JOURNEY IN BEING
MIND
Introduction (06?)… Foundation… The concept of Matter does not exclude mind. Indefiniteness of the common concepts of mind and matter (06)… Mind. Mind versus manifestations and particular cases of mind (06)… Development of the study of mind… Consciousness (06)… Attributes (06) … Psychology
Introduction… Aims… The concept of Matter does not exclude mind. Indefiniteness of the common concepts of mind and matter from ‘06… Mind. Mind versus manifestations and particular cases of mind from ‘06… Substance, Mind and Matter… Free will… Originality from ‘06… Consciousness… Attributes from ‘06… Morals and metaphysics from ‘06
This general discussion of mind focuses on three topics—mind: meaning, nature, and place in the world; study of fundamental aspects—freedom and novelty, consciousness and the unconscious, and attributes; and, finally, psychology as studied in the academic world and its relation to mind
Study of mind as it occurs in human and animal being is taken up in Human being
At outset it may be noted yet again that the interests in any topic are for its own sake—its own interest, for its interrelations with other topics, in its implication for this narrative—for the journey, and for its general contribution and potential application
Some important topics to be considered are essential characteristics of mind; mind and organism; consciousness and experience—and the unconscious… the conscious – unconscious dimension—polarity or continuum; and freedom and originality or creativity vs. determined behavior
(There can be no one meaning—the aim is to see from reflection on being in the world which includes reflection on the history of thought on mind and from Metaphysics, what meaning—sense—may be most faithful to the idea of mind. Perhaps, more accurately, as suggested in Meaning, the question is what fundamental collection of ideas with what meanings and interrelations are, within ability, most faithful to the world that includes being-in-it)
Experience is the being of mind; awareness of mind arises in reflexive experience—and such experience reveals self and object… but objects may have selves (and it appears to be true on account of Metaphysics of immanence that all objects have selves and this is to be discussed and the conclusion justified in what follows)
Freedom—choice—will be argued, below, to be essential in human and perhaps other animal being but is mentioned here because it seems first that reflexive experience is impossible without a free element to mind—the freedom to bind or withhold binding or relating experience to objects (this is essentially, perhaps, the kind of freedom in concept formation.) Perhaps, though, it is not the free element that permits reflexion—the form of the word is intended— but that freedom and reflexion are or come from the same element. Further, and fundamentally, is not elementary choice as elementary indeterminism present in the very elements of being that are being-wise (a materialist would say materially) constitutive of higher or compound being?
If matter were the only substance, then mind would be material in nature—and its nature would be that of a special kind of relation and mind would reach to the depth of being (matter.) However, the ‘matter’ of common thought and physics is not a substance—there is no substance. If the idea of matter is extended so that it can function as substantial to being, then matter must be (equivalent to the) void and in this case there is no significance to the idea of matter or materialism
It remains that mind refers to a special kind of relation—the experience of the object which may be bound to the object or free of any object though attachable to objects
Since there is no substance, mind does not of necessity reach to ground (depth of being.) However, on account of Metaphysics of immanence, mind may reach out to any object and to ground
Obviously there is structure to mind and binding—perception, emotion—of mind to world
Of necessity, from novelty there is freedom of choice from among presenting alternatives and of concept formation and so to create and or recognize alternatives. Structure conditions the concept formation, recognition of alternatives… and this may be regarded as internalization of the process of evolution (genesis)
As a result of absolute indeterminism and its implication of the necessity of structure, there can be no generic arguments of the type:
The universe is deterministic so there cannot be any freedom or that this cosmological system is deterministic
The fact of absolute indeterminism is inconsistent with the existence of form and structure
This aim arises because mind and matter are seen as experience versus object but experience itself may be seen as an object an aim related to the first arises:
In a detailed form taken up in Human World, this study may be useful to the journey. This chapter on Mind provides some framework and foundation for the later study
Freedoms—especially human freedoms and their nature and necessity versus contingency versus non-existent status—i.e. essentially illusory status. Substance thinking which is occasionally ego-thinking may predispose thinkers to essentialize the element of determinism in the thought that there is no freedom, human being and human behavior are determined… and may predispose liberal thinkers to suppose that freedom need pay no heed to constraint. Here, freedom and constraint are seen simultaneously present and in interaction so that experienced freedoms and experienced restraints are not given or necessary and may, perhaps, be negotiated
The following freedoms are constitutively and perhaps causally related:
Novelty—concept formation, other forms of originality or creativity
Choice, action and morals—acting morally, accepting and constructing morals
Self-determination, commitments and projects over a life—the project of a life (construction is a process of vision from and building upon the present)
Consciousness and awareness—and the unconscious (polarity versus continuum)
Human mind—taken up in Human World—in which further details and refinements are taken up but in which emphasis is on mind as manifest in animal and human
… especially as practiced in the academic world. The interest is for the utility of a variety of empirical and conceptual aspects to this narrative—especially in the study of Human being, and in understanding and making correction for historical and ongoing distortions of academic perspective
In this chapter, focus is on the general aspects and nature of mind. The development forms a framework for a more detailed study of the organism and the psyche that is deferred to Human being
Round out the Introduction, Aims and Topics with information from Mind, from Journey in Being-New World. Topics include understanding of mind, originality, consciousness, place of mind in the universe, mind-body issue, develop implications for human being
Looking at an organism negotiate the world, it is clear that there is inner physical –physiological– processing (for a complex organism this must be intricate.) At the same time, the organism has sense or feeling that must also somehow be about the world. (Even ‘pure’ experience is delayed reflection or potentially about the world especially when it is remembered that the organism is part of the world. Additionally, it is perhaps the case that what is thought of as pure experience may be seen as experience by one part of the organism of another part. Can a pure substance have experience?)
The sense and the physiological processing are two ways that awareness of ‘mind’ arises; two ways that mind may be studied. There are views for and against the idea that the two modes of mind are distinct
The two aspects of mind are related to meaning-sense and meaning-reference i.e. to concept and object
Much has been written about a related view that ‘sense’ i.e. the subjective aspect of mind does not have causal efficacy. Epiphenomenalism is the view that there is mind e.g. subjective experience but that mind has no causal efficacy and is likened to the foam of an ocean wave. An extreme version of the view that mind has no causal efficacy is that there is no such thing as mind; this view is found in some forms of behaviorism. Although epiphenomenalism is perhaps less extreme than the thought that there is no mind it is perhaps more absurd and is still an extreme view
Sources of such views are as follows. (1) Materialism is the predominant world view c. 2007, especially in the English speaking countries. However, materialism and the view that ‘sense’ can be a seat of cause may appear to be incompatible. (2) The human freedom to manipulate symbols and images may result in the impression that mind, the sense, is immaterial, flimsy, or not real. (3) That impression is encouraged by the needs of rationalism and science whose process requires criticism
The view that is argued here is that the two modes are not distinct. It is argued that mind has causal efficacy. It will be argued that the claims of the previous paragraph are meaningless without clear conceptions of mind and matter, that there are not two distinct conceptions of mind, and that the greatest possible distinction between mind and matter is that they are different aspects of the same elemental object. The argument will reveal that from a ‘material’ point of view the distinction is that or similar to that of the distinction between force and particle and, therefore, any distinction is a distinction among aspects of matter. Sufficient extension of the concept of mind then shows an identity of mind and matter in their ultimate senses (this is not pan-psychism because it is not being said that there are human or organismic minds that inhabit e.g. the elementary particles but that there is a consistent extension of the concept of mind that includes organismic mind and that inhabits and is –includes– the particle level)
Any topic may be studied for interest or intrinsic reasons and for extrinsic reasons or use. The intrinsic and extrinsic are not fundamentally distinct. When the only regard is for immediate use, study may focus away from the conceptual and toward the instrumental. The exclusive regard for use may enhance immediate use but may also retard general including long term utility. Thus it is with mind
A first aim in studying mind is to understand the relationships between organism and world – how does the organism negotiate the world. Regardless of whether the study is conceptual or instrumental –perhaps preferably both– this aim is close to developing the idea of mind through use of the concept
It may be apparent that a study of mind purely as a distinct object in itself is not productive of the first aim. A supportive aim is therefore to understand some essential aspects of the organism that are related to the idea of negotiating and surviving in the world. It may be asked, what is the minimum that an organism should possess for long term or species survival. Perhaps the very minimum is stimulus-response and reproduction. Mere stimulus-response does not imply absence of inner process i.e. of mind. In addition, the very simplest of animals may require, at least, detection or sense of difference or gradient and locomotion. The entire range of ‘higher animal mind’ may be studied in the context of niche exploration (e.g. physical, evolution itself which results in ‘free’ sense or symbol) and creation (e.g. biological, social and symbolic.) Additional thoughts, still brief, are deferred to Human being
A related aim is to analyze the motives for distinguishing motives and reasons for regarding mind and matter as distinct objects. The primary ‘analytic’ motives lies in the habit of substance thinking – that mind and matter are fixed essences i.e. that what is matter is finally known and is categorially distinct from mind… and from this flow a host of psychological and institutional motives that are expressions of the habit. There are some psychological and institutional motives not based in the analytic and these have been discussed in this and other documents. It is interesting to note that distinctions once named acquire an independent existence
A second aim is to study the nature and source or seat of mind. What is mind? How may the aspects of sense and physiology be rendered coherent? The following aspects or distinctions arise
Mind-organism. How is mind rooted in the organism? Given the paradigm of materialism, how is this possible. Includes concern with the classical problems of mind and body (matter) and causal efficacy of mind
Consciousness-the unconscious. Whereas the distinction is sometimes conceived as an opposition, it is here conceived as a continuum in which there is a shifting or dynamic threshold of consciousness that is a (perhaps the) source of the partial fluidity of the distinction and of conscious-unconscious relations
The essential characteristic of mind. First consider the dimensions of mind. What are the aspects of the (human) organism are considered to be mental? One obvious one is (subjective) feeling of which consciousness is an elaboration. One meaning of ‘experience’ is precisely feeling as used here. Thus in the standard analytic accounts, experience is counted as one of the dimensions of mind. Are there other aspects. Reflection, first, on catalogs of things considered mental and, second, on what kinds of relations there are to the world, suggests two other dimensions: attitude (i.e. aboutness or intentionality) and action. Thus, the –at least one– standard account is that the dimensions are experience, attitude and action. If against this it were argued that attitude and action were in fact experience combined with something else it might be countered that attitude and action may occur without awareness and commonly known experiments may be cited in favor of this counterargument. However, the ‘consistent extension of the concept of mind,’ mentioned above and justified below, deflates the counterargument. It is further argued that attitude and action are aspects of an external description of mind. In other words, experience is the characteristic of mind. As far as dimensions are concerned, then, experience may be taken to be a primary dimension and attitude and action, in their mental side, constituent dimensions. Against this it could be argued that pure experience is not about anything. It is argued in return that there is a difference between connection and connectability, and that pure experience is connectability in the sense that it is antecedent andor precedent connection (also see comments in Mind: Aims. Concepts and summary.) Additionally, as pointed out elsewhere in the narrative, what seems to be pure experience of (to) an individual is (likely) the experience of one part of the individual (or individual’s mind) by another. The idea that pure experience is not about anything is related to the idea that ideas are not causally efficacious
Note that one of the difficulties of fitting mind and its characteristics into a material framework is the difficulty of understanding, explaining or predicting such characteristics from matter. This difficulty, examples of which include the problems of experience, of causal efficacy, and of intentionality, are addressed in the narrative
Originality or creativity vs. determined behavior. Free and bound elements of sense. Moral sense and freedom of will. Determinism and indeterminism in mind and thought. Determinism and intuition. The seats of indeterminism. Humor as the intuition of indeterminism in the world
A detailed study of mind in terms of grounding in the world would be a continuation of the first aim above. This third aim has the aspects of survival, the passive-determined active-creative continuum, and niche exploration and creation
As noted, survival requires stimulus-response (which is not exclusive of inner sense.) This has the following aspects in the primitive case. (1) Afference-efference i.e. primitive feeling and perception and primitive motor control and action. (2) The primitive feeling and perception are about the world if only in a primitive way. This ‘aboutness’ is intentionality and its forms include the Kantian intuition
The passive-active continuum is marked by the emergence of the free sense that is associated with recollection or memory
Elaboration of ‘function’ by niche creation and elaboration. This concerns the development of complex conception (includes perception,) symbol, emotion (and drive,) and their interpretation as elaboration of primitive feeling (emotion and the physical senses of sight and sound and so on may be put on the same plane when it is recalled that emotive-feeling is in some sense perception of inner state and that inner and outer are both part of world or universe) and their integration and elaboration in intuition (of which symbol is a part)
When it is said that ‘emotive-feeling is in some sense perception of inner state,’ the following are not intended. That the perception involved is a (detailed) map of the neurophysiological state. This can be no more the case than perception of the world is perception of the thing-in-itself. Given that there is need for primitive emotion and feeling to be (highly) bound, no detailed map is necessary. The role of primitive emotion is distinct from the role of complex conception just as primitive perception has a role that is distinct from that of complex conception. If a function of primitive emotion is to promote positive feeling and to diminish negative feeling, then the states of primitive emotion (internal perception) should be a simple bi-valent continuum or, perhaps, a few simple bi-valent continua. How does the ‘work?’ (1) Perception and interpretation –including built in interpretation– result in a state of physiological arousal that is not entirely under autonomous control. (2) The subjective side of the arousal is the set of bi-valent continua of feeling. (3) Since arousal is bound to events, promotion of positive feeling is physical action that enhances the needs of the organism and inhibition of negative feeling is physical action that enhances avoidance needs of the organism. The picture painted is very simple. The case presented is the simplest case. In actuality, a variety of dysfunctions may enter. In the complex case, (the effect of) primitive emotion may be exaggerated or inhibited by cognition (thought)
Another aim concerns the study of psychology. In this narrative, psychology is the general and detailed study of mind as immanent (the word embodied has an undesirable connotation) in the organism. I.e. psychology is the study of psyche
In psychology, various ‘functions’ and ‘theories’ may be studied. Functions include cognition and emotion. There are theories such as the James-Lange theory of emotion (neuro-physiological theories) and theories of the form of cognition (structural theories of which an example the idea that cognition is computation.) Questions arise. Do cognition, emotion and conation (motivation) cover the range of function? What are their relations and integrations? Are they absolutely distinct or may they have root in a single primitive element? What is the conceptual grounding of a theory? What is the basis and source of the structure of the functions? I.e. whence the structure and variety of emotion, whence spatio-temporal perception? I.e. what is the nature of (Kantian) intuition? When to the foregoing, the standard topics that include attention, memory, learning, growth and commitments are appended, does a necessary and complete picture of human mind result – at least in principle?
The last question is obviously interesting and has implication for psychology and its application. For Journey in Being, it has the application that a complete and structured knowledge of mind shows one approach to the goal of realization through transformation – may show one approach to realization of the ultimate. Of course the utility of the structure that emerges from the study to transformation will be enhanced by a knowledge of the Metaphysics, the Theory of Identity, and the Cosmology
In this narrative, the question of a necessary picture of the human mind is answered affirmatively. E.g., the picture to be developed is not ‘mere’ theory. The picture will be necessary in its contours; the necessity will follow from grounding in the necessary elements of the metaphysics and necessary empirical facts e.g. that the organism negotiates the environment, that there is symbol and so on. The list of elements of study below show the metaphysical grounding. Will the picture be complete with regard to the kinds e.g. function (or whatever may be found to be the ideal form of the idea of function,) personality and so on? At the present, absolute completeness is not asserted but the metaphysical grounding suggests that the picture may be complete in its main features; the assertion is of course envisioned as revisable. (It is easy to think that a metaphysical grounding may lend completeness when a structure is seen against it as background for while the framework may well lead to vast improvement, the de-selection by a human individual of non-human even non-animal factors must, at least, be guarded against)
The details are deferred to Human being. However, following are some elements that will ground the study:
Understanding mind against the background of the metaphysics e.g. that neither mind nor matter are substances, that mind shall have deterministic and indeterministic elements… Further consequences are immanent in the following
Study of organism-mind structure and relations
Conscious-unconscious continuum
The essential characteristic of mind. The dimensions of mind
Bound-free elements of sense, originality and the moral sense
The functions
Extensions and modifications of the Kantian intuition
The dimension of time: growth, personality and commitments
A problem (perhaps the problem) with the idea of matter is the confusion of the idea with theories of matter. The idea of matter is the idea that the world contains material entities that can be felt and touched and so on. A theory of matter is much more precise than the idea of matter. In a Newtonian theory matter is made up of point particles that are devoid of internal structure; in the quantum theory there may be structure; the completion of a theory occurs when the behavior of common material systems is explained (derived) from the properties of the particles. The concepts of mind play no role in the theories or the explanations. This is the source of paradox – if it is given that human bodies are made up of matter how is mind possible? The resolution is so simple as to often avoid notice. The theories of matter make no reference to mind. It is quite reasonable to think that the Newtonian picture is devoid of mental characteristics. In the case of quantum theory it is not obvious that mind is not implicit; the actual relations between the possibilities of quantum theory and mental phenomena remain undetermined. On the other hand, there is nothing in the idea of matter that should rule out mind. ‘Inert matter’ appears to be devoid of mind but this is perhaps a mere appearance – perhaps matter is not inert (and certainly modern physics confirms this even though it is silent on whether the non inertness entails mind – which silence is often confused with the idea that mind is absent in matter; and there is no reason to think that the quantum theory –or modern physics in its totality– provides an ultimate picture of matter.) As will be seen, mind must be at least implicit in any final account of physics. Provided that the errors and their underlying assumptions are avoided, there need be no bar against talk of mind
The common concept of matter has been seen to be indefinite. It will be seen that there is a similar indefiniteness in common talk of mind
A crucial distinction regarding mind is mind-as-humans-and-other-animals-have-it versus mind in general. The central characteristic of high level (human and animal) mind is experience. ‘Experience’ has a variety of meanings. The meaning here is as follows. It is the feel of a cool breeze on a warm day, the color of the sunset, the sensing of the color and fragrance of a rose, the feeling of joy, and the awareness of a scene. When having the sense of the quality of color or of the pitch of a musical note, the individual is having experience. In a well known article, What It Is Like to Be a Bat, 1974, the philosopher Thomas Nagel (b. 1937, Belgrade, in what was then Yugoslavia) explained the present meaning of experience in terms of the phrase ‘What it is like’ i.e. it is like something to experience the fragrance of a rose; what it is like is the quality of the fragrance. Without experience (at all in the entire manifold of being) there would be no ‘significance in being.’ This would mean that even if there were beings who behaved as though they felt joy there would be no joy, even if they behaved as though they had thoughts there would be no (inner) experience of having thoughts. Notice that the ‘definition’ of experience was by example and by similar ideas (feeling, awareness) that are not more fundamental than the idea (experience) being explained. This is because (it seems) that there is nothing that is more fundamental. A problem already encountered now recurs. How is it that experience (e.g. feeling, awareness, consciousness) that does not occur in ‘mere’ actuality (matter) occurs in humans and animals? There are but two alternatives. First, Matter is devoid of mind altogether. On this alternative, explanation of mind is condemned to eternal logical paradox. Second, matter is not devoid of mind. This alternative may strain the imagination –surely the elementary particles of matter, e.g. electrons and quarks, do not have thoughts or emotions– but entails no logical paradox. There are two lines of offense against the second alternative. One is the position, already dismissed as logically absurd, that matter is altogether devoid of mind. The second is the common objection that it is absurd to suggest that atoms have thoughts and emotions (and so on.) However, this is not entailed by the idea that matter is not devoid of mind. A brick or a statue is made of matter; this does not imply that atoms are like little bricks or little statues. Similarly, that matter is not devoid of mind does not mean that at the level of atoms (and so on) there are thoughts and emotions. Rather it means that there are primitive elements of mind (they could be called primitive feeling –the effect of one element in another– but even ‘feeling’ might suggest something too removed from the primitive level) among the primitive elements of matter
[Another objection to this extension of mind to the primal case has to do with the observation that (human) experience is often about something. An individual sees a sunset; her or his experience is about the sunset. This quality of aboutness, labeled ‘intentionality’ by the German philosopher Franz Brentano (b. 1838, Marienberg, Germany,) is clearly significant to mind for it is crucial that mental content be about the world. Intentionality is regarded today (c. 2007) as important in itself and as central in any explanation of mind in material terms. Since intentionality is not central to the present narrative it is not discussed extensively; there are, however, a few remarks on the topic in subsequent sections. The objection regarding intentionality is that if the elementary particles of matter and so on do not have intentionality, how can it be that the particles in aggregate (brains) have intentionality? (The concern is an aspect of the mind-matter problem.) A resolution to the problem of intentionality is discussed in the section ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’ of the next division]
From the extension of the concept of mind to the primal case, it is possible to explain (in principle) macro-level material form and behavior as well as macro-level mental Experience and its forms without categorial paradox and without any need to confront any of the other classical mind-matter paradoxes e.g. mental causation which is the ability of ‘mind’ to have effect in the ‘material world.’ The ‘problem’ of mental causation does not arise on the present account because it contains no split of the world into mind and matter but, instead, its only true distinction is verbal whereas its ‘material’ distinction is (like) one of thing (matter) and relation (e.g. effect e.g. force i.e. mind.) Without the extension to the primal root, paradox arises. With the extension (which has no inherent inconsistencies and which may be done so as to avoid the absurdities mentioned earlier) the various paradoxes of mind and matter no longer occur and a uniform theory of being, i.e. one in which the division into duals e.g. that of mind and matter, is obtained. There is of course a real problem and that is of explaining the varieties of mental experience and behavior from the primitive; this is of course more a possibility or challenge than a fundamental problem and it concerns, should it prove to be feasible, scientific explanation, and not the resolution of a logical divide
The explanation given in the previous paragraphs has it that the primitive or elementary forms of Being may be regarded as having modes that may be described as or labeled ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ and that although the descriptions may be separated the thing being described knows no such separation. It is superficially open to the criticism that the concept of mind whose empirical origin is observation of the animal domain (some might add plants) is extended without warrant to the depth of being. However this is not the precisely case. Two distinct concepts have been identified – mind-as-manifest-in-the-animal-domain and mind (without restriction;) it is the unrestricted version that is applied to the depth. The explanation is necessary in that it is one of two possibilities and that the alternative explanation results in logical contradiction. The explanation eliminates rather than resolves the paradoxes of the presence of mind in material bodies (the mind-paradox) and the paradox of mental causation; it has no inherent contradiction; it undercuts the potential absurdity that there are thoughts, emotions and so on at the level of elementary particles. In principle the explanation of elaborations of mind in humans is via combinations and layering of the primitive mental elements. This is very much the way in which an in principle explanation in terms of material elements (also adequately extended) would be given. This is expected since the ‘material’ and ‘mental’ (and explanations based in them) are not distinct. The explanation has the advantage that it explicitly eliminates what is thought to be the gap between mind and matter. I.e. the explanation of higher (human and animal) mind does not face the logical paradox or divide associated with explaining how mind is manifest in (what is thought to be mindless) matter. A uniform explanation of sentient Being has been given in which it is not necessary to explicitly refer to mind and matter (there would of course be reference under some name to mental and material objects)
How will this explanation affected by the picture of the universe in the next section, ‘Cosmology?’ It will be consistent to regard the ephemera from the void as capable of ‘mental’ and ‘material’ description. It may be likely that life and mind as-humans-and-other animals-have-it occur only in normal cosmological systems. It will be seen to be possible that a system that is devoid of recognizable mind (as-humans-other-animals-have-it) may acquire infusions of life and mind from other systems or, perhaps, the background universe
Here or in Human world, refer to the discussions of ‘presence to’ of the essentials and the free will documents
Note that the following is done (begun) in Metaphysics—clarify and modify the relation of mind to ground first from the new insight from Metaphysics (and?) that the relation of mind to ground is indeterministic and how this loosens and firms up the foundation of ‘mind’ and its connection to the ground (which is now clearly a two way action)… and therefore the idea that there is causal rooting is irrelevant. Observe that this development continues the eradication of the habit of determinism
‘Presence to’ is present to the world. The world is the organism’s world which may include a concept of world or universe, the organism itself, the organism’s environment, and other organisms
Presence to is the essence of mind which, in animal being, is feeling
In animal and human being, mind is the elaboration and focusing of feeling
Ffeeling is whatever it is at ground zero that results in e.g. animal feeling; although the ultimate ground zero or root of being may be taken to be the void, here it is (temporarily) left open. Ffeeling and feeling are different concepts. Ffeeling includes the case of feeling; Feeling is the extension of feeling to ground zero. It may be thought that due to the pervasion of absolute indeterminism, feeling may have origin later than the root; however, also, as a result of absolute indeterminism, feeling that may have had later origin will find its way to the root. In the normal case, normal feeling should have origin in the normal root, i.e. ground zero
Relative to the universe, whereas mind and matter may be distinct and removed from the root, Mind and Matter cannot be distinct, they must extend to the root and may be consistently and realistically be taken as identical. I.e., Mind, Matter and being are not distinct
To deny this is to be ever condemned to paradox e.g. the mind-body problem; to accept it is grounding, entails no contradiction, paradox or absurdity e.g. of panpsychism
Practically, the root for a society of organisms, e.g. animals, may be ground zero which, in this cosmological system may be the atoms or perhaps elementary particles and forces. Conclusions from this ground zero are practical and, unless otherwise shown, may not be necessary
If ground zero is the substance of this cosmological system e.g. the ‘original’ singularity on to the present in its entirety, then it must contain the elements of mind as it is in this cosmological system
It may be remembered that paradox is disagreement among (what should be tentative) propositions or positions held as true. The world as such contains no paradox
Consciousness is not opposite to but continuous with the unconscious i.e. the conscious is acute, focused while the unconscious is diffuse; the two are in constant communication with varying degrees of relative intensity (e.g. reflection vs. alert)
The following are in error: (1) any equation of the unconscious (at whatever level i.e. even at the root or ground of being) with inertness or with an absence of ‘presence to,’ (2) any equation of the unconscious with the caricature of matter as ‘dumb’ i.e. with taking the standard conceptualization of matter as its essential characterization
Relative to animal mind the conscious vs. unconscious distinction is appropriate. Relative to an understanding of the entire range of being, the term ‘the unconscious’ is unfortunate, i.e. it has erroneous connotations
Metaphysics will found this section. The discussion will be in human being. Use the discussion of free will. Develop relations between free will and free concept
The human freedoms are the free symbol or concept which entails originality of thought and freedom of will or action (freedom of action and of will may be differentiated)
Here are the twin issues of the freedoms. (1) To give precise sense to the concepts. (2) To show or deny their existence and to elaborate the consequences of the conclusion. It is crucial to note that the issues are ‘dual’ – that is, they must be simultaneously addressed (of course against the background world-view or metaphysics.) This crucial issue may be seen as concern to avoid the habit of substance thinking. I.e. deciding what the freedoms are or entail at the outset of analysis may condemn it to futility or paradox
It is possible to make some general remarks on originality or innovation in ideas or thought. Think of originality as composed of new ideas and novel (re) arrangements of ideas. Some writers suggest that there are no new ideas – that all originality is rearrangement or (Plato) recollection. Regarding the entire manifold of being as a whole, there is, of course, nothing new. Further, if knowledge is discovery there is no creation of knowledge. However, the genesis and path of development of a normal domain (cosmological system) is not given at the outset or at any stage. Its further development starting at any time (including any initial or near initial state) may be conditioned but is not determined by its state at that time. In this sense the forms and structures of the domain are new. The words (and language) used by human beings are new in this sense; they were not (explicitly) there at the beginning. The generation of words cannot have been entirely genetic. Language can be seen as a property of the individual and the selection of genes occurred in part by success in generating useful novel forms (originality is real.) Now consider (re) arrangements of ideas that correspond to the world. Although the world may be relatively fixed over the origin of Language or the origin of descriptions of some of its features, the word combinations are novel. If the number of possible rearrangements of ideas exceeds computational ability, originality is required to see the viable ones
What is the source or location of the originality? It is essential that some ideas and arrangements occur spontaneously – perhaps what is spontaneous is an idea fragment. These fragments may occur at the intersection of the known and the unknown, of associations and possible associations, and it is reasonable to suggest that comprehension of a tradition of knowledge and exercise of imagination are conducive to productive originality
These thoughts show that the occurrence of new ideas relative to the history of a local cosmology is essential. It is also clear that relative to the universe (All Being) there is a sense in which there is ‘nothing new under the sun.’ Creation is recreation; this is another way of stating Plato’s idea that learning and discovery are recollection
The foregoing considerations apply to discovery in the world – including science. If a branch of mathematics is formulated axiomatically, its system of theorems forms a tautology. In any significant branch of mathematics the number of well formed statements far exceeds the number of theorems and so seeing significant theorems and generating proofs requires originality. Additionally, development and adjustment of axiomatic systems and the recognition of useful or productive domains of mathematics is not reducible to a system of tautology (is not an algorithmic process) and requires originality. While every life, every culture, every world are given in the manifold of being, their origin and continuation requires forms that are novel to their conditions and, in the case of human mind, thought that is original to its conditions. Regeneration is the sustenance of being
In the sections on ‘Human being’ and ‘Principles of thought,’ below, there are some further thoughts on originality
Also see the discussion in Substance, Mind and Matter, above
From ‘06
The discussion of Mind so far may be adapted to illuminate a variety of questions regarding consciousness – a topic that has seen resurgence in interest (starting c. 1975.) In the present meaning (perhaps the primary meaning in recent writing) consciousness is precisely Experience as used earlier. From the earlier discussion, in human-or-animal-experience and primal experience, ‘experience’ may be consistently replaced by ‘feeling,’ ‘awareness,’ or ‘consciousness’ even though the connotations of these words may make it problematic to do so. (The connotations of ‘feeling’ may make it undesirable to bring the phrase ‘primal feeling’ into common use.) The philosophical problem of consciousness, i.e. of explaining its presence in material bodies, is precisely the mind-matter problem of which a resolution (by elimination) was given in the previous paragraphs. Awareness is used in a meaning that is similar to that of consciousness and in another meaning in which the individual has access to the information without consciousness of it. This may appear to be paradoxical but the phenomenon of access without awareness has been observed in brain injured patients (who, in certain experiments, have behaved as if aware of an object in the visual field, without being able to report awareness of the object.) Some writers have said that for consciousness, awareness of awareness is necessary and others write that Language is necessary for consciousness. It seems however that awareness of awareness is one factor that may make for focusing of attention and that language makes it possible to describe consciousness and to talk about it and that to be able to report awareness, awareness of awareness would be necessary – simple awareness would not be enough (in this sentence, ‘awareness’ may be replaced by ‘consciousness.’) Therefore the fact that an individual is unable to report awareness does not mean that he or she was not conscious of the relevant information. This is consistent with the necessary conceptual extension of Mind to the root of being
That extension may similarly explain at least some aspects of the ‘unconscious’ as actually conscious but without (sufficient) awareness of the fact of consciousness so that e.g. after the experience was over it would not be registered in memory. (Other aspects of the unconscious may be of stored experience that are not currently recalled and that have varying degrees of remoteness which may be due to weakening of memory associations, perhaps to ‘defenses,’ and due to what is stored being the form of the information i.e. the intuition and its laying down should be in either direct experience or in evolution)
Some writers have described a concept that they label ‘access consciousness’ and refer to consciousness as used here as ‘phenomenal consciousness.’ They justify this move by arguing that it is precisely access to information without (phenomenal) consciousness that is what they call access consciousness. The arguments here, however, have shown that access consciousness – the ability to act on information without being able to report it does not imply lack of (phenomenal) consciousness. There is no argument here that the phenomena that are labeled access consciousness do not occur but that such labeling gains nothing and introduces confused terminology and reflects misinterpretation of the data regarding inability to report consciousness in cases of awareness (or, if not misinterpretation, then a manipulation of it.) Consciousness has been said to be on-off in that the individual appears to be either conscious of something or not but that consciousness does not ‘dim’ gradually into unawareness. An explanation that preserves the seeming on-off character without requiring it in fact may be that it is consciousness of consciousness that is on-off
A final concern regarding consciousness is to understand how or why it arose in evolution. Given that elements of experience have always been present the appropriate concern is how the elaborate, intense or focal forms of consciousness arose. The answer to this question is, in principle, very simple. It is that the elaborations correspond to the forms of the world, the intense forms correspond to what is important for adaptation (survival,) and (some of) the focal forms correspond to the ability of an organism attend to elements of novelty and originality while other focal forms are more directly related to day-to-day adaptation. Thus it is not the primitive elements of consciousness (feeling) that arise in the evolution of life but the elaborate, intense, varied and focal forms of it that arise as combinations of the elements, recording of experience (memory,) specialization of the combinations, layering and self-reference. It is not fully accurate to think that, as some have written, that ‘consciousness is evolution become aware of itself.’ Rather, acute animal consciousness is a concentration of primal consciousness or awareness (in the organism… It is appropriate to use the phrase ‘primal consciousness’ provided that the idea is not thought to refer to higher forms in miniature i.e. there is no logical problem in this use.) These brief remarks have been made as an illustration of the extension of the concept of mind but are not intended to illustrate the variety of recent thought on consciousness
The section, ‘Human being,’ below, continues the discussion of mind in terms that are more specific to human including animal mind and are, therefore, more concrete, detailed and structured
The idea that mind and matter are substances suggests that there may be many other substances or attributes of being. A suggestion of this kind was put forward by the Dutch philosopher Benedict de Spinoza (b. 1632, Amsterdam, Netherlands.) Spinoza reflected that there may be an infinite number of attributes. Here however, mind and matter have been roughly identified as ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ aspects of being and this suggests that there is no list of attributes that continues the series mind, matter… This suggests that while there may be degrees and elaborations of consciousness unknown to human being there is no mode of being beyond consciousness (this does not imply that other degrees of consciousness will be recognized by human being.) On the other hand, since the sensory modalities correspond roughly to the modes of physical interaction it is easy to imagine the existence of e.g. cosmological systems where creatures have sensory modalities that are not possessed by any living form on earth
That the list mind, matter… may have no continuation does not imply that there is no other basis for a system of attributes
The previous section, Mind, may have been labeled ‘Mind and metaphysics.’ A similar section on morals or ethics could be placed here; however, Ethics will not be only about morals but will also be an occasion to integrate considerations of metaphysics, knowledge, and value. In this capacity, it will be more effective to defer discussion of Ethics till after the discussion of ‘Human being’