would change if the perceptual system did not adjust; in fact the size does not typically seem to change; a non adjusting system might experience the cube as a different Object as it moved but we typically experience it as the same cube; and as it rotates the projected shape changes but it is typically perceived as having an unchanging shape. How does the perceptual system accomplish this? This is the problem of object constancy. The neural mechanisms must be intricate. However, a general explanation is simple: (1) adaptation has provided the organism with—possession of andor an ability to develop—the necessary complexity and integration, and (b) in evolution as in development cubes and other shapes present as shapes-in-motion and not as mere collections or as mere shapes-in-a-specific-location and therefore it is the whole rather than the mere collection or the specific aspect that is the Object of recognition. Clearly the general Object does not possess these features but we may learn to similarly accommodate some Objects that are not present in evolution and this generalized capacity is also part of animal and human adaptivity. It is perhaps a stretch to think that we can similarly adapt to the everywhere and every-time located Object ‘five’ or a seven-dimensional space (we may be able to develop some perceptual aids and significant symbolic familiarity.) The foregoing is, however, not an argument against the unified theory of Objects. Generally, progress may be achieved by transcending the distinctions to which we are adapted and by seeing unity where our adaptation sees difference (or nothing at all)

Some thinkers have objected to the ‘dangers’ of such thought claiming for example the suppression of distinctions that may be essential for survival or humanity. I suppose that the ‘danger’ is not altogether avoided but there is no logical requirement that unification should suppress the simultaneous perception of difference. And there is perhaps another danger in stasis—in refusal to use our faculty to alternative ways of ‘seeing’

The surprising character of the theory

The theory is surprising in the unification of the abstract and the particular and in that it stands against the history of thought on the kinds

And it is surprising for reasons already mentioned in the previous sections, especially the paragraphs Characteristics of abstract Objects and their theory in section The theory of abstract Objects, above

The non-exclusive character of the theory

It is important that the establishment of the theory of abstract Objects does not exclude other theories or interpretations. The theory may exclude some other theories, it may show some other theories as having lower stature

In addition to validity, efficacy and scope are also measures of a theory

It is significant that there is no competing theory that shows the nature and the location of the abstract Objects unequivocally and there is no competing theory that includes all Objects in its scope and excludes all non-Objects… and there is no competing theory that shows the immense variety of being or that founds the understanding of being without substance or infinite regress

The Object as the fundamental concept of the Universal metaphysics

The Object straddles all things and conceptions

Other kinds of Objects

The distinctions of practical versus necessary have been considered under particular Objects

In previous editions the distinctions local versus universal, partial versus entire, and definite versus indefinite or vague had been briefly introduced as having potential significance. What is significant in these distinctions has been absorbed into the development above

One Universe—one world

Origins of the idea of different worlds

Sensible Objects, we think, are in ‘this’ world—this generalizes to the particular Objects

Regarding abstract Objects, some questions and concerns that have arisen in the history of thought are

What are the abstract Objects?

And, Where are the abstract Objects? If they are not in our three-dimensional space may they be in some ideal or abstract space?

Perhaps the abstract Objects lie in an abstract world

But, then, what is the nature of this world?

Perhaps it is an ideal world, e.g. a world of Platonic Forms

But is that perhaps pushing our symbolism andor our intuition regarding the real too far?

Perhaps the ideal worlds are in fact mental worlds and the inhabitants of these worlds are ‘mental Objects’

What could these mental Objects be?

A likely candidate is the concept-as-mental-content

Most of the questions and possibilities—the perhaps's—have been dealt with earlier and the conclusion is by now definite and familiar

Before recapitulating that conclusion let us consider the issue of mental Objects. There is a cloudiness that envelopes the question of the nature and therefore the existence of such Objects. One source of this cloudiness is the vague thoughts and feelings that we may tend to have regarding our thoughts and feelings. They have reality—we have experience of experience—but it is not the reality, it seems, that we ascribe to the Objects of the world. There is a natural psychological tendency to think of our thoughts and feelings in themselves as less than real and a consequent doubt regarding their reality. And they are not orderly and order is necessary though not sufficient to logic and reason. What is more, they are born of blood and organs and blood and organs are messy if not fearful. But, stepping out of our natural reaction to blood and organ, and recalling the tentative and to be established identity—and not mere unity—of body and mind, the doubt regarding blood and organs is equivalent to the doubt regarding vagueness of the reality of thoughts and feelings. What is the status of this doubt? The mental content is the concept. True there is feeling and chaos in there (later we will argue that feeling as binding to the world is essential.) But, what is in the body is actual and real. Therefore, mental content and concept is real. The question, then, reduces to the reliability of mental content / concept. The reliability appears to be an inferior one in comparison to the neatness of logic and reason in symbols in a possibly abstract space. However, logic and symbols are abstractions and even though mind-body (brain) is an apparent mess, there is an abstract net in mind (a) that is equivalent to the symbolic system (marks on paper or silicon and other cultural repositories are extensions) and, therefore, (b) the Universal metaphysics. This is a momentous conclusion for it shows that we are already in possession of the Universal metaphysics and it bypasses and trivializes immense portions of debate regarding the reliability of intuition and of psychologism

The conclusion regarding the nature of abstract Objects is the earlier conclusion—abstract Objects are Objects whose study is conceptual andor symbolic but not empirical

The conclusion regarding the location of abstract Objects is also the earlier conclusion but now reinforced by elimination of superfluous worlds which, even if they can be ascribed some reality, are revealed as diversionary. That conclusion is:

There is one world or Universe

The idea of one Universe as not merely a valid concept but also as an (immensely) efficient concept

In this essay ‘Universe’ is reserved for the idea of all being. When talking of contexts, the word ‘world’ may be used

This is characteristic in the logic of many paradigm changes: the new paradigm is more inclusive and more effective

…

In the next section values are studied as Objects: values will be seen as Objects that lie in the (one and only) Universe. That values are perhaps most effectively seen as Objects implies neither objectivity nor non-objectivity for values. However the kind of Object that a value is may have consequences for objectivity

Values

The goal of the section is a general though brief study of fields for which value is central. The theory of Objects will frame the study

The study will be continued in Worlds but will remain in process

We study value because it is pertinent to Journey in being and because of its intrinsic interest. The study is placed in a separate section because of the importance of the topic

In some views values are not of this world—they lie in another world or perhaps in no world at all. In this section it will be determined that values are Objects (and therefore must lie in this world or Universe.) It is consistent with the approach taken in this narrative to observe that Whether values are Objects depends not only on the validity of the resulting theory but also on its efficiency and universality

Introduction

In order to introduce ‘value’ I use a somewhat randomly chosen definition of value that indicates a general sense of the term

“In ethics, value is a property of objects, including physical objects as well as abstract objects (e.g. actions), representing their degree of importance.” Value (ethics) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (this definition is among the first links that showed up under an Internet search for the term ‘values’ on September 7, 2009)

The choice is significant in that its sense stands against the sense to be used in this essay. It will be used to argue what is (seems to be) wrong about a purely objective approach to value and to thereby suggest an improved one; the aim will be to find an ultimate framework for value

What will emerge does not reject objectivity but finds—the idea is not new—that objectivity in values lies on a continuum with perhaps some universal values that are of the Object. In the general case, as for knowledge, value may be a dual construct from agent and world. In the practical case values will be a dual construct from agent and world; in the objective—or necessary or universal—case the dual construct is independent of the agency. In analogy to the case of knowledge, it will be explored whether practical values may be regarded as objective in view of the dual nature of the object

The study of value will now take up a range of possibilities regarding the nature of value so as to see whether it is possible to arrive simultaneously at possibilities (objectivity, universality…) and criteria for a theory of value and a (the) theory of value

Preliminary analysis

What are values?

The idea of value pertains to situations involving choice. Value is at least partially determinative of choice

The world or Universe has already been shown to be an indeterministic one in which structure flows and must flow from indeterminism but is conditioned by existing structure (if any.) Clearly, proponents of universal-temporal determinism are in error. Therefore there is no occasion for debate regarding alternative outcomes. Can agents make choices? It certainly seems to me that I make choices. However an agent-determinist would argue that we do not truly make choices; the feeling that I make choice is in error. An argument against determinism is that true novelty is what is not deterministically contained in what came before and that there is true novelty in the world (structure from the Void.) Therefore the agent-determinist effectively argues that all novelty is external to agency—i.e. novelty arises in the environment and perhaps the body but not in agency (mind.) Certainly there is novelty in the ‘environment:’ the origin of the species. It would be perhaps a little surprising if the brain that is often said to be the most complex object in the Universe would be incapable of novelty while true novelty arises at the molecular—gene—level. Is there agent-novelty? If an agent can have a new idea then there must be agent-novelty. Do we have new ideas? Some hold that all ideas are already determined by our form—i.e. by ideas that we already have even if we do not hold the ‘new’ ideas in consciousness. Consider then that earth and rocks and air and molten lava and the inorganic oceans contain no ideas yet beings with ideas arose from this organic background. Therefore, there are new ideas. In Worlds we will identify the locus of the new idea in the agent

What fields does value cover?

The general theory of value is sometimes called axiology. Fields that are axiological include aesthetics, ethics, economics, and politics

What is chosen in a value related choice?

The choice is of some combination of feeling (andor state andor assertion) of value, action, or outcome (an ‘end’ or state of affairs.) Deontological ethics emphasizes right actions, consequentialist or teleological ethics emphasizes outcomes in determining the morality of an action, and virtue ethics emphasizes the virtue of the agent. It is not necessary either practically or theoretically to emphasize any one aspect. Theoretically it may be possible to demand that action, outcome and virtue requirements be satisfied. The practical situation is complex and must involve principled as well as practical concerns that may be essential but ignored in moral discussion (and the practical concerns may involve non value concerns as well as conflicting value concerns.) The practical situation is sufficiently complex that even if a method of value determination is available an actual determination may be infeasible and actual choice may depend on rough judgment, intuition, and politicking. Also the practical situation is an arena to test the meaningfulness and soundness of any theoretical constructions

Is it possible to choose an emotional response?

It is reasonable to assert that a function of emotion is to affect behavior—e.g., to seek what is beneficial, to avoid danger. If emotional response was entirely volitional, it would not have this function

However, to perform this function it is not necessary that there should be no volition in emotional response. Although I cannot choose to feel happy when I am sad, my emotional response can be conditioned over time. One way in which it is conditioned is by my reaction to the emotion. Attempting to avoid emotional pain may intensify it; acceptance may attenuate it; and I may learn this at an emotive level over time. Another way to condition emotion is through cognition. Many emotional responses are due to cognitive interpretation. A change in interpretation may change emotional response. Of course there is an ‘inner compass’ that resists this: truth is not entirely malleable. However, it is at least partially malleable: if some interpretations are necessary others are relative. This too is learned over time

Similarly, although I do not have full control over my aesthetic responses those responses may change in response to growth, experience, and conscious cultivation

The fact that emotion does not seem to be under control has lead to a common belief that it is not under control at all. However, as the argument above shows the common belief is an exaggeration of difficulty in many cases into impossibility in all cases

How is the choice made?

A choice may be made on the basis of intuition or feeling (emotion) alone. Alternatively, choice may be principled—values are determined outside intuition and value influences or determines judgment and action. How are values determined? An example of a principled determination in ethics is the utilitarian form of consequentialism. Even in cases of a single value a decision ‘algorithm’ may be necessary. Complexity of contexts and theory as well as competing judgment invariably requires intuition and practical judgment in actual situations as complements to theory. In the actual situation it is the practical that may rule and the general relevance of ethics-considered-in-isolation is not determined. As in the case of knowledge, the entire world of value may be brought under intuition and ‘objectivity’ may be allowed to emerge where it is possible and proper. There is something ad hoc to separation of ethics from action, something ad hoc about a choice between deontology and teleology and virtue in values, something ad hoc about their varieties, something ad hoc about quantities attached to value. The very nature of value is not prescribed in advance and practice is both arbiter and teacher. The notion of value to be introduced cuts the implied Gordian Knot by subsumption of the divisions and specifying the place of value… and allowing questions and answers regarding value to emerge

Are values objective?

This depends, first, on what is considered to be the Object. If the entire context is the Object, objectivity of values lacks significance. Therefore, consider the Object to be the specific focus of choice. For values to be objective, value should depend only on the focus. It should be clear that only some values should be objective. The pure form of a drive to objectivity is, e.g. the aesthetic or moral sense. However, many morals are practical rather than intrinsically ethical. There is neither need nor sense to a demand for objectivity of all values. Regarding some values—e.g., do not kill—we prefer to let the resolution of objectivity or universality emerge even though ethical sense wants to make a proclamation as soon as killing is contemplated. The argument is familiar. Avoiding a priori prescription and allowing emergence, encourages the emergence of Truth or objectivity; and if some particular value is True or objective then knowledge of this Truth or objectivity is strengthened

Are values Objects?

Are values of the world (Objects) or not of the world? Some thinkers hold that value is of another world—that values are ideals; others hold that values are not of any world. But we have seen that subject to Logic every concept has an Object; therefore we expect that we may be able to conceive values as lying in the one Universe. However, we want a robust conception of value. We have also seen that while we may build theories that have certain classes of concept define Objects that belong to another world that includes the case of the zero world or no world (a) it is ultimately effective, clear, and free of error, and factual that there is one World, and (b) what is valid in such theories may be incorporated into the one World picture which must exclude what is invalid in them

What kinds of Objects are values?

Possibilities are (1) Values are properties of a special class of Objects—the value Objects that include actions as well as states of affairs (and thus include the ethical cases of the right and the good.) Since properties are Objects, values are Objects in this conception and may be called Objects of value or value-objects. If a value is a property of an object it is objective and therefore universal and this is problematic. A rejection of this point of view is not a rejection of objectivity or universality for it allows some objectivity, some universality. Must it not be the case that even if some values are universal there will be local values that are not? This is clearly true. Therefore we seek a more general alternative that allows a greater range. The alternative that is now introduced is neutral to the issue of objectivity. It will be regarded unhappily by those who seek objectivity at outset. The situation is similar to that of knowledge—in fact it will be seen to lie under that case. The similarity is that truth is allowed to emerge rather than imposed—i.e., the habit of substance thinking is avoided; and if values ‘are’ truly objective that truth will be allowed to emerge thus strengthening its case. The alternate that is used is designed to be neutral to other issues laid out below and therefore allows emergence of a valid and universal theory of value (it is the theory and not the values that shall be seen to be universal)

An alternative to value as a property of external Objects is (2) Values are tendencies (which may be regarded as properties) in the presence of alternatives and therefore of choice, of agents-in-contexts to feeling, action, end-seeking behaviors… and therefore also Objects. Such agents-in-contexts may be called value contexts

The term ‘tendency’ is general and lies on a continuum from strictly to very loosely determinative of action

Therefore, value does not determine action or desirable outcome. There is an uncertainty regarding desirable action that cannot always be eliminated. Consistent with this the notion of value as tendency may reduce but does not invariably remove uncertainty in action. Specifically, this conception does not offer resolution in competition for resources except that the ‘competition’ may be subsumed under a single value

Are values knowledge?

I.e., is there an essential distinction between fact and value? In option (a) of the previous paragraph an assertion that there is no distinction requires demonstration and that is at least improbable from earlier arguments. In option (b) there is no distinction

Is the knowledge intuitive or symbolic?

Since we reign in the symbolic under intuition the real distinction concerns which part of intuition is the source of value. It seems that natural and symbolic parts are both necessary to values as we know them

The concept of value

The idea of values as (properties of) Objects has been reviewed and rejected as a universal notion of value. Instead, we introduce value in such a way (a) as to be neutral to problematic issues in the concept and deployment of value, (b) to allow under its range both theory and practice of value, and (c) to allow emergence of a continuum of objectivity (or universality) including any cases of objectivity

This suggests the notion (2) of subsection ‘What kinds of Objects are values?’. This choice is justified in the next subsection

A value imperative in a given context is tendency based in feeling or judgment that affects choices regarding actions andor ends (states)

The ‘value imperative’ will be abbreviated to ‘value’ (the term ‘imperative’ does not imply that value determines choice: there may be conflicting or competing imperatives)

The concept of value shall be neutral with regard to (a) distinctions between action and end and (b) field such as ethics, economics and aesthetics

An imperative is a value regardless whether the source is biological or cultural adaptation, an ethical justification, random or personal idiosyncrasy

As an aspect of the state of an agent, a value is an Object

In the following it is understood values, actions, ends, and contexts may be individual, group, or institutional. It will be implicit in the term ‘tendency’ that its source will not be restricted to any one aspect of constitution, e.g. to biology, culture, or value judgment

The concept of value introduced above may be abbreviated:

A value is a tendency regarding choice. A value is an Object

Possession of value reduces but does not remove uncertainty in right action or desirable outcome. If there is competition for resources, a value approach may offer partial resolution by regarding the competing system as a single value context

That uncertainty cannot always be removed is an inherent aspect of value

A particular value in a person is a particular Object. That value regarded as an imperative external to an individual may be seen as abstract. The distinction is not of great importance

Justification of the chosen concept of value

The questions of the subsection Preliminary analysis were chosen to encourage and determine a conception of value that identifies the (any) crucial component of value—choice from among alternatives—and that corresponds to the reality and actual use of value; to the range of fields and uses; to values as lying in the Universe; to the kinds of ‘thing’ that values may be validly, most comprehensively, and most effectively conceived as being; and to validly and effectively seen value as knowledge rather than to perpetuate any schism between fact and value; and to validly see what kind of knowledge is knowledge of value

Finally the preliminary analysis does not insist on objectivity or non-objectivity of values—i.e., it is allowed that some values may be entirely objective while others, perhaps most, will have at most partial objectivity or perhaps objectivity in a context

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the choice is that it corresponds to the way in which value determines action in the complex arena of society and its institutions: it does not isolate problems, contexts, modalities such as aesthetics and ethics. The choice does not isolate value—regarding which there may be choice—from fact (the way the world is.) Finally, it makes no assumption about degree of choice and the degree of influence over action

An objection may arise that these distinctions are crucial. Well perhaps they are not crucial. The distinctions may however be significant. The impact of religious or philosophical or academic ethics in practice typically occurs over time and not necessarily in pure form; there is perhaps an education of sensibilities, a creation of a new ‘consciousness.’ The response to the objection is that while the present theory does not make the distinction in question it permits them. Practical and theoretical value lie within the range of the theory

It remains to determine whether there are any entirely objective values and perhaps to identify some such values. It will emerge that entire objectivity will be rare and it will not be surprising if we find but one or perhaps a very few truly objective values. If that turns out to be the case, the very singularity of the truly objective would suggest its importance. Still it may be useful find a source to this importance

Universal value

In contemplating the variety of ethical theories, it may be pondered whether there is any objective determination of a particular value. Surely there is some connection between some ethical values and making the world a better place, between some ethical values and making an individual a better person… and between some ethical values and survival. Questions that may arise are (a) Is survival of an individual or a race or species ultimately important? (b) Is survival more important that having a better world? (c) What is a better person or a better world? Why or how does observance of a value make an individual or the world better? Is there some circularity in these notions of value and ‘better’?

Contemplate the value of the joining of individual identity with Universal Identity. This idea is common to a number of traditions. In Vedanta there is the idea that the identity is already given. Perhaps though meditative transformation achieves awareness of the embedding and therefore some at least some lower reaches of the universal identity. Perhaps ‘physical’ transformation is required for full realization

Can this realization be a universal andor objective value? Certainly some may seek it but others want nothing of it. But not every individual even has an ethical sense. Therefore universality and objectivity cannot be determined as universal preference

If equality has value then perhaps elimination of difference between persons, races, species… worlds has value. It may be a value that betters all being. Therefore it is reasonable to suggest identity of all being as the Universe or universal identity as a value

The thought arises that such universal identity may be a homogeneity without color or meaning. But color can be retained by thinking of the meditative identity in which the self is not dissolved but instead the self enters a state dominated by awareness of the connection; andor the self is dynamic and goes meditatively into and out of the ‘oceanic feeling’ of identity

A more inclusive approach to meaning, color and adventure is the adventure into the infinite variety guaranteed as necessary by the cosmological form of the fundamental principle: The universe has the greatest possible variety of being. This includes the here-now (it is a somewhat but not entirely metaphysical question whether the Universe is occasionally experienced as a here-now.) It includes infinitely varied adventures through now alien now familiar landscapes, sky-scapes, and experience-scapes (‘mindscapes.’) It is a walk through a wilderness in spring; it is a transcending of the Normal into an alien form in an alien world; it is a coming of a messiah; it is the experience of infinite and inescapable pain; it is bliss; it is mind without emotion; it is mind without cognition; it is fullness—and emptiness

Universal knowledge as sought and found in this narrative is a co-value with that of universal identity

There is no rejection of the local; in one of its forms the Universe is a sum of physical-like and experience-like localities

In a value context, the context itself may be seen as the basic source of value. Its elements have value relative to the context

In a sense therefore the Universe has the ultimate value and similarly there is a sense in which its realization is ultimate to a limited being

Objectivity of human value systems

The actuality of objectivity or otherwise may perhaps be most effectively argued by considering the most universal of morals

Contemplate You will not kill. The distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘murder’ is already anticipated in the translations of the bible

But what is murder? Is it a legal andor moral notion? The main difficulty reduces to the following. (1) Intuitive. Perhaps we have clear intuition as to whether an act is murder. But there are immense differences in intuition—some feel that war is or may be murder but others do not. (2) Definition. It is probably the case that no definition can be given that is universally satisfactory (not all intentional killing even if not in defense of self or another is universally regarded as murder)

This is not an argument against the notion of murder or of corresponding punishment. However, if murder cannot be universally identified can it be associated with an objective value? This is at least an instrumental problem

On the other hand it appears to be universal across cultures that murder is wrong. This suggests objectivity

Although we feel powerfully and passionately that murder is wrong—that does not make murder objectively wrong. If it is manifest that murder is objectively wrong then there should need to be no discussion. Therefore if murder is objectively wrong the basis of this objectivity must lie in subtlety of definition andor argument. Analysis of the spectrum of views and feelings suggests that we feel that we must assert objectivity even when there is demonstrably no full objectivity. I.e., we confuse near objectivity with full objectivity

If I say I do not know precisely what murder is but whatever it is I do know that it is objectively wrong I am effectively admitting borderline cases that are fuzzy as to whether they are murder. We do not take the following quantification seriously but it still makes the point. At what point on a scale of 0 to 1 does murder become wrong? If that point is not determined , murder cannot be fully objective

But since the assignment of objectivity has practical implications and moral appeal, we can understand why some persons would desire to think that the near objective is objective. Others may want to contemplate terms such as ‘near objective,’ or ‘objective with the option to allow exemptions’

The variety of being

Recapitulation

The cosmological form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics is that The variety of being in the Universe is the (greatest that is Logically) possible

Every fiction, every story, every myth, every scripture, every legend, every novel, every science, every mathematical axiomatization, every imagination, every truth implicit in an affect or in a work of art, architecture or music is real. Regarding affect, art and so on as conceptual every affect, every work of art or architecture or music is real. All this and more lies within the Logos. It is probable that the human literary and artistic categories (fiction… architecture…) are them selves immensely limited

The Object of emotion is identified in Worlds

It has been seen, then, that the range of particular Objects is without contingent limit. The range of Normal Objects in our cosmological system is relatively infinitesimal and gives no hint of the immense general or Normal variety in the Universe. For a hint of this variety see A preliminary development of the variety of being in chapter Metaphysics. The variety is systematically developed in Cosmology

A system of Objects

As explained earlier, there is no full explicit showing of the variety of Objects. However, partial showing can be developed to greater and lesser degree

The abstract Objects introduced in this chapter furthers the explicit character of the variety of Objects

Subject to Logic, every abstract and particular Object is real

This means that subject to Logic every system of concepts has an Object (system of Objects) regardless of whether the concepts are perceptual and bound to the world or freely created and iconic or freely and symbolic

Significance of abstract Objects for Variety

The abstract Objects add immensely to the variety of being via what is at least in part symbolically known though real. However, do they add to an inhabitable variety? The meaning of this question and a response is found in chapter Cosmology, section Variety and its origins, subsection Inhabiting abstract Objects

Logic, grammar and meaning

The purpose of this section is to see (from the principle of reference and the developed theory of Objects) grammar as concept on par with Logic and so to further clarify the nature of linguistic meaning

Logic defines the form of concepts or descriptions that is necessary for them to be capable of valid reference

Given that the Universe is all actual being and that there is no distinction between the actual and possible:

Logic defines the form of concepts or descriptions that have reference

In talking of a limited context as though it were the Universe, it would be necessary reintroduce the first italicized form above

Thus the thought due to Wittgenstein that logic is grammar

Meaning involves concept and Object or sense and reference; this was perhaps first pointed out by Frege and taken up by Wittgenstein. Therefore, Logic or Grammar are aspects of meaning; and, further, a full Meaning determines Metaphysics… and a full and final Metaphysics determines Meaning

Since Logic has reference, Logic has meaning

Cosmology

The concept and principles of Cosmology

The concept of Cosmology

General cosmology is the study of the variety of being—i.e., the variety of Objects in the Universe

Physical cosmology is the conceptual and empirical study of the large scale physical structures of the known physical universe. A natural place to study physical cosmology is Worlds

The principle of variety—The variety of being in the Universe is the greatest Logically possible implies that physical cosmology and other local cosmologies are infinitesimal part of general cosmology

In this essay the word ‘cosmology’ used without qualification refers to general cosmology

Because of the emergence and power of  a physicalist paradigm in the modern era, cosmology is often conflated with physical cosmology. In recent times physical cosmology has come to play a central role in general cosmology. Here it is acknowledged that cosmology must draw significant suggestive power from physical cosmology: in its development the present study of cosmology drew much inspiration from modern physical cosmology

However, the Universal metaphysics has enabled the present study of cosmology to outgrow its roots in the physical

Even though the known physical universe is currently thought to be 13 billion years old and perhaps 80 to 160 billion years across—that the extent is greater than the distance light could have traveled since the big-bang is due to the expansion of space—it is very limited in relation to the Universe

Therefore, in terms of extent and variety, the actual role of physical cosmology in the study of general cosmology must be very limited

Principles of Cosmology

Principles available from Metaphysics include

The fundamental principle of metaphysics, especially in the following forms: (1) The first form—The Void which is the absence of being exists and contains no Objects. The following consequence of the first form is significant: the Void state is equivalent to every manifest state and therefore any manifest state is equivalent to every manifest state. (2) The second form or principle of reference—Subject to Logic every concept has reference. (3) The third or cosmological form or principle of variety—The variety of the Universe is the greatest that is Logically possible. (4) The sixth form—The Universe is absolutely indeterministic

The enhancements from Objects include

Clarification of the nature of the Object. Establishment of kinds of particular Object: concrete, process, relation, interaction, property, value, universal. Establishment of the nature of abstract Objects—they lie in the one Universe. The unified theory of particular and abstract Objects—the practical distinction is in the approach to study. A study of some kinds of abstract Objects—the Objects of mathematics, the Forms, and the particular Objects as or as generating abstract Objects

In Worlds the variety will be further clarified in terms of the categories of intuition

What may be labeled the ‘principle of fiction’

Every fiction, every story, every myth, every scripture, every legend, every novel, every science, every mathematical axiomatization, every imagination, every truth implicit in an affect or in a work of art, architecture or music is real. Regarding affect, art and so on as conceptual every affect, every work of art or architecture or music is real. All this and more lies within the Logos. It is probable that the human literary and artistic categories (fiction… architecture…) are them selves immensely limited

The role of imagination should be emphasized because it is often suppressed

The role of imagination is broadened and developed in Method via the idea of reflexivity

Metaphysics and cosmology

Shrunk to its essential core, metaphysics might consist of the single statement: there is being. A cosmology derived from this statement alone would be bare and skeletal but not empty because there is being implies that the Universe that is all being exists. The rich pictures of Metaphysics and Objects follow from necessary Objects beyond being-as-such. It is inherent in their necessity that knowledge of them is not distorted. The contents of this chapter: Variety and its origins; Process; Identity and death; Mind; and Space, time and being do not flow from being-as-being but from our forms of experience of the world. In Cosmology the discussion is at a level—e.g., of abstraction or generality—that does not introduce essential distortion. Significant studies that do not or cannot escape distortion are taken up in Worlds. The approximate studies may derive enhancement when seen in the context of pure cosmology and therefore strict separation will not be maintained. In this chapter confusion will be prevented by pointing those treatments that are approximate

Therefore while there are distinctions, the border between metaphysics and cosmology need have no actual significance

The principles of the study of variety are established in Metaphysics and elaborated as noted in the previous subsection Principles of General cosmology

In Cosmology the study of variety is pursued systematically

Significance of Cosmology

In illuminating the variety in the Universe, Cosmology provides a large scale map for any physical cosmology and any journey in being. The discussion of Identity and death shows personal or experiential ways in which to enter the exploration; and it also shows that Universal identity is and must be realized even though the path is not fully shown (the path is further illuminated in Worlds but is still not given: realization requires that actual exploration and experiment in being and identity be undertaken)

Variety and its origins

Origination is process; the placement of origins with variety is due to their enmeshment

The principles of the approach to study are laid out in the section on The concept and principles of Cosmology

The development in Metaphysics and Objects is in fact a part of a development of cosmology. A systematic approach retraces the development in Metaphysics and Objects in terms of the fundamental Objects. In the following sections the development is recounted with emphasis on variety

Universe

Because the Universe is all being it contains all Objects including ‘things’ as well as Laws, Patterns and Forms

Because the Universe is all being it can have no cause or creator—the meaning and significance of this assertion will become clear below

Domain

One part of the Universe may have a causal effect on another. The sense of ‘may have’ is that of logical possibility. It is not logically possible for the Universe to have cause or creator. The logical possibility of cause-effect will be strengthened to ‘necessity’ in the section Void below

Extension and duration are features of being; space and time (or space-time) are immanent in the Universe. That is: space and time are relative rather than absolute (it is not implied that there is a Universal space-time coordination)

However, one domain may set up a space-time for another. The space-time for a domain may be effectively or as if absolute

Void

The Void which is the absence of being contains no Object, i.e. no ‘thing’ or Law. The Void exists. From this it has been shown that

What is actual is necessary. Our cosmological system is necessary. Every individual is necessary; and their identities are necessary

States of manifest being are necessary. I.e., given the Void state a manifest state will emerge

The variety of being in the Universe is the Logically possible: subject to Logic, every concept has an Object

There is no universal substance. The Void may be regarded as a quasi-substance but it is not a true substance in the sense of being the deterministic source of change and variety

Although manifest states emerge ‘from’ the Void, the Void is not the cause of the manifest states in any common or reasonably strong sense of ‘cause’ or ‘creation.’ In a loose sense, however, the emergence of manifest states from the Void may be seen as creation

Given a manifest state, the Universe will enter the Void state. This is not destruction in any strong sense but may be regarded loosely as destruction. The Universe is thus created and destroyed without end. At any ‘time’ a manifest state of the Universe or part of it may ‘self-annihilate’

Since passing through Void and manifest states is necessary, the fundamental problem of metaphysics is not ‘Why is there being?’ but ‘What exists?’ I.e. Cosmology is the response to the true fundamental problem

The Universe is absolutely indeterministic. Although it is commonly thought that such a strong indeterminism could not result in structure, the opposite is in fact the case. Absolute indeterminism requires the emergence of structure. The absolute indeterminism of the Universe is a form of the fundamental principle. Absolute indeterminism—i.e., no states are unaccessed from any state—is also a non-temporal kind of absolute determinism: every state is accessed from any state. In the general case there is no preferred mechanism of emergence. In the Normal case it seems that incremental emergence by variation and selection will be most likely

It is necessarily the case that some domains will be implicated in the creation of other domains; will be causal upon other domains; will set up an as-if relative space-time for other domains

It was seen in Metaphysics, that there can be no external creator of the Universe; there is no God, the creator of the Universe. We now see that limited gods are necessary (subject to any interpretation of ‘god’ that does not violate Logic.) Some domains will destroy or annihilate others. Perhaps the most common creative principles, internal to a domain or to the Universe as a whole or external to a domain but not to the Universe have ‘natural’ interpretations as do the creative principles of our local cosmos according to modern science. Still, limited gods that are external to a domain, but conscious and of great power, and possessed of some kind of morality and dominion, are possible and therefore necessary. Probably, such cases are infrequent and too infrequent, it might be thought but does not therefore follow, to be of significance. An animal may be seen as a limited god

Perhaps the most important concern in relation to the issue of ‘gods’ is discovery of their nature and form and here it is far from sufficient to lay out a system of speculative concepts along the dimensions of identity (focused-discrete versus diffuse and distribute, e.g. pantheism and panentheism,) potency (power over the world versus powers of the world,) science (omniscient to limited,) creative power (absolute or near absolute versus limited,) creative mode (creating versus sustaining,) singularity (i.e. whether the concept of god should have all the characteristics of a particular notion or whether, as here, we identify the dimensions that might make a being god-like,) moral mode (author and executor of morals versus observer,) location (remote versus present,) transparency (degree of knowability,) dominion (we have our opinions of god’s relation to us—we often think of god as ruler but this is our opinion… but it seems that, especially to the reverent, god’s own feeling should be at least if not more important… and it is only in the case of absolute power does the possibility of the fact of supreme dominion arise… in the case of great but limited power any actual dominion apart from what is imprinted on the minds of men and women would be just as in our world, the function of transaction or struggle,) degree of naturalism (god as supernatural versus god as supreme or not so supreme expression of natural law; little scientific work on these possibilities have been done and this is perhaps due to the thought that modern science excludes god, significance of god and the thought that science has already revealed the kinds of creative principle and found them to be purely natural… note though that the Universal metaphysics shows that our modern scientific view of the natural is valid in its domain, that domain is immensely limited.) The dimensions just mentioned are among those derived from traditional thought in religion and philosophy. An animal has a creative principle, even if taken for granted and limited. Earth has creative powers (life, mind have arisen from Earth) and the animal powers are manifestations of the Earth’s. What greater power might we be capable of? Surely, reality exceeds the present limits of imagination (some of which may be intrinsic to our being, others perhaps the result of our knowledge so far.) But the Universal metaphysics has shown that there is infinitely more in us and that we are perhaps at the beginning of an exploration (and this is the result of our imagination since that metaphysics was, at least apparently, not received from an extra-human agency.) And even if our race is destined to extinction, our identity is not (theory of identity.) An infinite adventure in being and power is necessary and necessarily at our immediate disposal even if our awareness of it is remote. How do we begin? We begin with ourselves—my being, my civilization, its powers (science, technology, imagination, art, study of the depths an