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The Way of Being
An extended outline for The Way of Being
Anil Mitra, Copyright © (this document) – February 2024 – December 21, 2024
Anil Mitra, Copyright © (the way of being and precursors) September 1986 –
December 21, 2024
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Contents
The study topics include topics, persons,
sources, and ‘to do’ items.
1 The way
of being
1.1 Into
the way of being
1.1.1 The
way of being and its narration
1.1.1.1 What
is the way of being?
1.1.1.2 Description
and primary aim
1.1.1.3 What it takes—some
preliminary thoughts
1.1.1.4 The
title
1.1.1.5 Other aims
1.1.1.6 What
kind of work this is
Topic 1. The section
is not temporary but some of its content may be.
Topic 2. A telescoped
document.
Topic 3. Phrases “it
is seen”, “we see”, “we are seeing”, … , are to refer to discussions that may
not yet have been developed and will be linked later.
1.1.2 Motives,
reasons, and origins
1.1.2.1 Seeking,
the world, experience, study, and imagination
1.1.2.2 History
of ideas
1.1.2.3 Criticism
1.1.2.4 Paradox
1.1.3 Content
1.1.3.1 Preview
1.1.3.2 The main ideas and
their significance
1.1.3.3 Logic of the outline
1.1.4 Structure
of the way, its design, and logic of the outline
1.1.4.1 Design
1.1.4.2 Structure of the
way
Topic 4. The material
is now in the final two sections of this document
1.1.4.3 Meta-elements,
para-elements, and Styles
1.1.5 Features
1.1.5.1 Method
and content are one
1.1.5.2 Preliminary
on meaning and knowledge
1.1.5.3 The
essential concepts and related issues
1.1.5.4 Pre
and post metaphysical treatments of some topics
1.1.6 Reading
the way
1.1.7 Living
the way and shared pathways
1.2 The
world
1.2.1 Introduction
1.2.2 A
metaphysical system
1.2.2.1 Definitions
1.2.2.2 On contradictions at
the heart of being
1.2.2.3 The being
(existence) of some beings
1.2.2.4 The fundamental
principle
Topic 5. Search other
documents for proofs.
1.2.2.5 Consequences
1.2.2.6 The real metaphysics
1.2.2.7 Why being?
1.2.2.8 Logic
1.2.2.9 Experience and
agency
1.2.2.10 Hierarchy of
being
1.2.2.11 Dimensions of
being
1.2.2.12 Introduction to
space, time, and being
1.2.2.13 Realization—paths
to the ultimate
1.2.3 Doubt
1.2.4 The meaning
of life
Topic 6. Should the
title be enhanced for intension and extension?
Topic 7. The Meaning
of Life (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
Topic 8. May go to
‘parallel developments’
1.2.4.1 Is this philosophy’s
fundamental question?
1.2.4.2 Kant’s three
questions
1.2.4.3 A personal vs
communal vs universal question
1.2.4.4 The meaning of the
meaning of life
1.2.4.5 Open and closed
aspects
1.2.4.6 Possibilities and
necessities
1.2.4.7 The place of
existentialism
1.2.5 Our world
1.2.5.1 The evolving
situation, challenges, opportunities
1.2.5.2 Application of the
system of the way of being
1.2.6 Consequences
of the real metaphysics
1.3 Realization
Topic 9. More
detail on the path from (i) tradition but balanced with need for process and
negotiation… and to avoid mere system and posit (ii) modern understanding of
society enhanced by the real metaphysics (see system of human knowledge)
1.3.1 Process
and the ultimate
1.3.2 The
program and its design
Topic 10. concepts-detail.html#pathways
for latest path elements of 11/2/2024
1.3.3 Everyday
1.3.3.1 A
program
1.3.3.2 Affirmation
1.3.3.3 Dedication
1.3.3.4 Planning
1.3.3.5 Sample
schedule
1.3.4 Universal
1.3.4.1 A
menu
Topic 11. Beyul.
1.3.4.2 Design
of a timeline for immediate and ultimate action
1.3.4.3 Sample
plan
1.4 Return
1.4.1 Living
in the world
1.4.2 Sharing
the way
1.4.3 Universal
narrative
1.4.3.1 On
universal narrative
1.4.3.2 Writing
and updating universal narrative
2 Parallel developments
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Pragmatic
– our world
2.2.1 Dispersed
treatment
2.3 Existential
2.3.1 Dispersed
treatment
2.3.2 Human
destiny (‘destinations’) and exploration
2.4 Conceptual
and methodological
2.4.1 Human
knowledge (and enterprise)
2.4.2 Philosophy
and its disciplines
2.4.2.1 What philosophy ‘is’
and how to approach a definition.
2.4.2.2 The logic of the
divisions—to divide or not to divide. Main and secondary disciplines that
follow from the concept of philosophy.
2.4.2.3 The issue of
knowledge without boundaries?
2.4.2.4 The main
divisions—metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and logic and their essential
oneness.
2.4.2.5 Should an account of
language be part of the main divisions—e.g., under or together with logic?
2.4.2.6 Metaphilosophy
2.4.2.7 The important
questions
2.4.3 Metaphysics
Topic 12. Experience is
one of the problems of metaphysics.
Topic 13. A section
“real metaphysics” vs speculative vs joint
2.4.3.1 Worldviews and
personal metaphysics—implicit and explicit
Topic 14. Has some
discussion in the first chapter.
Topic 15. See Kant’s
three questions in Kant’s Account of Reason—Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy – (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/).
2.4.3.2 What is metaphysics
and what is its significance?
Topic 16. A meta-issue?
Topic 17. Also review
List of philosophical problems - Wikipedia > Metaphysics.
2.4.3.3 Meaning and
knowledge
2.4.3.4 Being, beings, and
agency
2.4.3.5 Ultimate metaphysics
2.4.3.6 Objects
2.4.3.7 Experience
2.4.3.8 A vocabulary for
metaphysics
Topic 18. Placement?
Topic 19. See
vocabulary for metaphysics.
2.4.4 Logic as
the general abstract and concrete science – logic, method, and content
2.4.4.1 Received conceptions
of logic
2.4.4.2 A comprehensive
conception of logic or argument
2.4.4.3 Self-sufficiency and
completeness—open and closed aspects of the metaphysics
2.4.5 Epistemology
2.4.6 Theory of
value
2.4.7 A new
cosmology
2.4.7.1 Principles with
metacosmology
2.4.7.2 Cosmology as theory
of variety, extension, and duration of being
2.4.7.3 General cosmology
2.4.7.4 Cosmology of
experiential form and formation
2.4.7.5 Hierarchy of being
2.4.7.6 Physical cosmology
2.4.8 Science and
the sciences, abstract and concrete
3 Reference
3.1 Tables
of contents
3.2 Index
3.3 Bibliography
3.4 Resources
3.5 Work to do, topics for study
3.5.1 Basic
outline
Topic 20. Combine the
basic outline with lexicon and grammar.
3.5.6 Lexicon and
grammar
3.5.6.1 Sources
Topic 21. Sources for
vocabulary include metaphysics and vocabulary for the way (vocabulary)
and journey in being (lexicon)
Topic 22. Two tentative
sources for grammar for metaphysics are Beyond the Limits of Thought (Graham
Priest) and Martin Heidegger (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
3.5.6.2 Introduction
3.5.6.3 Defining the problem
3.5.6.4 Issues
3.5.6.5 The high-level
concepts and their grammar
3.5.6.6 Tentative system to
remain under revision
Topic 23. In the
following, grammar is tentative and implicit; it needs to be made explicit –
with some attempt at definitiveness.
3.5.6.7 Critical thought
regarding the tentative system
3.5.7 About the
study topics
Topic 24. Study topics
are in process material; they may be dispersed and collected together
in separate section or as part of a long table of contents.
3.5.8 Program of
development for the outline and the way
Topic 25. This is a
permanent section, but its name, format, and placement may change
3.5.8.1 Define the central
issues
3.5.8.2 Identify source
files
3.5.8.3 Content and
structure
3.5.8.4 Pictures and their
function
3.5.8.5 On redundancy
3.5.8.6 Metacontent
3.5.8.7 On logic and
explanation
3.5.8.8 Paracontent
3.5.8.9 Tracks and styles
3.5.8.10 The problems of
philosophy and metaphysics
3.5.8.11 Outline and edit
for clarity and word magic
3.5.8.12 Write, co-edit
3.5.8.13 Develop site for
appeal
3.5.8.14 Network, publish
3.5.9 Study
topics and references
Topic 26. source
writers especially Plato, Aristotle, Samkara, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke,
Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Quine, Graham Priest
Topic 27. topics for
study – ideas from the source writers relevant to the way; logic and
logical calculi, logic and ontology, first order logic with substitution,
emergence of first order logic, set theory with ZF axioms (choice), universal
logic and algebra, dialetheism (inclosure schema), surreal numbers,
(especially Conway’s theory), artificial intelligence, Heidegger on Being,
god (hiddenness of, and necessary beings), theoretical physics (and its
mainstream and tentative theories), and physical cosmology.
Topic 28. web design
html, css, website design, JavaScript, java, python, php, and other languages
for the internet (iii) see the detailed outline for further topics.
Topic 29. also see the
little manual, program of development, site design, detailed resource system,
resource version of the way of being.
The Way of
Being
1
The way of being
1.1
Into the way of being
The Way of Being, abbreviated ‘the way’, has these
features—
1.1.1.1.1
A system of knowledge and guide to living in the universe
The system is a top – down
framework with (bottom – up) detail.
1.1.1.1.2
Relation to received thought
Is grounded in received thought,
western and eastern. Has beginnings in the history of ideas—reading,
experiments with the ideas, critiquing the ideas, and construction toward
going beyond the ideas.
Development has been a cycle of
study, reflection, criticism, experience, and synthesis.
1.1.1.1.3
Uses ‘being’ as a foundational concept
1.1.1.1.3.1 On
foundations
As the history of thought
progressed, it was sought to ground thinking about the world in a small
number of basic ideas.
The aim behind such grounding
includes (i) simplicity of systems of thought – while the world has many
aspects to it, to have effective explanations of the world, a simple
grounding would be effective (ii) precision – adequate to the claims and
needs of the system (iii) certainty and truth of the grounding ideas, which,
together with simplicity and precision, would result in achievable and
reliable understanding.
On the other hand there are
objections to the idea of foundation (i) some find it anathema, as if
minimizing the variety and beauty of the world (ii) whether secure and
adequate foundation is possible at all, i.e., for many kinds of foundation,
the foundation of the foundation may itself be in question (and then there
may be questions of infinite regress and whether regress may be
foundational).
A response to the dilemma above
is to abandon the idea of foundation in advance because the idea seems
problematic but to develop a tentative foundation or foundations and to see
whether the tentative foundation can be made secure. And, regarding, the issue
of ‘minimization’, if a secure foundation is found then there is no
minimization at all and one is free to admire the simplicity of the
foundation or the beauty-variety of the world or both.
1.1.1.1.3.2 On
substance
Many received systems are framed
in terms of basic concepts such as. A generic name for such concepts is
‘substance’ (while one characteristic of ‘substance’ has been thought to be
that it should be thing-like rather than process, property, relation-like and
so on, there is no fundamental reason for this and, indeed, it is presumptive
and therefore leading to, at best, an incomplete picture). The power of the
idea of substance is that it may give summary, foundational, and systematic
understanding.
Various characteristics have
been sometimes associated with substance—(i) generic in kind (as opposed to
substance for specific objects) (ii) simple and permanent, yet generative of
variety and change (iii) thing-like rather than process, event, or property
like. But why should we think in terms of permanence (it assumes time) or
being thing-like (to repeat, why should thing or object be more fundamental
than process, relation, or event—why should we think in terms of space and
time at all for foundation… should they not emerge from whatever is
foundational?). Here, we think of substance as (a) simple in idea though not
necessarily in fact (b) foundational.
Substance has issues (i) why
there should be substance as foundational at all—that substance has
conceptual power does not demonstrate the validity of substance or any
particular substance or substances (ii) substance is thought to provide a
secure foundation but substance is not founded (iii) if a set of substances
(just one, two, many, or even an infinite number—i.e., monism, dualism,
pluralism, infinitism) are thought to provide a foundation, the question of
completeness applies equally to all cases (iv) a single substance, e.g.,
matter, would seem to be incomplete, therefore some thinkers propose more
than one substance, but in that case the question of how the substances
interact arises, and if they do interact, it would seem that they combine as
or as part of a more inclusive true substance (v) why substance should be
foundational at all—why not take the world as it is (vi) but the world ‘as it
is’ seems to lack any cohesive system of understanding which was an original
reason for the idea of substance.
1.1.1.1.3.3 On
being, i.e., on taking ‘the world as it is’
Here, we find ‘the world as it
is’, can be used as a powerful idea in understanding and living. This
approach has a tradition which takes ‘being’ as fundamental. What is being?
Simply, being is existence—that which is. Historical problems with this concept
are (i) that it is too deep to describe or understand and, contrarily, (ii)
that it is shallow, trivial, and impotent. An issue is how to interpret ‘is’
in “that which is”. We do not assume spatiotemporality to be associated with
the foundational character of ‘is-ness’.
The approach here is—
Regarding depth, to approach
being only in its most general feature, ‘is-ness’, which defuses the problem
of depth, but is then at least seemingly open to the problem of impotence.
The possible impotence is
addressed by introducing a system of concepts based in being, only in their
most general features—some are the universe (all being), laws (i.e., natural
laws or patterns of / constraints on behavior that are pervasive in a local
region), the void (absence of being or the ‘nil’ being), and reason
(employing only the properties of the concepts).
1.1.1.1.3.4 Using
the idea of being
Now, the following is seen
(details are deferred to the main development)—
1.
From abstraction—the retention only of the
most general features—the concepts truly describe their objects.
2.
The universe as all being is ‘everything’.
Particularly, if mind, concepts, numbers, cosmoses, laws are real, they have
being—i.e., they are beings. Particularly, laws have being. On a materialist
account the real nature of laws is not clear—are they part of the world or
artifacts of mind; are they real or mere conventions?
3.
Since there are no beings in the void, there
are no laws in it, and the void is (seemingly paradoxically) limitless
(however, the paradox arises only on the notion that the void remains the
void—which is not given).
4.
Therefore the universe has identity and is
limitless (starting with the concepts of sameness and difference, we will
derive the concepts of extension-duration-identity or space-time-object) it
phases between nonmanifest, manifest, and peak states of identity; all beings
merge as one in the peak states.
5.
Starting with the concepts of sameness and
difference, we will derive the concepts of extension-identity-duration
(space, time, object).
6.
Experience—awareness in all its forms has
being. The hypothetical being that cannot be experienced is effectively
nonexistent from an experiential perspective, but truly nonexistent, given
limitlessness. Experience must reach down to the root of being. The universe
is experiential—but that is not to say that it is everywhere and always
experiential in the way that animals are.
7.
The elementary reasoning to limitlessness is
itself given by abstraction and therefore content and method emerge
intertwined and simultaneously. As experience (and mind whether real or as
if) has being, method and content are truly one.
Is experience a substance?
Rather, has the concept of experience been shown to be a substance? It seems
to have some characteristics of substance, for it may be seen as founding.
However, (i) from limitlessness any aspect of being can be seen as founding—and
that includes experience (ii) experience as foundational is derived from
something more basic, which is necessity grounded essentially in the fact of
being / nonbeing (iii) the substance nature of experience lies in value and
meaning, which is grounded in experience and that without experience, the
universe would be at least effectively nonexistent.
1.1.1.1.4
Derives and uses an ultimate and well-founded worldview
The derivation is as just
explained. The worldview will be named ‘the real metaphysics’ or just ‘the
metaphysics’.
The use of the view is developed
in using the view to describe dimensions of being and pathways in and from
the immediate to the ultimate.
1.1.1.1.5
Shows that there is an ultimate that far exceeds the ultimate
of most worldviews
As just explained.
1.1.1.1.6
Shows that the immediate and the ultimate are mutually
informing and enhancing
As they must be—from
limitlessness.
The primary aims of the
way of being are—
1.
Shared discovery and realization of
the ultimate or ultimates,
2.
In, for and from the immediate,
3.
Which entails living in the immediate
and the ultimate as one.
Our aims and actions in life
depend on the kind of person that we are and our worldviews—i.e., in simple
terms, our large-scale view of the world, what it is like, what we are like
as beings, and what we think important
1.1.1.3.1
Personality—accepting vs seeking
1.1.1.3.2
Worldviews
See a brief, recent version of the way
of being
Also incorporate secular
humanism
1.1.1.3.3
The nature and role of knowledge
While taken up in depth later,
some preliminary issues may be mentions
1.1.1.3.3.1 What
is knowledge?
1.1.1.3.3.2 Can
knowledge be faithful and how important is faithfulness?
1.1.1.3.3.3 Knowledge
alone as realization vs knowledge as part of being and as ever in give and
take with action
1.1.1.3.3.4 Can
or to what extent can a part—a being—know the whole, i.e., the universe as
all being?
1.1.1.4.1
The significance of ‘into’ (the way)
1.1.1.4.2
‘The way’
1.1.1.4.3
Why being?
1.1.1.6.1
Ideas in action
From ideas, to action, to
learning and revision of ideas.
1.1.1.6.2
Not dogma
The development of the way
begins dually with imagination and criticism. In reading the literature, in
imagination, in attempting to understand the world, imagination and criticism
have stood in balance, neither dominating the other.
Though arbitrary or ad hoc
certainty is generally rejected (i) it would be dogma to reject certainty
where it may be found (ii) we do find directions of both certainty and
uncertainty (iii), yet we maintain doubt (in balance with doubt about doubt).
Readers are encouraged to read
and understand the way. No reader is expected or encouraged to
‘believe.’ Some readers will have absolute doubt. They may go their way with
encouragement, without opposition. Some readers will agree with the arguments
that the way is consistent with experience yet doubt the
demonstration—the later discussion of doubt may address such concern.
Pathways are suggested, not
prescribed; as suggested, the pathways are generic, which enables adaptation
to specific situations and interests. Above all, the way is not
prescriptive—it is designed as shared negotiation of pathways and their
discovery.
1.1.1.6.3
An evolving document
1.1.1.6.3.1 The
evolution
The concept of the document
has gone through many phases (i) from a scientific and materialist bent,
through idealism, to a focus on being as fundamental in itself and to
understanding and (ii) from a view of the world and its beings as limited to
a view in which the world is limited in temporal descriptions and limitless
in descriptions that stand above difference (e.g., spacetime)
Each phase of the narrative
has gone through numerous iterations, and it has become undesirable to retain
only what is new, for what is changed is not merely additive but part of an
interacting whole. And, given my time resources, it is impossible to
disentangle the new from the old
1.1.1.6.3.2 Design
Topic 1.
The section is not temporary but some of its content may be.
Topic 2.
A telescoped document.
Eliminate repetition between
this chapter and the others.
All problems should be listed in
the problems of human knowledge,
especially philosophy and metaphysics.
Sub-documents?
Topic 3.
Phrases “it is seen”, “we see”, “we are seeing”, … , are to refer to
discussions that may not yet have been developed and will be linked later.
Edit phrases such as “it is
seen” vs “we have seen” and “I have shown” vs “we have shown” for
consistency.
Use single and double quotes
consistently. Eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate quotes.
Edit for brevity, poetry,
precision.
Introduce pictures / graphics?
A concept template (what, why,
relation to other concepts, historical meaning…) is part of writing
metaphysics.
1.1.1.6.3.3 The
outline
The outline itself is to remain
in process till found satisfactory
1.1.1.6.4
A self-contained system and document
While the ‘into’ and ‘return’
sections of Part 1 are important as orientation, guide, vision, and
motivation, the main formal content is in ‘the world’ and ‘realization’
The following will be shown.
1.1.3.1.1
An ultimate universe
The universe is ultimate in that
it is the realization of the greatest possibility (naïvely, the possibility
of coherence, or, formally, logical possibility—which guarantees consistency
of the view).
The universe has identity; the
universe and its identity are limitless in extension, duration, variety, peak
and dissolution of being; all beings inherit limitlessness and merge in the
peaks.
We do not see all possibilities
in our cosmos, which is but one possibility; the other possibilities are
realized beyond our cosmos, i.e., in other cosmoses, the void, and more.
Realization of the ultimate—of the limitless—begins in our world but is realized
beyond, trans-cosmologically.
1.1.3.1.2
Paths to the ultimate
Though it is given that all
beings realize the ultimate, if enjoyment is a value, there is an imperative
to develop, share, and negotiate intelligent (effective) pathways to the
ultimate for, beginning in, and from our world. While there are received ways
(philosophy, religion), shared development and negotiation are essential to
effective realization; and they are realization-in-process while in our
world.
Pleasure and pain are
unavoidable; there is pleasure in being on a pathway (this is not a rejection
of simple joy); the best resolution of pain is use of the best available of
therapy while, as far as possible, being on a path on which the fortunate
give aid and assistance to the less fortunate.
1.1.3.2.1
Primary
The primary ideas begin with
being, beings, experience, agency, concepts, and objects.
1.1.3.2.2
Metaconcepts
Knowledge of the world and so
knowledge of knowledge, nature and problems of knowledge, narrative, action,
method, and reflexivity.
Representation, abstraction, and
pragmatism.
Metaphysics as the overarching
discipline, which includes meta-metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and theory
of value.
1.1.3.2.3
Concept template
Nature, definition, and
significance, of the concept.
Relation to received meanings
and reasons for differences.
Place in the hierarchical
structure of the concepts.
1.1.3.3.1
On the choice of the ordering
1.1.3.3.1.1 Overview
The order of the chapters is
plain enough. Into the way of being paves the way in. The formal development is in the world, which
develops a foundation, and realization, which is about action based on the foundation. The
concluding chapter, return, is about living in the world on the way to the ultimate
from a new perspective.
Of the four chapters, the
structure of the second, the world, is in especial need of explanation. The following
account touches on the key issues of the chapter.
1.1.3.3.1.2 The
world
1.1.3.3.1.2.1
A metaphysical system—a preliminary section
A metaphysical system develops, briefly, the metaphysical system of the
narrative. Why is this done before introductory discussion? It is because
such discussion without metaphysical knowledge is invariably vague. A
Socratic attitude ought to be taken in interaction with a definitive one,
rather than coming at the beginning which that everything ought to be always
doubted (everything ought to be doubted but not always). The metaphysical
system is (a) ultimate (b) of course doubted (c) sets the scene.
1.1.3.3.1.2.2
The core development
The world is really metaphysics; however, it is informative to
begin it with metaphysics as such, followed by development of the
metaphysics. The section, worldviews
and personal metaphysics—implicit and explicit is a way into the metaphysics. what
is metaphysics and what is its significance
defines metaphysics, explains how and why the present conception differs from
the received, and reiterates the fundamental significance of metaphysics. Meaning and knowledge, a topic critical to clear thinking generally, is an
essential preliminary to the main development of metaphysics.
The development of metaphysics,
proper, begins with being, beings,
and agency, which is on the essential
subject and foundation of metaphysics. But why should we begin with
foundation? Would it not be better to begin with the immediate—where we are
and from there, to develop foundation and its application? That is—ought we
to begin with ‘ground’ or axiomatically with being? It is possible to do
both. This is because the immediate, our experience of things, is already but
implicitly built into the previous section, meaning and knowledge. We could have begun explicitly with experience, but
that would have made the development cumbersome as we would have to rework it
to account for the implications of the study of being for experience. Though
experience is essential to the development, it is effective to defer its
explicit treatment till after a basic metaphysical framework is in hand—and
the foundation for the framework is in being,
beings, and agency, while the framework
itself is developed in ultimate
metaphysics. (also: the real metaphysics)
The ultimate metaphysics is where we show the universe to be the realization
of the greatest possibility, which is far greater than received views,
secular and transsecular. Then, experience develops the concept of experience,
its importance, the experiential nature of the ultimate, and instruments for
and ways to the ultimate.
The remaining sections of the world are now
discussed briefly.
1.1.3.3.1.2.3
Consequences and elaboration
Is the truth of the real
metaphysics certain? The question is raised and addressed in doubt.
Logic, method, and
content has the following functions. It
extends the concept of logic to (i) fact and inference (ii) the certain and
the less than certain cases (in a manner that is a definite enhancement over
what is sometimes called ‘argument’). It fills in the range of metaphysics.
It shows logic and metaphysics to be the same. It shows metaphysics (and
logic) to be self-contained (as far as possible and in what sense).
Epistemology, theory of value, and cosmology (in a
new cosmology) are treated and developed as
part of metaphysics. Epistemology is part of metaphysics because knowledge is
part of the world, and it is important in metaphysics as founding. Ethics is
part of metaphysics as agency is part of the world, and it is important to
agency, choice, particularly the question “what should we do,” generally, and
in relation to realization. Ethics is also important as part of being—it is
not epitheory—and essential in informing epistemic criteria (which stands
against a common received notion that knowledge criteria are pure—intrinsic
to knowledge itself). Cosmology is a working out of the metaphysics,
especially in relation to the question “what is in the world and what is its
nature?” Here, cosmology includes but far exceeds classical philosophical
cosmology and modern physical cosmology—which is a consequence of the
demonstrated real or ultimate
metaphysics.
Our world is about problems of our world today and into the
reasonably near future—the problems themselves, (re) valuation in terms of
the real metaphysics, and their address.
The meaning of life is about (i) what the concern means, particularly is it
only about individual pursuit in a secular vein, and whether it is a
fundamental problem of philosophy—or, perhaps, the fundamental problem (ii)
addressing the issue in light of the real metaphysics in a top-down
manner—flexible and open at the higher level and a range of specifics and
choices at the lower.
1.1.3.3.1.2.4
The problems of metaphysics and philosophy
Many classical and modern
problems have been treated to this point—but the treatment is not for its own
sake – the problems are significant to the purpose of the way of
being. To catalog and treat the problems of metaphysics would be useful as
(i) a contribution (ii) potential utility in the way and in life (iii)
showing the power of the real metaphysics. This is done in the problems of metaphysics and philosophy, where the problems are extended, rationally arranged,
and addressed in light of the real or ultimate
metaphysics (emphasis is on those problems
not addressed in the main development).
1.1.3.3.2
Dynamic reordering
1.1.3.3.2.1 Introduction
Before the state of the evolving
narrative arrived at understanding the world in its own terms (being) rather
than in terms of something else (e.g., substance, process, and so on), it
(the narrative) experimented with the physical (matter) as fundamental and
then with experientiality (e.g., consciousness) as fundamental.
Questions arose—“Which is
fundamental, matter or experience? Are they equivalent?” To help answer these
questions I constructed two databases of the system of concepts, in one of
them matter was the highest-level concept, mind was highest in the other. Comparison
of the two databases suggested what may be expected—with sufficient
flexibility in the concepts of mind and matter, the two are equivalent.
That is, there is something more
fundamental than mind or matter. What is that something? At the highest-level
it would be property free.
It would be being itself—i.e.,
the world as the world, not as something else or something within it (and,
further, this will be found to be significant rather than trivial).
But being is not property free,
comes a response for it distinguishes between existing and non-existing
things. And a counterpoint is, but is not the concept of ‘non-existing thing’
a contradiction? It turns out that a proper understanding (theory of) meaning
is the key to resolution and that the idea of a non-existing thing is not
self-contradictory (see dialethic
logics).
1.1.3.3.2.2 Foundation
vs pragmatic beginning
Axiomatic systems begin with
what may be called foundational to the subject matter (they may of course
have further foundation).
In seeking foundation for
metaphysics, which is about the world, it may be better to begin with ‘where
we are now,’ e.g., with (our) experience.
This is addressed in the
previous section, on the choice of the
ordering, and we find (i) that dynamic
reordering suggests being as fundamental (a little bit of artificial
intelligence, which suggests that what is fundamental is a higher order
category than mind or matter) (ii) with being, foundation and pragmatic
beginning are both possible.
This section serves (i) as part
of an overview, which will be retained (ii) design, of which only parts will
be retained.
1.1.4.1.1
A template
The outline is a template for
comprehensive, brief, and purposed versions (e.g., real metaphysics, inspirational
guide to realization, the system of human knowledge)
1.1.4.1.2
A hierarchy
Manifestly top ®
down and tacitly bottom ® up
Collapsible
Arrangement and styles (below)
to make purposed versions (above) manifest content
1.1.4.1.3
In process design
The hierarchy enables efficient
in process change
1.1.4.1.4
The logic
The outline reflects the
following cyclic process.
1.1.4.2.1
Into the way (preliminary)
Include ‘my life’ and ‘my day.’
Introduces the way of
being and its aim(s).
Introduces the main ideas,
explains their meaning and significance to the way.
Discusses the logics of the
outline (i) Into the way (ii) the main material – “the world” and
“realization” (iii) Return (iv) Supplements (v) Reference
What are the important
questions?
1.1.4.2.2
Body—The world
1.1.4.2.3
Body—Realization
1.1.4.2.4
Return
Epilogue
Meaning of ‘return’
Last thoughts and commitments
1.1.4.2.5
Parallel developments and reference
Topic 4.
The material is now in the final two sections of this document
1.1.4.3.1
Meta
Meta is really part of the main
document and includes—
1.
Ideas and questions about ideas
2.
Relation between ideas and document flow
1.1.4.3.2
Para
Comments and questions
Topics for study and references
1.1.4.3.3
Some topics
Also see topics for study
1.1.4.3.4
Styles
Finalize and define the styles
later—(redo “Format Styles”)
1.
Base or Normal
2.
Comment
3.
Topic
4.
‘Jhang’
5.
Academic
6.
Realization?
They may be and are developed
together
Arguments against (a method
cannot found itself) and for (elementary nature of essential method,
pragmatism, moving forward)
1.1.5.3.1
The concepts
1.1.5.3.2
Necessity, sufficiency, and holism
1.1.5.3.3
Development of the concepts
What (definition)?
Why (significance, relation
to others, place in whole)?
Relation to and distinctions
from historical meaning and use
How this is useful and
illuminating
How it is advantageous to
short-circuit it
1.1.5.4.1
Substance vs being
1.1.5.4.2
The universe and all beings as experiential
1.1.5.4.3
Being, extension, and duration
There is nothing beyond this
1.1.5.4.4
As if mind and as if matter
There is nothing beyond this
1.1.6.1.1
On definition, meaning, and knowledge
A definition specifies a concept or mental content. Definitions may be related to but have difference from informal and received use.
Thus, a definition is a combination of a sign (usually linguistic, often compound) and an icon.
In metaphysics, a definition specifies a concept that is intended to capture
something real.
A meaning is a definition and the possible object (or objects).
However, capture or existence of
the real ought to be shown.
Isolated definitions generally
capture the real only in a context. In metaphysics it is the system
of definition that captures the real.
Knowledge is
meaning realized.
List of concepts in this
section—concept, sign, icon, definition,
meaning, system of definition, knowledge.
1.1.6.1.2
Issue of pre-formal meaning
1.1.6.1.3
The issue of holism
Do terms have meaning in
isolation or do their meanings depend essentially on being part of a system
of meaningful terms?
This is the problem of holism,
which I see as a non-problem, for terms do have some meaning in isolation
(via definition and use), but require a system for full meaning and to pin
down individual and entire meaning.
A.N. Whitehead claimed that full
meaning can occur only in the context of full understanding (i.e.,
metaphysical system).
Here, we will develop an
ultimate metaphysics of the universe as ultimate, which gives ultimacy to
meanings.
However, the metaphysics is
complete only as a dynamic system, and therefore its meanings are
meanings-in-process for the framework ground of the metaphysics.
1.1.6.1.4
On reading the way
1.2 The
world
This chapter develops knowledge of the world. The vehicle for this is
metaphysics, defined as knowledge of the real. This is questionable on counts
of (i) whether this is a good conception of metaphysics (ii) whether
metaphysics is at all possible, realistic, or potent.
The treatment begins with a
particular metaphysical system rather
than with metaphysics as such. This is because the system (i) shows the
possibility of metaphysics (ii) is (argued to be) a potent and ultimate
system (iii) lays groundwork for general treatment that follows. The
development of the system benefits from having gone through many iterations
which (a) has resulted in an optimal, empirical, and rational form (b)
anticipates and addresses issues of validity of the metaphysics. Thus, this
approach makes the development efficient. This efficiency is also seen in the
metaphysical system (a
metaphysical system) where even though
experience is seen as effectively essential to being, the treatment of
experience is made more efficient by deferring it to after development of the
core metaphysics.
The developed metaphysical
system is existentially and metaphysically empowering. What if its demonstration (proof) is doubted or does
not go through? It will be seen that it is consistent with experience and
reason, which has the following consequences. Existential significance
remains. Metaphysically, a possible worlds metaphysics has been described,
which is useful in itself and is background for interpretation and address of
many issues of philosophy, metaphysics, science, and the ‘meaning of life’.
The title of this chapter could be ‘Ideas and the world,’ but the world is the
world as known and therefore ideas are implicit in the title.
The title could also be ‘Ideas’
but, importantly, ideas include that those that are ideas of the world and
ideas are in the world—therefore the world would be implicit in the title
‘Ideas.’ However, the title ‘Ideas’ is not chosen because it might suggest a
narrative only of imagination or speculation.
Anticipating the conception
of metaphysics as knowledge of the real,
metaphysics may be seen as ‘the comprehensive or all-inclusive knowledge
discipline’ and therefore the title could have been ‘Metaphysics.’ However,
‘Metaphysics’ because it would suggest speculation, lack of basis in
experience, metaphysics of religious dogma, or an otherwise unfounded
narrative. The sections of the chapter fall under metaphysics in this general
sense.
The closing section of the
chapter ‘Problems of philosophy and metaphysics’ is not essential to the way of being, but on
contribution of the metaphysics developed to a delineation of the problems
and their address.
1.2.2 A metaphysical system
This section may be used as a
succinct version of the way and its foundation for knowledge and
realization.
1.2.2.1.1
On definition
Refer to the earlier section on definition, meaning, and knowledge, which could have been placed here.
1.2.2.1.2
Preliminary foundation
Metaphysics is
knowledge of the real.
A representational
concept or just concept, concept (knowledge) that is intended to depict a being.
When there is depiction, what results is a representation.
To abstract is to remove detail from representation that is
necessarily distorted.
A being (plural: beings) is that which is known to exist—i.e., to be; being is the property of beings as beings.
The universe is all being; the void is the being that has no part.
Given a representational
(referential) concept, the
being is possible if the concept
is self-consistent (logical possibility) and consistent with the nature the universe (real
possibility). Real possibility
presumes logical possibility; logical possibility is the greatest
possibility.
A simple fact is a minimal piece of data about the world (universe,
cosmos…) relative to a knower. A compound fact is a collection of simple facts.
From the truth of one fact, the
truth of another does not (logically) follow.
A pattern for a being obtains if the data to represent the being
is less than the raw data.
A cosmos is a coherent part of the universe, which is the extent
of observation to local beings.
A law for the universe or cosmos is a pattern that obtains
there.
A law is a patterned compound
fact; given a law or pattern, from the truth of one fact, the truth of
another (logically independent) fact may follow.
If we regard a cosmos as
constituted of physical elements which follow physical laws, the concept of a
being has physical possibility if
its constitution is physical, and it follows the laws of the cosmos. As long
as the physical laws of a cosmos are not known to be complete or eternal, the
cosmos is not known to be entirely physical.
Enjoyment is a
state of aware beings in which pleasure and pain are in good balance.
List of concepts in this
section—metaphysics, representational
concept, concept, representation, abstract, a being, beings, being, universe,
void, concept, possible, logical possibility, real possibility, fact,
compound fact, pattern, cosmos, law, physical possibility, enjoyment.
1.2.2.1.3
Derivative or secondary terms
For convenience, here is a list
of some significant terms introduced later—the fundamental principle of metaphysics (fpm), the ideal metaphysics, the real metaphysics (rmp), observation, inference, deduction, induction,
argument, inferential logic, general logic, Platonism, form, mathematical
Platonism, experience, as-if-mind, as-if-matter.
1.2.2.2
On contradictions at the heart of being
1.2.2.2.1
The void exists and does not exist
Issue of dialetheia and
resolution via (i) paraconsistent logic vs (ii) careful specification and
discrimination of meaning?
1.
For (most) beings, existence is manifest
existence.
2.
But for the void, existence is nonmanifest
existence which is its existence – therefore no contradiction.
1.2.2.2.2
What is being if not ‘kind’ or ‘property’ (of beings as beings)?
How can we have a handle on it
without a handle (kind, property)? Would that not be contradictory? Or – the
handle is its neutrality as container, i.e., handle-lessness? Perhaps (i) it
is necessary that it be knowable (ii) would that be sufficient – yes,
perhaps, for what would (the significance of) an unknowable being be?
1.2.2.2.3
Being as the is of existence vs being as the is of predication
Is this a confusion or
conflation – are the two versions of ‘is’ really just one? Thus, the general
version of a statement as “x is [y],” where square brackets indicate an
optional term.
1.2.2.2.4
The ineffability of being
Ineffability is the quality of
something that surpasses the capacity of language to express it.
But then, how can we even
mention it?
“It is ineffable” says something
about it and so it cannot be completely ineffable. But is not every being
somewhat ineffable? Yes, but the reason is we do not capture the whole;
however, with being, the argument is that we cannot logically capture the whole
because of the limitations of language? Again, would the limit be the
limitations of a specific language system or of language generally? And, if
the latter, would that be because of the discrete and linearly laid out
nature of language?
And even if so—why is that a
problem when language is only part of our being? Whereby the question ought
perhaps to be “can our being apprehend being”? Which is not a rejection of
language but recognition that it is only part of (our) being?
And further, does not the
intellect raise language to an ideal but unreal level, only to criticize that
unreal level because we have forgotten the nature of language (admittedly a
powerful instrument of description and communication)?
1.2.2.2.4.1 Being
is not a being (Heidegger)
– but is this true? With
abstraction is not being a being?
1.2.2.2.4.2 Nothing
is a thing, but as the absence of being it is ineffable, but being is nothing
For being is nothing nihilating
itself (Heidegger)…
However, the nature of the
ineffability of nothing is not the same as the general ineffability of
(putatively) ineffable things. In the latter case saying is insufficient
because there is more than can be said. But for nothing (the void), nothing
need be said because there is nothing to say. “The void (nothing) is that
about which nothing can be said that points to manifest existence,” which is
a complete description of nothing.
1.2.2.2.4.3 More
Obviously, further reflection
and analysis is needed.
This section provides examples
with some systematicity. A greater system and a more comprehensive list are
provided later.
1.2.2.3.1
Beings
A modified form of Descartes’
cogito argument shows via abstraction that there are beings and that there is
being.
Though the universe may not be
known in detail, that the universe is a being follows from abstraction from
the idea of all beings.
That the void may be taken to be
a being follows from the equivalence of its existence and nonexistence.
Laws have being.
The void contains no law.
1.2.2.3.2
‘Meta-being’
There is metaphysics (some has
just been established; more—an ultimate metaphysics—is established below).
As the world contains itself,
knowledge (including metaphysics), reason, and value, so metaphysics may be
seen as an all-inclusive discipline, containing metaphysics (‘proper’),
epistemology, metametaphysics, logic, theory of value (including ethics, aesthetics,
and their metatheories). Even if we do not place epistemology under
metaphysics, it is essential to proper metaphysics for metaphysics without
justification would be no more than imagination. As far as philosophy harbors
knowledge, it too lies under metaphysics; and science and philosophy of
science fall trivially under metaphysics.
1.2.2.3.3
Nonbeing
What could ‘nonbeing’ be?
The term could be used as follows. A nonbeing is a representational concept without an object. This is
also what is sometimes called a negative existential. Negative existentials
are considered problematic, in view of the question “what is it that does not
exist?,” which seems to require posit existence so as to deny it. However,
this definition of nonbeing is one simple resolution of the problem.
1.2.2.4.1
The idea and motive
1.2.2.4.2
Demonstration
If from the void, a possible
being does not emerge, that would constitute a law of the void.
The greatest possibility emerges
from the void.
The universe is the realization
of the greatest or logical possibility (i.e., the universe is limitless).
This statement above is the fundamental
principle of metaphysics (FPM).
1.2.2.4.3
Alternative proofs
Existence of the void is not
necessary, for laws only pertain to the manifest and proximate manifestation,
but not to ultimate manifestation.
Topic 5.
Search other documents for proofs.
The being of the universe is
necessary. It has no substance and no need of explanation in terms of
substance, but, uninformatively, the void or any being could be seen as the
substance of the universe.
The universe has identity; the
universe and its identity are limitless, particularly in extension, duration
(the universe is eternal), variety, peak, and dissolution; there are cosmoses
without end to their number or variety; all beings realize this ultimate (and
while this is given, there are effective paths to the ultimate); which is not
a contradiction, for individual beings merge as one. The ultimate is an
ultimate knower that knows and is all (which is not negated by paradoxical
conceptions of the ultimate for the logically impossible does not define a
being).
From the perspective within a
cosmos, its being may seem to be contingent. Beyond the cosmos there are
further cosmoses and more (temporarily isolated, ultimately in contact with
one another and the void). Consider the original cosmos; consider its conceptual
join to others; proceeding thus, we arrive, conceptually, at the universe,
which is all possibility and is necessary.
This defines an ideal
metaphysics. It shows ultimates; via
abstraction it is perfect as representation; and thus, it has an ultimate
character as metaphysics.
As far as enjoyment is a value,
it is good to be on—to negotiate—a path to the ultimate. It is not enough to
follow prescriptions. It is of the essence to negotiate intelligent and
shared paths on which the fortunate assist the less fortunate.
To negotiate the world in light
of the ideal metaphysics, we turn, also, to received knowledge-in-process,
which is a mix of the ideal and the pragmatic.
If we join the ideal to the
pragmatic, the ideal guides and illuminates the pragmatic and the pragmatic
illustrates and is instrumental toward the ideal. The join is not perfect by
received, e.g., representational, criteria. However, it is the best available
to negotiate the way to the ultimate. With enjoyment as criterion, the
join is perfect. Further, as seen, in the ultimate, the ultimate knower knows
and is all. Thus, the value criterion (enjoyment) approaches the
representational criterion in the ultimate which is our ultimate.
The join of the ideal and the
pragmatic constitute a perfect metaphysical system, which is named the real
metaphysics (rmp).
Epistemology, ethics,
aesthetics, and logic are subsumed under the real metaphysics.
The metaphysics has been arrived
at without reference to ‘kind,’ e.g., substance, which shows the power of
being. Being is neutral to kind. It might have been thought that this
neutrality would have been a weakness of the conceptual power of being;
instead, we see it as the reason for its (ultimate) conceptual power.
1.2.2.8
Logic
Some facts are established by observation (perceiving, measuring…), others by inference (to conclusions from premises).
1.2.2.8.1
Observation
When a fact is established by
perfect observation—for example, by abstraction—the truth of the fact is
certain; otherwise, due to imperfection in observation, the truth of the fact
may have uncertainty.
1.2.2.8.2
Inference
Though various kinds of
inference have been identified, let us class inference as deduction (certain) vs induction (probable).
The following are certain
inference—deduction under classical logics such as propositional and
predicate calculi, deduction under extended logics (e.g., modal logic) and
variant logics (e.g., many-valued logics), and deduction under some sciences,
e.g., quantum theories (though outcomes may be probabilistic, the
probabilities are certain) and relativistic mechanics.
The following are
inductive—arriving at a deductive logic (there usually are alternative
schemes for a given kind) or a scientific theory (from a limited data set),
via, e.g., abduction.
Note that though logics and
sciences are patterns or (patterned) inferential schemes, they may be seen as
patterned compound facts.
1.2.2.8.3
Classical notions of logic vs science
It is common to compare
deduction under logic to induction (or abduction) to a scientific theory.
However, the foregoing show that
it is proper to compare (i) arriving at a logic to arriving at a scientific
theory (uncertain) (ii) inference under logic to inference under a scientific
theory (in the physical sciences, inference under the science is typically
certain).
Thus, though they are not the
same, logic and science in their traditional senses, may be brought under one
umbrella.
1.2.2.8.4
Argument
One current notion of argument is the joint process of (i) establishing facts (simple
or compound) (ii) inferences to further facts (conclusions) under a logic (or
science).
It is usual in the literature to
consider certain fact and certain inference. In this case, the argument is
called valid if the certain inference is validly established. If, further,
the fact (premise) is established, the argument is called sound. Sound argument
is a particular case of argument as defined above.
Putting deductive logic and
inference under science under one umbrella, we get inferential
logic, whose derivation is uncertain
but under which inference is certain (from the real metaphysics, sciences
under which inference is not certain could be brought under this umbrella).
With this consideration, what we
call argument above may also and shall be called general
logic or just logic.
As far as there are no atomic
facts—i.e., all facts are compound, but atomicity is relative to knowers, the
distinction between fact and inference is porous, and logic in its ordinary
sense becomes argument. This thought needs to be developed.
Here we may allow the certainty
of both fact and inference to be relaxed. There are various particular cases,
which may be taken up as occasions arise.
Argument, the real metaphysics,
logic, and in some sense of the terms, all good knowledge are one.
1.2.2.8.5
Mathematics
Where does mathematics fit into
this scheme? It begins as an empirical science, e.g., geometry may have begun
as a science of shapes and their properties. However, Euclid found it
possible to axiomatize geometry. Today, we regard all systems of mathematics
as axiomatic systems. What is the object of an axiomatic system? One view is
that the systems are conventions and have no intrinsic objects. Original platonism—Plato’s view—was that the objects of mathematics are forms that exist in an ideal or Platonic world. Today,
original Platonism is seen as fanciful. However, some thinkers subscribe to mathematical
platonism, the idea that on account
of their seeming necessity and universality, there are abstract mathematical
objects, whose existence is independent of our thought and language. From an
empirical viewpoint, such abstract objects may be seen as idealizations of
(systems of) real objects. The real metaphysics shows that for any consistent
system of mathematics, the system perfectly represents the objects of some
world (and pragmatically represents the objects further worlds).
Mathematics falls under logic in
the inclusive sense of the previous section.
Experience is
awareness in all its kinds and forms, including consciousness and agency, which is the ability to conceive and act toward
outcomes (this conception of experience is more inclusive than is common in
received use).
Without experience, we would be
as-if dead. Experience may be considered to be the place of our being and the
sense of significance. We will establish the universe and our being to be
experiential in nature.
Experience has the following
aspects—there is ‘experience of’ and ‘the experienced;’ and there is the
experience itself, in which the experience-of and the-experienced are related
(‘pure experience’ is experience without a present object). The experience-of
is as if of mind (as-if-mind, of the subject); the-experienced is as if of matter (as-if-matter, of the object).
To begin consideration of
experience, let us not assume the real metaphysics. In a world strictly of
non-mental matter, there would be no experience. Therefore, our world is not
strictly material. If our world were strictly of a single substance—monist—the
one substance would have to be experience and thus it would have to be
experiential to the root. At the root, experience would be relational but not
be rich, varied, and reflexive (experience of experience) as ours is.
However, the real metaphysics
shows the universe to not be substance based (we could consider the void or
any being to be its substance but that would be uninformative). Yet, as there
is experience and experience harbors as-if-psyche and as-if-matter, experientiality
is a suitable candidate to characterize the universe. Is there more? As
experience is relational and relation of relation is relational, there is no
further kind (what there is beyond our experience of experience has to do
with variety and richness, not a further kind). Under the real metaphysics,
the root is always capable of experientiality. We may therefore validly
consider the universe to be experiential where even primitive being is
experiential with, perhaps, zero but not null experientiality.
That the universe is
experiential neither denies nor affirms that the universe is one or both
material and mental. However, it does affirm that the universe has
as-if-psychical and as-if-material sides, and so universe as experiential
loses no functionality on account of its lack of affirmation of matter and
mind as real.
The universe and our being are
experiential (and agentive).
Experientiality as principle
Hierarchy of experientiality
A more complete title of this
section is “Dimensions and paradigms of experience and being.”
The concept of ‘dimension’ is
related to that of ‘category of being.’ In received metaphysics, a category
is class or genera of being just under being itself and ‘the categories of
being’ refer to a (complete) listing of categories.
‘Dimension’ extends the idea of
category—(i) pure to include logic as knowledge, experiential being itself;
metaphysical dimensions as generalizations or abstractions from our cosmos,
e.g., true ad hoc origin; variation and selection; mechanism with and without
indeterminism; and the variety,
extent, duration, and behavior of being(s)
(ii) pragmatic to include the low level recognized modes of being in our
cosmos—natural (physical, living, sentient), social (class, individual,
cultural, political-economic), and universal.
Introduction and essence
1.2.3 Doubt
1.2.4 The meaning of life
Topic 6.
Should the title be enhanced for intension and extension?
Topic 7.
The Meaning
of Life (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
Topic 8.
May go to ‘parallel developments’
The meaning of life is a
critical human and philosophical concern. If one were to say philosophy has
become too technical, it would mean that the technical aspect has suppressed
the issue of the meaning of life.
The plan of this section is (i)
to enquire into the significance of the question (ii) reflect on the
meta-question of the meaning of the meaning of life as preliminary to
effectively understanding and addressing the question (iii) to discuss the
meaning of life with input from the real metaphysics.
1.2.5 Our world
1.2.6
Consequences of the real metaphysics
Treated in ‘parallel
developments’
Topic 9.
More detail on the path from (i) tradition but balanced with
need for process and negotiation… and to avoid mere system and posit (ii) modern
understanding of society enhanced by the real metaphysics (see system of
human knowledge)
Topic 10. concepts-detail.html#pathways for latest path elements of 11/2/2024
Topic 11.
Beyul.
1.4 Return
The developments lie at the
intersection of the way and the enterprise of (human) being—the
implications are mutual or two-way.
The material is secondary to the
main aim of the way, but of importance to (human being)—knowledge,
action, and destiny
The material will be treated
with greater inclusiveness and attention will be given to careful development
Some material will (also) be
interspersed with the main development
Development has begun in Part 1 The way of being
> The world
> Our world.
Treatment is dispersed
throughout Part 1 The way of being and in the section on conceptual and methodological
developments below.
See human
knowledge, reason, and action and enterprise.
Two further sources are (i) the recent archived
version of the document (ii) metaphysics.
The aims of this section are (i)
review received problems (ii) in view of the real metaphysics, improve the
listing, its expression, and address.
The problems and their treatment
are here enhanced by the real metaphysics.
Beings, first causes, unchanging
things, categories (and universals and particulars), and substance—these have
all received address above.
Metaphysical modality, identity
(persistence and continuity, space and time, causation, freedom, and
determinism), the mental and the physical have all received address above.
Also receiving treatment
earlier—the problem of negative existentials, abstract and concrete objects,
the nature of disciplinary study, metametaphysics.
2.4.2.3.1
What is it?
2.4.2.3.2
Science?
2.4.2.3.3
Philosophy?
2.4.2.3.4
Metaphysics?
2.4.2.3.5
Does it matter what we call it?
The essential incompleteness of
language?
Attempts at completeness and
paradox.
In what way, if at all, is
language a discrete element of being? Is it an element of the world that is
distinct from being? See the way
of being.
Topic 12.
Experience is one of the problems of metaphysics.
Topic 13.
A section “real metaphysics” vs speculative vs joint
2.4.3.1
Worldviews and personal metaphysics—implicit and explicit
Topic 14.
Has some discussion in the first chapter.
2.4.3.1.1
Worldviews
Persons may ask themselves—what
do I want to do in my life, what is the best or greatest thing I can and
ought to do.
Topic 15.
See Kant’s three questions in Kant’s Account of
Reason—Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/).
Whatever their answer, it will
be framed, at least in part, in a view of what the world is like—what kind of
world is it, what is in it, what kinds of processes are there, what is the
future of the world, what kind of person am I.
The framework may of course be
implicit, based on personal experience, absorbed from culture (which may
provide more than one framework, e.g., secular vs transsecular).
Such frameworks are worldviews.
2.4.3.1.2
Personal metaphysics
As the question of worldview has
relevance to individual choice, the person may, seeing its importance, seek
to make their worldview explicit. And in making it implicit they may question
it and seek to improve it.
That is, they may seek to
formulate a personal metaphysics. And they may turn to the history of thought
as a resource.
2.4.3.1.3
Explicit metaphysics
This is one reason to develop
explicit metaphysics, of which one expression is the literature of the
history of metaphysics. Metaphysics may also be told as myth and written as
general literature.
2.4.3.2
What is metaphysics and what is its significance?
Topic 16.
A meta-issue?
A rough characterization of
metaphysics is that it is a fundamental study of all being—whereas physics
(for example) is about the material aspect of our cosmos, metaphysics is the
entire universe and its nature.
A rough characterization of the
significance of metaphysics is that as the most inclusive account of what is
real (significant in itself), it has potential to illuminate and guide all
(general) endeavors of thought and action, to understand the nature and
destiny of (our) being, to guide our path in this world and (any) beyond.
But is it (only) the most
inclusive account… and does it have this and other significance? These
questions are best answered after developing metaphysics
2.4.3.2.1
What kind of question is this?
It is a question about
metaphysics—i.e., we could consider it to be a topic in ‘metametaphysics.’
However, metaphysics is in the world, and therefore metametaphysics—the study of metaphysics as a discipline, what falls
under it, its use, and its justification—falls within metaphysics.
2.4.3.2.2
How to define a knowledge discipline
Conceptually vs historically vs
academically (re: academic boundaries and ‘turf’), top-down vs bottom-up,
holistically vs atomistically (where vs means and/or).
The definition of a knowledge
discipline ought to aim at the probably contradictory aims of inclusiveness,
understanding, utility, and precision.
2.4.3.2.3
History—received problems of metaphysics
Here are some received problems
of metaphysics (modified, with additions, from Metaphysics
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Summer 2023 Edition). It is not intended to be a complete catalog of the
problems—resolved or unresolved. A more complete catalog in light of the real
metaphysics is placed later.
Topic 17.
Also review List
of philosophical problems - Wikipedia > Metaphysics.
2.4.3.2.3.1 Classical
metaphysics
The object of metaphysics—Being,
First Causes, Unchanging Things
Divisions of metaphysics—Categories,
Universals, Particulars
Ground and Foundation—Substance
(vs Groundlessness vs grounding in Groundlessness)
2.4.3.2.3.2 Recent
Metaphysics
Modality—i.e., metaphysical
modality (if we see necessity and possibility as a kind of cause, modality
will may fall under causation, below)
Identity; Persistence and
Constitution; Space and Time; Causation, Freedom (of will), and Determinism
Mind and Body (The Mental and
Physical)
Metaphysics of the dimensions of
being—nature (physical, biological, of psyche), society (institutions,
persons, culture), the universal (world, the ultimate, logic, experience)
2.4.3.2.4
What metaphysics is and how such assertions can be made
2.4.3.2.4.1 The
concept
If we define metaphysics as
earlier—as knowledge of the real, it is (i) a good approximation to the
received study, (ii) justified by the treatment of the previous chapter (iii)
still in need of elaboration.
2.4.3.2.4.2 Its
significance
All knowledge is metaphysical in some way (this is
brought out later).
Most fundamental issues in life
and ideas and many pragmatic concerns are vague in their formulation and
resolution without metaphysics (worldview). This is true of action issues
“what shall I do”, “what is our social endeavor about”, as well as knowledge
questions such as “what is knowledge”, “how is knowledge acquired and
justified”, “what is meaning”, and “how are knowledge and action
interactive”.
We are seeing that metaphysics
is the overarching discipline.
2.4.3.2.4.3 Metaphysics,
metametaphysics, and reflexivity
2.4.3.2.5
To what extent are metaphysics and philosophy science?
And to what extent would
metaphysics and philosophy as science be a complete characterization?
2.4.3.2.6
What directly falls under metaphysics?
2.4.3.2.6.1 Being
Being is the most general object
of metaphysics (it harbors nonbeing).
2.4.3.2.6.2 The
essential nature of being
That being is what it is and is
not to be reduced to some substance or category is evident from the chapter, a metaphysical system.
Thus, our first characterization
of being is that it is (a) characterized so inclusively that (b) its
characterization is trivial (some thinkers hold that it is not a
characterization at all).
However, we have seen that all
beings including the universe are effectively experiential.
That is, all being is
experiential being.
2.4.3.2.6.3
The variety, extent, duration, and behavior of being(s)
Variety includes kinds and a
hierarchy of beings on various scales, especially experientiality,
abstraction (abstract and concrete objects), existential scales, and null –
part – whole scales (see the little manual).
With regard to extent and
duration, we would like to show (i) levels, at least of description, above
them (ii) how extent and duration flow from (a) those levels (b)
experientiality (c) the real metaphysics (d) the concepts of sameness and
difference and thence of identity.
2.4.3.2.7
Ultimate, limited, and special metaphysics
An ultimate
metaphysics is a metaphysics of
everything, as far as it may be achieved, but, of course, not necessarily of
every single thing (we have developed an ultimate metaphysics which also
reveals that the universe is ultimate). For it to be efficient, a metaphysics
ought not to be a description of everything and it may therefore include such
concepts as kinds or substances, hierarchies of being, dynamics,
interactions, and equivalencies – merely real and / or logical. In the real
metaphysics, there are no ultimate kinds; it is neutral with regard to kind,
except that it finds – rather than posits – that the universe and all beings
are experiential in an extended sense of ‘experience’ (thus, if we said that
the universe is conscious, the statement would have occasional but otherwise
only symbolic truth).
A limited
metaphysics would refer to a part of
the universe, which might be defined by kinds rather than regions. From the
real metaphysics there are no ultimate kinds and therefore such kinds would
obtain for limited regions.
A special
metaphysics is a posit of
hypothetical kinds, e.g., as found in religion or limited speculative
metaphysics, and is not of especial concern in the way. However, from
real metaphysics, a consistent special metaphysics is always realized, but
the realization may lack stability, robustness, and especial significance.
2.4.3.2.8
The method of metaphysics
2.4.3.2.8.1 Method
Since we do not know more than
we know and cannot (logically) know more than the greatest knower, developing
metaphysics will involve (i) looking at our knowledge-in-process (ii)
metaknowledge, which is analyzing our knowledge for what is fundamental and
its element, perhaps enhance, by the idea of an ideal (knower), which, even
if we are not that ideal, we can perhaps leverage.
This will involve analysis of
logic and experience as understood in the previous chapter.
2.4.3.2.8.2 Real
and speculative metaphysics
Metaphysics as a join of real
and speculative thinking; the real as framework, ultimate, guide,
illumination, inspiration – the speculative as detail, of the word, means,
illustration, and process.
2.4.3.2.8.3 Structure
Logic
Knowledge – Fact
2.4.3.3
Meaning and knowledge
2.4.3.3.1
Concepts, language, and meaning
2.4.3.3.1.1 Concepts,
language, and meaning
2.4.3.3.1.2 Language
and being
2.4.3.3.1.3 Use
and formal meaning
2.4.3.3.2
Knowledge
2.4.3.3.2.1 The
concept
2.4.3.3.2.2 Kinds
Knowledge by acquaintance,
knowledge-that, knowledge-how.
2.4.3.3.3
Problems of knowledge
2.4.3.3.3.1 What
is knowledge?
Representation and its meaning,
correspondence, coherence, and pragmatism
What knowledge is vs criteria
Kinds of knowledge—knowledge
that, know how
2.4.3.3.3.2 Abstraction
and perfect representation
Is perfect knowledge possible?
What would perfection mean?
Is it needed? Why?
2.4.3.3.3.3 Pragmatic
knowledge
2.4.3.3.3.4 Union
of the perfect and the pragmatic
2.4.3.4
Being, beings, and agency
A being (beings), being,
universe (all being), the void, cosmos, pattern, possibility (logical, real),
agency
2.4.3.5
Ultimate metaphysics
2.4.3.5.1
The fundamental principle
2.4.3.5.2
The real metaphysics
2.4.3.6.1
Pre-metaphysics
The pre-metaphysical situation
is that concepts (representational, self-consistent) may have objects. The
objects may be real or as-if (e.g., fictional, e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes’). If
real, the object is a being. Thus, the class of objects includes the class of
beings.
That a concept has an object is
metaphorical. The concept and object are intertwined and not generally
separable into a concept and object-in-itself (which Kant called the noumenon
thing-in-itself). We have been using ‘object’ in two ways—as the (metaphorical)
object and as the concept-object (which Kant might call the phenomenon).
2.4.3.6.2
Noumena or things-in themselves
Just above, we said that “the
concept and object are not generally separable.” Thus, generally, the object
is not just imprecisely known—‘hiding behind the appearance’—but logically,
from the meaning of the term ‘object’ as concept-object, there is no
thing-in-itself, i.e., there, generally, are no noumena.
However, we have seen that some
objects are precisely known via abstraction; examples are being, experience,
the void, and the universe. Effectively, in such cases there are noumena.
In other cases, e.g., when I see
a tree, I may treat ‘the tree’ as noumenal for some pragmatic purposes. But
for general purposes, my knowledge of the tree falls short of being noumenal.
2.4.3.6.3
Concrete and abstract objects
Objects may be concrete
(typically physical, located in space/time, e.g., a brick, ten bricks, or a
copy of Shakespeare’s Hamlet) or abstract (e.g., the objects of mathematics,
universals such as redness, Shakespeare’s Hamlet). Mathematical objects may be
thought of as abstract, first by abstraction from real objects (‘ten’ from
‘ten bricks’ and ‘ten sheep’), but then by axiomatic definition. Redness is
abstract by abstraction from all red objects. Shakespeare’s Hamlet is
abstract because it is, perhaps, the meaning of the play.
What seems common to the
abstract objects is that they are not physical, not located in space/time.
But what are they?
2.4.3.6.4
Post-metaphysics
From the real metaphysics, every
consistent concept has (‘is’) an object. What is the object of the number
ten? We might say it is abstracted from the class of ten things. Thus, it is
not true that it is not in space/time but rather, space/time has been left
out in the abstraction. But then, what of axiomatization? Abstraction from
physical classes is still empirical and, if so, the notion the natural
numbers (unending) and the mathematical operations are questionable as
empirical. Therefore, we prefer axiomatization (today). But the common
axiomatization with first order predicate calculus has models of all
cardinality.
That is sometimes thought to be
negative, but it might be positive. How so? If a switch is turned on and off
at an infinite rate it would seem paradoxical as it is on and off at the same
time. However, it is not paradox because there is no one situation that is on
and off; rather an infinite number of situations are condensed into an
instant. Is there a mathematics of that? Yes, perhaps, in a cardinality of a
higher order than the one we use to represent time in our world. Similarly,
we might represent an infinitesimally slow process with a lower order
cardinality.
What is Shakespeare’s Hamlet? A
problem here is that the idea is vague. What do we mean by it? Perhaps as
above it is the meaning of the play. Perhaps it is the recollection of all the
performances that have been seen. But, regardless, there is some object.
2.4.3.6.5
Some further kinds
We may consider objects of the
following kinds—real (there is an object), possible (the concept can have an
object), nonexistent in a world (the concept does not have an object in our
world), nonexistent (the concept has no object at all and must therefore be
inconsistent), necessary in our world (the concept must have an object in our
world), necessary (the concept must and does have an object).
2.4.3.6.6
A conclusion
From the real metaphysics, the
distinction between the concrete and the abstract is not one of kind. All
consistent concepts have objects in the universe. It lies more in the
direction of particular vs universal, perception vs conception.
2.4.3.6.7
Discovery
As seen in the discussion of
meaning, objects are really concept-objects. If we have an idea of something
but do not know what it is precisely, then how do we discover the precise
meaning? It is a search in a dual space of concepts and objects and the outcome
may or may not be precise.
As we are agents, the search is
constructive. We may actually construct the object. In the ultimate we may
construct ourselves as peak being.
2.4.3.7.1
What experience is
2.4.3.7.2
We are experiential beings
2.4.3.7.3
The universe as experiential and agentive
2.4.3.7.4
The nature and form of the ultimate
Topic 18.
Placement?
Topic 19.
See vocabulary
for metaphysics.
2.4.4.1.1
Deductive logic and its kinds
2.4.4.1.2
Standard and non-standard logics
2.4.4.1.2.1 Standard
The standard logics are usually
taken to be (i) standard two-valued propositional calculus (with principle of
non-contradiction) (ii) first order predicate calculus built on a scaffold of
propositional calculus (with identity theory).
2.4.4.1.2.2 Non-standard
2.4.4.1.2.2.1
Extended logics—logics that fit into the standard schemes
Modal logics, second order
predicate calculus (sometimes seen as standard), and more
2.4.4.1.2.2.2
Deviant logics—logics that extend the standard schemes
Many-valued, intuitionist,
quantum, free
2.4.4.1.2.2.3 Logics that do not fit into the
standard or extended schemes, e.g., dialethic logics
Dialetheic logics are logics in
which the principle of non-contradiction does not hold.
In standard logic, a
contradiction leads to explosion—i.e., that every statement is true (and
false).
To avoid explosion, some change
from the standard machinery is necessary and one possibility is a
three-valued logic—see the little
manual (dialetheia) and the separate
treatment, dialetheia.
A first question is—are there
dialetheia, i.e., are there true contradictions? An example is that to say
being is ineffable is to state an effability of being; the resolution is that
being is highly but not entirely ineffable—the example is not literally
dialethic. Many examples of dialetheia in the literature are non-literal in
some sense. However, there are literal examples—two will be mentioned below.
Questions arise—(i) are
dialethic logics possible (i.e., are there logics with contradiction that are
non-explosive) (ii) do they make sense (are there true contradictions) (iii)
are they necessary (can they be replaced by more discriminating standard logic)
(iv) are they useful.
Responses are—(i) the
three-valued logic mentioned above is not explosive (ii) there are true
contradictions (a trivial example is that the sun is shining and not shining)
(iii) they do not seem to be necessary (the sun is shining in San Fransisco
but not shining in Mumbai) (iv) they may be useful when we wish to ignore the
greater detail that makes them unnecessary.
Note—though the example above is
trivial, non-trivial examples can be given (see the link above) of which one
is the Thomson
Lamp Paradox (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ), and consideration of a range of examples suggests
that while dialethic logics may be useful, they are not necessary).
2.4.4.1.3
Logics in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises with
certainty
2.4.4.2.1
Direct establishment of fact
2.4.4.2.1.1 Observation
2.4.4.2.1.2 Necessity
Are all necessary ‘facts’
analytic?
2.4.4.2.2
Inference
2.4.4.2.2.1 Certain
2.4.4.2.2.2 Less
than certain
2.4.4.2.2.3 Inference,
necessary or likely, from the null premise
2.4.5 Epistemology
2.4.6
Theory of value
2.4.7
A new cosmology
2.4.7.4.1
Experience
2.4.7.4.2
Experiential aspect
2.4.7.4.3
Material aspect
May include summaries
Tables of contents for the
special versions
To include the process of growth
and development of the way as an example with, perhaps, some
significant personal elements
3.5 Work to do, topics for study
3.5.1 Basic outline
This is a minimal outline for
development (its first version took less than an hour to complete).
Indented paragraphs are
secondary (material in ordinary brackets is elaboration).
[Paragraphs in square brackets
are elaboration.]
Topic 20.
Combine the basic outline with lexicon
and grammar.
3.5.2
Metaphysics
Being is
existence; a being (plural: beings) an existent (i.e., something that exists).
[That there is being (and
beings) follows from the abstraction of the terms.]
Some beings are—universe (all being), cosmos (local realm accessible to experiential beings in mutual
communication), void (absence of beings), natural
law (abbreviated: law), experiential beings (see § experience).
Laws have being—i.e., laws
are beings.
The void has no law. Therefore,
the void, the universe, and all beings are limitless.
Further, #i all
beings merge with the void and the universe in peak (peaks) #ii are one—at a level of description
above time (difference) #iii there are paths in and from our world to
the ultimate.
Ideal metaphysics—the
only conceptual restriction on realization is ‘logic.’
Paradigm(s) from the knowledge system are a necessary local
complement to the ideal. They explain the preponderant population of the
universe by robust being.
Real metaphysics (‘the metaphysics’)—the join of ideal metaphysics and pragmatic paradigm, which is #a imperfect on criteria of
precise knowledge but #b perfect on a criterion of ‘best or good
enough instrument of realization.’
[doubt of two kinds is natural. General doubt, regarding being
itself, is addressed above. Doubt about the validity of the real metaphysics
may be addressed #i the metaphysics is consistent #ii it has a
proof #iii realization of all possibility can be treated as #a
an observation consistent postulate #b an existential principle by which to live #iii) a practical metaphysics to
guide endeavor and knowledge.]
3.5.3 Experience
Experience is
awareness in all its forms.
[If the universe were a
substance universe #i it would be monist #ii experience would
be the one substance.]
[Experience these aspects #i
‘experience of’ (subject, concept, as if mind) #ii the experience (relation, concept-object,
representation) #iii ‘the experienced (object, as if matter).]
From the metaphysics, the
universe cannot be substance, has no essence (but contains essence-like
aspects). But primitive experience can – must and does – reach down to the root of being.
Effectively, the universe is an
experiential universe – a field of experience (experientiality). Further, the being that is not
experienced (at all) is effectively nonexistent.
[It is understood that at
the root of being—the primitive—the experience (relation) is primitive to our
consciousness but does not possess its animal level characteristics such as
quality, brightness, and form.]
Being is essentially being
that knows, i.e., has knowledge, especially of being, the sense of value.
[Individuals are born into
the world without explicit knowledge of the nature of the world; the history
of philosophy and culture is growth into such knowledge; the real metaphysics
is one completion of such knowledge to the extent that it is possible as long
as we are (temporally) limited or bracketed. That is, most cultures and
philosophies underestimate our greatest being and overestimate our limits.
The real metaphysics #i allows the immediate and ultimate to be seen
on par #ii shows common secular thought and culture to be limited and
potentiates overcoming the limits relative to #iii material and
experiential (including spiritual) aspects of the world.]
[Given that (human) being
has an essence that it knows and has a sense of value and employs that
essence in investigating and negotiating the world, what criteria should we
place on knowledge and value for reliability? One set of criteria are defined
in ‘criticism’ or ‘critical thought’ which is that knowledge and value must
be certifiably precise (and therefore necessarily true) and this standard is
widespread in the disciplines that employ critical thought, particularly
philosophy, science, logic (deductive), and mathematics. But there are two
reasons to look at alternatives #i whether we should (e.g., whether it
is optimal, affordable) wait for certainty to act on ‘knowledge’ #ii
it is conceivable that we can prove critically and certainly that certainty
is not (always) necessary. This is in fact the case of the ‘real metaphysics’
where #a there is a precise framework, and a pragmatic fill in #b
which is shown perfect relative to emergent value. This does not negate the
critical attitude above but places it in context—particularly it finds the
critical attitude valuable and useful but not of universality.]
3.5.4
Cosmology
The universe has identity; the universe, its identity, and all beings are limitless
in variety, extension, duration, and peak (where all merge as one); they phase through void and manifest
states; there are cosmoses without
limit to number and variety (e.g., of physical law).
[Cosmology as theory of variety, extension, and duration of being. Metacosmology—the principles of cosmology are #i fundamental
principles of metaphysics – approach from being, abstraction, and valuational
integration with pragmatics #ii logic – its nature, principles,
varieties, and application. General cosmology – investigation of cosmology from metaphysical and
logical principles #iii cosmology of experiential form and
formation – experiential and formal /
material aspects in light of the nature of experience and the real
metaphysics #iv physical cosmology – the cosmology of our cosmos including multiverse
theory.]
3.5.5
Realization
There is imperative to be on the way to the ultimate, which enhances the
quality of the worlds – immediate and ultimate.
There are intelligent pathways, which may learn from prescribed ways but which are best
when shared negotiation. In this world, peak (‘enlightened’) being is not a feeling of perfection, but of balance
between drive for local perfection and navigating the way, despite
doubt, pain, and the lure of
mere pleasure.
[The best address of the
problem of pleasure and pain is #i to associate pleasure significantly
with being on the way #ii healthy living – mental, spiritual,
physical, and communal #iii sharing – the fortunate assisting and
giving aid to the less fortunate iv the best therapy of the time – in balance with #v
above all being on the way in balance with address of pleasure, pain,
and (local) enlightenment.]
[Templates for realization can be given which #i address
everyday and ultimate concerns #ii are frameworks rather than
prescriptions but may (optionally, as according to preference) #iii
derive from traditional and modern prescriptions and philosophies.]
3.5.6 Lexicon and grammar
Topic 21.
Sources for vocabulary include metaphysics
and vocabulary for the way (vocabulary) and journey in
being (lexicon)
Topic 22.
Two tentative sources for grammar for metaphysics are Beyond the Limits of Thought
(Graham Priest) and Martin Heidegger
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
The aims of this section are
§ Formulate a language – lexicon and grammar – for
metaphysics, particularly the real metaphysics of the way of being
o
Seeking minimalism consistent with
depth,
o
Noting that the language and the
metaphysics must be co-emergent (this principle generalizes to the
co-emergence of content and method, which is widely ignored in the kind of
philosophical writing in which apparent sophistication passes for depth)
§ Use the language to augment the ‘ordinary language’
account of the real metaphysics,
§ Use the system as a structured outline of the way
of being and its metaphysics; this outline will be the basis of an essential
– minimal reformulation of the present document.
What are the fundamental
concepts
§ What are the fundamental concepts for metaphysics as all
the real, arranged hierarchically,
§ What is their grammar?
With database?
Relation to index, above?
3.5.6.5.1
The terms are
being, representation, value
Value, can be seen as part of
representation (knowledge). Objections arise but are addressed in the real
metaphysics.
Therefore, the essential terms
are
being and knowing
It is an essence of being that
it knows (the world, including itself).
3.5.6.5.2
The grammar
§ abstraction – unspecified, determined in context, but at
the highest level it is near absolute, i.e., a higher level would have all
and no reference
§ parts of speech – none but inclusive of all at the
highest level, many / all at lower levels, not a contradiction because the
case is contextual.
3.5.6.5.3
Synonyms, similar, and related terms
being – existence, that which is (‘isness’)
representation – image, knowledge
logic
as arriving at knowledge, what to do, is not explicitly included because it
is knowledge-in-process
value – that which gives meaning
(in the sense of ‘the meaning of life’), ethical, aesthetic
value
may be seen as falling under knowledge and knowledge as falling under being
3.5.6.5.4
Summary
§ being is the most inclusive of terms,
§ with being augmented by representation (and logic), and
value, the major branches of philosophy are emergent (metaphysics,
epistemology, value theory, logic understood in its most general sense),
§ but all the branches fall under metaphysics.
Topic 23.
In the following, grammar is tentative and implicit; it needs to be
made explicit – with some attempt at definitiveness.
being
knowing (experience), value (feeling, meaning in the sense of significance)
levels
and kinds of knowledge, DIMENSIONS, and aspects of being (knowing vs Heidegger’s ‘care’)
logic in a general sense (not just as inference, but as process
– structure of valid knowledge and value, method and content, method as
content)
language – kinds, e.g., discrete, linear; linguistic
meaning, mathematics, SCIENCE, and logic
atomism (lexicon), holism (grammar), reference (linguistic meaning), use
a being (that which has being; plural – beings)
kinds
and dimensions of being (whether experientiality is fundamental, whether human being is paradigmatic of
the highest levels of being)
universe, cosmos, law, void, limitlessness, paradigm, real metaphysics, metaphysics – value – perfection
doubt (doubts, address of doubt – rational, pragmatic, existential)
hierarchy of being, varieties and peak of being and knowing, enlightenment and realization
sameness, difference
field – interaction – change
spacetime
being
(‘matter’), extension (space),
relation (‘mind’), duration (time)
cosmology (variety, extension, duration, peak, emergence)
becoming (¿word?)
pathways, shared discovery and realization, intelligence, prescription vs negotiation, problem of pleasure and pain and their address
philosophy and the world; in
more detail—philosophy, science, art, feeling, judgment, being, and the world
this
apparently too detailed item is entered here (i) from concern with the
relation between knowledge and action—i.e., what is to be done regarding
uncertainty in knowledge and action, particularly, what the role of criticism
(critical thought) and action ought to be and (ii) what the relative and
interacting roles of philosophy, science, and so on ought to be
there
is often a temptation to answer this question at the beginning of analysis,
perhaps in order to make sure that the analysis is of sufficient standard;
however, the results of analysis may—are likely to—modify the initial
analysis; therefore, let us consider the issue of how metaphysics should be
done – here’s my thinking after having gone through many iterations of
metaphysical system: (i) begin with some idea of initial concepts, system,
method, and criteria (ii) work out system (iii) criticize #i and #ii (iv)
repeat
following
this approach, we found the real metaphysics as a framework of
perfection-in-the-sense-of-faithfulness-to-the-world filled in with pragmatic
detail and paradigm of some validity-according-to-some-received-criteria,
which (the real metaphysics) was imperfect-on-received-criteria but
perfect-on-emergent-axiological-criteria
thus,
in relation to the Quine-Carnap debate, there is a core of philosophy and
science which is ‘scientific’ (remembering of course that neither science nor
deductive logic themselves are perfectly perfect and that ‘what is science’
is also in question regarding ‘what philosophy ought to be’), and is basis
for larger system of science (in the sense just stated) as framework for
philosophy-science-art-feeling-judgment-being-and-the-world, in which
art-and-extended-language and judgment are essential elements of negotiation
toward the ultimate
implicit in the foregoing is
what has been noted explicitly in the tentative system—the essential and
mutual relationship between value and epistemic criteria (where neither
‘value’ nor ‘criteria’ are intended to minimize or jettison the other)
at root, we ought to recognize
that it is the entire system-of-being that is concern over and above just
concern with some particular element or set of elements
Topic 24.
Study topics are in process material; they may be dispersed and
collected together in separate section or as part of a long table of
contents.
Also see some topics, little manual, and journey in being
Topic 25.
This is a permanent section, but its name, format, and placement may
change
Content and method (meta, para)
3.5.8.2.1
For writing
3.5.8.2.2
For resources
Topics (content, metacontent,
paracontent)
Some redundancy may occur—the
aim is to balance efficiency with readability and coherence
As self-reference is
foundationally important, metacontent is essential
As knowledge and knowledge of
knowledge are in the world, the distinction between content and metacontent
is artificial
Self-foundation, to the degree
that it may be achieved, will be marked and dispersed in the content; Word
Styles will be used to collect meta-content (especially foundation) in table
3.5.8.7.1
On explanation
What constitutes an explanation
of the universe and its facts? What is the universe?
The issue of explanation—various
kinds – (i) proximate vs ultimate (ii) temporal vs ‘absolute’ (iii) pragmatic
vs necessary
3.5.8.7.2
On logic
From traditional to real
conceptions of logic (the latter to include science and fact)
Not just two but perhaps three
kinds – certain, pragmatically certain, and other
Other – likely or probable, of
which there are (at least) two kinds, (i) induction or generalization
(e.g., all individuals in a sample from a population have property x,
therefore all individuals in the population the same property, which is never
necessarily true but more likely as the sample gets larger) (ii) abduction,
originally due to Charles Sanders Pierce, or hypothesis or hypothetical
explanation, (e.g., all individuals in a population have property x, all
balls in a sample (not necessarily from the population) have property x,
therefore the sample is from the population
3.5.8.7.3
Paradox
Whether paradox is at the heart
of (i) being (ii) our – or any – understanding or knowledge of being.
3.5.8.7.4
Questions
What are our fundamental
questions (or question)?
What questions should we ask of
any concept or discipline?
Title page etc; name and
pseudonym – eastern and western
Preface
Prologue and epilogue (‘the way
in’ and ‘return’)
Academic and other consequences
of the foundation that are not essential to the main program
Reference
Styles will be converted to
color ‘Auto’ in HTML versions.
Style “Central” (Alt + M) – essence: minimal account of
ideas and realization for inspiration and command
Style “Formal” (Alt + Shift + F) – main foundational and
academic material
Style “Normal” (Alt + N) –
general and paracontent
Topic
26. Style “Topic” (Alt + V) – topics and persons to study, sources, and
items to do
Lists
Only the problems of metaphysics
will approach completeness
Not all problems will be
treated, only the significant problems of philosophy will be treated, and of
the problems of metaphysics, those treated will (i) illustrate the methods of
metaphysics (ii) be adequate to define metaphysics by example
Defining or conceiving
metaphysics and philosophy will be among the problems
The treatment of the problems
will be (i) those relevant to the way may have dispersed treatment
(ii) others may be treated in the parallel developments (iii) the problems
with dispersed treatment will receive mention and may receive further
treatment in the parallel developments
Interspersed and collected in
table(s)
The following topics align with the way of being > resources.html
Topic 26. source writers especially
Plato,
Aristotle,
Samkara,
Descartes,
Spinoza,
Locke,
Leibniz,
Hume,
Kant,
Hegel,
Heidegger,
Quine,
Graham
Priest
Topic 27.
topics for study – ideas from the source writers relevant to the
way; logic
and logical calculi, logic
and ontology, first
order logic with substitution, emergence of first order logic, set
theory with ZF
axioms (choice), universal
logic and algebra, dialetheism
(inclosure schema), surreal numbers, (especially Conway’s theory), artificial
intelligence, Heidegger on Being, god
(hiddenness of, and necessary
beings), theoretical
physics (and its mainstream
and tentative
theories), and physical cosmology.
Topic 28.
web design html,
css,
website
design, JavaScript, java,
python,
php,
and other languages for the internet (iii) see the detailed
outline for further topics.
Topic 29.
also see the little
manual, program
of development, site
design, detailed
resource system, resource version of the
way of being.
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