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The Way of Being [ to next version ] | [ to recent detailed outlines ] Contents 1.1.1 The way of being and its narration 1.1.1.1 What is the way of being? 1.1.1.2 Description and primary aim 1.1.1.3 What it takes—some preliminary thoughts 1.1.1.6 What kind of work this is Topic 1. The section is not temporary but some of its content may be. Topic 2. A telescoped document. 1.1.2 Motives, reasons, and origins 1.1.2.1 Seeking, the world, experience, study, and imagination 1.1.3.2 The main ideas and their significance 1.1.4 Structure of the way, its design, and logic of the outline Topic 4. The material is now in the final two sections of this document 1.1.4.3 Meta-elements, para-elements, and Styles 1.1.5.1 Method and content are one 1.1.5.2 Preliminary on meaning and knowledge 1.1.5.3 The essential concepts and related issues 1.1.5.4 Pre and post metaphysical treatments of some topics 1.1.7 Living the way and shared pathways 1.2.2.2 On contradictions at the heart of being 1.2.2.3 The being (existence) of some beings 1.2.2.4 The fundamental principle Topic 5. Search other documents for proofs. 1.2.2.12 Introduction to space, time, and being 1.2.2.13 Realization—paths to the ultimate Topic 6. Should the title be enhanced for intension and extension? Topic 7. The Meaning of Life (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Topic 8. May go to ‘parallel developments’ 1.2.4.1 Is this philosophy’s fundamental question? 1.2.4.2 Kant’s three questions 1.2.4.3 A personal vs communal vs universal question 1.2.4.4 The meaning of the meaning of life 1.2.4.5 Open and closed aspects 1.2.4.6 Possibilities and necessities 1.2.4.7 The place of existentialism 1.2.5.1 The evolving situation, challenges, opportunities 1.2.5.2 Application of the system of the way of being 1.2.6 Consequences of the real metaphysics 1.3.1 Process and the ultimate 1.3.2 The program and its design Topic 10. concepts%20-%20detail.html#pathways for latest path elements of 11/2/2024 1.3.4.2 Design of a timeline for immediate and ultimate action 1.4.3.1 On universal narrative 1.4.3.2 Writing and updating universal narrative 2.3.2 Human destiny (‘destinations’) and exploration 2.4 Conceptual and methodological 2.4.1 Human knowledge (and enterprise) 2.4.2 Philosophy and its disciplines 2.4.2.1 What philosophy ‘is’ and how to approach a definition. 2.4.2.3 The issue of knowledge without boundaries? 2.4.2.7 The important questions Topic 12. Experience is one of the problems of metaphysics. Topic 13. A section “real metaphysics” vs speculative vs joint 2.4.3.1 Worldviews and personal metaphysics—implicit and explicit Topic 14. Has some discussion in the first chapter. 2.4.3.2 What is metaphysics and what is its significance? Topic 17. Also review List of philosophical problems - Wikipedia > Metaphysics. 2.4.3.4 Being, beings, and agency 2.4.3.8 A vocabulary for metaphysics Topic 19. See vocabulary for metaphysics. 2.4.4 Logic as the general abstract and concrete science – logic, method, and content 2.4.4.1 Received conceptions of logic 2.4.4.2 A comprehensive conception of logic or argument 2.4.4.3 Self-sufficiency and completeness—open and closed aspects of the metaphysics 2.4.7.1 Principles with metacosmology 2.4.7.2 Cosmology as theory of variety, extension, and duration of being 2.4.7.4 Cosmology of experiential form and formation 2.4.8 Science and the sciences, abstract and concrete 3.5 Work to do, topics for study Topic 20. Combine the basic outline with lexicon and grammar. 3.5.2.5 The high-level concepts and their grammar 3.5.2.6 Tentative system to remain under revision 3.5.2.7 Critical thought regarding the tentative system 3.5.4 Program of development for the outline and the way Topic 25. This is a permanent section, but its name, format, and placement may change 3.5.4.1 Define the central issues 3.5.4.4 Pictures and their function 3.5.4.7 On logic and explanation 3.5.4.10 The problems of philosophy and metaphysics 3.5.4.11 Outline and edit for clarity and word magic 3.5.4.13 Develop site for appeal 3.5.5 Study topics and references
Part 1 The way of being1.1 Into the way of being1.1.1 The way of being and its narration1.1.1.1 What is the way of being?The Way of Being, abbreviated ‘the way’, has these features— 1.1.1.1.1 A system of knowledge and guide to living in the universeThe system is a top – down framework with (bottom – up) detail. 1.1.1.1.2 Relation to received thoughtIs grounded in received thought, western and eastern. Has beginnings in the history of ideas—reading, experiments with the ideas, critiquing the ideas, and construction toward going beyond the ideas. Development has been a cycle of study, reflection, criticism, experience, and synthesis. 1.1.1.1.3 Uses ‘being’ as a foundational concept1.1.1.1.3.1 On foundationsAs the history of thought progressed, it was sought to ground thinking about the world in a small number of basic ideas. The aim behind such grounding includes (i) simplicity of systems of thought – while the world has many aspects to it, to have effective explanations of the world, a simple grounding would be effective (ii) precision – adequate to the claims and needs of the system (iii) certainty and truth of the grounding ideas, which, together with simplicity and precision, would result in achievable and reliable understanding. On the other hand there are objections to the idea of foundation (i) some find it anathema, as if minimizing the variety and beauty of the world (ii) whether secure and adequate foundation is possible at all, i.e., for many kinds of foundation, the foundation of the foundation may itself be in question (and then there may be questions of infinite regress and whether regress may be foundational). A response to the dilemma above is to abandon the idea of foundation in advance because the idea seems problematic but to develop a tentative foundation or foundations and to see whether the tentative foundation can be made secure. And, regarding, the issue of ‘minimization’, if a secure foundation is found then there is no minimization at all and one is free to admire the simplicity of the foundation or the beauty-variety of the world or both. 1.1.1.1.3.2 On substanceMany received systems are framed in terms of basic concepts such as. A generic name for such concepts is ‘substance’ (while one characteristic of ‘substance’ has been thought to be that it should be thing-like rather than process, property, relation-like and so on, there is no fundamental reason for this and, indeed, it is presumptive and therefore leading to, at best, an incomplete picture). The power of the idea of substance is that it may give summary, foundational, and systematic understanding. Various characteristics have been sometimes associated with substance—(i) generic in kind (as opposed to substance for specific objects) (ii) simple and permanent, yet generative of variety and change (iii) thing-like rather than process, event, or property like. But why should we think in terms of permanence (it assumes time) or being thing-like (to repeat, why should thing or object be more fundamental than process, relation, or event—why should we think in terms of space and time at all for foundation… should they not emerge from whatever is foundational?). Here, we think of substance as (a) simple in idea though not necessarily in fact (b) foundational. Substance has issues (i) why there should be substance as foundational at all—that substance has conceptual power does not demonstrate the validity of substance or any particular substance or substances (ii) substance is thought to provide a secure foundation but substance is not founded (iii) if a set of substances (just one, two, many, or even an infinite number—i.e., monism, dualism, pluralism, infinitism) are thought to provide a foundation, the question of completeness applies equally to all cases (iv) a single substance, e.g., matter, would seem to be incomplete, therefore some thinkers propose more than one substance, but in that case the question of how the substances interact arises, and if they do interact, it would seem that they combine as or as part of a more inclusive true substance (v) why substance should be foundational at all—why not take the world as it is (vi) but the world ‘as it is’ seems to lack any cohesive system of understanding which was an original reason for the idea of substance. 1.1.1.1.3.3 On being, i.e., on taking ‘the world as it is’Here, we find ‘the world as it is’, can be used as a powerful idea in understanding and living. This approach has a tradition which takes ‘being’ as fundamental. What is being? Simply, being is existence—that which is. Historical problems with this concept are (i) that it is too deep to describe or understand and, contrarily, (ii) that it is shallow, trivial, and impotent. An issue is how to interpret ‘is’ in “that which is”. We do not assume spatiotemporality to be associated with the foundational character of ‘is-ness’. The approach here is— Regarding depth, to approach being only in its most general feature, ‘is-ness’, which defuses the problem of depth, but is then at least seemingly open to the problem of impotence. The possible impotence is addressed by introducing a system of concepts based in being, only in their most general features—some are the universe (all being), laws (i.e., natural laws or patterns of / constraints on behavior that are pervasive in a local region), the void (absence of being or the ‘nil’ being), and reason (employing only the properties of the concepts). 1.1.1.1.3.4 Using the idea of beingNow, the following is seen (details are deferred to the main development)— 1. From abstraction—the retention only of the most general features—the concepts truly describe their objects. 2. The universe as all being is ‘everything’. Particularly, if mind, concepts, numbers, cosmoses, laws are real, they have being—i.e., they are beings. Particularly, laws have being. On a materialist account the real nature of laws is not clear—are they part of the world or artifacts of mind; are they real or mere conventions? 3. Since there are no beings in the void, there are no laws in it, and the void is (seemingly paradoxically) limitless (however, the paradox arises only on the notion that the void remains the void—which is not given). 4. Therefore the universe has identity and is limitless (starting with the concepts of sameness and difference, we will derive the concepts of extension-duration-identity or space-time-object) it phases between nonmanifest, manifest, and peak states of identity; all beings merge as one in the peak states. 5. Starting with the concepts of sameness and difference, we will derive the concepts of extension-identity-duration (space, time, object). 6. Experience—awareness in all its forms has being. The hypothetical being that cannot be experienced is effectively nonexistent from an experiential perspective, but truly nonexistent, given limitlessness. Experience must reach down to the root of being. The universe is experiential—but that is not to say that it is everywhere and always experiential in the way that animals are. 7. The elementary reasoning to limitlessness is itself given by abstraction and therefore content and method emerge intertwined and simultaneously. As experience (and mind whether real or as if) has being, method and content are truly one. Is experience a substance? Rather, has the concept of experience been shown to be a substance? It seems to have some characteristics of substance, for it may be seen as founding. However, (i) from limitlessness any aspect of being can be seen as founding—and that includes experience (ii) experience as foundational is derived from something more basic, which is necessity grounded essentially in the fact of being / nonbeing (iii) the substance nature of experience lies in value and meaning, which is grounded in experience and that without experience, the universe would be at least effectively nonexistent. 1.1.1.1.4 Derives and uses an ultimate and well-founded worldviewThe derivation is as just explained. The worldview will be named ‘the real metaphysics’ or just ‘the metaphysics’. The use of the view is developed in using the view to describe dimensions of being and pathways in and from the immediate to the ultimate. 1.1.1.1.5 Shows that there is an ultimate that far exceeds the ultimate of most worldviewsAs just explained. 1.1.1.1.6 Shows that the immediate and the ultimate are mutually informing and enhancingAs they must be—from limitlessness. 1.1.1.2 Description and primary aimThe primary aims of the way of being are— 1. Shared discovery and realization of the ultimate or ultimates, 2. In, for and from the immediate, 3. Which entails living in the immediate and the ultimate as one. 1.1.1.3 What it takes—some preliminary thoughtsOur aims and actions in life depend on the kind of person that we are and our worldviews—i.e., in simple terms, our large-scale view of the world, what it is like, what we are like as beings, and what we think important 1.1.1.3.1 Personality—accepting vs seeking1.1.1.3.2 WorldviewsSee a brief, recent version of the way of being Also incorporate secular humanism 1.1.1.3.3 The nature and role of knowledgeWhile taken up in depth later, some preliminary issues may be mentions 1.1.1.3.3.1 What is knowledge?1.1.1.3.3.2 Can knowledge be faithful and how important is faithfulness?1.1.1.3.3.3 Knowledge alone as realization vs knowledge as part of being and as ever in give and take with action1.1.1.3.3.4 Can or to what extent can a part—a being—know the whole, i.e., the universe as all being?1.1.1.4 The title1.1.1.4.1 The significance of ‘into’ (the way)1.1.1.4.2 ‘The way’1.1.1.4.3 Why being?1.1.1.5 Other aims1.1.1.6 What kind of work this is1.1.1.6.1 Ideas in actionFrom ideas, to action, to learning and revision of ideas. 1.1.1.6.2 Not dogmaThe development of the way begins dually with imagination and criticism. In reading the literature, in imagination, in attempting to understand the world, imagination and criticism have stood in balance, neither dominating the other. Though arbitrary or ad hoc certainty is generally rejected (i) it would be dogma to reject certainty where it may be found (ii) we do find directions of both certainty and uncertainty (iii), yet we maintain doubt (in balance with doubt about doubt). Readers are encouraged to read and understand the way. No reader is expected or encouraged to ‘believe.’ Some readers will have absolute doubt. They may go their way with encouragement, without opposition. Some readers will agree with the arguments that the way is consistent with experience yet doubt the demonstration—the later discussion of doubt may address such concern. Pathways are suggested, not prescribed; as suggested, the pathways are generic, which enables adaptation to specific situations and interests. Above all, the way is not prescriptive—it is designed as shared negotiation of pathways and their discovery. 1.1.1.6.3 An evolving document1.1.1.6.3.1 The evolutionThe concept of the document has gone through many phases (i) from a scientific and materialist bent, through idealism, to a focus on being as fundamental in itself and to understanding and (ii) from a view of the world and its beings as limited to a view in which the world is limited in temporal descriptions and limitless in descriptions that stand above difference (e.g., spacetime) Each phase of the narrative has gone through numerous iterations, and it has become undesirable to retain only what is new, for what is changed is not merely additive but part of an interacting whole. And, given my time resources, it is impossible to disentangle the new from the old 1.1.1.6.3.2 DesignTopic 1. The section is not temporary but some of its content may be. Topic 2. A telescoped document. Eliminate repetition between this chapter and the others. All problems should be listed in the problems of human knowledge, especially philosophy and metaphysics. Sub-documents? Edit phrases such as “it is seen” vs “we have seen” and “I have shown” vs “we have shown” for consistency. Use single and double quotes consistently. Eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate quotes. Edit for brevity, poetry, precision. Introduce pictures / graphics? A concept template (what, why, relation to other concepts, historical meaning…) is part of writing metaphysics. 1.1.1.6.3.3 The outlineThe outline itself is to remain in process till found satisfactory 1.1.1.6.4 A self-contained system and document1.1.2 Motives, reasons, and origins1.1.2.1 Seeking, the world, experience, study, and imagination1.1.2.2 History of ideas1.1.2.3 Criticism1.1.2.4 Paradox1.1.3 ContentWhile the ‘into’ and ‘return’ sections of Part 1 are important as orientation, guide, vision, and motivation, the main formal content is in ‘the world’ and ‘realization’ 1.1.3.1 PreviewThe following will be shown. 1.1.3.1.1 An ultimate universeThe universe is ultimate in that it is the realization of the greatest possibility (naïvely, the possibility of coherence, or, formally, logical possibility—which guarantees consistency of the view). The universe has identity; the universe and its identity are limitless in extension, duration, variety, peak and dissolution of being; all beings inherit limitlessness and merge in the peaks. We do not see all possibilities in our cosmos, which is but one possibility; the other possibilities are realized beyond our cosmos, i.e., in other cosmoses, the void, and more. Realization of the ultimate—of the limitless—begins in our world but is realized beyond, trans-cosmologically. 1.1.3.1.2 Paths to the ultimateThough it is given that all beings realize the ultimate, if enjoyment is a value, there is an imperative to develop, share, and negotiate intelligent (effective) pathways to the ultimate for, beginning in, and from our world. While there are received ways (philosophy, religion), shared development and negotiation are essential to effective realization; and they are realization-in-process while in our world. Pleasure and pain are unavoidable; there is pleasure in being on a pathway (this is not a rejection of simple joy); the best resolution of pain is use of the best available of therapy while, as far as possible, being on a path on which the fortunate give aid and assistance to the less fortunate. 1.1.3.2 The main ideas and their significance1.1.3.2.1 PrimaryThe primary ideas begin with being, beings, experience, agency, concepts, and objects. 1.1.3.2.2 MetaconceptsKnowledge of the world and so knowledge of knowledge, nature and problems of knowledge, narrative, action, method, and reflexivity. Representation, abstraction, and pragmatism. Metaphysics as the overarching discipline, which includes meta-metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and theory of value. 1.1.3.2.3 Concept templateNature, definition, and significance, of the concept. Relation to received meanings and reasons for differences. Place in the hierarchical structure of the concepts. 1.1.3.3 Logic of the outline1.1.3.3.1 On the choice of the ordering1.1.3.3.1.1 OverviewThe order of the chapters is plain enough. Into the way of being paves the way in. The formal development is in the world, which develops a foundation, and realization, which is about action based on the foundation. The concluding chapter, return, is about living in the world on the way to the ultimate from a new perspective. Of the four chapters, the structure of the second, the world, is in especial need of explanation. The following account touches on the key issues of the chapter. 1.1.3.3.1.2 The world1.1.3.3.1.2.1 A metaphysical system—a preliminary section A metaphysical system develops, briefly, the metaphysical system of the narrative. Why is this done before introductory discussion? It is because such discussion without metaphysical knowledge is invariably vague. A Socratic attitude ought to be taken in interaction with a definitive one, rather than coming at the beginning which that everything ought to be always doubted (everything ought to be doubted but not always). The metaphysical system is (a) ultimate (b) of course doubted (c) sets the scene. 1.1.3.3.1.2.2 The core development The world is really metaphysics; however, it is informative to begin it with metaphysics as such, followed by development of the metaphysics. The section, worldviews and personal metaphysics—implicit and explicit is a way into the metaphysics. what is metaphysics and what is its significance defines metaphysics, explains how and why the present conception differs from the received, and reiterates the fundamental significance of metaphysics. Meaning and knowledge, a topic critical to clear thinking generally, is an essential preliminary to the main development of metaphysics. The development of metaphysics, proper, begins with being, beings, and agency, which is on the essential subject and foundation of metaphysics. But why should we begin with foundation? Would it not be better to begin with the immediate—where we are and from there, to develop foundation and its application? That is—ought we to begin with ‘ground’ or axiomatically with being? It is possible to do both. This is because the immediate, our experience of things, is already but implicitly built into the previous section, meaning and knowledge. We could have begun explicitly with experience, but that would have made the development cumbersome as we would have to rework it to account for the implications of the study of being for experience. Though experience is essential to the development, it is effective to defer its explicit treatment till after a basic metaphysical framework is in hand—and the foundation for the framework is in being, beings, and agency, while the framework itself is developed in ultimate metaphysics. (also: the real metaphysics) The ultimate metaphysics is where we show the universe to be the realization of the greatest possibility, which is far greater than received views, secular and transsecular. Then, experience develops the concept of experience, its importance, the experiential nature of the ultimate, and instruments for and ways to the ultimate. The remaining sections of the world are now discussed briefly. 1.1.3.3.1.2.3 Consequences and elaboration Is the truth of the real metaphysics certain? The question is raised and addressed in doubt. Logic, method, and content has the following functions. It extends the concept of logic to (i) fact and inference (ii) the certain and the less than certain cases (in a manner that is a definite enhancement over what is sometimes called ‘argument’). It fills in the range of metaphysics. It shows logic and metaphysics to be the same. It shows metaphysics (and logic) to be self-contained (as far as possible and in what sense). Epistemology, theory of value, and cosmology (in a new cosmology) are treated and developed as part of metaphysics. Epistemology is part of metaphysics because knowledge is part of the world, and it is important in metaphysics as founding. Ethics is part of metaphysics as agency is part of the world, and it is important to agency, choice, particularly the question “what should we do,” generally, and in relation to realization. Ethics is also important as part of being—it is not epitheory—and essential in informing epistemic criteria (which stands against a common received notion that knowledge criteria are pure—intrinsic to knowledge itself). Cosmology is a working out of the metaphysics, especially in relation to the question “what is in the world and what is its nature?” Here, cosmology includes but far exceeds classical philosophical cosmology and modern physical cosmology—which is a consequence of the demonstrated real or ultimate metaphysics. Our world is about problems of our world today and into the reasonably near future—the problems themselves, (re) valuation in terms of the real metaphysics, and their address. The meaning of life is about (i) what the concern means, particularly is it only about individual pursuit in a secular vein, and whether it is a fundamental problem of philosophy—or, perhaps, the fundamental problem (ii) addressing the issue in light of the real metaphysics in a top-down manner—flexible and open at the higher level and a range of specifics and choices at the lower. 1.1.3.3.1.2.4 The problems of metaphysics and philosophy Many classical and modern problems have been treated to this point—but the treatment is not for its own sake – the problems are significant to the purpose of the way of being. To catalog and treat the problems of metaphysics would be useful as (i) a contribution (ii) potential utility in the way and in life (iii) showing the power of the real metaphysics. This is done in the problems of metaphysics and philosophy, where the problems are extended, rationally arranged, and addressed in light of the real or ultimate metaphysics (emphasis is on those problems not addressed in the main development). 1.1.3.3.2 Dynamic reordering1.1.3.3.2.1 IntroductionBefore the state of the evolving narrative arrived at understanding the world in its own terms (being) rather than in terms of something else (e.g., substance, process, and so on), it (the narrative) experimented with the physical (matter) as fundamental and then with experientiality (e.g., consciousness) as fundamental. Questions arose—“Which is fundamental, matter or experience? Are they equivalent?” To help answer these questions I constructed two databases of the system of concepts, in one of them matter was the highest-level concept, mind was highest in the other. Comparison of the two databases suggested what may be expected—with sufficient flexibility in the concepts of mind and matter, the two are equivalent. That is, there is something more fundamental than mind or matter. What is that something? At the highest-level it would be property free. It would be being itself—i.e., the world as the world, not as something else or something within it (and, further, this will be found to be significant rather than trivial). But being is not property free, comes a response for it distinguishes between existing and non-existing things. And a counterpoint is, but is not the concept of ‘non-existing thing’ a contradiction? It turns out that a proper understanding (theory of) meaning is the key to resolution and that the idea of a non-existing thing is not self-contradictory (see dialethic logics). 1.1.3.3.2.2 Foundation vs pragmatic beginningAxiomatic systems begin with what may be called foundational to the subject matter (they may of course have further foundation). In seeking foundation for metaphysics, which is about the world, it may be better to begin with ‘where we are now,’ e.g., with (our) experience. This is addressed in the previous section, on the choice of the ordering, and we find (i) that dynamic reordering suggests being as fundamental (a little bit of artificial intelligence, which suggests that what is fundamental is a higher order category than mind or matter) (ii) with being, foundation and pragmatic beginning are both possible. 1.1.4 Structure of the way, its design, and logic of the outlineThis section serves (i) as part of an overview, which will be retained (ii) design, of which only parts will be retained. 1.1.4.1 Design1.1.4.1.1 A templateThe outline is a template for comprehensive, brief, and purposed versions (e.g., real metaphysics, inspirational guide to realization, the system of human knowledge) 1.1.4.1.2 A hierarchyManifestly top ® down and tacitly bottom ® up Collapsible Arrangement and styles (below) to make purposed versions (above) manifest content 1.1.4.1.3 In process designThe hierarchy enables efficient in process change 1.1.4.1.4 The logicThe outline reflects the following cyclic process. 1.1.4.2 Structure of the way1.1.4.2.1 Into the way (preliminary)Include ‘my life’ and ‘my day.’ Introduces the way of being and its aim(s). Introduces the main ideas, explains their meaning and significance to the way. Discusses the logics of the outline (i) Into the way (ii) the main material – “the world” and “realization” (iii) Return (iv) Supplements (v) Reference What are the important questions? 1.1.4.2.2 Body—The world1.1.4.2.3 Body—Realization1.1.4.2.4 ReturnEpilogue Meaning of ‘return’ Last thoughts and commitments 1.1.4.2.5 Parallel developments and referenceTopic 4. The material is now in the final two sections of this document 1.1.4.3 Meta-elements, para-elements, and Styles1.1.4.3.1 MetaMeta is really part of the main document and includes— 1. Ideas and questions about ideas 2. Relation between ideas and document flow 1.1.4.3.2 ParaComments and questions Topics for study and references 1.1.4.3.3 Some topicsAlso see topics for study 1.1.4.3.4 StylesFinalize and define the styles later—(redo “Format Styles”) 1. Base or Normal 2. Comment 3. Topic 4. ‘Jhang’ 5. Academic 6. Realization? 1.1.5 Features1.1.5.1 Method and content are oneThey may be and are developed together Arguments against (a method cannot found itself) and for (elementary nature of essential method, pragmatism, moving forward) 1.1.5.2 Preliminary on meaning and knowledgeThough concept and linguistic meaning and knowledge are fully developed later, a preliminary is useful 1.1.5.3 The essential concepts and related issues1.1.5.3.1 The concepts1.1.5.3.2 Necessity, sufficiency, and holismShould reflect content and method 1.1.5.3.3 Development of the conceptsWhat (definition)? Why (significance, relation to others, place in whole)? Relation to and distinctions from historical meaning and use 1.1.5.4 Pre and post metaphysical treatments of some topicsHow this is useful and illuminating How it is advantageous to short-circuit it 1.1.5.4.1 Substance vs being1.1.5.4.2 The universe and all beings as experiential1.1.5.4.3 Being, extension, and durationThere is nothing beyond this 1.1.5.4.4 As if mind and as if matterThere is nothing beyond this 1.1.6 Reading the way1.1.6.1.1 On definition, meaning, and knowledgeA definition specifies a concept or mental content. Definitions may be related to but have difference from informal and received use. Thus, a definition is a combination of a sign (usually linguistic, often compound) and an icon. In metaphysics, a definition specifies a concept that is intended to capture something real. A meaning is a definition and the possible object (or objects). However, capture or existence of the real ought to be shown. Isolated definitions generally capture the real only in a context. In metaphysics it is the system of definition that captures the real. Knowledge is meaning realized. List of concepts in this section—concept, sign, icon, definition, meaning, system of definition, knowledge. 1.1.6.1.2 Issue of pre-formal meaning1.1.6.1.3 The issue of holismDo terms have meaning in isolation or do their meanings depend essentially on being part of a system of meaningful terms? This is the problem of holism, which I see as a non-problem, for terms do have some meaning in isolation (via definition and use), but require a system for full meaning and to pin down individual and entire meaning. A.N. Whitehead claimed that full meaning can occur only in the context of full understanding (i.e., metaphysical system). Here, we will develop an ultimate metaphysics of the universe as ultimate, which gives ultimacy to meanings. However, the metaphysics is complete only as a dynamic system, and therefore its meanings are meanings-in-process for the framework ground of the metaphysics. 1.1.6.1.4 On reading the way1.1.7 Living the way and shared pathways1.2 The world1.2.1 IntroductionThis chapter develops knowledge of the world. The vehicle for this is metaphysics, defined as knowledge of the real. This is questionable on counts of (i) whether this is a good conception of metaphysics (ii) whether metaphysics is at all possible, realistic, or potent. The treatment begins with a particular metaphysical system rather than with metaphysics as such. This is because the system (i) shows the possibility of metaphysics (ii) is (argued to be) a potent and ultimate system (iii) lays groundwork for general treatment that follows. The development of the system benefits from having gone through many iterations which (a) has resulted in an optimal, empirical, and rational form (b) anticipates and addresses issues of validity of the metaphysics. Thus, this approach makes the development efficient. This efficiency is also seen in the metaphysical system (a metaphysical system) where even though experience is seen as effectively essential to being, the treatment of experience is made more efficient by deferring it to after development of the core metaphysics. The developed metaphysical system is existentially and metaphysically empowering. What if its demonstration (proof) is doubted or does not go through? It will be seen that it is consistent with experience and reason, which has the following consequences. Existential significance remains. Metaphysically, a possible worlds metaphysics has been described, which is useful in itself and is background for interpretation and address of many issues of philosophy, metaphysics, science, and the ‘meaning of life’. The title of this chapter could be ‘Ideas and the world,’ but the world is the world as known and therefore ideas are implicit in the title. The title could also be ‘Ideas’ but, importantly, ideas include that those that are ideas of the world and ideas are in the world—therefore the world would be implicit in the title ‘Ideas.’ However, the title ‘Ideas’ is not chosen because it might suggest a narrative only of imagination or speculation. Anticipating the conception of metaphysics as knowledge of the real, metaphysics may be seen as ‘the comprehensive or all-inclusive knowledge discipline’ and therefore the title could have been ‘Metaphysics.’ However, ‘Metaphysics’ because it would suggest speculation, lack of basis in experience, metaphysics of religious dogma, or an otherwise unfounded narrative. The sections of the chapter fall under metaphysics in this general sense. The closing section of the chapter ‘Problems of philosophy and metaphysics’ is not essential to the way of being, but on contribution of the metaphysics developed to a delineation of the problems and their address. 1.2.2 A metaphysical systemThis section may be used as a succinct version of the way and its foundation for knowledge and realization. 1.2.2.1 Definitions1.2.2.1.1 On definitionRefer to the earlier section on definition, meaning, and knowledge, which could have been placed here. 1.2.2.1.2 Preliminary foundationMetaphysics is knowledge of the real. A representational concept or just concept, concept (knowledge) that is intended to depict a being. When there is depiction, what results is a representation. To abstract is to remove detail from representation that is necessarily distorted. A being (plural: beings) is that which is known to exist—i.e., to be; being is the property of beings as beings. The universe is all being; the void is the being that has no part. Given a representational (referential) concept, the being is possible if the concept is self-consistent (logical possibility) and consistent with the nature the universe (real possibility). Real possibility presumes logical possibility; logical possibility is the greatest possibility. A simple fact is a minimal piece of data about the world (universe, cosmos…) relative to a knower. A compound fact is a collection of simple facts. From the truth of one fact, the truth of another does not (logically) follow. A pattern for a being obtains if the data to represent the being is less than the raw data. A cosmos is a coherent part of the universe, which is the extent of observation to local beings. A law for the universe or cosmos is a pattern that obtains there. A law is a patterned compound fact; given a law or pattern, from the truth of one fact, the truth of another (logically independent) fact may follow. If we regard a cosmos as constituted of physical elements which follow physical laws, the concept of a being has physical possibility if its constitution is physical, and it follows the laws of the cosmos. As long as the physical laws of a cosmos are not known to be complete or eternal, the cosmos is not known to be entirely physical. Enjoyment is a state of aware beings in which pleasure and pain are in good balance. List of concepts in this section—metaphysics, representational concept, concept, representation, abstract, a being, beings, being, universe, void, concept, possible, logical possibility, real possibility, fact, compound fact, pattern, cosmos, law, physical possibility, enjoyment. 1.2.2.1.3 Derivative or secondary termsFor convenience, here is a list of some significant terms introduced later—the fundamental principle of metaphysics (fpm), the ideal metaphysics, the real metaphysics (rmp), observation, inference, deduction, induction, argument, inferential logic, general logic, Platonism, form, mathematical Platonism, experience, as-if-mind, as-if-matter. 1.2.2.2 On contradictions at the heart of being1.2.2.2.1 The void exists and does not existIssue of dialetheia and resolution via (i) paraconsistent logic vs (ii) careful specification and discrimination of meaning? 1. For (most) beings, existence is manifest existence. 2. But for the void, existence is nonmanifest existence which is its existence – therefore no contradiction. 1.2.2.2.2 What is being if not ‘kind’ or ‘property’ (of beings as beings)?How can we have a handle on it without a handle (kind, property)? Would that not be contradictory? Or – the handle is its neutrality as container, i.e., handle-lessness? Perhaps (i) it is necessary that it be knowable (ii) would that be sufficient – yes, perhaps, for what would (the significance of) an unknowable being be? 1.2.2.2.3 Being as the is of existence vs being as the is of predicationIs this a confusion or conflation – are the two versions of ‘is’ really just one? Thus, the general version of a statement as “x is [y],” where square brackets indicate an optional term. 1.2.2.2.4 The ineffability of beingIneffability is the quality of something that surpasses the capacity of language to express it. But then, how can we even mention it? “It is ineffable” says something about it and so it cannot be completely ineffable. But is not every being somewhat ineffable? Yes, but the reason is we do not capture the whole; however, with being, the argument is that we cannot logically capture the whole because of the limitations of language? Again, would the limit be the limitations of a specific language system or of language generally? And, if the latter, would that be because of the discrete and linearly laid out nature of language? And even if so—why is that a problem when language is only part of our being? Whereby the question ought perhaps to be “can our being apprehend being”? Which is not a rejection of language but recognition that it is only part of (our) being? And further, does not the intellect raise language to an ideal but unreal level, only to criticize that unreal level because we have forgotten the nature of language (admittedly a powerful instrument of description and communication)? 1.2.2.2.4.1 Being is not a being (Heidegger)– but is this true? With abstraction is not being a being? 1.2.2.2.4.2 Nothing is a thing, but as the absence of being it is ineffable, but being is nothingFor being is nothing nihilating itself (Heidegger)… However, the nature of the ineffability of nothing is not the same as the general ineffability of (putatively) ineffable things. In the latter case saying is insufficient because there is more than can be said. But for nothing (the void), nothing need be said because there is nothing to say. “The void (nothing) is that about which nothing can be said that points to manifest existence,” which is a complete description of nothing. 1.2.2.2.4.3 MoreObviously, further reflection and analysis is needed. 1.2.2.3 The being (existence) of some beingsThis section provides examples with some systematicity. A greater system and a more comprehensive list are provided later. 1.2.2.3.1 BeingsA modified form of Descartes’ cogito argument shows via abstraction that there are beings and that there is being. Though the universe may not be known in detail, that the universe is a being follows from abstraction from the idea of all beings. That the void may be taken to be a being follows from the equivalence of its existence and nonexistence. Laws have being. The void contains no law. 1.2.2.3.2 ‘Meta-being’There is metaphysics (some has just been established; more—an ultimate metaphysics—is established below). As the world contains itself, knowledge (including metaphysics), reason, and value, so metaphysics may be seen as an all-inclusive discipline, containing metaphysics (‘proper’), epistemology, metametaphysics, logic, theory of value (including ethics, aesthetics, and their metatheories). Even if we do not place epistemology under metaphysics, it is essential to proper metaphysics for metaphysics without justification would be no more than imagination. As far as philosophy harbors knowledge, it too lies under metaphysics; and science and philosophy of science fall trivially under metaphysics. 1.2.2.3.3 NonbeingWhat could ‘nonbeing’ be? The term could be used as follows. A nonbeing is a representational concept without an object. This is also what is sometimes called a negative existential. Negative existentials are considered problematic, in view of the question “what is it that does not exist?,” which seems to require posit existence so as to deny it. However, this definition of nonbeing is one simple resolution of the problem. 1.2.2.4 The fundamental principle1.2.2.4.1 The idea and motive1.2.2.4.2 DemonstrationIf from the void, a possible being does not emerge, that would constitute a law of the void. The greatest possibility emerges from the void. The universe is the realization of the greatest or logical possibility (i.e., the universe is limitless). This statement above is the fundamental principle of metaphysics (FPM). 1.2.2.4.3 Alternative proofsExistence of the void is not necessary, for laws only pertain to the manifest and proximate manifestation, but not to ultimate manifestation. Topic 5. Search other documents for proofs. 1.2.2.5 ConsequencesThe being of the universe is necessary. It has no substance and no need of explanation in terms of substance, but, uninformatively, the void or any being could be seen as the substance of the universe. The universe has identity; the universe and its identity are limitless, particularly in extension, duration (the universe is eternal), variety, peak, and dissolution; there are cosmoses without end to their number or variety; all beings realize this ultimate (and while this is given, there are effective paths to the ultimate); which is not a contradiction, for individual beings merge as one. The ultimate is an ultimate knower that knows and is all (which is not negated by paradoxical conceptions of the ultimate for the logically impossible does not define a being). From the perspective within a cosmos, its being may seem to be contingent. Beyond the cosmos there are further cosmoses and more (temporarily isolated, ultimately in contact with one another and the void). Consider the original cosmos; consider its conceptual join to others; proceeding thus, we arrive, conceptually, at the universe, which is all possibility and is necessary. This defines an ideal metaphysics. It shows ultimates; via abstraction it is perfect as representation; and thus, it has an ultimate character as metaphysics. As far as enjoyment is a value, it is good to be on—to negotiate—a path to the ultimate. It is not enough to follow prescriptions. It is of the essence to negotiate intelligent and shared paths on which the fortunate assist the less fortunate. 1.2.2.6 The real metaphysicsTo negotiate the world in light of the ideal metaphysics, we turn, also, to received knowledge-in-process, which is a mix of the ideal and the pragmatic. If we join the ideal to the pragmatic, the ideal guides and illuminates the pragmatic and the pragmatic illustrates and is instrumental toward the ideal. The join is not perfect by received, e.g., representational, criteria. However, it is the best available to negotiate the way to the ultimate. With enjoyment as criterion, the join is perfect. Further, as seen, in the ultimate, the ultimate knower knows and is all. Thus, the value criterion (enjoyment) approaches the representational criterion in the ultimate which is our ultimate. The join of the ideal and the pragmatic constitute a perfect metaphysical system, which is named the real metaphysics (rmp). Epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and logic are subsumed under the real metaphysics. 1.2.2.7 Why being?The metaphysics has been arrived at without reference to ‘kind,’ e.g., substance, which shows the power of being. Being is neutral to kind. It might have been thought that this neutrality would have been a weakness of the conceptual power of being; instead, we see it as the reason for its (ultimate) conceptual power. 1.2.2.8 LogicSome facts are established by observation (perceiving, measuring…), others by inference (to conclusions from premises). 1.2.2.8.1 ObservationWhen a fact is established by perfect observation—for example, by abstraction—the truth of the fact is certain; otherwise, due to imperfection in observation, the truth of the fact may have uncertainty. 1.2.2.8.2 InferenceThough various kinds of inference have been identified, let us class inference as deduction (certain) vs induction (probable). The following are certain inference—deduction under classical logics such as propositional and predicate calculi, deduction under extended logics (e.g., modal logic) and variant logics (e.g., many-valued logics), and deduction under some sciences, e.g., quantum theories (though outcomes may be probabilistic, the probabilities are certain) and relativistic mechanics. The following are inductive—arriving at a deductive logic (there usually are alternative schemes for a given kind) or a scientific theory (from a limited data set), via, e.g., abduction. Note that though logics and sciences are patterns or (patterned) inferential schemes, they may be seen as patterned compound facts. 1.2.2.8.3 Classical notions of logic vs scienceIt is common to compare deduction under logic to induction (or abduction) to a scientific theory. However, the foregoing show that it is proper to compare (i) arriving at a logic to arriving at a scientific theory (uncertain) (ii) inference under logic to inference under a scientific theory (in the physical sciences, inference under the science is typically certain). Thus, though they are not the same, logic and science in their traditional senses, may be brought under one umbrella. 1.2.2.8.4 ArgumentOne current notion of argument is the joint process of (i) establishing facts (simple or compound) (ii) inferences to further facts (conclusions) under a logic (or science). It is usual in the literature to consider certain fact and certain inference. In this case, the argument is called valid if the certain inference is validly established. If, further, the fact (premise) is established, the argument is called sound. Sound argument is a particular case of argument as defined above. Putting deductive logic and inference under science under one umbrella, we get inferential logic, whose derivation is uncertain but under which inference is certain (from the real metaphysics, sciences under which inference is not certain could be brought under this umbrella). With this consideration, what we call argument above may also and shall be called general logic or just logic. As far as there are no atomic facts—i.e., all facts are compound, but atomicity is relative to knowers, the distinction between fact and inference is porous, and logic in its ordinary sense becomes argument. This thought needs to be developed. Here we may allow the certainty of both fact and inference to be relaxed. There are various particular cases, which may be taken up as occasions arise. Argument, the real metaphysics, logic, and in some sense of the terms, all good knowledge are one. 1.2.2.8.5 MathematicsWhere does mathematics fit into this scheme? It begins as an empirical science, e.g., geometry may have begun as a science of shapes and their properties. However, Euclid found it possible to axiomatize geometry. Today, we regard all systems of mathematics as axiomatic systems. What is the object of an axiomatic system? One view is that the systems are conventions and have no intrinsic objects. Original platonism—Plato’s view—was that the objects of mathematics are forms that exist in an ideal or Platonic world. Today, original Platonism is seen as fanciful. However, some thinkers subscribe to mathematical platonism, the idea that on account of their seeming necessity and universality, there are abstract mathematical objects, whose existence is independent of our thought and language. From an empirical viewpoint, such abstract objects may be seen as idealizations of (systems of) real objects. The real metaphysics shows that for any consistent system of mathematics, the system perfectly represents the objects of some world (and pragmatically represents the objects further worlds). Mathematics falls under logic in the inclusive sense of the previous section. 1.2.2.9 Experience and agencyExperience is awareness in all its kinds and forms, including consciousness and agency, which is the ability to conceive and act toward outcomes (this conception of experience is more inclusive than is common in received use). Without experience, we would be as-if dead. Experience may be considered to be the place of our being and the sense of significance. We will establish the universe and our being to be experiential in nature. Experience has the following aspects—there is ‘experience of’ and ‘the experienced;’ and there is the experience itself, in which the experience-of and the-experienced are related (‘pure experience’ is experience without a present object). The experience-of is as if of mind (as-if-mind, of the subject); the-experienced is as if of matter (as-if-matter, of the object). To begin consideration of experience, let us not assume the real metaphysics. In a world strictly of non-mental matter, there would be no experience. Therefore, our world is not strictly material. If our world were strictly of a single substance—monist—the one substance would have to be experience and thus it would have to be experiential to the root. At the root, experience would be relational but not be rich, varied, and reflexive (experience of experience) as ours is. However, the real metaphysics shows the universe to not be substance based (we could consider the void or any being to be its substance but that would be uninformative). Yet, as there is experience and experience harbors as-if-psyche and as-if-matter, experientiality is a suitable candidate to characterize the universe. Is there more? As experience is relational and relation of relation is relational, there is no further kind (what there is beyond our experience of experience has to do with variety and richness, not a further kind). Under the real metaphysics, the root is always capable of experientiality. We may therefore validly consider the universe to be experiential where even primitive being is experiential with, perhaps, zero but not null experientiality. That the universe is experiential neither denies nor affirms that the universe is one or both material and mental. However, it does affirm that the universe has as-if-psychical and as-if-material sides, and so universe as experiential loses no functionality on account of its lack of affirmation of matter and mind as real. The universe and our being are experiential (and agentive). 1.2.2.10 Hierarchy of beingExperientiality as principle Hierarchy of experientiality 1.2.2.11 Dimensions of beingA more complete title of this section is “Dimensions and paradigms of experience and being.” The concept of ‘dimension’ is related to that of ‘category of being.’ In received metaphysics, a category is class or genera of being just under being itself and ‘the categories of being’ refer to a (complete) listing of categories. ‘Dimension’ extends the idea of category—(i) pure to include logic as knowledge, experiential being itself; metaphysical dimensions as generalizations or abstractions from our cosmos, e.g., true ad hoc origin; variation and selection; mechanism with and without indeterminism; and the variety, extent, duration, and behavior of being(s) (ii) pragmatic to include the low level recognized modes of being in our cosmos—natural (physical, living, sentient), social (class, individual, cultural, political-economic), and universal. 1.2.2.12 Introduction to space, time, and being1.2.2.13 Realization—paths to the ultimateIntroduction and essence 1.2.3 Doubt1.2.4 The meaning of lifeTopic 6. Should the title be enhanced for intension and extension? Topic 7. The Meaning of Life (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Topic 8. May go to ‘parallel developments’ The meaning of life is a critical human and philosophical concern. If one were to say philosophy has become too technical, it would mean that the technical aspect has suppressed the issue of the meaning of life. The plan of this section is (i) to enquire into the significance of the question (ii) reflect on the meta-question of the meaning of the meaning of life as preliminary to effectively understanding and addressing the question (iii) to discuss the meaning of life with input from the real metaphysics. 1.2.4.1 Is this philosophy’s fundamental question?1.2.4.2 Kant’s three questions1.2.4.3 A personal vs communal vs universal question1.2.4.4 The meaning of the meaning of life1.2.4.5 Open and closed aspects1.2.4.6 Possibilities and necessities1.2.4.7 The place of existentialism1.2.5 Our world1.2.5.1 The evolving situation, challenges, opportunities1.2.5.2 Application of the system of the way of being1.2.6 Consequences of the real metaphysicsTreated in ‘parallel developments’ 1.3 Realization1.3.1 Process and the ultimate1.3.2 The program and its designTopic 10. concepts-detail.html#pathways for latest path elements of 11/2/2024 1.3.3 Everyday1.3.3.1 A program1.3.3.2 Affirmation1.3.3.3 Dedication1.3.3.4 Planning1.3.3.5 Sample schedule1.3.4 Universal1.3.4.1 A menu1.3.4.2 Design of a timeline for immediate and ultimate action1.3.4.3 Sample plan1.4 Return1.4.1 Living in the world1.4.2 Sharing the way1.4.3 Universal narrative1.4.3.1 On universal narrative1.4.3.2 Writing and updating universal narrativePart 2 Parallel developments2.1 IntroductionThe developments lie at the intersection of the way and the enterprise of (human) being—the implications are mutual or two-way. The material is secondary to the main aim of the way, but of importance to (human being)—knowledge, action, and destiny The material will be treated with greater inclusiveness and attention will be given to careful development Some material will (also) be interspersed with the main development 2.2 Pragmatic – our world2.2.1 Dispersed treatmentDevelopment has begun in Part 1 The way of being > The world > Our world. 2.3 Existential2.3.1 Dispersed treatmentTreatment is dispersed throughout Part 1 The way of being and in the section on conceptual and methodological developments below. 2.3.2 Human destiny (‘destinations’) and exploration2.4 Conceptual and methodological2.4.1 Human knowledge (and enterprise)See human knowledge, reason, and action and enterprise. Two further sources are (i) the recent archived version of the document (ii) metaphysics. The aims of this section are (i) review received problems (ii) in view of the real metaphysics, improve the listing, its expression, and address. The problems and their treatment are here enhanced by the real metaphysics. Beings, first causes, unchanging things, categories (and universals and particulars), and substance—these have all received address above. Metaphysical modality, identity (persistence and continuity, space and time, causation, freedom, and determinism), the mental and the physical have all received address above. Also receiving treatment earlier—the problem of negative existentials, abstract and concrete objects, the nature of disciplinary study, metametaphysics. 2.4.2 Philosophy and its disciplines2.4.2.1 What philosophy ‘is’ and how to approach a definition.2.4.2.2 The logic of the divisions—to divide or not to divide. Main and secondary disciplines that follow from the concept of philosophy.2.4.2.3 The issue of knowledge without boundaries?2.4.2.3.1 What is it?2.4.2.3.2 Science?2.4.2.3.3 Philosophy?2.4.2.3.4 Metaphysics?2.4.2.3.5 Does it matter what we call it?2.4.2.4 The main divisions—metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and logic and their essential oneness.2.4.2.5 Should an account of language be part of the main divisions—e.g., under or together with logic?The essential incompleteness of language? Attempts at completeness and paradox. In what way, if at all, is language a discrete element of being? Is it an element of the world that is distinct from being? See the way of being. 2.4.2.6 Metaphilosophy2.4.2.7 The important questions2.4.3 MetaphysicsTopic 12. Experience is one of the problems of metaphysics. Topic 13. A section “real metaphysics” vs speculative vs joint 2.4.3.1 Worldviews and personal metaphysics—implicit and explicitTopic 14. Has some discussion in the first chapter. 2.4.3.1.1 WorldviewsPersons may ask themselves—what do I want to do in my life, what is the best or greatest thing I can and ought to do. Topic 15. See Kant’s three questions in Kant’s Account of Reason—Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/). Whatever their answer, it will be framed, at least in part, in a view of what the world is like—what kind of world is it, what is in it, what kinds of processes are there, what is the future of the world, what kind of person am I. The framework may of course be implicit, based on personal experience, absorbed from culture (which may provide more than one framework, e.g., secular vs transsecular). Such frameworks are worldviews. 2.4.3.1.2 Personal metaphysicsAs the question of worldview has relevance to individual choice, the person may, seeing its importance, seek to make their worldview explicit. And in making it implicit they may question it and seek to improve it. That is, they may seek to formulate a personal metaphysics. And they may turn to the history of thought as a resource. 2.4.3.1.3 Explicit metaphysicsThis is one reason to develop explicit metaphysics, of which one expression is the literature of the history of metaphysics. Metaphysics may also be told as myth and written as general literature. 2.4.3.2 What is metaphysics and what is its significance?A rough characterization of metaphysics is that it is a fundamental study of all being—whereas physics (for example) is about the material aspect of our cosmos, metaphysics is the entire universe and its nature. A rough characterization of the significance of metaphysics is that as the most inclusive account of what is real (significant in itself), it has potential to illuminate and guide all (general) endeavors of thought and action, to understand the nature and destiny of (our) being, to guide our path in this world and (any) beyond. But is it (only) the most inclusive account… and does it have this and other significance? These questions are best answered after developing metaphysics 2.4.3.2.1 What kind of question is this?It is a question about metaphysics—i.e., we could consider it to be a topic in ‘metametaphysics.’ However, metaphysics is in the world, and therefore metametaphysics—the study of metaphysics as a discipline, what falls under it, its use, and its justification—falls within metaphysics. 2.4.3.2.2 How to define a knowledge disciplineConceptually vs historically vs academically (re: academic boundaries and ‘turf’), top-down vs bottom-up, holistically vs atomistically (where vs means and/or). The definition of a knowledge discipline ought to aim at the probably contradictory aims of inclusiveness, understanding, utility, and precision. 2.4.3.2.3 History—received problems of metaphysicsHere are some received problems of metaphysics (modified, with additions, from Metaphysics Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Summer 2023 Edition). It is not intended to be a complete catalog of the problems—resolved or unresolved. A more complete catalog in light of the real metaphysics is placed later. Topic 17. Also review List of philosophical problems - Wikipedia > Metaphysics. 2.4.3.2.3.1 Classical metaphysicsThe object of metaphysics—Being, First Causes, Unchanging Things Divisions of metaphysics—Categories, Universals, Particulars Ground and Foundation—Substance (vs Groundlessness vs grounding in Groundlessness) 2.4.3.2.3.2 Recent MetaphysicsModality—i.e., metaphysical modality (if we see necessity and possibility as a kind of cause, modality will may fall under causation, below) Identity; Persistence and Constitution; Space and Time; Causation, Freedom (of will), and Determinism Mind and Body (The Mental and Physical) Metaphysics of the dimensions of being—nature (physical, biological, of psyche), society (institutions, persons, culture), the universal (world, the ultimate, logic, experience) 2.4.3.2.4 What metaphysics is and how such assertions can be made2.4.3.2.4.1 The conceptIf we define metaphysics as earlier—as knowledge of the real, it is (i) a good approximation to the received study, (ii) justified by the treatment of the previous chapter (iii) still in need of elaboration. 2.4.3.2.4.2 Its significanceAll knowledge is metaphysical in some way (this is brought out later). Most fundamental issues in life and ideas and many pragmatic concerns are vague in their formulation and resolution without metaphysics (worldview). This is true of action issues “what shall I do”, “what is our social endeavor about”, as well as knowledge questions such as “what is knowledge”, “how is knowledge acquired and justified”, “what is meaning”, and “how are knowledge and action interactive”. We are seeing that metaphysics is the overarching discipline. 2.4.3.2.4.3 Metaphysics, metametaphysics, and reflexivity2.4.3.2.5 To what extent are metaphysics and philosophy science?And to what extent would metaphysics and philosophy as science be a complete characterization? 2.4.3.2.6 What directly falls under metaphysics?2.4.3.2.6.1 BeingBeing is the most general object of metaphysics (it harbors nonbeing). 2.4.3.2.6.2 The essential nature of beingThat being is what it is and is not to be reduced to some substance or category is evident from the chapter, a metaphysical system. Thus, our first characterization of being is that it is (a) characterized so inclusively that (b) its characterization is trivial (some thinkers hold that it is not a characterization at all). However, we have seen that all beings including the universe are effectively experiential. That is, all being is experiential being. 2.4.3.2.6.3 The variety, extent, duration, and behavior of being(s)Variety includes kinds and a hierarchy of beings on various scales, especially experientiality, abstraction (abstract and concrete objects), existential scales, and null – part – whole scales (see the little manual). With regard to extent and duration, we would like to show (i) levels, at least of description, above them (ii) how extent and duration flow from (a) those levels (b) experientiality (c) the real metaphysics (d) the concepts of sameness and difference and thence of identity. 2.4.3.2.7 Ultimate, limited, and special metaphysicsAn ultimate metaphysics is a metaphysics of everything, as far as it may be achieved, but, of course, not necessarily of every single thing (we have developed an ultimate metaphysics which also reveals that the universe is ultimate). For it to be efficient, a metaphysics ought not to be a description of everything and it may therefore include such concepts as kinds or substances, hierarchies of being, dynamics, interactions, and equivalencies – merely real and / or logical. In the real metaphysics, there are no ultimate kinds; it is neutral with regard to kind, except that it finds – rather than posits – that the universe and all beings are experiential in an extended sense of ‘experience’ (thus, if we said that the universe is conscious, the statement would have occasional but otherwise only symbolic truth). A limited metaphysics would refer to a part of the universe, which might be defined by kinds rather than regions. From the real metaphysics there are no ultimate kinds and therefore such kinds would obtain for limited regions. A special metaphysics is a posit of hypothetical kinds, e.g., as found in religion or limited speculative metaphysics, and is not of especial concern in the way. However, from real metaphysics, a consistent special metaphysics is always realized, but the realization may lack stability, robustness, and especial significance. 2.4.3.2.8 The method of metaphysics2.4.3.2.8.1 MethodSince we do not know more than we know and cannot (logically) know more than the greatest knower, developing metaphysics will involve (i) looking at our knowledge-in-process (ii) metaknowledge, which is analyzing our knowledge for what is fundamental and its element, perhaps enhance, by the idea of an ideal (knower), which, even if we are not that ideal, we can perhaps leverage. This will involve analysis of logic and experience as understood in the previous chapter. 2.4.3.2.8.2 Real and speculative metaphysicsMetaphysics as a join of real and speculative thinking; the real as framework, ultimate, guide, illumination, inspiration – the speculative as detail, of the word, means, illustration, and process. 2.4.3.2.8.3 StructureLogic Knowledge – Fact 2.4.3.3 Meaning and knowledge2.4.3.3.1 Concepts, language, and meaning2.4.3.3.1.1 Concepts, language, and meaning2.4.3.3.1.2 Language and being2.4.3.3.1.3 Use and formal meaning2.4.3.3.2 Knowledge2.4.3.3.2.1 The concept2.4.3.3.2.2 KindsKnowledge by acquaintance, knowledge-that, knowledge-how. 2.4.3.3.3 Problems of knowledge2.4.3.3.3.1 What is knowledge?Representation and its meaning, correspondence, coherence, and pragmatism What knowledge is vs criteria Kinds of knowledge—knowledge that, know how 2.4.3.3.3.2 Abstraction and perfect representationIs perfect knowledge possible? What would perfection mean? Is it needed? Why? 2.4.3.3.3.3 Pragmatic knowledge2.4.3.3.3.4 Union of the perfect and the pragmatic2.4.3.4 Being, beings, and agencyA being (beings), being, universe (all being), the void, cosmos, pattern, possibility (logical, real), agency 2.4.3.5 Ultimate metaphysics2.4.3.5.1 The fundamental principle2.4.3.5.2 The real metaphysics2.4.3.6 Objects2.4.3.6.1 Pre-metaphysicsThe pre-metaphysical situation is that concepts (representational, self-consistent) may have objects. The objects may be real or as-if (e.g., fictional, e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes’). If real, the object is a being. Thus, the class of objects includes the class of beings. That a concept has an object is metaphorical. The concept and object are intertwined and not generally separable into a concept and object-in-itself (which Kant called the noumenon thing-in-itself). We have been using ‘object’ in two ways—as the (metaphorical) object and as the concept-object (which Kant might call the phenomenon). 2.4.3.6.2 Noumena or things-in themselvesJust above, we said that “the concept and object are not generally separable.” Thus, generally, the object is not just imprecisely known—‘hiding behind the appearance’—but logically, from the meaning of the term ‘object’ as concept-object, there is no thing-in-itself, i.e., there, generally, are no noumena. However, we have seen that some objects are precisely known via abstraction; examples are being, experience, the void, and the universe. Effectively, in such cases there are noumena. In other cases, e.g., when I see a tree, I may treat ‘the tree’ as noumenal for some pragmatic purposes. But for general purposes, my knowledge of the tree falls short of being noumenal. 2.4.3.6.3 Concrete and abstract objectsObjects may be concrete (typically physical, located in space/time, e.g., a brick, ten bricks, or a copy of Shakespeare’s Hamlet) or abstract (e.g., the objects of mathematics, universals such as redness, Shakespeare’s Hamlet). Mathematical objects may be thought of as abstract, first by abstraction from real objects (‘ten’ from ‘ten bricks’ and ‘ten sheep’), but then by axiomatic definition. Redness is abstract by abstraction from all red objects. Shakespeare’s Hamlet is abstract because it is, perhaps, the meaning of the play. What seems common to the abstract objects is that they are not physical, not located in space/time. But what are they? 2.4.3.6.4 Post-metaphysicsFrom the real metaphysics, every consistent concept has (‘is’) an object. What is the object of the number ten? We might say it is abstracted from the class of ten things. Thus, it is not true that it is not in space/time but rather, space/time has been left out in the abstraction. But then, what of axiomatization? Abstraction from physical classes is still empirical and, if so, the notion the natural numbers (unending) and the mathematical operations are questionable as empirical. Therefore, we prefer axiomatization (today). But the common axiomatization with first order predicate calculus has models of all cardinality. That is sometimes thought to be negative, but it might be positive. How so? If a switch is turned on and off at an infinite rate it would seem paradoxical as it is on and off at the same time. However, it is not paradox because there is no one situation that is on and off; rather an infinite number of situations are condensed into an instant. Is there a mathematics of that? Yes, perhaps, in a cardinality of a higher order than the one we use to represent time in our world. Similarly, we might represent an infinitesimally slow process with a lower order cardinality. What is Shakespeare’s Hamlet? A problem here is that the idea is vague. What do we mean by it? Perhaps as above it is the meaning of the play. Perhaps it is the recollection of all the performances that have been seen. But, regardless, there is some object. 2.4.3.6.5 Some further kindsWe may consider objects of the following kinds—real (there is an object), possible (the concept can have an object), nonexistent in a world (the concept does not have an object in our world), nonexistent (the concept has no object at all and must therefore be inconsistent), necessary in our world (the concept must have an object in our world), necessary (the concept must and does have an object). 2.4.3.6.6 A conclusionFrom the real metaphysics, the distinction between the concrete and the abstract is not one of kind. All consistent concepts have objects in the universe. It lies more in the direction of particular vs universal, perception vs conception. 2.4.3.6.7 DiscoveryAs seen in the discussion of meaning, objects are really concept-objects. If we have an idea of something but do not know what it is precisely, then how do we discover the precise meaning? It is a search in a dual space of concepts and objects and the outcome may or may not be precise. As we are agents, the search is constructive. We may actually construct the object. In the ultimate we may construct ourselves as peak being. 2.4.3.7 Experience2.4.3.7.1 What experience is2.4.3.7.2 We are experiential beings2.4.3.7.3 The universe as experiential and agentive2.4.3.7.4 The nature and form of the ultimate2.4.3.8 A vocabulary for metaphysicsTopic 19. See vocabulary for metaphysics. 2.4.4 Logic as the general abstract and concrete science – logic, method, and content2.4.4.1 Received conceptions of logic2.4.4.1.1 Deductive logic and its kinds2.4.4.1.2 Standard and non-standard logics2.4.4.1.2.1 StandardThe standard logics are usually taken to be (i) standard two-valued propositional calculus (with principle of non-contradiction) (ii) first order predicate calculus built on a scaffold of propositional calculus (with identity theory). 2.4.4.1.2.2 Non-standard2.4.4.1.2.2.1 Extended logics—logics that fit into the standard schemes Modal logics, second order predicate calculus (sometimes seen as standard), and more 2.4.4.1.2.2.2 Deviant logics—logics that extend the standard schemes Many-valued, intuitionist, quantum, free 2.4.4.1.2.2.3 Logics that do not fit into the standard or extended schemes, e.g., dialethic logics Dialetheic logics are logics in which the principle of non-contradiction does not hold. In standard logic, a contradiction leads to explosion—i.e., that every statement is true (and false). To avoid explosion, some change from the standard machinery is necessary and one possibility is a three-valued logic—see the little manual (dialetheia) and the separate treatment, dialetheia. A first question is—are there dialetheia, i.e., are there true contradictions? An example is that to say being is ineffable is to state an effability of being; the resolution is that being is highly but not entirely ineffable—the example is not literally dialethic. Many examples of dialetheia in the literature are non-literal in some sense. However, there are literal examples—two will be mentioned below. Questions arise—(i) are dialethic logics possible (i.e., are there logics with contradiction that are non-explosive) (ii) do they make sense (are there true contradictions) (iii) are they necessary (can they be replaced by more discriminating standard logic) (iv) are they useful. Responses are—(i) the three-valued logic mentioned above is not explosive (ii) there are true contradictions (a trivial example is that the sun is shining and not shining) (iii) they do not seem to be necessary (the sun is shining in San Fransisco but not shining in Mumbai) (iv) they may be useful when we wish to ignore the greater detail that makes them unnecessary. Note—though the example above is trivial, non-trivial examples can be given (see the link above) of which one is the Thomson Lamp Paradox (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ), and consideration of a range of examples suggests that while dialethic logics may be useful, they are not necessary). 2.4.4.1.3 Logics in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises with certainty2.4.4.2 A comprehensive conception of logic or argument2.4.4.2.1 Direct establishment of fact2.4.4.2.1.1 Observation2.4.4.2.1.2 NecessityAre all necessary ‘facts’ analytic? 2.4.4.2.2 Inference2.4.4.2.2.1 Certain2.4.4.2.2.2 Less than certain2.4.4.2.2.3 Inference, necessary or likely, from the null premise2.4.4.3 Self-sufficiency and completeness—open and closed aspects of the metaphysics2.4.5 Epistemology2.4.6 Theory of value2.4.7 A new cosmology2.4.7.1 Principles with metacosmology2.4.7.2 Cosmology as theory of variety, extension, and duration of being2.4.7.3 General cosmology2.4.7.4 Cosmology of experiential form and formation2.4.7.4.1 Experience2.4.7.4.2 Experiential aspect2.4.7.4.3 Material aspect2.4.7.5 Hierarchy of being2.4.7.6 Physical cosmology2.4.8 Science and the sciences, abstract and concretePart 3 Reference3.1 Tables of contentsMay include summaries Tables of contents for the special versions 3.2 Index3.3 Bibliography3.4 ResourcesTo include the process of growth and development of the way as an example with, perhaps, some significant personal elements 3.5 Work to do, topics for study3.5.1 Basic outlineThis is a minimal outline for development (its first version took less than an hour to complete). Indented paragraphs are secondary (material in ordinary brackets is elaboration). [Paragraphs in square brackets are elaboration.] Topic 20. Combine the basic outline with lexicon and grammar. Metaphysics Being is existence; a being (plural: beings) an existent (i.e., something that exists). [That there is being (and beings) follows from the abstraction of the terms.] Some beings are—universe (all being), cosmos (local realm accessible to experiential beings in mutual communication), void (absence of beings), natural law (abbreviated: law), experiential beings (see § experience). Laws have being—i.e., laws are beings. The void has no law. Therefore, the void, the universe, and all beings are limitless. Further, #i all beings merge with the void and the universe in peak (peaks) #ii are one—at a level of description above time (difference) #iii there are paths in and from our world to the ultimate. Ideal metaphysics—the only conceptual restriction on realization is ‘logic.’ Paradigm(s) from the knowledge system are a necessary local complement to the ideal. They explain the preponderant population of the universe by robust being. Real metaphysics (‘the metaphysics’)—the join of ideal metaphysics and pragmatic paradigm, which is #a imperfect on criteria of precise knowledge but #b perfect on a criterion of ‘best or good enough instrument of realization.’ [doubt of two kinds is natural. General doubt, regarding being itself, is addressed above. Doubt about the validity of the real metaphysics may be addressed #i the metaphysics is consistent #ii it has a proof #iii realization of all possibility can be treated as #a an observation consistent postulate #b) an existential principle by which to live #iii) a practical metaphysics to guide endeavor and knowledge.] Experience is awareness in all its forms. [If the universe were a substance universe #i it would be monist #ii experience would be the one substance.] [Experience these aspects #i ‘experience of’ (subject, concept, as if mind) #ii the experience (relation, concept-object, representation) #iii ‘the experienced (object, as if matter).] From the metaphysics, the universe cannot be substance, has no essence (but contains essence-like aspects). But primitive experience can – must and does – reach down to the root of being. Effectively, the universe is an experiential universe – a field of experience (experientiality). Further, the being that is not experienced (at all) is effectively nonexistent. [It is understood that at the root of being—the primitive—the experience (relation) is primitive to our consciousness but does not possess its animal level characteristics such as quality, brightness, and form.] Being is essentially being that knows, i.e., has knowledge, especially of being, the sense of value. [Individuals are born into the world without explicit knowledge of the nature of the world; the history of philosophy and culture is growth into such knowledge; the real metaphysics is one completion of such knowledge to the extent that it is possible as long as we are (temporally) limited or bracketed. That is, most cultures and philosophies underestimate our greatest being and overestimate our limits. The real metaphysics #i allows the immediate and ultimate to be seen on par #ii shows common secular thought and culture to be limited and potentiates overcoming the limits relative to #iii material and experiential (including spiritual) aspects of the world.] [Given that (human) being has an essence that it knows and has a sense of value and employs that essence in investigating and negotiating the world, what criteria should we place on knowledge and value for reliability? One set of criteria are defined in ‘criticism’ or ‘critical thought’ which is that knowledge and value must be certifiably precise (and therefore necessarily true) and this standard is widespread in the disciplines that employ critical thought, particularly philosophy, science, logic (deductive), and mathematics. But there are two reasons to look at alternatives #i whether we should (e.g., whether it is optimal, affordable) wait for certainty to act on ‘knowledge’ #ii it is conceivable that we can prove critically and certainly that certainty is not (always) necessary. This is in fact the case of the ‘real metaphysics’ where #a there is a precise framework, and a pragmatic fill in #b which is shown perfect relative to emergent value. This does not negate the critical attitude above but places it in context—particularly it finds the critical attitude valuable and useful but not of universality.] Cosmology The universe has identity; the universe, its identity, and all beings are limitless in variety, extension, duration, and peak (where all merge as one); they phase through void and manifest states; there are cosmoses without limit to number and variety (e.g., of physical law). [Cosmology as theory of variety, extension, and duration of being. Metacosmology—the principles of cosmology are #i fundamental principles of metaphysics – approach from being, abstraction, and valuational integration with pragmatics #ii logic – its nature, principles, varieties, and application. General cosmology – investigation of cosmology from metaphysical and logical principles #iii cosmology of experiential form and formation – experiential and formal / material aspects in light of the nature of experience and the real metaphysics #iv physical cosmology – the cosmology of our cosmos including multiverse theory.] Realization There is imperative to be on the way to the ultimate, which enhances the quality of the worlds – immediate and ultimate. There are intelligent pathways, which may learn from prescribed ways but which are best when shared negotiation. In this world, peak (‘enlightened’) being is not a feeling of perfection, but of balance between drive for local perfection and navigating the way, despite doubt, pain, and the lure of mere pleasure. [The best address of the problem of pleasure and pain is #i to associate pleasure significantly with being on the way #ii healthy living – mental, spiritual, physical, and communal #iii sharing – the fortunate assisting and giving aid to the less fortunate #iv the best therapy of the time – in balance with #v above all being on the way in balance with address of pleasure, pain, and (local) enlightenment.] [Templates for realization can be given which #i address everyday and ultimate concerns #ii are frameworks rather than prescriptions but may (optionally, as according to preference) #iii derive from traditional and modern prescriptions and philosophies.] 3.5.2 Lexicon and grammar3.5.2.1 SourcesTopic 21. Sources for vocabulary include metaphysics and vocabulary for the way (vocabulary) and journey in being (lexicon) Topic 22. Two tentative sources for grammar for metaphysics are Beyond the Limits of Thought (Graham Priest) and Martin Heidegger (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) 3.5.2.2 IntroductionThe aims of this section are § Formulate a language – lexicon and grammar – for metaphysics, particularly the real metaphysics of the way of being o Seeking minimalism consistent with depth, o Noting that the language and the metaphysics must be co-emergent (this principle generalizes to the co-emergence of content and method, which is widely ignored in the kind of philosophical writing in which apparent sophistication passes for depth) § Use the language to augment the ‘ordinary language’ account of the real metaphysics, § Use the system as a structured outline of the way of being and its metaphysics; this outline will be the basis of an essential – minimal reformulation of the present document. 3.5.2.3 Defining the problemWhat are the fundamental concepts § What are the fundamental concepts for metaphysics as all the real, arranged hierarchically, § What is their grammar? 3.5.2.4 IssuesWith database? Relation to index, above? 3.5.2.5 The high-level concepts and their grammar3.5.2.5.1 The terms arebeing, representation, value Value, can be seen as part of representation (knowledge). Objections arise but are addressed in the real metaphysics. Therefore, the essential terms are being and knowing It is an essence of being that it knows (the world, including itself). 3.5.2.5.2 The grammar§ abstraction – unspecified, determined in context, but at the highest level it is near absolute, i.e., a higher level would have all and no reference § parts of speech – none but inclusive of all at the highest level, many / all at lower levels, not a contradiction because the case is contextual. 3.5.2.5.3 Synonyms, similar, and related termsbeing – existence, that which is (‘isness’) representation – image, knowledge logic as arriving at knowledge, what to do, is not explicitly included because it is knowledge-in-process value – that which gives meaning (in the sense of ‘the meaning of life’), ethical, aesthetic value may be seen as falling under knowledge and knowledge as falling under being 3.5.2.5.4 Summary§ being is the most inclusive of terms, § with being augmented by representation (and logic), and value, the major branches of philosophy are emergent (metaphysics, epistemology, value theory, logic understood in its most general sense), § but all the branches fall under metaphysics. 3.5.2.6 Tentative system to remain under revisionbeing knowing (experience), value (feeling, meaning in the sense of significance) levels and kinds of knowledge, DIMENSIONS, and aspects of being (knowing vs Heidegger’s ‘care’) logic in a general sense (not just as inference, but as process – structure of valid knowledge and value, method and content, method as content) language – kinds, e.g., discrete, linear; linguistic meaning, mathematics, SCIENCE, and logic atomism (lexicon), holism (grammar), reference (linguistic meaning), use a being (that which has being; plural – beings) kinds and dimensions of being (whether experientiality is fundamental, whether human being is paradigmatic of the highest levels of being) universe, cosmos, law, void, limitlessness, paradigm, real metaphysics, metaphysics – value – perfection doubt (doubts, address of doubt – rational, pragmatic, existential) hierarchy of being, varieties and peak of being and knowing, enlightenment and realization sameness, difference field – interaction – change spacetime being (‘matter’), extension (space), relation (‘mind’), duration (time) cosmology (variety, extension, duration, peak, emergence) becoming (¿word?) pathways, shared discovery and realization, intelligence, prescription vs negotiation, problem of pleasure and pain and their address 3.5.2.7 Critical thought regarding the tentative systemphilosophy and the world; in more detail—philosophy, science, art, feeling, judgment, being, and the world this apparently too detailed item is entered here (i) from concern with the relation between knowledge and action—i.e., what is to be done regarding uncertainty in knowledge and action, particularly, what the role of criticism (critical thought) and action ought to be and (ii) what the relative and interacting roles of philosophy, science, and so on ought to be there is often a temptation to answer this question at the beginning of analysis, perhaps in order to make sure that the analysis is of sufficient standard; however, the results of analysis may—are likely to—modify the initial analysis; therefore, let us consider the issue of how metaphysics should be done – here’s my thinking after having gone through many iterations of metaphysical system: (i) begin with some idea of initial concepts, system, method, and criteria (ii) work out system (iii) criticize #i and #ii (iv) repeat following this approach, we found the real metaphysics as a framework of perfection-in-the-sense-of-faithfulness-to-the-world filled in with pragmatic detail and paradigm of some validity-according-to-some-received-criteria, which (the real metaphysics) was imperfect-on-received-criteria but perfect-on-emergent-axiological-criteria thus, in relation to the Quine-Carnap debate, there is a core of philosophy and science which is ‘scientific’ (remembering of course that neither science nor deductive logic themselves are perfectly perfect and that ‘what is science’ is also in question regarding ‘what philosophy ought to be’), and is basis for larger system of science (in the sense just stated) as framework for philosophy-science-art-feeling-judgment-being-and-the-world, in which art-and-extended-language and judgment are essential elements of negotiation toward the ultimate implicit in the foregoing is what has been noted explicitly in the tentative system—the essential and mutual relationship between value and epistemic criteria (where neither ‘value’ nor ‘criteria’ are intended to minimize or jettison the other) at root, we ought to recognize that it is the entire system-of-being that is concern over and above just concern with some particular element or set of elements 3.5.3 About the study topicsAlso see some topics, little manual, and journey in being 3.5.4 Program of development for the outline and the wayTopic 25. This is a permanent section, but its name, format, and placement may change 3.5.4.1 Define the central issuesContent and method (meta, para) 3.5.4.2 Identify source files3.5.4.2.1 For writing3.5.4.2.2 For resources3.5.4.3 Content and structureTopics (content, metacontent, paracontent) 3.5.4.4 Pictures and their function3.5.4.5 On redundancySome redundancy may occur—the aim is to balance efficiency with readability and coherence 3.5.4.6 MetacontentAs self-reference is foundationally important, metacontent is essential As knowledge and knowledge of knowledge are in the world, the distinction between content and metacontent is artificial Self-foundation, to the degree that it may be achieved, will be marked and dispersed in the content; Word Styles will be used to collect meta-content (especially foundation) in table 3.5.4.7 On logic and explanation3.5.4.7.1 On explanationWhat constitutes an explanation of the universe and its facts? What is the universe? The issue of explanation—various kinds – (i) proximate vs ultimate (ii) temporal vs ‘absolute’ (iii) pragmatic vs necessary 3.5.4.7.2 On logicFrom traditional to real conceptions of logic (the latter to include science and fact) Not just two but perhaps three kinds – certain, pragmatically certain, and other Other – likely or probable, of which there are (at least) two kinds, (i) induction or generalization (e.g., all individuals in a sample from a population have property x, therefore all individuals in the population the same property, which is never necessarily true but more likely as the sample gets larger) (ii) abduction, originally due to Charles Sanders Pierce, or hypothesis or hypothetical explanation, (e.g., all individuals in a population have property x, all balls in a sample (not necessarily from the population) have property x, therefore the sample is from the population 3.5.4.7.3 ParadoxWhether paradox is at the heart of (i) being (ii) our – or any – understanding or knowledge of being. 3.5.4.7.4 QuestionsWhat are our fundamental questions (or question)? What questions should we ask of any concept or discipline? 3.5.4.8 ParacontentTitle page etc; name and pseudonym – eastern and western Preface Prologue and epilogue (‘the way in’ and ‘return’) Academic and other consequences of the foundation that are not essential to the main program Reference 3.5.4.9 Tracks and stylesStyles will be converted to color ‘Auto’ in HTML versions. Style “Central” (Alt + M) – essence: minimal account of ideas and realization for inspiration and command Style “Formal” (Alt + Shift + F) – main foundational and academic material Style “Normal” (Alt + N) – general and paracontent Comment 1. Style “Comment” (Alt + C) Topic 26. Style “Topic” (Alt + V) – topics and persons to study, sources, and items to do 3.5.4.10 The problems of philosophy and metaphysicsLists Only the problems of metaphysics will approach completeness Not all problems will be treated, only the significant problems of philosophy will be treated, and of the problems of metaphysics, those treated will (i) illustrate the methods of metaphysics (ii) be adequate to define metaphysics by example Defining or conceiving metaphysics and philosophy will be among the problems The treatment of the problems will be (i) those relevant to the way may have dispersed treatment (ii) others may be treated in the parallel developments (iii) the problems with dispersed treatment will receive mention and may receive further treatment in the parallel developments 3.5.4.11 Outline and edit for clarity and word magic3.5.4.12 Write, co-edit3.5.4.13 Develop site for appeal3.5.4.14 Network, publish3.5.5 Study topics and referencesInterspersed and collected in table(s) The following topics align with the way of being > resources.html Topic 26. source writers especially Plato, Aristotle, Samkara, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Quine, Graham Priest Topic 27. topics for study – ideas from the source writers relevant to the way; logic and logical calculi, logic and ontology, first order logic with substitution, emergence of first order logic, set theory with ZF axioms (choice), universal logic and algebra, dialetheism (inclosure schema), surreal numbers, (especially Conway’s theory), artificial intelligence, Heidegger on Being, god (hiddenness of, and necessary beings), theoretical physics (and its mainstream and tentative theories), and physical cosmology. Topic 28. web design html, css, website design, JavaScript, java, python, php, and other languages for the internet (iii) see the detailed outline for further topics. Topic 29. also see the little manual, program of development, site design, detailed resource system, resource version of the way of being. |