A complete analysis of these ideas, even if possible, would be quite long and probably unnecessary even though it might be a contribution to academic thought. Clearly, these thinkers were intelligent (and witty and occasionally excessively facile if not a little devious.) Before identifying what is common in their thought, I want to say something about irrationalism, by which I mean the view that nothing can ever be known to be right. Can that view be right? It is equivalent to saying that there is no structure in the world, not even temporariness. If that were true we would not be here. So, what is it that the four philosophers have in common? First, it seems that they all come from the tradition, encouraged by the great success of Newton’s mechanics over a reign of roughly two centuries, that scientific truths are universal or, in the modern incarnation of this view, on their way to becoming universal: I have observed how some modern positivistic scientists hold that there is nothing outside science which view may have two sources one of which is simply practical and the second lies in succumbing to the natural human tendency to take practical necessity as absolute necessity (the other side of this coin is the egoism of the scientist.) It may be noted that while a newer theory may be used to gauge the limits of an older one, there is no clear gauge by which to evaluate the latest theories thus destabilizing any concrete attempt at evaluation. In other words, the scientist has a freedom, without any immediate practical consequence, to hold any position regarding the finality of current theories (this is not meant to be a criticism of scientists for only someone who understands a theory can make any actual claim about its truth or validity; this, in turn, does not mean that others can have no valid views: they can hold informed views based on cumulative reading of those who understand)

The second common factor to the views of the four philosophers, is the reaction to the view of scientific theories as universal. This reaction was encouraged by the ‘overturn’ of theories that had been held as established for centuries (it is not the period of time that is crucial but the fact that the period is sufficient to allow the theories to become fixed in the intuition.) This view was encouraged by an assortment of other parties that may be accumulated under the label of ‘twentieth century pluralism.’ (No argument against the values of pluralism is intended; monolithic culture appears to be invariably repressive.) However, if the idea of scientific theories as theories of the entire universe (of objects to which they refer and physics frequently claims to refer to the entire actual universe although the claim is frequently to the known universe which, since science defines the scientifically known universe, is logically but not rhetorically empty) is relinquished, there is no need or occasion to react against the view. (That I may continue to react against this view probably means that I may continue to semi-consciously harbor ideas or hopes of ‘final and universal theories or, preferably, in that harbor of hope, a single final theory in the fashion of science.’) The entire debate and its interesting sophistication may be placed on a shelf (instead of occupying the whole room) and replaced by the realist view that I have justified and will repeat: instead of seeing scientific theories as limited and irrationalist constructions about the entire universe they may be seen as robust constructions about a phase of the universe, a phase of being. In this sense a mature scientific theory is a fact, and not a ‘mere theory’ as in some other uses of the word ‘theory’

One important qualification regarding the term ‘phase of being’ is necessary: in talking of a phase, restriction is not made only to extension in space and time. There should also be a restriction to dimension: the microscopic limit below which the current theories of physics are not known to have application; there are other similar restrictions: high enough particle energies and high enough densities of matter. Another kind of restriction is to ‘mode of being:’ is chemistry reducible to physics, biology to chemistry, psychology and sociology to biology? It is not sufficient to make a reduction in principle. Until a reduction has been made in fact from a higher level to a lower modality or the completeness of the lower mode has been demonstrated, the answer must be ‘we don’t know.’ It is conceivable, for example, that ‘all chemistry’ (the word ‘all’ makes the phrase vague) is reducible to the physics of a later day but not to modern physics. While biologists bristle at suggestions that biology is reducible to chemistry or physics, the reduction of sociology to biology is a common theme within theoretical biology. One is prompted to wonder to what extent all reduction is prompted by egotism (this of course does not disprove the case which generally lacks proof altogether. However, it is good reason to believe that egoism one of the roots of any reductionism that is more than an endeavor.) However, sociologists reject reduction of social science to biology and for good explanatory reasons: social science is sufficiently complex and too alien to biology to make the reduction actually possible. Biology, for example, is about a phase of being… continue