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What is
metaphysics? Response to a Quora Question Note—this
answer has not yet appeared on Quora and
I have not yet decided to post it there. 1/19/2020—3/28/2020 Anil Mitra Contents A
preliminary definition—Metaphysics is the study of the real A
meta-question—How to approach defining metaphysics? Historical
introduction to the discipline of metaphysics The
disciplines and topics of metaphysics Motives and
the question of foundations Concepts,
meaning, knowledge, and language Informal introduction and motivation—ideas,
concepts, and mind Concepts, meaning, knowledge, and language Centering
(human) beings in the universe The
Individual and the Universe Cosmology
of form and formation How may the
paradigms be used? Conclusion—Metaphysics
is metaphysics study of the real! Document links
Files this document points to: ..\topic
essays\concepts, meaning, knowledge, and language.doc Files pointing here— A
preliminary definition—Metaphysics is the study of the real
Like many
disciplines, metaphysics is hard to pin down. Moreover, the changing nature
of metaphysics in response to developments in science and philosophy make
metaphysics especially problematic to define. It is therefore common to
approach saying what metaphysics is with equivocation—i.e., not in terms of a
simple definition but by talking of and around its history and content. However,
I will go against the grain and provide a definition followed by
justification. ___ Metaphysics
is study of the real. This is
bound to raise questions and reactions. 1. What is the real? 2. Can the real be known? How? 3. Why is this a good definition?
How does it include the range of topics considered to be metaphysics? What
topics fall under it? In
response let’s observe that 1. The question of the nature of
the real is an aspect of the real and so the first question is a topic in
metaphysics as study of the real. 2. The second question is
epistemological. However, mind and knowledge, so far as they are real, are
also metaphysical objects. Therefore, in a very good sense, epistemology is
part of metaphysics. There will be objections. Regardless of the conclusion
to the issue of the boundary between epistemology and metaphysics it is
critical that to think there is a non porous boundary is to set up artificial
problems. Moreover at the conclusion of the section A
Theory of Being it is seen that whatever we call mind and matter are
interwoven. At minimum, metaphysics and epistemology ought to be studied
together1. 3. How to show it is a good definition
is the topic of the later sections. But
before approaching this ‘how to’, observe that an enhanced definition of
metaphysics is now Study of the real, the nature of the real, and what
falls under it. Let us
now turn to justifying our definition. A meta-question—How to
approach defining metaphysics?
It is not
the aim in this section to define metaphysics. In fact, as for many
disciplines, a brief definition may be inadequate. Therefore the aim is to
uncover how to say what metaphysics is. How many
we approach saying what any discipline is? It is effective to ask the broader
question because it may help by uncovering (i) common difficulties, (ii)
commonalities among some disciplines, and (iii) revealing relationships among
disciplines and the place of a given discipline within a larger framework of
human knowledge. How shall
we define a disciplines? 1. Etymology and analysis of the
term itself. We
will see that for metaphysics this is not informative. It will be combined
with the historical narrative, next. 2. History and practice. This is important and
revealing but not adequate in itself. This may suggest a definition and,
further, what is valid in the history ought to be included under the
definition. 3. The main ideas and topics of the
discipline.
This may flow naturally from the history and practice. It will be necessary
for the definition (i) to contain the historical topics and sub-disciplines
(so far as valid) (ii) to be a rational discipline, rationally defined. In
the case of metaphysics it should be shown worthy of its place as one of the
three or four major philosophical disciplines. 4. Immersion. That is the aim of definition
is not definition itself but as focus for the essence of the discipline. We
may talk of and around the discipline but there is no substitute for
immersion in the discipline—in this case for doing metaphysics. So while it
would be too much to develop ‘all’ metaphysics, the final substantive
section, A Theory of Being, will present a little
metaphysics. This will further reinforce the first three points above which
are the topics of the following sections. Historical introduction to the discipline of metaphysics
In the
west, the thought of the Greek philosopher Thales of Miletus, c. 600 BCE, is
often regarded as marking the simultaneous beginning of philosophy and its
sub-discipline metaphysics. However,
because of his penetrating thought, Aristotle, along with Plato, has been
called ‘the father of western philosophy’2.
Aristotle asked of the essences of things and his answers included substance
which we may take to be the unchanging ‘thing’ behind changing appearances.
He asked questions about Being (roughly existence) as Being (rather than as
special kinds such as matter and mind), the first causes of things (the cause
without cause), categories of Being (just under Being in generality), and
universals (the ‘opposite’ of particulars, e.g. an person a particular while
the property of being a person or personhood, if it exists, would be a
universal). Because these concerns defined the course of Greek and Scholastic
‘metaphysical thought’ and persist today, Aristotle may be regarded as having
launched metaphysics as a formal discipline. But
Aristotle did not use the term ‘metaphysics’. The term appears to have
originated with an editor of Aristotle’s works, in all probability,
Andronicus of Rhodes3, who noted that Aristotle’s books
on metaphysical subjects came after his books on the physical (ta meta ta
physika being ”after the things of nature”; or ta meta ta physika biblia—”the
books after the books on physics”). That is, the etymology and structure of
the term ‘metaphysics’ are not clues as to its meaning. This is
unlike the use of ‘meta’ in metamathematics (the study of mathematics using
mathematical methods) and metaphilosophy (study of the nature of philosophy).
In metaphysics, ‘meta’ does not connote a study that somehow goes beyond
physics. However, if physics is study of an aspect of Being, then in so far
as metaphysics is the study of Being, physics would be a part of metaphysics. In its
Greek and Scholastic phases metaphysics had an uncritical aspect—it was
rather unquestioningly regarded as possible. That changed in modern era with
David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Hume argued, for example, that we cannot know
that the world is causal. What we have is descriptions of the world that are
as if causal but that the ‘as if’ is part of the description and not
necessarily of the world itself. A problem is the gap between appearance and
reality—between knower and known, between description and described: the gap
may be bridgeable but we do not know it to be so and we cannot validly assume
it to be so without demonstration. Kant had an answer to Hume’s critique—for
knowledge to be possible, the structure of thought, which Kant called
‘intuition’, must correspond to the structure of the world (and since
Newton’s mechanics and Euclid’s geometry were then regarded as perfectly
capturing the real, and since we had discovered both, the
correspondence between the two structures must be precise, which is only
possible if the structure of thought is precise). Of course we now know that
Newtonian Mechanics and Euclidean Geometry do not precisely capture the
structure of the world and that the structure of experience is not precisely the
structure of the world (but Kant’s response regarding intuition remains
valuable in that intuition approximately captures a part of the real). But
even if Kant’s analysis were perfectly true of our knowledge of our empirical
cosmos, it would not be follow that metaphysics cannot transcend the
structure of experience of the cosmos and what may be inferred from and about
it. That is because science allows that the universe may be greater than the
cosmos (even though the cosmos is commonly thought of as ‘the’ universe);
particularly, as will be shown, we can know something about Being generally
and the universe beyond the cosmos. What is more, that something will be
shown to be non trivial. But this
makes it clear why, since Kant, epistemology as the study of knowledge has
been considered by many philosophers to be the central discipline of
philosophy. Regardless
of the question of the importance of metaphysics, philosophers’ views of the
nature of metaphysics and knowledge have changed as a result of the critiques
of Hume and Kant. There
have been outright rejections of metaphysics, for example by the logical
positivists of the early twentieth century. There has been renewed interest
in the old questions. There have been metaphysical syntheses such as that of Hegel.
But all of these have been marked by greater self-consciousness of the nature
metaphysics and its possibility. Further, there have been new questions
stemming from (i) the critiques, (ii) questions arising from the intersection
of science and philosophy, and (iii) the forward movement of philosophy and
metaphysics itself. From
Kant’s critique some philosophers came to regard metaphysics as the study of
the world of experience. In this view, metaphysics is metaphysics of
experience. In truth it may be observed that (i) metaphysics of experience vs
metaphysics of Being are interwoven but (ii) this does not imply that there
can be no metaphysics of Being (for all that it implies is that to know Being
as Being is problematic). ‘Metaphysics of experience’ refers to a number of
things but one is to build a metaphysical picture of the word from our
experiences (perhaps motivated by the observation that the individual never
quite gets outside their conscious experience). The
negative attitude toward metaphysics heightened, especially in the twentieth
century, as it became clear that science had made inroads into so many
disciplines that had been considered philosophy no further back than Isaac
Newton’s time. A movement called logical positivism emerged in the early
twentieth century that argued that anything beyond science was metaphysics
and that metaphysics was not possible. There was a program called logical
empiricism—to strictly derive the laws of science from elementary
observations. That logical empiricism failed because its program did not
result in success; and because the view of science as deriving its laws and
theories from data changed. That view was found untenable. Rather, theories
and laws are hypotheses that explain or predict observations but when new
observations do not fit the mold a new theory is called for if repeated
attempts to fit the old theory fail. In so far as the universe is
incompletely known, existing theories at any time may fail to predict or
incorporate new observations. And there
were things not explained by science and, positivism or not, they remained of
interest. They included the problems of modality (possibility and necessity);
space and time; persistence and constitution (identity); causation, freedom,
and determinism: and the mental and the physical4. Further
studies were identified under the umbrella of metaphysics—one is the study of
abstract objects. What are abstract objects? Whereas concrete objects are
thought of as physical or sensible, abstract objects are not. For example ‘an
electron’ refers to (what we think of as) a concrete thing. But to what does
the number one refer? If it refers, it would appear to refer to an
abstraction (but this is seen as speculative) and since ‘one’ is abstract in
itself it is regarded as an abstract object. But why is a number as an object
at all? The question arises with the modern axiomatic definition of number.
In seeking certainty in mathematics, the empirical view of mathematical
‘objects’ was abandoned. This was made possible by the axiomatic approach and
apparent certainty of proof in mathematics. The idea of number as abstract
appears to have arisen with Frege’s observations that numbers seem real
because of their very definite properties as elements in an axiomatic system
but at the same time are not concrete. However, while there is modern
consensus in English philosophy that there are abstract objects5,
their nature and extension (the class of abstract objects) is not agreed
upon. And so, the study of abstract objects is significant in metaphysics
today. In fact some philosophers regard metaphysics as the study of abstract
objects. Why is
that? Here is how the thinking might go. It is because the sciences, physics
particularly, have come to be commonly regarded as the exclusive means to
study concrete objects. So, then, if metaphysics is about the world it must
be about what is left over after the concrete. By default, then, metaphysics
would be the study of abstract objects. However, it is quite true to
counter-argue that physics is not the study of concrete physical objects—at
least in a real sense. In physics, whatever the stage, some ‘objects’
are regarded as fundamental. In quantum field theory it is the field that is
fundamental. Is the quantum field the ultimate and perfectly real? That is
not known—but it most probably is not. The truth of physics is pragmatic
truth. There remains to be developed a true study of all objects both
concrete and abstract. And it is not a vacuous study as will be seen in A Theory of Being. At this
point it is worth observing that it is a default view that the study of the
world is science and therefore philosophy cannot be about the world. This is
a common view among scientists and philosophers, especially analytic
philosophers. Philosophy is argued to be something else. However, in A Theory of Being it will be seen that there is a
definite role for philosophical thought as study of the world. Of course
philosophy is more than that for, even in that regard, it asks not only what
is the world like but how can we come to know it and what is that knowing and
so on. But it remains that philosophy can and ought to be also about the
world. What seems to have happened is that in academic as in common thought
an emergent reality is that the scientific picture is the picture of the
real. In so thinking scientists exceed their expertise and philosophers have
lost their nerve. The
modern period has not ignored the old questions of metaphysics but may view
them differently and from new perspectives. For example (i) The study of
Being was resuscitated in new form by Martin Heidegger (ii) The study of
causation and substance is significantly informed by modern physics. Also
arising in modern metaphysics are concerns from the ‘new’ self-consciousness
of the discipline—e.g. that the critique of pre modern metaphysics, e.g. that
there are first causes, is a metaphysical assertion6.
More generally, there has arisen the question “What is metaphysics? and the related
“What is philosophy?” which may be seen as metaphilosophical questions. The
disciplines and topics of metaphysics
From the
historical introduction, here are the main topics that have been studied
under the umbrella of metaphysics7 1. Pre-modern metaphysics includes8
(i) Being as such, first causes, unchanging things (ii) Categories of Being
and universals (iii) Substance. 2. Modern metaphysics includes9
(i) The older problems studied from new perspectives which may include denial
of older metaphysical ‘objects’, e.g. denial of first causes and God as
topics in metaphysics (ii) Problems of modality (possibility and necessity)
(iii) Space and time (iv) Persistence and constitution (identity) (v)
Causation, freedom, and determinism (including freedom of will) (vi) The
mental and the physical (vii) Metaphysics of experience (viii) Abstract objects
(ix) The study of metaphysics itself. Readers
may be questioning “Very well, you have defined the term metaphysics and
fitted it and history to one another but is there a rational justification of
the idea of metaphysics that justifies the fit?” This is best
done by construction of metaphysics rather than be indirect argument. A
Theory of Being
We
develop only a skeletal theory with motivation and application. There is more
at the website The Way of Being | A Journey10.
In the following bold font is reserved for terms being defined and undefined
terms; and the italic ‘is’ is short for ‘is
defined as’ (‘are’ is short for ‘are defined
as’); other terms, also italicized, will be where is
and are would be typical. Where ‘or’
is italicized it is the exclusive or. Motives
and the question of foundations
Individually
and in groups, human beings lie on continua of (i) seeking versus satisfaction and (ii) focus on the immediate
and everyday versus universal and ultimate. A fundamental
question for many persons and for society and civilization is “What shall we
do?”11 Whatever the particular answers, a
generic one is engagement with the real. An
approach to engagement is to seek knowledge
in process with action—and therefore degrees security or foundation for
knowledge. A foundation is commonly regarded an absolutely secure basis.
However, absolute security may be impossible or undesirable. Let us
think of foundations as follows—(i) We do not begin with foundation; rather
we begin where we are, as we are, ‘thrown’ into our life situation; (ii)
then, in seeking, we move simultaneously to foundation and to its use in
knowing and discovering what we shall or ought to do and its means; (iii) we
nearly invariably find that foundational approaches and systems are tentative
and in process—and with at most some remove from their use; (i) therefore we
conceive a base process of in process foundation and living with the two as co-emergent
and the foundation itself as a relatively secure focal reference for the
living. A foundation
is a provision for security for knowing or
be-ing (living). A
foundation may be (thought of as) absolutely secure and determined, final,
stand apart from knowing and living—or relatively secure and well determined,
in process, and co-emergent with knowing or be-ing and becoming and
action. Co-emergent foundations are not expected to be entirely prescriptive
and detailed but may be suggestive and generic; they are expected to be open
and the openness includes doubt in two directions—skepticism with regard to
validity as well as skepticism itself. This does
not entail neglect of tradition; rather what is valid in it ought to be
sought and given some weight. But tradition and traditional foundation (and
method) will remain in interaction with emerging knowledge and foundation. Further,
given that realization—answering the question of what we may attain—is not
just about our knowledge as representation and for future generations but
realization in the identity of all beings, we seek (and shall find ways to)
realization of and in identity. Now, to
those who say “But we still find perfect and final foundation worth seeking”
I respond “The approach suggested here allows the possibility of both in
process tentative foundation and absolute final foundation” and “In the
developments that follow what emerges and is shown is there is a perfect
foundation with regard to depth of ideas and Being but not with regard to their
details and variety amid our living beings; and further in the latter lies
the richness and freshness of life.” The basis
for this development emerges as the idea of Being and related concepts that
are introduced in what follows. Concepts, meaning, knowledge,
and language
Comment.
Edit at ../topic
essays/concepts, meaning, knowledge, and language.doc#OLE_LINK2. Informal introduction and
motivation—ideas, concepts, and mind
Ideas
are contents of mind with associated consciousness. A
precise sense to the terms mind, consciousness, and matter is not essential
to this discussion. Comment.
If this
document is part of another, the latter may discuss mind, consciousness, and
matter. Another
word for idea is concept which includes but is not limited to
higher concept or concept as unit of meaning. Examples
of ideas are thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. Ideas
are fundamental as 1.
The place
individuals feel and effectively are alive—i.e., not robotic. The location of all
significance and receptacle all that is significant to the individual—i.e.,
the location of the meaning of life. 2.
The effective
measure of existence (since
awareness, being ideational, does not step outside the idea); and therefore 3.
The only medium
for the extension of limited beings beyond their being and to the boundary of all
Being; 4.
The bearer of
meaning and knowledge (and
therefore the ultimate source or ‘ground’ of material support for the
extension of beings to all Being). That is,
ideas are target, means, and result of transformation.
In #3, they are seen to be intrinsic and direct; in #4, instrumental and
indirect. That is— Ideas are the entire target, means, and result of
transformation. Concepts, meaning,
knowledge, and language
An icon
is an appearance (semblance) that is capable
of resemblance, with or without association to an actual resembled. What is
a resemblance? If it is external to is mind it is not recognition. For
recognition it must be in the mind. But since the (hypothetically) resembled
is in the world, how is it recognized—how is recognition possible at all.
Briefly, semblance and so recognition occur because mind does not get outside
ideas—while the image of a mountain is in the mind, the ‘object’ is always the
product of further experience. This does not imply that there are no objects
or objectivity but that they are not precisely what they are naïvely thought
to be. It does not imply that the idea creates the object but that idea and
object are bound as one. It may seem that this says the world is flimsy like
an idea. That is not the case; rather the idea is more extensive and solid
than it is typically thought. Comment.
When this piece
is part of The Way, it is later shown what objects and objectivity are and
how ideas and objects are bound as one. A simple
sign is anything, usually
simple, whose assigned significance and meaning is only in association with
an icon—i.e. a resemblance. A simple
sign cannot be a designator, rigid or otherwise. Signs designate in virtue of
an associated icon (in memory, in a dictionary and so on). As an
example of the claim in the previous paragraph, imagine someone shouting
“tiger” in a forest in India. Only the English speakers react; the others
show no fear. It is because the English associate tigers with the word
‘tiger’ while the others do not. If one thinks ‘tiger’ gets is meaning from
word definitions like ‘large cat with black and orange stripes’ it is because
one knows the meaning of the terms in the definition. But what, for example,
is ‘orange’. Ultimately the words must be associated with icons. That is— Without
icons there can be neither reference nor recognition. A compound
sign is an arrangement of
simple signs whose significance is in association with an icon (resemblance) or
in the arrangement of the sign. The
italicized or refers to the ‘inclusive or’—‘p or q’ if at least
one of ‘p’ and ‘q’ is true. Without
the icons, a compound sign designates a resemblance class but no particular
referent. A symbol
is the association of an icon and a sign. Although
the association may be cultural or normative, it does not follow that no
rigid designation is possible; however, rigid designation often occurs in a
specific contest and requires further specification to be rigid in a larger
context. A simple
symbol is one for which sign is
simple. A compound
symbol is one for which the
sign is compound. It is essentially compound
if simplifying the sign or icon omits detail. A concept
is a picture—iconic or symbolic. The icon
or the symbol may be graphic, e.g. on a canvas or in stone, or
of the mind; it may also be dramatic—e.g., movement, expression, and acting
through. The association of icon and symbol is habitual, conventional, or by common use. A referential
concept—alternatively, an intentional
concept—is one that intends or is
intended to refer; a referent, if
there is one, is that to which the concept
refers. Reference
is (perfectly) faithful if the concept is faithful to the referent. This is
generally possible only (i) when the concept is abstracted so that distorted
detail no longer remains (ii) the criteria of faithfulness has play. This is
elaborated later. If null
referents are allowed, referential concepts always have referents. In the
following ‘concept’ shall denote ‘referential concept’. A
concept may have another concept as its referent. Concepts are as much in the
world as anything else. Though we often think of mind and matter as distinct
categories they are not (but we have not yet said anything significant of
what they are—even that they are ought to be thought of as categories). Meaning
is constituted of a concept and its possible
referents. It is a
triple of sign, icon, and referent. I regard
this as related to but a better ‘meaning of meaning’ than to think of the
concept as having meaning. A definition
(effective definition) is specification of the meaning of a concept. Comment.
In documents on
The Way, effective definitions of ‘Being’ and related concepts are given
later. When a
definition is given, only when it is not clear that there is a referent, will
existence of a referent or the class of referents be proved. Otherwise it may
be merely stated or assumed. Once two
terms A and B are defined, ‘A is B’ is used to say used to say that A and B
are the same referent (or, A is an object and B is a property, A has the
property B). Knowledge
is meaning realized in a definite referent (a
plurality may count as a referent). Abstraction
is filtering out of distorting detail from
the concept; and which results in perfectly faithful abstract knowledge. Pragmatic knowledge, which may also have
abstraction, is knowledge that is good enough
or even perfect for purposes at hand. If the
purposes at hand are all that count, pragmatic knowledge is (may be regarded
as) perfect. Language
is a sign system with meaning. That is,
language is typically regarded as a sign system with meaning, in which the
meaning lies in the arrangement of the signs as determined by convention,
reason, habit, and usage (and association with icons). When
language is thought of as divested from icons is because the icons are tacit
and we think we can talk of language without association of the signs to the
icon. But as seen earlier, icons are essential. Further,
since icons are essential to meaning in an actual situation, it may be better
to think of language as a symbol system in which the focal point of
meaning is simple symbols and compound signs (in reality of course, the
symbols, too, are compound and meaning lies not only in the simple signs and
icons but also in their arrangement and in the context). How is a
connector such as ‘and’ a simple symbol? It is a symbol when phrases are
regarded as objects. In
reality, though, communication is via any part of the triple of sign, icon,
and referent that suffices. The focus on simple symbols and compound signs renders language
close to effectively discrete representation or ‘digital’ but still symbolic
and semantic (a focus only on signs
and their arrangements is syntactic).
Precision of reference and necessity of inference (sound argument, valid
deductive argument) becomes possible. Though
capable of precision by abstraction and adjustment of criteria, our forms of
reference and inference (e.g. propositional and predicative) may be limited.
The kinds of form of knowledge may be larger than is commonly thought. A power
of discreteness is that it is effective in representation and communication;
and of the representation as an object in itself that is precisely knowable. There is
no doubt that syntactic formalization is powerful, not just in resolution of
foundational questions (especially in the abstract or symbolic sciences, e.g.
logic and mathematics, but also in the concrete sciences), but even in
formulating the questions. This is
already done informally (in non-intuitionist systems) but what may change is,
the admission of optimal—perhaps lesser—security in search of greater power;
the relative weights of the intuitive and the formal symbolic, of the
semantic and the syntactic, and of the rational and the empirical; and the
admission of new ways of dealing with signs—as in computation. Comment.
End ../topic
essays/concepts, meaning, knowledge, and language.doc#OLE_LINK2. Being
and beings
A being
or existent is
that which may validly be said to be; the plural of ‘being’ is ‘beings’;
and Being or existence is
the property of beings as beings. In the
definition of being, it is intended that ‘to be’ is some form of the verb to
be—e.g., is, are, was, will be and so on; but it is more than those
particular cases for it may be is or was etc, and was there or is here and
other such combinations. It is
necessarily at least implicit in the definition of a being that there is a
concept of the being and the referent being. Thus an enhanced definition of a
being would be A being is that which is identified or referred to by a
concept—and for symbolically capable organisms is typically denoted by
associated symbol. In practice, however, any part of the icon, symbol, or
referent may ‘stand’ for the Being. Generally,
the concept specifies the being (or existent or referent) in pragmatic terms.
However, with sufficient abstraction—elimination of detail—of concept and
intention, the concept may be faithful. For
example, if we ask whether there are tigers, the pragmatic answer is ‘of
course’. However, the concept of ‘tiger’ almost certainly does not capture
the referent precisely. This may be unimportant in day to day affairs. But if
we want to understand precisely the nature of a human being or an
electron—i.e., something on the border of understanding, we must admit that
our concepts are at best pragmatic. So let us
ask whether there are beings at all. Again, pragmatically the answer is that
there are. But suppose we ask whether there are concepts. Well of course
there are for without them there would be no icons; and if you argue that
that is illusory, the response would be that illusions are concepts (this is
essentially Descartes’ famous cogito argument). That is—there are some beings;
and there is Being. Further, with sufficient abstraction Being is a being
(Heidegger’s concern that Being is not a being refers to deep aspects of
Being that are suppressed in this paragraph but which of course may be filled
in). Now
though the establishment above that there are beings is fairly trivial, it is
the start of a powerful metaphysics. Rather than specify the nature of the
world (‘material’, ‘mental’, and so on) in advance, to talk of the world in
terms of Being allows the nature of the world and the issue of what are the
beings of the world to emerge. The idea of Being is central to an algebra of
metaphysics; and other key players in the algebra, in what follows, will be
power, cause, universe, law, logic, and the void. It is
significant that a being is a given, and thus neither relative foundation nor
subject to infinite regress. Rather, ‘being’ is shorthand for ‘that which may
be validly said to obtain’. That is, a metaphysics that begins with Being is
not encumbered at outset by a (possibly) erroneous posit of substance
(‘matter’, ‘mind’, ‘spirit’, ‘monism’, ‘dualism’, and so on). That is Being
is suitable to foundation without regress. And though its power might seem
trivial, it will emerge that the triviality is that it is transparent but not
that it is without conceptual power. The concept of spirit is
intended to refer to (i) a mode of existence higher than the secular and the
mundane, (ii) a cognition-intuition-feeling of higher aspects of the mundane,
or (iii) a higher ideal within of the one world of persons within themselves
and not relative to the rest of the world. The
approach from Being suggests and will show that the real and only meaning of
spirit is the third. Note that
the definition of a being might be enhanced to “A being is that which may be validly said to obtain
somewhere in extension and duration.” However, rather than to posit
extension-duration (spacetime) it is preferable to let it emerge from more
primitive terms. A hypothetical
being is one for which the
referent has not been established; a nonexistent
being is one for which it has been
established that there is no (actual) referent. Power
is the ability to affect and be affected. That is, power is material
cause. The
hypothetical being that has no power is effectively nonexistent. The
universe
The universe is
all Being. The
universe exists. There is
but one universe. The cause
or generator of the existence of the universe, if there is one, is not
another being for there is no other being; it is not material or physical
cause for material cause would be the effect of another being. A creator
of the universe is a being other than the
universe. The
universe has no creator. The
concept of the universe is different from the concept of the empirical cosmos
for the former is ‘what is’ (in a sense of ‘is’ over all extension and
duration) while the latter is ‘what is observed so far’. It is consistent
with science and our cumulative experience for the universe to be far greater
than the empirical cosmos in extension, duration, and variety of Being (e.g.
the theories of physics, the constituents of ‘matter’, and the nature of
living and sapient organisms). Logic
and law
Possibility
is that which can obtain. Possibility
is possibility according to criteria that determine its kind (e.g. physical
possibility, below). From the
construction, “it is possible that the possible is impossible”, it may seem
that possibility and all possibility are inconsistent or self contradictory.
However the construction does not show inconsistency for it violates the
meaning of the term possibility. This can be seen in that the construction is
rendered “it can obtain that what can obtain cannot obtain”. A pattern
for a being obtains when the information required
to completely specify the being is less than the raw data. A natural
law or law is a pattern, usually abstract in nature, for a
being (e.g. our empirical cosmos). Natural
laws for the entire universe are not known. Particularly, our natural laws—the
laws for our empirical cosmos—are not known to hold for the entire universe. A (concept for a) being is physically
possible when the concept follows physical law or theory. The
criterion for physical possibility stems, at least in part, from the world—for
laws or patterns are of the world. Real
possibility—physical or other natural—is
in conformation of the concept to the world. A concept is logically possible when the concept itself does not rule out
existence; logic is what must obtain of concepts so as to be
logically possible. A concept is impossible
if it is not possible. A concept is necessary
if its not obtaining is impossible (if it
must obtain). From the kinds of possibility
there are corresponding kinds of impossibility and necessity. In what
follows the unqualified terms ‘possibility’, ‘necessity’ and their various
forms will be used in their logical sense. It was
seen that the cause of the universe, if there is one, is not material cause. What is left over is non material or logical or modal cause. However,
mere possibility ought not to be regarded as a cause. For to say that
something is possible is also to say that it might not obtain—that the
its obtaining would be an accident. Therefore
only necessity would be acceptable as cause of the existence of the universe
in manifest form. Let us show that it is acceptable to label the cause of the
universe as necessity. It will also follow that the universe is the greatest
possible. Necessity
has no presumption (that is, while real necessity flows from laws and so on,
logical necessity is necessity of and only of itself). If a class of
contingent cases is necessary because it exhausts the possibilities, the
individual cases cannot be exclusively necessary. Name
the concluding sentence of the previous paragraph the principle of symmetry of necessity. That
which obtains exhaustively, i.e. without exception, is necessary for
‘necessary’ and ‘without exception’ cannot be distinguished. Name
the assertion just above the principle of identity
of necessity and exhaustion. Real
possibility presumes logical possibility (which is typically tacit). The void is
the absence of (manifest) Being. It is not
assumed in advance that the void exists. Real
metaphysics
The
universe is without exception in one of (i) a manifest (ii) the void states. From identity
of necessity and exhaustion, the universe is necessarily one of void or
manifest. From the symmetry
of necessity, the universe must phase between manifest and void states.
That is, the universe is necessarily manifest (at times which repeat
eternally) and void (at times which repeat eternally). Then from
the identity of necessity and exhaustion, the universe cannot only be in one
of its possible states. That is,
the universe is the realization of the (logically) possible. The
greatest possible universe cannot be less than the (logically) possible; but
the greatest possible cannot exceed the (logically) possible for the latter
cannot obtain. Therefore— The universe
is the greatest possible. Therefore,
the void exists. Name
the above assertion the fundamental principle
of metaphysics and Being (abbreviated to the fundamental principle of
metaphysics, fundamental principle, or FP). The
empirical cosmos is an infinitesimal part of the universe. The
hypothetical being that has no power is nonexistent. Note that
‘greatest’ does not mean ‘best’ or ‘perfect’. And while the ‘best’ and
‘perfect’ of common use may not be pertinent in the greatest realm, there may
be emergent perfection within that realm. As the it
shows the universe to be a rendering of all possibility, which includes our
empirical cosmos as a limited but necessary part of the universe (i) there is
no violation of our empirical science (ii) that the cosmos itself does not
realize all possibilities while in limited form is not a violation of the
principle that in the universe all possibilities are realized. Since FP is
‘logical’ there can be no violation of logic. It
follows from the fundamental principle that the universe is limitless in
extent, duration, variety, peaking-sustenance-and-dissolutions of Being. Are our
logics and grammars adequate to express this limitlessness? No, for they are
just some forms of expression. That is, despite their richness relative to
human experience they are limited relative to possibility. Necessity is recognized as a cause
that is named necessary cause. Material
and necessary cause are distinct in kind. The cause
of the universe may be said to be necessity or necessary cause. The
fundamental principle is ideal in being perfectly faithful knowledge. How
might we negotiate in this greatest possible universe that contains our
empirical cosmos? Tradition
is what is valid in the entire history of
human culture including knowledge practice. It includes ‘methods’ of
knowledge and practice as in process. Tradition
is an instrument for exploration of the universe. Its validity is ‘pragmatic’
or good enough for certain purposes; and it is limited for other purposes.
However, it is what we have for the negotiation of the universe that is
limitlessly greater than our immediate realm. Further the limitlessly greater
realm shows that to seek perfection (in terms of faithfulness) is effort
wasted relative to the ultimate (even if useful locally). Thus the ideal
knowledge revealed by the fundamental principle illuminates tradition and
tradition as pragmatic is perfect for exploration of and illustrates the
ideal. The two form a perfect system of two parts each perfect in its own
way. But as the parts are interactive and as tradition is embedded in the
ideal (FP) the system is unitary. The ideal system above is named the perfect metaphysics or real metaphysics
or just the metaphysics. The
system carries with it its own justified conception of knowledge as perfect
according to the dual criteria that emerged above. Note that
the ‘system’ in question has emerged from fundamental considerations. It is
therefore not subject to the usual criticisms and doubts regarding systematic
metaphysical systems that they are (i) hypothetical (‘speculative’) and (ii)
incomplete (even if valid as far as they go). What does
the metaphysics tell us about the universe and our place in it? In the
following, the assertions—some are repetitions—flow from the fundamental
principle and definitions. Centering
(human) beings in the universe
In a first definition, experience is
aware consciousness in all its forms. Experience
is the place of concept and significant meaning; it is the place of our
essential Being. The
hypothetical object that affects no experience is effectively nonexistent. The forms or kinds of experience
are attitudinal (perception,
feeling, thought, emotion), neutral or pure
(e.g. thought and emotion again, stream of consciousness), and actionable (will in the sense of directing
action and thought). A common
view is that experience, attitude, and action are distinct aspects of mind.
Here, attitude and action are seen to be experience in relation to something
experienced. In attitude and action, experience is relation or interaction.
But even in the pure case, experience is relation internal to the
experiencer. That is— Experience
is relation or interaction. On strict
materialism (the universe is material, mind is no part of matter), experience
(including emergent experience or consciousness) is impossible. Therefore,
elementary interactions must have an aspect that in aggregate is what we
experience as our consciousness. Elementary
beings (atoms etc) have what, in combination, sum to consciousness which can
therefore now be labeled higher experience or consciousness. In a second and broader
definition, experience is the interaction among the elements that is the
root of higher conscious experience (the term ‘experience’ is being
‘overloaded’). From the
metaphysics, there can be no absolute element. Therefore, in the extended
sense, experience goes to the root of Being. There is
an interpretation of the universe as experience. This is not in opposition to
the standard interpretation of the cosmos as a material cosmos in which there
are selves or centers of experience that experience a world that contains
their experience, themselves, and others—all in a material environment. There
is, however, a proviso. It is that the ‘material’ does not have the strict
interpretation of being exclusive of ‘mind’. Therefore the standard
interpretation is a particular case of the general interpretation. The
universe is a field of experience (or Being) with local cosmoses that present
just as ours—worlds with selves and others in an environment. There is
a sense in which do not transcend experience. If recognize a mountain because
I have, for comparison, an image of the mountain (or mountains) that is
retrieved from memory. I may doubt I see the mountain—due to possible faulty
memory, illusion, distortion by the environment. To be sure ‘the mountain’ is
the mountain, I may check my image with a reference, seek corroboration
(others’ experience), or physically check the mountain (e.g. closer view,
touch, experience the result of an instrument). But all of those acts remain
in my experience (and I experience the mountain as ‘objective’ because the
entire experiential system is implicated in seeing the mountain but close to
instantaneously and not at an explicitly conscious level; but for unfamiliar
‘objects’ the system takes repeated experience to build up; while for
doubtful ‘objects’, the system may never build). That is—While what I think
of as the concept is the image drawn from memory, what I think of as the
‘object’ is really an extended concept. As noted earlier, this does not imply
that no objectivity is possible—I know there is illusion (as experience),
(and therefore) experience, Being (and beings), the universe, and some
essential facts about the universe (no material cause, modal cause). And the
metaphysics opens up a whole world of interwoven perfect and pragmatic
objectivity. It was
earlier asked what a resemblance is and how resemblance is recognized and
possible. The foregoing explains what they are and in so doing show their
categorial possibility as well as their pragmatic recognition. From the
discussion above— A resemblance is
a concept and the resembled is the extended concept. Earlier,
a simple symbol was seen to be capable of reference but a sign was not.
However, what is the reference of the symbol ‘and’? But first, how is ‘and’ a
symbol in the way ‘an apple’ is a symbol? Intuitively or naïvely, one sense
of ‘and’ is as a symbol, not of a thing in the literal sense of ‘thing’, but
of combining more than one thing into one thing. Now that seems rather
abstract. In fact, the ‘thing’ designated by ‘and’ is an abstract object. From the
metaphysics, every consistent concept has an object (it may be a class of
objects but a class of objects is an object). An object is
the referent of a consistent concept (an object is an existent). Relative
to an individual, the object may be actual or potential; relative to the
universe it is actual. Entities are objects but the class of objects is not
limited to members that are entities. Some
objects are touched and seen, for example a brick. An electron is seen
indirectly, via instruments (as extensions of the senses). Electrons and
bricks are located in space and time and are causal in the material sense. We
can also think (conceive) such objects. We think of the brick as an object of
Newtonian Mechanics (and more); of an electron as an object of the Dirac
equation or as an excitation of a quantum field. But we can think some
‘things’ that we do not sense or measure with instruments. Such ‘things’
include number, property, and operations (e.g. ‘and’). But these things are
objects. However, they are not or do not seem to be located in space and time
or to be sensible or materially causal (note that being causal, in spacetime,
and sensible are present or absent together in objects in a fairly obvious
way). The perceived kind have been labeled ‘concrete’; and the thinkable but
not perceived kind ‘abstract’. Thus, in a fairly well established line of
thought, there are thought to be concrete objects and abstract objects; and
in the same line of thought, the existential status of the former is regarded
as transparent (‘real things’) but the latter are mysterious (Where and when
are they? Nowhere. Are they causal or sensible? No! So, then, what are they
(in kind)? We are not sure, goes the said line of thought.) However,
from the metaphysics we can now say that both concrete and abstract objects
exist and have the same existential status (real, i.e. have Being as
evidenced by location in experience). But though there is a distinction, per
the previous paragraph, it is not categorial but marked by a continuum
defined by how they are known. But that is relative to kind of experiencer,
for surely there can be perceivers that might shift the entire spectrum so
that what is abstract (concrete) for us is concrete (abstract) for them. Are we
saying experience creates or causes existence? No. Rather, existence is
located in experience or as an aspect of it (and as noted earlier, this
allows and there is a meaning to objectivity as faithfulness). Relative
to sentient beings the following defines a continuum— A concrete
object is one that can be sensed;
all objects can be thought (of); an abstract
object is one that can be thought or
conceived but not sensed. Sameness
and change are primitives. Identity
is sense of sameness of existent. Individual
or personal identity is that which occurs when the existent is
‘self’—i.e. the sense of sameness is that of an experiencer. A person is an
existent with personal identity. Duration
(time) is marked by sameness of identity
through change. Extension (space) is marked by different identities from the
perspective of a person. Because
identity defines and identifies (‘measures’) duration and extension, the
latter are perspectival (relative) and bound together with identity. That is, while ‘matter’ may be seen
as form (in space), ‘mind’ is relationship or interaction (among forms).
‘Mind’ and ‘matter’ are interwoven; and in what may be called dynamics of
being, mind or relationship or interaction may be seen as a
driver of change. The
Individual and the Universe
The
universe is far greater than the empirical cosmos. It must have personal
identity (self). The universe and its identity are limitless in extension,
duration, variety or kind of Being, peak, and dissolution. Individuals
(persons) must inherit this limitlessness (or else the universe would be
limited). That is, while death is
real, it is not absolute and the individual approaches the ultimate either in
their present life (if rarely) or after dissolution (death) into the general
background. There are pathways of approach to the ultimate (the universal)
from the immediate (this life). That
there is approach to and realization of the ultimate is given from the
fundamental principle. If the reader, despite the demonstration of the
principle, prefers to find this approach speculative, they may choose (or
not) to find a best approximation in ‘this life’. However, the fundamental
principle does imply not only the givenness of realization of the ultimate
but also, if they accept a simple ethic, to find and be on a best path. Here the
I must note a certain equivocation regarding this implication. My response,
noting the consistency of the principle, is to regard the fundamental
principle as (i) a fundamental postulate and (ii) an existential principle of
action. As a fundamental postulate I recognize it as hypothetical. However,
in view of the value of what it reveals if true, and knowing that it cannot
be shown untrue, it is also a principle of action for which a best
(‘optimal’) degree of risk is (at least apparently) not known—but it is and
can be known that no risk and mere risk are both less than best. What is a
proper level of confidence in the principle as a postulate? What is an
appropriate level of risk in relation to the existential aspect? There are
definite numerical answers but it is desirable (i) at least qualitative
assessment of doubt (ii) in relation to risk, to ignore neither the immediate
nor the ultimate. For (i) other proofs and heuristics may be given (a journey
in being-manual-essential.html and other documents). For (ii) comparison
with Pascal’s Wager is illuminating. Secular response is that doubt in the
Christian Ultimate is near absolute and the secular immediate is all we have;
it is therefore rational to not take the wager. However, in relation to the
real metaphysics, the ultimate may be far greater than the immediate. If all
possibilities are equally probable, the ultimate is greater with near
certainty than the immediate in quality and unbounded numerical magnitude. The path
to universal identity must be experience for else there is no continuity of
identity. Experience is the place of individual and universal identity and
meaning. Experiencing is relationship—experience of the world and experience
in action. Even ‘pure experience’ is relation inner to the individual. Now
experience has and must have form and this form is (a part of) the form of
the body. As
individuals do not create their own meaning entirely, community—especially
the dedicated community (‘Sangha’ in
Buddhism), is significant to realization. And yet, certain (relatively) realized individuals, often in charismatic
relation to the community, are significant in emergence of meaning and paths
to realization. The path
to the ultimate must involve experience in two ways, (i) in the
transformation of experience itself and associated transformation of body
(ii) in instrumental use of experience (knowledge) to transform material form
(and associated transformations of civilization). From the
fundamental principle, there are paths to the ultimate. They are cultivated
by intelligent enjoyment of the immediate and seeking of the ultimate. The
way necessarily has ecstasy and pain. The paths themselves ought not to
emphasize or suppress ecstasy; they ought not to ignore pain. The problem of pain
is important and it ought to be addressed in terms of our best therapy and
medicine; but the most complete address of pain lies in also being on the
path. This is true even of senseless pain, e.g. that of the infant or cancer,
for while it cannot eliminate the pain itself, it is the best resolution of
the apparent senselessness of it in the context of community. The best
approach to significant life (‘meaning’) is in intelligent discovery and
realization of the ultimate in and from the immediate, and enjoyment of the
same. General
cosmology
Cosmology
is the study of the variety, extension, and
duration of being and its kinds. It is
implicit that any methods of cosmology are tacit to cosmology. Speaking
expansively, cosmology is part of metaphysics. But the term ‘cosmology’ is
intended in a particular sense in which, if metaphysics is about the
principles, cosmology is about detail. Cosmology
has already begun in the previous sections, A
Theory of Being and The Individual and the
Universe. The kinds of Being identified were ‘material’, experiential,
(by implication) sapient, and among the latter are beings with identity. It
was seen earlier that the universe has no creator. However, there are higher
forms of Being. Are these Gods? Generally, not in the sense of ‘creators’,
‘rulers’, ‘perfect beings’, or apart from the world and its creatures. On the
other hand as the peak of Being of the universe, in which we all participate,
we are part of whatever it is that is the highest expression of Being, the
peak of universal Being. The peak of Being, of which we are
part, is the concept of Brahman from Advaita Vedanta. In so far
as there is ‘God’, it is an aspect of the process of the world, and we are
part of it. Beings
that are more advanced than us are possible and we might have relations to
them but we have no evidence of them in this cosmos (so far). Their primary
value appears to be symbolic and relative to particular cultures. What is
the method of this cosmology so far? There were two parts to the
understanding (direct knowledge) and reason (inferring) developed above—(i)
logic (and logical possibility and necessity) and (ii) law or science (and
real possibility and necessity, e.g. physical possibility). Thus far
the appeal has been to logic—to the realizability of concepts to existents in
the universe in terms of their intrinsic structure. Cosmology
of form and formation
We now
turn to appeal to the conformation of concepts to existents in formed
cosmoses, particularly our empirical cosmos—i.e., in terms of our sciences;
which presume and are framed by logic. But shall
we appeal to our sciences and encapsulated cumulative experience when it is
not known that all of that pertains to more than the empirical cosmos12?
That we should is already implied in talking of the real metaphysics. But there are specific reasons
(i) while the laws and behaviors are specific to our cosmos, the paradigms
may have greater universality (if not entirely universal to all formed
systems, the fundamental principle implies they are application to the many
cosmoses similar to ours—and where and if our local paradigms do not extend,
there is will be experience, metaphysics, and logic to fall back on) and (ii)
they are at least among the local instruments of realization. That is,
our traditions are a source of paradigm. One set
of main paradigms is from the sciences—(i) from the physical sciences we may learn about material cause and its two
sides of mechanism and randomness; we may learn about microscopic
and macroscopic behavior; and we may learn about the emergence and dynamic of
the empirical cosmos; (ii) from the life sciences we may learn about function and its microscopic
and macroscopic aspects; and we may learn about abiogenesis and evolution
and, particularly, the paradigm of random variation and structural selection
in the emergence and evolution of true novelty; (iii) from psychology we may learn about what freedom
and necessity—though not logical necessity—in human behavior and thought; and
we may learn of possibilities and blocks to creation and creativity; (iv)
from social
science we
may learn about group limits and enhancements to human possibility; (v) from economics, politics, and technology we may learn about constraints
and possibilities for large scale groups—for civilization. These
paradigms may be complemented by earlier traditions from other cultures—secular, transsecular, and primal. And they
may be all interpreted, enhanced, and complemented by general thought,
especially philosophy. How
may the paradigms be used?
This
section is continuation of and may be seen as part of the previous section. Relations
among the paradigms are particularly significant and perhaps potent for
interactive development; and the relations include various framings,
particularly of the real by the logical. The micro-macro structure relation may be
critical to the possibility of life and other cosmological structures—and so
to their understanding. The
variation and selection paradigm from biology—a paradigm of emergent
structure—may
be applicable to the origin of cosmological systems. Naturally the
particulars of ‘evolution’ would be different for cosmoses and life. And the
paradigms would have exception since the universe realizes all possibility.
What then would the use of the paradigms be? They may be indicators of stable
worlds, populations, probabilities, and novel structure. Our traditions
suggest pure and pragmatic dimensions of Being that are instrumental in forging paths to the ultimate. From the
foregoing, the pure dimensions are experiencer and world; from dimensions,
a useful pragmatic division of the world begins with psyche as follows:
psyche ® world ® world as psyche, nature,
society (and civilization), and the universal. Philosophical
thought (freed from its current limitations from scientific dogma, academic
boundaries, and self limitation as only a special kind of activity) will be
essential. For example, the sciences as practiced as well as information
models are inadequate to understanding the nature of ordinary consciousness
and its place in the lives of human beings and the universe. For that
understanding we may turn to philosophy and of course to experience. As
another example, philosophy is essential in scientific revolutions (in
revaluation of the concepts). Another example is that philosophical
reflection will be essential to revaluation of the use of formal and informal
language suggested in § Concepts,
meaning, knowledge, and language; and philosophy itself and its ‘methods’
will benefit from the same revaluation. Finally for our modern culture,
careful reflection of experience and experience of experience will be needed
to break free from the bonds that see consciousness as a peripheral oddity
and reclaim experience
as an essential way to universal Being. More
on the metaphysics
This is a
beginning. For more, see the home page to the
website The Way of Being | A journey13
where a range of the standard topics of metaphysics are considered. Conclusion—Metaphysics
is metaphysics study of the real!
Let us
conclude that metaphysics is the study of the real by reviewing the
criteria set up in A meta-question—How to
approach defining metaphysics? 1. Etymology and analysis of the
term itself.
While the etymology is not informative the term may be infused with meaning
for if physics is the study of the elements of the universe in pragmatic
terms, what lies ultimately beyond physics may be seen as the study of the
real in perfect terms. But is perfection possible? In A
Theory of Being perfection has been demonstrated. 2. History and practice. A review of the Historical introduction to the discipline
of metaphysics and The disciplines and
topics of metaphysics show that the topics traditionally and currently
studied do fall under the real. Even the epistemological questions can be
seen to fall under study of the real. Modern practice tends to deny that
metaphysics is study of the world but A Theory of
Being denies the denial. 3. The main ideas and topics of the
discipline. If
it is possible to study the real then the historical topics fall under it.
But is it a rational discipline—i.e., is it possible to study the real?
Descartes’ establishment of the existence of thought—that is what his cogito
argument amounts to—is an example. A Theory of Being
is a study of the entire real. Above all it has been shown that Being (and
experience) are real and that they are foundational without regress. A source
of the power of the concept of Being is that it refers, simply, to ‘what is’
rather than something else as in substance theories. Now ‘Being’ might seem
trivial—and indeed it is but it is trivial in the sense of being clear and
not in the sense of being contentless or without conceptual power. For,
together with the ‘categories’ of the universe, the void, logic, and law it
is ultimately potent as pivotal to an ultimate metaphysics. The intimate
relationship between metaphysics and epistemology has been argued, not only
in principle, but in A Theory of Being
they have been found to be joined as one. 4. Immersion. For immersion we have
developed A Theory of Being. This shows not only
the ‘possibility’ of metaphysics but an actual and ultimate metaphysical
system that incorporates beings and knowledge and their destinies. Noting
that the theory developed identifies Being as the real and contains with it
an epistemology—i.e. a justification of the metaphysics as study of the real
and the nature of the real. The theory has not been developed to the point of
including the range of topics considered to be metaphysics but enough has
been done to show that such an extension is possible. Though a
definition of metaphysics as study of the real has been justified a question
of conflict among definitions ought to be addressed. Some of the activities
in The disciplines and topics of metaphysics
have been considered definitive of metaphysics. There is no essential
conflict between those possible definitions and ‘study of the real’. They are
of course different but as pointed out they fall under study of the real.
Problems with other definitions are (i) they make metaphysics out to be less
than its potential, (ii) some make metaphysics vague or unclear where it is the
result of inadequate thought rather than essential vagueness, (iii) they may
make the place of metaphysics within philosophy questionable where it is not. Appendices
Appendix
I—the concepts
metaphysics seeking,
satisfaction, everyday, universal, what shall we do, engagement with the
real, knowledge, foundation icon,
sign, simple sign, compound sign, symbol, simple symbol, compound symbol,
concept, referential concept, intentional concept, referent, meaning,
definition, effective definition, knowledge, abstraction, abstract knowledge,
pragmatic knowledge, perfect knowledge, language, discrete representation,
semantics, syntax being (a
being), existent, beings, Being, existence, spirit, hypothetical being,
nonexistent being, power, material cause universe,
creator possibility,
pattern, natural law, law, physical possibility, real possibility, logical
possibility, logic, impossibility, necessity, modal cause, symmetry of
necessity, identity of necessity and exhaustion, void the
universe is the greatest possible, fundamental principle of metaphysics and
being, necessary cause, tradition, real metaphysics experience
(as aware consciousness), attitude, pure experience, action, experience (in a
more inclusive meaning as interaction among the elements that is the root of
higher conscious experience), resemblance, resembled, object, concrete
object, abstract object, sameness, change, identity, personal identity,
person, duration, extension, matter, mind, dynamics of being death,
sangha, realized individuals cosmology,
Brahman paradigm,
sciences, physical sciences, mechanism, randomness, life sciences,
psychology, social science, economics, politics, technology, civilization,
secular, transsecular, primal, philosophy dimensions
of Being, paradigm of emergent structure, experience as an essential way to
universal Being Appendix
II—the definitions
Metaphysics
is study of the real. Whatever
the particular answers, a generic one is engagement with the real. A foundation
is a provision for security for knowing or be-ing (living). Ideas
are contents of mind with associated consciousness. A symbol
is the association of an icon and a sign. A simple
symbol is one for which sign is simple. A concept
is a picture—iconic or symbolic. Meaning
is constituted of a concept and its possible referents. A definition
(effective definition) is specification of the meaning of a
concept. Knowledge
is meaning realized in a definite referent (a plurality may count as a
referent). Language
is a sign system with meaning. Power
is the ability to affect and be affected. That is,
power is material cause. A creator
of the universe is a being other than the universe. Possibility
is that which can obtain. A (concept
for a) being is physically possible when the concept follows
physical law or theory. Real
possibility—physical or other natural—is in conformation of the
concept to the world. From the
kinds of possibility there are corresponding kinds of impossibility and
necessity. What is
left over is non material or logical or modal cause. Name
the concluding sentence of the previous paragraph the principle of symmetry
of necessity. Name
the assertion just above the principle of identity of necessity and
exhaustion. The void
is the absence of (manifest) Being. Necessity
is recognized as a cause that is named necessary cause. The ideal
system above is named the perfect metaphysics or real metaphysics
or just the metaphysics. In a first
definition, experience is aware consciousness in all its forms. An object
is the referent of a consistent concept (an object is an existent). Sameness
and change are primitives. Cosmology
is the study of the variety, extension, and duration of being and its
kinds. The peak of
Being, of which we are part, is the concept of Brahman from
Advaita Vedanta. Notes
1 Along with other disciplines. And it
is worth noting that while we ought to recognize conventional academic and
disciplinary boundaries we ought not to be bound by them. 3 Metaphysics (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 4 Follow the above link to the Stanford
Encyclopedia article on metaphysics. 5 Abstract Objects
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 6 Follow the above link to the Stanford
Encyclopedia article on metaphysics. 7 The special metaphysics of topics such
as God and spiritual being are omitted as being an attempt to impose upon
rather than discover the real. Historically, ‘special metaphysics’ was a
major interest and mainly studied by the Scholastic philosophers. 8 Follow the above link to the Stanford
Encyclopedia article on metaphysics. 9 Follow the above link to the Stanford
Encyclopedia article on metaphysics. 10 When the article ‘Metaphysics’ is
written this link will be changed to point to it. 11 This is one of Immanuel Kant’s famous
three questions “What can I know?” “What must I do?” “What may I hope?” Here
the form of the second, “What shall we do?”, is the sole question for it
suggests the first which entails an answer to the third. 12 From science itself—probability is
contingent on what we know—it probable that the extent is beyond the
empirical but it is unknown whether it extends to the end of the entire
universe. But, even from science, if we assign equal probabilities to all
possibilities, the probability that the range of our sciences (here it is
physics that is relevant) is the entire universe. And as we have seen from
the real metaphysics, the range of our physics is infinitesimal. 13 When the essays for the site are complete this link will be changed to point to them. |