REFLECTIONS ON METAPHYSICS AND THE PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
ANIL MITRA PHD, COPYRIGHT © 1998 REVISED September 2003
Document status: September 25, 2003
This document was originally written in the winter of 1995 as a reaction to John Searle’s review of books on consciousness in the New York Review of Books. It was about that time that Michael Tye published Ten Problems of Consciousness. I was not aware of Tye’s book until the next year and it is a coincidence that there are ten problems in this essay
The current essay is outdated with regard to my thought on consciousness and philosophical frameworks for thinking about consciousness. It is superseded by Problems in the Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness and then by Journey in Being. The latter essay is far more ambitious than the former on consciousness and this essay – in scope and in depth – and it is, therefore less detailed. Therefore, the current essay may contain some items of interest
While the essential content of the current essay is implicit in Journey in Being in virtue of its relative depth, this essay may have some material of interest – especially suggestions for work on consciousness
CONTENTS
2 What is the seat of consciousness?
3 What is necessary and sufficient for consciousness?
5 What is the place of consciousness in mind?
6 What is the function of consciousness?
7 What is the place of consciousness in the universe?
8 What is necessary for a metaphysics to explain consciousness?
9 The problems of explanation and understanding
APPENDIX: METAPHYSICS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
COPYRIGHT AND MOST RECENT UPDATE
REFLECTIONS ON METAPHYSICS AND THE PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The topics of this essay are an important part of my interests. I have been thinking and writing on these issues for a long time
I read John Searle’s New York Review of Books articles on the “Mystery of Consciousness” starting November 1995 and by December, that year had written “The Problems of Consciousness” - the first version of this essay. I agreed with much of what Searle had to say. I disagreed with some of his views and felt that the treatment needed inclusion of additional and important dimensions. This was reflected in that original version
I added a significant amount of new material in a number of steps over the year of 1996. The additions included further reflections on metaphysics and relations to the problems of consciousness. I added a second part “Metaphysics and The Fundamental Problem of Consciousness.” This resulted in “Reflections on the Problems of Consciousness” in December 1996
This second version went through a number of revisions
Recently, I have been updating much of my writing using Microsoft Word 97 on a Gateway 2000 Pentium 166 MMX computer. I have made some additions and partial re-organization and the essay is now “Reflections on Metaphysics and The Fundamental Problem of Consciousness.”
The “digitization” has been an exciting task. In addition to the automation due to Word, I have entered the outlines of some of my essays as a Microsoft Access 97 database. The purpose is to manipulate the outlines as data and as concepts. Outlines can be joined. Different conceptualizations of the same outline can be compared. When I interpret the results, I find new understanding. The result is that the text and data processing is assisting in my thinking and concept formation
I have written an essay “Dynamic Uses of Computers” that catalogs numerous other ways from the detailed and merely organizational to the general and conceptual to programming and automation…in which data processing may be used in concept formation and related knowledge and thought processes. The potential applications range mechanical assistance to those in which the computer is deployed to “enter the loop of concept of knowledge and concept formation.”
I am exploring new concepts of “thought” which will allow an interpretation in which my computer is thinking. “Dynamic Uses of Computers” which elaborates and analyses this interpretation. This development clearly meshes with some of the considerations in the present essay
This indicates one line for further work
Another line is the mesh with my central interests that I have developed in “Evolution and Design” of 1987, and continue with “Evolution, Design, and the Absolute” - the title is not final
My adventures in nature and culture also affect my thoughts on consciousness
Some of these considerations are present - if obliquely - in the present essay
A number of other avenues and plans are outlined and discussed in §10 of this essay
One suggestion of that section is a consideration that is somewhat neglected in my essay and many academic developments. It concerns the wonder of the emergence of my own consciousness. That is a mystery, not so much in the sense of my being ignorant of the source of my consciousness, but in the sense of awe, wonder and adventure. As I point out in §10.4.3 this issue has academic interest and consequences in addition to its existential aspect
That paints a picture of the journey ahead
June 1998
In reflection on consciousness and upon what has been written on this topic, it appears to me that there are a number of interrelated issues, or questions, which, taken as a whole, define the problems and problem areas of consciousness and their relations with the world. I believe that, as for any significant philosophical or existential problem consideration in a whole or universal context contributes to understanding of the problem and of the universal context. This development does not arise at once but is iterative, reflexive and interactive. However, although the development is interactive, this essay is divided into two main parts. In the first part, “The Problems,” problems and resolutions are defined, refined and elaborated. The selection of the problems is important - I consider and apply the issue of what constitutes a complete set of problems of consciousness. “The Problems” are interactive with the second main part on “Metaphysics and the Fundamental Problem of Consciousness.”
The problem areas include the proximate - the immediate aspects, the material “substrate”, the nature including concepts and definitions of consciousness and its function from mechanical and from valuational perspectives, as part of an organism in nature and in social life, and the growth of consciousness in the individual; the evolutionary - the origins of consciousness in evolution [that is, in nature], the origin of its nature and functions and interrelations; and the ultimate issues which include the relations between consciousness and the universe, and questions such as whether the universe is material and or mental and or intrinsically conscious…
Proximate issues can be seen as immediate, as phenomenal and - according to choice of metaphysics - as empirical, or material or ideal. As far as origins are hypothetical rather than empirical, evolutionary issues can be seen as a conceptual integration of the proximate issues. This follows from the paradigm in biology where evolution provides a deep explanatory framework. Since ultimate concerns can be seen as the most general of conceptual schemes, evolutionary considerations form a connection between the proximate and the ultimate. I do not regard the evolutionary and the ultimate as merely conceptual and, as pointed out below, they are intimately related to the proximate even in a realistic framework
Note that the term “evolutionary” could be replaced by the more neutral “genetic” - which is introduced here in its etymological and not in any specifically biological or theological sense. Genetic issues would be those having to do with origins, creation, history and formation. The problem areas would then be the proximate, the genetic and the ultimate
It has been suggested in the literature that the essential problem of consciousness is its origin in the brain and that definition of consciousness is simple. This has a certain adequacy, especially in relation to some of the proximate problems. Remember, however, that in physical science concepts of matter have come a long way from ostensive definition, that is, definition by instance rather than description. Similarly, note that consciousness is an element of mind among other elements and that in this consciousness itself is not unitary. It follows that a restructuring of our understanding of mind and consciousness is possible and some considerations of this issue are made in this essay. These provide useful perspectives on consciousness. Further, to be taken up later, such an intrinsic science of consciousness would provide additional avenues for scientific investigation and explanation of consciousness. Thus, the idea that the definition of consciousness is or should be simple - or ostensive - is useful but limited
Relative to the evolutionary and the ultimate issues, I find characterizations of consciousness as simple or unitary to be inadequate, since they suggest, as noted in the following essay, a projection to the ultimate of certain proximate and contingent modes of description. Furthermore, I believe denial of the ultimate is an error - perhaps even pathology - of modern intellectual and spiritual life with serious negative intellectual and existential consequences
The evolutionary [genetic] and the ultimate problems are, of course, vital and interesting from both scientific and human points of view. Common origins result in relations among the elements and so genetic descriptions are a powerful component of systems of understanding and explanation. The history of the universe - or of the universes - is one of a handful of perspectives on the ultimate that provide alternatives to mere belief
Additionally, I see the proximate and the ultimate as intimately related - in fact and each for the understanding of the other. Therefore, from philosophic and even from scientific and practical day-to-day standpoints, the ultimate questions are relevant
In the following essay, I reflect upon these issues and relationships, and briefly, upon how they have been viewed in the recent literature. I list and discuss ten interrelated problems of consciousness. As discussed above, proximate, evolutionary and ultimate issues are considered, and, because of the interrelations, these problems and problem areas are synergistically interactive. In other words, reflection upon the group of problems as a whole also enhances understanding of the individual problems
In the essay, the problems are numbered 1 through 10. Problems 3 and 4 regard proximate concerns; except problem 10, the remaining problems are ultimate or evolutionary
The essay starts with reflection on the nature of consciousness in Problem 1 and its material origins in Problem 2. The treatment focuses more on the nature of the problems and solutions than on specific solutions
These considerations are then refined and elaborated in Problems 3 and 4. In Problem 3, I reflect on what are the mental and or material elements of consciousness - and of human consciousness. Problem 4 asks, “What is conscious?” and “How is consciousness recognized?”
In anticipation of the needs of the discussion of evolutionary and ultimate concerns - indeed even of a full treatment of proximate concerns - definitions and signs of consciousness beyond ostensive definition are up in problems 1 through 4
Problem 5 takes up the relationships of consciousness to other mental activity. The functions of consciousness are the concerns of Problem 6
This leads naturally into the evolutionary, ultimate and metaphysical issues of Problems 7, 8 and 9:
Problem 7 is on the place of consciousness in the universe. What are the relations and origins of consciousness?
Problem 8 considers the relation between consciousness and metaphysics. What are the necessary elements to explain consciousness?
Problem 9 considers the relation between consciousness and explanation and understanding. Explanation and understanding may be abstracted from their known human context. In their abstract form they may be regarded as features of the universe. What does this imply regarding consciousness?
In addition to thinking about consciousness, I also consider the nature and significance of the problems; approaches to thinking about these issues; competing metaphysical frameworks within which consciousness might be best understood; and, finally, directions for future work. These reflections are interspersed throughout the essay, but are also specifically taken up in problem 10
I have tried from a number of points of view to list a complete, structured problem set, and to show that this set is “necessary”; this is at this point somewhat implicit and intuitive. Problem 10 also takes up this issue in an explicit and rational way
In thinking about the problems, I naturally reflect upon ideas, resolutions and answers. A well-defined set of problems specifies the field and contains and implies the structure and nature of the resolutions
A future treatment would include reformulation of the issues as [1] Nature of consciousness; the aspects or areas of consciousness; function; relation to the world: mind, matter…[2] Perspectives on understanding and knowledge of consciousness as an element of the human endeavor of understanding. Now, since the broader topics [the “context”] themselves contain open questions, [1] raises questions of science, metaphysics, society, and value…and [2] raises epistemological issues. Further metaphysics includes - or can be seen as including - epistemology and this provides an organizational principles
This essay also functions as groundwork for further development; some beginnings towards resolution are found throughout the essay and specifically in a final section entitled “Metaphysics and the Fundamental Problem of Consciousness”. Building upon considerations developed in defining and reflecting upon consciousness and its problems, this section also provides beginnings toward definition and resolution of The Fundamental Problem of Metaphysics
This final consideration elaborates the necessity and power, noted above, of considering the broad and essential realm of consciousness in its complete ontological or world context. This contextual formulation of individual problems as part of a complete problem comes neither before nor after consideration of constituent problems but is part of an ongoing cycle or process. It relates to what I have called a “Complete Field” and, informally, to the idea of axiomatic systems from mathematical logic. Although there is an overlap with axiomatic systems the scope and emphasis are different. The scope of a complete field includes being or entities; facts and history; concepts, ideas and theories; discussion and analysis. The analysis is explicitly reflexive and so includes discussion of what should constitute a complete field and what constitutes good analysis. The historical element includes a requirement that incorporates the history of ideas; completeness requires that this should not be limited with regard to era, culture, society, or being. Thus the scope includes the “sub-fields” of being, history, concepts and analysis. The emphasis in formulating a complete is to bring all relevant considerations into play - starting, perhaps, with the immediate world and common meanings. This is followed by expanding scope, refining meanings and relationships. The elements of a Complete Field include - by design and by evolution - factors conducive to the production of a complete field. The potentially over-ambitious and paradoxical aspects of the term “complete” are diffused by the foregoing placement in an ebb and flow process. Given this, the idea of a complete field is seen as a reasonable modern process analogue of the ideas and intents of the older concepts of systematic or speculative metaphysics
December, 1995
December, 1996
June, 1998
REFLECTIONS ON THE PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS[1]
In some viewpoints - for both scientific and practical purposes - consciousness is not difficult to define: it is simply what we think it to be in common sense: it is the state or function of mind in which we have subjective experience of the world.[2]
Since there is a qualitative, subjective feeling to conscious states, such states have been labeled qualia
In one standard viewpoint the essence of consciousness is qualia; humans and some animals are conscious; consciousness arises in the brain; and the real problem of consciousness is how does it arise in the brain - “the most important problem in modern biology”.[3] Thus the problem of consciousness, in this viewpoint, is the problem of qualia; that is, how do feelings, sensations, imagery, and thoughts arise in matter. More particularly, how do they arise in the brain?
The flow of this essay is this: I first consider proximate issues and criticism of the standard view described briefly above and in the introduction. This leads via an examination of the nature of the argument - and of dialectic in general - to evolutionary and ultimate considerations. Finally, as an integral part of the development, a full field of concepts including metaphysics will be naturally delineated and tested. The final discussion will formulate and analyze a fundamental problem of metaphysics
The discussion will illuminate both topics
That discussion of fundamental problem of metaphysics will be flow naturally and necessarily from the consideration of the issues of consciousness. That is true because of the centrality and depth of the issue of consciousness and because a full discussion of any central ontological topic must be in its whole context
The purpose of the following note is to show that adequacy of definition is a function of objectives and to provide some preliminary consideration to be taken up in further detail later in this essay - of this issue relative to proximate, evolutionary and ultimate problems
Definition of consciousness as qualia is an ostensive definition - a definition by “pointing”, by identifying the object of definition; e.g., I point at a tree and say “that is a tree” and perhaps at another tree and say “that too is a tree”. Another type of definition is the verbal definition [Russell], also called or similar to the real definition. A tree has roots, trunk, branches, leaves, etc. The idea is, in preference to coming up with a perfect definition for all time, to illuminate here and now, and based also upon past experience [tree] recognition and understanding… and also its relation with other things [explanation, understanding, knowledge] by uncovering the real essence of “tree-hood”… ostensive definition is a beginning. It is the verbal definition in which I say, “a tree is a tree” or “a tree is what it is”… or “consciousness is qualia”. Simple!
But “real” definition attempts to understand one thing in terms of other things [external and or internal]: to enhance understanding. This, of course, is not a simple matter of inter-human agreement. Real definition is also a process or part of a process of discovery [and, therefore, a common notion of definition as coming at the beginning, as defining, is somewhat misleading; yes, in an axiomatic system definitions come near the beginning but in formulation there is an interactive process and in reformulation the redefinition of a concept is based on experience with the entire axiomatic system - and its relations internal and external]…
An objective in terms of making a system of knowledge most useful is to have a few - perhaps a minimal number of primitives [terms or concepts and axioms] in terms of which all else is understood. But what are the most fundamental of primitives? One criterion is identification [in a sense similar to empathy], another is efficiency - a function of number of primitives, simplicity and the number and variety of items, topics explained. Materialists would explain consciousness in terms of matter [and this includes biological materialism]; Idealists[4] would chart an atlas of mental function and identify consciousness as a territory within or as a result of other functions. And, regardless of whether the mental or material is “most fundamental”, the mental is necessary to interpret and identify the results of material explanation - and, perhaps, to guide material explanation… and if one posits that, ultimately, consciousness is the fundamental primitive underlying all of existence, then: since existence, the world, the universe, experience are structured: consciousness, too, must have or be capable of having structure and, in terms of understanding, a fundamental task is to map this structure, to reveal its dynamics and then - from both utilitarian and aesthetic perspectives of understanding - to reduce the dynamic structure to its basic form… Of course, the issue of matter vs. mind is not necessarily either or - multiple modes of description and phenomena may be present in the one universe
In what follows, we shall show that considering consciousness to include awareness of awareness we provide an approach to connecting first person descriptions [qualia] to the third person [matter or brain]; that is, to solving the problem of qualia. We also provide analytical, intuitive, mechanical and evolutionary bases for the idea of consciousness as including awareness of awareness. Structure of consciousness may be significant for the evolution of consciousness [Problem 6]. In Problem 8, I consider a reconceptualization of consciousness that may be relevant to the ultimate nature and role of consciousness. Such a reconceptualization may also be useful in evolutionary considerations
Here ends the note on definition. I now return to the tasks of defining consciousness. Here I will focus on proximate issues and problems. Evolutionary and ultimate concerns will be addressed later
Recall that in some viewpoints definition of consciousness is simple. There are other points of view which hold that consciousness is difficult, perhaps even extraordinarily difficult, to define
One question that has arisen in the past is whether consciousness is mere awareness[5] or whether awareness of awareness or self-awareness is necessary for consciousness. One motivation for this requirement would be to identify consciousness as a special kind of awareness: either as an attempt to understand consciousness and, more specifically, human[6] consciousness and or to imply that human [and perhaps some “higher” animal] forms of awareness are unique and or special. However, a valid question arises: is it possible to be conscious [or aware] without being aware of the awareness - even if the awarenesses are only vague and dim?
Another question is whether language is necessary for [higher] consciousness
I tend to think that awareness of awareness is necessary for consciousness but that language is not. My reasons for this are not, however, to imply that only humans and or higher animals are conscious, but, rather - and in so far as there is an external motive - to extend the domain of what we consider conscious to at least all animal being. The argument is that there is no such thing as a pure awareness of an object or the environment; each awareness is of a relation between perceiver and perceived
The fact that sensory organs, and their integration of information, have evolved or are adapted to specific environments, results in compensation for the specific vantage point of the perceiver, and this permits a sense of perception and consistent associated behavior, which is or may appear to be purely object-bound
I should be more careful about the argument regarding awareness. The premise is that each awareness is an awareness of a relation between a perceiver and a perceived “object”: this is clear and manifest. I can say:
Awareness = Relation [Self, Object]
Strictly then, each awareness involves an awareness of self-object relations. Thus it is a jump to substitute awareness for self
This needs careful reflection:
From the point of view [in a materialist or neutral[7] ontology] of the diffusion of consciousness or awareness among the elements of being which include the element of self. In this case an awareness is awareness of awareness
In an idealist ontology self = consciousness and, therefore, all awareness is awareness of awareness
Also consider that awareness may be primal - not a relation, and not awareness of - but may split into awareness of awareness and awareness of object
There are also the intuitions to be made precise - separately and together:
There is a core intuitive question: without being aware that I am aware, how could I be aware at all? This point requires reflection that can be refined as follows. We could call object awareness “primary awareness”, and awareness of awareness “secondary awareness”. Now allow all combinations in which both primary and secondary awarenesses range from the stark to the vague and the discrete to the diffuse
Also, in regards to the previous point: awareness - mind - consciousness - reality - phenomena… are all part of the universe
Body consciousness… includes consciousness of the World
The [perhaps] primal functionality of awareness of awareness:
Primitively: when awareness is changing in time, then by awareness of [changing] awareness we “know” that something in the world [interior and exterior] is changing in time
Primitively: when awareness is qualitatively varied over space [including the body] then by awareness as [varied] awareness do we “know” that the world [interior and exterior] has structure
In the above begins our image of our temporal being within the being of the universe
If consciousness is on-off while awareness [the word being used more in the sense of intentionality] is a continuum… then may not the “onset” of consciousness be at the point of awareness of awareness?
At a “higher” level: by knowing that I am aware… and the nature of the awareness… I can use and mould awareness to ends and function[s]
Is not all this [or can it not be expressed as manifestly] adaptive; and, therefore, is this not an indicator of the evolutionary origin of consciousness?
These functions are focused in - diffused through the body into the environment and in some ways continuous with it; and is this not, also, an indicator of the evolutionary origin of consciousness
And do not these close tie-ins mesh with the elements of all being connected with the reasons that we are [and machines are not] aware, conscious? [Machines are extensions of our awareness… being-environment connection] … or, put another way, consciousness or awareness is a manifestation of universal process in the individual being.[8]
Awareness of awareness is at least preliminary to knowing that one is conscious
And - is consciousness truly on-off? Introspection, that is consciousness of consciousness - especially directed exploration of consciousness - appears to show a substrate of process below each level… and how do we know there is a lower limit of possible access?
Note: [1] there is no implication above that awareness as a perception of a relation between perceiver and perceived is precise [in terms of, say, spatio-temporal categories] or stark and vivid, or linguistically expressed. Question: What does this imply for self-awareness and body perception and proprioception? Is this paradoxical, a reentrant map, or self-organization? And, in turn, what does this imply for perception as relation?
[2] If we are questioning the ontic status of perception, is it not naive to talk of perceiver and perceived?
In general, difficulties of definition and understanding may be relative to the problems addressed or the primitive terms of understanding and explanation employed; e.g., the material substrate, or the elements of mind
Relative to what is sometimes thought of as the problem of consciousness: how does consciousness arise in the brain? It may be sufficient, for practical purposes, to take the essence of consciousness to be QUALIA. However we do not yet know whether consciousness arises in or from quantum level phenomena [Penrose], neurons [Crick], neuronal groups [Edelman], the brain as a whole [hologram, global organization, self-reference… analogies], the brain and the rest of the body [importance of emotion, endocrine system, Israel Rosenfield: body image] or in brain-body-environmental interaction [and at all levels]? And in resolving this issue [resolution need not be either or[9]] it may very well be useful, perhaps essential, to know what are [some of] the elements of consciousness or its field [mind and mental function] or its nature. Is consciousness a [re-] creative process? In each act of awareness? In “creativity”? And is creativity necessarily creation of the new? At least of the locally new if not the universally new - and must it not be so if the “new” is what is not contained in what came before? And does this characterize the new? And if so, does not creation, creativity, consciousness, perception involve indeterminism and quantum mechanics?
Thus we can ask:
Relative to the elements of mind
Including memory or mental history; and, for example, the emotional as in emotional aspects of intelligence and cognition: empathy, optimism, etc.[10]
Relative to the material substrate: the brain
E.g., as in the work of Crick, Penrose, Edelman and Rosenfield - generally and in terms of anatomy, physiology and especially in terms of neuro-endocrinology
Now, we would also like to know, relative to an explanation which did not explicitly[11] contain qualia [and would therefore be other than subjective or first person], how we would recognize when an explanation of consciousness and qualia which are necessarily subjective or first person had been given in terms of, say, the elements specified above?
But why is this a problem? It is a problem because first and third [second] person descriptions are fundamentally different;[12] that is, qualia have an essentially subjective, qualitative aspect to their nature whereas third person descriptions are not subjective in nature
This is not a problem such as showing when and how a collection of molecules behaves as a continuum! Or is it? A conceptual problem even in the third person to third person explanation from molecules to continua is which aggregates of molecular effects will be identified as continuum effects. The identification is made easy since the same or similar class of material [mechanical] explanations apply to both kinds of phenomena: aggregates of molecules and continua [and note that the continua are not merely conceptual or epiphenomenal, for we deal with them also through observation and instrument]. Thus pressure, for example, is equal to force per unit area and force is identified - through Newton’s laws - as rate of change of momentum of molecules in molecular impact
We learn two things from this. First, if we had a system of explanation and theory which covered both first person and material or third person phenomena, the theory could perhaps be used to rationally [given the theory and…] derive or suggest what identification is to be used. Second, lacking such a theory, as is the case for the combination of mental and material phenomena, we must find other modes of identification. This is outlined next
In Problem 8, I will consider a graded idealism that includes or covers both first and third person descriptions; however the graded idealism is more a reconceptualization than a theory or explanation
An analogy with macroscopic properties
An analogy has been given that wetness and solidity are not contained in the fundamental properties of the molecules yet following from these properties. The analogy is that consciousness may be similarly explained from properties of matter. In the following discussion of the legitimacy of this analogy, the following symbols and abbreviations will be used in an experiment in symbolic play with fields of concepts:
b, B: biology, life. The lower case b refers to the details, interactions, parts and so on, while B refers to the fact or principle of life. Below lower and uppercase forms have similar meanings:
p, P: physics, matter; y, Y: psychology, mind; e, d: explanation, description; 1P, 3P: first, third persons; O, S: objective, subjective; E, M: epistemic, ontological; A --> B: “A” type explanation or description of “B”; m: metaphysics
Molecules and wetness are both fundamentally 3P and O [in the e-sense]
Wetness has a 1P or S aspect but it is the 3P mode that permits the [3P] e in terms of molecules. Because Atomism is so successful, we frequently believe all 3Pd objects can be explained in terms of 3P Atomism. However this is not always possible in terms of historically current 3P Atomism and may require revision of 3P atomic [microscopic] d to permit explanation of the [3P] macroscopic feature
Examples may clarify this point: Classical mechanics [CM] of atoms is sufficient to explain compressibility [more generally ideal gas behavior] of not too dense gases. But solidity, fluidity, variable specific heats of gases require quantum mechanics [QM] e for some aspects. Super-fluidity and conductivity require QMe. An explanation of atoms in terms of subatomic particles [nuclei and electrons] requires QMe
This leads us to ask [e.g.] what is an atom? Is it a particle… or is it its description in terms of current physics. The latter, which provides explanatory power, is evolving. Magic is the identification of symbol with object: “atom” = atom [?]
Now we know that an explanation of consciousness and mind has not been given in terms of modern physics. So what would it take? We have excellent reasons to believe classical physics to be inadequate: classical physics is deterministic. For the same reason Roger Penrose believes that modern QM is inadequate: Schrödinger’s evolution equation for quantum systems, per Penrose, is also deterministic; all the indeterminism in QM enters through “observation”. But we do not understand the observation process. Penrose believes that quantum gravity will bind evolution and observation in a single, coherent, indeterministic theory
This, per Penrose, is promising. I agree with the promise - for note the entrance of mind in observation. But also note that there is debate as to whether Schrödinger’s equation is deterministic. Given that observation is indeterminate, Schrödinger’s equation may still be indeterministic, and therefore some other aspect or refinement including refinement in understanding but not description may explain consciousness and mind
This is the source of the idea: P may e B or Y and B may e Y but this may require new e, d, understanding of P, B and or Y
So it may be that modern physics [and for similar and other reasons modern B] may be inadequate to explain Y or consciousness… we will not know until an explanation has been given or otherwise shown to be possible
There is an additional difficulty with P --> Y or B --> Y. It is that mind and consciousness is known, theoretically described in its most fundamental nature as 1P or E whereas P and B are primarily 3P and E. Thus, in addition to the e-gap due to stage of development of m, there is a modal or categorical e-gap between Y & P: mind and matter: consciousness and unconscious particles
Physical explanation: Pe: [1] continue to develop physical micro and macro-theories of universal nature; i.e., Atomism, particle-field theories. [This universal aspect is the appeal of the physics from Newton to the present day. The physics of continua and the organic study of the brain and conceptual study based on brain study [neuro-endocrinology and physiology] are, despite claims of biologists, physical theories of [apparently] non-universal domain.]
But what features or type of features are we looking for? [A] Indeterminism, non-locality… These are already present for some interpretations of modern quantum theory. Penrose of course believes further development is necessary for indeterminism. [B] First person aspects of P and microscopic nature & explanation…atoms with consciousness, subjectivity, intentionality? Would this not be strange? Well, since quantum physics and chemistry underpin genetics and genetics[13] underpins behavior and intentionality [more than consciousness and subjectivity, intentionality has both 1P or e and 3P or e modes], we already have QM or e beginnings toward e[Y]. But what of consciousness and subjectivity? A guide: We have 3P description of the 1P aspects [subjectivity and consciousness] even if primitive; we may try to match with the 3P aspects at microscopic level - seek 1P correlative description at the micro-level. [2] Continue to seek explanations P --> Y
B explanation: use biology as an intermediate level of explanation or as an independent level. [I have already noted that B is a P type limitation relative to universality. Of course biologists and others prone to academic reification may and will object.] Biology itself has a number of levels: chemical, bio-molecule, micro-tissue, cell, tissue, organ, system: neurophysiology, neuro-endocrinology [these are not a strict hierarchy]. Through B, with appropriate features, explanations of mind: consciousness, subjectivity, intentionality could be given. Such B would incorporate the necessary P features [indeterminism, non-locality, if aspects at microscopic level per above discussion] but the incorporation may be ontically and epistemically implicit. This would then be an explicit Be but an implicit Pe of Y. Of course in the sense of P restricted to B phenomena, this would also be a non-universal Pe. This avoids and suppresses the problems of Pe
Regardless of whether P or B or e occurs first, [1] the other mode remains important or more important because, in addition to the value of reduction [whether Y --> P or Y --> B or B --> Y] there is also value to coherence of modes of explanation. [2] The problem of explaining details: y or e etc. remains. Relative to this: [A] P --> Y is conceptually and meaningfully most important. That is explaining the fact and principle of mind in terms of the fact-principle of matter-physics [or as part of matter-physics] is most conceptually-meaningfully important. This is because of the universality of P [e.g., pan Atomism]. Conceptually P --> Y is more fundamental than B --> Y; meaningfully P --> Y provides a greater integration among the modes Y, B, P: mind, life matter: [B] b --> y [and B --> Y] are practically more immediate because the explanatory gap is shorter or smaller [and so more likely to happen sooner] and will probably have more explanatory power - at least in the short term. Information would be provided, light would be shed on y, Y especially in conjunction with direct study of y, Y. However we would still be interested in [C] B --> Y and p --> y, [D] p, P --> b, B as well as the reverse studies [E] y, Y --> b, B --> p, P and y, Y --> p, P
It should not be necessary to point out that such studies have been done, are in progress in the modern West and other cultures and through history. Light has already been shed. And whereas the West excels, from Aristotle on, in P --> Y, B and B --> Y, it also includes the reverse traditions Y --> P, B and B --> P in which other cultures excel or have excelled
Behavioral[14] explanations: the explanations will show how something [or group, class of things] behaves as though it is conscious. In the simplest case “as though” will be recognized by empathy, i.e. through human recognition [this is primitive, not circular]. In behaviorist explanations, a set of behaviors will be prescribed and derived from theory, experiment and empathy
Ideal or mental explanations: if the elements of mind include qualia, no explanation is necessary. If they exclude qualia, then an explanation in terms of behavior or empathy… may be possible but not conceptually satisfying. To explain qualia from mental non-qualia seems to be just as impossible as from material descriptions in terms of physics - physiology. How can we bridge from the mental primitive - qualia - to other primitive elements? A key is to allow qualia to be non-primitive, to allow it to have structure[15]… and as already suggested, we may take qualia to be or involve awareness of awareness. A mental explanation of consciousness will be one that shows awareness of awareness.[16] But is this not circular? I believe not, since a description of awareness can be given analytically… or behaviorally without empathy, or as a somewhat arbitrary prescription of behaviors
I believe this is a useful and key identification: qualia as including awareness of awareness
Material explanations:[17] Will depend on the above and show either:
Behavior of a material aggregate that would be as though it were conscious, or
Some kind of map of maps which is identified with awareness of awareness, or
A set of elements of mind that do not include qualia but which can explain awareness of awareness
Ideal vs. material explanation: We can see in the above paradigms for alternative mental and material explanations: which would be “complementary”; and for mental and material explanations as in the material explanation yielding a set of mental elements which then yielded awareness of awareness… In the case of alternative mental or material explanation we can validly begin to question the distinction between the material and the posited mental elements, by raising the issues: what is mental or material explanation
Ideal understanding: Understanding in ideal or idealist terms occurs when the mental elements include qualia. We do not demonstrate how consciousness arises from other features of mind - for this is assumed - but, instead, we explain and derive some properties of consciousness and some of its relations within general mental function…
Relative to mental, material, behavioral elements
Relative to basic, primitive consciousness
Necessary and sufficient conditions for a reductive - but not eliminative - explanation of consciousness in material terms to be valid:
A concept of consciousness must be given a valid material explanation in actuality or in principle:
Since a material explanation of qualia - subjective experience - is impossible in principle, I require only that a concept of consciousness be explained. This concept of consciousness should be adequate to the known empirical, conceptual-theoretical aspects of the conscious or mental function and to the adaptive-evolutionary function of consciousness. The function of qualia may and should be explained. An adequate concept of matter should be clearly defined:
Some criteria of definition are: the reduction must be substantial and not tautological and should therefore refer to an actual and not potential conception of matter such as a future version of scientific explanation or physics - quantum mechanics; the definition should be actual and not potential also from a historical point of view since in the evolution of concepts their meanings may alter polarity; e.g., matter as real in the commonsense view vs. matter as substance; finally, the definition should be definite… and perhaps the only way to acquire a definite meaning in a universe of changing perspectives and world views is to remember that matter “is” a meso-scale immediate thing… characteristics of matter would then be:
Sensible, not inferential or conceptual
Third person, common [mode of description]
Intrinsically lacking in agency and other mental attributes
Possessed of definite location
Other specifications that correspond to intuitive notions and are necessary to complete explanatory efficiency
Establishment of a complete materialist metaphysics
This is necessary because the concept of consciousness used may be incomplete relative to the phenomena of consciousness
But it is not sufficient because the existence of a metaphysics does not imply existence of explanations
Further Comments:
Material explanation is proximate… to focus on the proximate to the exclusion of the ultimate is to focus on “mere survival”… There is a historical relation:
Ultimate --> proximate
That is, as understanding grows, what has been considered ultimate may come to be regarded as proximate
And yet material explanation pervades. An example is what David J. Chalmers calls a “principle of organizational invariance”. This is an example of a “psychophysical law” or “high level bridging laws, connecting physical processes to experience on an everyday level”. The principle of organizational invariance “holds that physical systems with the same abstract organization will give rise to the same kind of conscious experience, no matter what they are made of”
The underlying assumption is that systems are physical systems and physical systems are fully specified by our physical description of them. This reification of the current physics and metaphysics of the most fundamental entities of the universe is insidious, pervasive and difficult to disengage from. The problem is not merely psychosocial. Much real progress in science occurs by treating its fundamental constructs as though they are real. The assumption is, however, untenable and this is shown by the history of physics
Chalmers states: “The remarkable implication is that consciousness might someday be achieved in machines.” A proof of this is given by performing a Gedankenexperiment in which more and more neurons in a human brain are replaced by their functionally equivalent silicon chips. At each stage of replacement, since the brain’s organization has not changed, the subject’s experience will not change - and this will continue until the entire brain has been replaced. Chalmers’ argument is that a change in consciousness would be absurd; therefore, there is no change
However, the argument is circular: it assumes what was to be proved: that a description of the neural circuitry captures the essence that gives rise to consciousness.[18] Incidentally, if this assumption is true, the machine assumption should be capable of proof and the above would be the proof
The problem is that, although we have and idea where and how consciousness arises, we do not know whether our knowledge is complete or precise. We know it arises in the brain[19], in neural cells and so on but we do not have a precise location. We know that neural processes are involved but we do not know precisely which neural processes, or in what combination, or - most importantly - whether we know all the processes and there physical and physiological nature. Therefore we do not know whether silicon chips can replicate the processes. We do not even know whether we can discover, invent, design or create elements that will replace brain processes. Therefore, although we know that the brain is a machine, we do not know whether we can replace the units of the brain part by part and retain consciousness. We do not know whether we can build conscious machines or whether thermostats are conscious. We do not know whether consciousness pervades the universe.[20]
What do we know? The main material point I want to make is this. It is that, even if all these other entities - thermostats, atoms, chairs, the universe - as a whole - are conscious the consciousness is very different from human consciousness or mental process. The difference is not necessarily one of kind but it involves a combination of degree of self-awareness, clarity, detail, sensory categories, hierarchies of self-reference and degree of cognitive ability including concept formation and language processing…The following is more speculative. As I have argued[21] definition - in the sense of elucidating its essential nature - is, likely, at a primitive stage in modern society; I argued further that, as understanding of mental processes and consciousness proceeds within our culture, we will see the domains of matter and mind expand and perhaps merge. Meanings will grow and change; inversions will occur. In the expanded meanings it is likely that distinctions will break down. We will likely see mind or psyche as pervading the universe. But that will not liken the human mind to atoms and thermostats. There will, as noted above, be degrees and modes of difference among the objects that will be seen as categorically identical. The values of this will include clarity of understanding, power of explanation, and unity of vision and being
Combined with detailed physical, neurophysiological, conceptual and psychological investigations this will elucidate the nature of the coming together of micro entities into a conscious one. These considerations will apply generally and more particularly to the brain and to human consciousness. They will show us what it is about a machine that may be conscious and what is mere peripheral processing. This would apply equally to computers as to thermostats. It would show to what extent and in what degree atoms and material structure is possessed of mental function and consciousness and to what degree a thermostat possesses consciousness over and above that of its design components and its material substrate
I now resume the analysis of Chalmers’ arguments. To further the analysis I consider the atomic or molecular substrate of the brain rather than the cellular one. Assume, then, that it is the atoms in the brain that give rise to consciousness. It is the same argument - for the atoms constitute the neurons that are supposed to give rise to consciousness. Now replace the atoms one by one by equivalent micro-tinker toys and so create a conscious machine
But: how do we know that the toys and atoms are equivalent? By doing a finite number of experiments or, equivalently, by comparing our descriptions: Bohr-Sommerfeld, Quantum [Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and Dirac…], etc
But, while a finite number of experiments and or our systems of descriptions are certainly suggestive, heuristic, they are of no guarantee[22] in relation to so complex an issue as the brain-consciousness issue. In relation to this issue our models, descriptions are useful as heuristic, as analogy, as basis for production of some results… but not as proof of equivalence of mind and brain or mind and machine
Classical physics is clearly inadequate. That quantum-physics may be inadequate - that is, that there is no demonstration of the adequacy of quantum physics, follows from the role of the observer in quantum mechanics. The detailed argument is as follows. [1] Quantum mechanics is not limited to being the physics of atomic or molecular real phenomena as follows from its application to super-fluidity, superconductivity, radiation theory of black holes, etc. [2] That quantum mechanics is not known to be complete follows from the collapse of the wave function or role of the observer; completeness would require a demonstration that collapse of the wave function follows from quantum theory and that the role of the observer follows from quantum theory or is non-essential
We ask, is the thought experiment physically possible? Even if this question is irrelevant, it remains true that in the thought experiment we are replacing atoms [neurons] by descriptive and not real equivalents
Its non-iconic form makes it ideal for non-subjective or objective encoding; for mentality, mentation and thought [time-sequence]; for abstraction; for linearity; for communication: for recording and transmission… and for these reasons [7] language is an ideal medium for logic and mathematics and define the meaning of this question
This question, and the [attempt to] answer [it] may have bearing upon and illuminate Problems 1, 2, 3, and more generally give us broader perspectives on consciousness, and its nature, its place in the universe
A related question is:
In humans and perhaps in some animals we recognize their consciousness by identification. In general, however, this may not work
The following suggestions have been made at various places in this essay: the possible primacy of awareness and its split into awareness of [i] awareness and [ii] awareness of object; degrees of intensity, clarity, intentionality associated with awareness and examination of these modes and degrees; unity vs. disunity and eternity vs. finitude of consciousness[es] - Problems 7 and 9; the conceptual and metaphysical framework for understanding consciousness - Problems 1, 2, 3, and 8; the role of action and waiting - perceptivity - in knowledge… and perceptivity as ultimate knowledge - Problem 8; and studies pertaining to consciousness particularly those on the envelope of consciousness. All these are approaches to greater awareness of one’s own conscious and unconscious [putative] processing and so to the enhancement of knowledge by empathy… and at the same time these approaches include understanding of “other minds”; and empathy and understanding act synergistically
So far we have been asking “proximate” questions. When we begin to consider more global “ultimate” questions and issues pertaining to consciousness; a fuller, more elaborate definition, understanding explanation of consciousness - perhaps in terms of a total field of reality and concepts - may be necessary to be able to adequately address, understand and consider such questions. And while such global questions [Problems 5-10, below] may be of intrinsic interest [human, cosmological, and metaphysical], their consideration may also lend conceptual clarity to the more immediate questions of Problems Of Consciousness [1-4 above]
What is the relationship of consciousness to other mental activities - especially to the unconscious; i.e., what is the place of consciousness in a map or atlas of mental function?
Mapping the unities, disunities and elements and functions of individual consciousness and mind, considerations on human or higher consciousness - language, socialization, and value.[24] Within the domain of consciousness itself, it may be useful even essential to distinguish reactivity, intentionality, awareness, consciousness, self-awareness…
Useful works for study and synthesis preliminary to developing an atlas of mental function are:
Searle, John R. Rediscovery of Mind, 1992
Searle, John R. The Construction of Social Reality, 1995
Other works in the philosophy of mind
Standard works in psychology and personality
My unpublished work, especially
Notes on consciousness[25]
On Personality Transformation
Consciousness as a continuum
Studies in consciousness and personality
See also My Work, below
Philosophy
Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Chap. 7: The unconscious and its relation to consciousness
The Connection Principle: “The notion of an unconscious mental state implies accessibility to consciousness”
“The ontology of the unconscious is strictly the ontology of a neurophysiology capable of generating the unconscious”
Comment
Assume that the ontology assertion is true. The following may still be true:
Alternative, equivalent explanations exist: functional, evolutionary, mental, ultimate Equivalence of explanations is not necessarily transparent
Demonstration of equivalence if possible may be difficult
The principle is not necessarily prescriptive. Neurophysiological processing may be indeterminate; even an isolated brain might be temporally indeterministic. Determination may include [a] interaction with the world, [b] indeterminate elements
Freud and successors: Psychoanalysis; symbols and archetypes; self-psychology; and object relations
Psychiatry
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Freud and successors on neurosis, dreams and related topics
Psychosis, the unconscious and random processing
Somatoform, dissociative and personality disorders
Hundert: Categories, mind and the unconscious
Further comments
The conscious-unconscious continuum
The envelope of consciousness
Personality and the unconscious; unconscious personality elements; all personality elements are present; construction of the primary and conscious personality; that such construction occurs to varying degrees of completeness but is not absolute; precipitating changes; crises; thoughts on multi-stable personality structures
Writing on the forms of the unconscious and on the reality of the unconscious; unconscious as metaphor
Evolutionary and ultimate considerations
Death
The unconscious and other consciousnesses
Multiple centers of consciousness
Origin of memory, dreams, imagery, symbols, language,
Thinking, creativity [and problem solving and design]
Other: I need to review this
…in:
Preliminary considerations on some of these issues were taken up in Problem 2, and in Problem 5
…and of conscious processes in universal process?
…and some related problems:
This problem has two meanings. First, if you are a materialist or dualist, it is the problem of metaphysics - ontology; further, if you are sensing or practical, you may find the issue dull, even contemptible, but if you are intuitive-romantic, the question excites you
Second, if you are an idealist, and especially if you hold that conscious experience is [or may be regarded as] the essence of all being [including the universe] you are asking how the structure-dynamics of all being may be shown to be manifestation of consciousness
Note that “the” commonsense definition of and approach to the solution of problems of qualia eliminates this second alternative altogether [especially in its essentialist version]
Proximately: ontogenetically in individual growth or epigenesis…
And including experience
Ultimately but evolutionarily in the development of life
In human evolution
In social evolution[26]
Relative to physical origins, current and other ideas and theories of the origin of the universe…
Remember that “the universe” and its origins are actually undefined in modern physical cosmology: the observed universe [at the present time] being bounded by a near but not necessarily absolute or isolated singularity in time and an extent of about 20 billion light years but perhaps extended beyond those space-time limits - to as much as infinity - and bounded conceptually, so far as modern physical cosmology is concerned, by the current quantum-relativistic-experimental limits of physics
… And remember, too, that “before time” and “beyond space” are not only undefined but also perhaps indefinable in modern physical cosmology
In the absolute atemporal sense
…And - What is the relation between these more ultimate problems and the other proximate issues?
Is all perception creation or recreation?
Is creation the creation of the new, of what did not come before, of what is not contained in what came before…
...and if so, does this not imply a temporally indeterministic universe?
...but if indeterministic, is not the universe random in its development and structure, and in what sense can we say humans make choices, create, have value?
A resolution of this issue is as follows. When nothing exists, indeterminism allows creation…but only the stable creations - quarks, etc - survive. Once structure exists, only those subsequent physical creations that are compatible with existing structure and stable persist and only those mental creations that are compatible with existing knowledge, reality and are self-consistent, and represent new knowledge persist. In biological terms there is variation and selection; in epistemic terms this is hypothesis and test, induction and deduction…
Is the putative separateness of individual consciousness actual, absolute or real… and why is this contingent separateness often equated with necessary separateness?
Is the putative birth and death of consciousness at physical birth and death actual, absolute or real… and why, again, is the contingent equated with the necessary?
Is all consciousness [becoming, derived from] one consciousness that is eternal in time, total in time - if time is finite in extent, or “beyond time”?
Can we show the diffusion of consciousness [mentality or mentalism] among the elements of being or the seat, source, “cause” [not necessarily in the temporal sense of causation but perhaps in the emergent sense] of “matter”… and what are the implied relationships?
What happens to these relationships in different metaphysical systems: dualism, neutral monism…?
Sensing, practical, critical: the process of answering, working with such questions illuminates the answering and significance of the sensing-practical problems
if you are of this type, these [including 7.5] need no proximate answer… ultimately you might question why you are this way
Intuitive, romantic, spiritual, speculative
if you are of this type, the questions [including 7.5] have intrinsic interest to you and the question needs no proximate answer; ultimately: why are you this way
the “ultimate” questions do in fact, have day-to-day behavioral-attitudinal consequences… the dogmatic-pragmatist who denies the spiritual is taking a spiritual stance
From the point of view of consciousness pervading, diffusing the universe
At the levels of primal and animal being
Attitudinal, behavioral and pragmatic
“Scientific”
“Religious”
Philosophical: various systems: material, ideal, neutral monism, idealistic realism [elsewhere called graded idealism in this essay]
Next: the metaphysical framework
The following is preliminary to developing an atlas of metaphysical systems
One appeal of an idealist metaphysics is that it [or some of its versions] posits as most basic our most direct experiences - qualia - without positing additional entities, such as chairs, petroleum refineries, atoms, fields. Therefore I will start with a consideration of such an idealist metaphysics [idealism]. We could call this experiential or phenomenal idealism.[27]
A preliminary question is whether there is non-conscious experience. If there is non-conscious experience, then phenomenal idealism is an incomplete metaphysics relative even to the domain of the idea
i] The planet Pluto revolves around the sun: is that process part of my non-conscious experience? True, I can have conscious [if partly conceptual or inferential] experience of the planetary revolution through telescopes and theory, but it is experience of the process; the process itself is not within my experience and is therefore not part of my non-conscious experience
ii] My hair grows: is that part of my non-conscious experience? If I can actually sense the proteins forming at the roots or the hair follicle pushing up, then I am having a conscious experience of the growth. If I feel an itch associated with the growth, then I am having a conscious experience: the itch, but not of the growth per se; I may infer the growth from the itch but that is an inference that there is growth, not an experience of the growth. If I look in the mirror today and then again in two weeks, I experience that “my hair has grown” [the experience is conscious if somewhat inferential]. In none of the above cases did I have a non-conscious experience of the growth of my hair
iii] Are unconscious mental processes experiences? If they are experiences they are non-conscious experiences. An initial argument against non-conscious processing being experience is that affecting experience is not the same as experience. However, there is still something paradoxical about denying that non-conscious processing is experience at the moment that, or in face of the fact that, non-conscious processing may enter into experience
As far as the non-conscious process itself is concerned, it is only experience if my consciousness is a multiplicity of sometimes non-communicating parts, the primary one being what I usually call “I” which has language and agency [relative to action] and the other[s] being more diffuse and “pure-animal” like “processing with fluid form in a field of being”. The alternative is that the non-conscious processing is not the experience of any subject, but that when it comes into consciousness, the experience is not of the process itself but of a combination of either the physiological trace of the experience or the experience that some change has occurred but that the changing itself was outside experience
A related consideration is the following: conscious experiences are associated with degrees of intensity, clarity, intentionality and attention. These factors and perhaps others affect awareness and recall. I can be aware of something without being aware that I am aware of it; later I may become aware that I was aware of it. An example is realizing what someone said a few seconds after the utterance - perhaps when one’s attention is drawn to the context of the utterance. All this needs careful analysis since there is the awareness A1 and the awareness of the awareness A2, and this needs to be examined conceptually. Further, A1 and A2 come with varying degrees of intensity, clarity and attention. On this model we can see how one may be conscious at some level of some happening yet be focusing on some other circumstance and become acutely conscious of the happening a few seconds later. Or, one may forget a low level conscious experience, be aware of some associated features and later remember the experience via the associated features as a non-conscious experience even though the original experience was conscious
Therefore, to call non-conscious processes - whether mental, physiological or physical - “experience” is to confuse the process with another experience that is conscious or to redefine experience to include the absence of experience
Therefore, there is no non-conscious experience and this phenomenalist idealism is complete relative to individual experience
But this immediately identifies a problem with phenomenal idealism: there are events or entities or processes outside of it:
Mental
Physical
The experiences of others
Therefore, I will generalize phenomenal [apperceptual[28]] idealism to conceptual idealism. A conceptual idealism is one in which, by appropriately and - of course - properly, expanding the domain of the concept of the idea, more of existence is subsumed under the concept. In the limit in which all of existence and all of being are included - as are nonexistence and nonbeing - we arrive at an idealist ontology… However, there is an extended sense in which perception includes conception; in this sense the resulting idealism remains a phenomenal idealism but is also an objective idealism
This extended idealism will not explain consciousness so much as understand it in the context of mental process. That this will be challenging yet possible arises from the following considerations:
i] The idea of multiple experience or multiple seats of experience within a single person
ii] The question of what is conscious
iii] The issue of separateness of consciousness [i.e., that discrete conscious centers - you and I - exist]: contingent or necessary
iv] A map of mental function
v] Posited reality of the world
vi] That the issues of the unconscious aspects of the mental functions must be worked out within the idealism
In fact, the extended idealism becomes what I have called “graded idealism” and is a tentative solution to the “problem of metaphysics” [different metaphysics and their competing but chimerical nature and the issue of completeness of metaphysical system]
Some elaborations of idealism occur in this essay in a number of places, including in Problem 9 below. Here I add a response to a criticism of this idealism: “But brains, atoms and cars are surely real.” Yes, they are. And idealism does not deny this. Even without recourse to idealism we recognize that the reality of the real is in part conceptual… and part perceptual. In the synthesis of percept-concept, we approach but do not arrive at the “noumena”. The real world has a structure within idealism within which there are grades of reality and there are ideas and “ideas of”. This is graded idealism, within which the real is actually more real than it is in materialism. However, we see that consciousness and awareness take on new dimensions. That is our concept of the idea is extended from an initial concept of idea as, say, visual imagery. First, we do not posit that idea is something that one has. Rather the ontological primary is the idea which is not “had” by anyone or anything. Second, we interpret experience within this framework. To be included are the primitive concept of idea, the first person experience, the third person experience or matter. Here, again, we find added motivation and source for expanded definitions, concepts and experiments of [or with] consciousness
In this ontology there are grades of idea; and mind, ideas of, and matter are constructs. Thus the first person viewpoint is primary except that person is not a primitive concept. The third person is the first person minus the pure subjective. The noumenon is not what the mind seeks to know but includes mind and all else
This idealism is not anti-materialist. Neither is it antirealist. Nor is it realist in the sense that there is an absolute reality outside of mind because mind itself is an approximate construct from the more primitive idea. It is realist in the approximate description in terms of mind and matter in that, within this approximation, matter has existence outside of mind. Thus graded idealism includes realism in the sense just specified. This is the sense of noumenon being outside mind that we now see as being possessed of explanatory power but not as absolute. The absolute noumenon in graded idealism is the idea that separates into idea of idea and idea of object; that is, into first and third person or, approximately, mind and matter. In this extended sense the graded idealism is a form of realism in which the real is primary to mind [and other derived categories] rather than outside mind. …As noted earlier, graded idealism is not a theory itself. There is, however, an associated assertion. It is that graded idealism provides a more comprehensive and unitary view of existence than prior metaphysics
I will add some comments on the relations of these thoughts on the graded idealism to the concepts of subjective idealism, objective idealism and absolute idealism as they appear in the literature of Western Philosophy
I will ignore subtleties - deriving from multiple meanings, shades of meaning and historical transformations and inversions of meaning - that are not primarily relevant to the present discussion
The following paragraph derives from Runes.[29]
Subjective idealism has more than one related meaning[30] one of which is acosmism,[31] but the meaning I use here is that the ontologically real consists of subjects; that is, possessors of experience. Objective idealism identifies an externally real Nature with the thought or activity of the World Mind. In Germany “objective idealism” is commonly identified with the view that finite minds are parts - modes, moments, projections, appearances - of the Absolute Mind. I will liberally interpret Hegel’s concept of the Absolute Idea, of Absolute Idealism to mean the following: the Absolute Mind is real even if this is not manifest or actual; its reality is both cause and result of the processing of its constituent minds finite or otherwise; its manifestation to its constituents occurs as a result of their evolutionary process and integration or reintegration