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Metaphysics is core to the system of ideas and partial foundation for the other significant concepts from Theory of Being and Human World. These concepts also provide partial foundation for and suggest approaches to transformation
In addition to its pivotal role in the ideas and the journey, the metaphysics also seeks to be a contribution to thought
What is metaphysics? A common conception is that metaphysics is the study of the real nature of things. What separates the nature of a thing from the thing itself? Is the nature of one entity completely separable from that of other entities—of the universe? Answers to these questions may depend on the study of the nature of things and of the universe. It is therefore probably mistaken to attempt a precise characterization of metaphysics at the outset of study. At outset a tentative characterization such as study of the real nature of things may be adequate. It may later be possible, as a result of study, to characterize metaphysics
In order to connect to the tradition it will be useful to mention some prior conceptions of metaphysics
Various conceptions of metaphysics have been suggested in the history of ideas—it is an inquiry into what exists, it is the study of what exists insofar as it exists, it is the study of what is real rather than what is merely apparent, it is the study of the world or universe as a whole, it is the study of first principles or ultimate and irrefutable truths. That these ideas are likely to be related is clear—it is also reasonably clear that the ideas are not exclusive—however, the actual relations may become clear only after study; and, if this is true, it may also be true that an actual evaluation will be possible only after metaphysics is complete
It is also clear that the related ideas may define impossible projects—it is not given that it is possible to ‘know’ the real nature of things. There is, however, a common mistake regarding—knowledge of—the real nature of things: it is to suppose that such knowledge is—roughly—uniformly possible or uniformly impossible for most if not all things and kinds of thing. It has already been seen that the universe as a whole—i.e. all being as all-being without regard to detail—may be known; the void as void may be conceived and this conception will turn out to count as knowing the void; the fact of experience may be known; domain and complement may be known… Whatever other things may be known shall or may fall out of study and this study which begins in this chapter is formally completed in Objects with details taken up in later chapters. The various conceptions of metaphysics from history may be suggestive and may—or may not—be eclectically incorporated into any final notion of metaphysics
Whatever metaphysics may turn out to be, it is perhaps clear, however, that it should not be the study of what is remote or esoteric for what is most real should, at least in some way, not distinguish immediate from remote. The most basic aspects of things will not—at outset—make distinctions such as near or remote, physical or spiritual, hidden or immediate. This suggests that metaphysics begin as a study of what is insofar as it is—what exists insofar as it exists or being as being
Perhaps being as being may be too broad a category to be the subject of productive study. Recall the necessary objects or aspects of being—experience and its forms or concepts, being, universe, change, difference and domain, complement and void. Logical development from the necessary objects and their properties will be seen to result in a metaphysics that is explicitly ultimate in depth and implicitly ultimate in breadth or variety—the meanings of italicized the terms in this sentence will be clarified in what follows. Since, as seen in Being, the universe contains all form, pattern and law as immanent in being, the metaphysics is called metaphysics of immanence. This metaphysical development, together with whatever further concepts are faithful to objects, may be labeled ‘pure metaphysics.’ Pure metaphysics, then, is the part of the theory of being that is the result of demonstration, i.e., showing by recognition, by analysis of meaning and by proof. Further information is needed to situate this world in the world revealed in the pure metaphysics. That the concepts or forms of experience are necessary objects does not imply that there are objects that correspond even roughly to the concepts even though it may be reasonable to suppose that in an adapted world there should be some objects that roughly conform to some concepts. Note that in the previous sentence, (rough) correspondence does not mean that somewhere there is object that has some match with the concept but has the stronger sense that there is a lock between concept and object, e.g. a causal link between an actual mountain and the perception of the mountain. Taking the various forms of experience—the variety of concepts—as corresponding, perhaps only approximately, to objects results in a picture of this world whose foundation is not as purely logical as the pure metaphysics. However, the pure metaphysics is instrumental in situating this world—and perhaps other kinds of sub-domain—in the universe via the concept of the normal introduced later It may of course be necessary to be selective with regard to what forms are ‘realistic’ and here, the most basic forms such as self and other and the objects of science may be suggested but not accepted without further scrutiny
There is or shall be, perhaps, no absolute distinction of pure metaphysics from other studies. As the study of the variety of being, cosmology intersects not only normal behavior and domains but also the entities encountered in pure metaphysics. Whatever is true in science, religion, myth, literature, drama, art, history and imagination must fall under metaphysics even though the study may be specialized. In the present meaning, metaphysics includes what is most immediate. There is another meaning of ‘metaphysics,’ that emphasizes an interest in the ‘occult arts.’ This other—perhaps derivative—meaning is foreign to the present one. However, if the occult arts contain truth, may intersect metaphysics in its present meaning. The present metaphysics is neutral with respect to the idea of metaphysics-as-occult-art
The approach to study. Plato suggested power—having an effect—as central to the concept of being. Plato’s suggestion is eminently reasonable—it is via effect that there is awareness of things and things without any direct or indirect effect may be conceived but their being has no effect on or in this world. A discovery of the present metaphysics is that its study may be approached via logic—as is seen in the present chapter and in Logic, it may be expected that this results from and implies a new conception of logic. It will be seen that there is no separate part of the universe without an effect on this part—or any other part. The present approach, then, is to start from logic and to then connect to the concept of power
This chapter has the following aims. (1) To develop the metaphysics of immanence. (2) As part of and in light of this development, to provide foundation for and to refine the ideas from Being though Faith; to set up subsequent developments through Faith; and to provide partial foundation for transformation. (3) To review and clarify the conceptions of philosophy and metaphysics and their relation to the history of ideas; and to catalog, clarify and set forth resolutions to the classic and modern problems of metaphysics. The review, deferred to the sections Philosophy and metaphysics and Problems in metaphysics is made possible by the metaphysics of immanence which enables an ultimate conception of philosophy and metaphysics and clarification / resolution of a number of central problems of metaphysics
The main concepts of the metaphysics. The essential concepts of the metaphysics shall be seen to be, first, the pre-metaphysical concepts—experience and concept or forms of experience which include experience itself and the fact of experience and, second, the metaphysical concepts—being, universe, void, logos—or logic or form or object, and the normal
The remarks of this paragraph will be clarified later in the narrative. There are restrictive and expansive senses of metaphysics and cosmology. All metaphysical concepts fall under the expansive meaning of cosmology. However, since it distinguishes varieties of behavior, unlike the other metaphysical concepts above, the normal may be seen falling under cosmology in its restrictive sense
To follow the narrative, it is essential to be aware of the present meanings as defined in the development and to avoid distraction by other meanings—either common or specialized. This injunction should not be taken to imply that other meanings and shades of meaning should not be considered for their suggestive power or for improvement of the developments
Outline. The metaphysics is developed as ten topics arranged in three sets of reflections
The first set of reflections is the core of the pure metaphysics that concerns necessary conclusions about and deriving from the necessary objects. The conclusions are organized, roughly according to the object on which they are based, as the following topics. (1) Demonstration—by recognition and naming, analysis of meaning and use, and proof—of the existence of the generic necessary objects: experience, being, universe, void, domain and so on. (2) Conclusions from the existence and properties of the universe. (3) Conclusions from the existence and properties of the void. (4) Conclusions from the existence of domains and their complements. (5) Development of the concept of the normal and its relation to the probable
It is often thought that metaphysics as theory of being is not and cannot be empirical. However, empirical content is built into the forms of experience—i.e. that forms of experience have being is undeniable. This does not mean that all the forms—concepts—have corresponding objects. However, as has been seen, the very general concepts such as experience itself, being, the universe—all being—and so on have objects and this may be seen in a way that is empirical e.g. the experience of all being. That such assertions are empirical lies in their meaning, e.g. given experience there is a world—at least of experience. The existence of experience and the general forms as objects is given but not necessarily as external objects. I.e., the existence of an external world does not follow from experience and its forms. While infinitesimal doubt exists regarding the existence of the—an—external world, there is doubt. The point to such doubt in this narrative is a sharpening of tools of analysis and improved understanding of the world. I.e., such doubt is not laid out as a system of positive knowledge. This doubt is addressed by what will subsequently labeled the fundamental principle of—the theory of—being or of the metaphysics of immanence. The claim regarding absence of empirical content may of course—at least in common sense terms—be true regarding a statement such as ‘there is distant a world that is beyond the present limit of measurement even when extended by scientific theory that is similar to this world.’ This claim—and other similar claims—cannot, of course, be empirical since the phrasing of the claim rules out the possibility of its being empirical. One of the aims of the metaphysics of immanence is to examine whether the existence of such worlds—and other ‘non-empirical’ objects—can be established by non-empirical means. The fundamental principle shows the possibility and necessity of the existence an immensely broad range of non-empirical objects. Further, the demonstration of the fundamental principle has both empirical and rational—logical—elements and is, therefore, partially empirical in character
The necessary conclusions are followed by normal or, roughly, probable conclusions about the nature of particular domains—especially this cosmological system and its sentient forms. Here concern is with those forms of experience—concepts—the existence of whose objects is in doubt for a variety of reasons and the proof of existence is not as directly forthcoming as in the case of the necessary objects. The first doubt is that if the concept is not the object, whether the object exists. Again, the doubt is infinitesimal but there is learning to be derived from entertaining the doubt; the doubt is not—typically—put forward as a system of positive knowledge. The second doubt is that of faithfulness. These conclusions are, roughly, probable—often to a degree such that exceptions are extremely unlikely over times of interest. The exceptions to normal behavior, significant over longer periods, are essential in universal perspectives. The topics are as follows. (6) Conclusions from and about specific empirical forms. (a) The fact and form of experience or sentience. (b) The form and existence of particular domains, especially this cosmological system
Whereas the first two sets of reflections are reflections on the world—the universe in its general features—the third set is a collection of reflections on the metaphysics itself—and on its development. These reflections include doubts and counterarguments regarding the metaphysics, and skepticism and faith which concerns attitudes toward doubt (since neither skepticism nor faith need be absolute, one term—either skepticism or faith—may suffice,) considerations on method or approach, and, finally an assessment of the status of the metaphysics so far. The topics follow immediately
(7) Objections and counterarguments that arise in reflecting on the development of the metaphysics. (8) Faith and affirmation—versus unlimited rationality. (9) Method or approach. ‘Method’ concerns the approach to development of the metaphysics. Two preliminary observations are pertinent. First, method does not—a priori—stand over study of objects but arises in study. Second, while study of necessary objects has a necessary character, the study of normal objects has necessary and contingent aspects. The necessary character of normal objects occurs in that they exemplify necessary objects and the contingent character arises from the particular details overlaid on the necessary. (10) The status of the metaphysics so far
The development of the metaphysics of immanence, having begun in Being, now continues in three sets of reflections labeled The core of the pure metaphysics, The metaphysics of normal objects, and Reflections on the metaphysics and its development. Developments from Being may be repeated in full or abbreviated form and with or without proofs
1. Demonstration—by recognition and naming, analysis of meaning and use, and proof—of the existence of the generic necessary objects
The demonstration is in Being which has clarification of the nature of ‘demonstration’ and further details
The existence of the following necessary objects was demonstrated in Being: experience and its forms; being; the universe or all being and which contains all objects, especially all form, pattern and law; difference, domain and complement which exists when the domain exists; change and before and now and after; and the void or absence of being which contains no object—especially no form, no pattern and no law
It is possible to raise an objection that what was identified in Being as experience is not, in fact, experience or, even, that it does not exist. It is hard to know precisely what to say to someone who asserts that, in fact, experience does not exist. The first counter may be ‘What is it that does not exist?’ The objection appeared to agree that experience has meaning but to then assert that experience does not exist. Perhaps the objection is that experience is immaterial or insignificant—the response to this would be that the material character of experience is not relevant to the development here even though the development has implications for its material or immaterial character… and that significance cannot be addressed without some framework such as the present framework. I.e., a free-floating objection ‘experience is insignificant’ lacks meaning. What of the objection that experience-as-in-this-narrative is not experience? One meaning of this objection may be that experience-as-in-this-narrative does not exist: in this meaning the objection has already been addressed. Another meaning is that what is here called experience should not be so called or is a trivial meaning. Again, this objection may be addressed in human terms or in relation to a framework. If the objection is that experience is irrelevant to human being, the first answer is that it is certainly relevant and important to this human being—and to many others. A second answer is that experience is important in terms of what can be done with the concept—and this will also be the answer in terms of a framework or system of ideas. This answer, of course, lies in the development of the metaphysics and it is for this reason that it has been relevant to raise the issue at this point
2. Conclusions from the existence and properties of the universe
A Metaphysics of Immanence. Recall that the universe is all being and contains all objects: all things or entities and processes, all Form, Pattern and Law—this is the first source of the name ‘metaphysics of immanence.’ The thought to use that name includes the idea that that things of the ‘mind,’ which are often assigned a secondary existential status or perhaps even a non-existential status, are, after all, real. The forms of experience or sentience and all of its constituent and related ideas such as percept, concept, feeling, awareness, idea, thought, image, are in the universe. Thus far, the existence of Form, Pattern and Law outside has not been shown—this demonstration will be given in ‘conclusions from the properties of the void.’ What is clear, here, is that if there are Forms outside experience, then those Forms along with forms of experience are equally real and are—immanent—in the universe
Clearly, on the existence of an external world—an existence that does not depend on experience for its existence—experience need not go to the root of being. Whether there is an external world and, then, whether a valid extension of the concept of experience is co-extensive with being will be taken up in discussing conclusions from the existence of the void
It is important to be clear about the meaning of immanence. That Forms are immanent in being does not mean that there is some external object or idea that is attached to or enmeshed with being. It means that Form is of being: since there is nothing and not just no-thing outside the universe—outside being—it cannot be otherwise
Actuality, possibility and necessity. If an event (thing) is described but never occurs (exists,) it cannot be possible. If it occurs or exists, it is possible
I.e. actuality and possibility are identical in their reference even though apparently distinct with regard to sense
Since actuality and possibility are identical, they must both be identical to necessity. That is, what is cannot not be—it would be if the universe were otherwise but the universe is not and cannot be otherwise. The meaning of necessity so introduced and its relation to other meanings—meanings that have arisen without benefit of the metaphysics under development—is analyzed in Logic
In fact a definite concept of possibility has been introduced. This concept of possibility, which refers to possibility of occurrence in the universe is absolute possibility
It may be thought that some other notion of possibility may be retained, but since there is nothing outside the universe, the sense of absolute or universal possibility must be identical to the sense of actuality—even though there may be an expectation of a different sense. I.e. a different sense could be deployed before reflection but it would have to be modified to the new sense—else it would be sense-less
Relative or contextual possibility refers to occurrence in a similar context. Relative to the universe, there is no ‘other’ context. When the context is the universe, relative possibility is absolute possibility
Absolute possibility will be seen to be logical possibility
Physical possibility is a form of relative possibility. The prototype of physical possibility is consistency with the laws of physics
The common or naïve concept of possibility is a kind of relative possibility
Absolute possibility should not be confused with the common concept—it is easy to fall into this confusion
The identity of the possible and the necessary and the varieties of ‘necessity’ are taken up in discussion of ‘conclusions from the existence and properties of the void’
3. Conclusions from the existence and properties of the void
Existence and fundamental properties of the void. That the void contains no Object, no Form, no Pattern or Law and that it exists has been shown earlier in Being. Because the existence of the void is essential to development of the metaphysics, (a) some alternate proofs are given in the next paragraph, and (b) it is important entertain doubts about the validity of the demonstrations. General objections and counterarguments are taken up later in this chapter
Doubts about the existence of the void. First, repeat the proof of existence of the void given so far. As the complement of the universe relative to itself or the complement of any element of being relative to itself, the void exists. A variant proof. The complement of a part exists. As the part approaches the whole, the complement exists at every stage of the approach and its limit is the void
An objection to the proof of existence of the void. The idea of ‘part’ is conceptual and the content of a concept should not imply anything about the world. Counterargument—if existence is merely recognition of variety, part is not merely conceptual (if part is defined by a conceptual property, the particular part may be merely conceptual)
Alternate proofs of the existence of the void. As a result of doubt, alternate proofs of the existence of the void may be useful. The alternate proofs now follow. (1) That the void exists is not intrinsically paradoxical. The existence of the void should be equivalent to its non-existence; therefore the void may be taken to exist. (2) Attaching the void to an entity makes no difference to the constitution of the entity; therefore the void may be taken to exist. (3) In physics the zero force may be said to exist; it is the force that does not change uniform motion; this of course is not a proof of the existence of the void but shows that existence may be assigned to a quantity of zero magnitude
A clarification. If the universe has a non-manifest phase, that phase will be the void; of course this final item does not at all prove existence of the void but provides one way to see how it may be real rather than merely a conceptual fiction
An inductive proof of the existence of the void. In science the ‘proof’ of a law or theory from data is a generalization. Of course, the generalization is not a mere generalization for there is some attempt to discern a pattern or symmetry—perhaps of the object, perhaps of the laws or theory developed so far—and the generalization or modification—expresses the discerned patterns. However since alternative patterns may be possible, the scientific laws and theories retain an hypothetical nature. This kind of inference has been called induction and is considered further in Logic. The study of inductive inference has included attempts to make induction more secure. An empiricist program sometimes called positivism attempted—primarily in the first half of the twentieth century—to show how theoretical inference necessarily follows from the data but the flaw of the approach is already visible in the nature of induction; positivism is no longer thought to be viable. Alternative approaches stressed simplicity and beauty—and probabilistic inference. After the failure of positivism, some approaches of the twentieth century stressed the hypothetical character of science but emphasized the idea that theories become accepted as more and more confirming data and successful applications build up. Thus even though being open to disconfirmation, scientific theories become accepted on account of their success—and such features as simplicity, beauty, symmetry, the existence of conservation laws, and probabilistic inference when possible add to the confidence in the theories. It is key, then, in this line of twentieth century thought that while there is confidence and realism in scientific theories, there is openness to revision, the realism is a limited realism and there is an inevitable hypothetical character to scientific theories. One way of looking at this situation is that at any given time, the received theories have validity in a limited domain. As theory and improved measurement makes new realms of phenomena possible, data from new domains—the microscopic realm, remote regions in space and time, objects of higher energy, spectra of higher or lower frequency—becomes visible and may put the current theories in doubt; and new theory may arise that subsumes both new and old data and reveals the older theory to be a special case. This view of the progression of science may be called hypothetical-progressive or revolutionary. In Logic, an alternative though not contradictory view of the nature of theory will be argued but here the revolutionary view will be used to argue for proof of the existence of the void——and, more generally, to argue the metaphysics of immanence
Regard the existence of the void and the metaphysics of immanence as being introduced hypothetically as an attempt to bring coherence into the split between empirical observation that even when enhanced by scientific theory can only see so far and the fact that there is no reason in either science or reason to assume that the boundary of the empirical world is the boundary of the actual world. First, note that the metaphysics does not contradict science or valid common sense in their domains—of course both science and the metaphysics do necessary violence to a variety of aspects of common sense. In fact, as will become evident, the metaphysics provides immense illumination of the nature and the theories of science. Second, the metaphysics recognizes and reveals the empirical character of a number of concepts that might seem metaphysical in the esoteric sense but are not so. An example is the universe as all being; the concept is esoteric if by ‘universe’ reference is made to remote detail; however, if reference is made only to the fact that there is both immediate and remote detail that both lie within the universe but reference is not made to the distinctions implied by the concept of detail then ‘universe’ is empirical. Whereas empirical science—which includes its theories—does not manifestly recognize the universe——the metaphysics does and does so empirically and without inconsistency. Third, the metaphysics has a host of predictions, developed throughout the narrative, and that are open to being disconfirmed. The parallel of the void to the quantum vacuum is a qualitative confirmation—even though the void and the quantum vacuum are not identical; this lack of identity might be a disconfirmation of either metaphysics of immanence or quantum theory if the other were given. Note that although the claim has been made that the proof of the metaphysics is a logical proof, since the objective here is to give an inductive argument the logical proof is set aside. Finally, the metaphysics introduces vast symmetry from the identities of metaphysics and logic, to logic as the law of being, to the equivalence of all states of the universe, to details of logic as developed in Logic
The fundamental principle of the metaphysics of immanence also called the fundamental principle of the theory of being or, simply, the fundamental principle—if a concept, picture or description has no internal or external contradiction, it must be realized from the void. This has the obvious and immediate generalization—if a concept, picture or description has no internal or external contradiction, it must be realized from any state. And—every non-contradictory state is realized. Demonstration of the principle: the non-realization of a non-contradictory concept would be a Law of the void; however the void contains no Law; therefore every non-contradictory concept must be and is realized. The principle is the cornerstone of the metaphysics and, therefore, it is crucial to take up Objections and counterarguments and this is done below
In the statement of the fundamental principle, ‘having no internal or external contradiction’ is roughly equivalent to ‘being logical.’ To replace the first phrase in quotes by the second would seem to be circular for the question then arises as to what it means to be logical. That it is not circular may be seen that while the substitution suggests a notion of—an aspect of—logic, the discovery of the principles of logic is empirical in that the discovery involves trial and error. Further, of the fundamental principles of logic—identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle—the principle of identity is near tautology, the principle of the excluded middle is questionable, and, therefore, the principle of non-contradiction is, perhaps, the essential principle of logic
The non-circular character of the idea of ‘being logical’ may be explained by appeal to adaptation of description, grammar and so on. Such explanations which are not proofs but may be reasons for belief have been labeled ‘transcendental’
The fundamental principle has the following trivial consequences
Any consistent class of concepts, pictures or descriptions is and must be realized—this is a restatement of the principle
Care is needed in considering what is consistent and therefore actual. Consider ‘There is an individual who knows everything!’ Although the claim may seem absurd, there is no explicit logical impossibility. However, depending on what ‘know everything’ is taken to mean, there may be a logical impossibility relative to that meaning. Additionally assuming a fine grained structure such as that of this cosmological system it may be contingently impossible—impossible relative to the assumed structure—for organisms to know all facts of the universe or even of the cosmos
Properties of the void. Any void generates every void. It is irrelevant whether the number of voids is taken to be infinite, finite but greater than one, or just one. The number of voids may be taken to be one
From every state, including the void state, every other state is accessible i.e. no state is inaccessible—an exception to accessibility might be the contradictory ‘states’ which need not be mentioned since they need not be regarded as states
The universe enters—and leaves—a state of being the void
When in the void state, the universe must leave it for a manifest state—this resolves the classic problem ‘why there is anything at all’ or ‘why there is something rather than nothing’ that Heidegger—and others—regarded as the fundamental problem of metaphysics
There is an improvement to this resolution to the fundamental problem as follows. Either there is something or not. In the latter case, the void exists—and it follows from the fundamental principle that something did and will exist. Temporally, it is not necessary that there is an eternal state of manifest being—as seen above, the universe must phase in and out of the manifest state
The fundamental principle, just shown to be true, is the assertion that the entire system of consistent descriptions is—must be—realized; that is, the only universal fictions are the logical contradictions—fact is stranger than fiction
From science, religion, myth, literature, drama, art, history and imagination, whatever system of concepts, descriptions and pictures hold without contradiction is and must be realized—the universe contains all mystery
Since the possible and the actual are identical, all possible states are realized. It will be seen that Logic may be taken to be theory of possibility or, equivalently, the theory of descriptions of—all—actual states and, further, that Logic is the—one—law of the Universe—of all being without exception
If a metaphysics is thought to be an attempt to encompass all that exists, the metaphysics revealed by the fundamental principle is a successful metaphysics. Other successful metaphysical systems can be no broader—and, as will be seen, no deeper
The metaphysics is ultimate in breadth in that it encompasses the variety of being
What is conceivable is of the highest consistent order of infinity. What is explicitly describable—in linear language—is of a lower order of infinity. Therefore, the variety of being cannot be encompassed by a linear sequence of descriptions
While the metaphysics does not provide a scheme to describe all states, it encompasses them and, so, the breadth is implicit
In other words, the discovery of the variety of being is without end. This may be seen as good
The fundamental principle and its consequences clearly seem to violate common sense and science. The resolution of any apparent contradiction or paradox is taken up below in discussing the concept of the normal. Apparent violations of common sense and science are also addressed below in the discussion of Objections and counterarguments
Discussion consequences of the fundamental principle continues immediately and in the chapters Objects through Cosmology and the divisions Human World through Transformation
Further properties of the void. The void exists and contains no thing, Form, Pattern or Law; i.e., since, as will be seen in Objects thing and form fall under object, the void contains no object—this has merely repeated the definition and properties of the void already established
The void is simple. The simplicity of the void is ultimate—this thought is taken up below in the discussion of substance and determinism. Since all states may be seen as coming from—equivalent to—the void, the simplicity of the void may be seen as conceptual rather than factual
The void may be regarded as containing all non-existent and only non-existent objects. This thought, logically nice but perhaps without practical significance, becomes transparent in Objects
The number of voids may be taken to be one—or, when convenient, finitely or infinitely many
Every element of being, including the void and the universe, may be regarded as being associated with ‘its own’ void. Every element of being—including the universe in a manifest state—may experience annihilation at any time. Although stated in terms of the void so as to bring out its properties, annihilation and creation—next paragraph—may be established directly from the fundamental principle of the metaphysics
A void need not be regarded as being attached to any manifest element—this implies spontaneous creation anywhere and anytime. These thoughts on creation and annihilation have a cosmological nature
Sources of focus on the void. In Being, it was noted that selection of the idea of being as fundamental was experimental. The experimentation with ideas involved not one but a number of concepts including those of void, universe, substance and determinism
Initially there were a variety of intuitions that suggested the significance of the void. In the heart of a forest there was an experience of identity with all being and—perhaps therefore—absence of being. Focus on being suggests focus on absence of being. From theoretical physics, the creation of a—manifest phase of the—universe from a non-manifest phase need not violate conservation of energy. Therefore, it seemed that the transformations and possibilities of being might be understood by seeing all being as equivalent to the void. This might show how to see changelessness behind change (Parmenides)
The final inspiration in the shadow of mountains—an inspiration to focus on the void rather than on this cosmological system. This thought permitted transition from suggestion and intuition to logic
There are varieties of voidism in Indian and Judaic thought. Sartre and Heidegger felt nothingness to be important. Wittgenstein, Hume and Leibniz implicitly skirt the idea of the void in their suggestions that the only impossibilities are logical. Leibniz says this explicitly; Hume and Wittgenstein say something equivalent—i.e., ‘from the truth of one atomic proposition the truth of another does not follow.’ Hume’s form omitted the word ‘atomic’
On substance and determinism. Absolute indeterminism. The concept of absolute indeterminism is that no state shall be inaccessible—that from any state, no state shall be unaccessed. From the fundamental principle, the universe and the void are absolutely indeterministic
It might seem that, under absolute indeterminism, structure would be impossible and, in particular, this cosmological system would be impossible. However, since no state is inaccessible, structure is necessary—and the existence of this cosmological system is necessary. These logical conclusions provide no explanation: explanations will be given later in discussing. However, there is also the following logical point
If the universe is absolutely indeterministic in that no state shall be unaccessed, it must also be absolutely deterministic in that all states shall be accessed—this shows the logical necessity of structure and of this cosmos
The kind of determinism of the previous paragraph is atemporal and is distinct from temporal determinism in which the state of the universe at any time determines its state at all times
Under temporal determinism, the future of the universe is determined by the present. However, since every point in time is or was or will be a present point in time, under determinism, the history of the universe is determined by its present. Since the present cannot be otherwise, the history of the universe is determined. This odd conclusion under determinism is contradicted by the metaphysics of immanence
A classical substance is a uniform and unchanging thing or object from which all variety and change manifest. The idea of classical substance arises, perhaps, from a desire to explain the complex from the simple—e.g., to explain the origin of a formed cosmological system
On Heidegger’s thought. In repudiating substance, Heidegger went, roughly, one third of the way to an ultimate metaphysics. The remaining steps are the overcoming of determinism—as well as common causation—and related habits of thought; and replacing intuition by logic or, perhaps, seeing identity of intuition and logic. Thus, though Heidegger saw the importance of eliminating substance, he did not succeed in eliminating it
Monism. Monism is the theory that there is one substance. However, a concern immediately arises. How would monism explain variety and change? Where in the realm of the uniform is the varied, where in the realm of the unchanging is the changing? The problems of monism are one source of dualism
Dualism. Dualism is the theory that there are two or more categorially distinct substances. Dualism, however runs into the same problem of explanation because the variety in the world is infinite. A theory with infinitely many substances is no longer simple and explanation of change may require reference to shifting combinations and illusion. How do shifting combinations occur if the substances are unchanging? How do they combine if without structure and categorially distinct. Illusion may explain change and variety but this explanation is illicit for the perceiver, too, must be of substance
The problem of substance theory is the problem of determinism. Why is substance theory unable to explain the complex in terms of the simple? It is because there is an—perhaps implicit—requirement that the explanation be deterministic i.e. that the properties of the complex explicitly fall out of—even if not seen in—the simple. The apparent simplicity of determinism is consistent with the original desire for simplicity in substance
Metaphysics of substance and metaphysics of determinism are duals. It is the tacit assumption of determinism that makes substance theory untenable, that requires the proliferation of substances that still provides no relief. The establishment of formation from the void and the recognition of the absolutely indeterministic character of the universe shows that substance theory is untenable and unnecessary
Determinism is the forgotten twin of substance theory
There is a connection between determinism and determinate form
The Void and the elimination of substance. The void may assume some aspects of the role of substance but is not a true substance—as has been seen, the void may be taken to be the basis of explanation that was sought in substance
However, since the void is not deterministic, it would be improper to refer to the void as a substance. The void is not a true substance. There is another reason for not regarding the void as a substance. This reason, already noted, is that although the void may be thought of a ‘base’ state relative to which formation and origins occur, under absolute indeterminism the role of base state may be played by any state of the universe. It is equally valid to regard any state of the universe—including that of the void—as the sub-stance of all being
Yet another reason for not regarding the void as substance is that though ‘voidism’ may have been regarded as a substance theory in certain developments of the past, here voidism is not the foundation—the metaphysics does not start with the void and there is nowhere any assumption of the fundamental character of a category or entity of being as in materialism, idealism and so on. Instead, the ‘foundation’ is that there is being—which is neither assumed nor proved but may be seen as a restatement or certain recognition of the given character of experience and which requires no further clarification but may be seen as empirical fact. The existence and characteristics of the void—and the universe and other necessary objects—and the metaphysical consequences are all derived from this foundation
Simplicity of the void. The void and its absolute indeterminism are simpler than substance
The void is ultimately simple. The void and absolute indeterminism are absolutely simple because they place no explanatory requirements on the elements of being. The simplicity of substance is a defined simplicity—i.e., via a stated uniform, unchanging and deterministic character a simplicity is built into the concept of substance. The simplicity of the void is different in nature—it is not defined or built in. The universe is all being and the void is the absence of being and it follows from the definitions that the void contains no objects—i.e., no form, pattern or law. The simplicity of the void is a conceptual simplicity—less is said about the character of the void than must be said about the character of substance. This gives the void what may be called a creative freedom that substance cannot have
Another motive to substance theory, perhaps related to the motive to explaining the complex from the simple, is that under determinism and without substances, there is no explanation of being that terminates at some concrete place, that explanation is either incomplete or (andor) non-terminating i.e. without end
From the void there may be both finite and infinite chains of explanation. The generic explanation of being is finite
A non-relativist philosophy without substance. A relativist philosophy or metaphysics is one that has no foundation at which its system of explanation terminates and, therefore, does need to employ substances in its explanatory scheme—if there is one. The relativist systems of explanation must either terminate at a point that is not foundational and therefore not regarded as secure or have infinite regress; such systems may be unsatisfying but the discomfort may be endured on the grounds of intellectual honesty. A non-relativist philosophy or metaphysics is one whose system of explanation does terminate in some foundation that is regarded as secure. It is commonly thought that a non-relativist system must acknowledge substance or substances—at least in the most generic sense of the term in which a substance need not be modeled after physical or mental substance and so on, i.e., ‘enduring particulars’ but could be events, processes, or facts. It is further commonly held that in order to make sense of the world, there must be a substance in the narrower sense of individual substance such as mind or matter. However, it has here been shown that the only explanation required to make sense of the world is that there is a world; i.e., that there is being. In fact, it is beginning and continues in this narrative to emerge that the measure of being is being—and not something else or more particular—and that this makes infinitely more sense than either substance or abandonment of the comfort for the insecurity of relativist thought
Explanation from the void terminates at the void. The resulting metaphysics is not a substance theory of any kind (whether material or mental like or in the form of facts or propositions…) but is not a relativist philosophy. It is non-relativist, i.e. it provides a foundation although not a determinist one; the error in thinking that non-relativist explanation requires substance is the thought world must come deterministically from some substance
If a determinist foundation is not possible it cannot be truly desirable. Conversely, if an—absolutely—indeterministic foundation is necessary it cannot be other than desirable
The metaphysics of immanence is ultimate in depth: as the entire manifest universe in all its phases comes from and goes to the void state, explanation of the universe has foundation in the void—i.e. in being itself—without need for further regress or foundation. It has been seen that the metaphysics is also ultimate in breadth: the variety of being is harbored in its system—as cannot be the case for mind and matter in their dedicated senses. If the metaphysics were not ultimate in either depth or breadth, it could not be ultimate with regard to the other
While the metaphysics of immanence is ultimate in depth in that it provides a non-relativist foundation in the void, the equivalence any two states of being, noted above, shows that the metaphysics is also ultimately apparent—shallow, trivial and transparent—in that any state of being including the present state provide a non-relativist foundation
As noted earlier, the power of the metaphysics may be seen as lying in its immediacy, shallowness and triviality
Substance—continued—mind and matter. Yet another appeal to substance in the form of dualism had been the absolute separation of mind and matter. Regardless of the philosophical, theological and scientific motivations for this separation, it should be clear by now that as distinct substances mind and matter could never interact and as absolute but dedicated, e.g. within this cosmos, even if indeterministic, are failed explanatory experiments
Later, it will be seen that if mind and matter are released from their local and historical moorings, they may be realized as nothing but other words for being
On account of the pre-judicial character of the ideas of mind and matter it would be confusing to substitute them for being
This opens up the resolution, in Mind and in Human being, by what is essentially the theory of formation from the void, i.e. from absolute indeterminism, of the mind-matter paradox and to an understanding of the nature of mind and its grounding and many aspects thereof
Given concepts of mind and of matter that are not other terms for being, if it is specified that mind and matter are distinct substances, there can be no causation from one to the other, no origin of one in the other
On the condition that they are substantially distinct, at least one of mind and matter cannot be a substance
Regarding matter as the fundamental element of this cosmos (i.e. as generalized to include energy and the other elements of theoretical physics,) matter can be a local and effective substance but not a true substance
Mind and matter are not substances. I.e. if they are regarded in their common senses and as substantial in nature, neither can function as a metaphysical or universal substance
Anthropomorphism and ‘cosmomorphism.’ An anthropomorphic view sees being as having human nature. In an anthropocentric view, human being is—at the—the center of the universe. A modern sentiment fostered by four centuries of science and by liberalism is to de-anthropomorphize thought about non-human being e.g. other entities and the universe as a whole
However, anthropomorphism is difficult to escape. Even when explicitly shed, it may remain in the weak form of cosmomorphism—modeling the universe on the local cosmological system e.g. taking the laws of physics to be the laws or at least a blueprint for the laws of the entire universe
Cosmomorphism is the building into a metaphysics or world picture the characteristics of this cosmos or, perhaps, these cosmological systems. Cosmomorphism is shed when only the most fundamental ‘characteristic’ is retained—e.g., that there is being, that there is one universe
Cosmomorphism is difficult to escape. However, its retention—mythic, scientific or philosophical-metaphysical—is infinitely restrictive of vision
Upon positively shedding all shreds of cosmomorphism, a vast ‘universe’ of possibility immediately appears
The result is a metaphysics of infinite and ultimate depth and breadth
A guiding principle for the metaphysician is to obtain conceptual distance from the immediate world without relinquishing relations to it, without relinquishing intent to return to the immediate. The immediate is essential as is home; and is useful for its suggestive power, inspiration and as test. The principle is to develop a ‘perspective’ in which the immediate and the remote, the frank and the occult are not distinguished. It is an anti-perspective
This guiding principle opens up a path to an adequate and proper conceptual relation to (understanding, knowledge of) the entire universe
As will be seen in Mind, Cosmology and Human World, the principle is also available to the study of particular aspects of the immediate world. It is helpful, for example, in the study of—human—mind. First, in recognizing the conceptual nature of mental categories and therefore seeing that neuroanatomy and neurophysiology… are at most half of the picture that is sought. Second, in the recognition that perception, thought, emotion, intuition and so on are conceptual and therefore not given as immediately experienced or conceived a play is allowed that permits movement toward a proper understanding and foundation of these categories and their relations
For an inhabitant of this cosmological system, knowledge of the entire universe must be of a general or abstract character. However, such knowledge is intensely and perhaps surprisingly illuminating of human knowledge and, particularly, knowledge of the immediate world
If the metaphysics of immanence is seen as remote, its implications are immediate—and momentous
It is clearly seen in the metaphysics and later in Objects, especially in the theory of identity, human being—every human individual—stands at the center of being. This, however, is not the exclusive case—all entities and creatures stand at center. It is then perhaps more than a value judgment to think that human being stands neither above nor below the other forms of life. What may be lost in thinking of human being as special—which may be seen as based in insecurity fostered by a false view of being—is gained in identity: in being centered among the elements of being
Home is not a fixed place. This stands in addition to and not in opposition to the idea of a familiar and loved home. It suggests the possibility of feeling accepted everywhere
The idea that human—animal—being is a lonely accident at the edge of an vast and alien cosmos in which human—animal—being has no significance is not a fact. It is a feeling or emotion that may become attached to some contingent information
It may be undoubtedly true that any individual may be normally subject to suffering and alienation. It is a mistake—even if difficult to avoid—to elevate the normal to the universal and the necessary… just as it is a mistake to think that the normal is without meaning or significance
To suppress what is normal and to think that the universal will inevitably and routinely alleviate the normal condition are, of course, also mistaken ideas. However, it is most normal, even if rare and difficult, to seek, and to occasionally achieve a medium between these extremes; and it is also normal, even if rarer, to occasionally transcend the normal in its immediate sense
Form and the nature of Form. Since all manifest being may be regarded as coming from the void, the Forms of being are—may be regarded as—immanent in being
Form may be regarded as coming out of the void
All structure may be regarded as that of Form
Form is immanent in being i.e. it is of being rather than imposed on being
Some Forms are more durable than others
The distinction between the Forms of lesser and greater durability is not one of kind
Practically, the Forms of lesser durability may be called transients and those of greater durability may be called, simply, Forms
Actual Forms are dynamic
A Form of infinite duration—a static Form—is not a realized Form and is not capable of decay or annihilation or of interaction. I.e. static Forms have no origins—cannot come into being—and if one were to have being it would have no un-becoming or end. A static Form has no significance. The existence and non-existence of static Forms are without distinction
The existence of a static Form capable of interaction—dynamics—would be characterized by inherent contradiction and would also constitute a Law of the void. The being of a static form is logically impossible. The existence of a such static Form would be a violation of any Logic immanent in being—this statement anticipates but is not used at all to found the concept of Logic of the present narrative
All Forms are dynamic. There are, as has been seen, no static forms. Forms have origins and ends
Mechanisms are discussed below, in this chapter, and are considered further in Cosmology
Also see the later discussions of sentience and sentient form and of logos and logic
Symmetry. Platonic aspects of the character of Form. The condition of durability may also be called stability and the characteristic of stable forms—the one that ‘makes’ them stable—may be called Symmetry. From modern theoretical physics, it would appear that Symmetric includes but is not limited to geometric symmetry and from now on, the single term, symmetry, will be used. Because there are no eternally durable forms, there are no absolutely stable and perfectly symmetric forms. The durable forms are relatively stable and near symmetric
An absolutely stable or perfectly symmetric form would be static—and have neither beginning nor—were it to be—end
Since all structure is Form and since there are no absolute substances, the view of being that emerges has Platonic characteristics
It has been noted that Form is immanent in being. Form is not imposed. Nor is the immanence that of a foreign kind. Form is of being, of entities as much as is being-hood
The idea of Form as foreign or imposed has probable origin in that Form is experienced as form, i.e. as perceived and therefore ascribed the vague status of an object residing in ‘mental space’ or ‘conceptual space’ but not in actual space
(There may be a conceptual space but such a space would be a domain resident in actual space)
Perfection—symmetry—of form is never attained, is logically impossible and is therefore not desirable
It cannot be desirable
The metaphysics of immanence is a metaphysics in which the structure in the world has characteristics of Form rather than substance
However, there is no separate Platonic world or universe. All actual worlds are in the one universe. Forms reside in this world—in the one universe
On power. At the outset of the discussion of being, a promise was made to connect to the concept of power—the ability to have an effect. The fundamental principle shows that being must have power, i.e., effect. Knowability is a form of power. Must being be knowable? In the common meaning of knowledge, the answer is ‘no.’ However there is a necessary and consistent extension of knowledge to the root, just as and because mind and experience extend to the root, which (1) shows that being must be knowable and (2) stands as a reminder that the special status—an immateriality, a not of this worldliness—that is often assigned to mental content is mistaken
…
4. Conclusions from the existence of domains and their complements
The idea of domains has been used occasionally above but it is useful to gather some specific conclusions from the existence of domains and complements together in order to benefit from systematic use
The idea of creation and of a creator. If a creator is external to what is created, the universe can have no creator. One part of the universe may create another part. That is logically possible. However, origins in terms of a normal incremental mechanism of random variation and selection of relatively stable states—elaborated below and in Cosmology—may be far more likely
In-formation. The form of one cosmological system may be ‘informed’ by that of another or of the background universe. It is perhaps typical that complexity and intelligence are self-formed while formation from the outside occurs for at most initial conditions. This is because, with exceptions, a formative system must require a much greater complexity that a formed one—causal formation is far more complex than spontaneous origin in terms of a normal mechanism
The abstract idea of God. As an explanation of origin form, omnipotence—God—is seriously deficient. The idea of explanation requires explanation of to be of the complex in terms of the simple and the evident. However, omnipotence is infinitely more complex and far less apparent than the manifest world. Which is not to say that there is no external effect in the formation of, e.g., a cosmological system but that the likelihood of an external cause being the entire cause—that origins should be entirely causal—is extremely unlikely. Arguments regarding external formation and its extent should take place on a case by case basis
In the sense of cause as determining, the void is not and cannot be a causal creator of manifest being. Although the manifest universe may be seen as coming out of the void, it is a stretch of meaning to say that the void created the manifest universe
However, the following are true. Given the universe in a void state, the universe will enter a manifest state; and, a manifest state is followed by the void. From some visitations to the void state, myriad cosmological systems will emerge before the next void state
Whether the void may be regarded as a causal agent depends on the meaning of causation. There is a project to investigate the meanings of cause according to which the void may be said to cause manifestation and according to which one domain may be said to cause or create another
Prospect. Although the depth and power of the metaphysics of immanence has become clear, what is presented so far is a beginning. The developments so far have clear metaphysical content and significance. The concern that certain ‘objects’ have been shown to exist but the question of knowledge of the objects—beyond existence—has not been addressed is taken up in Objects. Further developments continue below. The concept of the normal addresses the apparent violence done to ‘common sense’ and science by the metaphysics. Here and in subsequent chapters—especially Mind, Logic and Meaning, Cosmology and the chapters of Human World—there that elaborates the interaction of the metaphysics and various topics from the particular to a level of generality or abstraction that is close to that of the metaphysics itself. The use of the developments of Theory of Being and Human World in the transformation of being is the subject of the—second—part of the narrative labeled Journey
5. Development of the concept of the normal and its relation to the probable
It has been seen that the metaphysics of immanence does apparent violence to common sense and to science and philosophy as usually understood to reveal the nature of the universe. Whereas common sense suggests that the given forms, stabilities and facts of this world define broad features of the universe, the metaphysics shows an infinitely greater variety of fact and form and an underlying universe of stabilities amid transience. Where science reveals broad features of this cosmological system and its laws and the broad features of the story of life on this earth, the metaphysics reveals these as but an infinitesimal element of being. Where it is almost invariably thought that a non-relativist metaphysics must be based in a substance at some finite depth, the metaphysic of immanence is non-relativist but requires and can have no substance
Since the metaphysics of immanence can be seen as a foundation in absolute indeterminism, the question of the possibility of structure arises
There is a trivial response to the violence of common sense and the possibility of structure. It is that what is actual is not only possible but must be necessary. A less trivial response is to appeal to the fundamental principle—every consistent state must be realized and further, every actual state must be consistent
The forms of cosmological systems—such as this one—that are very special in relation to the necessary infinity of form in the universe are labeled normal
What is normal is necessary—no explanation of the normal is necessary
Regarding formation from the void as origin, the fundamental principle shows that formation may occur in a single step, a few steps, or gradually and incrementally in a process in which every step—most steps—are incremental variations from one relatively stable state to another. It is reasonable to expect that incremental origins are far more likely than large step origins. Incremental origins by indeterministic variation from relatively stable to relatively stable state may be labeled a normal mechanism and the corresponding explanation a normal explanation
While normal mechanisms usually prevail, it is necessary that there shall be situations in which the likely mechanism does not fit the normal mold as described above
What constitutes normal behavior is not of one mold
The standard concepts of the typical objects of this cosmos may be labeled normal concepts
It is proper to talk about normal objects since the conclusions, even for normal objects, here, are necessary. While the metaphysics of immanence determines that there shall be—normal—correspondences between normal concepts and normal objects, it does not follow from the metaphysics that the normal concepts of this world correspond to normal and external objects
The generic explanation of the relation between normal concepts and objects is that a lock between a normal concept and a normal external object is far more likely than a free floating concept, that lock does not occur in every instance of the normal concept
Details of the explanation are deferred to Objects
6. Conclusions from and about specific empirical forms. (a) Conclusions from and about the fact and form of experience or sentience which includes experience of the fact of experience, experience of the external object, experience of self and other—including the idea of ‘you’ as explicitly similar to ‘I.’ (b) Conclusions from and about the form and existence of particular domains, especially this cosmological system
General conclusions and observations. That the empirical forms are highly specific, detailed and—apparently—immediate should not result in the deception that the necessary forms are not empirical and immediate. As an example, in talking of the—entire—universe the term universe could have a number of senses of which two are all being with reference to all its details and all being as a single entity without any reference to distinction or detail. While the former sense has non-empirical content, the latter is empirical and only empirical for all that is necessary to know that there is all being in the latter sense is that there is being which follows from the fact of experience
The specific domains of empirical knowledge as being of this cosmological system are of intrinsic interest. The domains include large domains of human knowledge—the sciences including psychology, history, significant portions of mathematics, philosophy, and, even, religion
Conclusions of and about the metaphysics from the empirical domains. Even if what is known empirically is regarded as hypothetical, it provides raw material for possible content and suggests methods and mechanisms. As an example of content, that the cosmos is conveniently described in terms of space and time—space-time—provokes a fruitful analysis of space and time in terms of the metaphysics. As an example of mechanism, the idea of variation and selection from evolutionary biology is ever suggestive. It is important to recognize, however, that the existence of content and mechanism is not taken as proof; questions of proof—as they arise—are taken up independently of sources of ideas
Conclusions from the metaphysics regarding empirical knowledge. Does the metaphysics found empirical knowledge by showing the existence of what seem to be external objects as actual external objects? Not quite. If the system of empirical knowledge is consistent, there must be corresponding external objects somewhere in the universe. That does not imply that a given concept is locked in to an actual external object; rather the locking is, perhaps, made more likely—talk of probability may require hypotheses about fine-grained structure. Philosophers have no agreement on what proofs show the existence of external objects, e.g. in the case of the problem of other minds, or whether those proofs are conclusive. The metaphysics makes the existence of external objects more probable via arguments just mentioned. One fine grained argument goes as follows. Any one can observe, ‘It is hardly likely that I am the author of the universe as a figment of my mind. If I were the author of the universe as figment I would face all kinds of paradox. There would be figments called Germans who appear to know far more of the German language than I even though I created them.’ A more conclusive proof might require the assumption of physical theory—atomism, the quantum theory and so on. Perhaps in the final analysis we would end up admitting that even physical hypotheses have no certain purchase. It might then follow that a purely rational proof—a metaphysical or philosophical proof—of the existence of the non-necessary external objects is impossible; this in fact appears to be the case since the existence of the solipsist appears to be logically possible. This is—would be—good to know. If the metaphysics is unable to provide proof of lock-in external merely empirical—not necessary—objects, it assists in analysis of the status of the metaphysical problem. One way it does that is to provide a framework for assessing the possible options regarding the existence of objects and to suggest probabilities to associate with the options
The metaphysics shows that human empirical knowledge of the world is an infinitesimal fraction of the actual variety. While the empirical knowledge has obvious significance, one significance, then, that it does not have is the definition of the universe in extent, duration and variety. Empirical knowledge is as deficient as corrupt religions in providing insight into the existence or non-existence of a spiritual world. The metaphysics shows, first, that the term ‘spiritual’ is rather vague and that the proper distinction is that of the actual / possible and the normal: what might be termed spiritual lies, roughly, in the domain of the actual outside the normal. A more practical example is the insight provided by the metaphysics into space-time-matter of this cosmological system by locating it in a larger context of space-time-matter possibilities in the context of a universe that must go through phases of being the void. This analysis is taken up in Cosmology
The interaction of metaphysics of immanence and standard domains of empirical knowledge is immensely fruitful
Conclusions from the fact and form of experience. That there is experience of an external world does not imply the existence of an external world. From the fundamental principle there may be domains or phases of the universe that are characterized by a single center of experience without an external object. What may be concluded from the experience of an external world is that the existence of the external world is immensely likely. It is conceivable that there are fine structures that allow a single center of experience to create the rich experiential variety of a human individual. However, in terms of most fine structures, including those that conform to human experience, it appears to be immensely unlikely that a single human mind could reconstruct the immense variety of experience
Some thoughts on the form of sentience follow
Sentience may be seen as a relation among forms. This sets up the possibility of error, paradox, and correction
Alternately, sentience may be seen as a form that includes the related forms and their relation. These forms are Forms as Forms and though they may be forms of experience, they may be revealed only imprecisely in experience
Excepting paradox, all forms have the possibility of sentience—this has been seen in an earlier discussion of mind
However, significant forms of experience may require sufficient durability for the appropriate elaboration of form
Some details of a logic of the nature of the field of experience now follow
Sentience may be regarded as a field of sentience or as a field of bodies with experience
There is no logical difference between these depictions
The sentient-field and body-experience field descriptions of organisms in the world are merely different terminologies
In some phases of the universe, a single sentient form is possible, therefore actual
Therefore, any argument against solipsism must be practical or contingent, i.e. in such and such a kind of system of beings e.g. durable evolved, solipsism would be impoverished or impossible
In this phase, a single sentient form is logically possible but, from complexity, practically so improbable that there should not be reasonable doubt that this cosmos (world) is populated as in the multiple centers of experience form of experience and intuition, i.e., by individuals. There may be fine structures—e.g. some forms of atomism—under which it is impossible that a cosmos should be a solipsist
Except for the eternal solipsist, solipsism, i.e. occasional solipsism of the universe or a domain of the universe, is possible and necessary on account of the Theory of being
Logically, universe may be seen as a solipsist. However, since it enters a phase of being the void it would not be an eternal solipsist even though the universe it is eternal—it is the manifest universe that is not eternal
Given the structure of this world, the world of human experience is far richer than it could be if the individual were a solipsist
The discussions in Mind, Cosmology and Human World will elaborate conclusions from the form of experience including the experience of Identity regarding which it will be seen that the experience of an isolated identity is an approximation to a fuller experience of Identity
Conclusions from the form and existence of this cosmological system. The behavior of this cosmological system is subject to the fundamental principle and therefore from any state of the system any state of the universe is accessible
The normal behavior of this cosmological system, however, includes deterministic-like and causal behavior. It also includes and non-causal behavior as in the quantum description at microscopic levels that often but not invariably averages out as causal or near causal behavior at macroscopic levels and which permits a number of otherwise inexplicable macroscopic behaviors. The—variation and selection—mechanism of evolution is a normal mechanism for—explanation of—evolution and, more generally, of becoming; this mechanism may be framework for other, more specific, mechanisms. The experience of space and time in this cosmological system, including its expression in the theory of gravitation—Einstein’s general relativity—are among the normal behaviors of this cosmos
The metaphysics of immanence must permit the observed behavior of this cosmos
Together with—the pure—metaphysics of immanence, the forms of this cosmological system will suggest and permit numerous conclusions of General Cosmology and possibilities for local, physical or normal cosmologies
The earlier discussions of Form, General Cosmology and Mind and Matter are relevant to the Local or Physical Cosmology and other local cosmologies
The treatment of the issues of empirical domains of knowledge is taken up in subsequent chapters, especially Mind and Cosmology. The question of the foundation of such knowledge is further addressed in Objects. Objects further contributes to the discussion via a careful analysis of the variety of objects and, especially, kinds of objects such as concrete or particular objects and abstract objects such as number, morals, and logic as an object. The metaphysics of immanence is instrumental in the definitive treatment of abstract objects which shows them to not be as different from ‘concrete’ objects as has traditionally been thought
7. Objections and counterarguments. These arise in reflecting on the development of the metaphysics
Objections to proof of the existence of the void have been considered earlier
It may be objected that the void is an event and not a state. It remains the case that in the void, the universe passes through a state in which there is no Form, Pattern or Law
Some foci for general objections. (1) What may appear to be the use of mere concepts—e.g. void, universe and domain—to demonstrate actual or real consequences. The objection is, of course, serious, first, in its nature and second and most importantly in that, if valid, it puts the foundation of the metaphysics of immanence—it’s fundamental principle—in question. I.e. the objection is not a disproof of the fundamental principle but is a proof that the given proof lacks validity. (2) Quantum theory implies that the absence of things—the ground state of the local cosmos—is be the quantum vacuum which is far from the absence of being but is a seat of enormous of energy, a place of continuous creation and destruction of particle pairs. (3) The violation of common sense in the ideas of ‘something from nothing’ and the realization of all consistent systems of description and, in physics, possible violations of the principle of conservation of energy. Responses to the objections follow
(1) The intensely empirical character of the—concepts of—universe, void and so on has been discussed at length. It is the fact that these necessary objects are so close to ‘seeing’ that, in their immediacy, their empirical character may escape notice. These objects are not mere concepts. There are further objections regarding the idea of ‘all being.’ One is that, as a concept, the idea may entail self-reference. There may be self-reference in that an individual referring to ‘all being’ refers also to him or herself. However, in viewing all being as an entity but not with regard to—all—its details there is no necessary self-reference. In Logic it will be seen that it is not self-reference per se that results in paradox. Another problem may be thought to arise in that all being also includes concepts. In the discussion of abstract objects, it will be seen that concepts are objects and that the concept of the concept is not a new category. A further objection to or problem with the idea of all being is the possibility of infinitely many decompositions of it into possible objects. However, although this possibility exists, it is no more explicit in reference to all being than is the same possibility for any object. The arbitrariness of decomposition is an interesting idea that is discussed elsewhere in the narrative. (2) The quantum vacuum is the seat of patterns of behavior that are laws. The void contains no law and is therefore ‘below’ the quantum vacuum in simplicity and fundamental character. The void ‘generates’ the quantum laws of this—our—cosmological system as well as the laws and entities of all cosmological systems. (3) Common sense and intuition—at least for some persons—is indeed violated; there is nothing, it may appear, in common day-to-day life that suggests the origin of a cosmos out of a void. However, common sense, experience, and intuition are situated in the everyday world. It may be said of such intuition that its extrapolation to the universe is an extrapolation of a mere or contingent empirical fact—or absence of fact—to the form of intuition and, more, to the form of the necessary. Self-aware empirical common sense is silent on such issues and—should it desire to know—will seek to follow the analysis. It appears to be a fact of human variety that some individuals are bound to their experience more than others. However, as will be seen in Human being, both binding and freedom are important to being human—and to think that freedom is essentially and only destructive or essentially and only creative are essentialist over-reactions to the imperfections and possibilities of freedom. It is interesting that the integration of intuition and analysis is to algebraic thought where the partial replacement of intuition by analytic expression allows the analysis of forms not amenable to intuition… Attention now turns to the issue of violation of the principle of conservation of energy. It is an immediate consequence of the fundamental principle that, regarding the entire universe, conservation of energy does not—cannot—obtain and that—near—conservation laws are perhaps features of relatively stable worlds. However, since, in terms of physical theory, energies can be positive as well as—e.g. gravitational field energy—negative, spontaneous creation of ‘a universe’ from nothing need not violate the physical principle of conservation of energy
An objection regarding meaning. ‘It is in the meaning of existence that in having this discussion or even in having an illusion of a discussion, there is existence’—something like that is said above. However, it might be replied, ‘No, existence does not necessarily have that kind of meaning at all. Existence has many meanings of which your meaning is but one. To assert that your meaning is the only meaning is to assert a privilege that you do not have and may not claim.’ The concern is a general one regarding meaning. The objection has semantic and—perhaps implicit—political dimensions. The semantic dimension includes that a word such as ‘existence’ may well have a variety of meanings or shades of meaning. Although they employ the same sign, ‘existence,’ they correspond to distinct concepts or shades of concept. Matters could be kept in order by using different signs but that might be confusing in other ways. A more serious charge might be that the selected meaning of existence is not tenable. However, as has been seen some aspect of meaning is and must be beyond analysis and for this it suffices in the beginning to identify what aspects of meaning are most immediate and the subsequent process is experimental rather than primarily analytic. The political dimension of meaning is that, in the case of a significant idea, there may be conflict regarding appropriation of the sign used to designate the concept. It is especially appealing to users of a tradition to deploy a received meaning (that it is received is not a measure of validity or invalidity.) And it is especially appealing to others—the critic, the iconoclast, the deconstructionist, the thinker who would be democratic with regard to ideas—to make negative assertions about received meaning. Naturally, the semantic and the political are not altogether independent for an aspect of appropriation may be to make the implicit claim that other meanings have no semantic validity. However, it is necessary to show that such meanings have no such validity and not merely to make the claim or to suggest that the meanings in question have been used to negative ends. If one is not a pragmatist, the ends argument may suggest that the negative ends meaning not be used but not that it is invalid and, regarding the pragmatic argument, there is a valid question of what kinds of end are to be chosen and when
The position in this narrative has been the one asserted above—that a term or word may have a variety of meanings, that in principle the variety of meanings correspond to a variety of symbols, that each meaning could be assigned a distinct word e.g. existence1, existence2 and so on but, provided the distinctions are kept in mind, this is not necessary. The thrust of the narrative has included that the chosen meanings have evolved or been selected to enable development of the ultimate metaphysics and its consequences. If a critic argues that his or her meaning is the valid one they have not understood what has just been said about ‘one word many symbols.’ If they insist on using their, different, meaning, that would not be ‘invalid,’ but the ensuing discussion would not be about the content of this narrative; rather it would be to engage in another discourse that is perhaps at most tangential to the present one. If the critic insists on some other meaning and insists that the meanings in this narrative are but one of many then it would be necessary to employ the seeming artifice of using distinct words for the distinct symbols. It is amusing that if distinct words had not been employed there might be no argument but when the same word is accidentally used for distinct meanings there may follow what appears to be a debate about meaning but is of the form the use of z to mean Z is invalid because x actually means X. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assert that the valid criticisms of the arguments of the narrative would deploy the meanings of the narrative and show that either the meanings or the arguments are lacking in substance. In doing so the critic would face the following concern. In a critique of the meaning of one of the terms, the meanings of other terms would come into question. Therefore, the criticism would employ the entire system of meaning of the narrative. In the process of criticism or discussion, certain terms might arise that are external to the system of the narrative and these terms might be either of the same kind or level as those of system or otherwise e.g. from a common but diffuse vocabulary or, perhaps, from the vocabulary of criticism. Discussion of the meanings of these extra-system terms might also arise. How might this discussion be approached? One possibility is that meaning is open ended and that there is no final settling of such matters even though there may be occasions of general agreement. Another possibility is that the meanings of the extra-system terms may be given definite meaning in terms of some system—perhaps the metaphysical system of the narrative. Would that be valid? If only the pure elements of the metaphysics were used, it would appear that this approach to the meaning of the extra-system terms is based in Logic. Even though it has been shown that the metaphysics is ultimate in depth and breadth, it is not reasonable to anticipate that all critical vocabulary could be brought within the system or shown to lack validity even if this should have been done for all critical vocabulary so far. Therefore, there may be a confidence in the system of the narrative. Therefore, also, there is openness to discussion. Although reason is a source of confidence, openness is and should be another. If the metaphysics is to ‘survive’ it must be open for, even if ultimate, its strength cannot be in isolation or dogmatic insistence. The power of the concept of ‘being’ is that it allows both known and unknown and it allows reference to both known and unknown to be simply empirical or, in the admission of details of what is beyond the empirical, to be non-empirical in that there are concepts that await objects on which to lock but not in that those concepts have no objects. In its origin, a basic purpose of the system lay in the service of ‘life’ and this, as well, is a fundamental aspect of openness
The metaphysical developments show quibbles about sign-association—e.g. of ‘existence’—to be trivial in relation to the illumination and deployment of a core idea in relation to ‘existence.’ If it is argued that the metaphysics implicitly values the ultimate over the immediate, the reply is that the ultimate / immediate distinction is not intrinsic to the metaphysics—what is ultimate in depth is also ultimate in immediacy, triviality and shallowness and the ultimate character derives from the trivial character. There is a practical ultimate / immediate distinction that is distinct from the conceptual and regarding the practical distinction the metaphysics makes no a priori distinction of value and allows it to emerge as a result of experience and analysis
Some general comments on criticism and objection. That the development—search—for objections and their refutation—or otherwise—must be an aspect of any method or approach. Criticism is enhanced by alternative formulation. The development of the conclusions of the theory of being is a source of objections
The following generic approaches to refutation or criticism of objections occur. Analysis of the meaning and motive of the objection—motive is significant at least in so far as it reveals implicit meaning. Repeated analysis and improvement of theory of being and its concepts e.g. the fundamental principle defines rather than merely employs logic… as the result of reflection on the ideas, as a result of learning from the tradition of knowledge, and as a response to real or apparent paradoxes. Interpretation, especially via the concept of the normal and building a coherent picture as a response to absurdity. The particular and the idiosyncratic refutation are not ruled out. Analysis of the world-view, if any, implicit in the objections and observation that the shedding of invalid or merely local ‘world-views’ is and must be liberating
‘Faith’ has a variety of meanings and uses. One family of use is the one in ‘religious faith.’ The use introduced here is more akin to the one in ‘animal faith’ which is the state of living in an immediate environment as part of the environment and without doubt or need for doubt and without certainty or need for certainty. Flow of environment and organism are not at odds; they are the same flow—which is not to say that the organism does not feel pain or pleasure, fear or confidence but, perhaps, that there is no labeling of such feelings or need to label them. In the present meaning, however, the organism envisaged has the ability to label and to doubt and to want and, perhaps, to attain security or, at least, a feeling of security. The organism has gone through these activities. In a search for security, the organism is part of a tradition that has valued doubt and reason but, from reason itself, has come up against limits to reason. Since the organism and the tradition came to value doubt, the limits to reason may have left the organism with doubt but not confidence. This however, was not the original state of animal grace. The organism wishes to return to such a state but without rejecting either doubt or reason or the places for doubt and reason. These thoughts motivate the meaning of faith that is about to be suggested
Although the meaning of faith that is now suggested has distinctions from the meaning in ‘religious faith’ it is not suggested that all religious faith is of the dogmatic kind that would set it apart from animal faith or the present meaning that is an integration of animal faith and the human freedom of reason and meaning—which freedom is introduced and discussed in some detail in Human being
Faith is that attitude, routine or inspired, which is most productive of action in the face of doubt—of quality of being in the face of fear, of ends in the face of destruction
This faith is productive of equanimity of being without foundation in something else
Faith is not refutation of analysis and reason—it is affirmation in the face of uncertainty
In faith there is affirmation of being—over mere system, over knowledge, over means and instruments
In faith there is life in relation to the world—life of the world—rather than life apart, rather than life through knowledge, means, and instruments
The attitude of faith is not fixed but is adaptable and adapts to circumstance
Faith does not reject doubt but does not dwell in doubt
Faith does not reject reason but does not ever dwell in reason
Faith is not identical to but is not other than reason
Reason is an occasional element in faith but is not definitive of faith
However, rejection of reason would also be a rejection of faith
At least on account of limits to reason, reason cannot be all of faith
Faith is an intrinsic condition of—sentient—form
There is an enhanced meaning that includes intuition and feeling in which reason approaches faith
Faith is not belief
Adherence to what is merely absurd or merely given on authority is not what is here meant by faith
The word merely is significant. What rings of the absurd may not in fact be absurd. Authority may, on occasion, be respected for its seen or experienced authentic power in the world rather accepted as an act of submission in the face of force over the world or punishment
The significance of this meaning of faith is further developed immediately below and subsequently in Faith
9. The method or approach
Method is any approach, systematic or ad hoc, based in the nature of being and patterns of thought and transformation that are conducive to realistic thought and effective transformation. Method may be revisable in practice
The method starts the description of forms of experience that require, for their existence, corresponding general or universal forms of being—being itself, all being and so on. This aspect of the method has an affinity with what Kant labeled the transcendental analytic. In its second aspect, the method is that of formal deduction of the results of general metaphysics which includes the theory of substance and determinism, logic, and general cosmology
The necessary objects have an entirely empirical character. To say that something is entirely empirical is not to say that it is not without conceptual content. Things known must have conceptual content whether empirical or not. An object is known but not empirical when the existence is demonstrated by some means, e.g. logical necessity, but the object has not—yet—been located in perception
The existence of the necessary objects follows from the corresponding forms of experience which would not exist without the existence of the corresponding necessary objects. The one exception to this schema of demonstration is the void whose existence is a logical inference from the necessary empirical concept of domain. Although it has not been argued so before and it is not argued now, it could, perhaps, be argued that the void is empirical in the notion of that which cannot enter perception—of any organism in any phase or domain of the universe
The ‘theory of the void’ lies on the boundary between the universal forms and formal deductions and it is regarding the existence of the void that, in the discussion above, doubt has been entertained, refuted and reconsidered. There is temptation to suppress this doubt but it is not ‘honesty’ that requires it to be recorded. Rather the power of the theory and the range of vision that result would be poorly served by suppressing doubt. Whatever doubt remains stands as an invitation to grapple with it
There is doubt even about the nature of the doubt—is it necessary or is it perhaps some neurosis that forces the doubt on account of the magnitude of the vision that results from the existence of the void?
Although it is not perfectly clear that faith is necessary to allay doubt, this is the point at which faith may enter. Although animal being may not experience faith since, in the absence of reason, there is no need to doubt, there is experience of warmth and fear. In the absence of reason there is no doubting fear. Thus life is characterized by faith. It may be said that faith in the void is removed and is thus not animal faith. Recall, though, that among the objects that may be contemplated in reason, metaphysics is most immediate
Perhaps, however, it is not taking reason far enough that is its downfall. Perhaps in the limit, reason, faith and intuition are—occasionally—one
The foregoing aspects of method have been experienced as necessary and may be labeled the method of the metaphysics of immanence or, simply, the method
The parallels and anti-parallels of the present idea and place of faith with religious faith are remarkable. ‘Worldly knowledge’ is a source of power but is impoverished in relation to the whole person and knowledge of being. Faith is not known to be certain but is rich where worldly knowledge is poor. Therefore, faith is not more—it is the world
Here, however, parallels end. Religious faith is often regarded as dogma; here there is no dogma. Religion is often presented as against science; metaphysics of immanence subsumes science. In the world view of dogmatic religion, whoever lacks faith in dogma may find meaning in the barren landscape of science where may be found solace in the lonely stance of truth—this thought resonates with the beliefs of so many persons of a scientistic—science as truth, whole truth and nothing but truth—persuasion. The faithful are asked to believe, e.g. in Christ, in what would with any other person seem absurd. Here there is no either / or—either metaphysics of immanence or science. Science is often but only presented as the truth. The absent either / or is not only with regard to truth but also action. The person can live ‘under’ science and metaphysics… can know fullness of being and worldly power—and while the limits of the metaphysics—the doubt—are accepted are the limits of science and reason in a world once full of hope for reason but perhaps unable to find a way out—except of hope—in reason
After developing the metaphysics, focus turns, in Objects, to the questions of what objects correspond to concepts and then, in Cosmology, to study of the variety of being. Objects is largely an analysis of concepts in the light of the metaphysics. In Cosmology—Human World may be considered to be a chapter in cosmology—the approach is to study particular topics in light of the metaphysics. Here there is doubt concerning not only about precision but also about the validity of the concepts. Sustained reflection from the metaphysics as well as the particular topics may be seen to remove much of the doubts regarding validity of the concepts. For example in discussion the ‘functions’ of mind, the reflections on substance and determinism give clarification and foundation where there would otherwise be isolated fragments that, even when they have some explanatory power, lack coherence and any sense that they refer to something that is of the organism
Thus the net method integrates the method of the metaphysics of immanence with ‘disciplinary studies’ and, in this aspect, goes beyond the disciplines and is dependent on science and at most partially founded by it
It is important to note that such lines of thought also clarify science as seen briefly above and taken up further in Logic
The present method subsumes what is true in science but is not founded by it. As being of more general application than what is usually meant by science, the method cannot be equated to it
Two observations are important—and should be integrated with their further discussion below. First, method does not stand a priori over study—object—but is what method or approach that may have arisen along the way; therefore, approach is as good a term as method. Second, whereas method has a necessary character in the study of necessary objects, in the study of normal objects its character has a necessary since the normal resides within the necessary and a contingent side since there are details to the normal that are not necessary
Necessary proof includes the following aspects: demonstration by proof, demonstration by recognition and naming of what is given, and demonstration by analysis of use or meaning. It has been seen incremental analysis of systems of concepts is not invariably an open loop. It may be seen that development e.g. analysis of method is not a priori given or separable from development e.g. analysis of objects and that method does not stand a priori over study—object—but is what method or approach may have arisen along the way; therefore approach is as good a term as method. As an example, Logic will be seen to be an object and this shows the essential braiding of Logic and object and that, where method is revealed as necessary so is object
Contingent proof arises in contexts where knowledge is contingent, e.g. this cosmos and Human World where contingency from what is locally interesting but not universal in nature
There is a distinction between method, discussed here, and principles of thought, discussed in Ideas. Whereas method refers to methods of demonstration, principles of thought are practices that are conducive to discovery—of both content and method. The method may be seen as included in the principles
Some detail. Necessary and contextual ‘proof.’ Necessary proof begins from incontrovertible premises—especially those implicit in the conditions or meaning of presence—e.g. the premise of being e.g. the premise of this discussion or of experience. Perhaps ‘incontrovertible’ is actually weak in relation to ‘experience’ for being is in the meaning of experience and existence which are limit points of analysis. Necessary proof proceeds by simple instruments that can be seen inherent in conditions of existence / stable meaning but which also have analytic representation e.g. the propositional calculus which has analytic consistency proof. Examples of necessary proof are found in the demonstrations regarding the necessary objects—experience, being, universe, void, form and the normal objects. In Logic, it will be seen that method of proof does not altogether rise above the contingent. In contextual proof, reference is made to some special context so that premises or proof are generally though not invariably contingent. Proof is supplemented—given flesh—by interpretation—which may be necessary andor contextual. Interpretation is often essential in that what is proved is that some state must obtain somewhere in the universe but it is interpretation that shows that it obtains in some specific situation—and such interpretation may appeal to the established scientific disciplines. Demonstration has occasional use in interpretation—subject to consistency requirements, an interpretation must obtain in some situations. Examples of contextual proof are abound in Human World and are also found in demonstrations at the intersection of local or normal cosmology and pure metaphysics
10. The status of the metaphysics so far
Metaphysics is the theory of being as being and harbors within it all specialized studies as instances. Pure metaphysics is that part of metaphysics that is absolutely demonstrable, i.e., by recognition, by analysis of meaning and proof. General metaphysics outside its pure part may be labeled cosmology. However the distinction between cosmology and pure metaphysics is arbitrary and in their broad meanings, cosmology and metaphysics are identical
The principles of pure metaphysics are those that establish it, i.e., they are the components of demonstration as defined above
The metaphysics is systematic and empirical. The development of the metaphysics shows the possibility of a metaphysics that is systematic and empirical
In talking of ‘a metaphysics’ it is not implied that there are other systems of metaphysics. There may be other forms of metaphysics but, except perhaps for level of detail, would be identical to the present one. Therefore, there is, in principle, but one metaphysics
Pure metaphysics includes its principles. The following are some results of the pure metaphysics pertinent to an assessment of the status of the metaphysics so far
The existence of the necessary objects: experience and its forms; being itself, the universe which is all being and form and law and pattern—all objects; difference, domain and complement; change and before, now and after; the void which is the absence of being and contains no object—especially no form, no pattern and no law
The existence and properties of the universe and the void suggest the name metaphysics of immanence
The actual, the possible, and the necessary are identical—as noted above, the meaning of ‘the necessary’ will be elaborated in Logic
The fundamental principle of the metaphysics of immanence: every consistent concept—including pictures and descriptions—is realized as a state from every other state. Or, every state is realized. Stated in this form, this implies that since the description of the void state is consistent, it, too, is realized. The apparent violence that the fundamental principle does to ‘common sense’ and science as it is known is resolved below
Although every concept has an object, it does not follow that every concept is locked in to an object, i.e., has what, in the literature, starting with Franz Brentano, has been called an intentional relationship to an object. In some cases, of course, the concept is what may be labeled a free concept—the product of an organism with imagination and in some cases the concept is a dream or hallucination. The question of the object is whether there is anything ever that is an object that corresponds to a given concept. This is the question of the existence of the external world of which a special case is the philosophical dilemma of solipsism. Such questions are worthy of reflection, not because there is healthy doubt about the existence of an / the external world but because the reflections sharpen understanding of the nature of the world—of the nature of the relations between concepts and objects, and because the reflections may be the occasion to develop powerful tools of analysis. The answer given earlier and to be elaborated upon in Objects is that, in some phases of the universe and, possibly in some domains of the present phase which is not necessarily this cosmological system, the existence of the solipsist is not logically consistent—without assumptions or conditions regarding the structure or makeup of the phase or domain. The general conclusion is, however, that the solipsist case is immensely unlikely and, more particularly, given the fine grained structure, e.g. cellular, structure of a brain, the richness of individual experience is extremely unlikely to be the product of a solipsist imagination. Perhaps, though, Brahman, in which normal, i.e. non-solipsist, individuals participate, has the character of a single mind without an external world
A resolution of what has been called the fundamental problem of metaphysics—why there is being in a strong form in which it is seen that there must be—occasions of manifest—being
Except logical contradictions, there are no fictions—the universe contains all mystery
The void is ultimately simple. The simplicity of the void is conceptual rather than factual. No particular importance is attached to the number of voids—which may be taken to be one or finitely or infinitely many
Every element of being—including the universe in a manifest state—may be regarded as being attached to ‘its own’ void. This attachment makes the necessity of spontaneous annihilation and creation most obvious
The universe is absolutely indeterministic and this is not only consistent with form and structure but makes them necessary
The metaphysics itself requires the necessary existence of normal cosmologies in the universe of absolute indeterminism
This cosmos and its structure are logically necessary—this also follows from the identity of the actual, the possible and the necessary
The problem of substance is also the problem of determinism. I.e., since substances are introduced to explain the complex in terms of the simple, substance explanation must be deterministic or else it would not be simple. Therefore, there are and can be no substance or substances as the ground of being
From the fundamental principle it is a short step to see that the void—or any state—may be regarded as the ground of being. The corresponding explanation is not deterministic and is therefore not a substance theory. However, the fundamental principle does found a non-relativist philosophy without substance. This is extremely remarkable and surprising in view of the common view that a non-relativist metaphysics without substance is impossible
The metaphysics of immanence is ultimate in breadth in that it encompasses the variety of being
The metaphysics of immanence is ultimate in depth in grounding—explanation of—all being without substance or infinite regress, i.e., in providing a non-relativist metaphysics without substance
In their common meanings—e.g. in physics and the philosophy of mind—mind and matter cannot be regarded as having a substance nature. Yet, as will be seen in Mind, there are extended meaning in which mind or matter could, if indeterministic explanation were allowed to be part of substance explanation, be taken as substance; this, however, would be likely to result in confusion on account of the common meanings of mind and matter. Matter, in its meaning from modern theoretical physics, could be taken to be an effective local substance but not a true substance
The metaphysics of immanence sheds not only anthropomorphism and anthrocentrism but also cosmomorphism and cosmocentrism. However, in showing that any particular kind of being is not universal in its form, its potentiality for all form is revealed—according to the fundamental principle and as will be elaborated and explained in the theory of identity. And, that a particular being is not the center of the universe is only a statement that all particular beings are equally at center or, equivalently, there is no place or being that deserves—or should require—the title of center of the universe. Whether this leads to feelings of inconsequentiality or of significance is a function of ego-perspective
The metaphysics of immanence is a metaphysics of form. Form is immanent in being. All forms are dynamic and have origins and ends. A static form would never manifest; however, if manifest, it would be eternal. What are typically seen as forms are the more durable, more stable and more symmetric forms. Although the metaphysics of immanence has Platonic characteristics, there is no separate Platonic world. In a purely Platonic view, actual entities would be seen as—impure—copies of perfect forms. Here, the origin of the structure of manifest being is in the dynamic aspect of form and the symmetry of actual forms is a near symmetry or one that is near to the perfect symmetry of the so-called static forms that do not and cannot exist. ‘Imperfection’ is a condition of—manifest—being
Equivalent characterizations of the metaphysics of immanence. (1) The universe which is all being contains all Form, Pattern and Law. (2) The void that is the absence of being exists and contains no Form, Pattern or Law, i.e., no Objects. (3) The universe is absolutely indeterministic; this means that there are no not-accessed states except the impossible or contradictory states—i.e., those ‘states’ whose description involve contradiction. (4) The metaphysics achieves absolute non-cosmorphism, i.e., in their foundation, the metaphysics and cosmology eliminate all reference to the particular form of this or any cosmos. (5) Logic, properly conceived as the theory of the possible or equivalently as the theory of the actual, or as the theory of descriptions, is the one law of the universe—of all being
The metaphysics sets up subsequent developments. Objects considers the connection between concepts and objects; the metaphysics sets this up by demonstrating the existence of the objects, by demonstrating the necessary connection between concepts and their corresponding objects in some cases, and by suggesting the probable connection in many cases. That every—consistent—concept must have some object is further instrumental in understanding abstract objects and in showing that, in contrast to received understanding, abstract and concrete objects are distinguished by—their currently most productive—mode of study but are not distinct in kind—‘all objects lie in the one universe.’ Logic is set up in the ideas of the identity of the actual, the possible and the necessary and in the fact that every consistent concept has an object. Meaning is clarified through the same considerations and further in that since there can be no consistent sense whose object lies outside the universe, sense must be latent reference that may have intentional reference. The clarification of substance, form, meaning and its extension, and the notion of depth are instrumental in developing the concept of Mind and, incidentally, that of matter. The concept of variety, the demonstration that the metaphysics implicitly contains all variety and all kinds and the fundamental principle of the metaphysics set up Cosmology. The foregoing topics are a foundation for Human World
In some of the topics, e.g. Logic, the development is an elaboration of what is already implicit in the metaphysics. In others, e.g., Local or physical cosmology and Human World, the development is the result of interaction between the metaphysics and the specific topic; these developments are not only applications of the metaphysics to a topic but may also involve clarification and deepening—in some cases ultimate—of the topic and illumination of the metaphysics
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