2008 EDITION
In process version with comments and planning
ANIL MITRA, COPYRIGHT © 2008
Format for temporary comments
Design is in Map. Tasks in a unit will be specific to it / generic-collected—paste special—lower level tasks
Current content: this, Journey in Being-New World-essence.html, elements of the narrative.html, docs linked from index.html—§ index.html#_Toc198363063
Outline
Contents… Journey in being… First things. 4… Foundation… Journey… Map
Sketch… On publication… Reading the narrative… The audience
Emphasis: ideas. 9… Origin and doubt—a foundation in-process… Why ideas are taken up first… Significance of ideas… Contribution to the history of ideas
Introduction… Being… Metaphysics… Objects… Logic and meaning… Mind… Cosmology… Journey… Method
Introduction… Human being… Social world… Civilization… Faith
Introduction… Philosophy and metaphysics… A system of human knowledge
Introduction… History of transformation… Basis and theory of transformation… System of experiments… Transformations so far and their further Design
A map for the Journey… Design… The way ahead
Issue and function of reference… Reference in this essay… Select sources
Journey in Being is a journey in ideas and transformation. The ideas, which form a partial foundation for transformation, are the subject of Foundation—the first part of the narrative. The second part, Journey, narrates transformation so far and thoughts and designs toward further transformation
This part has no introduction—it is the introduction and overview. Alternative titles may be Introduction, Overview, Plan, Portal, A portal to the journey, Gateway…
Source: first things.html—the part Material from the 2008 edition—has material for this part and its sections
Sources: on the viewpoint and narrative and their difficulties.html and first things.html
Note that there are roughly three units on Journey: this one; Journey—the discussion in Foundation, and the part Journey. Consider, reduction, paste special from the detailed to the overview discussions, and renaming, e.g., Journey in being®Journey
Note that there are roughly three units on Journey: Being—in this division, in the Introduction to Theory of being, and the main discussion Being in Foundation.. Consider, reduction, paste special from the detailed to the overview discussions
This introduction describes origins, nature and scope of the journey. It then introduces the concept of being and its fundamental character
Following is a subset of final—level 5—subsections of this section
In the process of discovery and experiment, the idea or concept of being was found to be pivotal to the adventures in ideas and in transformation
The emergence of these essential concepts, understanding of the concepts, and awareness of their significance was a process—gradual and step-wise—that occurred in interaction with many other ideas, attempts to understand the world in terms of systems of ideas, and experiments in use of the ideas in life
The concepts of being and of experience emerged as central in the development of a Theory of being that frames the journey or adventure. From this theory, ultimate limits of knowledge and transformation are found
The meanings of the terms ‘being,’ ‘experience’ and others emerge in the narrative and their absorption by the reader is expected to be a process. It is crucial for understanding to pay attention to the meanings and uses as developed here
The ultimate limits of being—of the being of the universe—will be found in Metaphysics to be identical to those of Logic. These limits are necessarily ultimate for, whatever the object of the term ‘Logic’ may be, it is inherent in the concept that the limits of Logic cannot be violated—insofar as the limits of realizations of Logic, i.e. the logics, can be violated, they are approximations of Logic
Those limits of science and of educated commonsense that are not Logical limits may be labeled normal limits. From the theory of being it follows that normal limits are not ultimate or absolute. Where it has been thought impossible, the transcendence of normal limits is found to be—perhaps extremely—improbable. Similarly, normal necessities are but highly probable. In the development of science what may have been thought impossible has often been found to be feasible. Thus the normal is not fixed but is relative to states of being and knowing
It will follow that whatever is Logical is possible and therefore actual and necessary. This may seem to violate reasonable sense (1) in the identification of the possible, the actual and the necessary, and (2) in allowing the violation of common ideas of reality including science. There is, however, no violation
If something does not exist or occur in the entire universe (over all time and space) it cannot be possible for there is no other universe in which it might occur; thus what is possible is actual. What is actual is of course possible. Therefore the actual and the possible are identical… The proof regarding necessity requires more than analysis of concepts and must wait until Metaphysics
The common ideas of reality are not violated for, as noted, common impossibility actually immensely improbable. Again, proof and details must wait until Metaphysics
The situation is similar to any conceptual advance. The new conceptual system must agree with the old in its domain of validity and should reveal new phenomena outside that domain
These limits defined above are the outer limits of the journey. The paths of the journey will ‘wander’ within these limits
Ideas are important but—actual—transformation is essential. Transformation includes the idea but more—transformations of—or in—being itself and identity. The adage ‘the pen is mightier than the sword’ ascribed to Edward Lytton, 1803-1873, was penned. Since the writing tends to be the domain of thinkers, it is perhaps natural that in literature importance may shift from transformation and action to ideas. Literature, especially academic and intellectual literature, tends to exaggerate the importance and transformational character of the idea. Without transformation and action, the idea stands incomplete. Still, the idea is the place where action may be conceived and being is appreciated. In the narrative, ideas are emphasized in Foundation and transformation in Journey. Even though the developments in the foundation are demonstrated, their substance is felt to lie in transformation. What is here expressed is not the philosophy that ideas should find application but the thought that without realization the idea stands essentially incomplete. This idea distinguishes this work from the standard academic emphasis and is worked out in greater detail in the narrative
The limits of ideas and transformation are the outer limits of the journey
All being
One of the connotations of being in the tradition of thought is that which is most fundamental to understanding the world or some aspect of the world
It is natural, then, that being should also be fundamental to transformation and action
This is the connotation of interest in selecting Being as the central concept in a system of thought that is fundamental to the journey and to thought and action
The idea that being is most fundamental… is an implicit and perhaps partial specification of the concept of being
The semantic or linguistic origin of the word being is the verb to be. Of course, this observation does not exhaust the concept of being. Additionally, there are subtleties to the use of the verb to be—not all uses of the verb connote be-ing. These concerns are taken up later
A connotation of ‘to be’ is ‘to exist.’ Can being be equated to existence? There is a line of thought in which existence is ‘the mode of being which consists in interaction with other things’ while being includes the connotation of independent or pure being or being-in-itself. Thus it is conceivable that existence and being are not identical. However, not every connotation corresponds to something actual. Therefore, distinctions in connotation do not necessarily correspond to actual distinctions. That the—apparently—distinct thoughts ‘being-in-interaction’ and ‘being-in-itself’ can be had does not imply that there is a corresponding actual or real distinction. Therefore, without further analysis, it cannot be concluded that being and existence are distinct
It will emerge later that being and existence are identical
Existence will found to be ‘objective’ but objectivity requires some kind of grounding
The grounding of existence, of being-in-itself and of being-in-interaction, of existing and knowing, will be in—the concept of—experience
These assertions require demonstration. The meanings of the terms being, to be, existence, experience require clarification. There are a number of problems and paradoxes, some well known, that are associated with the terms. These concerns deferred to Foundation where it will be seen that demonstration, meaning, resolution of problem and paradox are intimately related
It may be said that everything in the universe exists or has being. Thus existing or being does not distinguish one thing from another. In using being as fundamental the character of things is not referred to something more fundamental or simpler. In contrast, in substance theory which will be considered in detail later, the character of things is explained in terms of something simpler. For example in materialism there are explanations in terms of matter. For these reasons, it might appear that an explanation in terms of being might be trivially true but also unenlightening
However, in substance theory, things are explained in terms of something else, something that stands behind or under. This ‘something else’ cannot be truly outside the world but is something else in that it is not on the surface andor in that it is a part of the variety of things. Thus while substance theory may be powerful, it is also open to error—it is not given that the world will be explainable in terms of what is below the surface of phenomena or that the whole will be explainable in terms of a part of it. The nature of substance theory, its potential, and its ultimate untenability as the basis as an understanding of the world will be taken up later
On account of its trivial character, explanation in terms of being cannot be in error. Explanation in terms of being is, in effect, an explanation of the world in terms of itself. The idea to explain the world in its own terms may be seen as including the position that at the outset of study, of investigation, the nature of the world is regarded as unknown. Thus the approach from being is similar to the use and naming of the unknown in algebra and the approach from being has powers that are similar to those of the algebraic approach
It will emerge that, despite this trivial character, explanation via being is ultimately profound. First, such explanation cannot be in error. More importantly, however, the use of being encourages and permits the formulation of a system of understanding of the world in terms of its most general and universal of characteristics such as being, all being and absence of being which will be found to be capable being the basis of a powerful system of understanding (metaphysics, theory of being.) This system does not say anything about the particular and detailed aspects of our world. However, when used in interaction with detailed understanding, the general enhances and corrects understanding of the particular and the particular provides details and examples of the general. While the result is indeed profound and unexpected, what has been said so far is but a glimmer of the actual developments
The section Introduction to a new picture of the world below provides some account of these developments
The idea of a theory of being is explicitly mentioned in Aristotle’s work. In the particular sciences, things are studied in some aspect or other—material aspects in physics, the living aspect in biology. Aristotle’s idea, in metaphysics, was to study ‘things as such,’ i.e., that things as they are
In the history of thought, being has numerous connotations. Some of these will be excluded from the meaning of being developed in this narrative. This might lead to confusion that, however, may be avoided by attending to the meaning as developed here. The gain in suggestive power from the tradition is worth the care that is required. It is probably true that the every significant concept has a rich multiplicity connotations. Therefore careful attention to meaning is not necessary only to avoid confusion but also to productive and creative thought
Use perception-logic; develop metaphysics of immanence, consequences, implications for journey
Consider the problem of the end of the world: it is an existential problem that has an existential and a real resolution
This is the probable place to discuss what has been before—by whom or in what tradition
Sources for the new picture: first things.html and on the viewpoint and narrative and their difficulties.html
It is unlikely that any picture or metaphysics will be entirely new—aspects of the view have been in a variety of traditions. However, the picture has, apparently, not been seen before as a dynamic whole, with a rational-empirical foundation, as a foundation that has no infinite regress and yet no substance, and with a breadth of scope such that all being is implicit in it, and with the breadth of application covered in the narrative
The title was A brief motivation from the metaphysics. The goal is to show the power of the metaphysics and its methods of proof and demonstration. Make the section as brief and as simple as possible in order to make the point
…and action, process and relationship
Seek a better title. Lengthen it to ‘An orientation to the narrative.’? ‘Narrative’ versus ‘essay’ versus ‘piece’…
Task—import material: ’06 and earlier versions may be useful sources for The narrative if the ’07 version is not adequate
This section is, tentatively, a sketch of the journey and an outline of the narrative
Contents. Outline or map
Sources: first things.html and on the viewpoint and narrative and their difficulties.html… include ‘the picture’ and the problem of demonstration (proof)
Specifics first things.html
Part 2003 Edition: Relations between our world and the absolute
Part 2006 Edition: Power of the vision and the next section Brevity of the story
The purpose of this section is to assist in understanding the narrative by alerting readers to the possible difficulties. The next section has suggestions on negotiating the difficulties
The narrative contains a deepening—in significant ways ultimate—of foundations of knowledge and being and may therefore present difficulties of understanding. Although some difficulties may be technical, a significant difficulty may lie in recognizing that a new picture of the world—a metaphysics—is painted and in grasping the logical foundation and quality of that picture and of the immense variety of being portrayed within and shown necessary by it. This difficulty may be especially acute for those immersed in the traditional pictures, e.g., from Western philosophy, metaphysics and science—i.e., for academics and experts
When a narrative is expected to present difficulties of understanding, it is helpful to the reader to have some acquaintance with the presence of the difficulties and their nature
Sources—specifics first things.html
Part 2003 Edition: To the reader
Part 2004 Edition: Reading the document
Part 2005 Edition: Reading the essay
This is the section legend in Journey in Being-New World-essence.html
Sources—specifics first things.html
Part 2005 Edition: The audience
Part 2006 Edition: The audience—general and specialist and the next section Some special interests
There is an interest in the journey itself, its nature, its ways and means, its ambitions and goals
Interest is typically in the treatment of a specific topic or discipline from the point of view of the Journey—the Foundation or the ways of Transformation. The interest in the topic may be technical and for further study and research. Typical topics may be found in Program of research and experiment in the modes and means of transformation
Sources-general for this part: index.html; possibly first things.html
Foundation focuses on—transformation in—ideas; in the next part Journey the concern expands to transformation in being and identity
The ideas have achieved some maturity; the transformations in being and identity are in process
Origin of the Foundation. Fundamental incompleteness of ideas. Doubt. Foundation as ‘what foundation has been found along the way’
While the journey has a personal aspect, there is, also, along the way, exploration and discovery in ideas and foundations, the tradition of ideas, of what foundation is possible, and in being and identity
Foundation did not arise in a single step as a unitary whole—it arose piece-meal, iteratively, cycling through a growing range of ideas, exposure to the history of thought, subject to a universe of criticism and resolution until it was realized in its state as a unitary whole
In the Metaphysics it is demonstrated that the system of metaphysics is ultimate with regard to depth and breadth. Further the principles of demonstration arise organically, in interaction with discovery; the Method is part of the interaction between knower and known. However, the ultimate character with regard to breadth or variety of being is shown to be necessarily implicit and this is what keeps the Journey infinitely open. The variety of being provides infinite realms of discovery and adventure. The Foundation is expected to see further iteration in interaction with the Transformation of being and identity
As transformation ideas are important but incomplete. Doubt is a minor and perhaps subjective aspect of the incompleteness of ideas. The fundamental incompleteness of ideas is that, in their normal interpretation at least, they constitute only part of being, identity and power
Since doubt served the exploration well, since there remain questions about the foundation, and since the approaches to transformation remain experimental, the regard for the foundation is that it may be best thought of as what foundation has been found along the way
Early in the story, the universal aspects of the journey were seen implicitly to be in terms of ideas. This may reflect an original personal orientation; it is also a reflection of the sentiment of the Western intellect. It was later that transformation in the universal realm was seen to be possible and the ideas came to be regarded as incomplete
Ideas are taken up first since they have been fundamental to understanding the nature of the journey and to determining possibilities of—and approaches to—transformation
Ideas are an essential part of the journey, provide a critical and ultimate vision that is a foundation-in-interaction with the journey. The idea is the place of experience and appreciation of being
Although Foundation is not in the form of a journey, development of its ideas has been and remains a journey—a part of a larger journey in transformation of being. The ideas seek to be a contribution to thought. The first purpose of the ideas is to provide a vision of the world that will be critical and, as far as possible, ultimate. The vision will be a foundation for transformation and further developments in ideas and thought
In the more complete understanding of Metaphysics, Objects and Mind, the idea is seen to expand to include being. In the immediate realm and in its normal interpretation, however, the idea remains limited
The narrative seeks to be a contribution to ideas in the topics—chapters—and their foundation, and to transformation
Although acceptance is determined in the course of a contribution in the stream of ideas and action, it is thought that the contribution includes an estimate of what directions in ideas are capable of ultimate foundation, that such ultimates have been sketched and proved, that knowledge has been pushed to a number of its boundaries, and that the envelope of transformation is traced and shown
Sources include all documents for the chapters, especially Being and Metaphysics
Theory of being is metaphysics
Integrate the following pre-Introduction comments
An outline of the development from experience
That there are universal ‘elements’ whether named, experienced as such, or experienced only implicitly
These elements are necessary
And entail, of necessity, a metaphysics:
The metaphysics of experience
Whose depth and breadth are ultimate
…
For is not all ultimately in experience in some way? (That which is outside experience is named in experience—‘that which is outside experience!)
And what lies ahead, lies ahead in future experience…
That it is exciting the only fiction is that which harbors contradiction—which is outside Logic. And if Logic is ultimate in paucity of what it excludes it is ultimate in the richness of what it permits
And if what is merely possible is too unlikely, then what is feasible and worthwhile is even more exciting for it involves high creation over and above mere adventure
It is important to note that the introduction of being-as-being, being-as-existence, and experience are not counter to the purpose of not introducing substance, not regarding the nature of the world as something else… of seeing the nature of things, first, as—immanent in—the world
Note that the foregoing neither eliminates nor requires substance or essence or nature at the outset, i.e., it is neutral in these regards and allows any non-neutrality to be the outcome of investigation
What is a Theory of being? The question has two sides. The first side concerns the idea of a Theory of being and the second is about its content
The two sides above correspond to the ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ or ‘concept’ and ‘object’ sides of—linguistic—meaning. The distinction is crucial to the concept of meaning and to understanding concepts. It is considered in detail in the later discussions of meaning
The following introductory discussion of Theory of being may contain significant material on Being itself and perhaps also on Metaphysics. Some material may go to those chapters. Eliminate repeated material where repetition serves no purpose
So far, the idea of ‘being’ has been specified in functional and very general terms. However, an explicit concept of being has not yet been given. An explicit concept that is at the core of a coherent and consistent system of ideas—one that will be a ‘metaphysics’—that has powerful—ultimate—application will be developed in what follows
What is the idea of ‘being’ so far? It is ‘that which is most fundamental’ and ‘that which is universally applicable.’ Thus, roughly—i.e., as a first approximation, a theory of being would be a ‘theory of everything’
What form shall this theory take? That is not specified at outset and, from discussion so far, it is probably most efficient to not make specification at outset
The idea of being ‘that which has universal application’ indicates that whatever should emerge, the concept will be very general—will make little distinction. The concept has been criticized as making no distinction but as will be seen the concept does distinguish the—logically—possible (versus the logically impossible.) Whether this is a true distinction or not is a matter of perspective. What is critical is that the distinction is necessary—not under-specified—and sufficient—not over-specified—to the powerful and empirical metaphysics that will be developed
It may be expected, then, that as a ‘theory of everything,’ a theory of being will not be a theory of the details of all things but will be a theory of, roughly—in a second approximation, the most general kinds or aspects of things—a theory of the common aspects of all things. Alternatively and perhaps equivalently though still tentatively, a theory of everything will see the universe, not in its details and modes of distinction, but as a whole
The most general kinds and aspects will turn out to be being itself—that there are things, all being, the absence of being, difference or distinction, extension-duration, and domain… and, seeing the universe in light of these aspects is seeing it, first, as a whole and, second, in terms of a minimum of generic distinction
These thoughts are now laid out in further detail
An implicit specification of idea of Being was seen to be whatever is most fundamental in the world. whatever is in the world. Perhaps whatever is in the world is made of matter. This appears to be the modern scientific and secular sentiment. Still, even in the twenty-first century, materialism is not the universal view; and even if one accepts materialism there is the question ‘What is matter?’ Science does not answer this question or claim to answer it
The claim that ‘everything is made of matter’ is not clearly true and, in any case, is not a complete explanation of whatever is in the world. That is clearly true for materialism is at most implicit or tacit rather than explicit. In science, explanation stops at matter without showing its fundamental character or referring to something more fundamental. In the sense of ultimate explanation, materialism is not even part of an explanation of what is in the world
The scientific materialist might respond that scientific materialism is the best that can be hoped for, that it is the foundation of an extremely potent instrumental knowledge of the world, that it provides an excellent stand in for ultimate explanation, and that it appears that such explanation is impossible and that what is impossible cannot be desirable
In response to the scientific materialist, note that there is no proof of the impossibility of ultimate explanation—there is at most a record of failure in the attempt to get such an explanation. It will emerge that such an explanation of what is in the world is possible and this will be demonstrated, not merely in principle, but by developing and demonstrating the validity of an ultimate explanation. Why is the view that such explanations are not forthcoming widely spread?
First, there is, in most cultures, the tacit acceptance of the dominant paradigms of explanation of the culture
Second, there is the generally accepted failure of the grand metaphysical systems of the past as merely speculative—of these explanations perhaps the grandest in Western thought is the Hegelian metaphysics. However, it does not follow from a sequence of failures of a type of explanation that that type is impossible; for impossibility, the necessity of such failure must be demonstrated. The wide acceptance of scientific materialism and secular humanism is implicitly regarded as tacit demonstration of the impossibility of ultimate / metaphysical explanation. Additionally, the philosopher Immanuel Kant is taken as having demonstrated that it is impossible to know the validity of a metaphysics whose foundation lies outside experience. In this narrative there are two arguments that counter the Kantian position. The first argument is rational: it is the logical demonstration of the validity of an ultimate system of metaphysics—the metaphysics of immanence—taken up in Metaphysics. The second argument is empirical: it looks carefully at what lies in experience and finds that it is characteristic to consider that question in terms of such detail as to exclude certain general characteristics that appear to be ‘merely metaphysical’ but are in fact intensely and centrally empirical. This argument is of course not logically counter to the Kantian position for it locates—certain aspects—metaphysics within experience. However it is counter to the effective Kantian position as follows. The effective position depends on the tacit and common assumption that all being is an essentially metaphysical concept in that it cannot be empirical. The position makes sense for it appears to say that some being lies outside our experience and therefore all being cannot lie within experience. However, the concept of all being has a generic meaning and multiple specific meanings within the general framework. One specific meaning is ‘all being in all of its details.’ Another is ‘all being with the details filtered out.’ The former has contingently though not logically empirical content; the latter does not have even logically empirical content. In this sense, all being is empirical. The point identifies and counters the common assumption tacitly embedded in the Kantian position that the notion of all being cannot be empirically knowable—even in a form in which detail is filtered out of the concept. The first argument demonstrates the fact and possibility of an ultimate metaphysics; this metaphysics may appear to lie outside experience; the second argument locates the ultimate metaphysics within the realm of experience, i.e., of things experienced and other things that, though not yet experienced, are capable of being experienced and, according to the metaphysics, must lie in the experience of some individual. It will be seen that the rational and the empirical approaches are not separate but are in fact strongly intertwined
A third argument against an ultimate explanation that claims to stand on its own is that every system must have some fundamental unexplained terms and unproven axioms—that all chains of explanation must be either unending or must end in something unexplained. The rational-empirical approach referred to above will show the error of this idea that has widespread acceptance. Although the actual considerations shall be more intricate, the general idea is that there must be something given in experience that though not given in terms of something else is nonetheless given. What is it that is given? This must fall out of the study rather than be posited at outset. It is entailed that, while it is of fundamental importance to development and foundation of a variety of logical-mathematical and other systems, the axiomatic ‘method’ it is not ultimately fundamental. This point also addresses concerns regarding issues of completeness and consistency of axiomatic systems and thus the completeness aspect of ultimate explanation
The discussion has found the general reasons for rejection of systematic thought to be inadequate. The situation that should result from these reasons is not a rejection of systematic thought but, of course, an openness to its impossibility. In terms of reason and logic, this necessarily entails a simultaneous openness to the possibility of systematic thought
The demise of system in analytic thought is generally regarded as being coincident with Russell’s rejection of idealist system that occurred roughly at the end of the nineteenth century. However, the rejection was more putative than actual with pockets of significant idealism and system in Britain and America continuing well into the twentieth century
Given that the rejection of system was not logical even though it is often presumed to have been so, it is reasonable to suggest that its putative demise is significantly the result of academic fashion—even dogma
It has been common for authors of modern and recent works in metaphysics—especially analytic metaphysics—to reject system at the outset. It would be more logical for these writers to disclaim system in their thought
The present work has elements of system. However it is emphasized that what system there is stems from two sources. The main source is the result of analysis; i.e., what system there may be is largely the result rather than the presumption of thought. It is significant that the metaphysical system emerged from sustained experience and reflection. What is system? One way of looking at it is that it is the continuation or extrapolation of some metaphor of pattern and wholeness in the world. The writer’s thought has gone through a number of phases of system and rejection. In this final system there was no a priori metaphor. It is a result of the investigation that when the world is sufficiently understood, there is neither need nor place for metaphor in the understanding (though of course metaphor will remain powerful in sub-domains of incomplete understanding and, naturally, in other kinds of literature.) The original insight regarding the logic of the void initiated its own relentless but fluid unfolding in contact with the dimensions of thought… Thus the work exhibits system without the intent to be systematic. This fact together with the fact that the system emerged together with its principles of demonstration shows its system to be both natural (unpremeditated) and necessary. The ideas, the system and the logic are naturally co-emergent… The second source of system lies at the interface between the emergent logic of the metaphysics of immanence of the narrative and the houses of human thought. The process of interaction has not been one of subsumption. Instead it has been one of destruction and reconstruction. The destruction was necessitated by the logic of the metaphysics, especially the principle of reference. In the phase of destruction, significant elements of prior metaphysics, the ideas of object, of logic and of meaning, of mind and its conception, and of cosmology are found to crumble. The reconstruction was the natural result of the momentum of the same logic. Since system emerges it is not imposed; there is no psychological or logical commitment to it; its emergence is natural. In a sense there is no system; the sense is the same one in which the world has and needs no foundation
The result, the gift is an ultimate system of thought; the ultimate character, too, is emergent rather than forced. It is system that is not forced, not imposed. If the being of the world has a logic, the system that emerges is that logic
To be committed to or against system at the outset of thought is a form of substance theory, i.e., a commitment to the form and character of thought and being. The form of modern university education may be said to be a rampant exercise in substance theory applied to the world, to thought and to action; undergraduates are told what to think before they learn how to think; they are given to believe that how to think is something that can be said rather than learnt or that the how of thought can be implicit in a course of lectures on the disciplines… In considering substance theory in this narrative there is no a priori commitment and it emerges from the logic that the notion of substance at the foundation of an understanding of the world, i.e. as foundation of metaphysics, is untenable. Similarly, it has been learnt in the ‘journey’ that, even if system should in fact be either necessary or impossible, the actual case can only be strengthened by having no a priori commitment and allowing the actual case to emerge naturally in the course of investigation
A final criticism of the idea of ultimate explanation is one that questions its utility rather than its validity. Is not scientific explanation enough? What is the point of an ultimate explanation that has no utility? The first answer to this criticism is that there is a distinction between immediate and deferred utility. Science itself has often had no immediate utility; discovery came first and utility later. However, explanation and understanding may be criticized as such—for what is the use of understanding and explanation that are not instrumental, that do not enable any prediction or technology? In the first place, understanding the nature of the world is of immense significance to the quality of the experience of the world. Secondly, while mere understanding and explanation is not instrumental in itself, it may be the framework for instrumental knowledge
Perhaps there is no ultimate explanation. On the assumption of materialism, for example, reasons for though not proof of the final lack of explanation may be given. However, an alternate approach to the question of—ultimate—explanation is to attempt other explanations and see if they can be—made—ultimate. That would not be counter-scientific but parallel to science or, in a broader sense, inclusive of science—at least in principle and in so far as science is valid
How might the search for explanation be approached? Something would be different from science—from scientific materialism. The explanation would still be empirical, would probably still employ concepts. The discussion already suggests what might be different. Look at the world. It does not appear to be made up of the fundamental forces and particles of modern physics. In a sense the foundational part of the approach of modern physics is to describe the world in terms of something else. The alternative would be to not refer the world to something else
This suggests an explicit specification to the idea of Being: it is whatever is in the world just by being in the world… or perhaps, Being is the quality of being in the world. The latter use is syntactically rather like ‘things are material’ or ‘things have the quality of being material’
The use of being—consistent capitalization may be tedious—just suggested is the historical idea of being, the one that derives from the linguistic root be-ing, the idea to study being-as-being, i.e. to study things-as-they-are—to study the world-as-world
It might seem that the idea of being cannot generate much in the way of understanding beyond ‘what is there is what is there!’ That is where the developments that follow hold an immense surprise. The developments from this plain beginning are enormous. It is not enough to say they are profound—profundity signifies depth, perhaps. The outcome is not merely deep but it is that what is ultimately deep is also ultimately shallow and that there is no entity or kind that is not implicitly included. Of course, these developments are not the result of ‘what is there is there’ alone but of imagination and careful reflection. However, one source of power is already in hand. It saying that the world is not made up of matter it is not being said that it is made of something else. It is not being said that the world is being made of anything at all. The nature of the world, if any, will fall out of our researches. Since there is no advance commitment, the approach does not begin with the kind of mistake to which substance theories are subject. And the rational-empirical foundation of the approach has already been suggested… but these general thoughts about the approach remain to be put in to practice and that will require imagination and diligent care in the development of the system of ideas
What, then, is the (or a) Theory of being? It will not be that the nature of the world is something ‘more fundamental’ as in science or something else or, as in some religions, something outside the world, for example, ‘God the creator.’ This idea will be taken up in detail in discussing ‘substance theory’ where the idea of substance as ‘underlying’ the world will be shown to be untenable
One thing is clear. In talking of the world as or having being, the criticism of referring to or explaining in terms of something else cannot be made. And it is would be a deep criticism for the next concern would be ‘what is that something else?’ This is how use of being cuts the Gordian knot of substance; how being cuts the endless chain of explanation at something real. Since the world is referred to itself perhaps the gain is a loss—nothing is truly explained in saying ‘the world is itself.’ This is the surprise. Something is gained—as noted above. In saying things have a deep explanation there nature is referred to something else which may harbor error; in not making the deep reference that possibility of error is blocked. Simultaneously, the possibility of looking at what is ‘immediate’ is opened up and this has, at least, the potential of opening up understanding. The story of Foundation is one story of an opening up of understanding
If it is not to begin with something else, it will begin with what is immediate. What exists is immediate, not in that everything that exists is close by, but in that it is not being said that it is something else. ‘Existence’ is another word for—or at least close in meaning to—being. So it seems that not much is being said in introducing existence. The concept of existence has been subject to much scrutiny and criticism, e.g., since ‘everything exists’ existence does not really mean anything at all; there are other fundamental criticisms taken up later. However, something is gained. Addressing the criticisms will lead to much clarification of the meaning and uses of being and of existence
What exists? Does my worktable exist? It has a flat top and four legs and has a certain geometry. But I also think it is made up of atoms and forces and so on. Is it those? And if so, what does that mean for the geometrical solid shape that I experience the table as having? Obviously the table—something corresponding to my idea of the table—exists but I don’t know precisely what it is. Is there anything that I know that exists? The universe exists! I do not know all the details of it and from the example of my table I may not know any of the details but I do not need to know them. In saying that the universe exists I am not referring to the details. The universe, then, is roughly ‘all being’ and this term is used a lot in the narrative so readers should not confuse it with other uses such as in the phrase ‘multiple universes.’ In the present use there is one universe and there is nothing outside it. Immediately it follows that it has no outside creator
Here is one doubt. There is an experience of the universe (all being) but perhaps experience is all there is. In the example of the table, experience was to not be a certain guide—this is of course common knowledge. Discussion of ‘experience’ is taken up later. One aspect of the discussion is to show the intimate weave of existence and person (it is nowhere going to be said that being perceived is required for or confers existence—at least in the naïve meanings of the terms used.) This is another place that the kind of analysis done here is different from that of science. Experience or perception is analyzed in grounding science but, as far as possible, the aim is to show the truth of science as outside the subjective realm. Here, instead, the aim is to analyze what overlap there may be between the objective and the subjective and this line of thought will lead into showing the empirical nature of the Theory of being and to show where analysis and experience meet and this leads, in addition to the weave of being and person, to the empirical-rational character of the Theory of being. It is relevant to note that nowhere is it said that objective truth is grounded in mere experience. The philosopher Immanuel Kant had an idea that could be interpreted as follows. Since we live in and negotiate in this world our experience of it in perception, emotion and thought must have some reliability even though it is not perfect and even if the nature of the correspondence (reliability) is not clear. The evolutionary thought of Charles Darwin adds something to this. It sees ‘imperfection’ as ‘being in a process of adaptation’ where perfect attunement to an environment is not so much impossible as lacking in meaning
Discussion began with ‘what is there;’ and continued with ‘how can what is there be explained;’ the idea of existence was introduced; the question whether I know anything that exists precisely and surely was entertained. The outcome was that there is one thing that I know for sure exists—the universe; and it was discovered that it has no creator (on the reasonable thought that a creator is an external creator.) A thought about the reliability of experience leads to some understanding of the nature of experience and to the relation between individual and world
The outcome of discussion so far is not a Theory of being but it seems as though it may be part of such a theory
The discussion so far has glossed over numerous difficulties—some mentioned, others not. These will be brought up and dealt with in what follows. Some of the ‘problems’ may seem like quibbles. ‘Does the table exist?’ Of course to doubt the table in a practical way would be neurotic. However, philosophic doubt, as has already been seen in a small way, may lead to profound understanding—this is well known. ‘What does it mean to say that the table exists?’ casts the quibble as a conceptual question. In this narrative it will be found that profound results may occur as well and this is contrary to much contemporary thought—analysis of ideas leads to clarification, for results we turn to practical knowledge and science
What, then, is a Theory of being? In the sense of being hypothetical it is not a theory at all. Its process is the process of looking at the world as it presents and reflecting on what is known and can be known in immediate terms. Of course, there is no reason to exclude science except in dogmatic forms and the development often draws from science in various ways. However there is an emphasis being-as-being and this, as seen, goes rather outside science which often sees the world in ‘other’ terms
A look at the contents of the division Theory of being suggests what the content may be. Two dimensions are ‘depth’ and ‘breadth.’ The depth which is seen to be quite shallow (and it is in the shallowness that some profundity lies) is in the analysis of the nature of immediate things: the contents of chapters Being, Objects, Logic and meaning, and, to some extent, the contents of Mind and of Method. The breadth or variety concerns what variety of things and kinds of thing are there: the content of Cosmology. The discussions above show beginnings of how these topics may be approached and just a brief hint of results; the logic and the detail is left for the narrative
A short reflection on ‘what there is in the world’ may be interesting. In addition to things such as trees, mountains and galaxies there is also behavior and there are also laws. Obviously, behavior is in the world. A law of nature is a more or less general verbal or mathematical expression of patterns, behaviors and dynamics in the world. Is a law in the world? If a law is valid then it corresponds to something of the world, not something else, that may be called Law and is in the world. Next consider numbers. One apple is in the world, more precisely there is one apple (and more) on the apple tree. But where is the number one? Is it anywhere? Numbers are an example of what have been called abstract objects. In today’s thought there is no full agreement on the nature of abstract objects and their relation to the non-abstract or particular objects such as apples and stars. In the developments that follow it will be shown that the distinction between particular and abstract objects is artificial. Abstract objects are in the world as is behavior. A form like a number is also and abstract object and is therefore in the world. Where are the abstract objects? The considerations taken up later show that contrary to most current thought abstract objects may have spatial location and temporal being; in the more abstract objects the spatial and temporal character is not of consequence. Consideration of ‘what there is in the world’ reveals that there are not only things, but laws, patterns, forms, mathematical objects and many other kinds taken up later
Consider the void. It is what is left when the universe or world is ‘taken away.’ The idea has difficulties for how can the universe are ‘taken away?’ Such concerns are addressed later (the ‘taking away’ is conceptual.) Since all laws are in the world, there are no laws in the void. Therefore the void can transform to (or annihilate) any state except logically impossible states, i.e., those whose description or concept has a contradiction; therefore any logically possible state exists or will exist and will transform to any other
That every logically possible state exists is a critical idea in showing that particular and abstract objects are not distinct
These thoughts encourage and conjure up ideas of paradox and more; these concerns are addressed in the narrative
Imagine, now, the universe of possibilities that arises. It is possible to speak meaningfully on the variety of things and kinds in the universe, on karma, on recurrence, on God and identity, on the identities of and among individuals…
But what then of science and ‘common sense’ and practical experience? Surely ‘anything is possible’ is absurd. The narrative resolves the absurdity, preserves science and practical knowledge but modifies their interpretation in a way that is consistent with their own principles, and develops implications: these ideas inform every chapter of the text including the variety noted above and that is on display in greater scope and detail in Cosmology. Thus not only it is possible to speak meaningfully on the variety of things and kinds in the universe… but the logic permits this talk to be definitive; the developments in identity provides significance to ‘mere’ facts
There is a story of a disciple who was excited to learn from his teacher that God is in all things. The disciple sees an elephant walking toward him and thinks the exhilarating thought ‘God is in me, I don’t need to move.’ Later, bruised in body and ego, he complains to the teacher about the teaching. The teacher says ‘Yes, God is in you but why didn’t the God in you see the God in the elephant and move out of the way?’ This is the ‘paradox’ of ultimate truth immanent in the present. One may have to learn how to walk that path carefully. There is ultimate truth but the immediate world is no less real for it. Truth revealed shows not just itself but how to relate to this world as well; this concern is addressed in many traditional religions. In this narrative a logic of the side-by-side character of the ultimate and the immediate is developed; this can only help the intuition in accommodating to the real
Naturally, the fist topic in a theory of being will be the working out of the nature of the most general kinds or aspects of things. This is the subject of Metaphysics whose empirical character and some of whose conceptual elements are set up in Being. It is essential to the development of the metaphysics that it should resist any temptation to think of a theory of everything as a theory of the details of all things; this makes the development possible. What makes it powerful? First, it is that the most general aspects and kinds are empirical. It is the flight into imagination and away from the empirical that has made prior systematic metaphysics such as Hegelian metaphysics subject to the criticism that they are, in the end, only fantasy; it is this that has encouraged the invalid generalization that no systematic metaphysics is possible. The generalization is invalid because it concludes from the fact that some systematic metaphysics are marked by non-empirical elements and foundation that all such metaphysics must be non-empirical. However, it has been noted and it will be carefully shown that the metaphysics to be developed is empirical at core
The second characteristic of the metaphysics to be developed that will make it powerful is that it excludes no real kind. Obviously, any proper understanding should contain—the idea of—all things. However, what of laws such as the laws of physics, what of the patterns and forms of things—are these to be included among things? That it is us who see patterns and who read laws suggests to us that the laws are not ‘real’ but merely read. However, even though laws may be read, and even though as read they may be approximate, they refer, approximately, to some actual pattern or dynamic. We may label the actual pattern, dynamic, law, or form by capitalization thus: Pattern, Dynamic, Law, or Form. The universe defined here as all being so that there is precisely one universe must contain all Patterns, Dynamics, Laws and Forms… and all ideas, concepts and so on. The point may be confusing because we may regard Patterns and ideas and so on as being not quite real and if at all real then on the fringes of reality—not quite in this world, and not quite outside it. Some of these ideas may be more and others less confused. However, whatever it is real must lie within all being, i.e., within the universe
Simultaneously, the absence of being, i.e., the void, can contain no thing or kind of thing. In the void, there is no thing, form, pattern, law, idea, image, or concept or other actual kind
This is a logical point and it is this that is the source of power of the metaphysics. Metaphysics develops the system
In this chapter, the various kinds that seem as though they may be kinds are clarified as to nature and, quite in contrast to most modern developments of metaphysics, are found to be capable of placed on common ground. The primary conclusion is that the distinction between abstract and particular objects is one of convenience or approach to study rather than one of kind
Logic and meaning works out a—new—concept of logic as immanent in being and relates it to the traditional concepts of logic. The Logic is immanent and implicit and therefore include the logics; from the development of Objects this enables clarification of the status of traditional logic and shows that principle and investigation, i.e., logic and its application have common ground, i.e., they are not essentially distinct. From Objects it is shown that—linguistic—meaning fits into this same framework
Mind is an important kind. However its status in traditional and modern metaphysics is at best uncertain. In Mind, the concept is clarified; this clarification requires a significant extension to the concept; and the extension requires and therefore makes it possible to see that mind is not another category lying outside being, i.e. mind is on par with and immanent in being and, in the extended concept, immanent in all being
Cosmology includes the theory of the variety of being. In this chapter, application of the metaphysics to the variety with which we are (seemingly) familiar yields a variety of being that far exceeds the traditional variety and is shown to be implicitly complete. That, as will be seen, there is ever being that shall not have knowledge and experience of all being implies there shall ever be, at least on some plane, discovery and adventure, success and failure, pain and joy
Journey works out some consequences of previous developments for the nature of the journey. One consequence is the affinity of being and the form of journey or travel
Method works out the idea that, even though method may appear to stand above, it is not pre-scripted but ‘whatever method arises in-process;’ and that method and study arise together and have only degrees of separability. Method also sets down some formal and informal aspects of method that have arisen in practice. Traditional principles of thought and logic are seen as aspects of method
Do the developments constitute A theory of being or The theory of being? What is said is not hypothetical; it is grounded, factual and logical; it is ultimate in depth, i.e., it requires no infinite regress or further support; it is ultimate in breadth, i.e., every entity and kind is implicit in it; it weaves together the inner and outer worlds—experience and existence. In these ways it is The theory…
There may of course be alternate formulations of the theory; some alternatives are explored in the narrative. If any other theory has valid parts, those parts must be implicit in the theory
The ultimate character of the theory of being developed in the narrative shows that the appellation ‘The Theory of Being’ may be validly employed
For ‘restriction’ to the empirical is not the limitation that it may appear to be
The wholeness emerges in Metaphysics and is a consequence of the recognition that the universe must contain all actual kinds including Law and so on
That it constitutes a framework follows from its ‘wholeness.’ That it is a framework for all being and experience follows from its having universal application
A requirement for a theory of being as the study of being-as-being might be that it not study being in terms of any special categories. This thought is at the root of Aristotle’s as well as Heidegger’s approach to being. The exclusion of special category and substance, in fact substance altogether in its proper meaning, is accomplished in this narrative and is necessary to any theory of universal application. It will be shown that there are and can be no substances in any proper meaning of substance. Provided that mind and matter are specified with sufficient definiteness to be not open to be ‘anything’ neither can be the substance of being and the same will be seen to be true on more abstract interpretations of substance
It is natural of course that the special categories of particular domains should enter into the application of the theory and should be subject to criticism and refinement in the application. Therefore critical doubt regarding the special categories may not survive the application of the theory of being. The actual status of special disciplines and categories will emerge on a case by case basis
The goals of this division include development of a metaphysics. The metaphysics developed—metaphysics of immanence—will be shown to be ultimate in depth and breadth and Being will emerge as its focal concept
The theory of being binds knowledge, depth and variety of being into an ultimate framework
The theory provides a foundation for the more immediate world as developed in Human world and some though not an entire foundation for the Journey. That the foundation shall not be entire is inherent in the open ended nature of the journey. This open ended character, i.e. that whatever greatness there may be it is being-in-itself that is great, shows that no ultimate foundation is desirable even though some foundation is good
The necessity and significance of being and its theory depends on what is included in the concept and what is excluded; this significance will become clear in what follows
The developments depend not only on inclusion and exclusion but also diligence in incorporating experience into the ideas. It is essential of course that the experience to be incorporated is not mere experience or any or every item of experience. The experience to be incorporated must be necessary—in some appropriate sense
It will also be necessary to articulate and demonstrate the validity of this sense
Think about the best placement of this section
The title of this section in other versions was ‘Requirements of a theory of being… .‘
The material in this section covers ‘An ideal metaphysics… ’ and ‘Requirements for a metaphysics… ’
The following is a tentative outline. Search versions since 2003 for ideas
In the process of formulating a Theory of being, which includes integration of ideas from the history of thought, the idea of An ideal theory of being may arise. If the actual theory does not achieve the ideal, the ideal may spur further development; alternatively if it can be shown that the ideal cannot be achieved it will be appropriate to then change the ideal. In the history of thought there is a tension between the ideal and the critical. The present era is critical and the errors of idealist and speculative thought are ‘all too obvious’ in the current—lack of a—world view
In critical times it is often forgotten that criticism itself may have assumptions. In a critical era there is a hidden obsession with correctness over real action, exploration and truth. I.e., significant truth is sacrificed for correctness… even though a little reflection shows that not much is gained by the sacrifice except satisfaction of vanity or obsession
Still, it is possible to have an ideal and the development of a theory of being may be a ‘conversation’ between the real—the development—and the ideal
The present theory of being eliminates the need for the foregoing discussion since its development is ultimate and is therefore equal to or exceeds any ideal that may be imagined except those ideals that contain logical contradiction
It is now possible to state the ideals of a theory of being
Sources: being material.html and index.html
Task: since, in being material.html, the concept of being is well developed, synthesis of the material is especially necessary
Task: this chapter repeats material from First things so as to keep Foundation self contained. This will permit self-contained versions that drop First things. The task is to (1) put all material pertaining to Journey, Being—but not the material on the narrative itself—from First things in Foundation and (2) make the relevant portions of First things an extract—possibly paste special—of First things
A fundamental question—What might be a focal concept for a metaphysics, for an understanding of the world?
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section Origin of and reasons for the interest in Being
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Primary objectives. Frame and motivate ideas for the journey. Explain why Being is fundamental. Understanding in relation to being-in-the-world
The following sections from the 2007 version discuss the centrality of the concept of Being to metaphysics
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Why Being? I.e., why is Being central to metaphysics?
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section The origins of the metaphysics and related developments
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section What are the manifest characteristics of being that make it the basic concept of a metaphysics?
Combine this section with the subsequent, Exhaustive alternatives of understanding and nature of the world: substance versus being. Introduce the sections On substance theory and The problem of substance or essence—introduction from being material.html here? Or… ?
Action and the origin of understanding—animal including human
Whatever is most fundamental is central to understanding and efficiency of action in the world and—therefore—in the journey
For reasons suggested earlier and established below, the central idea in the understanding and action shall be Being
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section Aims of the discussion on being
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section World as substance versus being
The exhaustive options: world-as-world or being versus world-as-other or substance or essence
The failure of substance and essence theories
World-as-being is trivially true and so courts the charge of lacking in power. In fact, however, the approach from being is of ultimate power, depth and breadth
Understanding—pre-commitment, post-commitment and commitment-in-process
The ‘a priori’ meaning: no given meaning, that which is most fundamental for understanding and or action including the issue of whether idea andor action is most fundamental, and, finally, that which is most fundamental
In the foregoing ‘meaning,’ etymology and the history of thought are eschewed insofar as they give us definite meaning—until such meaning is established as consistent with and equivalent to the functional meaning of Being
Being and world
This helps develop the meaning and necessity of Being
There is a need for a term to designate that which is most fundamental (the meaning of the italicized phrase unfolds below)
Among the connotations of Being, one is that which is most fundamental
At outset, here, this meaning of Being is selected
All other meanings and connotations of Being are temporarily suppressed until further consideration necessitates their acceptance or rejection
Among these other meanings is a (the) meaning rooted in the verb to be. In this meaning, Being is that which is or that which has the quality that permits application of some form of the verb to be… simply, Being is that which is (there.) This meaning of being is suppressed temporarily but it will unfold that it has identity with that which is most fundamental
Since being is a ‘charged’ term from the history of thought might it not be better to use some other term, perhaps a coinage? Being is selected, first, because of the great significance of the ‘simple’ root meaning in the verb to be. It is selected, secondly, because of the power that it derives from in its place in the Western tradition of thought and from the power of similar terms from other traditions. One task of this narrative will therefore be to avoid the potential confusions from the multiple connotations and uses of ‘being’ and to reject, at least as fundamental, meanings that are slanted toward local or prejudiced contexts, e.g. world as this cosmos or world as essentially spiritual or essentially material…
That which is most fundamental—what is the meaning of the phrase and to what does it refer? Perhaps even in the history of human thought the most that can be hoped is to be in a process of answering these questions
At outset the idea of being as that which is most fundamental is unknown in a number of ways
One of the aims of the present narrative is to attempt some answers. In thinking of that which is most fundamental the concerns arise—most fundamental for what and to who? The developments of the narrative attempt to be and are thought, not only to provide some answers, but also to be a framework for addressing the various concerns. To what extent the questions are answered and to what extent the narrative remains in a process-of-answering shall emerge
It will be shown that the metaphysics of Metaphysics is explicitly ultimate in its depth and that will entail that it is a theory that requires and allows no substance and yet whose chain of demonstration from elementary terms to the world is finite. It follows that any other system can have equal but not greater depth and that the depth is finite; in fact, with regard to depth, shallowness will be seen to be a strength. With regard to breadth or variety the metaphysics is implicitly ultimate; this means that while any particular actual entity is contained in the domain of the metaphysics the end result of any finite chain of demonstration cannot be a complete display of the variety in the world. The determination and experience of variety, at least for finite individuals, must remain ever in process. In itself this is significant for it is not otherwise known whether the determination and experience of variety is terminating even though it may be suspected to be infinite. However, the metaphysics is not empty with regard to explicit variety—it permits the display of a explicit variety that contains any explicit variety determined by other means including science, myth and religion, art, literature and poetry
A specific form of the question is ‘What is the being of an entity such as an electron or a human being?’ The question includes whether there are electrons as described in any theory of the electron and whether the description is merely instrumental or that of an actual entity; and if the description is that of an entity whether the entity a substance, irreducible and eternal, or whether it is the manifestation of something else. The question includes the question of the meaning the various questions. In the case of human being the question is less theoretical in we might not want to refer to something else; we might be interested in our intrinsic nature and, of course, the meaning of ‘intrinsic nature’
The answer to such questions need not be simple—the word that in that which is most fundamental may be a collection of concepts, i.e. a compound rather than an atomic concept
The general form of the question has already been stated—What is it that is most fundamental? What is the meaning of the question? Even the open character of the question encourages doubt that there is any definite-like answer, is there an answer? Are there such answers?
It is not given that the answer to the general question will be more than a collection of the answers to the specific questions. It is not given that there shall be any unity to the specific questions
In Metaphysics and subsequent developments it is shown that there is a definite answer. And, instead, of showing that there is a sense in which the answer obtains—there is—the answer and its ultimate significance are demonstrated
In that every entity may ‘enjoy’ its existence, answers to the questions of being are various. This is contained in the metaphysics which also shows that there is an answer to the general question that is a framework for the specific questions in their here-now and their ultimate forms
Being as whatever is most fundamental—as unknown
The object of ‘whatever is most fundamental’ as it emerges in process, e.g. in this narrative
Even an object has been demonstrated, the in-process or unknown aspect is not eliminated for when, as in this narrative some answer is thought to have been given, the author may continue the discovery and experience of variety and someone else may criticize the attempt and shelve it or attempt to start it anew
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, sections The problem of substance or essence—introduction and On substance theory
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Why substance and essence are important in the tradition but not in the ultimate metaphysics to be developed
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section A preliminary analysis of substance and essence
The main discussion of substance is here. There is a brief treatment in Metaphysics that discusses Substance, determinism and absolute indeterminism, reiterates from metaphysics of immanence the untenability of substance, and ties up any loose ends
The discussion of substance may be reduced to the minimum needed to make the points that (1) there is an extensive tradition of substance theory in philosophy, (2) that substance theory as the idea that the world-is-something-else is untenable, and (3) that this suggests being, i.e., world-as-world
The idea of substance—simplicity behind complexity, changelessness behind change
The ideal of substance—single and not dual-multiple, uniform and without boundary, unchanging and eternal, that is the essence of the manifest world of variety and change
Note that eternity is not necessarily an actual infinity of time if, e.g., (1) time should loop back on itself or (2) if it were to slow down so that its citizens experienced a ‘finite’ time as unending. The second option is questionable in that if all individuals including any elementary particles experienced the slowing, would not another measure in which time extended infinitely be indistinguishable from the measure in which time is finite? Note, similarly, that uniform substance without boundary does not necessarily entail an infinite space
The necessity of determinism in being the essence of the manifest world
The intellectual appeal of substance: simplicity, laziness
The emotional appeal: similar to the intellectual appeal—the purity and cleanliness of the world
Ideas of substance—the first idea, ‘stuff,’ Thales—water, atomism, materialism, idealism; monism and dualism
Note: in some of the points below there is repetition from First things-Being-The concept of being
Eliminate excess duplication r/t above note; minimize details to essentials
Ideas of substance—the second idea, ‘knowledge,’ Plato—idea, idealism; sense and empiricism; Kant and the rise of epistemology even though Kant himself did not hold to an out-and-out ‘epistemologism,’ Meinong and the concept-object; Wittgenstein, fact, logical empiricism-atomism; philosophy as analysis of language, philosophy as any philosophy is this-ism; Heidegger’s premature conflation of appearance-reality; Husserl’s premature positing of forms of experience—premature phenomenalism;
Note: below, in experience, we see the intersection of idea and stuff; this understanding of intersection which begins to be seen in the analysis of experience is completed in Metaphysics
Ideas of substance—Vaihinger, the theory of ‘fictions’ and ‘as-if’
The implicit pervasion of substance thinking: substance in knowledge and morals—knowledge and morals are part of the world but their explicit mention is pivotal in identifying certain habits of substance thinking in ethics, in the role and significance of knowledge and epistemology; anthropomorphism, cosmomorphism and a variety of morphisms and reductionisms; a priori-ism in general; hard headed thinking, forcing the real to fit the mold of thinking; determinism; the idea of determinate form, essentialism; knowing over being and the a priori ban of the same from any understanding of the world
The untenability of substance—from determinism
Two uses of substance—from Journey in Being-New World-essence.html
There is a second notion of substance in the history of thought whose motivation includes the idea that if the universe does not have a single essence, perhaps there are kinds of things, e.g. species, that each have their own essence. This notion is now taken up—and will also be rejected
The two uses of ‘substance’ are roughly that of the distinction sortal/non-sortal or sortal/mass term. Horse is a sortal because it can be asked ‘How many horses are there?’ ‘Horse-hood’ is a mass term because it may, instead, asked ‘How much horse-hood is there?’ Roughly, a sortal is something pertaining to a sort. When Thales suggested water as the stuff of which the world is made, the thought is that water is the essence of everything but not a sort. Similarly, matter, idea as distinct from an idea and even knowledge-as-stuff are not sortals. But the untenability of substance just demonstrated is an untenability of the mass term as substance. Therefore in order to defuse this problem of substance, each kind has been suggested by various thinkers to be ‘its own substance.’ Thus the substance ‘horse’ is the kind of all horses. This use arises in asking what the essence of a particular thing may be, e.g. what is the essence of being a horse or a mountain. However, this concept of substance runs into precisely the same difficulty as the mass concept substance. For each horse is different as can be seen by simply looking. And if the sortal-substance-horse is to be explanatory, it cannot so be because the sortal-substance-horse cannot explain through determinism the variety of horses. It then comes down to ‘everything is its own substance!’ Of course this is no substance explanation at all
Aristotle was an early proponent of the sortal view of substance and for the kinds of reason above. But surely Aristotle must have worried about the ultimate artificiality of a substance for each kind as not altogether different from the idea of a single kind—as he attempted to repress the artificiality and illogic of his idea?
Aristotle’s substance is not too different from Plato’s form. Why then did Aristotle reject form? It is perhaps more than the rejection of the master’s thought. It is perhaps realism—Plato’s forms were citizens of another world. Aristotle’s substances were of this world
However, even in Aristotle’s thought the substances are not quite of the world—the substance horse is not any particular horse. What and where, the question arises, is the substance horse? This is a difficulty over and above the logical need for an infinity of horse substances each identical to some actual horse. The infinity of horse substances ‘solves’ the problem of the nature and location of the substance for each substance is the thing and its location is identical to that of the thing. As seen, however, this is not a substance theory at all
In this narrative the general notion of substance is replaced by a (the) theory of being. The sortal kind is replaced by a theory of form. However, the forms are not resident in another world. There are as many forms as there are things but this turns out to not be a problem because the forms are dynamic-actual-immanent-this worldly rather than static-perfect-remote-other worldly. The forms are explanatory-determinative in (1) showing a dynamic of the being-becoming of entities and, (2) understanding kinds of entities by seeing by abstraction of the common elements of their form as an abstract-dynamic form. It will be seen however that the abstract forms are not resident in another world or in mental or conceptual space and are not essentially non-temporal—temporality may be effectively abstracted out of some abstract forms so that they are temporally neutral but not atemporal. Further, it will be seen in Objects that there is no real distinction between the entities and the abstract forms
The assertions of the previous paragraph will be clarified and demonstrated
Note. In recent developments and philosophy of biology it has been recognized that species are populations and not essences but, while this may be lend weight to the argument it gives no logical support to it. The argument, however, requires no further support
Substance theory is therefore rejected
Still, even though we will not use the term ‘substance,’ this thought is taken up below in terms of a second connotation of substance that is the basis of developing and improving what detailed understanding of the world we may be given
The explanation from being as being explanation from this and not another world, as explanation that is not in terms of something else
In Metaphysics, it is seen that the distinction breaks down
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section Being as existence
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Existence
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section The concept of existence
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Being
Integrate the following topics into the main discussion that follows
When the above topics are integrated eliminate the level 5 heading ‘Main discussion’ and this comment line
The sense in which this says nothing—and therefore implicitly everything
Local global, below, could go here
The phrase ‘the quality of having’ rather than ‘that which has’ emphasizes being over beings
The significance of the phrase ‘in its entirety’ is explained later
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section Approach to study…
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Issues regarding existence
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Existence versus essence
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Existence and being
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Three paradoxes of the concept of existence
1. Substance versus being-as-being has been addressed above
2. Paradoxes and problems regarding the concepts of being and existence
3. The problem of explaining-determining the world in its own terms, i.e., the problem of the explanatory-determinative power of the concept of being
4. The existential problems of being—whether anything exists and what things exist. These questions have trivial and a non-trivial aspects. The—practically—trivial aspects are especially significant in clarifying the nature of the concepts and laying the foundation for the development of powerful methods of analysis and demonstration. The non-trivial aspects of the issue of what things exist include, first, establishing the nature of concrete or particular objects such as the common objects of experience, second, existence or non-existence of problematic kinds such as abstract kinds such as number and, third, laying the foundation to establish the existence of an ultimate variety of objects whose existence would otherwise be merely possible
5. The problem of the nature of the world and its variety which is taken up in Metaphysics through Cosmology and the applied to our world in Human world
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section The problem of the nature of being
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section The problem of the nature of being
This just repeats what is above
Although we reject as untenable the explanation in terms of something else or substance and we see, therefore, the logical possibility and necessity of explanation-in-its-own terms, is not this explanation trivial?
We begin to see the non-trivial character of this mode of explanation, first, in the integral character of experience, then in the necessary forms of experience, and finally, its ultimate character in the metaphysics in Metaphysics. It is noteworthy that the development in the metaphysics follows very closely from the necessary forms
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section The problem of existence and its meaning—an introduction
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section The allegation that ‘existence’ is trivial, that it is not a concept
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section The problem of the non-existent object
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section The first existential problem of being—whether anything exists. Experience
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Experience and being are primary—why. Experience and proximate being; its relation to being-as-being. The Heideggerian reduction
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Experience
Includes the problem of the existence of the external world which is, again, important for in clarification and development of approaches to demonstration. The resolution of the problem begins here and is completed in Metaphysics and Objects
For the problem of the external world see also elements of the narrative.html
Enter a note on the ‘subject’
Experience and concept
Determine placement of the following—To deny being is to misunderstand experience and existence
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section The second existential problem of being—what exists. The forms of experience…
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section The forms of experience
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section What has being?
Note that the problem might have been ‘what things exist’ and that is not bad except it is efficient to extend thing to kind of thing
There is a further essential extension that concerns the meaning of ‘thing.’ Often ‘thing’ refers to something concrete or particular. However there are ethereal ‘things’ such as air; these two should be included but the extension of the sense of ‘thing’ required to include air is not significant. Are ghosts included? If ghosts exist then, certainly, they are. What of abstract ‘things’ such as numbers, values, properties, kinds, partial things, forms, ideas, sentences, grammar, logic and logics, abstractions… Here we are primarily concerned with particular things, e.g., a person, the atmosphere… The notion of existence is elaborated in Metaphysics and Objects where the criteria of existence and the concepts of particular and abstract objects are developed. The idea of the abstract object is developed in a way that leaves by the wayside the vagueness and the sense of unreality of abstract objects that marks most writing on the subject. The distinction between abstract and particular objects will be seen to be one of approach to study rather than essence and existence of an array of abstract and particular objects of unexpected breadth demonstrated with surprising definitiveness
Critique of the meaning and significance of faithfulness and of knowledge as knowing-the-object. Subsumption of the general case of the concept, e.g., even in primitive organisms and elementary particles under the ‘practical object’
The discussion focuses on the forms of experience:
Review the following examples—the self and the external world, the common objects, identity, the intuition: sense through concept, this cosmos, the human condition, inference, category, and judgment
Should the following be done here? Raise the question of the distinction between the contingent and the necessary and whether it is contingent upon restriction to the known universe. Observe that it may turn out that all consistent concepts may have objects in some worlds and that this would eliminate the distinction—with profound consequences. Briefly note that this will be established in Metaphysics
Source: being material.html, Part II: the new material of 2007, section Existence, sub-section Local and global modes of description
Now, let us regard the earlier ‘formal’ uses of ‘substance’ as one and consider another direction of meaning and motive to substance
The individual did not create the world—the world is found to have a certain given-ness. This is a second source of the idea and a meaning of ‘substance.’ That the given-ness of the world is experienced or interpreted differently by different individuals explains the different kinds of substances and even the fact that not all individuals see the world as substance
The individual did not create the world—the world is found to have a certain given-ness: this is true in the normal sense of ‘individual.’ The meaning of ‘normal’ and the suggestion that there is a sense of ‘individual’ in which the individual participates in creation and in which there is no absolute experience of given-ness is taken up in Metaphysics
Still it is typical to find ourselves in the situation of the ‘normal’ individual, i.e., to experience the world as substance
This experience is critical for it is in terms of substance that so much of our contextual understanding, e.g. science lies
Foundation first develops the theory of being. Then, in Human world, the theory is ‘applied’ to human being. It might be better to say that the study of the human world is developed in terms contextual knowledge of this world and the universal ‘context’ of theory of being. I.e., contextual or contingent knowledge is (best) developed as an interaction of being and substance in its second connotation. Further, this interaction sharpens understanding of being; this sharpening is of course present in the development of understanding and action, in the journey, even though it may be somewhat suppressed in the narrative
In Cosmology there is a brief discussion of a practical use of substance in normal—e.g. local, physical—cosmologies
Source: being material.html, Part I: the new material of 2008, section On meaning
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section On meaning
Source: being material.html, Part II: the material of 2007, section Concepts and objects
We have been working with meaning and here accumulate some practical thoughts on meaning
Refer back to concept and object
Discussion of meaning at this point is appropriate and useful. However, the formal discussion of meaning is in Logic and meaning. Therefore the title to this section could be Epilogue: On meaning
Rename heading: Word ‘problem’ … ‘Understanding and action’ …
This extends knowledge / philosophy / metaphysics from the realm of idea into being-action; it releases epistemology from the staleness of European universities into being
What has been said so far may have the implicit suggestion that understanding is substance
This thought may be emotionally and intellectually appealing
However understanding is an incomplete being-in-the-world. First and most importantly understanding, at least in its normal meaning, is not the world; however, if we accept extension and duration as defining extent, then understanding and becoming or idea and action are, over all beings, the world. Secondly, and this supports the first point, understanding is only implicitly complete over its own domain as seen in the explicit incompleteness of any knowledge of the variety of being pointed out above and demonstrated in the metaphysics
…thus the importance of journey of which there is an image in Foundation and which is taken up in the part Journey and which ‘completes’ Foundation
Sources: metaphysics—the source document, substance, emotion and cognition. Tropes—E. J. Lowe’s web article Recent advances in metaphysics
Tasks. Minimize and eliminate duplication among Being and Metaphysics. Possibly eliminate advance treatments of Objects, Logic… and transfer material to the particular chapters…
The formal metaphysics may be developed independently of Being. However the developments of Being are suggestive and provide a mesh between the immediate world of individual or animal or human experience and the ultimate world of the metaphysics. Being provides an understanding of the success of the metaphysics. Metaphysics and Being have mesh and independence and in this independence the development is different from such developments as those of Heidegger and Husserl. The independence has been seen to be a source of power. The kind of approach of Heidegger may be useful to a deep embedding of the individual in this world and in the ultimate and may be useful. However, it is desirable for in the service of the real and of individual being for the individual to step out of his or her paper-being in the pages of a text and into the world. This is an important aspect of Journey in being and it is anticipated that any commitment to paper of a more detailed character of an individual journey will be a story, even a moral, rather than a universal paradigm even when the story of a remarkable person
Integrate the following topic into the main discussion
The main treatment of substance theory is placed in Being. Here, (1) briefly discuss: Substance, determinism and absolute indeterminism, (2) reiterate from metaphysics of immanence the untenability of substance, and (3) tie up any loose ends regarding substance theory
Absolute possibility
Relative possibility
Remarks on absolute and relative possibility
Existence and fundamental properties of the void
Doubts about the existence of the void
An objection to the proof of existence of the void
An objection to the proof that the void contains no Object—no Form, Pattern or Law
Alternate proofs of the existence of the void
A clarification
An inductive ‘proof’ of the existence of the void
The fundamental principle of metaphysics
A restatement of the principle
Properties of the void
The universe is equivalent to the void
The fundamental problem of metaphysics
Fact is stranger than fiction
On Logic
A metaphysics that is ultimate in breadth
The breadth is the highest consistent order of infinity
Discovery without end
Resolution of the apparent violation of common sense—and science
Further properties of the void
Sources of focus on the void
On substance, determinism and absolute indeterminism
Relation to Heidegger’s thought
Monism
Dualism
The problem of substance theory is the problem of determinism
Metaphysics of substance and metaphysics of determinism are duals
The Void and the elimination of substance
Simplicity of the void. The void is ultimate in simplicity
Metaphysics of immanence is non-relativist philosophy without substance
The metaphysics of immanence is ultimate in depth
Substance continued—mind and matter
Anthropomorphism and ‘cosmomorphism’
A guiding principle for the metaphysician
Some reflections on and consequences from the ‘guiding principle’
Form and the nature of Form
All Forms are dynamic
Mechanism
Sentient form
Symmetry. Platonic aspects of the character of Form
A metaphysics of form
There is no separate Platonic world
On power
General conclusions and observations
Conclusions of and about the metaphysics from the empirical domains
Conclusions from the metaphysics regarding empirical knowledge
Conclusions from the fact and form of experience about the nature of experiencing
Some thoughts on the form of sentience follow
Some details of a logic of the nature of the field of experience now follow
1. The basis in mere concepts is only apparent. The actual basis has been seen to be empirical
2. The void lies below the quantum vacuum
3. Common sense may be violated. However, the developments are dually empirical and rational. Therefore, common sense may require reeducation
The general problem identified. Resolution: one word, two symbols (concepts)
A serious version of the problem. The charge that the selected meaning of existence is untenable. Response—given the present analyses of experience and existence, the first burden of argument lies with the critic
If the critic does not respond to the first burden of proof but continues to insist that their meaning is the meaning they have not heard or understood the ‘one word, two symbols’ argument (assuming of course that no further argument has been produced by the critic)
Absurdity of the one word, one symbol argument of some ‘critics’
Proper criticism should address the entire system of meaning rather than just individual word meaning. Possibility of open ended versus closed discussion
Reasons for confidence in the present narrative and reasons for openness to discussion
It is hoped that discussion should not reduce to quibbles about sign-association. An example: the ultimate versus the immediate
The metaphysics is systematic and empirical
There is, in principle, one metaphysics
Existence of the necessary objects
Identity of the actual, the possible and the necessary
The fundamental principle of metaphysics
Every concept has an object
Resolution of the fundamental problem of metaphysics
There are no fictions
The void is ultimately simple
Every element of being has its own void
The universe is absolutely indeterministic
Necessary existence of normal cosmologies
Substance and determinism are twins
The void may be regarded as the ground of being
A metaphysics of ultimate breadth
A metaphysics that is ultimate in depth
Mind, matter and substance
The methods sheds anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism
A metaphysics of form
Pure metaphysics
General metaphysics
Pure metaphysics includes its principles
Objects
Logic
Meaning
Mind
Cosmology
Journey
Human World
Sources: objects—the source document, empiricism-rationalism
The introduction will consider the idea of the object, the goals of a discussion of objects, the achievement of the goals and the contribution of this achievement to thought, and, finally, the place of the chapter in the narrative
While some problems concerning the concept of the object have been mentioned earlier, the concept has been used casually. While the concept of the object is not as critical in the present metaphysics as it is in the pictures—here rejected—in which metaphysics is impossible it is still important, first in anchoring the individual in this world and, second, in clarifying the nature of the object which we receive in a somewhat confused state from earlier metaphysics
It may be useful repeat earlier conclusions on the nature of the possibility of metaphysics. Since the era of Kant, a metaphysics as the study of being-as-being has been regarded as impossible. The thought stems from Kant’s analysis that, while there is being-as-such what we can know is at most a metaphysics of experience. Here, this supremacy of the metaphysics of experience—of epistemology over metaphysics—is rejected. First, the metaphysics of immanence shows that we can know that there is an immense and—otherwise—unexpected variety of being in the world and that this variety is of great significance to human being on par with the here-and-now. Second, a careful analysis of experience has shown that this metaphysics is not merely an abstract metaphysics that has been shown by abstract (but strict) methods to obtain but is—in senses clarified earlier—a metaphysics of experience and, therefore, what appeared abstract is not merely abstract and what appeared remote is intimate with the here-and-now
Faithfulness and accuracy. Reflection on the concept-object system. Pre-con-formation
Programmed development versus learning
Memory of form and memory of facts
Reduction of the infinity of conceivable objects
Reconstruction in construction of images (and thought)
The memory-concept
Iconic perception. Thought and reason
Inadequacy of the empiricist and rationalist programs
Transcendental approach
Universals are abstract objects
Sources: logic material.html
Observations. 1. The idea introduced in this chapter of a variant concept of Logic that is different from, real rather than merely formal, but that includes the idea of the traditional view. 2. That the new and variant concept of Logic begins in percept and concept. It begins especially in the empirical percept-concepts of being, thing or object—grounded in extension, duration and distinction, absence, and all. The necessary—and of course empirical—idea that all includes all: concept, pattern, law, form, all objects. In the percept-concept lies the possibility of truth and falsehood and in the free-concept the possibility of contradiction; so here is the common origin of contingency and necessity—of fact and logic. Thus, in a sense, what is called formal logic and what is thought to be non-empirical may be labeled para-Logic; it is of course non-empirical in its reference though not in its possibility—evaluate this claim. 3. As noted in Journey in Being-New World-essence.html, of the fundamental principles of logic but not Logic—identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle—the principle of identity is near tautology, the principle of the excluded middle is questionable, and, therefore, the principle of non-contradiction is, perhaps, the essential principle of logic. There are oppositions to the principle; and mathematicians and logicians are sometimes willing to allow the ‘para-consistent’ systems that exception to it imply. However, the principle essentially says that things are not what they are not and its strict violation makes all statements true. Since things are what they are, the system is para-Logical even though it may be logical. 4. In the early modern era, the distinction between formal logic and science was not altogether clear. Science contains two ‘logical’ processes. In the first facts are the occasion though not at all the entire basis for the laws and theories of science. The process of ‘deriving’ the theories is especially one of recognizing patterns; recognizing is not pure recognition but includes ‘gestalts’ that could be otherwise; therefore, even when the sum total of current ‘evidence’ weighs in favor of the theory, it still contains an hypothetical element. In the past, theories with a history and domain of success have been thought of as necessary. Therefore, a logic of derivation of theories was sought. Such a logic was called inductive. We now know that the derivation of scientific theories was not logical in the sense of necessity; we could have known this, the Greeks knew it, but the distinction was not universal in the modern era until the late nineteenth, and perhaps the twentieth centuries. Therefore, logic today is regarded as deductive and is distinct from the induction of scientific theories. The second logical aspect of science is the prediction of results given certain data and the theories; this is in fact deductive but is only a small part of deductive logic. 5. However, the join of the empirical and the necessary in Logic suggests that science and Logic are not as separate as has come to be generally accepted. This is why science and mathematics are included here alongside logic in the discussion of Logic. Precisely what is the relation can only be stated after the development of the metaphysics of immanence. We can now see the nature of the Logical necessity of every consistent scientific theory; and it is via the concept of the normal that the old distinctions remain valid in our local context. Thus the new Logic and related ideas do not invalidate the nineteenth-twentieth century clarifications in their domains of validity. 6. In the dual origin of empiric-logic, we also see the intimacy of Logic and meaning… which informs the selection of the title of the present chapter
A note in relation to the fundamental principle of logic. It was suggested above that the principle of non-contradiction is the essential principle of logic. Two observations are pertinent in this regard. (1) The principle of reference is emerging as perhaps the essential principle of logic. (2) As observed, mathematicians are often willing to work with the possibility of paradox so as to admit richness of content. Graham Priest has introduced the idea of dialethic logic in which contradictions are permitted—in part because of his claim that there are true contradictions—and this is ‘consistent’ in that such logics are non-explosive, i.e., one true contradiction in such logics does not imply A for all A. What is the truth of this idea? Similarly, what is the ‘truth’ of modal, many valued, fuzzy and many other logics? It is difficult to get good handle on these issues when treating logics as axiomatic systems. This point emphasizes the importance of the first claim in the modified version that the principle of reference should emerge as the essential principle of logic
Some experiments with compound propositions may be found in earlier versions of Journey in Being
Keep this? As a separate section?
Refer to abstract objects
Alternate: Ockham’s principle
The present chapter introduces ‘mind’ and discusses it at a general level. The central aim is to attempt to free the concept of mind from immediate human experience as conditioned by received notions and philosophies of mind. A detailed discussion of human—animal—mind is taken up in Human world, below
The earlier discussion of experience is fundamental to mind
There is perhaps a native state of human-being that is not excessively conditioned by philosophies that disenfranchise the individual from his or her natural condition. That natural condition is perhaps one in which there is no special focus on mind but is one in which the individual is intimately bound to the world through experience. In this state the individual has not heard the droning of the intellectuals telling him or her to not believe experience, reminding him or her of the ephemerality and barely existent character of that experience in relation to material reality. This native state is perhaps closer to the being of mind than the sum total of our received philosophy of mind in the western tradition. Of course, the idea of the native state is not presented here as a theory or reality but as a suggestion for the reader to catalyze a freeing up from the chains of illusion of a disenfranchised view that claims to be empirical but is in fact highly metaphysical in asserting the ultimate reality of the ‘objects’ of science as ultimate
The present discussion is empirical in taking the immediate as ground but not as the form of the world. The form of the world falls out only after analysis. The earlier discussion of experience has laid the groundwork for showing how to bind the empirical and the rational. The discussion follows that mold
In any view, mind and matter are conceived in certain terms. In some views, there is a gulf between mind and matter. Still, mind and matter refer to aspects of experience. Therefore in any ultimate view mind and matter converge upon the real and therefore each to the other, i.e., in the ultimate extension of the concepts, mind and matter cannot be distinct
In this chapter, the concept of mind is taken to its ground or root where it is found to be identical with being. Of course this may be confusing to the reader who holds on to a received notion of mind to the exclusion of all others. One way for this reader to free him or herself up from self-limitation is to remember that although ‘mind’ is one sign, it may be many symbols. The aim of the chapter is to find the ultimate form of that symbol
Along the way, a number of classic concerns and illusions regarding mind are cleared up
Source: cosmology material.html
Possible task. Incorporate ‘two divides’
Task. Eliminate repetition in the following main and sub-topics
Develop the ideas of truth, real, universal using earlier versions of Journey in Being and external sources
The purpose of this chapter is to collect together earlier reflections on the journey and to show its fundamental character to being-in-the-world and the-being-of-the-world
Source: journey material.html
Note. In Journey in Being-New World-essence.html this chapter and the next, Method, came later in a division, Journey, and were called The idea of a journey and Principles of thought, respectively
Note. It is important that Method, Principles of thought, Human world—especially Faith, Ideas, and Transformation should come after Journey and this is one reason for the change in location
Note. There may be duplication of material here and in First things
Journey was the division, The idea of a journey from the part Journey of Journey in Being-New World-essence.html. Here it becomes a chapter. Think about the following topics… Is Narrative necessary? Should it go somewhere else, e.g., to First things
Here is the outline from The idea of journey was the division, The idea of a journey from the part Journey of Journey in Being-New World-essence.html. The subsection A magnificent delusion… has been added
The following may go to the part Journey
Is Method including Principles of thought distinct from Logic? Should Method be placed in Logic?
It is time to revaluate the relationship between content and method. That content and method are interwoven is appreciated. What is in question is the depth of their identity, and the manner of the relation… This also has dimensions of form and particular, law and element
Of course method is ‘what method has arisen along the way.’ Method and investigation emerge together and remain in interaction; it is therefore essential that aspects of method are specific to context
Principles of thought and action are practices, especially reflective practices, that are conducive to creativity of thought and action—to the construction of realistic systems of ideas of and action various levels of generality
Method now includes Principles of thought and action—in Journey in Being-New World-essence.html principles include method. In Journey in Being-New World-essence.html the section on method has no named subtopics
There is currently no outline for method per se
Task. Generate a brief outline and source document if helpful
There is not much that is new to say regarding method since its development is implicit in the foregoing
The basic idea of method is the join of the empirical and the rational in perception-conception
Via this idea, we see the identity of Logic and Metaphysics and the empirical character of conception that may have otherwise been thought of as speculative
In this idea lies the foundation of the ultimate metaphysics of immanence, the theory of objects and the elimination of any ultimate character of the abstract-particular distinction, the origin and variety of cosmology, and any ultimate character of the rational-empirical distinction
Comment. Faith could be here but can be more complete in Human world. Placement of some of its parts would be relevant here to the content of Foundation, especially to Metaphysics, Objects, Cosmology, Journey and Method. However, placement in Human world makes it otherwise more relevant. Make a note of this here
Here is the outline from Journey in Being-New World-essence.html for Principles of thought and action whose final section Method has been promoted to chapter and placed over Principles
Imagination, criticism, world and text
Listing possibilities
Source: emotion and cognition. Journey in Being (2006) may contain useful detailed information for Human world… and a significant conceptualization of Ethics (discarded in 2007-2008)
Think about the occurrence, names and content of these topics:
It may be natural to emphasize the human world but the topic is our world inclusive of the forms of life, matter and relationship
Task and note. This introductory chapter to Human world was not in the original version of Journey in Being-New World-essence.html and does not yet have a source document
What would the lineaments of such a theory be? The logical join of Theory of being and real knowledge of individual and society… in which both are subject simultaneously to criticism and joint elaboration?
Search versions since 2003 for ideas
…in the context of life; a similar comment applies to the next chapter
Task and note. This chapter does not yet have a source document
The introductory discussion lies in Journey in Being-New World-essence.html
The following is a new version of the discussion of language. It started with the version in Journey in Being-New World-essence.html. There may still be some elements from the older version to incorporate
Also see the section On meaning in Being
Language is important to human being and to the journey as a primary mode of expression and communication. Expressive modes include affect and cognition. Communication is lateral—among persons and communities, and vertical—over time and generations. Although speech is perhaps the native medium of language, all modes of expression and communication are enhanced by written language
‘Prose’ is perhaps most effective with regard to literal, cognitive content and poetry, which on the syntactic-semantic model, has para-linguistic elements, is effective for suggestive and affective meaning. Metaphor may be thought of as a poetry of ideas
The importance of the thoughts in the previous paragraph to this narrative is that they raise the question ‘what is language?’
The following discussion of language considers issue of the nature of language and reviews the possibilities of language that emerge from a consideration of Theory of being and linguistics
From the Theory of being as elaborated in Being through Logic and meaning, it is clear that a language that is complete relative to the possibilities of expression and communication is possible, except by accident, only in terms of a complete metaphysics such as the Theory of being itself. Further, since the completeness of the theory is implicit with regard to breadth, a complete language under its aegis is possible only in regard to the realm for which the theory’s explicit completeness has been realized so far
Main concepts
language, function, expression, representation, and communication
It is common though not essential to think of language in terms of function. Therefore there is some ‘risk’ in talking of language as though its limits are defined by functions. Yet function may be a useful approach to analysis. An analysis of the relations of the organism and the world which includes other organisms may suggest a theory of the functions. If language is expression of state of being, the functions of language have some correspondence to the state of being of the organism which include relations to world, self, and other. It is pertinent that ‘state of being’ is not a mere description in terms of place and time but may include intent or relation to the world wrapped into the state of an organism
(1) The functions of relation to the world include the affective such as appreciation and the cognitive such as representation and assertion. Assertion is representation as true-representation. (2) The functions of self-relations, over and above relations to the rest of the world—self is part of the world and the objective character of such statements has been established in Objects—include expression and musing. (3) The communicative functions of relation to others include the previous, especially assertion and expression. Expression is perhaps the root form. The form of assertion is not invariably distinct from that of expression but may be inferred from context or marked by inflexion or other device. The distinct functions of communication, those that do not fall under relation to self or world, have been analyzed in recent analytic thought to be commission, declaration and direction. These functions are possible for self-relations but their force in that case has differences from their force in the case of other-relations
In broad terms the functions of language may be regarded as expression including representation and communication. In terms of relation to self or world (which includes others) the functions may be analyzed as assertion, direction, commission, expression, and declaration. Assertion includes the sub-forms of fact, exclamation, and question…
Language and para-language
language, para-language
Although language as generally understood has distinct brain centers it does not follow that it is an entity unto itself. I.e., the naming of ‘para-language’ does not identify separate objects—language and para-language. Para-language is typically though not essentially verbal and is usually called para-verbal. Para-linguistic phenomena——is usually referred to as para-verbal. Written language may be speculated to have had origin in para-verbal phenomena. Origins, of course, do not relegate descendants to a lesser status; descendants may exceed forbears in terms of magnitudes and qualities. Yet the intimate tie-in among speech, and organism—brain—and community gives speech a special status
Speech and para-verbal language
speech, para-verbal language
Para-linguistic phenomena are often referred to as para-linguistic communication but para-linguistic expression and representation are also real and important
Syntax and structure of the world; semantics and objects
states of affairs, processes, structure of states and processes, words, syntax, syntactical form, semantics
Syntactical form has some relations to the structure of the world, e.g., to the structure of states of affairs and processes. As seen in Logic, a requirement that language be an effective tool for the function of representation implies the separation of syntax and semantics shall be complete only in those special contexts or approximate modes of thought in which the world assumes atomic form. Generally, however, syntax has implicit semantics—relations between word-word and world-world relations—which is saying, roughly, that syntax is the form of meaning, i.e., of sense-reference
Subject-predicate form. Generally linear form of language
subject-predicate form, generally linear form of language
Work out the question of non-subject predicate forms, examples, nonlinear expression… in greater detail and definitiveness
The form of representation is often taken to be the subject-predicate form. However, there are forms of language, especially those relating to affect, e.g. a groan, that are not in (explicit) subject-predicate form. The implicit form of all forms of language is a topic for investigation
Other forms. Speech, linear and nonlinear expression
non subject-predicate forms, e.g., perhaps the groan
non-universality of subject-predicate form; non-predicative utterances; formal exclusion from written form-the domain of the priest and the scholar... a mark of distinction… distinction as a source of the intuition of correct syntax over and above the semantic content of syntax
Speech is naturally but not inherently linear. Therefore spoken language is predominantly linear. Written forms lend themselves to geometric expression and communication but speech may be used to the same effect because of the sign-context nature of language and the especial relation of speech to context. In combination with dramatic expression—that tends to be underemphasized in linguistic analysis for reasons identified below—speech escapes its linear form
Language production and comprehension is a form of intuition but this does not mean that it is entirely innate
‘Language’ as usually understood has continuity with iconic and dramatic production and ‘interpretation.’ Even when language in its typical understanding has been well defined, this continuity is one motive to ask again ‘what is language?
The central place of linear, verbal language and the de-emphasis of other forms and affect in linguistic theory arise perhaps because that form of language becomes a selective factor for kinds of intelligence, perception and activity. It has been suggested that a reason for the de-emphasis of emotion is due to its ineffability; however it has been seen that the putative ineffability is an illusion founded on insistence on looking in a certain putatively scientific way. Put another way, the ineffability is in fact prejudice. The de-emphasis of affect may build toward a world in which linear-cognitive language looms larger than it would be in a more open universe. What is being suggested is the thought that the barrier set up between language in its conventional sense, e.g. language as in spoken language and the other forms of communication, the dramatic, the poetic, the para-‘linguistic’ has artificiality. The incompleteness of modern linguistic theory suggests that the subject is very difficult andor that it has been ill-conceived at the outset
Thus linear verbal forms come to be emphasized for these reasons but also for the good reasons that they lend to analysis and the originally algebraic form of language
In broad term, the parallel is clear and obvious
In contextual terms it reflects the emphasis of analytic thought which is also self-selecting and expands to fill an affective vacuum but without fulfilling the affective function
The micro-analysis of elements of the world without context is ever complete. This opens the way to a vision of endless analysis and to the illusion that lateral analysis, while important in itself, is a wave-front of progress where it is mostly merely vacuum filling, where it creates opportunity for work without product. Since it tends to be its own critic, and since it is so micro-precise it gives the illusions of significance, accuracy, rigor, in isolation (rather than as an element of process) and progress far beyond its actual production
A broader perspective of language is possible. Semantically the distinctions correspond to different objects rather than different understandings of the same object. The broader perspective also suggests that the value emphases that make analysis of the linear forms so important are themselves limited. These analyses follow the fashion of modern formal theory in logic, mathematics and science. The success of the endeavor has come to be regarded with doubt even by the linguists. Regardless of the final success of the endeavor within its own context it is not clear what its broad value might be. Such doubts are not an absolute mark against a perspective. However, it may be reasonable to suggest that a larger view of language and of analysis generally may encourage a more complete view of human being and the possibilities of human endeavor
This view of language restores emphasis to the essential character, discussed earlier, of affect in human life and expression, generally, and especially in the cognitive sphere
The Theory of being developed in Being through Cosmology. suggests not only a broader but an absolute perspective. The Theory of being reveals and shows the ultimate character of the sign and the symbol. It has been seen that the greater ultimate character lies in breadth, variety, openness, fluid foundation and adventure over depth, final foundation and security. There is no final knowledge—gnosis—of all being in its great variety; there are process toward and away from that final knowledge and its intimations. The adventure is one of immersion at least as much as one of ends. The adventure itself is not some goal at the end of an immense journey. What is required is an openness of perspective. From the point of view of the emphases of the modern world the openness may be restored by a restoration of balance, a de-emphasis of the extreme height of the linear-cognitive mode. This may be difficult due to the material power and the self-selecting nature the perspective. An important aspect of the restoration is return to a more whole view of language
Meaning function—literal and non-literal
meaning or semantic-syntactic function, literal and non-literal functions including poetry, meaning in ‘non-formal’ elements such as sound, alliteration, meter
Because the meaning and the literal are an important context, they tend to be associated with the meaning of language… especially as a result of the selection noted above. This result, regarded from a different context, perhaps a future or a more universal context, may be revealed as a ‘distortion’
Non-meaning function
non-meaning functions, e.g., social bonding
Non-meaning functions are discussed in but of course not limited to Faith
Written language, comparison with spoken language, special features or functions of written language
written form-sign, alphabet; word; punctuation including sentence structure and para-verbal; dissociation from context-a strength and a weakness
The written form, including its modern mechanical and electronic versions, less context oriented than the spoken forms. Because of a common ground—language is a medium of a community—all language expresses and evokes context in layered-hierarchical relationship and islands of context as well. Speech is more immediate, more tied in to the organism, more contextual. The greater contextual character of speech derives from the fact that communicators are generally (though not invariably but note that electronic speech communication is no different in kind than the report of a messenger) present in the context and that para-verbal elements of language communicate context—especially affective content
The abstract character of the written form which may be regarded as a deficiency regarding context may be a strength from another point of development of abstract thought. The loss of context encourages a wider variety of interpretation. It is reasonable to think that the written form accelerated the early development of concepts, of abstract thought, of the formal side of language including logic, mathematics and science. There can be little doubt that the more recent contribution is immense—if not essential to widespread distribution of developments that is then the foundation upon which further development is built. The written form has the advantages of visibility and permanence. The use of permanent written signs—texts and artifacts—may be interwoven with the establishment of a sense of civilization if not civilization itself. Permanence lends to analysis, storage and transmission of ideas including knowledge. Transmission may be lateral—among cultures and nations—and vertical—from one generation to the next, from one time to another. Written language is instrumental in the widespread distribution of modern knowledge and other elements of culture
Modify Economics in light of recent reading
Task and note. This chapter does not yet have a source document
The introductory discussion lies in Journey in Being-New World-essence.html
Inseparability of the institutions
Join politics and ethics even though the theoreticians and academicians are against this join?
Locus of power
Points of influence
Paths to influence
Principles and practice
Principles and practice stand in interaction
Formation and sustenance require stability and conservation of form. This is the fundamental politics of a limited metaphysics—of perspective and slant. To this, politics of power in perception—distortion—is second
Source: ethics and action
Can the name of this chapter be improved? Matrix, web…? Content: it combines War and peace (applied ethics and the artificiality of problem and disciplinary boundaries—emphasizing that this artificiality not only limits understanding but—crucially—address,) Civilization and history, and The highest ideal of Journey in Being-New World-essence.html
Address ‘state of the world’
The new chapter ‘Civilization’ was called ‘Civilization and history’ and now also includes the material of the old chapters ‘War and peace’ and the ‘Highest ideal.’
Perhaps ‘Civilization’ should be divided into sections ‘History’ or ‘Civilization and history’ and ‘War and peace’ or ‘Applied ethics’ or, better, ‘Ethics in action’ which would emphasize the inseparability of ethics from action and experiment and the artificiality of contrived andor isolated examples, and ‘The highest ideal’
A primary objective of this chapter is to develop and recognize the importance of a view of society and individual as part of and tied into a universal web or matrix
The practical importance of the first objective to this society depends on another primary objective that derives from the loss of a feeling of being at the center of things that derives from the secular-scientific view that tends to see humanity as an accident that is alien to the universal scheme. This objective is to provide a framework within which there may be restoration to humankind a sense of universal significance that needs no basis in belief in human superiority or even uniqueness
The following section titles are very tentative
Possible content—the old chapter Civilization and history
Possible task—outline and source document
Possible content—the old chapter War and peace
Possible task—review and modify outline; make source document
May given the section its old name War and peace back. In any case is Imperative a good name?
Includes ‘state of the world’
Sources: faith material.html
Task. Modify Faith, certainly, especially noting the joint effect of Theory of being and the burden imposed by the traditional cosmologies—mythic, religious, and scientific | Place Faith-Objects in Objects with possible stem left in Faith
That religion and faith have been under assault in our world is commonplace. In the western world the assault on religion may be thought to have begun with the modern era that began with the renaissance
As the renaissance was a period of revolt against authority, it is natural that the authority of religion should have come under scrutiny
In the ascent of rationalism it is natural that dogma should have been subject to suspicion even where rationalism was its own purpose
When rationalism itself came under the scrutiny of its own microscope, the assault on religion continued in the psychological analyses of Nietzsche and the economic reflections of Marx. There can be no doubt that religious faith can and does have a palliative effect that disenfranchises human being from truth
It is a commonplace in the modern—secular—world to mock religion as a source of superstition and abuse
And the dogmatic and institutionalized forms of religion may deserve such criticism
However, that a form of an institution suffers from corruption is not an essential mark against the concept. Every institution is subject to corruption
In the foregoing developments we have seen that the sanguinity of modern secularism conceals an easy superficiality; that there is an immense world beyond the comfortable borders of secular thought
If, for example, religion and science are both striving to truth, there cannot be any a priori boundary between them. Of course if any truth of religion is limited to addressing the truths of the psyche by telling stories then there is that a priori boundary. However, the developments in Theory of being shows that there is no mere story except for the logical contradiction
The purpose of this chapter is to question the meanings of faith, religion, myth, the spiritual and the sacred. In view of the opening up occasioned by metaphysics of immanence and the approaches that allowed limited received ideas such as ‘mind,’ ‘logic,’ ‘metaphysics,’ ‘object,’ ‘cosmology’ to grow up into ultimate forms ‘Mind,’ ‘Logic’ and so on we may expect that ‘faith,’ ‘religion’ will grow similarly
The purpose of the chapter is to find and work out these ultimate meanings, to relate them to the received meanings, to see what this may imply to the boundary between the secular and the sacred, to see what this means for the individual and civilization in ultimate terms, and to apply these thoughts to our present context
Is this the appropriate place for this discussion. Should the discussion be merged with and replaced here by a reference to Objects?
Source: ../../../../Journey in Being-New World.html (2006) may contain useful material for this part
This part has been streamlined. The division The idea of a journey has been moved to Foundation. This is appropriate because the journey and metaphysics have a join. This part, Journey, then, is about the actual journey rather than the idea or concept of the journey
Note that the old part, Journey, is now divided into a chapter, Journey, above, and this part Journey, whose divisions are Ideas, and Transformation, below. It is important that Journey comes before the chapter, Philosophy and metaphysics and, perhaps also, A system of human knowledge
See Journey in Being-New World-essence.html under the part / division ‘Journey’ for material
This part narrates an actual journey and its foundations. For an introduction and basic concepts see Journey in being and Journey
It is not necessary that Ideas should come after Transformation. This because of the earlier placement of Journey includes development and discussion of the essential role of ‘action’
A separate and titled introduction to this division may be unnecessary
Review the point to these introductions…
Task. Source document?
Task. Introduce the ideas thought-symbol as immanent-interactive versus definitive and that there are degrees / areas of definition but definite areas of non-definition. Introduce the idea that an institution or a discipline is not like a physical object (‘philosophy is not a hippopotamus’) and this is due to the factors of implicitness, distribution, multifaceted-ness, and the fact that an institution or discipline is a cultural artifact and not a physical artifact, i.e., object of physical creation
The aims included:
1. Journey in ideas
2. Foundation—whatever foundation in ideas, for transformation in being and identity may arise or has arisen along the way
3. Illustration and elaboration of ideas from Foundation
4. Contribution to thought
Task. Source document?
Can the title be and improved? It was named Approaches to answering the question ‘What is philosophy?’. Another version is What philosophy is and how to think about such issues. The two parts of this title interact dynamically. Can it be shortened?
…and, more, generally about such conceptual-definitional issues
Incomplete with putting the approaches into practice and therefore must include actual reflection on the nature of philosophy and metaphysics
…these are, however, preliminary and set up the following sections in which it is possible to be—more—definitive and to judge other slanted characterizations based in special interest or in premature or slanted if natural estimates of what it is possible to know, to be and to become
Comment on the possibility and realization of definitive treatment of this section and the next and of the relation between the two sections and the two possibilities
Modifications in light of Theory of being and the concept of the Journey
Comment on the completeness of the system—to the extent that completeness obtains… and on the resolution of the essential problems of metaphysics—classical, modern and recent… which resolutions are executed and listed
The thought that there is a universal divide between noumenon and phenomenon, between metaphysics of being and metaphysics of experience, is based in a mistaken characterization of experience
The title of this section could be A system of knowledge. This, however, could be interpreted as referring to some specialist system. Therefore, the actual title suggests vastness
Note. No source document necessary. Use Journey in Being-New World-essence.html
Tasks. Need source document(s)?
Think about the topics:
Tasks. Source documents
Execution of Program of research…, Design, and Material design will be selective and eclectic and simultaneous with or after placement
A program of research and experiment in the modes and means of transformation
Place in System of experiments?
The principle of repetition or persistence
The principle of risk and opportunity—taking and creating opportunity
The principle of cultivating emotional resourcefulness—crisis, sudden or immediate… and sustained or long term
The principle of meditation, premeditation and intelligence
Nor should I be ‘hereafter ashamed to confess my faith’
Also discussed in First things
The kinds of form
…and holism
Inclusion of design reduces the number of essential documents for the journey to one
For both print and web versions see the section Style and convention. Convention should be consistent without obsession
See for versions including special versions as basis of persuasion, talk, guide… see Narrative form
Use styles and filtering to derive special, less detailed versions from this master version
Special versions may be: basis for a talk or debate—informative andor persuasive, a guide, advertisement at a variety of venues such as shops, universities, churches, radio and TV, mass gatherings
An ultimate outline—will further connect the immediate and the ultimate; and in the immediate will be real… Some topics—studies in the human-universal spirit, mythology and spirit—the classical writers and thinkers
Design is modular; see resources Narrative form and ..\design and principles of design.html
Elements of the narrative
Essential problems, truths, concepts, theories, propositions and hypotheses, arguments and demonstrations, objections and responses or counterarguments, and interconnections
Database
The following should be worked out in detail and perhaps placed in another location and or file
Use the outlines to form a database of topics, and the elements listed in Outlines and main elements of the narrative. The purpose and principles of formation of the database(s) shall be as follows. Functions of the database. (1) Organization and reorganization. Filtering. Note that this can be done programmatically. (2) Representation of concepts and re-conceptualization. There is a clear relation between organization and concepts and so between re-organization and re-conceptualization. Approach to re-conceptualization. The approach could be rather ad hoc as in the earlier application of relational database management to Evolution and Design. A more fundamental approach would be to have a system of basic entities, perhaps proto-concepts, out of which the system—theory of being, human world—concepts are built and that form a basis of organization and re-organization. A purpose of re-conceptualization is, as in the Evolution and Design example, to see relations among alternate formulations which also suggest which concepts are pivotal. (3) Conceptual advance. Another purpose of database re-conceptualization, as for any re-conceptualization, is conceptual advance. This would require the comparison (selection) of re-conceptualizations (variations) against constraints (reality, nature.) Perhaps the greatest conceptual advance might come about by allowing random novel elements in the concepts or basic proto-concepts…
The tasks in any unit will be only those specific to it. Task levels. Document level tasks will include (1) document tasks and (2) generic part, division, chapter… tasks. Higher levels may collect—paste special—lower level tasks
Sources: for self-contained planning-design, the primary resource must be this (Map) which, with Journey in Being-New World-essence.html, provide a blue-print for narrative and design. For details see index.html, Home (links) and immediate priorities.html
Design and personal priorities may be eliminated from formal versions by assigning a special style. Sources and source documents may be in a special style
A smaller, tightly knit site will make the works more accessible, alluring and engaging
Psychic resources
See Charisma, persuasion and influence
Elaborate: mind-ends & no mind-the moment, boundaries-focus, discipline and presence
Objectives
Projects
Week
Weekend. Out—3+ day weekend-retreat-place-jobs + Everyday
Month +.
Year +.
To use this and the next appendix as separate documents, replace italic headings by bold, not italic
The places, institutions and times are specific to a six week period mid-September, 2007
Nature trips
People, places and placement trips
…to see, while looking at the universe, what the path may suggest
…perhaps, as alternative, to embark on another venture
Is this topic—division—at odds with the nature of—this—narrative? The following sub-topics or chapters… see the earlier discussion of publication (On publication)
Review—
Is this section at odds with the nature of the narrative?
Possible
List names? Journey in Being-New World.html (..\..\..\..\Journey in Being-New World.html#_Toc153202280)
An index may be sufficient. Consider sectioning as follows
Should I arrange this by division and chapter? Should I consider only the most important topics?
Include? Weave in? Possible topics