|
The Way of being Anil Mitra,
Copyright © First Edition – 2002 Contents How to revise a document or part of a document Part 1. Into to The Way of Being On illusion and its implications for the nature of the real An example: logic from ordinary language Part 2. An account of the world Language, concept meaning, and knowledge Topics in metaphysics and philosophy* Experience as universal and in detail The concept of experience extended to all being The fundamental nature of experience and reasons for its deferred treatment How shall we extend the concept of experience? Meaning and justification of the extension There is experience; and it is known by there being experience of experience We are On consciousness and consciousness studies The detailed structure of experience The
universe is Identity, extension, and duration Introduction – categories in philosophy and in this work The categories and dynamics according to their levels and paradigms More on paradigms and dynamics Writing and updating universal narrative Planning for The Way of Being† Planning†PlanNowNow > (i) method and content as one (ii) “This aspect of meaning is good for TWB at present, other aspects such as ‘use’ may be incorporated and integrated later. Metaphysics > the significant universe On design and planningMinimize plans in all site docs > paste special to design and planning. Sources to go to design and planning organized by division. HowGeneralMinimal; do it. Top ® down 1. Outline (improve titles later) 2. Fill in (decide secondary content such as notation while doing this). Conventions etc., on the go; rethink / rework ‘Truth’ and ‘Assertion’ styles. New outline – rational, then import axiomatic to new outline as axiomatic. RethinkResourceSee the master edition for details StylesDefinition – Alt + F. Truth – Alt + Ctrl + Shift + T. Assertion – Alt + Shift + A Main-mini – Ctrl + 9 Main-mini-list – Alt + Ctrl + ; How to revise a document or part of a document1. Go through the document, writing down the main points. 2. Note repetition. 3. Collect together the main points, so as to eliminate inessential repetition. 4. Write out the main points, then order them. 5. Rewrite. The Way of Being NotationAbbreviationsTWB – The Way of Being. TM – The real metaphysics; the system of knowledge instrumental to realizing the ultimate. IM – The ideal metaphysics; the abstracted, perfect side of TM. fp – The fundamental principle (of metaphysics); the proven assertion that the universe is the realization of the greatest possibility. TerminologyDefinitions – Numbered items that introduce concepts. Though they resemble elements of an abstract axiomatic system, their function includes to point to the real (thus, the definitions are more than just specifications of concepts and unless what they point to is manifestly real, its reality must be demonstrated); how they perform this function is explained in the introduction and worked out in detail, later. Definitions are formal or informal according to whether they are in the formal or informal parts of the work. Material in (parentheses) is elaboration or commentary. Assertions – Statements asserted as true on the basis of argument – informal; meta, e.g., about the formal development (method or content); and comments. Truths – Statements whose truth is either manifest or derived from manifest truths. They include what could be called ‘axioms’, ‘postulates’, or ‘theorems’. As will be seen, it is inherent in the development that method, foundation, and further content emerge together and therefore definition, axiom, and postulate intersect. Uses of terms—new and variantBe-ing – The word ‘Being’ will be used as abstract in the sense that essential distortion has been removed from the concept, which is a strength in that it empowers precision. However, the abstraction also removes the depth and ineffability that is powerful in historical use of ‘being’. Thus, a term to connote what has been lost in abstraction is an essential need; ‘be-ing’ will be used to provide that connotation. Experience – this term has been used in many senses. As used in positivism, it was limited, e.g., to sense data, the point (in positivism) being that sense data is given, and the aim then was to derive all knowledge from it. An extended meaning of experience is identified and identifiable subjective mental content, including what is below conscious awareness but must, by inference, exist. Here, the use of ‘experience’ shall be (i) awareness in all its levels, kinds, and forms (ii) justified extension to the ‘root of being’ (the meaning of which shall be explained and the extension justified (iii) experience as ‘ground of being’ parallel to an ultimately abstract conception of being also as ground. Meaning – this term has two senses in this work, (i) as in a family of meanings suggested by the terms ‘the meaning of life’, ‘significance’ or ‘importance’ (ii) concept and linguistic meaning. Both senses are important—the first as what is meaningful, e.g., why we aspire to anything at all; the second is crucial to concept development—a lack of proper understanding of it in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions results in confused and limited understanding; such an understanding is developed in the formal system. Where the use is not clear from the context the terms ‘significant-’ and ‘concept-’ or ‘linguistic-’ meaning will be used. Unition – a term for (i) the insight that individual and universal identity are locally distinct but ultimately the same (the insight is shown to hold) (ii) knowledge pertaining to the insight and ways of realizing ultimate identity for and beginning in our world. The ultimate identity is a state of being but is also experienced as an endless process of peaking and dissolution. ‘Unition’ is a neologism whose meaning is closely related to the meaning of ‘yoga’ as it originated in what is now called South Asia, inclusive of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Miscellaneous notationWhen a term is An asterisk or star (*) marks material that is very much in process. A section marked with a star may be empty or have just an outline. A dagger (†) marks temporary material that will be removed from final versions. Part 1. Into to The Way of BeingThe material of ‘Into’ serves as an informal introduction. The formal system of the work appears in an account of the world. Comment 1. Format tabs, add heading here, introduce doubt. PreliminaryAssertion 1. In the realm of ordinary and everyday experience, our cosmos is limited. Yet this limitedness is fully consistent with the universe—the realm of the ordinary and beyond—being the realization of the greatest possibility (that we do not experience all possibilities is true as far as we do not experience the entire universe). The claim that all possibility is realized, proven later, is the fundamental principle of metaphysics (fp). In what follows, (i) the meaning of limitlessness is formalized and expressed in common terms, (ii) the limitlessness of the universe and its beings is demonstrated, and (iii) the consequences of limitlessness are developed and shown to bear immense significance for life as it is lived now and across the unbounded realms of being. Assertion 2. The aim of The Way of Being (TW)is the shared discovery and realization of the ultimate—arising in, oriented toward, and starting from our world. Assertion 3.
The main concepts of TW center on being and experience because (i) the use of
being states simply that ‘things are what they are,’ without reference to any
other foundational idea, and this very triviality makes it foundational both
to the conceptual development and as a conceptual container for our
experiential being and becoming; (ii) thus, being, as used here, is trivial
compared with its use in existentialist philosophy, but, as just noted, this
is a strength, and what might otherwise be lost is assigned to ‘be-ing,’ which
is within being rather than of it; (iii) in summary, the present use of
‘being’ avoids the imprecision of its use in existentialist philosophy while
preserving its depth; and (iv) experience is central as the What is The Way of BeingDefinition 1. The Way of Being (TWB) is (i) an attitude that sees our present world and its cultural traditions as transitional, (ii) a system of knowledge—‘the real metaphysics’ (TM)—instrumental to realizing the ultimate, perfect in its effectiveness and the best to be had while we remain limited and which changes in interaction with change in our being, and (iii) a way (‘pathways’) to the ultimate that begins in our world and emphasizes the world, the ultimate, and the process. Assertion 4. The real metaphysics (TM) is based on well-founded concepts as explained in foundational issues, below. In the development, the concepts cluster around (i) being as precisely known, inclusive, and neutral (and so of perfect and potentially universal application, that is free of slant) (ii) experience which is grounding of being and, particularly, of our being. While most of the terms for the concepts are common and often lack a single use, it is critical to the development to follow the meanings as specified in the definitions and, further, that the system of terms constitute a system that has system-meaning that captures and is designed to capture the form and process of the universe. Assertion 5. The cluster of concepts did not arise at once but in stages via conceptual trial and error: (a) a rough stage in which I experimented with materialism, evolutionism, idealism, and physicalism, before settling on being and experience for their neutrality and foundational character (b) a stage of selecting and fine-tuning the cluster of concepts (c) a final but still ongoing stage in which I recognize the system—the cluster—as adequate to a sufficiently precise and complete metaphysics. Thus, the origins of TM are in my experience and reflection and, via reading, in the history of thought. Similarly, the pathways, are also based on my exploration and reading in what might be called ‘experiments in being’, a mix of philosophical resources, and traditional pathways, both east and west. Assertion 6. TM has two sides: (i) a perfect side, ‘the ideal metaphysics’ (IM), formed by deploying abstracted versions of the concepts—i.e., by removing distortable detail from the concepts, and so leaving concepts and detail free of distortion, and (ii) pragmatic knowledge. IM is perfect and shows the universe to be ultimate and limitless. It points to the ultimate, but, being a framework, it requires a complement for effectiveness, namely pragmatic knowledge, and its ongoing process of discovery. Though pragmatic knowledge is subject to imperfection, the union of the two sides is the most effective instrument we possess for realizing the ultimate and for advancing toward that realization. Because IM provides perfect orientation and pragmatic knowledge provides the best means available under limitedness, their union is the uniquely maximal instrument for realization. It is in this value sense that TM is perfect. Founding The Way of BeingComment 2. Issue of abstraction, inclusivity, and neutrality. On illusion and its implications for the nature of the realThat there is some illusion in our perception, thought, and sense of what is real and important is not doubted. But do we know what is real at all or is ‘everything illusion’? If the latter were true, we could not know it, for it too would be illusory. Some impressions of what is known must be real, while others are illusory. But there is a presumption behind the idea of illusion. It is the common—though not universal—view of knowing as a picture of the real, in some ways a misdirection. Rather, we should perhaps look at the entire seeming picture of our process in the world—knowing, valuing, and acting—from the outside, as it were, and observe that there are impressions of the process to which we give the names ‘knowledge’, ‘value’ (ethical, aesthetic, and meaningful as in the family of senses surrounding the meaning of life), and intentional and choice based ‘action’, but which are not as definite as we commonly think they are. That is, we are perhaps reifying our names. Yet our naming is not mere reification; it arises from and points to something real. The giving of names is not the end of how meaning emerges—the emergence is an interaction between the sense of meaning, naming, use or practice, and formalization (which except when – where – it is shown otherwise cannot be said to be complete). Whether our names reach the real, and whether knowing can be disentangled from the real, cannot be clearly or satisfactorily resolved without a picture of the world that has some truth and some completeness. Furthermore, such a picture should account for the relation between knowledge – experience of the world – and the world itself. The name we give to such a picture shall be ‘metaphysics’. And an adequate metaphysics will incorporate, will weave into the world picture, experience, knowledge and reason, value, and action. It will not be a ‘metaphysics of experience’ (etc., as above), but a metaphysics of the world in which experience, etc., are integral aspects. Thus, effectively, we are saying that metaphysics is study of the real, where ‘the real’ has a broad implication, such that epistemology, reason (philosophical logic), ethics, and implications for how and what we do – and how we regard what we should do – are parts of metaphysics. While this is different from some approaches to explaining what metaphysics is, it is conceptually strong enough to incorporate the subject matters from the history of metaphysics through today, in fact and in principle – and much more (the ‘etc.’) Foundational issuesThe question of foundation is complex: what a foundation (that which is founding) and what is founded (that which is founded) are; whether it should be a thing of the same kind as what is founded, of another kind, or not a “thing” at all; what kinds of foundation are possible; and whether foundation is possible in any sense. Here I address only the present foundation. 1. Experience is given. (Following a generalized Cartesian argument, the fact of experience is indubitable and requires no further grounding.) 2. From experience, abstraction yields precise concepts and a metaphysical framework. Abstraction from experience—including ordinary language and reason—gives rise to method and content together, resulting in precise concepts such as being (and whole or universe, part or a being – plural: beings, null or the void), and relationship (reason, argument, logic). That there is being, and that universe exists is given; however, existence of the void may be questioned—and is addressed below in doubt and dialetheia. From the existence of the void, as proven later, all possibilities follow; and from all possibilities, necessity emerges as foundational. Because necessity is modal rather than a further “thing,” it avoids infinite regress. 3. Not only do method and content emerge together, TWB is self-referential or reflexive in examining its own process and cross-referential in continually checking its content against the published literature for possible error and enhancement. 4. The foundation in being allows a precise metaphysical side (IM) and a pragmatic side. Thus the epistemology is pure on one side but pragmatic on the other and this non-uniformity or non-purity is part of its strength. Similarly, the foundation in being requires no substance, but in the pragmatic side there may be as-if substance or substances. That is, an aspect of the strength of the metaphysics is that it is not pure—while it needs no substance it does not ban substance altogether. Purism in epistemology and metaphysics would be a defect. 5. Given the precise metaphysical side (IM), that we are limited makes grounding and realization cyclic rather than regressive. The grounding aspect of foundation is not an infinite regress but a helical process—iterative, deepening, and self-correcting. 6. Foundation is not in another being or substance, either remote or immanent—unless, of course, necessity is seen as an immanent being (which follows from the necessary realization under fp of all concepts, concrete or abstract). 7. But if there were nothing, the logic from the void still applies. 8. Necessity and logic are inherent in being but to talk of them we must build them up from concepts that arise in experience. 9. The universe is self-founding; the question of foundation deflates. Thinking through the previous steps reveals that the universe is self-founding, and the traditional question of foundation dissolves into the structure of being itself. Features of the developmentHere, we informally note some remarkable features of the system (TM). Doubt and dialetheiaThe crucial logical point of the demonstration of the ideal metaphysics (IM) is proof of the existence of the void. Existence of the void – Demonstration 1. The existence and nonexistence of the void are equivalent, therefore the void may be taken to exist (two further proofs are given in the formal development). This will of course be doubted. I have doubt, even though there is no inconsistency in the proof itself or in the foundation in being and experience. The doubt results from the claim of equivalence, the magnitude of the conclusions, and that to sharpen knowledge, doubt is essential. My response to doubt is to suggest three options to the reader, (i) to simply accept the demonstration (ii) to accept the result but live with doubt and accept with the fundamental principle (fp) and IM as hypotheses which optimize expectation, metaphysical, existential, or both (iii) to reject the demonstration and the metaphysical system. Option ii is the most philosophically fertile because doubt keeps the system – and action that flows from it – alive rather than dogmatic and metaphysically dead. There is an interesting consideration regarding an assertion such as ‘the void exists and does not exist’. Consider a contradiction such as ‘it is raining and it is not raining’. In standard propositional calculus the truth of a proposition and its negation imply that all propositions are true (and false), which is commonly called ‘explosion’. How can we defuse explosion? Consider that ‘it is raining and it is not raining’ could mean ‘it is raining in New York but not in Beijing’. For standard logic to apply, symbols for objects must be precise, e.g., one symbol : one object (such considerations pertain to the domain of applicability of any logic). There is a literature on what are called ‘dialetheia’. A dialetheia is a true contradiction, e.g., ‘A and not A’ (meaning, it is true that A and not A), where A is a proposition. Dialetheism is the thesis that there are true dialetheia. See my article Dialetheia and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Dialetheism. Some proponents of dialetheism hold that it obtains because (i) there are dialetheia (a strong claim if the propositions are truly contradictory) (ii) the universe is inherently contradictory (a stronger claim). Critics assert that dialetheism leads to explosion. The ‘rain’ example suggests that there are no actual dialetheia, but only propositions that are in the form of dialetheia. In my article, linked above, I argue, tentatively, based on a variety of examples, there are no actual dialetheia. In my article, all the examples depend on artifacts such as imprecision of symbols, metaphor, and shift in meaning. There is more, though: if a proposition that has the form of a dialetheia is such that explosion is defused, call it what you will, there is nothing exceptional to it (but this does not negate the usefulness of dialetheism for there are situations in which dialetheic logics are at least potentially useful). Regarding the void, we can argue as follows. For most things, existence means that there is an object that can be experienced (later: there is an object corresponding to the concept). And since we live in a world that is experienced, we translate ‘most things’ into ‘all things’. However, this is inadequate regarding the void. But this does not prove that the meaning of existence must shift for the void. Here is an argument that the meaning of existence must not just shift, but be broadened. A proof of existence of the void was given above. A second proof, given in the formal development, shows that, though (or even if) the void is not experienced, it is a source of that which can be experienced. Thus, while the meaning of ‘existence’ for manifest objects is ‘there is a real object that corresponds to the concept’, for the void, the meaning must shift: ‘real object’ must be changed to ‘potential object’. A counter argument is that ‘potential’ is something and therefore cannot reside in the void. However, a response to this counter is the idea of potential being something is based on potential as causation and there is no necessity to causation projecting to the entire universe and the void. The void is neither causal potential nor unreal; it reveals the conceptual possible as indeed — as actually — possible. Logic, science, and argumentIf something violates the laws of physics, it cannot obtain where those laws obtain. However, if for it to obtain would violate logic, it cannot obtain at all (e.g., in any world, actual or possible; and note that the phrase ‘it cannot obtain at all’ eliminates any need to refer our development to ‘possible worlds’—to the contrary, it may found the concept and object of the notion of possible worlds). Therefore, logic defines the greatest possibility. Here, of course, we are thinking of strict logic, e.g., deduction as used in mathematics, not induction or abduction as used in generalizing and in science. It is common to make a comparison between science and strict logic—induction / abduction is ‘probable’; strict logic is certain. However, the comparison is not appropriate—it compares reason to a scientific theory with reason under strict logic. If, on the other hand, we compare arriving at a scientific theory to a logic (e.g., propositional calculus), the conclusion is not certain (there are alternative propositional logics, e.g., three valued logics)—we see the beginnings of a true parallel. The parallel is completed when we note that inference under both science and strict logic can be strict (it could also be non-strict if the science were less than precise as in the theory of evolution and the logic was ‘fuzzy’). Thus, there is a general sense of ‘logic’ that covers induction / abduction and strict / deductive logic. In philosophy, ‘argument’ has been relatively recently used to describe establishment of facts via inference from given facts. It has been used in the context of deduction: if the deduction is correct, the argument is ‘valid’, if, further, the fact is true, the conclusion is true, and the argument is ‘sound’. In mathematics, the basic ‘facts’ are axioms. Here, however, the basic facts are about the world. Usually, such facts are imprecise and incompletely certain. Are there any certain facts? Yes—(i) the fact that there is experience and so (as we will see) being, beings, and the universe (ii) the existence of the void is found to be necessary, from which all possibilities are necessary (somewhere in the universe including the universe itself) and thus there are facts that are absolutely necessary. That is, there are strict arguments—there is strict argument—based in necessary fact and certain inference. On the less than certain side, there are imprecise, perhaps not entirely certain facts, and induction / abduction, as in science. Thus, just as logic may be thought to bifurcate into probable and certain inference, so, argument may also bifurcate to the same options. I.e., the term argument could be used to refer to the establishment by whatever means, so long as it falls under reason (and not, e.g., superstition or dogma) It is my preference to use ‘logic’ for this umbrella notion of argument and then classify logic according to fact vs inference and likely vs certain, however, I continue to use ‘argument’ so as not to overload convention. An example: logic from ordinary languageComment 3. It is a project to clarify and make precise the content of this section and to also consider predicate calculi. Some fundamental laws of logic are1. The law of identity—each thing is identical to itself, expressed A º A, or that a proposition implies itself. The law has exceptions if A is insufficiently well defined. Thus “it is raining is” the same as “it is raining”, which as we have seen requires it to be specific as to location (and time) and thus the law of identity is not universal. 2. The law of noncontradiction, encountered earlier, that a proposition cannot be both true and false. It was implied earlier that logic follows from relationships among concepts; thus “it is raining” and “it is not raining” cannot apply to the same object and are therefore mutually exclusive. However, as seen earlier, for the law to hold, the proposition must be sufficiently specific. 3. The law of the excluded middle—every proposition is true or false, i.e., there is no third option. Without sufficient discrimination, it is possible for propositions to have some third, e.g., intermediate, truth value or no truth value at all”, for example, “on a nonexistent planet neither true nor false that it is raining”. These ‘laws of logic’ are fundamental to standard logical systems but do not obtain in some nonstandard but useful systems; an example, suggested by “it is raining and it is not raining”, is a system of nonstandard logic for contexts in which some propositions are both true and false (e.g., systems in which such propositions are both, a third truth value ‘b’, and thus, in the system, neither ‘t’ nor ‘f’ (true or false). It is clear that for these ‘laws’, often thought absolute, especially in the past, to obtain, the language being used must be sufficiently precise and if that precision obtains, the laws are trivially true. Standard logicsWhat we call standard logics here are those for which the fundamental laws obtain, especially the propositional and first order predicate calculi (the syllogisms fall here too). In the propositional calculus, there are propositions or statements, which are one of t or f. There are truth functions. An example is negation. If A is a proposition, its negation, written, ~A, –A (preferred for compound statements), not A, or Ā (preferred). The negation of a statement is false if the statement is true and true if the statement is false. A second truth function is conjunction—if A and B are propositions, AÚB is the proposition ‘A and B’, such that it is true if and only if A and B are true. A third truth function, alternation, AÙB, ‘A or B’ such that it is true if and only if at least one of A and B are true (note this is the ‘logical or’, which is different from ‘or’ as it is usually used in English in which one and only one of the propositions true). These functions are called truth functions because their truth value by and only by the truth values of their components (there is just one component for negation and two for each of conjunction and alternation). The propositional calculus, concerns compound truth functions of propositions. It turns out that all truth functions can be expressed in terms of negation and conjunction or, alternative, in terms of negation and alternation (it further turns out that a single elementary truth function, e.g., the ‘Sheffer stoke’ is sufficient). The essential question here is the requirements on language for the machinery of the propositional calculus to hold. It is first, that we are not concerned with non-logical ‘variables’, such as in mathematics. Second, we are concerned with propositions and their combinations but not in the inner structure of a system of non-compound propositions. Third, the propositions must be either true or false, but not both. Finally, there must be some non-compound propositions. The arc of The Way of beingIts partsThe introduction explained what The Way of Being (TWB) is, its foundation, and its range. It has motivated TWB and outlines origins, personal and in world culture. Recall that “The aim of The Way of Being is the shared discovery and realization of the ultimate—arising in, oriented toward, and expressed from our world”. Discovery and realization will be based in (i) a phase that emphasizes knowledge, conceptual experiment, and criticism (ii) a phase that emphasizes being in the world and active directed at both the quality of the world as well as experiential and physical action toward the ultimate. These phases are of course intertwined. These two phases are addressed in Part 2. An account of the world and Part 3. Pathways. The final part, Part 4. Return, is a short account of what I will do, what readers may do, after having developed, lived with, or absorbed ‘The Way’. SummaryThe arc of The Way of being is: Into the way – Foundation (the account of the world) – Realization (the pathways) – Return. Part 2. An account of the worldBeingExperience and beingDefinition 2. When an appearance that seems to be of something, is indeed of the intended thing, e.g., is known to be neither fictional nor merely illusory, it is real (here, in ‘something’, ‘thing’ is entirely general and not restricted to entity, process, relation, property or other such kinds); otherwise, it is as-if (or as-if real, i.e., of unknown status, or at least partial illusion or fiction). Definition 3. Experience is awareness in all kinds, forms, and levels (this definition, which includes consciousness, is extended later, not nominally, but as a consequence of the nature of the real). Truth 1. That there is experience is known in that there is experience of experience. The objection that experience of experience may be illusory, is resolved in that illusion is experiential. Definition 4. Choice is selection of thought or action from among real options. Truth 2. Experience includes consciousness, receptive and active modes including choice and agency; it has quality, intensity, and form – emotion and cognition with choice. Definition 5. The idea of an object is that it may be either real (e.g., the table in my living room) or as-if real (e.g., fictional as in Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, 221B Baker Street, London; Sherlock Holmes is an object in that, although ‘he’ is not real, we can talk of ‘him’ as if he were real, and he may seem real in our imagination; note that while there is a ‘mental object’, that object is the concept, and it is not the as-if object). Assertion 7. Thus, all real objects are objects but not all objects are real. Definition 6. The structure of an experience is concept – relation – object, or, in detail, (i) a concept, an experience as-if of (this as-if is there only because the object that follows may be as-if: that there is an experience is given) (ii) its intentional relation, the experiential relation, to (iii) an object or as-if experienced (the problem of ‘as-if’, i.e., of appearance vs reality is noted; however, it is effective to allow its address to emerge with the development). A referential concept is a concept that has an intended object. In pure experience an object is absent because it is unintended, potential, or otherwise not attached to or detached from the experience—pure experience is entirely conceptual. Definition 7. A definition is a conceptual specification (note that when the terms ‘is’ and ‘are’ are used in defining concepts, they may be but are not necessary temporal or concerning a particular place). Definition 8. Abstraction is removal from a concept of all detail that may be subject to distortion or error (it is via abstraction that we know that there is experience itself and that there are being and real beings, e.g., experiential beings, and in terms of later definitions, the universe, the void, laws, logic, and metaphysics). Definition 9. Perfect faithfulness of knowledge is perfect depiction as congruence of the forms of concept and (real) object so that truth and certainty have meaning and can be asserted (thus defined, perfect faithfulness is significant to the development of the metaphysics of TWB; and one source of perfect faithfulness is abstraction and important examples are given beginning with experience above and continuing with ‘being’ and related concepts below). Informal commentary. In earlier versions of the work, being was introduced as existence, without defining existence, and without reference to the essential role of experience in existence and beinghood. What is that role? It is that without a concept, there is no being corresponding to a mere system of signs, but there may seem to be a being due to the implicit presence of a concept. This may be put “no concept, no being”. The deficit thinking in the earlier definitions is now remedied. Definition 10. An existent is the real object of a referential concept; the plural of ‘an existent’ is existents. Existence is the property of existents as existents. Definition 11. A being is the real object of a referential concept; the plural of ‘a being’ is beings. Being is the property of being as beings (while ‘being’ and ‘beings’ are conceptually distinct and being is not a being, with sufficient abstraction, the distinction vanishes). Truth 3. While definition does not imply existence, there is being and there are beings (this conclusion is sound). Truth 4. There is no being without the depictive or iconic concept (the linguistic sign without the associated icon is an empty label). In abstraction, the concept is implicit. A being is known as a being via its conception. Concepts are beings, as are concepts of a concept-being. The general being is a concept-being; the general object is the concept-object. Thus there is no essential distinction between objects and being. There is no being that is not known or not knowable. Assertion 8. A reason objects are sometimes introduced as different from beings is that we are then able to talk about possible objects, necessary objects, and nonexistent objects. However, we have just seen is that being, existence, and object-hood are essentially are identical, and therefore we do not really need the concept of an object. Thus, we can consistently talk about possible beings, necessary, beings, and nonexistent beings (or objects or existents). Assertion 9. However, we may continue to use ‘being’, ‘existence’, and ‘objecthood’, for the differences in connotation—being suggests richness, existence suggests bare existence, and objecthood suggests both existence and nonexistence. Definition 12. If the object is a being, it is said, as already noted, to exist; otherwise it is said to not exist, i.e., to be nonexistent (and thus the conception of an object as concept-object, trivially resolves the problem of nonexistent objects or beings and provides one conception of nonbeing). Definition 13. When we want to refer to the depth of being or of a being, e.g., that of our being relative to our intellect, we will use the hyphenated forms be-ing and a be-ing (plural be-ings). Definition 14. Society is a group of beings with institutions that promote their identity and well-being. Culture (in the words of EB Tylor) is “that complex whole which includes knowledge (including development, dissemination, and education), belief, art, morals, law, custom, institutions (government, economic, technological, military, and political), and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (additions and changes to Tylor’s definition have been italicized). Significant meaning and value‘Meaning’ has two senses in this work. In this section it is ‘significant meaning’, as in the meaning of life or importance. The second sense is concept and linguistic meaning, which is introduced later. Definition 15. We are accidental in that our immediate sense of why we have be-ing and what that be-ing is or may be is opaque to us (to what extent the opaqueness is absolute has emergence in the development). Definition 16. Significant meaning and value are is whatever give be-ings the sense that they are more than mere accidents (though it is not emphasized, negative meaning would be what gives the sense of being less than a mere accident); it lies in the quality and form of their experience. Assertion 10. Experience is the place, though not the sole source, of significant meaning and of our being. We are experiential beings. The being that does not register at least indirectly in some experience is effectively nonexistent (it is later seen that the word ‘effectively’ may be dropped; that the universe is experiential, where it is not necessary to use the term ‘effectively experiential’; and that such predication does not entail absence of material or mental qualities, real or as-if). Definition 17. The sense of beauty or the beautiful is a joint emotive-cognitive sense of what gives beings pleasure to perceive or contemplate, with an emphasis on durability or permanence in time (and across ‘subjects’) of that sense. Objects and beings that are a source of the sense of beauty are beautiful. Definition 18. The Intrinsic good or primary good is that which improves significant meaning of experiential (human) beings (particularly their well-being and community, safety, and security, their projects, the life well-lived and what it is to live well, the sense of the beautiful, what it is to live well, and culture as a way of expression). Right choice and action are those which promote intrinsic goodness. Definition 19. Secondary goodness (is not experientially intrinsic but) promotes intrinsic goodness; the secondary good includes culture as a system of institutions and social arrangements (society itself, economic and political arrangements, and technology). Definition 20. To be ethical is to choose thought and action that promotes what is good (here, there is no rejection of systematic ethics, but the personal is emphasized in interaction with the systematic and the large scale). Ethics is study, systematic and other, of what thought and action are ethical (ethics is not primarily about the abstract good or right). Metaethics is about the nature of ethics and ethical judgement (but as topic in itself is not particularly important in this work). (While ethics is often studied for its normative side “what we should do and so on”, and the associated discipline is named ‘normative ethics’, analysis of the meaning of ‘ethics’ in terms of word-concept-object, we will find that normative and metaethics are bound as one – two sides of a coin). Applied ethics is about what is ethical in concrete situations and institutions (it is currently, in 2026, a broad subject and some examples are taken up in this work; also note that applied ethics gives ethics flesh and ethics gives applied ethics structure, so while their independent study is important, so is their joint and perhaps dialectic analysis). Definition 21. Government is group decision making and its institutions for decision and implementation. A foundation government in a fundamental value of experiential being in small and large scale choice may be called democracy, especially liberal democracy (as explained, just below), which is democracy with (institutional) protection for all beings and groups as far as not dedicated to destructive ends. Assertion 11. A concern regarding the promotion of experiential beings is the balance between self- and group- interest. Where, in the movement of society, do we move – and want to move – toward? The problem arises in all societies, but it is a special concern in democracy. Truth 5. Thus, liberal democracy has secondary goodness (in this sense, the idea behind democracy is close to intrinsic goodness and is not just as one of many possible systems of government – it is not a system of government at all, but functions as a principle for systems which is derived from fundamentals; this conception is effective in that under it, the instrumental effectiveness of democracy is a pragmatic rather than conceptual or ideological concern). KnowledgeThe kind of knowledge considered here is factual, expressed as a statement and its establishment may be perception (‘direct’) or inference from established facts. Language, concept meaning, and knowledgeDefinition 22. There is a range of sophistication (self-reflection, criticism, and creativity) in the use of language and experience. Ordinary experience, ordinary language, ordinary reason, and ordinary knowledge, though not unsophisticated, lie in a region on a spectrum toward the everyday, and away from institutional, specialist, academic and standards setting uses. Assertion 12. Ordinary language (and experience) is a ground for discovery, expression, and justification of knowledge as beginning framework for the formal development (which, though it begins with the ordinary, it does not presume it—the ordinary is improved upon in the formal development via precision of meaning of terms and reason via relations among terms). From the ‘ordinary’, via abstraction, we may arrive and precise meaning and knowledge and certain inference. Definition 23. (The following repeats some material from the earlier definition on the structure of experience.) A concept is a mental content. A referential concept is a concept in referential form, i.e., a concept that is intended to refer to an object, real or fictitious. The association of a sign (elementary or compound, where the structure of a compound sign may reflect the structure of the object) with a concept constitutes a linguistic concept. The meaning, conceptual or linguistic, of a referential concept is the concept and its possible references (objects) in use (this constitutes a three part meaning of meaning as sign – concept – object). Knowledge is meaning realized. Truth 6. The three part meaning of meaning as in The Meaning of Meaning, by C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, has necessity in that signs devoid of even indirect iconic content cannot refer. It has sufficiency so far shared signs have common associations. Though it does not exhaust an understanding of meaning, it is effective in this development. Its virtues include that (i) confusion in search for meaning of a vaguely understood term may be resolved by seeing the search as in a sign – concept – object space, suggested by H.A. Simon’s notion of search in a dual space of concept and object, and (ii) it can neatly resolve the problem of negative existentials (see Nonexistent Objects – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for a definition of the problem) via the earlier definition of a nonexistent object (or nonbeing). Definition 24. The intension of a concept specifies the nature of the term, e.g., in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (specifying the intension does not imply that the concept has objects). The extension or range of a concept specifies to what real objects the concept refers. Definition 25. A fact is a true assertion (knowledge is factual; it concerns the way the world is – the way things are, where ‘is’ and ‘are’ may be but are not necessarily temporal). Definition 26. Knowledge or belief are true and certain when it is indubitable that their content corresponds to the fact(s) to which they are intended to refer (notes—some accounts of knowledge do not require absolute certainty; while certainty is desirable in some endeavors, it may not be the case that it is always desirable, e.g., to base action on it; though correspondence is not the only ‘theory’ of truth, it is, as will be seen, adequate to the needs of TWB; finally, a more comprehensive account of knowledge, one that takes into account the developments for TWB, is presented in, knowledge / world under development in longer versions of this work) DiscoveryDefinition 27. Discovery is a creative phase of knowledge acquisition (though significant to TWB, it is not the focus of this discussion of knowledge and argument, which is amplified later; however, it crucial to ultimate—human—endeavor and knowledge, for it is unlikely that all is known regarding knowledge acquisition and negotiation of the world; thus, we cannot afford to rely only on established or certified means of argument and ought to be open to ‘what works’ and to discovery, not just of ‘things’ but also of means or method). Assertion 13. Establishment of tentative knowledge as knowledge requires selection, which is the subject of argument. ArgumentDefinition 28. An argument is establishment of fact (to argue is to establish a fact; here we consider only argument in itself rather than kinds of argument specific to restricted fields of inquiry; note that this definition is related but not identical to common conceptions of ‘argument’; the elements of argument are direct establishment of fact and indirect establishment, or inference of a fact or conclusion from an established fact or premise;). Definition 29. An argument is certain when it establishes that the conclusion is certain and likely when it is thought to be likely according an accepted kind of inference and degree of likelihood. Direct argumentDefinition 30. Direct argument is direct establishment of a fact (by observation including measurement, which may be contingently precise or imprecise, and, which may, in some cases, be necessary). Truth 7. In direct argument certainty is possible via relaxation of precision and by abstraction. Some facts are intrinsic in that their truth is necessary (e.g., that there is experience or, equivalently, that experience has being; a later example is necessity of existence of the void and its consequence that the universe realizes all possibility in the greatest sense of possibility). Assertion 14. Direct establishment is likely when doubt is low or accuracy is high. Precision may be confirmed by corroboration or theoretical agreement with other facts. Indirect argument or inference from established factDefinition 31. Inference is valid conclusion of entities in fact form and called conclusions from other such entities called premises, such that if the premises have truth (facticity), then so do the conclusions. Definition 32. In indirect argument, conclusions are established in two stages (i) direct establishment of premises (ii) inference from premises to conclusions (which gives strength to the claim of truth for the conclusions as elaborated below). Certain inferenceDefinition 33. In certain inference, if the premises, P, are true, the conclusions, C, are certainly true (abbreviated: if P, then C, or P ® C). Assertion 15. Sources of certainty are (i) precise reasoning, which is obtained as below in deduction and intrinsic inference (ii) that in such reasoning (though there may be exceptions), the conclusions contain only information that was at least implicitly present in the premises (they may seem to say more because the chain of connection is not transparent to beings with limited intellect – but would of course be transparent to a limitless being.) Assertion 16. When the information in the conclusion is already at least implicit in the premise, the inference is called nonampliative, which is formally defined below. Certainty is a function of an argument being explicitly or implicitly nonampliative. Though certain inference is not ampliative, it may be effectively so when the a direct or indirect argument not obvious and even counter to received expectation. Definition 34. Deduction is certain inference from premises to conclusions which is stepwise via laws of logic (its power lies in that it is explicit and open to inspection, and, given logic, the conclusions are implicit in the premises; also note that some basic modes of deduction are the propositional and predicate calculi and a range of extended and variant logics, which, of course, are not asserted to exhaust the possibilities of deductive inference; note, further, that this does not eliminate the possibility of non-explicit certain inference as in, intuited and received results). Definition 35. In intrinsic inference, the conclusion is established without recourse to premises (this is related and, at least in some cases, maybe identical to intrinsic fact; though intrinsic inference may seem absurd or counter-foundational, there are examples, e.g., that there is experience and a later one will be the equivalence of existence and nonexistence for nothingness which will also be called ‘the void’). Assertion 17. The certain inferences in this work include the intrinsic and the deductive. Likely inferenceDefinition 36. In likely inference (or reasonable inference), if the premises are true, or likely to be true, the conclusions are also likely to be true (examples of sources of sub-certainty include, first, that the conclusions are ampliative – also defined below – i.e., contain information not present in the premises, or that the reasoning is ‘rough’ in some sense). Definition 37. In induction, some observations of instances and regularities, are generalized or lead to general principles. Abduction is argument to the best explanation (and is significant in science). In inference by analogy, if two systems are similar in some ways, similarity in some other ways is concluded. (That these are recognized modes of likely inference does not eliminate the possibility that intuited and received results could be likely). Assertion 18. Such inference is typically more than a process from premise to conclusion but is seen as strengthened with buttressing information or inference and repeated confirmation. Further, the above modes (induction etc) may be used together and may be incomplete as modes of likely inference. Manifest patterns may perhaps be thought of as intrinsic and likely inference. The likely inferences in what follows are abductive and analogical. Transitivity of inferenceDefinition 38. When inference is in more than one step, it may be of the following form: given A ® B and B ® C, then A ® C. This is transitivity of inference, which guarantees the validity of ‘long’ proofs in deductive logic (however, transitivity of inference, even if it has meaning, may not obtain in likely inference). Assertion 19. Thus deduction is fundamentally different from likely inference, not just in reliability, but also in kind. Argumentative strengthBoth direct and inference indirect establishment can be certain; and both can be less than certain but good in terms of appropriate criteria or in restricted settings. The certain caseDefinition 39. An argument is valid if the conclusion certainly follows from the premise (a standard approach is step-by-step, via rules of deduction). A valid argument is sound if the premise is true (significant sound arguments are identified, sometimes with just the word ‘sound’). A necessary argument is a certain inference from the empty fact (an important example will be given). The less than certain caseDefinition 40. In the less than certain case, the argument is good if the conclusion likely follows (e.g., with pragmatic certainty) from the premise. A good argument is strong if the argument and premise are likely enough that the conclusion is likely (significant and strong arguments are identified as strong; in absence of such an identifier, the argument is regarded as at least reasonable). Ampliative vs nonampliative argumentDefinition 41. An argument is nonampliative if the conclusions are explicitly or tacitly (e.g., via relations between meanings) already present in the premises (thus deductive inference in mathematics results in theorems that are already at least implicit in the axioms and postulates). In ampliative argument, the conclusions contain essentially new factual material, i.e., material that is not tacit in the premises. Assertion 20. The standard reasons for (i) (to repeat) the certainty of deduction is that it is nonampliative (for an omniscient being, deduction would not be necessary for the chain of inference would be transparent to it) (ii) the noncertainty of likely inference is that it is ampliative (of course, the omniscient being would see all patterns and the limits of the regions in which they obtain). What argument doesAssertion 21. Argument synthesizes (i) knowledge and its establishment, i.e., content and method, (ii) e.g., the sciences – abstract and concrete, and (iii) as will be established later, knowledge, inspiration, and value. SummationWe have completed the argument that precise method and content flow from ordinary language and experience and that science and logic fall under one umbrella, ‘argument’. We have also argued that knowledge and value interact such that there is a tradeoff between precision and value. Where concepts are abstracted to perfection, there is no need for a tradeoff between knowledge and value. Otherwise, tradeoff may be necessary. Another way to look at the situation is to observe that knowledge and value are intertwined in their very conception. BeingsBeing and beingsThe concepts of being and beings are introduced above in being. Here we take up beings that frame the real metaphysics (TM). Other beings, especially experiential, peak, and other cosmological beings are taken up later. The universe and its contentsDefinition 42. The universe is all being (meaning all beings as a being; used in this bare sense, the term is ‘universe’; later when it is shown that the universe is limitless, has identity, and confers this power on all beings, ‘Universe’ will be used to refer to “the universe and all beings and their collective identity”). Truth 8. There is exactly one universe; all (real) beings and (real) kinds are parts of it (sound, from the definition of ‘universe’). What we sometimes call ‘our universe’ or ‘other universes’ is an inappropriate use of the word ‘universe’; instead we shall use the term ‘cosmos’ (below). CosmosesDefinition 43. A cosmos is a causal domain in whose interactions with the rest of universe over the times of concern, are below the threshold of observation including measurement. Truth 9. Our cosmos exists (it is a being; later it is found that there are limitlessly many cosmoses of limitless variety). LawsDefinition 44. A pattern obtains for a being if the information to specify it is less than the raw information. Definition 45. A law for a being is (our reading of) a pattern (usually of a degree of general applicability and for one or more cosmoses, typically abstract in nature). Truth 10. Laws are beings. The void and its existenceDefinition 46. The void is the being that contains no beings (if it exists, it is an empty being and it contains no laws; that we talk of the void, as if there is just one, is justified later). Comment 4. That we talk of ‘the void’ rather than ‘a void’ is justified later. Truth 11. The void exists (this was proven earlier; two further demonstrations follow, one significance of which is the address of doubt). Existence of the void – Demonstration 2. Assume the void does not exist. This implies that the universe is eternal and in eternity, give that there is at least one possibility (our world), by symmetry all possibilities occur and so the void must exist. Existence of the void – Demonstration 3. The universe and the void are eternal. In eternity, the above symmetry argument goes through. Necessity is the ‘cause’ of the universe. Truth 12. The rational foundation of the being of and cause of the universe is necessity. Truth 13. There are no laws of the void (sound, from definitions). Definition 47. A being that is not the void is manifest. MetaphysicsDefinition 48. Metaphysics is knowledge and study of the real. Assertion 22. Though the possibility and meaning of metaphysics are seen as having openness, here we are demonstrating possibility (our metaphysics has been underway, beginning with experience and being). Further, it will emerge that traditional through modern metaphysics—the idea and the topics—have significant intersection this conception of metaphysics. PossibilityThe concept of possibilityDefinition 49. Given a concept of a being (entity, event, …), it is possible if nothing rules out its realization (existence). Conceptual or logical possibilityDefinition 50. If a concept cannot be realized because of its form alone, e.g., an object that is both black and not black, it is impossible in the sense of conceptual impossibility (or logical impossibility). Definition 51. A being whose existence is not ruled out by the concept alone defines conceptual possibility (‘c-possibility) or logical possibility (‘L-possibility), sometimes called subjective possibility (because it is thinkable without contradiction). Definition 52. A maximally expressive language is one that would be capable of describing all logical possibility (note that this does not imply that such a language exists, even if language in discrete signs is enhanced to include the perceivable state of the communicator). Assertion 23. If (the concept of) a being is not L-possible, it is not possible (at all). Definition 53. Logical possibility is the boundary of the greatest possibility in the sense that, presuming logic(s) for a maximally expressive language, the being has realized logical possibility has realized all that can be realized. Definition 54. Limitlessness for a being is realization of the possible (and, optionally, the impossible—because it explicitly includes the void among the limitless but makes no difference for manifest being). A being that realizes the greatest possibility is limitless (sound, from the concept of limitlessness). Assertion 24. Infinities are not inherently limitless; the limitless is not inherently infinite, but it has or contains (all) infinities. Real possibilityDefinition 55. If a logically possible being (one whose conception is logically possible) cannot be realized in a world because its form is incompatible with the form of that world, it is impossible in a world, w; if it can be realized there it has possibility in that world, or w-possibility; if that world is the universe, the possibility is u-possibility, i.e., just possibility (other terms for ‘just possibility’ are real possibility, global possibility, ontological possibility; other terms for w-possibility, where ‘w’ is not the universe, are local possibility or relatively real possibility, of which an example is physical possibility—possibility in terms of known physical laws, which may be imperfect; note that these meanings are not universal). Truth 14. To be possible in a world, it is necessary that the being shall be logically possible. Therefore, L-possibility bounds w-possibility for all worlds as well as u-possibility; that is the concept of L-possibility is the greatest or the most inclusive possibility. Assertion 25. L-possibility is a prerequisite for real possibility; real possibility presumes logical possibility. Assertion 26. If from the void, a (logically) possible being did not emerge, that would be a law of the void. Truth 15. All L-possibility emerges from the void. That is, u- and L-possibilities are identical in range. That is, the universe is limitless—the realization of the greatest possibility (this is named ‘the fundamental principle of metaphysics’: fp). Impossibility and necessityDefinition 56. A being that is not possible is impossible. Definition 57. A being whose nonbeing (nonexistence) is impossible is necessary. Cause and the cause of the universeAssertion 27. Causation has many senses, even if we restrict it to the main modern use of (Aristotle’s ‘efficient cause’)—e.g., cause as based in origin (necessary, possible, probable, and random) or cause as reason for being (existence), again (necessary, etc.) Definition 58. A fundamental cause is itself without cause. Assertion 28. A being cannot be the fundamental cause of the universe for that would require the being to be without cause or infinite regress. Therefore, the only cause can be modal. However, since possibility is unsatisfactory, the only satisfactory cause of the universe would be necessity—which will be demonstrated to be the case. Assertion 29. However, if such a cause is causation over time, it would seem to be contradicted that there is no necessity to a chain of events (generally) and therefore the fundamental cause of interest is cause of the universe over all time and space as a whole (or more generally over all coordinates of difference; which may be called the scotus universe, after the conception of Duns Scotus). Truth 16. We now see that the cause of the Scotus Universe can only be necessity and the fundamental principle confirms that this can indeed be seen to be the cause of the (Scotus) universe. The range of possibilityThis discussion has been about the concept of possibility. The range of possibility, also of great interest, is best deferred till after the universe has been shown to be limitless and the concept of robust worlds has been developed. Comment 5. Enter link to robust worlds above. The limitless universeThe limitlessness of being and the universeTruth 17. If from the void the greatest possibility did not emerge, that would be (constitute) a law of the void. Therefore, all logical possibility is emerges from or is necessarily equivalent to the void. That is, the logical and real possibilities are, in fact, the same, even though the conceptions are (at least seemingly) different. Since there has been no assumption in making this conclusion, absolute necessity is the cause of the universe (sound, given existence of the void). Assertion 30. This resolves (what Heidegger called) the fundamental problem of metaphysics, i.e., why there is being at all, i.e., why there is something rather than nothing. Truth 18. The universe is the realization of the greatest possibility (this is the fundamental principle of metaphysics, abbreviated fp). Truth 19. The universe—equivalently, the void—confers greatest possibility on all beings (for otherwise there would be a limit on the universe; also sound). Alternative demonstrations of limitlessnessThese demonstrations parallel the proofs of existence of the void. Reasons for their provision are (i) uncovering the ‘deep’ logic of the emerging metaphysics (ii) to address doubt. Second demonstration (the first is above). Either the universe does not enter a void state or it does not. If not, it is eternal and, in eternity, given that at least one possibility obtains (our world), by symmetry all possibilities occur—which contradicts the premise that the universe does not enter the void state. Therefore, the universe enters the void state and the earlier demonstration goes through. Third demonstration. The system of universe and the void are eternal. In eternity, the above symmetry argument goes through; necessity is the ‘cause’ of the universe. Truth 20. The rational foundation of the being of and cause of the universe is necessity. Assertion 31. This is a ‘logically satisfying conclusion for the possibilities of foundation are (i) another being (ii) regress (iii) possibility or necessity. However, there is no ‘other being’ and so foundation in a being would be self-foundation which is not a foundation at all. Further, regress and possibility (and probability) are less than satisfactory for they allow that the universe might not be manifest at all, which leaves necessity as the only satisfactory and demonstrated foundation (necessity could be seen as self-foundation). Some significant consequencesComment 6. Following is one core of a ‘center-out’ approach to presentation. All beingsTruth 21. The universe has identity (given limitlessness in the sense defined above, this and the remaining conclusions in this section, ‘all beings’, are sound). Truth 22. The universe and its identity are limitless in extension, duration, variety, peaking of being and dissolution; it contains cosmoses without limit to kind and number. Every cosmos is as-if an atom in another and every cosmos contains as-if atoms that are cosmoses. Truth 23. All beings inherit the limitlessness of the universe—they realize peak being (this can also be derived from the fact that a being and the being-and-the-void are identical). The realization of peaks by all beings is not a contradiction, for they merge as one in the peaks. Truth 24. Birth and death are real—and this is not a contradiction, for, though real, they and death are not absolute. Beings have limited form on limited scales but on death they diffuse into the background, from which they emerge on birth. Truth 25. It is in higher forms that we see across the multitude of forms that do not seem to communicate with one another (while we are in limited form and do not see that we can see and therefore do not attempt to do so). Knowledge of our limitlessness is revealed in higher forms, but not only their—there may be communication among lower forms via peak being; communication across the void equivalent of peaks is to be examined. Truth 26. From the limitlessness of beings as well as from the void, the identity of all being is present in both the extended distribution of being as well as in an instant; yet, in our limited experience and local time and its perception, this instant encompasses lifetimes – lifetimes of individuals, cosmoses, and cosmoses of cosmoses (and so on). We are both limited and limitless. While there may be eternities and infinities of extension between lower manifestations of a being, those limitlessnesses are experienced as no more than a point. Truth 27. There are paths in, for, and from this world to the ultimate (a careful specification of paths is given later). On perfection, pleasure, and painTruth 28. In most received senses of ‘perfection’ there is no final perfection. Pain, doubt, and pleasure are inevitable. Effective attitudes toward perfection, pleasure, pain, and doubt, are in sharing, mutual support, and pleasure in being on a path of realization, addressed further in pathways. The universeTruth 29. The cause of the manifest universe is necessity (sound). Assertion 32. What is the edge of the known universe? It may have edges duration and extension. It also has edges having to do with strength of interaction; this edge is everywhere. The voidTruth 30. There is effectively one void (the number of voids presumed to exist has no relevance to the real). The void is the empty being (sound). KnowledgeAssertion 33. The limit of knowledge (i.e., for a limitless being) and of the universe are identical—of logical possibility. Living in two worldsComment 7. Placement? The two worldsAssertion 34. Thus, we live in two worlds in the following sense. We live in the world of ‘ordinary’ experience (the big bang). But we also live in a larger world—the universe—which is real, which we do not necessarily see, but which we can know by rational thought. Living in two worlds as oneA part of the difficulty of this view is the contrast between the two views. One may overcome this difficulty by (i) accepting the difficulty (ii) living with it (iii) becoming accustomed to it (iv) to the point where the two views merge and we no longer habitually resort to one or the other (v) living in light of the immediate and the ultimate as one as a guide to life in this world and life beyond death, birth, and finitude. An ideal metaphysicsDefinition 59. Limitlessness defines a perfect and ideal metaphysics (the perfection is in the sense of perfect faithfulness of the metaphysics as concept to the universe as object, which follows from fp, is illustrated above, and whose developed into full-fledged account of being, the universe, its beings, and their changes, in what follows). Assertion 35. In greater detail, from the perfection in the abstraction in the concept of being, there is a perfect and ideal metaphysics, a framework, summarized – the universe is the realization of the greatest possibility, which gives us an ultimate value, realization of the greatest possibility. Real metaphysicsDefinition 60. When the ideal metaphysics is adjoined to at least pragmatically valid knowledge, what results is named the real metaphysics (TM)or just the metaphysics. Truth 31. Though TM is not perfectly faithful in entirety, the framework remains faithful. Further, it is the best that limited (human) beings have, and as a practical instrument toward ultimate knowledge and realization, it is perfect relative to the value of realization. TM is a dynamic unity, for the ideal side illuminates and guides the pragmatic while the pragmatic illustrates and is an instrument for the ideal. That is, the criterion for TM is dual—epistemic perfection and valuational (ethical and aesthetic). Assertion 36. Alternatively, we may see metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory as an integral whole. TM implies existence of all possibility and possible worlds which may have temporary but not permanent isolation. Are all possible worlds of the same significance? This is taken up in the sections on metaphysical possibility through the significant universe. Metaphysical possibilityDefinition 61. By metaphysical possibility, we understand (i) ‘what may occur under a system of metaphysics’ or (ii) what may occur under conditions of realism, e.g., whether an unembodied mind is possible. Assertion 37. If one accepts (say) physics as determining what is real, then the systems of metaphysical possibility #i and physical possibility are the same. Assertion 38. Under TM the metaphysics, metaphysical possibility, logical possibility, and (metaphysical) reality are the same. Assertion 39. The interest in metaphysical possibility #ii is that it distinguishes reasonable from the most inclusive possibility. In this work the topic has been explored, imaginatively and with input from world literature. Assertion 40. Systematic development of reasonable possibility is an ongoing project. Robust worldsDefinition 62. A robust world or cosmos is one that is significant because it has an adequate combination of endurance in time, beings capable of cognitive experience, and causal ability to register in experience. By contrast, a bizarre world, is transient, does not register significantly in the experience of experiential beings. And a bizarre explanation is a non-standard ‘explanation’ of the existence of a robust world that seems to rob it of significance, e.g., that our world came into existence a moment ago complete with apparent history and memories. Truth 32. Though possible, bizarre worlds and bizarre explanations are real but seemingly of limited significance and probability. Truth 33. Yet the fact of bizarrely created worlds have the significance that even if our world is non-bizarre (robust as defined below), it may meaningfully but bizarrely transform to other very different but robust worlds. Truth 34. In the robustness of our world we are part of peak process – on the way to peaking – for a robust concept of ‘god’ is a process and peaking that is the world or worlds and is neither alien in kind nor remote in extension and duration, i.e., space and time (a strong conclusion). The significant universe*Comment 8. Also see the master version. The range of possibilityDefinition 63. The range of possibility is the range of whatever satisfies the space of logics (and while this is of conceptual interest, it is of especial interest to extract from this what is relevant to be-ing). Assertion 41. The extension of the range of possibility may be developed conceptually and computationally. Source or study topic 1. Possible Worlds (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Source or study topic 2. Search the ‘space of logics’ and computational approaches thereof. The significant universeDefinition 64. The significant universe is the universe that has relevance to beings for more than transience (this is both somewhat hypothetical and vague, but needs to be said; it is especially hypothetical that it is accessible from our cosmos or that must have relevance to at least robust beings with more than ‘transient’ existence—that it does or cannot pertain to bizarre worlds). Doubt and certaintyOn certaintyDefinition 65. Certainty is absolute agreement of concept and referent (and is obtained in some axiomatic systems and, as we have seen, empirically when the object-referent space is allowed imprecision). Assertion 42. It was observed in discussing argument, that certainty is not always possible; and we have seen that it is not always desirable (and this is amplified below). Doubt and its useDefinition 66. To doubt is to question what is accepted as or potentially true including reasons for the acceptance. Assertion 43. Doubt is a prerequiste to degree of certainty (whether absolute or not), and to seeing whether there are absolute foundations for knowledge and ground for being (this would be idle, were it not for the fact that we have developed such foundation and are in the process of developing ground). General doubtAssertion 44. Unquestioning certainty of any degree is a recipe for ignorance and error. Therefore, doubt is an essential phase of knowledge acquisition. Further, action under doubt is often an efficient existential stance. The Way of Being: doubtAssertion 45. Doubt in TWB arises (i) in the arguments, e.g., the existence and properties of the void (ii) the magnitude of the conclusions and imperative to question them (iii) and, as seen shortly, for the power of entertaining doubt relative to knowledge as hypothesis and existential stance. The Way of Being: response to doubtAssertion 46. The following, which are not fully exclusive, are effective options— a. As a preliminary, to note that in the development of TWB, it was doubt about the canons of human knowledge—method and content—that led to the emergence of, first, IM, and then TM, and their ongoing refinement. b. Given internal and empirical consistency of fp, to regard it as a hypothesis about the real (world)—and, so, for metaphysics. c. To, therefore, consistently see fp as an ‘existential hypothesis’ as guide to and framework for living. d. Therefore, to employ fp as a guide to (pathways to) realization (of the ultimate in, for, and from the world). e. To acknowledge that doubt and certainty are not exclusive. f. To see fp and TWB as ground for being as just noted and further developed in pathways. g. To reject fp and be on one’s way in the world. Topics in metaphysics and philosophy*Comment 9. Placed in knowledge / world. Experience as universal and in detailIn this division, we extend the earlier conception (definition) of experience to all being, explain what the extension means, show of the extension, and describe the form of experience. Then, experience is shown to be fundamental to (i) our being, (ii) (as-if) mind, matter, space, time, property, and, cause (iii) realization. The concept of experience extended to all beingDefinition 67. Experience is awareness in all its kinds and levels, extended to all being, i.e., to the hierarchy of being from the void to peak of being (this is the promised extension of the earlier definition of experience, which is justified below, with some repetition of earlier material). The fundamental nature of experience and reasons for its deferred treatmentAssertion 47. The concept of experience is implicitly present in talking of being even if experience is not explicitly mentioned. Thus, to say “Being is the property of that which is”, ‘that which is’ has not even meaning unless it is the sign for a concept which occurs in experience. If explicit treatment with extension came before metaphysics, it would have to be reworked. How shall we extend the concept of experience?The plan for the extension is as follows. The definition is not proof. We shall demonstrate extension of the concept of experience, explain its meaning, and relate it to consciousness – the phenomenon and its phenomenality – as understood in the philosophical literature (better: see consciousness-as-we-have-it as a region within experience-extended). Let us now execute this plan. Meaning and justification of the extensionIn strict materialism (everything is matter and mind – consciousness, awareness – are excluded from the domain of matter), there can be no ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’ (which discloses that the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ is really an ‘impossible problem’). The only resolution must involve seeing that strict materialism, while it could obtain in an inert cosmos, cannot obtain in our cosmos and that experience is an essential part of the world. Now, we have seen that the contour form of experience is experience-of – experiential-relation – the-experienced. And that can be written subject (mind-like) – relation – object (matter-like). Assertion 48. In other words a possible description of the real as disclosed is that of an experiential field within which there is mind – relation – matter (all terms in a limited sense). Assertion 49. Therefore, by TM, it is a true (though not exclusively true) description of the universe. That is— Truth 35. The universe is an experiential field which does (must) extend to the root of being (the void), where primitive ‘experience’ is the primitive even though not ‘like’ our experientiality or higher forms. Assertion 50. Within that field mind and matter are neither denied nor asserted but there are domains in which there are as-if mind and as-if matter in (experiential) relation, which is an as-if material-causal relation. There is experience; and it is known by there being experience of experienceTruth 36. There is experience, for it is in and only in it that there is awareness (and even if that is illusory, illusion is experience). Assertion 51. Without experience of experience, there could be no real talk of it. In terms to be introduced below, while experience is the mark of a subject, it also presents as object. We are
|