Founding Normal (Quantum) Equations of Motion
From file: founding equations of motion.doc
Becoming (pre-quantum) ® uniformity, repetition
Small-large « ephemerality (less determinate or [?] observable) – stability (more)
Origin of duration « extension
Becoming ® causation, dynamics
Founding Normal Equations of Motion: Constitution and Dynamics
What are x and t? In a determinate region they could be space and time (t would reduce to t.) In a region of determinate being, x could refer to material points. In some cases they may be coordinates of Euclidean space but, generally, the simplest description will be obtained from other spatio-temporal structure
In general, where being is ephemeral and here and there, there is more or less stability, x, t = {xi, ti}, i Ì U, some very large set. In this case, the simplicity of B = f(x,t) is infinitely deceptive
Logic and natural law: is it reasonable to insist on a strict distinction between logic and natural law? If not, what is the relationship? What is the implication of natural law for logic?
Simplifications: natural law should not specify the possible f’s but something about the patterns of the f’s. The strength of natural law is in generality and therefore in simplicity. It is not being said that natural law is ‘simple’ but that in order for natural law to have meaning as law it should cover a multitude of ‘occasions’ and, therefore, while the actual ‘histories’ BBB will have ‘infinite’ variety, the law itself will be simpler, e.g.
Homogeneity: ψ(x + a, t + b) = ψ(x, t) which is satisfied in case ψ(x, t) = ψ(δx, δt) which includes the second order, Schrödinger and Dirac cases
Formal theory of reality: quantum theory has taught us to introduce f, ψ , by any means and then find interpretation
The meaning of ‘essential or artifact’ is as follows. There are viewpoints according to which knowledge is limited –in some ways at least– to observables and even more restrictive views in which being is the observable. I.e. there is no being outside of the observable – which is less restrictive than the view that there is no being outside of observation. This set of views is the position that the observable is essential as being. The view is subject to the criticism that a full understanding of being should yield observable and observation as one of its developments. One source of this view is the apparent ‘reality’ of what is observed and justifications include subtle arguments such as those of Berkeley and Heidegger; such arguments start from observation. However, observation is interaction – the view of observation as object is egocentric – and thus it may be argued that the theory of observation should be a component of the theory of being. A primary argument against this is the Kantian notion that we cannot get outside experience. This is not, however, Kant’s real position which is that sensory knowledge cannot get outside experience but this is not a necessary limitation on conceptual knowledge – whose justification or mechanism is an issue whose justifications include both transcendental and conceptual-empirical and analytic methods. The analytic method is the derivation of consequence from meaning which my theory of being has shown to be not only possible but also possessed of great and fundamental power. The construction, development and rational-empirical testing of symbolic systems – argued, for example, by Roland Omnes – is an example of the conceptual-empirical approach. In this second view, the observable is real and significant but not ultimate and its projection as ultimate is artifactual
At the level of discussion, it is not necessary to introduce observation or observables. Observation should fall out of theory, i.e. observation is part of being and not external to or imposed upon it. Thus, observation is relationship and it is a delusion based on our intuition of observation that observation should have anything like the nature of sharp replication of what is observed. In special cases, there may be sharp replication of features of what is observed but it is open to question whether the interpretation of that replication is literal or functional
The question arises, what is the relation between LOGIC and logic? However, the question may be moot… for:
The recent developments in the theory of observation (Omnes) teaches us that the conditions of being [B = f(x,t)] and equations of motion(f|R) do not need supplement by a theory of observation or interpretation in terms of non-standard logic: the theory of observation falls out of the constitution and the dynamics