1.    Return video, get red seal, eat, movie.

2.    Tomorrow, Sunday, decide on the “main concepts and definitions, main axioms and postulates, main hypotheses, main results and demonstration, and principles of identification and demonstration”

this document is temporary and preliminary to axiomatic (and precise) formulation; its aim is to identify main concepts and definitions, main axioms and postulates, main hypotheses, main results and demonstration, and principles of identification and demonstration; since introductory and preliminary material are part of the general and informal treatments, they are not stated here

an axiom is a primitive truth; a postulate is a primitive principle of argument (direct or indirect establishment of truth); a hypothesis is a possible but not established truth or principle of argument (a function of hypotheses is to establish reasonability or its lack, but hypotheses and conclusions inferred from them will not be regarded as certain)

when ‘or’ is italicized its sense is inclusive—A or B is true when at least one of A and B is true (such italicization will be used consistently, only for formal content—i.e., definitions, demonstration, axioms, postulates, results or resulting truths, hypotheses and likely truths)

experience, verb to be, a being (an existent), part (sub-being), whole, being, world

the significance of experience—experience is the place of significant meaning, our intrinsic and (effectively) instrumental becoming and realization; it is the effective place of being; and it will emerge that the terms ‘effectively’ and ‘effective’ may be omitted

a being (an existent) is that of which there is experience, direct or indirect, and to which the verb to be applies (the plural of ‘a being’ is ‘beings’); the ‘experience of’ is a referential concept which is constituted of an icon that is necessary for recognition, and an associated sign

the sign is optional for recognition, necessary for language, and efficient for communication

so, a being is properly thought of as an experience of (referential concept) and experienced (the referred of ‘object’); it is standard and usually convenient for the sign to stand for the being; however, this is essentially mistaken and, though it is efficient, it often leads to error, confusion, and paradox

Comment 1.      Consider combining the two style Main statements immediately above (the significance of experience… so, a being is properly thought of as an…). Emphasize (i) a referential concept is a mental content and includes percepts and that ‘experience of’ is not just immediate experience of but includes all intentional thought and perception or content in intentional or referential form (ii) that (effectively) even the objects are mental contents which may or may not be referential

Comment 2.      Something’s missing above

since it is generally a posit that extols limited experience as fundamental, substance is a poor foundation for being and the world

as far as it goes being or existence is a perfect foundation for being (obviously) and the world; and experience is the best foundation for knowledge of the world

and existence will go, not just far, but to ultimates; and while experience, broadly understood, is the only foundation, it is, of course, trivially, the best; however, it too, will go to ultimates; and the distinction between existence and experience is and will be found null

the whole being is the being; a part of a being is some of the being; a proper part is a part that is not the whole

there is experience of a world which includes experience (thus experience is reflexive—i.e., there is experience of experience), selves, and others; thus, there is experience and the world, but it is not immediately clear that there are selves or others

interpretations and conclusions about them from the fundamental principle may be added later

Comment 3.      The interpretations…

the issue that one remains effectively in experience is implicit—as is the aim to identify the nature of objectivity and establish it where it may obtain

Comment 4.      Based on a previous comment, it is now explicit that one remains effectively in experience.

universe, void

the universe is all being—i.e. the universe is the being that has all beings as parts

there is one universe—i.e. the universe is a being, which has no ‘outside’ or ‘before’ or ‘after’, and which has and cannot have effective cause or creator

the void is the being that has no parts

possibility

a hypothetical being—or concept of a being—is possible if its existence does not violate experience (which includes inference from experience)

Comment 5.      The following need to be expressed in a manner such that the parallels between science and logic become superficial.

if the violation would pertain to a world, the kind of possibility is real, which includes scientific possibility

the theories of science are ordinary experience of the world extended, refined for precision or concise formulation of patterns

if the violation would pertain only to the concept, the kind of possibility is logical

Comment 6.      For the following, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_thought.

Comment 7.      Now on the ‘all is experience’ interpretation, logic is about relations among concepts—e.g. the criteria that a compound concept should have the possibility of referring to something in the world, sets constraints on relations among the sub-concepts. But given that science is about relations between concepts and the world, but the world itself is mental content, science is also about relations among concepts. This introduces or reveals a symmetry between science and logic. Science is clearly empirical—its conceptual theories must agree with its perceptual facts (note that the facts can also be conceptual as in lower level theories). In other words, science is based in experience of the world. But logic is also derived from experience with relations among concepts such that the compound concept may refer. In both cases there is an empirical content but, to put it simply, for science it is concept-perceptual concept where the empiric lies and for logic it is concept-conceptual concept. We may join logic and science as one—relations among concepts for realism. The similarity also lies in (i) discovery—logical theories require to be discovered, just as scientific theories and both kinds of theory are compound facts over a limited ‘universe’ while both are hypotheses regarding the entire universe (ii) application to conclusions—in both cases there is inference from premise to conclusion. Finally, while establishment of fact is typically contingent, facts may also be necessary (the fundamental principle—absolutely, that there is experience—from the givenness of our being in the world).

Comment 8.      If logic or logics are empirical, how is that empiric accomplished (logics seem a priori (i) from the way they are taught as established systems (ii) they do not seem to relate ideas to the world in the way science does)? In the first place there are some general principles. A tendered fact is a claim about a relation of one concept (‘the snow is white’) to another (the snow is white, which is a concept in being a percept). If it is true and false, it would seem to be impossible to obtain. That, however, is not entirely true—for in an empty ‘universe’, snow can be both white and not white, without contradiction. Thus, the law of non contradiction assumes a universe that is not empty, factual claims pertain to the universe, and the universe is capable of having facts—not a severe limit, but yet not entirely ‘universal’. Are there further situations in which a statement can be true and false—it would seem not, but this is a somewhat open question (A).

Comment 9.      What of the law of the excluded middle? Obviously, pertaining to an empty universe, there are statements that have no meaning and are therefore neither true nor false. Also, if we entertain a statement about (knowledge of) the future, statements can be neither true nor false and perhaps true and false (which addresses the question A, above). So, there are requirements, perhaps modest, on the universe of application for the law of the excluded middle to apply.

Comment 10.  Finally, the law of identity. If A and B are the same object A = B. But what if there is an object A that we know in one context and B in another, but we suspect that A and B are the same. How might we know that A and B are the same. Leibniz principle of indiscernibles has limits, because it is logically (very) possible for two distinct objects to have same properties. Particularly, it is only the physics of our cosmos that seems to imply that (some) objects cannot occupy the same position at the same time. There are issues with identity. Consider Bertrand Russell’s musing that George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley, but since Scott was the author of Waverly, George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. But it’s not really a puzzle because what George IV wished to know was really whether the person with some properties of Scott was also the person with some other properties of Scott. Thus, there are issues surrounding identity which may set restrictions on the universe of discourse in which identity has sense. But in such a universe, instead of proposing that ‘A = B’ and ‘A and B are the same object’ are different expressions of the same concept, we may define ‘A = B’ by saying that its meaning is ‘A and B are the same object’.

Comment 11.  Can we derive systems of logic and inference rules from these laws? Yes, but only if the universe has further structure. Which is simple enough in principle but not so in practice. Note that it is similarly true that the theories of science are true only if the universe has a certain structure (i.e., the structure defined by the theories).

if there are necessary facts or truths, their possibility is both real and logical

law

a law is a pattern in or constraint on a world or cosmos

proofs and heuristics for the fundamental principle

the universe is the greatest possible world

greatest is not best but includes the good (best)

ultimate (best as existent—i.e. not necessarily state or process or relation)

identity

individual

the universe and its identity phase between nonmanifest and manifest; in the manifest, it is limitless with regard to extension, duration, variety, peak, and dissolution; individuals merge with this power in peaking; otherwise explicit power and merging are diffuse

the universe may be seen or described but need not be essentialized as a block; from the perspective of peak being the universe, the being, is given; from limited perspectives, the universe and beings have determinism and indeterminism, which is a source of creation; and it is at the different trajectories through an individual who is discrete in extension and duration, that merging (and diverging) and dissolution occur and via which there is continuity among individuals and across death which is real but not absolute

realization of the ultimate is given; there are effective and enjoyable ways to discovery and realization ultimate; to be on a path is not just to follow but also to engage with diligence in discovery and realization of the ultimate and development of a path; there is an imperative to be on the way (path); the best general address of pain, which is given, is to join therapy with being on a path

the aim of being