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A DATABASE OF ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES ON PHILOSOPHY Anil Mitra © November 5, 2021 - February 28, 2022 Philosophers in chronological order Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich* Russell, Bertrand, Arthur, William** Western schools and ideologies Metaphysics—process philosophy Indian philosophy—periods and schools Philosophies of the disciplines Our world—philosophy of the humanities Philosophy and metaphysics of questions General science, abstract sciences, and method Artifact and the created world Language, meaning, and philosophy What is philosophy, revisited?
A DATABASE OF ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES ON PHILOSOPHY IntroductionAimDatabase of encyclopedic articles on philosophy—the discipline, branches, and topics. For details see the knowledge database project. This document is preliminary to a full-fledged relational database. EmphasisThe database is ‘systematic’ in reflecting the metaphysics of the way of being. It is currently idiosyncratic in emphasizing my interests, especially as in the way of being – website > the way of being – content. LinksFor each topic there are source links to pages in one or more of (i) this document (ii) the way of being (ii) the Internet. Repeated linksSome articles are linked from more than one section. Companion documentwhat is philosophy.html is a narrative companion to this document. PhilosophyPhilosophyWhat is philosophy (the way of being) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Metaphilosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu)—has material on what philosophy is (and more) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Approaches to philosophySee experimental philosophy (this document) Computational Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Computational Linguistics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Branches of philosophyThe core are branches of philosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics. The following sections elaborate on the core disciplines of philosophy, and (i) history of philosophy (ii) philosophies of academic disciplines and other activities (iii) metaphilosophy, i.e., roughly ‘philosophy of philosophy’ (iv) ‘the meaning of life’ and more. MetaphysicsSources—the way of beingvery bare content.html (the way of being), bare content.html (the way of being) Sources—the internetGeneralMetaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Modal Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Metaphysics of Science | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Search the encyclopedias for ‘metaphysics’ David Lewis’s Metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Aristotle: Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Kant, Immanuel: Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Theory of objectsPossible Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Nonexistent Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Abstract Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Abstract Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)— “About the expression ‘Object’ ” Ordinary Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) EpistemologySources—the way of beingMetaphysics > sources (this document) Sources—the internetEpistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Formal Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) AxiologyAxiologyValue Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) The Axiology of Theism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) EthicsDeontological Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Virtue Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Consequentialism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Ethics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) AestheticsThe Concept of the Aesthetic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Aesthetic Judgment (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Plato’s Aesthetics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Wittgenstein’s Aesthetics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Aesthetics of the Everyday (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Aesthetics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) LogicLogic | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Philosophical logic - Wikipedia History of philosophyHistory of philosophyWestern philosophy - Wikipedia (history of) Philosophy - Wikipedia (history of) Philosophers in chronological orderNotation—one star indicates a possibility for further study; two stars indicate a priority Thales of Miletus**Presocratic Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Thales of Miletus | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Heraclitus*Heraclitus (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Presocratic Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Heraclitus | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Parmenides*Parmenides (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Parmenides | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Socrates*Socrates (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Socrates | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Democritus*Democritus (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Democritus | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Plato**Plato (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Plato | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Aristotle*Aristotle (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Aristotle | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Epicurus*Epicurus (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Epicurus | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Augustine*Saint Augustine (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Augustine | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Augustine of Hippo - Wikipedia Samkara, Adi**Śaṅkara (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Vedanta, Advaita | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Johannes Scotus Eriugena**John Scottus Eriugena (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) John Scotus Eriugena - Wikipedia Thomas Aquinas*Saint Thomas Aquinas (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Thomas Aquinas | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) William of Ockham*William of Ockham (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Ockham (Occam), William of | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Descartes, Rene**René Descartes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Descartes, Rene | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Baruch Spinoza*Baruch Spinoza (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Spinoza, Benedict De | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) John Locke*John Locke (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Locke, John | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm**Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - Wikipedia Berkeley, GeorgeGeorge Berkeley (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Berkeley, George | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Hume, David**David Hume (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Hume, David | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Kant, Immanuel**Immanuel Kant (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Kant, Immanuel | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich*Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Hegel: Social and Political Thought | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel - Wikipedia Schopenhauer, Arthur**Arthur Schopenhauer (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Schopenhauer, Arthur | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Arthur Schopenhauer - Wikipedia Mill, John Stuart*John Stuart Mill (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Mill, John Stuart | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Karl Marx*Karl Marx (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Nietzsche, Friedrich**Friedrich Nietzsche (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Nietzsche, Friedrich | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Friedrich Nietzsche - Wikipedia Hans Vaihinger**Hans Vaihinger (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Husserl, EdmundEdmund Husserl (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Husserl, Edmund | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Alexander, Samuel **Samuel Alexander (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Alexander, Samuel | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Whitehead, Alfred North**Alfred North Whitehead (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Whitehead, Alfred North | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Alfred North Whitehead - Wikipedia Russell, Bertrand, Arthur, William**Bertrand Russell (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Russell: Logic | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Russell, Bertrand: Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Russell, Bertrand: Ethics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Wittgenstein, Ludwig**Ludwig Wittgenstein (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Wittgenstein, Ludwig | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Ludwig Wittgenstein - Wikipedia Heidegger, Martin**Martin Heidegger (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Heidegger, Martin | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Popper, Karl Raimund**Karl Popper (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Popper, Karl: Philosophy of Science | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Popper: Critical Rationalism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Karl Popper: Political Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Quine, Willard Van Orman**Willard Van Orman Quine (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Quine’s New Foundations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Quine, Willard Van Orman: Philosophy of Science | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Willard Van Orman Quine - Wikipedia Searle, John**The Chinese Room Argument (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Speech Acts (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Chinese Room Argument | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Nagel, Thomas*Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) (comments on Nagel’s views) Kripke, Saul Aaron*Modern Origins of Modal Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) (comments on Kripke’s contribution) Modal Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) (comments on Kripke’s contribution) Lewis, David**David Lewis (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) David Lewis’s Metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) David Lewis | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) David Lewis (philosopher) - Wikipedia Lowe, E. J.*Lowe, Edward Jonathan | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) E. J. Lowe (philosopher) - Wikipedia Chalmers, David*Western schools and ideologiesMetaphysics of substanceMaterialismPhysicalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Material Constitution (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Material Composition | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) IdealismIdealism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)German Idealism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Platonism, Mathematical | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Platonism and Theism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Monism and neutral monismMonism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Neutral Monism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Russellian Monism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy); the metaphysics of the way of being is Russellian Monism, without substance DualismDualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Dualism and Mind | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Dualism in cosmology - Wikipedia PluralismPluralism (philosophy) - Wikipedia ZeroismEntries are under Metaphysical existentialism (this document), below Metaphysics—bundle theoryObject (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Hume, David | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Russell, Bertrand: Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Property | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) (in a legal context, but relevant) Metaphysics—process philosophyProcess Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Process Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Process philosophy - Wikipedia Metaphysics—trope theoryTropes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Universals | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Trope (philosophy) - Wikipedia Metaphysical existentialismbare content (the way of being) very bare content (the way of being) Relational metaphysicsbare content (the way of being) very bare content (the way of being) Relations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Whitehead, Alfred North | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) EpistemologyEmpiricismRationalism vs. Empiricism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) RationalismRationalism vs. Empiricism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) PragmatismPragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Pragmatism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Epistemic existentialismPluralist Theories of Truth | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) EthicsSee Ethics (this document), above ConsequentialismDeontological ethicsVirtue ethicsAncientAtomismAncient Atomism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Also see Atomism from the 17th to the 20th Century (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) SkepticismSkepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Ancient Greek Skepticism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Cicero: Academic Skepticism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Contemporary Skepticism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Skeptical Theism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Philosophical skepticism - Wikipedia Religious skepticism - Wikipedia Skeptical movement - Wikipedia (Scientific or rational skepticism) Emanation (ism)God and Other Necessary Beings (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Emanation | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) MedievalMedieval Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Practical Reason, Medieval Theories of | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Free Will, Medieval Theories of | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Aesthetics, Medieval Theories of | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Medieval philosophy - Wikipedia PatrismAugustine: Political and Social Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu)Church Fathers - Wikipedia ScholasticismMedieval philosophy - Wikipedia (the high period of Scholasticism) Enlightenment and afterRationalismSee above, under Epistemology (this document) PositivismLogical Empiricism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Analytic Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) has material on logical positivism Logical positivism - Wikipedia IdealismSee above, under Metaphysics (this document) British IdealismIdealism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) EmpiricismSee above, under Epistemology (this document) ModernAnalytic philosophyAnalytic Philosophy in Latin America (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Analytic Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Analytic philosophy - Wikipedia Logical positivism - Wikipedia Ordinary language philosophy - Wikipedia Continental philosophyContinental Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) (a resource page as of November 10, 2021) Continental philosophy - Wikipedia Phenomenology (philosophy) - Wikipedia ExistentialismAlso see continental philosophy (this document), above. Existentialism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Existentialism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) EmergentismEmergence | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) HolismSee Holism (this document), later IntuitionismIntuitionism in the Philosophy of Mathematics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Dummett, Michael | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) (relevance) Language philosophySee analytic philosophy (this document), earlier Ordinary Language Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Logical positivismSee analytic philosophy (this document), earlier Logical empiricismSee analytic philosophy (this document), earlier MaterialismSee above, under Metaphysics (this document) PhysicalismSee above, under Metaphysics (this document) PragmatismSee above, under Epistemology (this document) Process philosophySee above, under Metaphysics (this document) RealismRealism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Scientific Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Structural Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Challenges to Metaphysical Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Philosophical realism - Wikipedia (contemporary) Indian philosophy—periods and schoolsOriginalVedaReligion and Science (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) has information on the Veda Hindu Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) UpanishadReligion and Science (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) has information on the Upanishads Upanisads | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Bhagavad GitaGod and Other Ultimates (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)—replaces: Concepts of God (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2021 Edition) Philosophy of Religion (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Bhagavad Gītā | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) ĀstikaHindu Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Āstika and nāstika - Wikipedia The Āstika or Orthodox schools accept the authority of the Vedas. NyayaAnalytic Philosophy in Early Modern India (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) has material on Nyaya Nyaya | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) VaishesikaAnalytic Philosophy in Early Modern India (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) has material on Vaishesika Hindu Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) SamkhyaSankhya | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) YogaYoga Sutras of Patanjali | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Purva MimansaVedantaŚaṅkara (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Advaita or non-dualVedanta, Advaita | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) SamkaraŚaṅkara (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Ramanuja—qualified non-dualismRamanuja | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Dvaita or dualMadhvaNāstikaĀstika and nāstika - Wikipedia Lokayata/Carvaka – Indian Materialism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) has information on Nāstika The Nāstika or Heterodox schools do not accept the authority of the Vedas. There are four main schools— CārvākaLokayata/Carvaka – Indian Materialism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) ĀjīvikaBuddhismMadhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Pudgalavada Buddhist Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) JainismJain Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu) Ideas—essential versionthis is a version of the way of being.docm; what is useful but not already in the way, ought to be absorbed there; a skeleton should be left here and joined with Ideas—detailed version plana temporary division the documentthemes, deferring and continuing, their continuity with regard to deferment—experience… reason as including attitude, action (which includes experiment), and value; yoga and reason as one ideaswhat are the essentials? where are they? property, mode, attribute, quality, quantity mind and matter extension, duration, being (space, time, matter) holist circle of problems logic is the theory of the universe ‘real metaphysics’ is best knowledge of the real yoga as reason; elaborate, add to ‘pathways’—meditation, yoga importance of system as emergent; not imposed has the following been entered—how most questions (characterize them) depend on a metaphysics and how so much vagueness results from having only an implicit and vague metaphysics, perhaps depending on extant paradigms; and that at minimum these paradigms ought to be made explicit and precise; and how all answers (and even the meanings of the questions) will be incomplete until we have a complete metaphysics—introduce a section, the necessity of metaphysics (metaphysical study)… or the possibility and necessity of metaphysics to add, to doindent paras per importance; add micro sub heads red and green stuff—comments and sources for import hierarchize > main points for essence and summary > lesser points > … > academic > … > least mark all statements empirical, rational, irrational (why?), critical, probable, imaginative, and such; and t-d, b-u; make notes on ‘before and after’ the real metaphysics mark study projects including modern physical cosmology, Whitehead’s Process and Reality, predicate logic, logics of the modes of expression, general logic… the wayphilosophy and the waysuggestions for readers(1)it is perhaps of greater value than the above approaches via individuals and schools, to study history of philosophy as history of ideas in philosophy; the following ideas from the metaphysics of the way of being (detailed version) are in no sense a complete list of important ideas in philosophy (in later updates, justice to completeness will be attempted); however, the system of ideas is not idiosyncratic—they are the main ideas of the metaphysics of the way, a metaphysics that is ultimate with regard to foundation for the world and though incomplete with regard to the variety of the world, it is shown that knowledge of variety must always be limited for limited beings; in the following, the divisions the way through the ultimate are an informal introduction parts of the metaphysics are anticipated in the history of ideas; however, there is newness (relative to what I have read), and the metaphysics goes beyond common paradigms; therefore, profession and lay readers alike should not expect confirmation of their common paradigms; they should expect to reform their formal and intuitive views the essencein “the way of being” it is shown (i.e., demonstrated or proved) that the universe (‘everything’) is the greatest possible—i.e., given a concept of an object that is possible (in the greatest sense of ‘possibility’), the object is realized somewhere and when in the universe it follows that the universe has identity and that the universe and its identity are limitless in all possible ways, particularly variety, extension, and duration; that there are limitlessly many cosmoses—worlds—and systems of physical law; that the universe has phases of peak being and dissolution into the void; that all beings realize peak being the pursuitit is found that intelligent pursuit of peak or ultimate being results in the greatest enjoyment or appreciation of pleasure and pain in our world and beyond the foregoing, which is shown, is seen to be consistent with informed experience (informed common sense) and empirical science if enjoyment is a value, it is imperative to be on the way to the ultimate; the narrative suggests pathways in and from the world to the ultimate for individuals and civilizations; however, the ways do not ‘micro-manage’ the lives, rather they are general and adaptable templates, for efficient realization results from shared discovery and realization of the ways—which requires understanding and development of the way, including criticism, imagination, and improvement the worldthis division and the next could be part of the previous division; they are separate divisions to highlight their relevance to motivation of the development the idea of the worldin its most inclusive sense ‘the world’ is everything that is (in, over, or beyond time); and ‘our world’ is the experienced world—which may depend on the individual and the culture; the idea of many worlds refers to other worlds, like ours in being a totality, which are actual or possible but not interactive with ours our world‘our world’ is the experienced world and the world of empirical science; it is the place of secular affairs; it is the world of common experience and so, when we project science beyond the empirical, it may seem to be the universe; however, the projection is not valid, and it is consistent experience and science for there to be limitlessly many worlds and beings, both beyond and within worldviewscommon transsecular alternatives to the secular view are the religions and hypothetical metaphysics; which have no valid basis as established perfect capture of the real; on the other hand, when secular persons and thinkers consider enhancements of the secular view, the limited alternatives tend to shut down thought given the consistency with experience and science of a limitlessness beyond and within our world, we ask what is ultimate and whether and how we can know it worldsas noted in the way > the essence, it will be shown that our world is one of limitlessly many—and the same is true of our cosmos common transsecular alternatives to the secular view are the religions and hypothetical metaphysics; which have no valid basis as established perfect capture of the real; on the other hand, when secular persons and thinkers consider enhancements of the secular view, the limited alternatives tend to shut down thought the ultimateabout the ultimatewhat is the magnitude of the ultimate and can we know it? how? should we? we will develop a system of the ultimate; the means are (i) reason, conceived as the join of direct knowledge and inference from direct knowledge, conditioned by emotion and discovered value, and worked out in action—synthesized with (ii) what is valid in received culture and tradition to the present time the ultimate is unavoidableshould we attempt to know the ultimate? if it is truly ultimate it would have immanence in our world—it would affect our lives and world; therefore, not only ought we to seek it, but knowledge and realization of it are (likely) unavoidable when we see and think clearly beingformal development begins with being; although the division on metaphysics appears later, implicit development of metaphysics begins here the concept of beinga being is that which can be validly known to affect experience (not necessarily at the present time or place or even in time and space); being is the characteristic of beings as beings why being?we want a foundation for knowledge—a way for our knowledge to be reliable; substance, e.g., matter or mind, is historically one way to go to foundation; relation, process are other ways; the idea is ‘here is something simple that is in the world”, let us attempt to show that everything is a manifestation of it and therefore found all knowledge of things; the problem of this approach is that we do not know that the foundation is itself known or generative of all things and knowledge of things but being is clearly given and not limited in the way of substance; thus, whatever it can found is founded in something definite (being) which needs no further foundation (foundation is thought to be needed only on the assumption that substance is needed for foundation); the questions that now arise are (i) whether being can found knowledge of the entire universe (ii) and to what extent such knowledge can be perfect (and what ‘perfection’ should mean) we will find that it can; and we will develop such a foundation adequacy of the conceptthere are two issues—what is the relation of the concept above (i) to being itself (ii) to received concepts? the first issue is one of meaning and knowledge taken up later; the best attitude is that we are searching for a meaning of being such that the knowledge of being best captures what we want—what is fundamental in the world and what is founding of knowledge; it is a search and so the meaning of being cannot be a posit and is unlikely to be even a critical acceptance of the received; that we have capture the essence we seek, will emerge in the development, particularly in finding that we have captured the—some—essence of the universe regarding the second issue, the word ‘being’ has more than one use; the ‘being’ of a thing often denotes the essence of the thing; but here we do not use ‘being’ in such sophisticated ways; our way is simple; provided we do not conflate the uses of ‘being’ we run into no error of meaning conflict; though there is one sign, ‘being’, we can see it as or more two symbols with different meanings, perhaps related; the issue is whether we can build a consistent, coherent, and powerful picture of the universe based on being; and the answer is “we can and will”; later one may seek to related to the present meaning to the received it is also important that the definition of being as something real above is incomplete and that for completion, it will be necessary to place it as part of an entire system of the universe—an articulated system of terms, ostensive truths, and reason note that for the same reasons, similar considerations will pertain to all concepts introduced a critical issue—how can we know being and beings?that there is being is evident for otherwise there would be neither things nor illusions of things; but are there beings or, more precisely, is our seeming knowledge of beings true and precise knowledge? it is also important to ask why we should be concerned with true and precise knowledge—why is pragmatic or good enough knowledge not enough? the response is that pragmatic knowledge is often enough, e.g., to travel from one place to another, or to build a safe dam; however, since small errors multiply, only perfection is adequate for knowledge of the ultimate how, then, can we know beings? see meaning > abstraction existencethat which is a being, or which has being is said to exist i.e., ‘existence’ is another word for ‘being’; that existence is mysterious arises from attempts to found existence in kinds of thing (ideas, matter) whose nature is incompletely defined and not known to be fundamental; the attempt to define being and existence in terms of something else is to enter into free-fall in a space of unknowingness; we will find mystery enough in the sense seeing through the superficial to the real (rather than mystery as ignorance arising from deviant understanding) meaningthe sections on meaning through the void could be part of the division on being; that they are separate divisions is due to their significance a problem of meaningthe nature of meaning is elusive—how is it that a linguistic form, e.g., a word or sentence, can refer to an object? what is the object of a piece of fiction? and how do words come to have their ‘meanings’? there are problems with the idea of word – object association; the plan for the section, below, explains the strategy of the treatment of meaning, which is justified in the development another problem of meaning is how words come to have and keep their meaning; we focus only briefly on this question strategy for discussion of meaningit is effective (i) to discuss meaning in terms of the concepts of ‘concept’ and ‘object’ and (ii) to tie together the concepts of meaning and knowledge; therefore (i) we will introduce the concept of meaning after preliminaries and (ii) discuss knowledge after meaning this section is about concept and linguistic meaning; meaning as significance is discussed later it would be instructive to discuss conscious experience or awareness here; however, it is efficient to defer the discussion concepts—the concept of a ‘concept’a concept is a system of signs, icons, percepts arranged to designate objects; the percepts are the parts ‘bound’ to objects (unless otherwise said, here ‘concept’ shall mean ‘referential concept’) objectsan object is that to which a concept refers; another word for ‘object’ as used here is ‘referent’ the concept of meaninga concept meaning is a concept and its possible objects (‘the meaning of the word or concept’); via signs, semantics, and grammar, concept meaning includes linguistic meaning significance of this conceptionto see meaning as a relation among signs, icons, and possible objects is (i) essential in that the icon is necessary to recognition (the sign in one language means nothing to a non-speaker) (ii) clarification of meaning and meanings where there would otherwise be vagueness (iii) complementary to meaning as use and as determined in social give and take (iv) potent in a simple resolution of the problem of non-existent objects problems of non-existent objectsthe first problem is that to talk of a non-existent object assumes—or seems to assume—that the object exists; for example, in a commonly used example, if we talk of the fictional character ‘Sherlock Holmes’, i.e., one who (that) does not exist, to whom (what) are we referring? the present conception of meaning resolves this—it denies that we are referring, even potentially, to anything but says that the concept of Sherlock Holmes does not or is not intended to refer to anyone (thing); this, by the way, is an example of resolution of issues of vagueness by use of the present conception of meaning a second problem arises if we posit that there are non-existent objects? what are they? if we regard an object not as a ‘thing’ but as a concept-object complex, then a non-existent object (not an abstract object) is a concept-object for which the object is null; what is the justification of regarding a thing as a concept-object complex? pragmatically, it would be that we never encounter the object side and, so, never need entertain a thing-in-itself; conceptually, such general questions cannot be resolved without some metaphysics; our common pragmatic secular-materialist metaphysics is inadequate to resolution (and the source of much vague thought on this and many other issues); but if reality is relational, especially if the medium of relation is experience, then there is justification in seen things, not in themselves, but as a complex the experience of – and the experienced—which is justified in the later divisions, metaphysics and experience; this is an instance of the necessity of a metaphysics when attempting to resolve issues beyond the ordinary meanings for the waysuggestions for readers(2)as seen in being, it is critical to introduce a coherent system of meaning that captures the real and which is related but not identical to received meaning; therefore, readers should pay attention to meanings as introduced knowledgethe concept of knowledge is derivative of meaning; however, in order to highlight its importance, it is assigned a separate division the conceptknowledge is meaning realized; concepts and their actual objects is knowledge possible? significance of the questionbut can there be knowledge? the significance of the question is as follows given that we have at least a significant amount of pragmatic knowledge, the question of whether knowledge is possible at all seems absurd however, the question is important, at least, from the point of view of cartesian doubt—in questioning knowledge, we are led to refining the concept, assessing whether there are kinds of knowledge and what their criteria and relationships might be, and ways to acquire and validate knowledge the problem is not just one of error (for ‘error’ presumes there is an object, which the concept does not quite get) but that the concept is not the object and may therefore be not at all of any object; the approach, executed in what follows, is—first, via abstraction to perfection; second, to introduce pragmatic knowledge as complement to the abstract; finally, to show that the perfect and the pragmatic have a synthesis as perfect according to an emergent value, the value of realization of the ultimate in and from the immediate let us now entertain preliminary considerations on abstraction knowledge—value and limitations, an assessmentthe value is aesthetic—knowing the beauty of the word; pragmatic and ethical—knowledge is useful in negotiating the word and improving the quality of life; in turn ethics is significant in determining (i) what knowledge is useful and (ii) criteria for validity of knowledge as in, e.g., the real metaphysics some potential limitations are (i) validity, considered above and later, (ii) knowledge itself is insufficient to utility, learning from application is important; however, learning or experiment is part of the cycle of knowledge, (iii) incompleteness of the knowledge systems of human culture and the real metaphysics—this is not a true limit, for we would not expect completeness and, further, the incompleteness revealed in the real metaphysics is positive in that it is not only a fact of our nature but a call to adventure, (iv) knowledge will not solve all ills—a limit only relative to the expectation that it would, (v) knowledge can be used for harm—but this is inevitable and the resolution is not for ‘good people’ to not develop knowledge, but to have ethical intent (this is in part a value), and (vi) knowledge itself is not realization, but it does phase into realization abstractionthe conceptto abstract is to remove distortable detail from the concept-object; what remains is real and immediate, not remote; is this possible and useful—we find so in what follows; particularly, we find an abstract and powerful ‘real metaphysics’, which shows an ultimate universe and our place in it, particularly that we can realize the ultimate effectiveness of abstractionbut is the abstract instrumental? i.e., can it be used to find ways to live well in the world and to approach the ultimate? we will join the perfect abstract metaphysics joined to concrete but only pragmatic knowledge; we will find this join to constitute a system that is not perfect by traditional criteria (correspondence, coherence) but is perfect according to the emergent value of being on a path to the ultimate reasonsnote that ‘a reason’ is not the same as ‘reason’, considered later, under the real metaphysics (the two concepts are, of course, related) the conceptthe idea of a reason is a generalization of cause to a higher level of abstraction and was originally discussed here; it is however more effective to discuss reasons below in reasons, abstract and concrete the power of the concept of a reasonthe power of the concept of reason is (i) that it generalizes or abstracts the idea of cause, commensurately with an abstraction from substance to being (ii) developed in reasons, abstract and concrete through cosmology kinds of beingthe concept of kindskindsbeings may be classified in ways or kinds; in this division we consider some kinds and varieties of being categoriescategories are kinds or genera at the highest level—just below being itself significance of the conceptstudy of being at the highest level—what is there in the universe, continuing the study of being (i.e., of ontology), beginning of cosmology in everyday experience and science, various kinds are encountered—study of kinds may reveal the reality status of kinds, clarify their intrinsic structure, their completeness and incompleteness relative to the range of kinds principles of enumerationthe development of the real metaphysics, to come, enables identification of beings; in addition to the above, the following arise— (1) cartesian methodology (doubt) (2) concrete beings and descriptions (3) abstract-concrete continuum and form, kinds as beings cartesianwhere knowledge can be shown non-illusory, there is being; e.g., while an object of experience may be illusory, the experience and the experience of experience are not to build up the world from the Cartesian primitive above, map experience, noting its interpretations, show that the different interpretations are exhaustive, and that logically indistinguishable interpretations are different descriptions of the same thing or world abstract-concrete continuumbelow sentience and agency continuumbelow parthood continuumbelow abstract-concrete continuumperception is a filter; percepts are among the building elements of concepts (see meaning); there are no truly concrete objects, but perceived objects are metaphorically described as concrete (or ‘reified’); there are (at least) two approaches to abstract objects—the following two are complementary (i) abstraction from the relatively or metaphorically concrete (ii) build up from elementary concrete objects (meaningless signs or undefined ‘terms’), abstract rules of structure (axioms), and abstract rules of formation of new structures (rules of inference or logic) depending on degree and kind of abstraction, various kinds may be abstracted ‘out’, totally, or partially, e.g., spatiality, temporality, quality (e.g., color); thus (i) rather than objects as concrete or abstract, there is concrete-concrete continuum, and (ii) whereas at extremes of abstraction objects are often regarded as categorially non spatiotemporal and noncausal, they are, indeed spatiotemporal and causal, with minimal or zero level spatiotemporality and causality some more or less abstract objectslinguistic elements, universals (e.g., redness), tropes (e.g., the redness of that red ball), the objects of mathematics, ‘concrete’ objects have degrees of abstraction (in partial repetition, we add that abstract objects are not located outside spacetime but have degrees of spatiotemporality abstracted out or, in the case of abstract science such as mathematics, not built in) some relatively concrete objects of significancesameness, difference, identity, and extension-duration-being (since no more than extension-duration arise from sameness – difference – identity, the series space – time does not extend further), and property reasons, abstract and concretereasons can be seen as falling on an abstract-concrete continuum and could be discussed above, but are important enough to warrant separate discussion ‘reasons’ and the term ‘reason’, introduced later, are related but significantly distinct what a reason isa reason is that which entails a state of being with some likelihood (with ‘state’ understood most generally and, particularly, not a snapshot of a being at a particular point in time) possible vs likely vs necessary reasonswhen the nature of the reason is only such that the state of being is not ruled out, the reason is possible or possibilistic if the state is likely, the reason is probable or probabilistic if the state is certain, the reason is necessary if the reason is less than necessary it may be because the reason is only a tendency or because it is partial causea material or concrete cause is a kind of reason (another term for material cause is power, described by Plato as the effect of a being and the measure of being) abstract reasonsit will be found that there are reasons sufficiently abstract to not count as manifest – concrete – ‘material’ beings absolute reasonsif the reason is premise-free, the outcome may be called self-generated or generating if the reason is premise-free and necessary, the reason is absolute that there could be absolute reasons seems to deny our experience with cause; however, that there are some absolute reasons will be shown the unconditional and the absolutea state (e.g., existence) of a being is unconditional means that it obtains in all situations that a state is unconditional is equivalent to saying that its reason to obtain is absolute (necessary with the null premise) if the reason for existence of a state is absolute, then, from symmetry of necessity with the null premise, all possible states must obtain sentience and agency continuumcategorially non-sentient; later we see there are no such beings sentience level zero but potentially not zero; possible in a non-substance world material level sentience; in a monist cosmos, matter has primitive sentience which is not consciousness in the way of animal consciousness, but, e.g., in our cosmos, if monist, builds up in organisms to animal level consciousness and more animal sentience and agency—sub sapient animal sentience and agency—sapient; self-aware, aware of awareness, capable of seeing the self as internalizing the apparent design of evolution as real design, capable of conceiving the ultimate and approaching it via intelligence, but not intrinsically being it ‘higher being’ (gods, if there are any) that is or is in command of being the ultimate; in the real metaphysics to be developed, all beings do approach this, at least haphazardly, and sapient beings raise the approach to the level of intelligence, design, and, if not linear process, then experiment and correction what is god? i.e., are there possible, reasonable, and necessary conceptions of god? see the cosmology of limitless identity parthood continuumwhole, part, null example—the universe, cosmoses, the void; individuals (see sentience and agency above) universethough they fall under it, it is effective to have separate divisions for treatment of the concepts of universe and the void the conceptthe universe is all being (since not talking spatiotemporally, to say “over all time and space” would be superfluous and limiting) importance of this conceptionin many analyses of physics, metaphysics, philosophy, cosmology, and theology, the concept of ‘the universe’ is left vague or implicitly conflated with the concept of the empirical universe; this leads to confusion in these disciplines—e.g., the thought that the empirical is the real and the confusion whether the universe has or can have a creator or reason for being and the issue of whether there is but one universe; to resolve such issues, it is crucial to have a concept of ‘all being’, and here we choose to name that concept ‘universe’; though some may object, this choice eliminates the confusions (and the objections would have the effect of sustaining the confusions); this does not reject utility of the other conceptions for which terms such as ‘empirical universe’, ‘cosmos’—for ‘our universe’, and ‘material universe’ for discussions of creation creationself-creation impossible—it assumes the universe has manifest existence before it has manifest existence creation by another being is logically impossible—there are no other beings reason for beingthough not created, there may be a reason for its being; possibility is discounted as accident; since there are no premises outside the universe, a reason would have to be absolute; and absolute reasons for manifest being of the universe will be found lawa (natural) law is a reading of a pattern (typically of relations among objects in space and time in, say, a cosmos, rather than just local and spatiotemporal); may use ‘law’ to refer to the pattern itself as it can be validly known, laws have being—i.e., laws are beings cosmosour cosmos is the empirically known part of the universe, with lawlike behavior, possibly projected beyond the empirical the real metaphysics shows that there are limitlessly many cosmoses of limitless variety in transient interaction with the void civilizations, worlds, individualsthe voidthe conceptthe void is the null part of the universe or of any being importance of this conceptionconsider the questions (i) what is the extent and duration of the (entire) universe? (ii) can something emerge or come from nothing? the questions seem to be incapable of analysis based on the universe as studied in, say, physics; general relativity, quantum theory, and physical cosmology suggest nothing (multiverse theory is specialized and speculative); it turns out that analysis of the void and its properties is instrumental in addressing the issues and this is undertaken shortly, in the division on metaphysics; the following properties of the void are important properties of the voidthe void contains no beings; particularly, the void contains no laws (this is the critical property) it will turn out that it is critical that there is a void but that the number of voids, one or many, has no significance metaphysicswhat metaphysics ismetaphysics is knowledge of the real (if non-standard, this conception is effective here, and will be found to subsume what is valid in received metaphysics); though criticized as impossible, the anti-metaphysical age is currently over (c.2022: there are still critics) significance of this conceptionadequacy of the conceptunder this conception, metaphysics will be found adequate and potent importance of the conceptthe importance is immanent in the development; explicit discussion is deferred to the possibility and necessity of metaphysics relation to received concept of metaphysicsthe received concept is not as neatly defined as above—rather, the consensus view might be derived from a study of the history and validity of the idea; however, the essences of the received view are subsumed and advanced under the present conception metaphysics began with ‘being’and we have begun to see definite metaphysics—there is
being, there are beings, the universe is a being, laws are beings, developing a ‘real metaphysics’development of metaphysics continues; the next step is crucial and potent is the void a being? existence of the voidexistence and non-existence of the void are equivalent; therefore, the void may be taken to exist the void exists; it is a being that contains no beings there is at least one void a heuristic regarding existence of the void is that it is ‘there’ alongside every being; this suggests that there are many voids possibilitya ‘possible object’ is one for which the concept does not rule out the existence (or state) of a corresponding object; some kinds of possibility are physical and logical; for a limited world or context, the possible may be greater than the real; for the universe the possible and the real are identical the most permissive sense of possibility is logical possibility, for if a concept is illogical, e.g., contradictory, it cannot refer to a real object (referent) in any universe fundamental principle—the universe is the greatest possibleif, in the most permissive sense of possibility, a possible object does not emerge from the void, that would be a law of the void; but, since there are no laws of the void, every possible object (being) emerges from the void; heuristically, our laws apply to what we see but not to nothingness the universe is the realization of the greatest possibility; this demonstrated assertion shall be called ‘the fundamental principle of metaphysics’; ‘logic’ may be used as a name for a system of description of the greatest possibility this is an example of an absolute reason that all possible beings emerge from the void entails that the universe and its parts are mixes of determinism (a part, often but not necessarily a temporal slice, determines the whole) and indeterminism that all possible states are realized entails that the universe must phase between manifest and non-manifest (the void) because existence of the void may be doubted, let us now give a demonstration of the fundamental principle that does not have that premise— the number of voidssince any void has limitless power, the number of voids has no significance; what is significant is that there is at least one void; we may take there to be but one void the void and the quantum vacuumthe void has similarities to the quantum vacuum; however, the void is not the vacuum; the distinction is essential another proof of the fundamental principle; heuristic reasonsthe existence of the universe is either (a) unconditional (particularly, it is eternal) or (b) it enters a void state; if #a holds, the reason for its existence is absolute (necessary, null premise) and from symmetry of the absolute reason, every possible state must obtain (which includes the void state and thus unconditionality of a manifest universe would be contradictory); if #b holds, the universe enters a void state, which, from the earlier proof, entails the fundamental principle; note—consideration of #a renders consideration of #b unnecessary here are some heuristic arguments—(i) the heuristics in showing existence of the void (ii) since the picture of the known part of the universe (the cosmos) is empirical (data and their induced patterns or theories), that all logical possibilities are realized somewhere and when in the universe is consistent with reason; the magnitude of this possibility space is immense and it is therefore immensely unlikely, i.e., the probability is negligible, that the universe is not endlessly greater (in terms of realized states) than the cosmos; of course, this is heuristic because the ‘possibility set’ is not known to be an actual set (iii) consider the next fundamental theory of physics—it can be guessed at; but subsequent theories become harder and harder to guess; however, the limit of all theories requires no guess—it is logical possibility (iv) possibility and actuality are distinct relative to limited contexts: for the universe possibility and actuality are identical; but actuality for the universe is real possibility; therefore, real possibility is the greatest possibility; it does not follow but it does suggest that this greatest possibility is what is recognized as logical possibility logiclogic is the system of description of the greatest possibility our logics are a limited system of at least approximations to logic below, the concept of logic is further developed cosmology of limitless identitythis cosmology is described in the first two paragraphs of the way; to it should now be appended a consequence of the fundamental principle—the cosmoses, the beings (individuals, civilizations, peaks), are in interaction with one another (there may be temporary isolation) and in interaction with a system of transients, which is all embedded in the void let us append to that account a discussion of peak being in terms of ‘god’ if internal contradictions are removed from the Abrahamic god, it is possible and therefore necessary; however the Abrahamic god does not necessarily pertain to our cosmos, where it seems most unlikely, but to some cosmoses—in fact a limitless number of them; however that god has limited significance for those cosmoses are likely unstable and their number, even though limitless, pales in comparison to the number of cosmoses and the number of cosmoses with a stable and meaningful concept of god (this is reasoned later) what is a stable, meaningful, and necessary concept of god? 1. As a being—peak being above is an ultimate; 2. As a process—god may be seen as life and sapience erupting from ground level being; the process of evolution on earth thus far exemplifies a partial stage to such god; we are part of that process but not to the exclusion of the rest of life; we are potentially on the way to a peak in this life and necessarily on the way in some life; among the factors that make this god stable and meaningful are (i) absence of arbitrary contradiction arising in mythic religions (e.g., the Abrahamic) (ii) no requirement of perfection in terms of a need to escape from the harsh side of reality (iii) has ultimate character, but the nature of this ultimate is not remote—it is in the nature of any true ultimate that it must actually or potentially reach down to us and be reachable to us. 3. There may be local, lesser ‘gods’ in some cosmoses. consistencythe fundamental principle and cosmology of limitless identity may seem inconsistent with informed experience or common sense and empirical science; however, it is not and only seems inconsistent if experience and science are projected beyond their valid region—the empirical why do we not see all possibilities in our cosmos? our cosmos is one possibility—it cannot be itself and another; other possibilities occur elsewhere in the universe doubt, attitudeit is right to doubt the fundamental principle and cosmology of limitless identity; however, since they are consistent with informed experience and empirical science, if we find doubt to disallow affirmation of their demonstration, the following alternative attitudes to the principle may be undertaken as optimal risk in maximizing truth, enjoyment, and realization The principle as a postulate or hypothesis for an ultimate metaphysics. The principle as an existential principle of attitude and action. an objection that some people will have is that the principle, its demonstration, and the attitudes to it above, may stem from a desire to hold it true; it is not a logical objection, but it cannot be entirely denied; herein lies an element of choice; but it should be noted that the principle is not all ‘wine and roses’, for, if the ultimate is inevitable, so is great pain on the way objection let us address the issue that the fundamental principle shows what will be realized, it does not show how to realize it— the real metaphysicsthe metaphysicssince derived from perfect abstract concept-objects, the fundamental principle and cosmology of limitless identity are perfect knowledge in the sense that what they describe, the concepts, are perfectly faithful to their objects—the universe and its inhabitants—individuals and civilizations to render this perfection practical, let us append ‘tradition’—that which is at least pragmatically valid in received knowledge up to the present in realization, we may attain the ultimate in this life; otherwise, we move from self to self, from civilization to civilization, from cosmos to cosmos, from manifest-real to non-manifest-limitless (no law in the void) with disposition to all being to manifest; as limited beings in our present forms, we do not have precise concrete knowledge of the present being-civilization-cosmos (it is not impossible but, on the nature of the concrete, not possessed of meaning); however, given the fact and value of realization of the ultimate, it is not even desirable for our concrete knowledge (e.g., the sciences) to have perfect object-faithfulness: ‘good enough’ is good enough the join of the perfect abstract to the local and pragmatic can be now seen as not a patch up, but seamless the perfect abstract illuminates and guides the pragmatic; the pragmatic illustrates and is enabling in realization of the ultimate; the seamless system is perfect in terms of the value of enjoyment, the imperative of realization—beginning in our world; this system is named the real metaphysics regarding the a priori as pertaining to a system that is seen as self-founding once thought through, rather than as prior to experience of the world (and even inner experience, e.g., thought, body sensation), the real metaphysics is a priori or self-founding with regard to depth for knowledge, action, and value (as seen in cosmology of limitless identity, in terms of being, universe, and void as abstract) but not with regard to breadth; breadth is ever open for limited beings and is where exploration, discovery, and adventure are found; also note the breakdown of the empirical-rational distinction (see the abstract-concrete continuum) general logic, reason‘reason’ and ‘reasons’ are distinct (but related) the logic – conceptual or intensional approachthe real metaphysics brings logic and the concrete sciences under one umbrella; it may be called general logic; it has a necessary side logic as necessary inference and establishment of fact and science as likely inference (induction) and tentative establishment of fact note that (i) ‘science’ and ‘logic’ are brought on par in that their discovery is inductive while their application, assuming their truth, is deductive (ii) mathematics, linguistics, computer science, and other symbolic sciences (as we may name them), can be placed under the named umbrella of the ‘abstract sciences’, which is also subsumed under general logic, (iii) general logic subsumes establishment of fact (understanding) and inference (reason), for which we also like the name general reason; we contract the latter to reason, which includes both understanding and reason in its limited meaning, (iv) noting that experiment is a part of general logic – reason and that action generalizes experiment, action, too, is subsumed under general logic (real) metaphysics, (general) logic, and (general) reason are one the logic – extensional or bottom-up approachthe approach above was top – down; let us develop a bottom – up approach a (referential) concept may fail to refer (i) because the structure of the concept does not permit of reference at all (the failure is logical) (ii) it may refer but does not in fact (the failure is in matching the world—it is scientific); this brings logic and science under one umbrella (general logic) a theory of the universethe real metaphysics, general logic, and general reason, which are the same, are the theory of the universe reason and reflexivityphilosophical or metaphysical holism; circle of problems and paradoxes (especially of interpretation)imaginationon the power of emergent systematic metaphysicsthere was a heyday of systematic metaphysics; revolts against it; and returns to system with metaphysics redefined by some thinkers as the study of abstract objects (the intended comparison being to physics as the study of concrete objects) however, we have seen that metaphysics as conceived here is the study of all things, with emphasis on ‘things’ at a general rather than particular level how the real metaphysics is systematicwhat has emerged here is a potent systematic metaphysics; it is stressed that the system is emergent, not imposed; it is further stressed that the system is essential, for the elements of the metaphysics stand together, where alone they would fall therefore, there is no need to enter into a debate on the pros and cons of systematic, or a debate with those who reject the ‘grand narrative’—for in that sense, here there is no narrative let us just note that the system of the real metaphysics is emergentit is neither imposed nor posited; and— emergent system is potentthe possibility and necessity of metaphysicsplace here, the discussion of necessity that is now in the plan ontology and special metaphysicsthis section is included for completeness; the distinctions in this section are rather conventional and somewhat arbitrary ontology as general metaphysicsontology or general metaphysics is the study of being as being, and of its kinds special metaphysicsthe ‘special’ in special metaphysics has been used with two connotations (i) particular aspects of the study of the real; with a sufficiently broad notion of being, these may be seen as falling under being; studies under this aspect of special metaphysics are included in the problems of metaphysics (ii) special and posited or hypothetical kinds, e.g., religious and fictional, which may appear absurd or unreal in secular thought, but, if rendered consistent, are, on the real metaphysics, to be found somewhere in the universe, with significance, e.g., for us, to be determined on an individual basis problems of metaphysicsreasonas noted earlier, the meanings of ‘reason’ and ‘reasons’ are distinct. reason the highest level of rational processas reason has been discussed adequately above, this division is redundant. it is included to highlight the importance of ‘reason’. let us repeat here that reason incorporates understanding or direct knowledge the lesser meaning of reason as inference; that it incorporates value and action; and that, with appropriately and rationally extended meanings, reason, general logic, and yoga (which includes meditation), are one—i.e., the same thing. against exclusive specializationthis stands in opposition to the tendency to exclusive specialization; there is value to specialization, but it ought not to exclude identities within and among the thought of different traditions, and it ought not to be reified experiencethe following concept and discussion of experience is part of metaphysics; however, it is effective to treat it separately what experience issubjective awareness in all its forms and degrees note the enhancement of the meaning of experience from earlier informal use; will further enhance below significance of experiencewe live in experiencethe being that has no effect
in experience is
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