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On
meaning Contents What does a concept-word mean? The problem of negative existentials Is there a problem of positive existentials?
On concept and linguistic meaning IntroductionAs developed here, meaning derives from my thought over the years. The little manual is a recent source. This work was written as a supplement to the essential way of being. It will be effective to read the two documents together. The present meaning of meaning is a variant of C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richard’s meaning of meaning. The specialization of modern philosophy is a necessary consequence of its broad development. The breadth is positive, yet specialization has negative consequences (i) when interdependent topics are developed in relative isolation form one another, the development of a given topic may be limited by its dependence on limited versions of other topics and, generally, philosophy tends to develop piece-meal rather than coherently (ii) whereas philosophy once had knowledge as a whole as an emphasis, there is no discipline that has this emphasis today. Regarding item #i, concept and linguistic meaning is one significant topic among the interdependent topics of philosophy. But it is more than just a topic—it impinges almost every discussion in philosophy, whether seen narrowly through the lens of specialization or broadly; and modern notions of meaning are themselves specialized and often distorted by too much weight being given to recent developments. Further, as meaning is immanent everywhere in the knowledge disciplines, even in the sciences, it is essential to the development of knowledge as a whole. I acknowledge that the idea of knowledge as a whole is often seen as a hopeless even if meaningful endeavor. However, the essential way of being develops a significant system of knowledge-as-a-whole and demonstrates its validity. The system is in fact a framework and high-level development of knowledge-as-a-whole filled with low-level, proximate, and pragmatic knowledge that is only partially held together by its own structure and the framework. The importance of meaningInadequacy of concept and linguistic meaning plague thought. We have so many debates, e.g., about what this or that concept means. For example, in discussing ‘being’ we often talk as though there is something definite behind the word, but it is only that we have not captured it yet. But, lacking the capture, we cannot know that there is anything definite behind the word. A good theory of meaning might resolve this. In philosophy, in particular, discussion is further plagued by multiplicity and inadequacy of meaning, even where we might find definite meaning if were to attend to it (rather than being wedded to the received) and which might require an adequate theory of meaning. The concept of meaning is immensely important. Introduction to meaningIf a westerner who does not know the local language is in a tiger forest in India and a guide cries “sher”, it will register nothing of significance to the westerner. If the guide had cried “tiger”, the response would likely be fear. But ‘sher’ translates to ‘tiger’. Why did the westerner feel fear at “tiger” but not “sher”? It is because ‘tiger’ evoked the image of a tiger. Concepts, beings, and objectsA concept is mental content (itself or perhaps reflected in physical objects such as graphics and text), e.g., a picture or sign, perhaps in association. A referential concept is one that is intended to and in the form of reference. If a referential concept actually refers, the reference is a (real) being. What if the concept is Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes? There is no being—alternatively, the being may be said to be nonexistent—but there is an as if being. The term object will include both real and as if beings. What if there is neither a real nor an as if being? In this case we may call the object nonexistent. The term object may refer to beings, nonexistent but as if beings, and nonexistent objects. If the concept cannot refer to a being, we may talk in terms of an impossible being; if reference is not ruled out, we may use the term possible being; it has necessary reference to a being, we talk of necessary being. Now, are there as if and nonexistent objects? It has been argued that there are, e.g., since we can talk about them. It ought not to be surprising, then, that such talk can lead to contradiction—at least to apparent contradiction. One approach to this issue is to allow dialetheia or true contradictions, which cannot be accommodated by standard logic (the propositional calculus) but to isolate the true contradiction via nonstandard logics, named ‘paraconsistent logics’—the need for isolation is that in standard logic a true contradiction implies that all propositions are true (and false). Another is to see that the term ‘contradiction’ carries with it more than a single sense—on the one hand it is a contra-diction (words in opposition) and on the other hand, if it were true, it would entail a contra-real—an impossible real; it would then be argued that, though paraconsistent logics are not necessary, they are useful where we cannot or choose not to discriminate. In this paragraph, we take up an aside that requires further reflection. In that while the concept for an as if being is not real, an as if being is not real; but on the other hand, we can refer to the as if, which does seem to make it real; and it may enter into cause and effect, if not directly physical, in the mind; but if the world is physical, so is the mind, and therefore there is physical causation even if the chain of causation somewhat indirect. This dual real and not real status requires reflection to see whether it is meaningful, whether it is resolvable as nondual, or whether it is dialethic. MeaningA concept meaning is a concept image and its possible intended objects. A linguistic meaning is a simple or compound sign in association with a concept, with possible intended objects. Without the association, the linguistic sign, simple or complex, has no meaning (familiarity may short-circuit explicit association of sign and concept, but the association is always at least implicit). The association is necessary for the sign, e.g., a word or sentence, to have meaning. The association is sufficient for the sign to have meaning. This concept of meaning is immensely significant. The concept is extended, and its importance further brought out in the subsequent sections. What does a concept-word mean?Let us consider the example of being as conceived in the essential way of being. It was given a bare definition—the characteristic of that which exists. How do we know that this is the meaning? The answer is that knowing that it is the meaning is beside the essence of meaning. Imagine a discussion among philosophers. ‘Being’ is a term of use; some of those philosophers may have a formal definition. They debate “what being really means” and whether the definitions catch that meaning. This assumes, of course, that there is one true meaning. But is there? If we have not agreed upon one definition, how do we know there is such a thing? Perhaps there is no definite thing. This, too, is beside the essence. Herbert Simon said that the search for meaning is a search in a dual space of ideas (concepts) and things and, therefore, that while we are finding meaning (in the world) we are also creating it in ideas. Let us reflect a little more on examples as a means of clarifying the meaning of a concept-word (and also the meaning of the examples being). First, consider ‘being’. The definition above is a bare definition—it does not capture the richness that many existentialist philosophers assign to being. But there is no intention of capturing that richness in being. The intent is to lay down a bare framework that is as certain and secure as possible and to search for the richness within and supported by the framework. Second, let us consider the concept of the concept. The literature in analytic philosophy will inevitably refer to Frege’s conception of the concept, to which there ought to be no objection except that further thought may find itself weighed down by a history of insights without clear foundation. Here, in line with the emerging theories of meaning and metaphysics, it is the emerging system that codifies a system meaning of terms, particularly that of concepts, and it is the truth and completeness of the system that determines the appropriateness of the meanings of the individual terms. Therefore, let us recall the fact that the real metaphysics of the essential way of being is a perfect framework filled in with pragmatic knowledge that is, in-process, the best available to beings while in limited form, and that the net join is perfect according to the system’s emergent criteria. How do we know when we have arrived at an adequate meaning for a concept-word? The next section addresses this question. System meaningAre meanings determined in isolation? In some cases, yes and it is often argued from the cases that meaning is ‘atomic’ rather than system dependent (‘holist’). But that is not only to depend on the cases, it is also to depend on very fallible ‘common sense’ (which for some reason seems to plague the way philosophy is practiced and taught). It might seem necessary to have foundation in common sense. Now that indeed makes some sense, for where can we begin but with what we have. True enough. But we do not need to end there. Once begun, we can criticize. We can compare with experience. We can and may need to then go beyond. And we may and often will find that the beginning in common sense was only an initial footing, which is no longer necessary. All that, however, is not adequate to justification of meaning. For, as the world hangs together, so too do the elements of understanding. As in the essential way of being, meaning and knowledge lie in the system. The validity of acceptance of the individual meanings lies in (i) their coherence (ii) their correspondence to the real. Other meanings in other systems, naďve and intuitive or formal are possible and they depend for acceptance on their coherence and system correspondence; but those meanings are different, even where the word-signs are the same; we tend to be confused in thinking that the same word-sign designates the same concept; it is a confusion that arises from thinking that meanings are merely formal; it is a confusion that the sign-concept-possible object notion of meaning resolves. The next two sections exemplify the importance of the present conception of meaning. KnowledgeMeaning was conceived as sign-concept-possible object. Now, knowledge is conveniently—and rather easily—conceived as sign-concept-actual object. The problem of negative existentialsThe problem is this—if one says “Sherlock Holmes does not exist” is not one presuming that there is an existing thing (that does not exist)? It is a problem arising from an inadequate conception of meaning and, correspondingly, common resolutions of the problem are contorted, even if adequate. The resolution is to see that regardless of whether there are or are not things-as-just-things, to talk of them, there must be a sign-concept-thing. Then an existing object is one where the sign-concept points to an object and a nonexistent object is one for which the sign-concept points to an as-if but not an actual object. Is there a problem of positive existentials?There is indeed a problem of positive existentials. The problem is that (without the present theory of meaning or some equivalent of it), language has no meaning. Thus, for example, as in the section, introduction to meaning, ‘tiger’ has no meaning, without its concept (note that while concepts may be specified in terms of words, root concepts must be iconic for there to be reference at all). But is not the meaning of common concepts fixed by use? It is not. Rather, use reinforces and stabilizes meaning in that every native user of the language (English, in this case) knows that for every other native user, the concept of ‘tiger’ is tiger (i.e., the icon). While negative existentials point to the sufficiency of the present theory of meaning, positive existentials point to its necessity. The next section reflects the general significance of the present conception of meaning. Meaning and metaphysicsThe present theory of meaning reflects and supports the perfect, ultimate metaphysics of the essential way of being as a system of meaning—a perfect framework according to standard criteria, filled in by rich pragmatics that is not perfect in any common received sense, but does not need to be, for the framework generates its own criterion of perfection according to which the system is perfect. The criterion, as it turned out, is a join of the reliability and the ethical value of knowledge. That is—meaning, system, knowledge, value, and criteria emerge together. Some final thoughtsFinal meaning of ultimate objects. When a term is not definite in its meaning, e.g., ‘the ultimate’, because we do not have experience of it—inner in thought, or outer via senses—we (may) have an intuition of it, which guides us in the beginning of discovery. What are we discovering? It is a dual search for a concept and an object. Is there a final meaning, i.e., a final concept-object? Typically, such searches are guided by a metaphysics. Even where the search is formal, the metaphysics may be informal, perhaps a consensus metaphysics such as the cosmological singularity model of our cosmos enhanced by a materialism, strict or weak. Such searches cannot be known to be final unless, perchance, the consensus happens to be final and known to be final. Definite meaning requires a definite metaphysics—a source for the thought is AN Whitehead’s Process and Reality—and definite final meaning requires a definite final or ultimate metaphysics. Thus, the real metaphysics of the way of being may frame questions of final meaning for ultimate objects. Meaning and language. What we can express in language is limited by the power of the language. Everyday language and its formalizations are not necessarily ultimately expressive. This would be a limitation of the real metaphysics, even though the latter is ultimate in principle. Is the ultimate form of a statement of fact, i.e., the sentence, x is [y], (y optional), as in Heidegger and Frege? This needs exploration. On negative existentials. “Holmes does not exist” is puzzling in that it seems to refer to the thing that does not exist. It’s not just a problem for a singular term, for, before the advent of birds, “birds do not exist” would face the same problem. The resolution is in terms of Ogden and Richards’ understanding of meaning. A term is not just a term. ‘Holmes’, the sign, has no meaning. It gains meaning in association with the description of ‘Holmes’ in Arthur Conan Doyle’s fictional works. For people who have read the works ‘Holmes’, the word, is associated with a word picture as in the works and perhaps an icon-picture in imagination or from picture magazines or the cinema. Then, “Holmes does not exist” means that there is no real object to which the word-picture or word-concept refers. |