The Ordinary and the Extraordinary
Or, the ordinary as is the ordinary
ANIL MITRA, © FEBRUARY 2015—March 2015
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CONTENTS
Introduction
Science
and religion
Science
Is our cosmos the universe?
Probability that the universe is
boundless in size and nature
Probability that the universe is
larger and more varied than our cosmos
Spirituality and religion
Metaphysics
The
modern problem of perfection versus action
How
can we think on these issues?
Stages
in the growth of the quality of knowledge
The ordinary is the extraordinary
Introduction
‘Is’—the
verb to be
Ordinariness
The
ordinary as is the extraordinary
Uncovering the real: An account of
discovery
A formal account of metaphysics
Being
Experience
More
Meaning,
identity, space, and time
Universe
All real things are in the universe
Creation
Possibility
Domain
Pattern and natural law
Cosmos
The
void
About laws and limits
Realism
The fundamental principle of
metaphysics
Something from nothing
The fundamental problem of
metaphysics
The void
The
universal metaphysics
A universal metaphysics
Extension to all being
The
way of being
The Ordinary and the
Extraordinary
Amid the haste of everyday life—work, family, friends,
joy, and pain—we occasionally ponder what it all means. We ask questions.
What is the universe like? What is our place in the universe?
Tradition gives us some answers.
The distant origins of science and religion are in primal
cultures where the natural and the spiritual are seen as fused. I do not see
the primal as less or more but I want to be simple—to see the larger
questions in our terms. So I begin with science and religion as a simple
dichotomous way of symbolizing our answers.
Science is empirical—to make predictions in our
world we must know the patterns of our world. We do not see the deep
patterns of science but we represent them in concepts that we discovery by
making conceptual hypotheses and testing. We keep or reject the conceived
patterns as they predict or disagree with what we see (observation). Many
think it a waste to speculate beyond the science of the time while some think
it wrong and yet others think there is essentially nothing beyond that
science. This kind of thinking informs a worldview that may be labeled
‘secularism’. Secularism does not deny finer things—art and its value, higher
human values, the good life; but it asserts that our lives and aspirations
are bounded by a universe or cosmos as seen in science.
Some secular thinkers hold that the universe may well be
more than as seen in science. What bases are there for this? (1) The history
of science includes ‘revolutions’ that are marked by new conceptual
understanding: new theories that agree with the older ones where they are
valid but that disagree elsewhere in small to vast ways both empirical and
conceptual (the way the world is). Probably more scientists, philosophers,
and other thinkers think this way but do not speak of it because they do not
want to be seen as speculative—that would not be proper and might well be bad
for career and reputation. Thus the conservative position, the empirical
cosmos is the bound of the universe, becomes the official position. This
becomes a worldview which many though not all ‘ordinary’ people
accept—perhaps explicitly but perhaps most often as the tacit default view
that informs their days and hopes. (2) There is nothing in the reasoning or
method of science that implies that what has been seen so far is the extent
of the real. What is the possible boundary of the real? Logically, that
boundary need not be defined by science so far: it may be boundless. That is,
it is possible that there are no limits to the duration and spatial extension
to the universe, whether the universe is entirely spatiotemporal, and the
variety of being and the power of the universe.
If the possibilities are boundless, and since the
boundless is not bounded by any limited form, is not the probability of
boundlessness 100%? The answer has to be no, the conclusion does not follow,
because we must have knowledge of the nature of the possibilities and not
merely that they are possible. We can think in terms of an example. A sack
has ten black and ten red marbles in it. What is the probability of picking a
red marble (without looking)? The answer is obviously ½. Change the data to:
a sack has some objects in it. Now what is the probability of picking a red marble?
Assuming we can know nothing about the contents the best answer is somewhere
between 0 and 1.
The discussion continues from item #2 above.
(3) The previous item established the range of
possibilities consistent with what we know but nothing about probability.
However, there are other ways of establishing probability. Item #1
established that the probability is at least significant. Another approach to
probability is to note the special nature of the cosmos. The fundamental
constants lie in the very narrow range required to support life in the
cosmos. Also there seems to be no fundamental explanation for either the
origin of the cosmos or the values of the constants except on an account that
it is not special but one of many possibilities. In that case the probability
is significant. But if we somehow reason to what those possibilities may be
we then face the question of their origin. How far back do we have to go?
Unless there is some principle of exclusion (we do not even have proof that
there is such a principle) we would have to go all the way back to
nothingness to have an explanation. But even that would not be enough. Why
did it begin with nothingness? Unless there is an exclusion principle, the
universe would have to cycle through all possible states to explain an atom
of being. But this tells us what we might need for explanation, not about
probabilities because once we go further back that before our cosmos which we
know we are getting into areas of quite complete ignorance and so probability
is likewise quite beyond estimation. Nonetheless we have found an explanatory
principle. To explain any being whatsoever and, particularly, to explain our
cosmos, the universe must, barring an exclusion principle, go through all
possible states. It is a perfect explanation in that no further assumption
has to be made. Then one of the states must be our cosmos. But if we allow
that some unspecified state (or states) might not occur then one of those
states might be our cosmos so we do not have a perfect explanation.
Apparently there are two perfect explanations (a) our cosmos must occur (b)
all cosmoses do occur. Of these, the first is peculiar but not the second.
There are people who think in terms of that boundlessness.
‘Boundless’ may not be the thought; the thought may be ‘surely this is not
all there is, surely there is or may be more’. And more than a few think such
thoughts. However, the numbers of people who enquire seriously into what that
may be is probably small.
Beginning with primality one class of such ‘thinker’
thinks in spiritual terms. Given the notion of the natural as what we
naturally know, the spiritual is realistic in the thought that there is
probably more and perhaps even moral in wanting to know and investigating
what that might be. Even though the religious cosmologies may seem fantastic,
surely this is one of their functions: to think on and investigate that
‘more’ (the religious cosmologies have other functions too but they are not
altogether ‘other’ for morals and culture are, ultimately, part of the
cosmos—part of the universe).
Metaphysics
But there is another class of thinker—one that reasons but
is not limited by the empirical. This class recognizes that the empirical and
scientific do not bound the universe and wants to enquire of what might and
probably lies beyond but they do not want to be non or anti-empirical or
merely fantastic in their thought. They use reason to attempt to investigate
and explain our system of experience (awareness in all its manners, kinds,
and forms) which includes all and any positive content of science and
religion (the supra-natural) but also the issue of the nature of experience,
of how we relate to experience, and the bounds of the universe revealed in
the nature and fact of the universe. This kind of thinking (in the west)
began in Greece with the idea that understanding and explaining the world did
not lie beyond the world in gods or unseen forces but in the world. Simply
put, the idea was that there is some pervasive feature of the world, some
simple enduring substance, that we can see and that is the source of the
complexity and variety in the world. Thus Thales of Miletus (c. 600 BCE)
suggested that the world is made of water. This might seem far fetched but
its virtues are that it seeks explanation of the world (1) in the world
rather than beyond (2) in terms of something that is or seems simple (3) in
terms of something rather pervasive (so even if ‘water’ is far fetched it is
more reasonable than some unknown force). Thales knew that he was being
speculative but he also realized that if we let doubt hold us back we will
get nowhere: we may make mistakes but if we admit that we are being
hypothetical we may correct hypotheses and so make advance. Thus Thales break
with the superstition of Greece may be seen as the origin of western
philosophy and the forebear of western science. Later, Thales line of thought
came to be labeled ‘metaphysics’ which has its own history. Early metaphysics
was frankly speculative. Plato was a height of speculation that was a mix of
reason and explanatory imagination. Aristotle set up a language that
continues to inform metaphysical thought. The scholastics adapted metaphysics
to developing understanding of the universe as seen in canonical terms of the
church and which also shape that canon. Their vice was their
servitude—partial rather than universal—to the church; their virtue was
setting up of terms suggestive of how to think on such issues. Early modern
thinkers broke free of the shackles of convention and the church. The
thinkers Locke through Kant were authors of a rational system based in and
limited by the knowledge of their time. However, the terms of their though,
adapted to newer views of nature, is immensely useful. After, Kant the
idealist philosophers, e.g. Hegel, built up vast speculative rationalistic
systems, perhaps on the model of science, but not subject to the empirical
constraints of science. This was followed by criticism and more reasonable
thinkers, especially the British idealists, culminating in the impressive
system of A. N. Whitehead. Whitehead’s system however came at a time when
philosophy had accepted a secular worldview centered in science. For much of
the 20th century, metaphysics was suspect. Today, metaphysics has
returned but, except perhaps for metaphysics in theology, in new forms which
have in common that they recognize primarily this world, e.g. (a) as
metaphysics of experience, (b) special problems of modernity such as space
and time, free will and others, and (c) as study of abstract objects. The
latest metaphysics still shows the secular / trans-secular bifurcation—i.e.
the metaphysics of theology vs. the metaphysics of the immediate.
The modern situation then is that the divide between the
secular and the trans-secular remains; the secular distrust of trans-secular
systems is well founded but such distrust of trans-secularism is without
foundation; and knowledge of what lies beyond the secular is wide open. Such
distrust is not altogether unfounded. Where precise knowledge is wanted we
expect foundation. On the other hand where forward motion or pure being in
the present is wanted we do not want to wait for final foundation. Can we
mesh these opposites? Are we at an impasse?
The question that arises is How can we think on
these issues? The bifurcation seen above is that of exclusive focus on
the immediate or the ordinary versus emphasis on the extraordinary without
sufficient connection to the ordinary.
- The animal.
- The primal.
Free conception has
arisen—i.e., the world is not given: there is something beyond the immediate.
Concepts of the immediate (nature) and the beyond (myth) interwoven.
Experience influences concepts but analysis of concepts not formalized. A
ground on which later civilization may fall back. Process beyond this level
is not given to be absolute; it is ‘relative’ (to new circumstances and
aims).
- Religion: uncritical attitude to cosmology (at this
stage science is primarily that of the immediate).
Separation of knowledge of the
immediate and the beyond. Early science and religion (as separate). Religious
cosmology primitive relative to the primal. Science advanced but only
relative to new circumstances and aims.
- Science of the modern era.
Critical attitude to
cosmology. Uncritical attitude to completeness of the cosmology.
Semi-critical attitude to method.
I pass over vast tracts of
metaphysics—not as intrinsically unimportant but because for the present
purpose they can be subsumed under metaphysics I, next.
- Metaphysics I-post idealism: e.g. metaphysics of A.N.
Whitehead. Modes of criticism inherited.
Critical attitude to completeness
of the cosmology. Critical attitude inherited from or simultaneous to science
of the modern era: the method of hypothesis and test. Differences between
metaphysics and the sciences: (1) Sciences concern particular phases of the
real; metaphysics is interested in the general. (2) The testing of the
conceptual systems of science is for external (empirical) and internal
(consistency of the terms and conceptual systems). Metaphysics is not
essentially different but has further layers: to data is added common
experience carefully understood and therefore also the conceptual systems of
science; has further concerns: human experience is a concern, therefore
concerned especially with morals and aesthetics but these are to be brought
into / interpreted as aspects of the metaphysics; internal consistency
remains of course important but there is more freedom.
- Metaphysics II-from the categories to the ordinary
(ordinary philosophy a well known idea in the 20th century
and, implicitly at least, earlier)…
…from the a priori modes of
criticism to criticism as part of the metaphysics (made possible by
transition to the ordinary). Thus perfection is not pre-determined but by the
metaphysics itself. It turns out that a non relative framework system is
possible. It turns out that a single valued meaning of perfection is
impossible and undesirable. For the framework perfection is perfect precision
of the ideas; for the rest (‘tradition’) perfection is ‘good enough’ (and
related criteria). The metaphysical analysis reveals these criteria.
Analysis of the ordinary
taken-to-extreme is (i) to repeat, perfection and simultaneous emergence of
fact and method for the framework (ii) ultimate depth of the framework (the
non relative foundation) (iii) ultimate breadth of the universe is revealed
(iv) thus the ordinary acquires new significance but so does the esoteric
which, from ultimate breadth, emerges as fact, and (v) what the new
metaphysics with suggestion from tradition reveals is a vast range of stable
cosmologies of being-experience (intelligence and feeling as and perhaps more
significant than matter even for cosmological purposes), reality of special
metaphysics (e.g., trivially, the logically cleaned up, religious and earlier
metaphysical cosmologies) but equivocation on their significance: the
remote-god-cosmologies having apparently minimal significance and the
immanent-god-cosmologies receiving interpretation (not entirely new) of the
process of human and similar entities as a stage in the process of emergence
of levels and forms of experience (consciousness).
At this stage the identity of
being and experience—cosmos and intelligence or intelligent feeling—is
manifest. Our stage—somewhere from the animal to human—is a dawn of
this stage.
The ordinary
is the extraordinary
Imagine an ordinary object such as a block of wood (you
can choose your favorite ‘ordinary object’ if you wish; mine tends to be
something from nature, often a tree, but for the present purpose a tree has
so many aspects that it might be misleading).
For practical purposes a block of wood is a block of wood.
It is true that if I want a precise description of the block I must begin by
acknowledging the universal gap between knower and known (the situation is
that, at least naïvely, I do not know the nature of that gap and so if I want
to claim knowledge I must admit the gap). Practically, however, for ordinary purposes
the block is a block. Mechanical carpentry does not need philosophy:
philosophy might even be detrimental to practice. On the other hand adherence
to such practical concerns (only) would not be merely detrimental to
philosophy or ‘deeper’ understanding: it would prevent it altogether. So when
I want to look deeper I acknowledge that what is sufficient for practical
purposes is insufficient for ultimate purposes. The block looks like a cube,
say, but is it precisely a cube—and is it capable of being a cube when its
surfaces cannot be perfectly flat (atoms) and when I do not know whether
space is perfectly Euclidean? These distinctions are important to some ways
of beginning metaphysics. And careful metaphysics is important to
considerations that take us beyond the known world. And if all is flux then
our survival will depend on going beyond the known. So if survival is
important, so are the distinctions.
However, that is not the direction in which I want to go.
Here is where I want to go. For practical purposes, the block is perfectly
well known. That is not merely practical or pragmatic, it is deeply
metaphysical. If my criterion is practice, then my knowledge is perfect.
Early metaphysics and even modern metaphysics do not acknowledge that because
it accepts the implicit criterion of perfect precision. Perfect precision is
important if we want to look into the future precisely. But we do not know
that we can get such perfect precision. So we must recognize different
criteria of knowledge and acknowledge that they might not be the same even at
root. Now that may or may not be the case but the case is that ‘we do not
know’. So the best we can do is acknowledge different criteria and that the
criteria may not be equivalent (but they are not equivalent, there may be a
way, perhaps perfect, of having the different criteria mesh). So then, for
some purposes—the practical or the precise within limits of tolerance—the
block is perfectly well known.
The same could be said of a thought (the thought itself,
not its content), a tree, a living organism, a human being in all its (I’m
tired of saying he/she) variety, or even the universe.
Admittedly the practical criterion in these cases (so it
seems) would or should be very rough. But are there things for which the
practical criterion of what can only be rough knowledge in many cases becomes
precise for the ‘things’ in question?
We must ask what it is that makes knowledge rough. An
answer is that we are looking at detail.
Something is there—the ‘block’—but if I were not there my
knowledge of it would not occur. So my knowledge of the block is not the
block (if the terms are simplistic what it points to is not). But for some
practical concerns my knowledge is perfect. Therefore I may equate knowledge
with known (for those purposes). But even when I do that I recognize that the
concept is not the object. Importantly, whether the concept is or is not the
object and whether there is or is not some way the two can be equivalent or
whether there is or is not some way in which they are part of the same larger
object called a concept-object, the point is: it is the concept that enables
dealing with and talking of things.
There is a block means I have a specific concept that
corresponds to the thing; there is no block means I have a specific concept
but it does not correspond to a thing. In that sentence I could replace ‘is’
by ‘exists’. I am not saying that existence depends on being seen. Rather I
am saying that without experience, we cannot talk about anything. Suppose we
are in the jungle. I yell ‘there is a tiger’. If you have no mental picture
of tigers you will look at me with puzzlement. For information to have been
conveyed you will have to already have an association between the sound of
the word ‘tiger’ and a mental picture of a tiger (things with four legs,
black and yellow stripes, that kill and eat weaker prey including human beings).
And if you have that sound-picture (word-concept) association you will likely
feel fear the moment I yell ‘tiger’.
There is a block.
There is a tiger.
There stands a proud human being.
These and many other similar sentences have perfectly precise
practical meaning (language-concept-object relationship). Metaphysically,
however, they are precise only in practical terms. On the classic and often
abandoned metaphysical sense of perfect precision they are absolutely
imprecise and wrong (or meaningless) because anything less than perfect
precision is unacceptable. That is why that notion of metaphysics is so often
abandoned. It cannot even do practical service let alone its putative service
of knowing the (so far) unknown.
Then: is there anything at all?
Yes: there is something for if there were not there would
not even be the true versus practical versus illusory perception of things.
This is really Descartes’ argument ‘I think therefore I
am’ divested of the presumption of the term ‘I’.
Is there anything at all?
There is.
That reply has two meanings. First as reply to the
question that preceded it. But second, and importantly, just as a wild but
true assertion (true in the sense of something perceived to be the case where
the perception is perfectly precise).
There is!
This is ordinary beyond ordinary ordinariness.
The ordinary as
is the extraordinary
From ordinariness taken to the extreme we have established
precisely that there is something. It is quite trivial. Yet it is deep
because it establishes that something exists precisely where we wondered
whether any such thing could be established.
The source of power is that ‘there is an x’ is generally
much more discriminating than ‘there is’ something. ‘There is an x’ chooses
from the universe some very specific thing or things ‘x’. ‘There is’ chooses
only things that are (in the universe). I.e. one way of looking at our
derivation is to see that there is a universe and therefore ‘there is’. The extra
ordinary is extraordinary.
This is powerful because we have gotten precision where we
were in doubt but what we have gotten precision about is still rather
trivial. Can we do more? Yes; we will do much more in a formal account of metaphysics. There we
extend the present kind of analysis to a framework for the world (and
subsequently, with different but essential criteria of perfection, to the
whole world). Here, however, is a little preview of the magnitude power of
the world and so of the ordinary in informal terms which will be taken up
formally in a formal account of metaphysics
below.
If ‘what is’ is ordinary, what lies outside it? At most
‘absence’.
But absence means absence of laws (even).
Imagine something. Imagine it as a whole. What is left
over beside the something? It is absence! Absence exists (this is not a very
good argument but it is a heuristic and therefore useful one; a formal
argument is given later in a formal account of
metaphysics).
But since there are no laws in absence, absence must
generate everything possible—i.e. there are no possible but unachieved states
of being.
This is so contradictory to experience that people find it
unpalatable. To the everyday person it violates ‘no free lunch’, violation of
the thought that there are surfeits and deficits, violates the ethic that
things must generally be worked for. To the scientist it violates
conservation laws, especially of energy. To a philosopher it violates
principles of causation. But if you accept that there is true absence then the
generation of all possible states of being follows at once. Nothing comes
from nothing says, in effect, that nothing is more than nothing: it is not
just not something; it is the ‘cause’ that prevents nothing. Nothing comes
from nothing contains an implicit contradiction (there is much apparent
contradiction here, but in realism all contradiction
is defused in principle; the beginning of this defusing begins in the next
few paragraphs).
The universe has no bound to the states it achieves. It
has absolute power.
It confers this power on all its elements or parts (the
contrary would contradict its absolute power).
Individuals are parts.
Our experienced limits are, e.g., temporal. In the
vastness of time (and beyond time which if such a thing is logically possible
must from absolute power also be) our temporal limits dissolve.
Death which is obviously empirically and existentially
given is therefore real but not absolute.
‘This life’ has no absolute meaning.
Now this reveals power and significance but we can doubt
the informal analysis and we can question the significance for our present
lives. These issues are addressed below.
For this account see the section History of the
metaphysics in the
realizations-resource version.
A formal
account of metaphysics
This account takes off from where we were left in the ordinary as is the extraordinary.
There are many connotations of ‘being’—the ultimate Being,
deep being, the essence of one’s being—i.e. human or sentient being. But let
us go back to etymology. Not because etymology is determining of meaning but
because it illuminates this case. Being is derived from the verb to be of
which ‘is’ is the present singular case.
Define being as that which is—as the quality of things by
virtue of which I can say ‘that is’.
Being is that which is.
I can now say (even if I have metaphysical doubt about
what there is) there is being.
That is the power of the ordinary.
Note that the various special connotations of being have
been jettisoned. That is, we are not referring to those connotations. This
does not mean that those connotations are ‘wrong’ or ‘better / worse’ but,
simply, that I am not using them and therefore in what I write here this
(that which is) is the meaning of being; other writers validly use other
meanings; what is not valid is when one meaning is confused with another or
others without showing the equivalence of the two or more meanings.
But you might say that there is being says almost
nothing, that it is beyond trivial. This is a common argument against
thinking about being—it says nothing, it is universal therefore unknowable,
and, on the other hand, it is self-evident therefore not worth discussing.
But ‘trivial’ and ‘not deep’ or ‘not profound’ or ‘too
easy’ or ‘simple’ or ‘too simple’ are not the same thing—
Already we can see the depth of the concept of being. Even
if the content of the concept is simple, it is the first concept we have
encountered that corresponds perfectly in the sense of absolute precision to
its (an) object. But in my narrative ‘being’ is also the beginning of a
metaphysics that is perfect but also non trivial in its content which is the
universe which it finds to be ultimate.
One more thing about ‘is’. In English ‘is’ is present
tense singular. When I say is I typically mean somewhere. There seems to be
no English word that means ‘is’, ‘was’, or ‘will be’. There seems to be no
English word that means ‘exists in some region or regions either marked by
space and time or not’ (where the ‘not’ signifies modes of extensionality
other than space and time and / or modes other than extensionality—assuming
of course that such modes are logically possible).
So, now, I introduce an extended meaning of ‘is’: is
means exists in some region(s) of space and time and / or not. In the
following definition the first ‘is’ is the ‘is’ of definition and the second
‘is’ is the ‘is’ as defined above.
Being is that which is.
The simple statement-definition hides and conveniently
suppresses a welter of careful thought.
Experience is subjective awareness (in all its manners,
forms, and kinds).
Do I have emotion? That depends on what ‘emotion’ means;
and the proper meaning of emotion is still under debate. I do not doubt that
there is emotion in the ordinary sense but I do and should doubt that there
is metaphysically precise emotion. Why should I do that? I would do if I
wanted to use emotion to some purpose that called for absolute precision.
There is a sense in which all we have to go on is experience in its most
general sense whose purview is everything mental. So if I wanted to use
experience to build up a precise picture of the universe I would want a
precise picture of all aspects of experience. That is a valuable project
taken up by some philosophers, e.g. A.N. Whitehead in Process and Reality
(1929). But my goal here is to use ordinary things, e.g. experience without
distinction as to kind of experience, to frame understanding and so to see
how extensive that understanding can be (of which we got a hint in the ordinary is the extraordinary): we want
precision with regard to scope rather than detail (precision with regard to
scope may be a foundation for detail after scope has been established). I
want to begin with experience for the human reasons stated below but also
because I cannot doubt experience.
But some careful thinkers do doubt that there is
experience. Is there experience at all? Sentience is what makes sentient
being different from non-sentient being such as a rock (assuming a rock to be
non-sentient) or a living being that behaved as if sentient but that was not.
Sentience is so fundamental a notion that it is not defined in terms of
something more fundamental (of course, it might be understood in other
terms, e.g. the material; and we may doubt the efficacy of experience—I do
not—but that is another story that I briefly discuss at the end of
this section). The real fallacy of denying sentience is that we expect to
define things in other verbal terms while forgetting that the chain of
explanation (to be an explanation) must end somewhere (sometimes the end of
the chain is infinitely remote). The fallacy of the denial of experience does
not stem from thoughts such as materialism or scientific behaviorism: those
are just reasons for doubt. But they are bad reasons because they take
unjustified positions (e.g. ill thought out materialism: there is nothing but
matter and matter excludes mind, and behaviorism: the realm of mind
is the subjective therefore existence of mind is subjective) as basis
of criticism. From the fundamental character of experience or sentience,
then, there is no further defining in other concepts but the defining is a
naming: experience names the awareness in our (‘consciously’) aware presence;
here the chain of reasoning is not just finite but very short. The doubt
about experience is valuable. It sharpened understanding.
As said I can doubt emotion and cognition (not that I
practically doubt those things but rather I doubt there adequacy of a
functional or otherwise specific account to perfectly capture the reality of
mind). However, I do not doubt experience. I cannot doubt experience because
doubting is experiencing. That is (a definition, followed by a true
assertion):
Experience is awareness.
There is experience.
Or: experience has being.
We could have approached this via a deep argument: (1) functional—here
are the varieties of experience, (2) material—what is the relationship of two
material particles (Leibniz monad argument), (3) evolutionary—experience
(awareness) is adaptive (it is not; rather it is the varieties, intensities,
focusing, and self-referential aspects, i.e. the more than mere aspects of experience
that make it adaptive).
But why is experience important?
It is our presence (to the world which includes our
selves).
It is the place of our more than just being.
It is relationship. It is the place of our
being-in-the-world or universe as human / living beings.
It is how being and human being connect in the sense of
perfectly precise metaphysics.
(Doubts about the efficacy cite experiments that show that
subconscious decisions to act precede awareness that ‘I am deciding’. Of
course: we should not want to consciously process everything: that
would be inefficient. The body has much awareness that is not focally
conscious—some think it unaware but it is probably just dim consciousness
perhaps below some threshold of intensity (I use the term ‘probably’ because
I am not providing an argument here: the argument is in the realizations-resource
version): the quick reaction to fear without thinking the situation
through is valuable. The situation, however, is rather like an army. The
troops react, act; they see immediately. The command center learns later;
develops strategy; communicates back to the front. The obvious analogy is
this: the front line corresponds to un- / dim awareness while the command
corresponds to clearly conscious consciousness. Here, then, is another
example of doubt sharpening thought.)
It is useful to say a little about the kinds of
experience. For convenience we may call them ideas (thought, perception,
feeling) and intending and willing that parts of action (over mere process).
Now just a few more thoughts to show the power of being as
being and experience and experience (‘x as x’ simply means x as understood
here).
There is a beautiful and simple account from documents
such as the
realizations-resource version (the account brings out the power of being
in the ordinary sense but it would take this discussion to far away from its
purpose to repeat that account here).
The universe is defined as all being (over all space and
time and/or not).
The definition is ordinary. It does not refer to the
contents of the universe or its nature—whether it is it matter or not, or
mind or not, in or of space and time or not…
Let us look at the power of this ordinary concept.
There is nothing outside the universe. So far as concepts,
ideas, minds, ideas, atoms, numbers, philosophy, metaphysics, streams of
consciousness exist, they are in the universe.
If a creator is external to the created the universe has
and can have no creator.
But self creation would be creation from nothing—which
would not be creation but emergence.
The universe has no creator. It is not created.
The sense of ‘is’ above is atemporal.
Possibility
Relative to a conception of reality, something is possible
if it satisfies that conception. If the something is actual it is obviously
possible. But if it is possible it is not necessarily actual. Possibility is
larger than or the same as actuality.
Regarding the universe as the real, the possible is actual
because there is and can be nothing outside the universe.
Relative to the universe, the possible and the actual are
identical.
Now that, ‘the universe as real’ is a true but only a
partial specification of possibility. Further specification is possible.
Examples are physical possibility (satisfies the laws of physics of our
cosmos), logical possibility, and even moral possibility (if the universe is essentially
moral everything must be moral even those things that do not seem
moral).
Note that logical possibility is the most inclusive.
Something that is not logical, e.g. a square circle, does not and cannot
exist (except in certain deviant metaphysics that, e.g., conflate concept and
object—i.e. the regard the concept as the object at least in those cases that
the object itself does not exist). Therefore physical and moral possibilities
presume logical possibility but logical possibility does not presume physical
or moral possibility (unless we have some how immensely underestimated the
restrictiveness of logic or, more likely, use a very broad notion of the
physical or the moral).
A domain is part of the universe.
The meaning of ‘part’ includes the connected and the
un-connected.
In a more inclusive sense of part things are parts of
themselves. In this sense the universe is a domain.
In the following domain is used in the sense of ‘proper
part’—i.e. the part is not the whole.
If a domain exists the remainder called the complement
also exists.
A domain may be created.
One domain or part may be implicated in the creation of
another.
A pattern is a set of arrangements. It ‘allows’ some but
not other arrangements.
Natural laws are patterns.
The laws of our natural sciences are examples of natural
law.
In a hunter gatherer society the observation that there
are ebbs and flows of natural resources that depend on the specific resource
is a natural law.
Natural laws have being (they are in the universe).
There is nothing about a natural law that entails that it
projects beyond its empirical realm, especially to the universe.
Cosmos
A cosmos is a connected domain defined by a uniform set of
natural laws or theories called physical laws.
Other laws or theories are particular or local. Examples
are theory of evolution and the law of black body radiation.
We often think of our cosmos in empirical terms. There are
empirical limits such as the size of the cosmos set at 80 billion light years
(not 13.8 billion or so because of the expansion of space). Whether it is 80
billion light years rests on the assumption that the cosmos began with the
big-bang and that light speed is uniform and the maximum possible speed (and
in which case the limit of the cosmos is also the limit of distant
observation). There are empirical limits to smallness that we might never
exceed in terms of known particle physics. We tend to imbue these laws /
theories with an absolute character. We tend to think that there is nothing
beyond the cosmos (except in terms that remain speculative). However, there
is nothing that is necessary to these various limits.
There is nothing in our cosmos or observation of it that
requires that its laws are universal or uniform.
There is nothing in our cosmos, observation, or reason
that requires that it is the only cosmos or that the universe is essentially cosmos
like in nature.
The laws are of manifest being.
They are not of the non-manifest (even if the non manifest
is empty alongside the manifest).
Since the non-manifest has no law it generates every
possibility (the contrary would be a law).
What kind of possibility?
Logical possibility says: if I have a concept that does
not violate logic it is possible. However, if a concept violates true logic
it cannot exist.
Therefore, if a concept does not violate logic the object
exists (atemporal sense).
Logic is the only constraint on our concepts for
existence.
Logic is a constraint on concepts for realism, not a
limit.
Violation of fact is also violation of logic in which
premise and conclusion are identical.
In this sense science and fact are part of logic. However,
‘fact’ and ‘science’ must be interpreted to have only local application for
this sense to apply. This extended sense may be called realism.
We can doubt this proof the proof of the principle of
‘every possibility realized’ but absurdity is not one of the reasons for
doubt: ‘every possibility’ means that our cosmos ‘must’ be just as it is. The
principle of ‘every possibility’ does not say, however, how the cosmos
originate but just (trivially) that it did and non-trivially that there are
many other similar as well as dissimilar cosmoses (and more). How did they
originate? The principle says every possible way. However, it seems likely
that the most likely origins and the greatest population density of the
universe by cosmos-like entities is via increment from some other state,
especially the void, by a process of increment and selection of near stable
(near symmetric) states. Now the proven principle violates neither logic nor
experience nor fact. If you still doubt it then note that by the end of this
piece you will see that it is an effective action principle that optimizes
expectation of the value of outcomes.
Realism
Realism is the only constraint on being.
Being and the universe have no limits. I.e., every
realistic (‘logical’) concept obtains.
Because our logics are found rather than given this
redefines the concept of logic (and the effective concept of realism). Our
traditional logics and sciences are approximations to realism / Logic (and
possibility) in this sense.
That the universe has no limits, i.e. that the universe is
the realization of realism / Logic / all possibility has been established and
is called the fundamental principle of metaphysic or, simply, the fundamental
principle.
Therefore the universe must enter non manifest and non
manifest states.
This solves the problem of why there must be being at
all—i.e. the problem of something from nothing which has been called the
fundamental problem of metaphysics.
Something from nothing has a simpler solution. If the
universe is non manifest there are no laws. Therefore something (and
‘everything’) must emerge.
Something from nothing can no longer be called the
fundamental problem.
The problem of what has being is open and, with careful
reflection, will be seen to be the one problem. What is the future of the
cosmos and my consciousness are, for example, parts of this problem.
The void is the null domain.
It is the absence of being.
It is the complement of the universe.
As the complement of the universe the void exists.
But that ‘proof’ is invalid because existence of
complements is true only for proper parts.
However, from the fundamental principle, the non manifest
has power and, also, the universe enters into non manifest states of being.
Therefore the void exists.
There is at least one void.
A void may be associated with every element of being.
The number of voids is not relevant (except that there is
one).
The power of the universe, i.e. that all possible states
are realized, is also the power of the void.
The void is not the quantum vacuum but the two have
similarities.
A metaphysics has been uncovered. Its principle is
realism. It is ultimate in depth since it constitutes foundation without
reference to another level. It is demonstrated rather than speculative. It
captures the universe and shows it to be unbounded in extensionality (space,
time, etc), beyond, and variety.
It is in a sense The metaphysics. It is now called
the universal metaphysics or, simply, the metaphysics.
The metaphysics is only a framework—but an ultimate
framework.
It requires that our cosmos, its laws, and any possible
physical law to obtain; and limitless repetitions of these (within realism /
Logic); all against a void and proto-void / transient background. However, it
tells us nothing of our particular status—human being as being, animal being
as being, cosmos as cosmos.
But it does imply that as we expand to universal being we
will encounter and shed like the skin of a snake innumerable physical-like
laws each of which we will not transcend in that form. Therefore we cannot
know all laws and we do not need to know them all because they are all
temporally experienced and we, even if we can, do not need to know our own
laws precisely. Thus in the path of realization, perfect and full knowledge
of laws, even if such perfection has being, is impossible but also unnecessary
and not desirable. In this practical ‘good enough’ (or being-as-being) sense
the metaphysics and local knowledge mesh; the local knowledge is perfect in
the sense of better is not logically possible or existentially necessary; and
the mesh is prefect in the sense of being the way of realization… a way of
being which must of course include action.
But what is the way? I.e. what is its manner? If the individual
realizes ultimate power—i.e. all being, how is that to be? It is given. However,
it is reasonable to think, efficiency and enjoyment of the way is immensely
enhance by intelligent-committed action.
And what are the dimensions of the way?
The way of being is the use of all dimensions of being
(especially ideas and action) in the transformation of being and the realization
of all being.
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