Definitions – Numbered items that introduce concepts. Though they resemble elements of an abstract axiomatic system, their function includes to point to the real (thus, the definitions are more than just specifications of concepts and unless what they point to is manifestly real, its reality must be demonstrated); how they perform this function is explained in the introduction and worked out in detail, later. Definitions are formal or informal according to whether they are in the formal or informal parts of the work. Material in (parentheses) is elaboration or commentary.

Assertions – Statements asserted as true on the basis of argument – informal; meta, e.g., about the formal development (method or content); and comments.

Truths – Statements whose truth is either manifest or derived from manifest truths. They include what could be called ‘axioms’, ‘postulates’, or ‘theorems’. As will be seen, it is inherent in the development that method, foundation, and further content emerge together and therefore definition, axiom, and postulate intersect.

Uses of terms—new and variant

Be-ing – The word ‘Being’ will be used as abstract in the sense that essential distortion has been removed from the concept, which is a strength in that it empowers precision. However, the abstraction also removes the depth and ineffability that is powerful in historical use of ‘being’. Thus, a term to connote what has been lost in abstraction is an essential need; ‘be-ing’ will be used to provide that connotation.

Unition – a term for (i) the insight that individual and universal identity are locally distinct but ultimately the same (the insight is shown to hold) (ii) knowledge pertaining to the insight and ways of realizing ultimate identity for and beginning in our world. The ultimate identity is a state of being but is also experienced as an endless process of peaking and dissolution. ‘Unition’ is a neologism whose meaning is closely related to the meaning of ‘yoga’ as it originated in what is now called South Asia, inclusive of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

Meaning – this term has two senses in this work, (i) the sense in this section as in family of meanings suggested by the terms ‘the meaning of life’, ‘significance’ or ‘importance’ (ii) concept and linguistic meaning. Both senses are important—the first as what is meaningful, e.g., why we aspire to anything at all; the second is crucial to concept development—a lack of proper understanding of it in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions results in confused and limited understanding; such an understanding is developed in the formal system. Where the use is not clear from the context the terms ‘significant-’ and ‘concept-’ or ‘linguistic-’ meaning will be used.

Miscellaneous notation

When a term is ~~crossed out~~ – later development implies it to be unnecessary.

An asterisk or star (*) marks material that is very much in process. A section marked with a star may be empty or have just an outline.

A dagger (^†) marks temporary material that will be removed from final versions.

Part 1. Into to The Way of Being

The material of ‘Into’ serves as an informal introduction. The formal system of the work appears in an account of the world.

Comment 1. Format tabs, add heading here, introduce doubt.

Preliminary

Assertion 1. In the realm of ordinary and everyday experience, our cosmos is limited. Yet this limitedness is fully consistent with the universe—the realm of the ordinary and beyond—being the realization of the greatest possibility (that we do not experience all possibilities is true as far as we do not experience the entire universe). The claim that all possibility is realized, proven later, is the fundamental principle of metaphysics (fp). In what follows, (i) the meaning of limitlessness is formalized and expressed in common terms, (ii) the limitlessness of the universe and its beings is demonstrated, and (iii) the consequences of limitlessness are developed and shown to bear immense significance for life as it is lived now and across the unbounded realms of being.

Assertion 2. The aim of The Way of Being (TW)is the shared discovery and realization of the ultimate—arising in, oriented toward, and starting from our world.

Assertion 3. The main concepts of TW center on being and experience because (i) the use of being states simply that ‘things are what they are,’ without reference to any other foundational idea, and this very triviality makes it foundational both to the conceptual development and as a conceptual container for our experiential being and becoming; (ii) thus, being, as used here, is trivial compared with its use in existentialist philosophy, but, as just noted, this is a strength, and what might otherwise be lost is assigned to ‘be-ing,’ which is within being rather than of it; (iii) in summary, the present use of ‘being’ avoids the imprecision of its use in existentialist philosophy while preserving its depth; and (iv) experience is central as the ~~effective~~ place and fact of our being, our reason, and the ‘meaning of our lives’.

What is The Way of Being

Definition 1. The Way of Being (TWB) is (i) an attitude that sees our present world and its cultural traditions as transitional, (ii) a system of knowledge—‘the real metaphysics’ (TM)—instrumental to realizing the ultimate, perfect in its effectiveness and the best to be had while we remain limited and which changes in interaction with change in our being, and (iii) a way (‘pathways’) to the ultimate that begins in our world and emphasizes the world, the ultimate, and the process.

Assertion 4. The real metaphysics (TM) is based on well-founded concepts as explained in foundational issues, below. In the development, the concepts cluster around (i) being as precisely known, inclusive, and neutral (and so of perfect and potentially universal application, that is free of slant) (ii) experience which is grounding of being and, particularly, of our being. While most of the terms for the concepts are common and often lack a single use, it is critical to the development to follow the meanings as specified in the definitions and, further, that the system of terms constitute a system that has system-meaning that captures and is designed to capture the form and process of the universe.

Assertion 5. The cluster of concepts did not arise at once but in stages via conceptual trial and error: (a) a rough stage in which I experimented with materialism, evolutionism, idealism, and physicalism, before settling on being and experience for their neutrality and foundational character (b) a stage of selecting and fine-tuning the cluster of concepts (c) a final but still ongoing stage in which I recognize the system—the cluster—as adequate to a sufficiently precise and complete metaphysics. Thus, the origins of TM are in my experience and reflection and, via reading, in the history of thought. Similarly, the pathways, are also based on my exploration and reading in what might be called ‘experiments in being’, a mix of philosophical resources, and traditional pathways, both east and west.

Assertion 6. TM has two sides: (i) a perfect side, ‘the ideal metaphysics’ (IM), formed by deploying abstracted versions of the concepts—i.e., by removing distortable detail from the concepts, and so leaving concepts and detail free of distortion, and (ii) pragmatic knowledge. IM is perfect and shows the universe to be ultimate and limitless. It points to the ultimate, but, being a framework, it requires a complement for effectiveness, namely pragmatic knowledge, and its ongoing process of discovery. Though pragmatic knowledge is subject to imperfection, the union of the two sides is the most effective instrument we possess for realizing the ultimate and for advancing toward that realization. Because IM provides perfect orientation and pragmatic knowledge provides the best means available under limitedness, their union is the uniquely maximal instrument for realization. It is in this value sense that TM is perfect.

Founding The Way of Being

Comment 2. Issue of abstraction, inclusivity, and neutrality.

On illusion and its implications for the nature of the real

That there is some illusion in our perception, thought, and sense of what is real and important is not doubted.

But do we know what is real at all or is ‘everything illusion’? If the latter were true, we could not know it, for it too would be illusory.

Some impressions of what is known must be real, while others are illusory.

But there is a presumption behind the idea of illusion. It is the common—though not universal—view of knowing as a picture of the real, in some ways a misdirection. Rather, we should perhaps look at the entire seeming picture of our process in the world—knowing, valuing, and acting—from the outside, as it were, and observe that there are impressions of the process to which we give the names ‘knowledge’, ‘value’ (ethical, aesthetic, and meaningful as in the family of senses surrounding the meaning of life), and intentional and choice based ‘action’, but which are not as definite as we commonly think they are.

That is, we are perhaps reifying our names.

Yet our naming is not mere reification; it arises from and points to something real.

The giving of names is not the end of how meaning emerges—the emergence is an interaction between the sense of meaning, naming, use or practice, and formalization (which except when – where – it is shown otherwise cannot be said to be complete).

Whether our names reach the real, and whether knowing can be disentangled from the real, cannot be clearly or satisfactorily resolved without a picture of the world that has some truth and some completeness. Furthermore, such a picture should account for the relation between knowledge – experience of the world – and the world itself.

The name we give to such a picture shall be ‘metaphysics’. And an adequate metaphysics will incorporate, will weave into the world picture, experience, knowledge and reason, value, and action. It will not be a ‘metaphysics of experience’ (etc., as above), but a metaphysics of the world in which experience, etc., are integral aspects.

Thus, effectively, we are saying that metaphysics is study of the real, where ‘the real’ has a broad implication, such that epistemology, reason (philosophical logic), ethics, and implications for how and what we do – and how we regard what we should do – are parts of metaphysics. While this is different from some approaches to explaining what metaphysics is, it is conceptually strong enough to incorporate the subject matters from the history of metaphysics through today, in fact and in principle – and much more (the ‘etc.’)

Foundational issues

The question of foundation is complex: what a foundation (that which is founding) and what is founded (that which is founded) are; whether it should be a thing of the same kind as what is founded, of another kind, or not a “thing” at all; what kinds of foundation are possible; and whether foundation is possible in any sense. Here I address only the present foundation.

1. Experience is given. (Following a generalized Cartesian argument, the fact of experience is indubitable and requires no further grounding.)

2. From experience, abstraction yields precise concepts and a metaphysical framework. Abstraction from experience—including ordinary language and reason—gives rise to method and content together, resulting in precise concepts such as being (and whole or universe, part or a being – plural: beings, null or the void), and relationship (reason, argument, logic). That there is being, and that universe exists is given; however, existence of the void may be questioned—and is addressed below in doubt and dialetheia. From the existence of the void, as proven later, all possibilities follow; and from all possibilities, necessity emerges as foundational. Because necessity is modal rather than a further “thing,” it avoids infinite regress.

3. Not only do method and content emerge together, TWB is self-referential or reflexive in examining its own process and cross-referential in continually checking its content against the published literature for possible error and enhancement.

4. The foundation in being allows a precise metaphysical side (IM) and a pragmatic side. Thus the epistemology is pure on one side but pragmatic on the other and this non-uniformity or non-purity is part of its strength. Similarly, the foundation in being requires no substance, but in the pragmatic side there may be as-if substance or substances. That is, an aspect of the strength of the metaphysics is that it is not pure—while it needs no substance it does not ban substance altogether. Purism in epistemology and metaphysics would be a defect.

5. Given the precise metaphysical side (IM), that we are limited makes grounding and realization cyclic rather than regressive. The grounding aspect of foundation is not an infinite regress but a helical process—iterative, deepening, and self-correcting.

6. Foundation is not in another being or substance, either remote or immanent—unless, of course, necessity is seen as an immanent being (which follows from the necessary realization under fp of all concepts, concrete or abstract).

7. But if there were nothing, the logic from the void still applies.

8. Necessity and logic are inherent in being but to talk of them we must build them up from concepts that arise in experience.

9. The universe is self-founding; the question of foundation deflates. Thinking through the previous steps reveals that the universe is self-founding, and the traditional question of foundation dissolves into the structure of being itself.

Features of the development

Here, we informally note some remarkable features of the system (TM).

Doubt and dialetheia

The crucial logical point of the demonstration of the ideal metaphysics (IM) is proof of the existence of the void.

Existence of the void – Demonstration 1. The existence and nonexistence of the void are equivalent, therefore the void may be taken to exist (two further proofs are given in the formal development).

This will of course be doubted. I have doubt, even though there is no inconsistency in the proof itself or in the foundation in being and experience. The doubt results from the claim of equivalence, the magnitude of the conclusions, and that to sharpen knowledge, doubt is essential.

My response to doubt is to suggest three options to the reader, (i) to simply accept the demonstration (ii) to accept the result but live with doubt and accept with the fundamental principle (fp) and IM as hypotheses which optimize expectation, metaphysical, existential, or both (iii) to reject the demonstration and the metaphysical system.

Option ii is the most philosophically fertile because doubt keeps the system – and action that flows from it – alive rather than dogmatic and metaphysically dead.

There is an interesting consideration regarding an assertion such as ‘the void exists and does not exist’.

Consider a contradiction such as ‘it is raining and it is not raining’. In standard propositional calculus the truth of a proposition and its negation imply that all propositions are true (and false), which is commonly called ‘explosion’. How can we defuse explosion? Consider that ‘it is raining and it is not raining’ could mean ‘it is raining in New York but not in Beijing’. For standard logic to apply, symbols for objects must be precise, e.g., one symbol : one object (such considerations pertain to the domain of applicability of any logic).

There is a literature on what are called ‘dialetheia’. A dialetheia is a true contradiction, e.g., ‘A and not A’ (meaning, it is true that A and not A), where A is a proposition. Dialetheism is the thesis that there are true dialetheia. See my article Dialetheia and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Dialetheism.

Some proponents of dialetheism hold that it obtains because (i) there are dialetheia (a strong claim if the propositions are truly contradictory) (ii) the universe is inherently contradictory (a stronger claim). Critics assert that dialetheism leads to explosion.

The ‘rain’ example suggests that there are no actual dialetheia, but only propositions that are in the form of dialetheia. In my article, linked above, I argue, tentatively, based on a variety of examples, there are no actual dialetheia. In my article, all the examples depend on artifacts such as imprecision of symbols, metaphor, and shift in meaning. There is more, though: if a proposition that has the form of a dialetheia is such that explosion is defused, call it what you will, there is nothing exceptional to it (but this does not negate the usefulness of dialetheism for there are situations in which dialetheic logics are at least potentially useful).

Regarding the void, we can argue as follows. For most things, existence means that there is an object that can be experienced (later: there is an object corresponding to the concept). And since we live in a world that is experienced, we translate ‘most things’ into ‘all things’. However, this is inadequate regarding the void.

But this does not prove that the meaning of existence must shift for the void. Here is an argument that the meaning of existence must not just shift, but be broadened.

A proof of existence of the void was given above. A second proof, given in the formal development, shows that, though (or even if) the void is not experienced, it is a source of that which can be experienced. Thus, while the meaning of ‘existence’ for manifest objects is ‘there is a real object that corresponds to the concept’, for the void, the meaning must shift: ‘real object’ must be changed to ‘potential object’.

A counter argument is that ‘potential’ is something and therefore cannot reside in the void. However, a response to this counter is the idea of potential being something is based on potential as causation and there is no necessity to causation projecting to the entire universe and the void.

The void is neither causal potential nor unreal; it reveals the conceptual possible as indeed — as actually — possible.

Logic, science, and argument

If something violates the laws of physics, it cannot obtain where those laws obtain.

However, if for it to obtain would violate logic, it cannot obtain at all (e.g., in any world, actual or possible; and note that the phrase ‘it cannot obtain at all’ eliminates any need to refer our development to ‘possible worlds’—to the contrary, it may found the concept and object of the notion of possible worlds).

Therefore, logic defines the greatest possibility. Here, of course, we are thinking of strict logic, e.g., deduction as used in mathematics, not induction or abduction as used in generalizing and in science.

It is common to make a comparison between science and strict logic—induction / abduction is ‘probable’; strict logic is certain.

However, the comparison is not appropriate—it compares reason to a scientific theory with reason under strict logic.

If, on the other hand, we compare arriving at a scientific theory to a logic (e.g., propositional calculus), the conclusion is not certain (there are alternative propositional logics, e.g., three valued logics)—we see the beginnings of a true parallel.

The parallel is completed when we note that inference under both science and strict logic can be strict (it could also be non-strict if the science were less than precise as in the theory of evolution and the logic was ‘fuzzy’).

Thus, there is a general sense of ‘logic’ that covers induction / abduction and strict / deductive logic.

In philosophy, ‘argument’ has been relatively recently used to describe establishment of facts via inference from given facts.

It has been used in the context of deduction: if the deduction is correct, the argument is ‘valid’, if, further, the fact is true, the conclusion is true, and the argument is ‘sound’.

In mathematics, the basic ‘facts’ are axioms. Here, however, the basic facts are about the world. Usually, such facts are imprecise and incompletely certain.

Are there any certain facts? Yes—(i) the fact that there is experience and so (as we will see) being, beings, and the universe (ii) the existence of the void is found to be necessary, from which all possibilities are necessary (somewhere in the universe including the universe itself) and thus there are facts that are absolutely necessary.

That is, there are strict arguments—there is strict argument—based in necessary fact and certain inference.

On the less than certain side, there are imprecise, perhaps not entirely certain facts, and induction / abduction, as in science.

Thus, just as logic may be thought to bifurcate into probable and certain inference, so, argument may also bifurcate to the same options.

I.e., the term argument could be used to refer to the establishment by whatever means, so long as it falls under reason (and not, e.g., superstition or dogma)

It is my preference to use ‘logic’ for this umbrella notion of argument and then classify logic according to fact vs inference and likely vs certain, however, I continue to use ‘argument’ so as not to overload convention.

An example: logic from ordinary language

Comment 3. It is a project to clarify and make precise the content of this section and to also consider predicate calculi.

Some fundamental laws of logic are

1. The law of identity—each thing is identical to itself, expressed A º A, or that a proposition implies itself. The law has exceptions if A is insufficiently well defined. Thus “it is raining is” the same as “it is raining”, which as we have seen requires it to be specific as to location (and time) and thus the law of identity is not universal.

2. The law of noncontradiction, encountered earlier, that a proposition cannot be both true and false. It was implied earlier that logic follows from relationships among concepts; thus “it is raining” and “it is not raining” cannot apply to the same object and are therefore mutually exclusive. However, as seen earlier, for the law to hold, the proposition must be sufficiently specific.

3. The law of the excluded middle—every proposition is true or false, i.e., there is no third option. Without sufficient discrimination, it is possible for propositions to have some third, e.g., intermediate, truth value or no truth value at all”, for example, “on a nonexistent planet neither true nor false that it is raining”.

These ‘laws of logic’ are fundamental to standard logical systems but do not obtain in some nonstandard but useful systems; an example, suggested by “it is raining and it is not raining”, is a system of nonstandard logic for contexts in which some propositions are both true and false (e.g., systems in which such propositions are both, a third truth value ‘b’, and thus, in the system, neither ‘t’ nor ‘f’ (true or false).

It is clear that for these ‘laws’, often thought absolute, especially in the past, to obtain, the language being used must be sufficiently precise and if that precision obtains, the laws are trivially true.

Standard logics

What we call standard logics here are those for which the fundamental laws obtain, especially the propositional and first order predicate calculi (the syllogisms fall here too).

In the propositional calculus, there are propositions or statements, which are one of t or f. There are truth functions. An example is negation. If A is a proposition, its negation, written, ~A, –A (preferred for compound statements), not A, or Ā (preferred). The negation of a statement is false if the statement is true and true if the statement is false. A second truth function is conjunction—if A and B are propositions, AÚB is the proposition ‘A and B’, such that it is true if and only if A and B are true. A third truth function, alternation, AÙB, ‘A or B’ such that it is true if and only if at least one of A and B are true (note this is the ‘logical or’, which is different from ‘or’ as it is usually used in English in which one and only one of the propositions true).

These functions are called truth functions because their truth value by and only by the truth values of their components (there is just one component for negation and two for each of conjunction and alternation).

The propositional calculus, concerns compound truth functions of propositions. It turns out that all truth functions can be expressed in terms of negation and conjunction or, alternative, in terms of negation and alternation (it further turns out that a single elementary truth function, e.g., the ‘Sheffer stoke’ is sufficient).

The essential question here is the requirements on language for the machinery of the propositional calculus to hold. It is first, that we are not concerned with non-logical ‘variables’, such as in mathematics. Second, we are concerned with propositions and their combinations but not in the inner structure of a system of non-compound propositions. Third, the propositions must be either true or false, but not both. Finally, there must be some non-compound propositions.

The arc of The Way of being

Its parts

The introduction explained what The Way of Being (TWB) is, its foundation, and its range. It has motivated TWB and outlines origins, personal and in world culture.

Recall that “The aim of The Way of Being is the shared discovery and realization of the ultimate—arising in, oriented toward, and expressed from our world”.

Discovery and realization will be based in (i) a phase that emphasizes knowledge, conceptual experiment, and criticism (ii) a phase that emphasizes being in the world and active directed at both the quality of the world as well as experiential and physical action toward the ultimate. These phases are of course intertwined.

These two phases are addressed in Part 2. An account of the world and Part 3. Pathways.

The final part, Part 4. Return, is a short account of what I will do, what readers may do, after having developed, lived with, or absorbed ‘The Way’.

Summary

The arc of The Way of being is: Into the way – Foundation (the account of the world) – Realization (the pathways) – Return.

Part 2. An account of the world

Being

Experience and being

Definition 2. When an appearance that seems to be of something, is indeed of the intended thing, e.g., is known to be neither fictional nor merely illusory, it is real (here, in ‘something’, ‘thing’ is entirely general and not restricted to entity, process, relation, property or other such kinds); otherwise, it is as-if (or as-if real, i.e., of unknown status, or at least partial illusion or fiction).

Definition 3. Experience is awareness in all kinds and levels (this definition, which includes consciousness, is extended later, not nominally, but as a consequence of the nature of the real).

Truth 1. That there is experience is known in that there is experience of experience. The objection that experience of experience may be illusory, is resolved in that illusion is experiential.

Definition 4. Choice is selection of thought or action from among real options.

Truth 2. Experience includes consciousness, receptive and active modes including choice; it has quality, intensity, and form – emotion and cognition with choice.

Definition 5. The structure of an experience is concept – relation – object, or, in detail, (i) a concept or as-if experience of – (ii) the relation (between the concept and the object) or the experience itself – and (iii) the object or as-if experienced (objects are not necessarily, but may be real; the problem of ‘as-if’, i.e., of appearance vs reality is noted; however, it is effective to allow its address to emerge with the development). A referential concept is a concept that has an intended object. In pure experience an object is absent because it is unintended, potential, or otherwise, or detached from the experience.

Definition 6. A definition is a conceptual specification (note that when the terms ‘is’ and ‘are’ are used in defining concepts, they may be but are not necessary temporal or concerning a particular place).

Definition 7. Abstraction is removal from a concept of all detail that may be subject to distortion or error (it is via abstraction that we know that there is experience itself and that there are being and real beings, e.g., experiential beings, and in terms of later definitions, the universe, the void, laws, logic, and metaphysics).

Definition 8. Perfect faithfulness of knowledge is perfect depiction as congruence of the forms of concept and (real) object so that truth and certainty have meaning and can be asserted (thus defined, perfect faithfulness is significant to the development of the metaphysics of TWB; and one source of perfect faithfulness is abstraction and important examples are given beginning with experience above and continuing with ‘being’ and related concepts below).

Informal commentary. In earlier versions of the work, being was introduced as existence, without defining existence, and without reference to the essential role of experience in existence and beinghood. What is that role? It is that without a concept, there is no being corresponding to a mere system of signs, but there may seem to be a being due to the implicit presence of a concept. This may be put “no concept, no being”. The deficit thinking in the earlier definitions is now remedied.

Definition 9. An existent is the real object of a referential concept; the plural of ‘an existent’ is existents. Existence is the property of existents as existents.

Definition 10. A being is the real object of a referential concept; the plural of ‘a being’ is beings. Being is the property of being as beings (while ‘being’ and ‘beings’ are conceptually distinct and being is not a being, with sufficient abstraction, the distinction vanishes).

Truth 3. While definition does not imply existence, there is being and there are beings (this conclusion is sound).

Truth 4. There is no being without the depictive or iconic concept (the linguistic sign without the associated icon is an empty label). In abstraction, the concept is implicit. A being is known as a being via its conception. Concepts are beings, as are concepts of a concept-being. The general being is a concept-being; the general object is the concept-object.

Definition 11. If the object is a being, it is said, as already noted, to exist; otherwise it is said to not exist, i.e., to be nonexistent (and thus the conception of an object as concept-object, trivially resolves the problem of nonexistent objects or beings and provides one conception of nonbeing).

Definition 12. When we want to refer to the depth of being or of a being, e.g., that of our being relative to our intellect, we will use the hyphenated forms be-ing and a be-ing (plural be-ings).

Definition 13. Society is a group of beings with institutions that promote their identity and well-being. Culture (in the words of EB Tylor) is “that complex whole which includes knowledge (including development, dissemination, and education), belief, art, morals, law, custom, institutions (government, economic, technological, military, and political), and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (additions and changes to Tylor’s definition have been italicized).

Being and beings

Significant meaning and value

Significant me aning and value

‘Meaning’ has two senses in this work. In this section it is ‘significant meaning’, as in the meaning of life or importance. The second sense is concept and linguistic meaning, which is introduced later.

Definition 14. We are accidental in that our immediate sense of why we have be-ing and what that be-ing is or may be is opaque to us (to what extent the opaqueness is absolute has emergence in the development).

Definition 15. Significant meaning and value are is whatever give be-ings the sense that they are more than mere accidents (though it is not emphasized, negative meaning would be what gives the sense of being less than a mere accident); it lies in the quality and form of their experience.

Assertion 7. Experience is the place, though not the sole source, of significant meaning and of our being. We are experiential beings. The being that does not register at least indirectly in some experience is effectively nonexistent (it is later seen that the word ‘effectively’ may be dropped; that the universe is experiential, where it is not necessary to use the term ‘effectively experiential’; and that such predication does not entail absence of material or mental qualities, real or as-if).

Definition 16. The sense of beauty or the beautiful is a joint emotive-cognitive sense of what gives beings pleasure to perceive or contemplate, with an emphasis on durability or permanence in time (and across ‘subjects’) of that sense. Objects and beings that are a source of the sense of beauty are beautiful.

Definition 17. The Intrinsic good or primary good is that which improves significant meaning of experiential (human) beings (particularly their well-being and community, safety, and security, their projects, the life well-lived and what it is to live well, the sense of the beautiful, what it is to live well, and culture as a way of expression). Right choice and action are those which promote intrinsic goodness.

Definition 18. Secondary goodness (is not experientially intrinsic but) promotes intrinsic goodness; the secondary good includes culture as a system of institutions and social arrangements (society itself, economic and political arrangements, and technology).

Definition 19. To be ethical is to choose thought and action that promotes what is good (here, there is no rejection of systematic ethics, but the personal is emphasized in interaction with the systematic and the large scale). Ethics is study, systematic and other, of what thought and action are ethical (ethics is not primarily about the abstract good or right). Metaethics is about the nature of ethics and ethical judgement (but as topic in itself is not particularly important in this work). Applied ethics is about what is ethical in concrete situations and institutions (it is currently, in 2026, a broad subject and some examples are taken up in this work).

Definition 20. Government is group decision making and its institutions for decision and implementation. A foundation government in a fundamental value of experiential being in small and large scale choice may be called democracy, especially liberal democracy (as explained, just below), which is democracy with (institutional) protection for all beings and groups as far as not dedicated to destructive ends.

Assertion 8. A concern regarding the promotion of experiential beings is the balance between self- and group- interest. Where, in the movement of society, do we move – and want to move – toward? The problem arises in all societies, but it is a special concern in democracy.

Truth 5. Thus, liberal democracy has secondary goodness (in this sense, the idea behind democracy is close to intrinsic goodness and is not just as one of many possible systems of government – it is not a system of government at all, but functions as a principle for systems which is derived from fundamentals; this conception is effective in that under it, the instrumental effectiveness of democracy is a pragmatic rather than conceptual or ideological concern).

Knowledge

The kind of knowledge considered here is factual, expressed as a statement and its establishment may be perception (‘direct’) or inference from established facts.

Language, concept meaning, and knowledge

Definition 21. There is a range of sophistication (self-reflection, criticism, and creativity) in the use of language and experience. Ordinary experience, ordinary language, ordinary reason, and ordinary knowledge, though not unsophisticated, lie in a region on a spectrum toward the everyday, and away from institutional, specialist, academic and standards setting uses.

Assertion 9. Ordinary language (and experience) is a ground for discovery, expression, and justification of knowledge as beginning framework for the formal development (which, though it begins with the ordinary, it does not presume it—the ordinary is improved upon in the formal development via precision of meaning of terms and reason via relations among terms). From the ‘ordinary’, via abstraction, we may arrive and precise meaning and knowledge and certain inference.

Definition 22. (The following repeats some material from the earlier definition on the structure of experience.) A concept is a mental content. A referential concept is a concept in referential form, i.e., a concept that is intended to refer to an object, real or fictitious. The association of a sign (elementary or compound, where the structure of a compound sign may reflect the structure of the object) with a concept constitutes a linguistic concept. The meaning, conceptual or linguistic, of a referential concept is the concept and its possible references (objects) in use (this constitutes a three part meaning of meaning as sign – concept – object). Knowledge is meaning realized.

Truth 6. The three part meaning of meaning as in The Meaning of Meaning, by C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, has necessity in that signs devoid of even indirect iconic content cannot refer. It has sufficiency so far shared signs have common associations. Though it does not exhaust an understanding of meaning, it is effective in this development. Its virtues include that (i) confusion in search for meaning of a vaguely understood term may be resolved by seeing the search as in a sign – concept – object space, suggested by H.A. Simon’s notion of search in a dual space of concept and object, and (ii) it can neatly resolve the problem of negative existentials (see Nonexistent Objects – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for a definition of the problem) via the earlier definition of a nonexistent object (or nonbeing).

Definition 23. The intension of a concept specifies the nature of the term, e.g., in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (specifying the intension does not imply that the concept has objects). The extension or range of a concept specifies to what real objects the concept refers.

Definition 24. A fact is a true assertion (knowledge is factual; it concerns the way the world is – the way things are, where ‘is’ and ‘are’ may be but are not necessarily temporal).

Definition 25. Knowledge or belief are true and certain when it is indubitable that their content corresponds to the fact(s) to which they are intended to refer (notes—some accounts of knowledge do not require absolute certainty; while certainty is desirable in some endeavors, it may not be the case that it is always desirable, e.g., to base action on it; though correspondence is not the only ‘theory’ of truth, it is, as will be seen, adequate to the needs of TWB; finally, a more comprehensive account of knowledge, one that takes into account the developments for TWB, is presented in, knowledge / world under development in longer versions of this work)

Discovery

Definition 26. Discovery is a creative phase of knowledge acquisition (though significant to TWB, it is not the focus of this discussion of knowledge and argument, which is amplified later; however, it crucial to ultimate—human—endeavor and knowledge, for it is unlikely that all is known regarding knowledge acquisition and negotiation of the world; thus, we cannot afford to rely only on established or certified means of argument and ought to be open to ‘what works’ and to discovery, not just of ‘things’ but also of means or method).

Argument

Definition 27. An argument is establishment of fact (to argue is to establish a fact; here we consider only argument in itself rather than kinds of argument specific to restricted fields of inquiry; note that this definition is related but not identical to common conceptions of ‘argument’; the elements of argument are direct establishment of fact and indirect establishment, or inference of a fact or conclusion from an established fact or premise;).

Definition 28. An argument is certain when it establishes that the conclusion is certain and likely when it is thought to be likely according an accepted kind of inference and degree of likelihood.

Direct argument

Definition 29. Direct argument is direct establishment of a fact (by observation including measurement, which may be contingently precise or imprecise, and, which may, in some cases, be necessary).

Truth 7. In direct argument certainty is possible via relaxation of precision and by abstraction. Some facts are intrinsic in that their truth is necessary (e.g., that there is experience or, equivalently, that experience has being; a later example is necessity of existence of the void and its consequence that the universe realizes all possibility in the greatest sense of possibility).

Assertion 10. Direct establishment is likely when doubt is low or accuracy is high. Precision may be confirmed by corroboration or theoretical agreement with other facts.

Indirect argument or inference from established fact

Definition 30. Inference is valid conclusion of entities in fact form and called conclusions from other such entities called premises, such that if the premises have truth (facticity), then so do the conclusions.

Definition 31. In indirect argument, conclusions are established in two stages (i) direct establishment of premises (ii) inference from premises to conclusions (which gives strength to the claim of truth for the conclusions as elaborated below).

Certain inference

Definition 32. In certain inference, if the premises, P, are true, the conclusions, C, are certainly true (abbreviated: if P, then C, or P ® C).

Assertion 11. Sources of certainty are (i) precise reasoning, which is obtained as below in deduction and intrinsic inference (ii) that in such reasoning (though there may be exceptions), the conclusions contain only information that was at least implicitly present in the premises (they may seem to say more because the chain of connection is not transparent to beings with limited intellect – but would of course be transparent to a limitless being.)

Assertion 12. When the information in the conclusion is already at least implicit in the premise, the inference is called nonampliative, which is formally defined below. Certainty is a function of an argument being explicitly or implicitly nonampliative. Though certain inference is not ampliative, it may be effectively so when the a direct or indirect argument not obvious and even counter to received expectation.

Definition 33. Deduction is certain inference from premises to conclusions which is stepwise via laws of logic (its power lies in that it is explicit and open to inspection, and, given logic, the conclusions are implicit in the premises; also note that some basic modes of deduction are the propositional and predicate calculi and a range of extended and variant logics, which, of course, are not asserted to exhaust the possibilities of deductive inference; note, further, that this does not eliminate the possibility of non-explicit certain inference as in, intuited and received results).

Definition 34. In intrinsic inference, the conclusion is established without recourse to premises (this is related and, at least in some cases, maybe identical to intrinsic fact; though intrinsic inference may seem absurd or counter-foundational, there are examples, e.g., that there is experience and a later one will be the equivalence of existence and nonexistence for nothingness which will also be called ‘the void’).

Assertion 13. The certain inferences in this work include the intrinsic and the deductive.

Likely inference

Definition 35. In likely inference (or reasonable inference), if the premises are true, or likely to be true, the conclusions are also likely to be true (examples of sources of sub-certainty include, first, that the conclusions are ampliative – also defined below – i.e., contain information not present in the premises, or that the reasoning is ‘rough’ in some sense).

Definition 36. In induction, some observations of instances and regularities, are generalized or lead to general principles. Abduction is argument to the best explanation (and is significant in science). In inference by analogy, if two systems are similar in some ways, similarity in some other ways is concluded. (That these are recognized modes of likely inference does not eliminate the possibility that intuited and received results could be likely).

Assertion 14. Such inference is typically more than a process from premise to conclusion but is seen as strengthened with buttressing information or inference and repeated confirmation. Further, the above modes (induction etc) may be used together and may be incomplete as modes of likely inference. Manifest patterns may perhaps be thought of as intrinsic and likely inference. The likely inferences in what follows are abductive and analogical.

Transitivity of inference

Definition 37. When inference is in more than one step, it may be of the following form: given A ® B and B ® C, then A ® C. This is transitivity of inference, which guarantees the validity of ‘long’ proofs in deductive logic (however, transitivity of inference, even if it has meaning, may not obtain in likely inference).

Assertion 15. Thus deduction is fundamentally different from likely inference, not just in reliability, but also in kind.

Argumentative strength

Both direct and inference indirect establishment can be certain; and both can be less than certain but good in terms of appropriate criteria or in restricted settings.

The certain case

Definition 38. An argument is valid if the conclusion certainly follows from the premise (a standard approach is step-by-step, via rules of deduction). A valid argument is sound if the premise is true (significant sound arguments are identified, sometimes with just the word ‘sound’). A necessary argument is a certain inference from the empty fact (an important example will be given).

The less than certain case

Definition 39. In the less than certain case, the argument is good if the conclusion likely follows (e.g., with pragmatic certainty) from the premise. A good argument is strong if the argument and premise are likely enough that the conclusion is likely (significant and strong arguments are identified as strong; in absence of such an identifier, the argument is regarded as at least reasonable).

Ampliative vs nonampliative argument

Definition 40. An argument is nonampliative if the conclusions are explicitly or tacitly (e.g., via relations between meanings) already present in the premises (thus deductive inference in mathematics results in theorems that are already at least implicit in the axioms and postulates). In ampliative argument, the conclusions contain essentially new factual material, i.e., material that is not tacit in the premises.

Assertion 16. The standard reasons for (i) (to repeat) the certainty of deduction is that it is nonampliative (for an omniscient being, deduction would not be necessary for the chain of inference would be transparent to it) (ii) the noncertainty of likely inference is that it is ampliative (of course, the omniscient being would see all patterns and the limits of the regions in which they obtain).

What argument does

Assertion 17. Argument synthesizes (i) knowledge and its establishment, i.e., content and method, (ii) e.g., the sciences – abstract and concrete, and (iii) as will be established later, knowledge, inspiration, and value.

Summation

We have completed the argument that precise method and content flow from ordinary language and experience and that science and logic fall under one umbrella, ‘argument’.

We have also argued that knowledge and value interact such that there is a tradeoff between precision and value.

Where concepts are abstracted to perfection, there is no need for a tradeoff between knowledge and value. Otherwise, tradeoff may be necessary. Another way to look at the situation is to observe that knowledge and value are intertwined in their very conception.

Beings

Being and beings

The concepts of being and beings are introduced above in being. Here we take up beings that frame the real metaphysics (TM). Other beings, especially experiential, peak, and other cosmological beings are taken up later.

The universe and its contents

Definition 41. The universe is all being.

Truth 8. There is exactly one universe; all (real) beings and (real) kinds are parts of it (sound, from the definition of ‘universe’). What we sometimes call ‘our universe’ or ‘other universes’ is an inappropriate use of the word ‘universe’; instead we shall use the term ‘cosmos’ (below).

Cosmoses

Definition 42. A cosmos is a causal domain in whose interactions with the rest of universe over the times of concern, are below the threshold of observation including measurement.

Truth 9. Our cosmos exists (it is a being; later it is found that there are limitlessly many cosmoses of limitless variety).

Laws

Definition 43. A pattern obtains for a being if the information to specify it is less than the raw information.

Definition 44. A law for a being is (our reading of) a pattern (usually of a degree of general applicability and for one or more cosmoses, typically abstract in nature).

Truth 10. Laws are beings.

The void and its existence

Definition 45. The void is the being that contains no beings (if it exists, it is an empty being and it contains no laws; that we talk of the void, as if there is just one, is justified later).

Comment 4. That we talk of ‘the void’ rather than ‘a void’ is justified later.

Truth 11. The void exists (this was proven earlier; two further demonstrations follow, one significance of which is the address of doubt).

Existence of the void – Demonstration 2. Assume the void does not exist. This implies that the universe is eternal and in eternity, give that there is at least one possibility (our world), by symmetry all possibilities occur and so the void must exist.

Existence of the void – Demonstration 3. The universe and the void are eternal. In eternity, the above symmetry argument goes through. Necessity is the ‘cause’ of the universe.

Truth 12. The rational foundation of the being of and cause of the universe is necessity.

Truth 13. There are no laws of the void (sound, from definitions).

Definition 46. A being that is not the void is manifest.

Meta physics

Definition 47. Metaphysics is knowledge and study of the real.

Assertion 18. Though the possibility and meaning of metaphysics are seen as having openness, here we are demonstrating possibility (our metaphysics has been underway, beginning with experience and being). Further, it will emerge that traditional through modern metaphysics—the idea and the topics—have significant intersection this conception of metaphysics.

Possibility

The concept of possibility

Definition 48. Given a concept of a being (entity, event, …), it is possible if nothing rules out its realization (existence).

Conceptual or logical possibility

Definition 49. A being whose existence is not ruled out by the concept alone is conceptually possible, which defines logical possibility, sometimes called subjective possibility (because it is thinkable without contradiction).

Definition 50. A maximally expressive language is one that would be capable of describing all logical possibility (note that this does not imply that such a language exists, even if language in discrete signs is enhanced to include the perceivable state of the communicator).

Definition 51. Logical possibility is the greatest possibility in the sense that, presuming logic(s) for a maximally expressive language, the being has realized logical possibility has realized all that can be realized.

Definition 52. Limitlessness for a being is realization of the possible (and, optionally, the impossible—because it explicitly includes the void among the limitless but makes no difference for manifest being). A being that realizes the greatest possibility is limitless (sound, from the concept of limitlessness).

Assertion 19. Infinities are not inherently limitless; the limitless is not inherently infinite, but it has or contains (all) infinities.

Real possibility

Definition 53. If, further, the existence of the being is not ruled out by the nature universe (or the locale, e.g., a cosmos, in which it is embedded), it has real possibility, sometimes called ontological possibility (or, if it is for a locale, relatively real possibility, of which an example is physical possibility—the possibility in terms of known physical laws, which are, in all likelihood, imperfect). (Note that these meanings are not universal)

Assertion 20. Logical possibility is a prerequisite for real possibility; real possibility presumes logical possibility.

Definition 54. Real possibility may be local, in which it is relative to a limited world, or global, in which it is relative to the universe.

Comment 5. Is it helpful to have the definition above.

Impossibility and necessity

Definition 55. A being that is not possible is impossible.

Definition 56. A being whose nonbeing (nonexistence) is impossible is necessary.

Definition 57. A fundamental cause is itself without cause.

Assertion 21. A being cannot be the fundamental cause of the universe for that would require the being to be without cause or infinite regress. Therefore, the only cause can be modal. However, since possibility is unsatisfactory, the only satisfactory cause of the universe would be necessity—which will be demonstrated to be the case.

The range of possibility

This discussion has been about the concept of possibility. The range of possibility, also of great interest, is best deferred till after the universe has been shown to be limitless and the concept of robust worlds has been developed.

Comment 6. Enter link to robust worlds above.

The limitless universe

The limitlessness of being and the universe

Truth 14. If from the void the greatest possibility did not emerge, that would be (constitute) a law of the void. Therefore, all logical possibility is emerges from or is necessarily equivalent to the void. That is, the logical and real possibilities are, in fact, the same, even though the conceptions are (at least seemingly) different. Since there has been no assumption in making this conclusion, absolute necessity is the cause of the universe (sound, given existence of the void).

Assertion 22. This resolves (what Heidegger called) the fundamental problem of metaphysics, i.e., why there is being at all, i.e., why there is something rather than nothing.

Truth 15. The universe is the realization of the greatest possibility (this is the fundamental principle of metaphysics, abbreviated fp).

Truth 16. The universe—equivalently, the void—confers greatest possibility on all beings (for otherwise there would be a limit on the universe; also sound).

Alternative demonstrations of limitlessness

These demonstrations parallel the proofs of existence of the void. Reasons for their provision are (i) uncovering the ‘deep’ logic of the emerging metaphysics (ii) to address doubt.

Second demonstration (the first is above). Either the universe does not enter a void state or it does not. If not, it is eternal and, in eternity, given that at least one possibility obtains (our world), by symmetry all possibilities occur—which contradicts the premise that the universe does not enter the void state. Therefore, the universe enters the void state and the earlier demonstration goes through.

Third demonstration. The system of universe and the void are eternal. In eternity, the above symmetry argument goes through; necessity is the ‘cause’ of the universe.

Truth 17. The rational foundation of the being of and cause of the universe is necessity.

Assertion 23. This is a ‘logically satisfying conclusion for the possibilities of foundation are (i) another being (ii) regress (iii) possibility or necessity. However, there is no ‘other being’ and so foundation in a being would be self-foundation which is not a foundation at all. Further, regress and possibility (and probability) are less than satisfactory for they allow that the universe might not be manifest at all, which leaves necessity as the only satisfactory and demonstrated foundation (necessity could be seen as self-foundation).

Some significant consequences

Comment 7. Following is one core of a ‘center-out’ approach to presentation.

All beings

Truth 18. The universe has identity (given limitlessness in the sense defined above, this and the remaining conclusions in this section, ‘all beings’, are sound).

Truth 19. The universe and its identity are limitless in extension, duration, variety, peaking of being and dissolution; it contains cosmoses without limit to kind and number. Every cosmos is as-if an atom in another and every cosmos contains as-if atoms that are cosmoses.

Truth 20. All beings inherit the limitlessness of the universe—they realize peak being (this can also be derived from the fact that a being and the being-and-the-void are identical). The realization of peaks by all beings is not a contradiction, for they merge as one in the peaks.

Truth 21. Birth and death are real—and this is not a contradiction, for, though real, they and death are not absolute. Beings have limited form on limited scales but on death they diffuse into the background, from which they emerge on birth.

Truth 22. It is in higher forms that we see across the multitude of forms that do not seem to communicate with one another (while we are in limited form and do not see that we can see and therefore do not attempt to do so). Knowledge of our limitlessness is revealed in higher forms, but not only their—there may be communication among lower forms via peak being; communication across the void equivalent of peaks is to be examined.

Truth 23. From the limitlessness of beings as well as from the void, the identity of all being is present in both the extended distribution of being as well as in an instant; yet, in our limited experience and local time and its perception, this instant encompasses lifetimes – lifetimes of individuals, cosmoses, and cosmoses of cosmoses (and so on). We are both limited and limitless. While there may be eternities and infinities of extension between lower manifestations of a being, those limitlessnesses are experienced as no more than a point.

Truth 24. There are paths in, for, and from this world to the ultimate (a careful specification of paths is given later).

On perfection, pleasure, and pain

Truth 25. In most received senses of ‘perfection’ there is no final perfection. Pain, doubt, and pleasure are inevitable. Effective attitudes toward perfection, pleasure, pain, and doubt, are in sharing, mutual support, and pleasure in being on a path of realization, addressed further in pathways.

The universe

Truth 26. The cause of the manifest universe is necessity (sound).

Assertion 24. What is the edge of the known universe? It may have edges duration and extension. It also has edges having to do with strength of interaction; this edge is everywhere.

The void

Truth 27. There is effectively one void (the number of voids presumed to exist has no relevance to the real). The void is the empty being (sound).

Knowledge

Assertion 25. The limit of knowledge (i.e., for a limitless being) and of the universe are identical—of logical possibility.

Living in two worlds

Comment 8. Placement?

The two worlds

Assertion 26. Thus, we live in two worlds in the following sense. We live in the world of ‘ordinary’ experience (the big bang). But we also live in a larger world—the universe—which is real, which we do not necessarily see, but which we can know by rational thought.

Living in two worlds as one

A part of the difficulty of this view is the contrast between the two views. One may overcome this difficulty by (i) accepting the difficulty (ii) living with it (iii) becoming accustomed to it (iv) to the point where the two views merge and we no longer habitually resort to one or the other (v) living in light of the immediate and the ultimate as one as a guide to life in this world and life beyond death, birth, and finitude.

An ideal metaphysics

Definition 58. Limitlessness defines a perfect and ideal metaphysics (the perfection is in the sense of perfect faithfulness of the metaphysics as concept to the universe as object, which follows from fp, is illustrated above, and whose developed into full-fledged account of being, the universe, its beings, and their changes, in what follows).

Assertion 27. In greater detail, from the perfection in the abstraction in the concept of being, there is a perfect and ideal metaphysics, a framework, summarized – the universe is the realization of the greatest possibility, which gives us an ultimate value, realization of the greatest possibility.

Real metaphysics

Definition 59. When the ideal metaphysics is adjoined to at least pragmatically valid knowledge, what results is named the real metaphysics (TM)or just the metaphysics.

Truth 28. Though TM is not perfectly faithful in entirety, the framework remains faithful. Further, it is the best that limited (human) beings have, and as a practical instrument toward ultimate knowledge and realization, it is perfect relative to the value of realization. TM is a dynamic unity, for the ideal side illuminates and guides the pragmatic while the pragmatic illustrates and is an instrument for the ideal. That is, the criterion for TM is dual—epistemic perfection and valuational (ethical and aesthetic).

Assertion 28. Alternatively, we may see metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory as an integral whole.

TM implies existence of all possibility and possible worlds which may have temporary but not permanent isolation. Are all possible worlds of the same significance? This is taken up in the sections on metaphysical possibility through the significant universe.

Metaphysical possibility

Definition 60. By metaphysical possibility, we understand (i) ‘what may occur under a system of metaphysics’ or (ii) what may occur under conditions of realism, e.g., whether an unembodied mind is possible.

Assertion 29. If one accepts (say) physics as determining what is real, then the systems of metaphysical possibility #i and physical possibility are the same.

Assertion 30. Under TM the metaphysics, metaphysical possibility, logical possibility, and (metaphysical) reality are the same.

Assertion 31. The interest in metaphysical possibility #ii is that it distinguishes reasonable from the most inclusive possibility. In this work the topic has been explored, imaginatively and with input from world literature.

Assertion 32. Systematic development of reasonable possibility is an ongoing project.

Robust worlds

Definition 61. A robust world or cosmos is one that is significant because it has an adequate combination of endurance in time, beings capable of cognitive experience, and causal ability to register in experience. By contrast, a bizarre world, is transient, does not register significantly in the experience of experiential beings. And a bizarre explanation is a non-standard ‘explanation’ of the existence of a robust world that seems to rob it of significance, e.g., that our world came into existence a moment ago complete with apparent history and memories.

Truth 29. Though possible, bizarre worlds and bizarre explanations are real but seemingly of limited significance and probability.

Truth 30. Yet the fact of bizarrely created worlds have the significance that even if our world is non-bizarre (robust as defined below), it may meaningfully but bizarrely transform to other very different but robust worlds.

Truth 31. In the robustness of our world we are part of peak process – on the way to peaking – for a robust concept of ‘god’ is a process and peaking that is the world or worlds and is neither alien in kind nor remote in extension and duration, i.e., space and time (a strong conclusion).

The significant universe*

See master version for a tentative outline.

Topics in metaphysics and philosophy*

See the master version.

Experience

Comment 9. Change to ‘Experiential Being and Universe’?

Comment 10. Add comments on adaptation and the dimensions of experience!

Part 3. Pathways

Part 4. Return

Return

Having reflected on our place and trajectory in the universe, while acting out and upon these reflections, we return to focus on action and transformation, emphasizing the immediate, the ultimate, and their mesh. Return is a complement to Part 1. Into to The Way of Being. Here, there is an emphasis on a place of quiet, contemplation, and reflection on what is essential. However, it is not a final place. Rather, it is part of a cyclic process, and from ‘return’, we may begin again from the beginning or at any point in the cycle of our individual and social life. ‘Return’ is also looking inward, so as to more effectively act in the world.

Truth 32. We are the ultimate even – especially – when we do not see it. Our work, if we choose it, is to see and realize the ultimate in sharing, while attending to immediate ground, informed by our new understanding.

The focus

Definition 62. Return signifies a focus on the world that is freshened by a new point of view. The focus is an ongoing ‘conversation’ between reflection, ideas, sharing and publication; the world and the ultimate; and action and realization.

Focus – interaction and conversation among living in the immediate, community, and realization under The Way of Being. A time of living in the present, for the present as (if it is) ultimate. The foci include foundation (ideas, writing, publishing) and becoming (realization; attention to the categories of nature, society, psyche, and the universal; unition; sharing).

Action – the categories, with emphasis on immersion.

Publishing – see universal narrative, below.

Perception – seeing the world as it is, in balance with the lens of concepts.

Retreat and renewal

Retreat and renewal – for sustenance of attitude and immersion in a path to the ultimate—as the occasion arises and annual or biannual.

Places – home; extended nature and culture travel for immersion, renewal, and ad hoc and other inspiration in the moment

Universal narrative

Introduction

Synthesis – It is of value to have a synthesis of the history of thought. In doing so individuals have been important, especially because some thinkers are occasions for fundamental advance. However, it is also useful to focus on ideas.

The status of the literature of ideas – Today we refer back to thinkers about 2500 years ago, that is, to the earliest written words in philosophy. What if, instead, there were 10,000, 100,000, or 1 million years of written history? In formulating philosophical thought, would it be required to refer to all important thinkers of the last million years? If philosophical thought continues for another, say, 10,000 years would not referring back, become an impediment to new thought?

What is required – Some of the seminal thinkers of the future will be summarizers and synthesizers. They will capture the essences of thousands of years of philosophy. This will make for productive new, thinking. This will, of course, not prevent any thinker from referring to the detailed record (and perhaps some kind of systematic databases will be available to help minimize the labor of back referral).

Writing and updating universal narrative

Writing and updating the narrative shall be an ongoing and shared project.

1. Sharing is an intrinsic (community) value in being and becoming; sharing will address the problems of limited time and expertise of a single writer.

2. The problem of coherence and inspiration will be addressed by a team under inspired leadership.

3. For The Way of Being – continued development, publication, advertising, sharing, and realization.

On universal narrative

Assertion 33. Synthesis – the history of ideas and endeavor rewritten, perhaps once a generation or at cultural paradigm shifts, as a single and evolving text (and oral and ideational tradition). The synthesis will be concept centered with individual thinkers as a secondary emphasis.

Comment 11. Add link to ‘institute’.

Planning†

Uses of terms—new and variant

Part 1. Into to The Way of Being

Foundational issues

Doubt and dialetheia

Logic, science, and argument

An example: logic from ordinary language

Some fundamental laws of logic are

Standard logics

Part 2. An account of the world

Being

Experience and being

Significant meaning and value

Language, concept meaning, and knowledge

Direct argument

Indirect argument or inference from established fact

Certain inference

Likely inference

Transitivity of inference

Argumentative strength

The certain case

The less than certain case

Ampliative vs nonampliative argument

What argument does

Being and beings

Metaphysics

The concept of possibility

Conceptual or logical possibility

Real possibility

Impossibility and necessity

The range of possibility

The limitlessness of being and the universe

Alternative demonstrations of limitlessness

Some significant consequences

All beings

On perfection, pleasure, and pain

The universe

The void

Knowledge

Living in two worlds

The two worlds

Living in two worlds as one

Metaphysical possibility

The significant universe*

Part 3. Pathways

Part 4. Return

Universal narrative

Planning^†

Significant me aning and value

Meta physics