PROBLEMS IN THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS:
A LOGICAL CATALOG WITH REFLECTIONS
ANIL MITRA PH D, COPYRIGHT © 1999 REVISED February 2007
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Note: This essay is essentially as it was written in 1999: revisions have been minor. The treatment of mind and the philosophical background are significantly improved in the essays on being on the website linked immediately above, especially Journey in Being-New World. In these essays the focus is on being and not exclusively on mind. The improvements are due to the placement of the concept of mind in a wider context and to the simultaneous improvement in my own understanding |
Outline. Bulleted links ( 
)
go to the topic in the table of contents. Descriptive
links go to the text
Introduction | Revision of May 2003
Mind and Consciousness | Relations among Mind, World and Time | Origins of Mind and Consciousness | Philosophical Concerns
Bibliography | Copyright | Footnotes
TaBLE OF CONTENTS
The Structure of the Set of Problems Constitutes an Implicit Metaphysics
The Website and Plans for Future Development
Tentative Status of the Document and Current Studies in Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem
1.1 The Concepts of Mind and Consciousness
1.1.2 First Meanings of Mind and Consciousness
1.1.3 Need for Further Analysis of the Concepts of Mind and Consciousness
1.1.4 Evolution of the Concepts of Matter, Mind and Consciousness
1.1.5 Recognizing Mind and Consciousness: the Signs
1.1.6 Confusion between the Signs and the Concepts
1.1.7 The Mystery of Consciousness
1.2 What Is the Extent of the Conscious in Relation to All Mental Phenomena?
1.2.1 All Mental Phenomena Are Conscious
1.2.2 Mental Phenomena Are Either Conscious or Accessible to Consciousness
1.2.3 There Are Mental Phenomena That Are Not Accessible to Consciousness
1.2.4 There Are No Conscious Phenomena
1.3 An Atlas of Mind and Consciousness: Structure, Functions and Dynamics
1.3.1 The Elements of Psychology
1.3.2 Directions and Modes of Development for Psychology
1.3.3 Elements of Mental Processes as a Dynamic System
1.3.4 Psychiatric or Mental Disorders as Variation
1.3.5 Exceptional Abilities and Performance from a Framework of Variation and Nurture
1.4 Direction of Further Study
2 Relations among Mind, World and Time
2.1 Mind and World: Two Problems
2.1.2 The Problem of Mind and Matter: Explaining Mind from Matter or Nature
2.1.3 The Problem of the Structure and Dynamics of Mind
2.1.5 The Problems of Consciousness
2.1.6 Are there two Problems or One
2.2 The Concept of a Theory of Mind and Consciousness
2.2.2 What will or should a Theory of Mind and Consciousness Do?
2.2.3 What Would It Take to Have a Theory of Consciousness?
2.3.3 Biology and Neuroscience
2.4 Mind, Society and Language
2.4.1 Relates to, Mirrors Psychology in Two Ways
2.4.2 Communication, Mind and Consciousness
2.4.3 Thought as Internal Speech or Dialog
2.4.4 On the Knowledge of Other Minds
2.5 Mind, Machines and Technology
2.5.1 Nature of Machines and Tools - Machines as Objects
2.5.2 Role of Machines - Machines and Tools as Aids
2.6 Mind, Information and Mathematics
2.6.1 Cognitivism and Its Critics
3 Origins of Mind and Consciousness
3.3.1 Adaptivity of Mind and Consciousness
3.3.2 On the Nature of Knowledge from Its Evolutionary Context
3.3.3 Evolution: Bio-psycho-social
4.1.2 Nature and Status of the Problems of Mind and Consciousness
4.2 Ontology, Metaphysics and Being
4.2.2 Specific Ontologies or Metaphysics
4.2.3 Relationship to Special Disciplines
4.3 Epistemology, Explanation and Theory
4.3.2 Scientific and Evolutionary Explanation: Nature and Value
4.3.3 Society and Epistemology
4.3.4 Thoughts on Future Forms of Explanation
4.3.5 Explanans - A Variety of Source Theories
4.3.6 Explanandum: Mind and Being?
4.3.8 A Hierarchy of Neutral Ontologies
4.4 Method: How to Study the Problems
4.4.1 On Constructing New Theories
4.4.2 What Will It Take to Develop a Theory of Consciousness and Mind?
4.4.3 A Variety of Conscious Experience - Mind as Experienced in a Variety of Contexts
4.5 Sources - the Literature, Institutions
4.6 An Approach to a Theory of Mind and Nature
4.8 The Future of Studies in Mind and Consciousness
4.8.3 What if all Problems of Science and Philosophy Were Conceived and Solved
4.8.4 The Scientific Problems - Physics, Biology, Psychology
Copyright, Most Recent Update and Status of the Document
Introduction
I have been thinking, writing and reading the literature on consciousness for a while. I have arranged my thought into a set of problems that I want to be reasonably well organized and complete
The field of consciousness research is in flux: proposed solutions to the problems do not have finality at the present stage of development. Indeed one problem is to identify the main issues. I thought it would be useful to publish my reflections in the format of a set of problems. As a catalog of problems, the content of this document is a compilation of viewpoints and issues rather than a development of a single theme from a single point of view
My original intent was to sketch an outline of the modern problems of consciousness and this catalog will reflect that concern. Additionally, there were various reasons to take a broader view. An obvious one is that consciousness is an aspect of mind, which, as a fundamental and main descriptive category [the ontological status of mind is one of the issues considered in this document], provides firmer ground from which to understand consciousness and its relations. Thus, I decided to consider the problems of mind generally while retaining a focus on consciousness
A second reason to take a broader view is as follows. Much of the recent activity and excitement in the theory of consciousness is due to [1] the new models of mind from philosophy, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and proof theory; [2] the promise that ongoing experimental and theoretical neuroscience is detailing places and processes in the organism-brain where micro-physiology meets the classic mental functions such as memory, cognition and emotion; [3] breaking of the materialist-functionalist domination in psychology and philosophy of mind - and a willingness to explore mind itself. Modern physics may also provide critical insight into the mind. This modern activity is very specialized – in a number of ways. The principles of organization and criticism of such activity come in part from general considerations such as are provided by the traditions in psychology and the philosophy of mind. At the same time, the tradition is by no means completed and contains its own cycles of expansion, error and correction; ongoing reflection and analysis will continue to remain productive. Importantly, the new activity in the theory of mind and the continuation of traditional thought should be mutually informing. Therefore, it is important to consider the historical context of the study of mind
The analytical approach should be balanced by experiment. In the case of mind, the study of experience is a form of experiment
The demands of history and of the present may be met through consideration of current and classical problems. The requirements of both theory and experience may be satisfied by considering input from a variety of disciplines and traditions
A personal reason to expand the scope of the catalog is to make it a more complete resource for my broader interests, especially in the theory and nature of being
The Logic of the Arrangement
The logic is expressed in the scheme: Mind; its relations; and criticism
This can be expanded:
[1] Mind, its structure and processes
[2] Relations to the world, dynamics
[3] Origins - immediate, developmental, evolutionary and ultimate, and
[4] Philosophy, questions about the nature of the problems, “meta-questions”
Naturally, the topics overlap
There are many open questions; the main issues are grouped into the four topics and are recounted in section 4.7, under the heading Status of the Catalog of Problems. In the present version of the document, it is the place of mind in the world -and study of the relationship- that forms the organizing principle. An outline of the problems and reasons for its deferment is given in Section 4.7
Because of the interrelations, reflection upon the problems as a group enhances understanding of the individual problems. The broader concerns, ultimate issues, the immediate, and the practical sphere are mutually relevant
A number of primary and supporting themes are developed in stages, interwoven with one another. The supporting themes are related to but do not directly constitute the main subject. These themes are taken up as needed and hence the recurrence. However, recurrence is not repetition and each occurrence may involve a new consideration or point of view. Thus, there is a natural development of some of the supporting ideas in the contexts of their application. It would be useful to gather the different aspects of a topic: Appendix A lists some of the themes and the locations in the document where they are developed
The Structure of the Set of Problems Constitutes an Implicit Metaphysics
The terms ontology and metaphysics are used somewhat interchangeably. However, ontology may be used in reference to an actual or explanatory generative principle behind a metaphysical system
A value of metaphysics is that consideration of a significant problem in a universal setting contributes to understanding of the problem and of the whole. This development does not arise at once but is iterative, reflexive and interactive. Thus, a system of metaphysics and its application arise in interaction
The structure of any problem set that aims at completeness must, in part, imply and derive from an ontology or metaphysics, which may be implicit or pragmatic. Pragmatic, here, may mean a system that is defined by practice rather than as a separate system whether explicit or implicit. My initial plan was to use the tacitly defined scientific worldview that defines the terms of much of the modern discussion on mind. As described above, I have relaxed the original intent; this will place the scientific view in a context. The scheme Mind, Relations and Origins, Reflection or Philosophy assumes a metaphysics of mind-in-the-world. Derivation [see Topic 4] of a set of issues or problems from the interaction of current study and metaphysics is currently implicit in this document
The Website and Plans for Future Development
A primary long-term objective is to develop a site for my work in Being and the Elements of Being
The purposes of the present site for a Catalog of Problems in the Science and Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness are [1] to publish, to contribute, to learn by criticism [2] to experience site development and maintenance - updating, advertising, registering, maintaining correspondence... I chose consciousness because I have been studying and writing about it for a while, because of its pertinence to the larger topic of Being, and because of its current interest
Plans for the present site on mind and consciousness are: tighten the logic and the organization - and, to some extent, bring together themes that weave through the discussion; incorporate material from the spectrum of disciplines labeled cognitive science - especially artificial intelligence [AI] and proof theory, from neuroscience, psychology, philosophy and psychiatry, and other sources - including other cultures and direct individual experience - noted in the document; elaborate and modify the content in response by my own and others’ ideas and criticism and to progress in the field; report on developments and results in a program of study, and research... In planning and working out the present format, I went from the particular [mind] to the general [philosophy, metaphysics]. There is an advantage to the reverse order - general to particular that I have used in other writing - and I may adopt that approach later
Discussion and plans for the site continue in the immediately following comments
An In-Process Document
This document is part of the blurred boundary between formal and informal work that is a byproduct of electronic publication
This is definitely an in-process document. Commentary on others’ work, though critical, is primarily for learning and sharing. Similarly, the cycling through various ontological positions is not subscription to any particular ontology or even to the idea of categorial ontology. This cycling shows the relative nature of categorial ontologies, which is brought out also by noting that a categorial ontology such as materialism has no meaning until the notion of matter has been specified sufficiently so that we know that if other categories turn out to be included, that is not the case because what is called matter actually has the mental residing deep in the recesses of its original nature. One way in which I work through a variety of ontological positions is through commentary on work of other writers; this is effective in that the metaphysical positions of the writers are intended to be instantiated in application. I have not worked out a complete and systematic metaphysics; it is not clear that one would be useful. However, there should be at least a sketch of a complete system of the one world; for I see meaning as neither merely atomic nor merely established by use; rather meaning occurs in the context of, at least, a descriptive system or theory of the one world and the application of the system. The document builds toward an outline of a complete system. This placement within such a complete system would also be a requirement for classification to be the basis of categorial ontology
Upon completion of the document, it has become clear that there are two main problem areas:
Mind - what it is or its nature and its significance; and its relations to the world. Note that the world includes mind. Relations are defining; they include spatio-temporal relations and intensionality
The background of understanding
These two problem areas will guide further development
Tentative Status of the Document and Current Studies in Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem
I hesitate to say that the working through a variety of categorial positions - this includes positions that are asserted or intended to be non-categorial - without presenting any definite position of my own is representative of the field. However, even though I may later make a more definite commitment, I feel that the indefiniteness is rather characteristic of the field of mind-body relations today. My position is definite in that [1] I specify a framework for the formulation of background metaphysics, [2] I specify what makes an intended monism such as materialism truly monistic - I argue that many so-called materialisms or idealisms are too under specified to count as a true monism, and [3] I present alternatives for the way in which the ontological framework may work out - this implies that the current scene is indefinite despite claims to definiteness, [4] I define a program of research - drawing from the current scene and my ideas of effective organization from practical and theoretical / conceptual points of view - at experiential, theoretical and ideological levels
Is the indefiniteness of ontological foundation that characterizes the field of mind-body study, including the origin and structure of consciousness and its place in the realm of mental phenomena, an essential indefiniteness? This is somewhat an open question for me. However, I have been coming to believe that definiteness in metaphysics goes together with detailed work in the study of all known realms of phenomena. Metaphysics is not something that is specified in advance; its specification and elaboration is not separate from the elaboration of the individual sciences and disciplines. This does not mean that metaphysics is without use over and above any appeal that it may have to the human spirit since the process of mutual specification is in the form of dialog. Furthermore, there is no implication that metaphysics is impossible. This is because modes of knowing and knowledge are also part of the equation of discovery. As a rough approximation, one may say that today’s science is - and is informed by - yesterday’s metaphysics. Similarly, our metaphysics, in addition to giving significance to the process of discovery - this has a rather subjective component, may also inform tomorrow’s science and practical knowledge. A framework for this process is given in the previous paragraph
An Invitation to Readers
I welcome commentary - appreciative, questioning, and skeptical - from others
Acknowledgements
I have cited main references, sources of information and ideas. The text references are collected in a bibliography and links are provided for Internet sites
I am immersed in the cultural milieu and its tradition. I have been reading the popular and technical literature in a number of fields for many years. I have absorbed ideas and vocabulary from these sources. Various conclusions and ways of thought, which might otherwise be original, are have derivation from the cultural environment and likely to be anticipated by others. It does not seem necessary, even if possible, to identify all these influences. However, a general awareness of the influence is healthy and the debt is acknowledged
Revision of May 2003
The site http://www.horizons-2000.org is no longer restricted to the issues of mind and consciousness. As planned, the focus on mind has been expanded to being
The main document for the site is Journey in Being. There, I have collected, conceptually systematized and condensed my thought on mind. I have been fortunate to have found much conceptual clarification especially with regard to the ontological status of being generally and mind in particular, with regard to the mind-matter issue and to the nature and kinds of mental function
However, the document Journey in Being is not dedicated to mind. Its four sections are Knowledge and Action, Experiments in the Transformation of Being, The Variety of Being, and Action and Influence. The first and third sections are pertinent to the present document. Knowledge and Action includes a treatment of mind, consciousness, of various problems especially mind-matter and of the mental functions. The Variety of Being has a discussion of cognitivism and computation in relation to the study of mind and includes a discussion of the ontological status of machines including the question of machine intelligence which is not a controversial topic and of machine thinking and machine consciousness. The treatment there – on mind and machines – goes far beyond that of the present document
Status of The Document
The present document is useful as a source of detail and as a possible foundation – for organization – if I write again specifically on consciousness. With that end in mind and since much content is now in Journey in Being, I have excised a number of parts of present document
1 Mind and Consciousness[1]
1.1 The Concepts[2] of Mind and Consciousness
The first meaning[3] of a notion in the context of humankind[4] and culture[5] is through experience and use. The first experience of mind is as experience[6] itself; and later, a name such as “mind” may be used. A tendency to reification may attach a spatial metaphor, e.g., the seat of experience [7] to “mind”. This first meaning will be modified below
Here are two aspects to this. You and I may use the same word but refer to different things. A first step is to make sure that we are talking [more or less] about the same thing. Secondly, although something may exist, our idea or description of it may be adequate or inadequate for the context or purpose. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond the “first” meaning. How may this be done? What is revealed for “mind”? These questions are addressed in what follows
Regarding mind, without consciousness or sentience, i.e. without phenomenal experience, there is no datum, no subject, and no discussion. The first approach identifies what it is that is [to be] under discussion; it is the occasion for the word “mind” and its meaning
In reflective thought there have been two related senses [Runes, 1983] of this first meaning: [1] The individual mind is the self that perceives, remembers, imagines, feels, conceives, reasons, etc. and which is functionally related to an individual bodily organism. [2] Mind, generically considered, is a metaphysical substance, which pervades all individual minds and is contrasted with matter or material substance. I.e., we can talk of individual minds... and of Mind. The latter appears to be hypothetical. Discussion starts with individual minds
It important to talk about meanings and uses because the correspondence between words, meanings and uses is many-to-many; because any given correspondence is never clear and definite; and because words and meanings are in flux, i.e. in evolution. This does not mean that there should be no sense of focus or concreteness to meaning; words, meanings, concepts and uses cohere or coalesce in more and less well knit groups; meanings and uses remain stable for periods of time that may correspond to phases of history or to the ascendance of a paradigm within which meanings find application. Enlightened dialog about meaning encourages proper but not false clarity, and is a part of the growth of knowledge
It is important to be clear about the meanings of the mind and consciousness [1] because of the centrality of mind, especially of consciousness, to human experience, [2] as part of establishing any adequate theory of mind, and [3] because “consciousness” is used in a variety of related senses. It is thus important to be clear on the meaning used here and it is desirable for that meaning to be the core or primary meaning [in a sense elaborated below] and to have appropriate historical continuity. The difficulty of analytic definitions of mind and consciousness relates to the difficulties associated with establishing their precise nature and boundaries and relations to the world. Regarding the central nature of consciousness and difficulty of definition, the following illuminates the point:
“Consciousness cannot be defined: we may be ourselves fully aware of what consciousness is, but we cannot without confusion convey to others a definition of what we ourselves clearly apprehend. The reason is plain: consciousness lies at the root of all knowledge[8]”
The human psychology of language is such that naming something lends concreteness to it; and therefore the naming of mind already contains a latent hypothetical character [9], [10]. This is a source of confusion and error but also of fruitful adventure into the nature of the world. From a practical point of view, we should remember that the form of mind is the form of experience
1.1.1 On Meaning[11]
As suggested above the first meaning of a concept is through experience and use. It is implicit in this thesis that meanings are not given but evolve. It was also implicit that a first meaning of “meaning” is related to experience and use
Here are some thoughts on this issue. As Wittgenstein emphasized, talk of meaning must look to use. This statement is indefinite if the purpose of talk about meaning is to find definite meaning. Meanings have more or less concrete use, first, in close-knit sub-cultures. There is, however, regardless of openness or closed nature of the sub-cultures, an interaction or communication, even when only an indirect one through interaction with the common culture. These interactions are threaded through time. Tracing these processes must be difficult since their time scale frequently exceeds the life spans of individuals and of interpretations. What appears closed over a few years may be open over a generation
A related consideration focuses on the hierarchy of structures through which meaning is elaborated. At the first level, there is experience and use. At another level, there is the class of informally related concepts, meanings and uses. I think of this as a modified first meaning. A second level of meaning of is arrived at through an elaboration of a descriptive world and this includes the possibility of theories. Thus, consciousness, emotion, cognition and so on find enhanced meaning by being placed in relation to one another. In this second level of meaning of a word / concept, we may find that a bit of the meaning of cognition should go under emotion; we may find emotion to be a compound concept. We might find a single or small number of elementary phenomena that constitute the field of mental phenomena. The old meanings are stripped down and built up; some concepts are discarded and new ones arise. Even in the most anti-empirical or extreme rationalist of settings, the process must be informed by the experience - at least at an unconscious level. The metaphor of a collage is appropriate under the following provision. After the collage is constructed, the artist looks at the collage and asks, “Is this saying anything?” In addition, if the answer is “No”, or “Yes, but not quite the right thing!” then the collage may receive additional work or start again with a blank canvas
The first and second levels of meaning correspond roughly to the idea of “sense” and the following levels correspond roughly to “reference”. The relations among these levels correspond, approximately, to a system of relations among sense and reference
A third level meaning of a word / concept or system of words is through the addition of an active and intentional empirical phase to the process of second meaning described above. We now have a system of concepts that stand in relation to one another and a system of description, possibly a theory, that provide understanding or explanation of the world or a more or less coherent sub-domain of facts and patterns. There is attempt to improve the faithfulness of the system of description over the domain and / or extend to domain to which the system applies. This attempt includes explanation of known phenomena and prediction of new ones; new experiments are suggested by the predictions and experiments require further prediction and comparison; and, when the theoretical system is in sufficient disagreement there is the revaluation of that system as described in the previous paragraph
Meanings evolve in mutual relation to other meanings [second level of meaning] and in the evolution of context or application [third level]. The associations of words and meanings also change but words do not precisely follow meanings. Even given a fixed set of meanings, word associations change as the space of the meanings is explored; other influences are sound and custom
These second and third levels of meaning of word / concepts provide second and third meanings of meaning
There is an analogy with axiomatic systems[12]. Consider Euclidean geometry: for two millennia there was an open question and debate about the fifth postulate - the postulate that non-parallel lines meet at exactly one point. The postulate was finally shown to be independent of the other postulates; i.e., the negation of the fifth postulate could be added to the first four postulates without contradiction. This led to the possibility of non-Euclidean geometry. In so generalizing from Euclidean geometry, just one of a number of alternative meanings of “straight line” generalizes appropriately. In further seeking to analyze the nature of the concept of space and its possibilities the idea has been generalized to spaces without metric where relations between points are specified in terms of “continuity.” The various theories of modern geometry and topology have a broad range of application to natural science and within mathematics itself. In the process the definitions of the basic concepts or terms and their meaning is changed. The way in which meanings change in general is similar though not as formal
Alfred North Whitehead, 1929, states this as follows: “A precise language must await a completed metaphysical knowledge.”
From the present considerations, the following can be added to Whitehead’s observation. Meaning cannot be completely isolated from the entire system. However, the act of naming is an act of partial isolation and the process of partial isolation for the purpose of clarification of use and meaning is a process of illumination and, though not complete in itself, part of the expansion of the system, or increase in its faithfulness over, the domain of application. This is a structured affair for a word can have a general meaning within, for example, the English Language - the distinction between formal and informal languages is not significant here - and derivative and specific meanings within specific contexts. When a word / concept is isolated from a special context, its more general meaning may still be available
The process of meaning is not separate from its broadest canvas, yet separation is necessary for the process to go on. This is the case even when the separation is not an analytic operation and is not fully someone’s mental content. The separation may be a process in a small community that is subject to selection pressure. The process, then, is something that occurs with natural language and its use. The canvas of meaning, in the case of natural language, may be so broad as to not come within the scope of most natural users
However, consider Edward Hall’s [1995] description of negotiations in a meeting with tribal leaders in Arizona’s Navajo reservation in the 1930’s. He describes how, before the main discussion, the Navajo leaders provided a careful account of the meanings of the terms to be used. When the natural canvas is not so large, its entirety comes within the scope of users. The distinction between users and specialists, that appears to be a product of civilization and specialization, is not yet fully established
In the academic and other specialist communities such as trade organizations, it becomes the business of the practitioners to work with meanings and the nature of meaning. The distinction between users and specialists [by virtue of coinage, acknowledged expertise, keepers of tradition] becomes formal; expertise is accorded and has some basis in use and institution but does not become absolute. There are tendencies, both institutional and psychological, to make the distinction absolute; however the idea of central store of correct meaning, use and construction is somewhat mythic: at times we behave as though it were real but cannot point to any final arbiter. Even a canonical set of meanings, grammatical and spoken forms is derivative – though not in 1-1 correspondence – from [a] metaphysics. We may regard it as Written that the most secure fortress has begun to crumble even before it is conceived
In the social realm, the construction of meaning transcends discovery: it is also part of the process of creation of “reality.”
What kind of mind would be such that its creation of meaning would be [part of or interactive with] the creation of natural or of universal reality? Is the answer “There is none”? If there were another answer, what would be the nature and meaning of “mind”, “meaning”, and “reality”? What would that mind be? What would be its relation to human minds?
A fourth level of meaning of a concept, as much potential as actual, occurs in the confession of limits to knowledge and is manifest, not by a polite omission from conversation of what we do not know, but by visiting the shadow and dark regions at the edge of the universe of what is known. If such journeys lead us in to the shadow it is the positive shadow of a journey to the center of what we are and not the negative shadow that in exalting limits into absolute boundaries passes as light. In the actual case, the shadow is a continuum from light to dark; however, when limits are made absolute the shadow is seen as dark, something to be avoided
The concepts of mind and consciousness are elaborated in this document, especially in sections 1.1.2, 1.3, Topic 2, Topic 3, and section 4.4.2
1.1.2 First Meanings of Mind and Consciousness
1.1.2.1 Consciousness
The meaning of consciousness used here is that of phenomenal or subjective experience - to be conscious is to have phenomenal experience. The phenomenal qualities of conscious experience are sometimes called qualia. In the words of Thomas Nagel 1974, a state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state
This is the first and core meaning of consciousness. Two ways in which it is the core meaning follow. Firstly, there needs to be a name for the phenomenality that is so central to [human] being in the world; the history of its use makes “consciousness” proper to that task
It follows that the first experience of mind stated above is as consciousness. As a meaning, this is to be modified below
Awareness is related to consciousness. In some uses “awareness” can be substituted for “consciousness” as described above; in related uses, awareness is more and less than consciousness: “I am aware that her spirit is present” includes the possibly of knowledge by inference but “I am conscious of the presence of her spirit” seems to imply direct apprehension. There is a sense used in psychology and cognitive science in which an organism can be aware of something without being conscious of it. There are examples from normal and abnormal psychology. People occasionally become conscious of something that someone said a few seconds after it was said. The delayed response includes knowledge that something had registered without entering consciousness. This phenomenon is a common experience and does not necessarily involve pathology. Another example is “blindsight” in which brain injured persons have awareness without phenomenal awareness of objects in their visual field. This sense of “awareness” is non-phenomenal awareness. Non-phenomenal awareness appears to be real but there is potential for confusion in using “awareness” to refer to both phenomenal and non-phenomenal experience
The second way in which phenomenal experience is the core meaning of consciousness is that there are varieties of other uses that add some ingredient to this core meaning
Consciousness is sometimes used to refer to the following related but distinct ideas: awareness of awareness[13], self-consciousness, conscience, higher consciousness, introspection, and language consciousness
In the modern literature, a distinction is sometimes made between phenomenal consciousness, which is the core meaning that I am using here, and access-consciousness [Block, 1995]. Block defines phenomenal-consciousness as experience and access-consciousness as availability for use in thought or action; access-consciousness may or may not be associated with phenomenal consciousness. So defined, access-consciousness is related but not identical to awareness in the sense of non-phenomenal awareness: although a degree of awareness is present in blindsight, the awareness is not necessarily available for use. The motive for the introduction of access-consciousness appears to be to make valid distinctions and to have a concept of consciousness [or signs of consciousness] available for use in cognitive and functional theories of mental processes. One problem with the use of “access-consciousness” is the associated confusion that the term was supposed to dissipate. This point is discussed further below. A second problem is the question is as to whether access-consciousness is different from phenomenal consciousness [Chalmers, 1997] or whether it is a functional or cognitive characteristic or correlate of phenomenal consciousness. The fact that the awareness in blindsight is both non-phenomenal and unavailable suggests that access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness are not different, i.e. they are logically distinct [this is expected of corresponding functional and phenomenal terms] but empirically identical [this is desired of corresponding functional and phenomenal notions.] Even if the phenomenal and availability concepts are empirically identical, they are conceptually distinct and this distinction may be useful. I suggest using “consciousness” for its original phenomenal sense [unless it is shown that there is no such thing as phenomenality] and other terms such as “awareness” for the cognitive, functional or behavioral measures of consciousness. A problem with “awareness” is that it, too, comes pre-loaded with multiple meanings. Alternatives are “availability” and “cognitive correlate”. As used in this document, consciousness is phenomenal consciousness
Chalmers [1996] argues that mental terms can have two sets of meanings: a phenomenal meaning and a psychological meaning. The psychological meanings are supposed to be objective: functional, measurable, behavioral, instrumental, pragmatic or operational. Searle [1997] criticizes this view and advocates that there is a single meaning to psychological phenomena - the phenomenal, intrinsic, conscious meaning. Further, if there is only the phenomenal meaning or, more generally the meaning as mental phenomenon, are the functional meanings characteristics or correlates? And, what is the status of the functional and related theories of mind? These issues are taken up in more detail below
As noted by Searle [1997], some cognitivists effectively subscribe to a view that there are no conscious phenomena. A variant is that conscious phenomena are unimportant. Another variant is to redefine consciousness in a way that is not consciousness at all; and, perhaps, to allow for the original meaning but to alter its significance. It is not necessary to think that these views or their motivations or consequences are explicit or intended. An example of the appropriation of “consciousness” is through the idea of “access-consciousness,” noted above. A comparison with “heat” and “temperature” is used as justification by historical analogy. “Heat” used to be used, with confusion, in reference to two separate concepts that are now called “heat” [roughly amount of energy; think of the analogy with a water tank - heat corresponds to the volume of water] and “temperature” [in the analogy, temperature corresponds to pressure; in a tall slender tank the pressure at the bottom is greater than in a squat shallow tank even though the volume of water in the tall tank may be less]. Note that we do not have two similar terms that could have been suggested by the historical development: A-heat [amount] and D-heat [degree]. Rather, there are two separate terms: temperature and heat. Why should we use phenomenal-consciousness and access-consciousness when, in the sense inherent to the meaning of consciousness, phenomenal-consciousness is consciousness and access-consciousness is not consciousness at all? This perpetuates the confusion that it was sought to alleviate. One thing is clear: phenomenal consciousness is here to stay[14] and access-consciousness is confusing and poor etymology
Need for a Catalog of Terms and Concepts
It is clear that there is some need, even in the absence of the functional and related meanings, to clarify terminology and classify concepts. It is not clear that, given the pace of publication, this would contribute to conceptual clarification, which must in part be an historical process. My intent here should be to display some of the variety, to state my choices with reasons and to attempt to be appropriately consistent
1.1.2.2 Mind
The first experience given above of mind as the place of experience or consciousness is incomplete as a meaning. It may logically or empirically turn out to be the case that mind so experienced includes unconscious processes but, at this point, it is desirable to give a modified first meaning:
Mental phenomena and processes are those phenomena or processes that are conscious or accessible to consciousness
The concept of the unconscious stated below follows from the present concept as a tautology
This “definition”, which derives from a conception of the unconscious as outlined by Searle [1992, Chapter 7] is founded in the following considerations: [1] It is based in the original experience of mind[15], [2] however, mental phenomena as conscious phenomena is too restrictive, [3] to posit unconscious phenomena that are not accessible to consciousness goes beyond the scope of the original meaning and begins to turn mind into something that it is not, i.e. the concept becomes so broad that it begins to designate just about anything. I remain open, of course, to further dialog and refinement in these considerations
I have been talking as though phenomenal experience or accessibility to phenomenal experience is the mark of mental phenomena. Another “criterion” of the mental is intensionality. The way in which a sentient organism takes up a thing in its environment - that environment includes ideas if the organism has them - seems close to what it means to be mentally engaged with something that, as a result of the engagement, becomes an object. There are non-intentional conscious states and unconscious intentional states. So, which is primitive, consciousness or intensionality? Even though intensionality comes close to the core, consciousness, as I said earlier, is the first experience of mind. All intentional states are either conscious or accessible to consciousness. Another possible characteristic of mind is intelligence. It is necessary to be careful what is meant by “intelligence”. As I use “intelligence”, it is adaptation itself adapted or the process of evolution incorporated into the organism. Although this does not imply consciousness or intensionality, it points to them. If one is looking for the origin of the mental in evolution this is one place to look. This is interesting but all these criteria... how do they fit together? The point here: there is an aspect of futility to this kind of debate! The global objective is a process that inherits and modifies systems of understanding, explanation and prediction in the process of use or application. Meanings and primitives are actors in that theatre. This is taken up, first in sections 1.3, 2.1, and 2.2.2 below and subsequently in a distributed way throughout the document
In the next section, I begin to look at broadening the realm of mind and consciousness. In doing so, I am aware that I might make the concept “so broad that it begins to designate just about anything”. This result will be avoided by retaining the present sense of the mental as a special case of any extensions to the sense. Such extensions may occasion refinement and understanding. It will also be proper to show that any extended sense deserves the designation as “mental.” There should be some kind of continuity between the levels of meaning
1.1.3 Need for Further Analysis of the Concepts of Mind and Consciousness[16]
In this section, I am not looking for a refinement of the definition of mind or consciousness. I am not taking the point of view that the ideas of consciousness and mind are adequate but need elaboration and clarification. Rather, I consider that there is meaning of consciousness that includes the meaning considered so far. I am also concerned with justifying this position, with what the broader ranges of meanings and entities may be, and the limits to these ranges
1.1.3.1 Consciousness
Domain of adequacy of the human experience of consciousness as the concept of consciousness:
Analogy with concepts of matter - modern understanding of matter is significantly evolved from the original immediate experience of what may be called the psychological investment in the permanence of physical reality. The notions of mind and consciousness are quite primitive in their development. This does not mean that the primitive or “folk” notions are invalid. However all notions, primitive, folk, or modern, scientific and philosophical find their validity within a certain context. One of the adventures of human exploration is in the broadening of context, of worldview. The question is open, but I believe that “mind” and “consciousness” are capable of evolving in to greater domains of validity and, as they do so, the concepts will evolve[17]. The modern meanings will not be invalidated within their domain and will find interpretation within the future meanings. Why do I believe this? The following factors contribute: the loose ends in the modern system; extended reflections on mind and consciousness and experimentation with the concepts; the influence of alternative western traditions and eastern traditions; that the notion of the idea need not be the ephemeral, immaterial thing we tend to imagine that it must be; the freedom, and the consequent potential to subsume greater regions of experience, afforded by generalized concepts in my experiments - conceptual and actual[18]...and the resulting ties that are found between the realms of matter and mind in consequence of these explorations. Thus while it is clear that - given the modern concepts of mind and matter and the modern forms of scientific explanation - there should be a tendency to make matter [nervous system] primal in our explanatory systems; this is not required in experimental forms of the concepts
1.1.3.2 Mind
Domain of adequacy of the human experience of mind as the concept of mind
As with consciousness, the concept [at any stage or level including the meaning or definition by pointing and common sense] has elements of anthropomorphism, is limited; we recognize the co-evolution of meanings concepts, definitions, theory, applications and culture
There is a tendency to argue the limits of understanding based in the anthropic and cultural limits to perception and the anthropomorphic and culture based qualities of the concepts; at the same time, we argue universal limits to universal properties and relations based in the limited conceptions. The resolution is familiar; the criticism of any fundamental meaning requires the criticism of all fundamental meanings; the process of criticism is essentially reflexive
As concepts and meanings evolve they may be held back by the baggage of old associations; while the perspectives of a given time and place, a given cultural niche, imply certain necessary relationships among the ideas e.g. “mind from matter”, there is room for invention and evolution in meaning that alter, invert and introduce new basic relationships, ontological givens. The old givens lose primacy; the old relationships lose their necessity
1.1.3.3 On the Ontology of Naming
There is a legacy of issues associated with the words “mind” and “matter” and other categories. Contrast and variety provide richness to the world so, certainly, not all of the issues are problematic. The Cartesian tradition, for example, was a source of innovation and progress but, viewed rigidly as an ontological statement rather than as a solution to a problem of a phase of cultural history, has become a block to understanding; it is a favorite scapegoat that is frequently chastised along the path to clarity and further progress in the realm of fundamental ideas in the modern world. The ideas of mind and matter and of the gulf between them are, however, by no means merely of Cartesian origin. I believe that within the milieu of human biological and cultural evolution such a split, though by no means necessary, is natural. That milieu, large as we may perceive it to be, is, from the vantage point of the universality, a niche. Further growth in the realm of ideas would be growth of and beyond the traditional and the modern categories
By the ontology of naming, I mean the tendency to assume an implicit set of categories, regardless of explicit recantation, that is based in human psycho-sociology and is potentiated or exaggerated by naming the categories. So, for example, if I restrict my speech and thought to “I...” “I am...” “I do...” “I think...” i.e. if I allow only categorially neutral nouns and the verbs corresponding to the categories I may avoid the need to explain “mind”, “matter”, and their relationship. I may diminish the force of categorial thinking. I am not suggesting an immediate modification to vocabulary and usage[19]. However, in terms of a hierarchy of increasingly neutral ontologies - or a single ontology in which there are levels of universality - we would eliminate the concepts in question from the higher levels. This leads to the following consideration:
What is a mental act?
The following is not meant to be a definition. It is a reminder that the received categories can be avoided
There are difficulties that arise from supposing that I am a physical entity that thinks. Rather, I exist and live in a field of experience that is populated with discrete-like entities and continuities and painted with qualities. I have varying degrees of control and of causal give and take and other faculties [functions]. For example, I have a certain degree of control over thought but I experience control and flow with physical balance and inertia. I encounter entities that, though possessed of independence, I experience - through perceptive empathy, analogy, and transference - as mirroring my own experience; these are other beings
Do I really need to talk of mental acts and physical entities? Cannot all of experience, being, myth, culture, knowledge and science be situated economically within this framework without reification of contingent categories?
The key is the economic consideration. Brevity and significance may be obtained from naming but reification is a possible price
1.1.4 Evolution of the Concepts of Matter, Mind and Consciousness
This topic includes evolution of words, ideas, definitions, concepts and theories
What is primal, consciousness [mind] or matter? Consciousness and mind are focused in specific forms of matter; matter is everywhere - so matter, it would seem by experience, is primal. But, a re-understanding or re-conceptualization of consciousness may reveal it primal and the possible destiny of consciousness may make it immanent and so primal
...However, mind and matter are projections behind the one universe [the whole of being] that includes the categories of mind and matter as phases of description. Mind and matter refer to no definite [type of] object, use, or meaning therefore there can be no ultimacy to the projections of idealism or materialism[20]
In the following, idealism and materialism will be used only in extended senses to be specified. At the same time I will consider the following alternatives: [1] retreat from the categories or modes, and [2] consideration of a mode, whose nature is not specified in advance but is sought in terms of the condition that it will include the elements of matter, mind; the name of this mode may be Being
1.1.5 Recognizing Mind and Consciousness: the Signs
Needs for a system of signs have included the following:
Reduction. One motivation has been the need to maintain the scientific worldview
Getting a theory. Given the status of modern theories of the material world - primarily the physical and biological sciences it is difficult to see how these could explain mind and consciousness per se. How does my own consciousness, my experience arise from matter that in its fundamental or aggregate descriptions appears to be devoid of mental characteristics. This issue is considered in more detail below. However, if one had a set of signs that necessarily and sufficiently indicated the presence of mind and / or consciousness then the conceptual headache, the “explanatory gap” would be eliminated
The way in which need for recognition arises is as follows:
First, consider a common analogy that is used, i.e., the way in which the wetness of water arises from the properties of the molecules. Wetness is not a property of the molecules; it arises through the interactions of the molecules. The analogy is that, similarly, consciousness is not a property of the material elements of the brain, yet it arises from the interactions. There is however, the following difficulty with this analogy or numerous others that use an analogy from physical properties in the bulk arising from physical properties of the molecules. Although wetness or, more generally, bulk physical properties have an experiential meaning, i.e., I can feel the wetness of water, and I can feel the hardness of a diamond or see a diamond cutter scoring softer materials, these are not the aspects that are directly predicted from the properties of the molecules. Rather, wetness - or hardness - is first translated into physical terms, e.g. surface tension and so on as a measure of wetness, and the prediction is from the microscopic physical properties to the bulk or macroscopic physical property. In the case of consciousness, which is experience itself, what are the corresponding bulk physical or biophysical attributes?
Various measures have been proposed. Mind and consciousness or are nothing but aspects of the underlying biophysical substrate, they are the behaviors, the functional or causal relations, sufficient causal powers. These all suffer from the same problem: given that they are not consciousness itself, how do we know that are sufficient to guarantee consciousness? When the feel of wetness is translated into physical terms we know that materials with the appropriate bulk physical properties will attach to the skin in a certain way, feel a certain degree of consistency...but how would we know that the purported signs of consciousness would guarantee consciousness? No answer is forthcoming and, further, there are reasons that there is no answer. Whereas wetness and other bulk physical properties are clearly physical, this is not clearly the case for consciousness. Whereas the wetness can be described in both subjective and objective terms, this is not the case for consciousness
Therefore, there is a need to know how to recognize consciousness: so that we will know when an explanation or theory is an explanation of consciousness
However, there is a potential circularity to this search for signs. The signs validate the theory and, so, cannot be validated by it. In working with the field, as information is gathered, tentative explanations constructed, applied and modified understanding grows and the signs initially rough and ready are refined through the process rather than predicted by theory. There is an analogy with the development of the concept of force in physics. Newton’s second law of motion relates force and motion and therefore seems to supply a measure of force. However, this would be circular and the measure of force has to come from other effects that are first the rough and ready notion of effort. This notion is then refined through other effects whose measure is reproducible in quantitative terms
The following possibilities arise:
a. An explanation in current biological and physical terms will be given, and
Either:
We will recognize at that time that the explanation is indeed an explanation of consciousness; it will be an “aha” experience in the sense that the explanation includes its own verification
Or,
By that time, we will have translated the phenomenality of consciousness into a set of sufficient terms that allow prediction from the microscopic level. There are currently, only clues as to how this might happen. A new element to physics, e.g., the requirements for creativity or Penrose’s non-computable quantum gravity, may turn out to be necessary to explain certain characteristics or aspects of mental phenomena. It is not clear, however, how we would get a sufficient set of signs, i.e. a set of signs that would positively identify the presence of mind or consciousness or any of their phenomenal aspects