The development of the way begins dually with imagination and criticism. In reading the literature, in imagination, in attempting to understand the world, imagination and criticism have stood in balance, neither dominating the other.

Though arbitrary or ad hoc certainty is generally rejected (i) it would be dogma to reject certainty where it may be found (ii) we do find directions of both certainty and uncertainty (iii), yet we maintain doubt (in balance with doubt about doubt).

Readers are encouraged to read and understand the way. No reader is expected or encouraged to ‘believe’. Some readers will have absolute doubt. They may go their way with encouragement, without opposition. Some readers will agree with the arguments that the way is consistent with experience yet doubt the demonstration—the later discussion of doubt may address such concern.

Pathways are suggested, not prescribed; as suggested, the pathways are generic, which enables adaptation to specific situations and interests. Above all, the way is not prescriptive—it is designed as shared negotiation of pathways and their discovery.

1.1.2.3 An evolving document

1.1.2.3.1 The evolution

1.1.2.3.2 Design

Comment 1. The section is not temporary but some of its content may be.

Comment 2. A telescoped document.

Eliminate repetition between this chapter and the others.

All problems should be listed in the problems of metaphysics.

Sub-documents?

Comment 3. Phrases “it is seen”, “we see”, “we are seeing”, … , are to refer to discussions that may not yet have been developed and will be linked later.

Edit phrases such as “it is seen” vs “we have seen” and “I have shown” vs “we have shown” for consistency.

Use single and double quotes consistently. Eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate quotes.

Edit for brevity, poetry, precision.

Introduce pictures / graphics?

A concept template (what, why, relation to other concepts, historical meaning…) is part of writing metaphysics.

1.1.2.4 A self-contained system and document

1.2 Origins

1.2.1 Seeking, the world, experience, study, and imagination

1.2.2 History of ideas

1.2.3 Criticism

1.2.4 Paradox

1.3 Content

1.3.1 Preview

The following will be shown.

1.3.1.1 An ultimate universe

The universe is ultimate in that it is the realization of the greatest possibility (naïvely, the possibility of coherence, or, formally, logical possibility—which guarantees consistency of the view).

The universe has identity; the universe and its identity are limitless in extension, duration, variety, peak and dissolution of being; all beings inherit limitlessness and merge in the peaks.

We do not see all possibilities in our cosmos, which is but one possibility; the other possibilities are realized beyond our cosmos, i.e., in other cosmoses, the void, and more. Realization of the ultimate—of the limitless—begins in our world but is realized beyond, trans-cosmologically.

1.3.1.2 Paths to the ultimate

Though it is given that all beings realize the ultimate, if enjoyment is a value, there is an imperative to develop, share, and negotiate intelligent (effective) pathways to the ultimate for, beginning in, and from our world. While there are received ways (philosophy, religion), shared development and negotiation are essential to effective realization; and they are realization-in-process while in our world.

Pleasure and pain are unavoidable; there is pleasure in being on a pathway (this is not a rejection of simple joy); the best resolution of pain is use of the best available of therapy while, as far as possible, being on a path on which the fortunate give aid and assistance to the less fortunate.

1.3.2 The main ideas and their significance

1.3.2.1 Primary

The primary ideas begin with being, beings, experience, agency, concepts, and objects.

1.3.2.2 Metaconcepts

Knowledge of the world and so knowledge of knowledge, nature and problems of knowledge, narrative, action, method, and reflexivity.

Representation, abstraction, and pragmatism.

Metaphysics as the overarching discipline, which includes meta-metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and theory of value.

1.3.2.3 Concept template

Nature, definition, and significance, of the concept.

Relation to received meanings and reasons for differences.

Place in the hierarchical structure of the concepts.

1.3.3 Logic of the outline

1.3.3.1 On the choice of the ordering

1.3.3.1.1 Overview

The order of the chapters is plain enough. Into the way of being paves the way in. The formal development is in the world, which develops a foundation, and realization, which is about action based on the foundation. The concluding chapter, return, is about living in the world on the way to the ultimate from a new perspective.

Of the four chapters, the structure of the second, the world, is in especial need of explanation. The following account touches on the key issues of the chapter.

1.3.3.1.2 The world

1.3.3.1.2.1 A metaphysical system—a preliminary section

A metaphysical system develops, briefly, the metaphysical system of the narrative. Why is this done before introductory discussion? It is because such discussion without metaphysical knowledge is invariably vague. A Socratic attitude ought to be taken in interaction with a definitive one, rather than coming at the beginning which that everything ought to be always doubted (everything ought to be doubted but not always). The metaphysical system is (a) ultimate (b) of course doubted (c) sets the scene.

1.3.3.1.2.2 The core development

The world is really metaphysics; however, it is informative to begin it with metaphysics as such, followed by development of the metaphysics. The section, worldviews, personal, and explicit metaphysics is a way into the metaphysics. What is metaphysics and what is its significance defines metaphysics, explains how and why the present conception differs from the received, and reiterates the fundamental significance of metaphysics. Meaning and knowledge, a topic critical to clear thinking generally, is an essential preliminary to the main development of metaphysics.

The development of metaphysics, proper, begins with being, beings, and agency, which is on the essential subject and foundation of metaphysics. But why should we begin with foundation? Would it not be better to begin with the immediate—where we are and from there, to develop foundation and its application? That is—ought we to begin with ‘ground’ or axiomatically with being? It is possible to do both. This is because the immediate, our experience of things, is already but implicitly built into the previous section, meaning and knowledge. We could have begun explicitly with experience, but that would have made the development cumbersome as we would have to rework it to account for the implications of the study of being for experience. Though experience is essential to the development, it is effective to defer its explicit treatment till after a basic metaphysical framework is in hand—and the foundation for the framework is in being, beings, and agency, while the framework itself is developed in ultimate metaphysics. (also: the real metaphysics) The ultimate metaphysics is where we show the universe to be the realization of the greatest possibility, which is far greater than received views, secular and transsecular. Then, experience develops the concept of experience, its importance, the experiential nature of the ultimate, and instruments for and ways to the ultimate.

The remaining sections of the world are now discussed briefly.

1.3.3.1.2.3 Consequences and elaboration

Is the truth of the real metaphysics certain? The question is raised and addressed in doubt.

Logic, method, and content has the following functions. It extends the concept of logic to (i) fact and inference (ii) the certain and the less than certain cases (in a manner that is a definite enhancement over what is sometimes called ‘argument’). It fills in the range of metaphysics. It shows logic and metaphysics to be the same. It shows metaphysics (and logic) to be self-contained (as far as possible and in what sense).

Epistemology, theory of value, and cosmology (in a new cosmology) are treated and developed as part of metaphysics. Epistemology is part of metaphysics because knowledge is part of the world, and it is important in metaphysics as founding. Ethics is part of metaphysics as agency is part of the world, and it is important to agency, choice, particularly the question “what should we do”, generally, and in relation to realization. Ethics is also important as part of being—it is not epitheory—and essential in informing epistemic criteria (which stands against a common received notion that knowledge criteria are pure—intrinsic to knowledge itself). Cosmology is a working out of the metaphysics, especially in relation to the question “what is in the world and what is its nature?” Here, cosmology includes but far exceeds classical philosophical cosmology and modern physical cosmology—which is a consequence of the demonstrated real or ultimate metaphysics.

Our world is about problems of our world today and into the reasonably foreseeable future—the problems themselves, (re) valuation in terms of the real metaphysics, and their address.

The meaning of life is about (i) what the concern means, particularly is it only about individual pursuit in a secular vein, and whether it is a fundamental problem of philosophy—or, perhaps, the fundamental problem (ii) addressing the issue in light of the real metaphysics in a top-down manner—flexible and open at the higher level and a range of specifics and choices at the lower.

1.3.3.1.2.4 The problems of metaphysics and philosophy

Many classical and modern problems have been treated to this point—but the treatment is not for its own sake – the problems are significant to the purpose of the way of being. To catalog and treat the problems of metaphysics would be useful as (i) a contribution (ii) potential utility in the way and in life (iii) showing the power of the real metaphysics. This is done in the problems of metaphysics and philosophy, where the problems are extended, rationally arranged, and addressed in light of the real or ultimate metaphysics (emphasis is on those problems not addressed in the main development).

1.3.3.2 Dynamic reordering

1.3.3.2.1 Introduction

Before the state of the evolving narrative arrived at understanding the world in its own terms (being) rather than in terms of something else (e.g., substance, process, and so on), it (the narrative) experimented with the physical (matter) as fundamental and then with experientiality (e.g., consciousness) as fundamental.

Questions arose—“Which is fundamental, matter or experience? Are they equivalent?” To help answer these questions I constructed two databases of the system of concepts, in one of them matter was the highest-level concept, mind was highest in the other. Comparison of the two databases suggested what may be expected—with sufficient flexibility in the concepts of mind and matter, the two are equivalent.

That is, there is something more fundamental than mind or matter. What is that something? At the highest-level it would be property free.

It would be being itself—i.e., the world as the world, not as something else or something within it (and, further, this will be found to be significant rather than trivial).

But being is not property free, comes a response for it distinguishes between existing and non-existing things. And a counterpoint is, but is not the concept of ‘non-existing thing’ a contradiction? It turns out that a proper understanding (theory of) meaning is the key to resolution and that the idea of a non-existing thing is not self-contradictory (see dialethic logics).

1.3.3.2.2 Foundation vs pragmatic beginning

Axiomatic systems begin with what may be called foundational to the subject matter (they may of course have further foundation).

In seeking foundation for metaphysics, which is about the world, it may be better to begin with ‘where we are now’, e.g., with (our) experience.

This is addressed in the previous section, on the choice of the ordering, and we find (i) that dynamic reordering suggests being as fundamental (a little bit of artificial intelligence, which suggests that what is fundamental is a higher order category than mind or matter) (ii) with being, foundation and pragmatic beginning are both possible.

1.4 Reading the way

1.5 Living the way and shared pathways

2 The world

Introduction

This chapter develops knowledge of the world. The vehicle for this is metaphysics, defined as knowledge of the real. This is questionable on counts of (i) whether this is a good conception of metaphysics (ii) whether metaphysics is at all possible, realistic, or potent.

The treatment begins with a particular metaphysical system rather than with metaphysics as such. This is because the system (i) shows the possibility of metaphysics (ii) is (argued to be) a potent and ultimate system (iii) lays groundwork for general treatment that follows. The development of the system benefits from having gone through many iterations which (a) has resulted in an optimal, empirical, and rational form (b) anticipates and addresses issues of validity of the metaphysics. Thus, this approach makes the development efficient. This efficiency is also seen in the metaphysical system (a metaphysical system) where even though experience is seen as effectively essential to being, the treatment of experience is made more efficient by deferring it to after development of the core metaphysics.

The developed metaphysical system is existentially and metaphysically empowering. What if its demonstration (proof) is doubted or does not go through? It will be seen that it is consistent with experience and reason, which has the following consequences. Existential significance remains. Metaphysically, a possible worlds metaphysics has been described, which is useful in itself and is background for interpretation and address of many issues of philosophy, metaphysics, science, and the ‘meaning of life’.

The title of this chapter could be ‘Ideas and the world’, but the world is the world as known and therefore ideas are implicit in the title.

The title could also be ‘Ideas’ but, importantly, ideas include that those that are ideas of the world and ideas are in the world—therefore the world would be implicit in the title ‘Ideas’. However, the title ‘Ideas’ is not chosen because it might suggest a narrative only of imagination or speculation.

Anticipating the conception of metaphysics as knowledge of the real, metaphysics may be seen as ‘the comprehensive or all-inclusive knowledge discipline’ and therefore the title could have been ‘Metaphysics’. However, ‘Metaphysics’ because it would suggest speculation, lack of basis in experience, metaphysics of religious dogma, or an otherwise unfounded narrative. The sections of the chapter fall under metaphysics in this general sense.

The closing section of the chapter ‘Problems of philosophy and metaphysics’ is not essential to the way of being, but on contribution of the metaphysics developed to a delineation of the problems and their address.

2.1 A metaphysical system

This section may be used as a succinct version of the way and its foundation for knowledge and realization.

2.1.1 Definitions

2.1.1.1 On definition, meaning, and knowledge

A definition specifies a concept or mental content. Definitions may be related to but have difference from informal and received use. Thus, a definition is a combination of a sign (usually linguistic, often compound) and an icon.

In metaphysics, a definition specifies a concept that is intended to capture something real.

A meaning is a definition and the possible object (or objects).

However, capture or existence of the real ought to be shown.

Isolated definitions generally capture the real only in a context. In metaphysics it is the system of definition that captures the real.

Knowledge is meaning realized.

List of concepts in this section—concept, sign, icon, definition, meaning, system of definition, knowledge.

2.1.1.2 Preliminary foundation

Metaphysics is knowledge of the real.

A representational concept or just concept, concept (knowledge) that is intended to depict a being. When there is depiction, what results is a representation.

To abstract is to remove detail from representation that is necessarily distorted.

A being (plural: beings) is that which is known to exist—i.e., to be; being is the property of beings as beings.

The universe is all being; the void is the being that has no part.

Given a representational (referential) concept, the being is possible if the concept is self-consistent (logical possibility) and consistent with the nature the universe (real possibility). Real possibility presumes logical possibility; logical possibility is the greatest possibility.

A simple fact is a minimal piece of data about the world (universe, cosmos…) relative to a knower. A compound fact is a collection of simple facts.

From the truth of one fact, the truth of another does not (logically) follow.

A pattern for a being obtains if the data to represent the being is less than the raw data.

A cosmos is a coherent part of the universe, which is the extent of observation to local beings.

A law for the universe or cosmos is a pattern that obtains there.

A law is a patterned compound fact; given a law or pattern, from the truth of one fact, the truth of another (logically independent) fact may follow.

If we regard a cosmos as constituted of physical elements which follow physical laws, the concept of a being has physical possibility if its constitution is physical, and it follows the laws of the cosmos. As long as the physical laws of a cosmos are not known to be complete or eternal, the cosmos is not known to be entirely physical.

Enjoyment is a state of aware beings in which pleasure and pain are in good balance.

List of concepts in this section—metaphysics, representational concept, concept, representation, abstract, a being, beings, being, universe, void, concept, possible, logical possibility, real possibility, fact, compound fact, pattern, cosmos, law, physical possibility, enjoyment.

2.1.1.3 Derivative or secondary terms

For convenience, here is a list of some significant terms introduced later—the fundamental principle of metaphysics (fpm), the ideal metaphysics, the real metaphysics (rmp), observation, inference, deduction, induction, argument, inferential logic, general logic, Platonism, form, mathematical Platonism, experience, as-if-mind, as-if-matter.

2.1.2 The being (existence) of some beings

This section provides examples with some systematicity. Greater system and a more comprehensive list is provided later.

2.1.2.1 Beings

A modified form of Descartes’ cogito argument shows via abstraction that there are beings and that there is being.

Though the universe may not be known in detail, that the universe is a being follows from abstraction from the idea of all beings.

That the void may be taken to be a being follows from the equivalence of its existence and nonexistence.

Laws have being.

The void contains no law.

2.1.2.2 ‘Meta-being’

There is metaphysics (some has just been established; more—an ultimate metaphysics—is established below).

As the world contains itself, knowledge (including metaphysics), reason, and value, so metaphysics may be seen as an all-inclusive discipline, containing metaphysics (‘proper’), epistemology, metametaphysics, logic, theory of value (including ethics, aesthetics, and their metatheories). Even if we do not place epistemology under metaphysics, it is essential to proper metaphysics for metaphysics without justification would be no more than imagination. As far as philosophy harbors knowledge, it too lies under metaphysics; and science and philosophy of science fall trivially under metaphysics.

2.1.2.3 Nonbeing

What could ‘nonbeing’ be? The term could be used as follows. A nonbeing is a representational concept without an object. This is also what is sometimes called a negative existential. Negative existentials are considered problematic, in view of the question “what is it that does not exist?”, which seems to require posit existence so as to deny it. However, this definition of nonbeing is one simple resolution of the problem.

2.1.3 The fundamental principle

If from the void, a possible being does not emerge, that would constitute a law of the void.

The greatest possibility emerges from the void.

The universe is the realization of the greatest or logical possibility (i.e., the universe is limitless).

This statement above is the fundamental principle of metaphysics (FPM).

2.1.4 Consequences

The being of the universe is necessary. It has no substance and no need of explanation in terms of substance, but, uninformatively, the void or any being could be seen as the substance of the universe.

The universe has identity; the universe and its identity are limitless, particularly in extension, duration (the universe is eternal), variety, peak, and dissolution; there are cosmoses without end to their number or variety; all beings realize this ultimate (and while this is given, there are effective paths to the ultimate); which is not a contradiction, for individual beings merge as one. The ultimate is an ultimate knower that knows and is all (which is not negated by paradoxical conceptions of the ultimate for the logically impossible does not define a being).

From the perspective within a cosmos, its being may seem to be contingent. Beyond the cosmos there are further cosmoses and more (temporarily isolated, ultimately in contact with one another and the void). Consider the original cosmos; consider its conceptual join to others; proceeding thus, we arrive, conceptually, at the universe, which is all possibility and is necessary.

This defines an ideal metaphysics. It shows ultimates; via abstraction it is perfect as representation; and thus, it has an ultimate character as metaphysics.

As far as enjoyment is a value, it is good to be on—to negotiate—a path to the ultimate. It is not enough to follow prescriptions. It is of the essence to negotiate intelligent and shared paths on which the fortunate assist the less fortunate.

2.1.5 The real metaphysics

To negotiate the world in light of the ideal metaphysics, we turn, also, to received knowledge-in-process, which is a mix of the ideal and the pragmatic.

If we join the ideal to the pragmatic, the ideal guides and illuminates the pragmatic and the pragmatic illustrates and is instrumental toward the ideal. The join is not perfect by received, e.g., representational, criteria. However, it is the best available to negotiate the way to the ultimate. With enjoyment as criterion, the join is perfect. Further, as seen, in the ultimate, the ultimate knower knows and is all. Thus, the value criterion (enjoyment) approaches the representational criterion in the ultimate which is our ultimate.

The join of the ideal and the pragmatic constitute a perfect metaphysical system, which is named the real metaphysics (rmp).

Epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and logic are subsumed under the real metaphysics.

2.1.6 Why being?

The metaphysics has been arrived at without reference to ‘kind’, e.g., substance, which shows the power of being. Being is neutral to kind. It might have been thought that this neutrality would have been a weakness of the conceptual power of being; instead, we see it as the reason for its (ultimate) conceptual power.

2.1.7 Logic

Some facts are established by observation (perceiving, measuring…), others by inference (to conclusions from premises).

2.1.7.1 Observation

When a fact is established by perfect observation—for example, by abstraction—the truth of the fact is certain; otherwise, due to imperfection in observation, the truth of the fact may have uncertainty.

2.1.7.2 Inference

Though various kinds of inference have been identified, let us class inference as deduction (certain) vs induction (probable).

The following are certain inference—deduction under classical logics such as propositional and predicate calculi, deduction under extended logics (e.g., modal logic) and variant logics (e.g., many-valued logics), and deduction under some sciences, e.g., quantum theories (though outcomes may be probabilistic, the probabilities are certain) and relativistic mechanics.

The following are inductive—arriving at a deductive logic (there usually are alternative schemes for a given kind) or a scientific theory (from a limited data set), via, e.g., abduction.

Note that though logics and sciences are patterns or (patterned) inferential schemes, they may be seen as patterned compound facts.

2.1.7.3 Classical notions of logic vs science

It is common to compare deduction under logic to induction (or abduction) to a scientific theory.

However, the foregoing show that it is proper to compare (i) arriving at a logic to arriving at a scientific theory (uncertain) (ii) inference under logic to inference under a scientific theory (in the physical sciences, inference under the science is typically certain).

Thus, though they are not the same, logic and science in their traditional senses, may be brought under one umbrella.

2.1.7.4 Argument

One current notion of argument is the joint process of (i) establishing facts (simple or compound) (ii) inferences to further facts (conclusions) under a logic (or science).

It is usual in the literature to consider certain fact and certain inference. In this case, the argument is called valid if the certain inference is validly established. If, further, the fact (premise) is established, the argument is called sound. Sound argument is a particular case of argument as defined above.

Putting deductive logic and inference under science under one umbrella, we get inferential logic, whose derivation is uncertain but under which inference is certain (from the real metaphysics, sciences under which inference is not certain could be brought under this umbrella).

With this consideration, what we call argument above may also and shall be called general logic or just logic.

As far as there are no atomic facts—i.e., all facts are compound, but atomicity is relative to knowers, the distinction between fact and inference is porous, and logic in its ordinary sense becomes argument. This thought needs to be developed.

Here we may allow the certainty of both fact and inference to be relaxed. There are various particular cases, which may be taken up as occasions arise.

Argument, the real metaphysics, logic, and in some sense of the terms, all good knowledge are one.

2.1.7.5 Mathematics

Where does mathematics fit into this scheme? It begins as an empirical science, e.g., geometry may have begun as a science of shapes and their properties. However, Euclid found it possible to axiomatize geometry. Today, we regard all systems of mathematics as axiomatic systems. What is the object of an axiomatic system? One view is that the systems are conventions and have no intrinsic objects. Original platonism—Plato’s view—was that the objects of mathematics are forms that exist in an ideal or Platonic world. Today, original Platonism is seen as fanciful. However, some thinkers subscribe to mathematical platonism, the idea that on account of their seeming necessity and universality, there are abstract mathematical objects, whose existence is independent of our thought and language. From an empirical viewpoint, such abstract objects may be seen as idealizations of (systems of) real objects. The real metaphysics shows that for any consistent system of mathematics, the system perfectly represents the objects of some world (and pragmatically represents the objects further worlds).

Mathematics falls under logic in the inclusive sense of the previous section.

2.1.8 Experience and agency

Experience is awareness in all its kinds and forms, including consciousness and agency, which is the ability to conceive and act toward outcomes (this conception of experience is more inclusive than is common in received use).

Without experience, we would be as-if dead. Experience may be considered to be the place of our being and the sense of significance. We will establish the universe and our being to be experiential in nature.

Experience has the following aspects—there is ‘experience of’ and ‘the experienced’; and there is the experience itself, in which the experience-of and the-experienced are related (‘pure experience’ is experience without a present object). The experience-of is as if of mind (as-if-mind, of the subject); the-experienced is as if of matter (as-if-matter, of the object).

To begin consideration of experience, let us not assume the real metaphysics. In a world strictly of non-mental matter, there would be no experience. Therefore, our world is not strictly material. If our world were strictly of a single substance—monist—the one substance would have to be experience and thus it would have to be experiential to the root. At the root, experience would be relational but not be rich, varied, and reflexive (experience of experience) as ours is.

However, the real metaphysics shows the universe to not be substance based (we could consider the void or any being to be its substance but that would be uninformative). Yet, as there is experience and experience harbors as-if-psyche and as-if-matter, experientiality is a suitable candidate to characterize the universe. Is there more? As experience is relational and relation of relation is relational, there is no further kind (what there is beyond our experience of experience has to do with variety and richness, not a further kind). Under the real metaphysics, the root is always capable of experientiality. We may therefore validly consider the universe to be experiential where even primitive being is experiential with, perhaps, zero but not null experientiality.

That the universe is experiential neither denies nor affirms that the universe is one or both material and mental. However, it does affirm that the universe has as-if-psychical and as-if-material sides, and so universe as experiential loses no functionality on account of its lack of affirmation of matter and mind as real.

The universe and our being are experiential (and agentive).

2.2 Metaphysics

Comment 4. Experience is one of the problems of metaphysics.

Comment 5. A section “real metaphysics” vs speculative vs joint

2.2.1 Worldviews and personal metaphysics—implicit and explicit

Comment 6. Has some discussion in the first chapter.

2.2.1.1 Worldviews

Persons may ask themselves—what do I want to do in my life, what is the best or greatest thing I can and ought to do.

Comment 7. See Kant’s three questions in Kant’s Account of Reason—Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/).

Whatever their answer, it will be framed, at least in part, in a view of what the world is like—what kind of world is it, what is in it, what kinds of processes are there, what is the future of the world, what kind of person am I.

The framework may of course be implicit, based on personal experience, absorbed from culture (which may provide more than one framework, e.g., secular vs transsecular).

Such frameworks are worldviews.

2.2.1.2 Personal metaphysics

As the question of worldview has relevance to individual choice, the person may, seeing its importance, seek to make their worldview explicit. And in making it implicit they may question it and seek to improve it.

That is, they may seek to formulate a personal metaphysics. And they may turn to the history of thought as a resource.

2.2.1.3 Explicit metaphysics

This is one reason to develop explicit metaphysics, of which one expression is the literature of the history of metaphysics. Metaphysics may also be told as myth and written as general literature.

2.2.2 What is metaphysics and what is its significance?

Comment 8. A meta-issue?

A rough characterization of metaphysics is that it is a fundamental study of all being—whereas physics (for example) is about the material aspect of our cosmos, metaphysics is the entire universe and its nature.

A rough characterization of the significance of metaphysics is that as the most inclusive account of what is real (significant in itself), it has potential to illuminate and guide all (general) endeavors of thought and action, to understand the nature and destiny of (our) being, to guide our path in this world and (any) beyond.

But is it (only) the most inclusive account… and does it have this and other significance? These questions are best answered after developing metaphysics

2.2.2.1 What kind of question is this?

It is a question about metaphysics—i.e., we could consider it to be a topic in ‘metametaphysics’. However, metaphysics is in the world, and therefore metametaphysics—the study of metaphysics as a discipline, what falls under it, its use, and its justification—falls within metaphysics.

2.2.2.2 How to define a knowledge discipline

Conceptually vs historically vs academically (re: academic boundaries and ‘turf’), top-down vs bottom-up, holistically vs atomistically (where vs means and/or).

The definition of a knowledge discipline ought to aim at the probably contradictory aims of inclusiveness, understanding, utility, and precision.

2.2.2.3 History—received problems of metaphysics

Here are some received problems of metaphysics (modified, with additions, from Metaphysics Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Summer 2023 Edition). It is not intended to be a complete catalog of the problems—resolved or unresolved. A more complete catalog in light of the real metaphysics is placed later.

Comment 9. Also review List of philosophical problems - Wikipedia > Metaphysics.

2.2.2.3.1 Classical metaphysics

The object of metaphysics—Being, First Causes, Unchanging Things

Divisions of metaphysics—Categories, Universals, Particulars

Ground and Foundation—Substance (vs Groundlessness vs grounding in Groundlessness)

2.2.2.3.2 Recent Metaphysics

Modality—i.e., metaphysical modality (if we see necessity and possibility as a kind of cause, modality will may fall under causation, below)

Identity; Persistence and Constitution; Space and Time; Causation, Freedom, and Determinism

Mind and Body (The Mental and Physical)

Metaphysics of the dimensions of being—nature (physical, biological, of psyche), society (institutions, persons, culture), the universal (world, the ultimate, logic, experience)

2.2.2.4 What metaphysics is

2.2.2.4.1 The concept

If we define metaphysics as earlier—as knowledge of the real, it is (i) a good approximation to the received study, (ii) justified by the treatment of the previous chapter (iii) still in need of elaboration.

2.2.2.4.2 Its significance

All knowledge is metaphysical in some way (this is brought out later).

Most fundamental issues in life and ideas and many pragmatic concerns are vague in their formulation and resolution without metaphysics (worldview). This is true of action issues “what shall I do”, “what is our social endeavor about”, as well as knowledge questions such as “what is knowledge”, “how is knowledge acquired and justified”, “what is meaning”, and “how are knowledge and action interactive”.

We are seeing that metaphysics is the overarching discipline.

2.2.2.4.3 Metaphysics, metametaphysics, and reflexivity

2.2.2.5 To what extent are metaphysics and philosophy science?

And to what extent would metaphysics and philosophy as science be a complete characterization?

2.2.2.6 What directly falls under metaphysics?

2.2.2.6.1 Being

Being is the most general object of metaphysics (it harbors nonbeing).

2.2.2.6.2 The essential nature of being

That being is what it is and is not to be reduced to some substance or category is evident from the first chapter, a metaphysical system.

Thus, our first characterization of being is that it is (a) characterized so inclusively that (b) its characterization is trivial (some thinkers hold that it is not a characterization at all).

However, we have seen that all beings including the universe are effectively experiential.

That is, all being is experiential being.

2.2.2.6.3 The variety, extent, duration, and behavior of being(s)

Variety includes kinds and a hierarchy of beings on various scales, especially experientiality, abstraction (abstract and concrete objects), existential scales, and null – part – whole scales (see the little manual).

With regard to extent and duration, we would like to show (i) levels, at least of description, above them (ii) how extent and duration flow from (a) those levels (b) experientiality (c) the real metaphysics (d) the concepts of sameness and difference and thence of identity.

2.2.2.7 The method of metaphysics

2.2.2.7.1 Method

Since we do not know more than we know and cannot (logically) know more than the greatest knower, developing metaphysics will involve (i) looking at our knowledge-in-process (ii) metaknowledge, which is analyzing our knowledge for what is fundamental and its element, perhaps enhance, by the idea of an ideal (knower), which, even if we are not that ideal, we can perhaps leverage.

This will involve analysis of logic and experience as understood in the previous chapter.

2.2.2.7.2 Real and speculative metaphysics

Metaphysics as a join of real and speculative thinking; the real as framework, ultimate, guide, illumination, inspiration – the speculative as detail, of the word, means, illustration, and process.

2.2.2.7.3 Structure

Logic

Knowledge – Fact

2.2.3 Meaning and knowledge

2.2.3.1 Concepts, language, and meaning

2.2.3.2 Knowledge

2.2.3.2.1 The concept

2.2.3.2.2 Kinds

Knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge-that, knowledge-how.

2.2.3.3 Problems of knowledge

2.2.3.3.1 Abstraction and perfect representation

2.2.3.3.2 Pragmatic knowledge

2.2.3.3.3 Union

2.2.4 Being, beings, and agency

A being (beings), being, universe (all being), the void, cosmos, pattern, possibility (logical, real), agency

2.2.5 Ultimate metaphysics

2.2.5.1 The fundamental principle

2.2.5.2 The real metaphysics

2.2.6 Objects

2.2.6.1 Pre-metaphysics

The pre-metaphysical situation is that concepts (representational, self-consistent) may have objects. The objects may be real or as-if (e.g., fictional, e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes’). If real, the object is a being. Thus, the class of objects includes the class of beings.

That a concept has an object is metaphorical. The concept and object are intertwined and not generally separable into a concept and object-in-itself (which Kant called the noumenon thing-in-itself). We have been using ‘object’ in two ways—as the (metaphorical) object and as the concept-object (which Kant might call the phenomenon).

2.2.6.2 Noumena or things-in themselves

Just above, we said that “the concept and object are not generally separable”. Thus, generally, the object is not just imprecisely known—‘hiding behind the appearance’—but logically, from the meaning of the term ‘object’ as concept-object, there is no thing-in-itself, i.e., there, generally, are no noumena.

However, we have seen that some objects are precisely known via abstraction; examples are being, experience, the void, and the universe. Effectively, in such cases there are noumena.

In other cases, e.g., when I see a tree, I may treat ‘the tree’ as noumenal for some pragmatic purposes. But for general purposes, my knowledge of the tree falls short of being noumenal.

2.2.6.3 Concrete and abstract objects

Objects may be concrete (typically physical, located in space/time, e.g., a brick, ten bricks, or a copy of Shakespeare’s Hamlet) or abstract (e.g., the objects of mathematics, universals such as redness, Shakespeare’s Hamlet). Mathematical objects may be thought of as abstract, first by abstraction from real objects (‘ten’ from ‘ten bricks’ and ‘ten sheep’), but then by axiomatic definition. Redness is abstract by abstraction from all red objects. Shakespeare’s Hamlet is abstract because it is, perhaps, the meaning of the play.

What seems common to the abstract objects is that they are not physical, not located in space/time. But what are they?

2.2.6.4 Post-metaphysics

From the real metaphysics, every consistent concept has (‘is’) an object. What is the object of the number ten? We might say it is abstracted from the class of ten things. Thus, it is not true that it is not in space/time but rather, space/time has been left out in the abstraction. But then, what of axiomatization? Abstraction from physical classes is still empirical and, if so, the notion the natural numbers (unending) and the mathematical operations are questionable as empirical. Therefore, we prefer axiomatization (today). But the common axiomatization with first order predicate calculus has models of all cardinality.

That is sometimes thought to be negative, but it might be positive. How so? If a switch is turned on and off at an infinite rate it would seem paradoxical as it is on and off at the same time. However, it is not paradox because there is no one situation that is on and off; rather an infinite number of situations are condensed into an instant. Is there a mathematics of that? Yes, perhaps, in a cardinality of a higher order than the one we use to represent time in our world. Similarly, we might represent an infinitesimally slow process with a lower order cardinality.

What is Shakespeare’s Hamlet? A problem here is that the idea is vague. What do we mean by it? Perhaps as above it is the meaning of the play. Perhaps it is the recollection of all performances that have been seen. But, regardless, there is some object.

2.2.6.5 Some further kinds

We may consider objects of the following kinds—real (there is an object), possible (the concept can have an object), nonexistent in a world (the concept does not have an object in our world), nonexistent (the concept has no object at all and must therefore be inconsistent), necessary in our world (the concept must have an object in our world), necessary (the concept must and does have an object).

2.2.6.6 A conclusion

From the real metaphysics, the distinction between the concrete and the abstract is not one of kind. All consistent concepts have objects in the universe. It lies more in the direction of particular vs universal, perception vs conception.

2.2.6.7 Discovery

As seen in the discussion of meaning, objects are really concept-objects. If we have an idea of something but do not know what it is precisely, then how do we discover the precise meaning? It is a search in a dual space of concepts and objects and the outcome may or may not be precise.

As we are agents, the search is constructive. We may actually construct the object. In the ultimate we may construct ourselves as peak being.

2.2.7 Experience

2.2.7.1 What experience is

2.2.7.2 We are experiential beings

2.2.7.3 The universe as experiential and agentive

2.2.7.4 The nature and form of the ultimate

2.2.8 Realization—paths to the ultimate

2.2.9 Dimensions of being

A more complete title of this section is “Dimensions and paradigms of experience and being”.

The concept of ‘dimension’ is related to that of ‘category of being’. In received metaphysics, a category is class or genera of being just under being itself and ‘the categories of being’ refer to a (complete) listing of categories.

‘Dimension’ extends the idea of category—(i) pure to include logic as knowledge, experiential being itself; metaphysical dimensions as generalizations or abstractions from our cosmos, e.g., true ad hoc origin; variation and selection; mechanism with and without indeterminism; and the variety, extent, duration, and behavior of being(s) (ii) pragmatic to include the low level recognized modes of being in our cosmos—natural (physical, living, sentient), social (class, individual, cultural, political-economic), and universal.

2.2.10 A vocabulary for metaphysics

Comment 10. Placement?

Comment 11. See vocabulary for metaphysics.

2.3 Doubt

2.4 Logic, method, and content

2.4.1 Received conceptions of logic

2.4.1.1 Deductive logic and its kinds

2.4.1.2 Standard and non-standard logics

2.4.1.2.1 Standard

The standard logics are usually taken to be (i) standard two-valued propositional calculus (with principle of non-contradiction) (ii) first order predicate calculus built on a scaffold of propositional calculus (with identity theory).

2.4.1.2.2 Non-standard

2.4.1.2.2.1 Extended logics—logics that fit into the standard schemes

Modal logics, second order predicate calculus (sometimes seen as standard), and more

2.4.1.2.2.2 Deviant logics—logics that extend the standard schemes

Many-valued, intuitionist, quantum, free

2.4.1.2.2.3 Logics that do not fit into the standard or extended schemes, e.g., dialethic logics

Dialetheic logics are logics in which the principle of non-contradiction does not hold.

In standard logic, a contradiction leads to explosion—i.e., that every statement is true (and false).

To avoid explosion, some change from the standard machinery is necessary and one possibility is a three-valued logic—see the little manual (Dialetheia).

A first question is—are there dialetheia, i.e., are there true contradictions? An example is that to say being is ineffable is to state an effability of being; the resolution is that being is highly but not entirely ineffable—the example is not literally dialethic. Many examples of dialetheia in the literature are non-literal in some sense. However, there are literal examples—two will be mentioned below.

Questions arise—(i) are dialethic logics possible (i.e., are there logics with contradiction that are non-explosive) (ii) do they make sense (are there true contradictions) (iii) are they necessary (can they be replaced by more discriminating standard logic) (iv) are they useful.

Responses are—(i) the three-valued logic mentioned above is not explosive (ii) there are true contradictions (a trivial example is that the sun is shining and not shining) (iii) they do not seem to be necessary (the sun is shining in San Fransisco but not shining in Mumbai) (iv) they may be useful when we wish to ignore the greater detail that makes them unnecessary.

Note—though the example above is trivial, non-trivial examples can be given (see the link above) of which one is the Thomson Lamp Paradox (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ), and consideration of a range of examples suggests that while dialethic logics may be useful, they are not necessary).

2.4.1.3 Logics in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises with certainty

2.4.2 A comprehensive conception of logic or argument

2.4.2.1 Direct establishment of fact

2.4.2.1.1 Observation

2.4.2.1.2 Necessity

Are all necessary ‘facts’ analytic?

2.4.2.2 Inference

2.4.2.2.1 Certain

2.4.2.2.2 Less than certain

2.4.2.2.3 Inference, necessary or likely, from the null premise

2.4.3 Self-sufficiency and completeness—open and closed aspects of the metaphysics

2.5 Epistemology

2.6 Theory of value

2.7 A new cosmology

2.7.1 Principles

2.7.2 Variety

2.7.3 Hierarchy of being

2.8 Our world

2.8.1 The evolving situation, challenges, opportunities

2.8.2 Application of the system of the way of being

2.9 The meaning of life

Comment 12. Should the title be enhanced for intension and extension?

Comment 13. The Meaning of Life (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

The meaning of life is a critical human and philosophical concern. If one were to say philosophy has become too technical, it would mean that the technical aspect has suppressed the issue of the meaning of life.

The plan of this section is (i) to enquire into the significance of the question (ii) reflect on the meta-question of the meaning of the meaning of life as preliminary to effectively understanding and addressing the question (iii) to discuss the meaning of life with input from the real metaphysics.

2.9.1 Is this philosophy’s fundamental question?

2.9.2 Kant’s three questions

2.9.3 A personal vs communal vs universal question

2.9.4 The meaning of the meaning of life

2.9.5 Open and closed aspects

2.9.6 Possibilities and necessities

2.9.7 The place of existentialism

2.10 The problems of metaphysics and philosophy

Comment 14. Combine with previous list and enhance. Evaluate for problems addressed thus far. Address remaining problems, perhaps only briefly and in principle.

The two sources are (i) the recent archived version of the document (ii) metaphysics.

The aims of this section are (i) review received problems (ii) in view of the real metaphysics, improve the listing, its expression, and address.

The problems and their treatment are here enhanced by the real metaphysics.

Beings, first causes, unchanging things, categories (and universals and particulars), and substance—these have all received address above.

Metaphysical modality, identity (persistence and continuity, space and time, causation, freedom, and determinism), the mental and the physical have all received address above.

Also receiving treatment earlier—the problem of negative existentials, abstract and concrete objects, the nature of disciplinary study, metametaphysics.