THOMAS
KUHN’S STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS: A CRITIQUE
ANIL MITRA PHD, COPYRIGHT © 1994, UPDATED 2002
REFORMATTED June 2003
CONTENTS
1. Kuhn’s
Caricature of the History of Science
Normal or
paradigmatic science
Kuhn’s
characterizations of scientific revolutions
4. Evaluation of Kuhn’s
contribution
5. Detailed account of Kuhn’s
Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Introduction:
A Role for History
Normal
Science as Puzzle Solving
The Priority
of Paradigms [over sets of rules]
Anomaly and
the Emergence of Scientific Discovery
Crisis and
the Emergence of Scientific Theories
Nature and
Necessity of Scientific Revolutions
Revolutions
as Changes in World View
The
Invisibility of Revolutions
Latest
Revision, Copyright, Document Status
Kuhn argues that scientific “progress”
is not linear. New theories and paradigms are not continuations of old ones but
replace the old ones and are discontinuous and incommensurable with them. Criticism
of earlier science must be made through the eyes of the contemporary. The new
ones arise due to the bulk of evidence against the old becoming intolerable;
they become paradigms as they become accepted by younger scientists and as the
older ones die. Kuhn implies that an active field of science is productive
because it is an accepted paradigm. That before him the received notion of the
history of science was the Baconian one of linear, directed, empirical,
incremental process. That puzzle solving in the paradigm amounts to clever
exercises and this constitutes scientific activity in the periods of normal
science in between the periods of revolution when paradigms are being replaced.
That those not working within the paradigm “are not scientists”
This is a caricature. Progress has linear and
non-linear elements – it is the linear version that is the whipping boy
of critics who hate all constructive endeavors. Further, we must distinguish
numerical progress from progress as a value: here, progress is a priori
numerical and may be, according to some one a posteriori valuational. However,
such valuation is external and not at all intrinsic. New paradigms are breaks
and incorporate elements of the old. Incommensurability is a function of
psychology of resistance rather than epistemic. As an undergraduate in India in
the 1960’s – I was not exposed to Kuhn till I came to America; I made
the acquaintance with his work around 1984 – I had read some of the great
works by Archimedes, Galileo, Newton, Maxwell, Einstein, Dirac, Schrödinger,
Heisenberg and others; and I had also read some works on the philosophy of
science especially Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel… and arrived at the
nonlinear development of science, of its non-Baconian elements and all this as
naturally evident rather than requiring some kind of analysis… also, as
documented by Donald Campbell, such evolutionary notions occur in print as
early as 1828. The idea of scientific revolutions the idea of difficulty of
communication between two world views – all this was familiar and thus I have
difficulty understanding what was novel about Kuhn’s work. As noted I understood
the difficulty of communication but do not at all agree with incommensurability.
From evolution, linear progress is a non-sequitur; evolution branches and on a
given branch there is before and after that do not correspond to intrinsic
value; across branches there is no intrinsic comparison: that one species has
another for food is not superiority except according to some external account;
and increase in complexity or increase in intelligence are not intrinsic values.
There is no intelligence in the abstract; it is always contextual although it
seems to be perfectly general from within the community of agents. I can
understand why Kuhn was thought to be novel and why he would appeal, especially
to individuals in some fields. Kuhn sets up a paper tiger: the text book
accounts and the group thinking of American science [which due to its very
power would be conservative.] Paradigms are accepted also because they are
productive - scientifically in being predictive and explanatory, and
technologically. Older paradigms may remain productive: of technology, of
interpretations, tests, concepts, and limiting cases in their domain of
validity for the newer ones… and their continuance is not, therefore, due
to their incommensurability. If paradigms of science are essentially
incommensurable to one another they must also be refractory to the historian of
science - else the incommensurability is merely contingent. At all times - just
read the literature - there are individuals with neo-paradigmatic ideas who in
the time itself are collegial but who, only in retrospect, are regarded as non-scientists.
Real science stands in multi-dimensional, multi-modal context… in
contrast to the Kuhnian and the Baconian. “Normal science” as an
absolute, rather than as a tendency, is the science of the herd. The Kuhnian
paradigm of paradigms is possible only after the mass professionalization of
science, the standardization of text books that parallels the standardization
of language and grammar, the existence of a herd, it is only possible in the 20th
century, especially in America [this is parallel to the popularity of Derrida /
Foucault / deconstruction that continues on in America in the 1990’s long
after these viewpoints became marginalized in France and the continent.] The
neo-paradigmatic ideas become incorporated due to opportunity [counter-evidence
regarding prevailing paradigms] and productivity
What accounts for the “success” of
Kuhn’s work? 1. It fit the paradigm of relativism dominant at the time in
sociology and anthropology. 2. It appealed to non-scientists and scientists in
the “soft” sciences who may have been envious of the success of the
physical and biological sciences. 3. It appealed to some scientists in the hard
sciences. Part of the appeal is the validity of the non-linearity of scientific
process. It may appeal to some as the assumption of a superior stance. He
appeals to both guilt and narcissism. 4. It is putative in that it is
successful - and being putative is a non-linear effect in which small causes [in
this case other than originality and validity] are amplified
In the previous
section I was reacting to the phenomenon of Kuhn. Kuhn made a number of actual contributions
He emphasized the paradigm as a useful though
not absolute operative principle in the process of science
He did some interesting historical
investigations representative of work of a group of individuals circa 1950 at
MIT and Harvard
He mistook textbook history for received
opinion. It is only the “herd” who held textbook history as the
history
He rallied forces against the perverted
science as absolute as Baconian as over humanities idea; this was and is good
He thoroughly agitated the evolutionary
epistemologists and the school of micro-sociology of science. This agitation
was not, of course, thoroughly due to Kuhn but it remains true that Kuhn is a
key figure of the dialectic in epistemology c. 1950 – 1996. [Thomas Kuhn:
1922 – 1996]
Characteristics similar to those of the
crisis period
Consensual and directed
Programmatic, sanguinary... Elaboration of
the fit between paradigm and nature: puzzle solving
Anomaly - discovery
Crisis: paradigm or theory untenable. Search
for new paradigm
Non-paradigmatic, non-consensual, non-directed
research, philosophy, foundations
Like the pre-paradigmatic period before
science
Incommensurable with the old one... Persuasive
articulation... Old schools and scientists die. Normal science again
Non-cumulative
The old paradigm as well as the associated
program is dropped in whole or in part
Are necessary
Since unanticipated novelty can only mean
that the old paradigm is wrong
Are changes in world view
… analogous to changes in Gestalt. The
changes in view are not mere changes in interpretation - the changes in
interpretation result from the change in paradigm
Seem invisible [to posterity]
… because the textbooks are written
from the standpoint of the new paradigm in a way that suppresses [or subsumes
fitting aspects of] history
There is linear, goal directed progress
within normal science
… as in all mono-paradigmatic fields
Therefore science as a whole seems cumulative
… in retrospect, as cultivated by the
textbooks
But paradigm changes are changes in “worldview”
… as evidenced by new standards, new “languages”
- with old words - and, most fundamentally, by the new Gestalt brought to
nature which results in the inability to communicate across paradigmatic
boundaries
Therefore like Darwinian evolution, science
as a whole is non-progressive
It is non-linear - not the result of a single
line of process from origins to the present
Non-goal directed in that it is unanticipated
and nature-directed
Non-cumulative in that the old paradigm and
much of its program, methods and instruments are dropped
This may be seen in periods of crisis - marking breakdown of the old paradigm and
before establishment of a new one; and in the manner of adoption of he new
paradigm - amplification, persuasion, conversion… and “dying
away of the old die-hards”
Mechanism of crisis: precipitation and
resolution
Analogy of the historicity of science with
evolution
That science rewrites its own history
Psychology of paradigm shifts; that the
paradigm is not completely defined by explicit prescription but also by a
system of practices that are not fully articulated
Mechanism of crisis - precipitation and
resolution and analogy with history: Popper in the 1930s, Planck, numerous
other scientists; the research of Donald Campbell into literature on the evolutionary
nature of science; this literature dates back to at least 1828
Psychology of paradigm shifts: Planck,
Poincaré, Einstein, and Hadamard... Gestalt school... Omits consideration of
relation between “conversion” and group dynamics... Omits
psychology of creativity... Substitutes for creativity, the group dynamics of
the paradigm
Existing and pre-existing awareness of the
non-linear history of science
Textbook history as history
Ignores the unrecorded non-paradigmatic
conversation… frequently admitted to by scientists
Incommensurability of paradigms is inferred
from the fact that people can be stubborn and blind and sometimes intentionally
so
Ignores the psychology of creativity, of the
originators, at the time of the paradigm shift... Actually, he performs a trick.
He mentions it and yet ignores it in evaluating the total psychology. This
appears to be a standard Kuhnian argumentative device
From the above he deduces the relativism of
paradigms - that new paradigms are no truer than old ones. I assume he also
means that present paradigms are no truer than future ones
Uses Universalism as the only concept of
progress and shoots down this cardboard concept
Implicitly identifies science as normal or
normal + extraordinary science according to convenience. Does not make the
possible mistake of identifying science with extraordinary science
Uses subtle condescension
His paradigm is the anti-progressive paradigm.
His attachment to this paradigm is like that of the “die-hards” in
their attachment of the old paradigms. He is criticizing the personality type
and the style of inference that are most like his own
Although his views are one-sided he provides
amplifications of his views; provides interesting, pertinent historical
studies; provide some interesting “causal” relations in science. These
do heighten awareness of the history of science. Were Kuhn less of a
narcissist, he would be a better philosopher
History of science is a source of data for
theories of knowledge
Scientific fact and scientific theory are not
categorically separable
Discussion - He sets up false idols and straw
men!
The textbook environment
The herd mentality
A paradigm defines a field of science - defines legitimate problems and
methods for a field for succeeding generations because it is sufficiently
unprecedented and persuasive to attract and enduring group from competing modes
and is open ended enough to leave all sorts of problems. The paradigm
results in the following transformations on the scientific community in field: from:
|
Pre-paradigmatic period |
Post-paradigmatic period |
|
Lack of consensus, a paradigm, a program,
direction. |
Presence of consensus, a paradigm, a
program, direction |
|
All questions including philosophy and
foundations allowed |
Only problems and methods of the program
allowed. |
|
Each researcher may write his own books that are accessible to wide
audiences |
Textbooks are written in the initial phase
and serve as models for subsequent texts. The original publications are the
monograph and the paper - specialized publications that are accessible only
to specialists. |
Table 1 Crisis and Paradigmatic Science
According to Kuhn
Extending and articulating the paradigm and
its range of application. Kuhn describes this in some detail and classifies the
areas of activity: determining facts, matching theory and facts, articulating
theory [and then sub-classifies.]
Nature of puzzle solving
Little focus on true / unanticipated novelty
Solution assured, rules known
Extends scope and precision of the paradigm
Motivation and appeal
The scientist, once engaged [whatever his
motivation for joining the field] thinks “if only he is skillful enough,
he will succeed in solving a puzzle which no one before has solved or solved so
well”
A paradigm is not defined by a set of rules [although
such may be specified or attempts may be made to codify the paradigm]… rather
a paradigm is defined by an institution and its set of practices which include:
§
Proper research methods and problems
§
Questions which may not be asked
§
The process of education and the textbook
§
The dynamics of success
The next two sections are interwoven
Normal science produces crisis
A period that looks like the pre-paradigmatic
period… and is characterized by
§ Non-progressive etc
§
Numerous partial solutions
§
Accumulation of data is non-structured
Nature: non-cumulative developmental episodes
in which an old paradigm is replaced by an incompatible new one… a
revolution
Necessity: unanticipated novelty can only
result to the extent that the old pattern proves wrong and therefore real
progress must be through revolutions
Changes in Gestalt - a metaphor for changes
in world view… an analogy that has been worked out in some detail in N. R.
Hanson, A Picture Theory of Meaning, 1958. The metaphor falls short, however - “The
scientist can have no recourse above and beyond what he can see with his eyes
and his instruments”
Actual paradigm changes involve [but are not
merely] changes in interpretation
Kuhn means that revolutions are invisible as
revolutions… that is, instead of being viewed as changes in worldview;
they are seen as continuous with and cumulative upon prior science. This is
brought about by the textbooks that are written after the revolutions, for
functional reasons refer to only those parts of pre-paradigmatic science that
contributed to the present, and therefore present the process as cumulative
The transition is made by younger individuals
not so committed to the older paradigm by intense focus on the crisis producing
problems
The reasons for the incommensurability are: disagreement
over problems requiring resolution and standards and definitions of science;
use of the old vocabulary with altered meaning that results in
misunderstanding; the incommensurability of the paradigms that Kuhn likens to
the sense of strangeness felt by an individual accepting the dominant world
view of his own culture when visiting an alien culture
How does the group make the transition?
1. Testing of alternate paradigms arises due
to crisis, 2. The number and strength of the persuasive arguments for some
particular paradigm increase until it is seen as supplying and alternate that
resolves the crisis in enough individuals, and 3. The “elderly holdouts”
die
From Max Planck: “A new scientific
truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them se the
light, but rather because its opponents die and a new generation grows up that
is familiar with it”
Kuhn: “The transfer of allegiance from
one paradigm to another is a conversion experience that cannot be forced”
Kuhn denies the cumulative view of scientific
progress applied to science as a whole
Kuhn’s relativism: older theories are
not wrong; newer theories are not truer
There is obvious progress of a type within a
paradigmatic endeavor but this is not so in crisis or pre-paradigmatic periods
He notes that the paradigm will
tautologically seem like progress to its proponents. But, he implies that as a
whole there is not progress because: 1. It is non-cumulative, 2. Newer
paradigms are incommensurable with the old, 3. The new is unanticipated and
therefore cannot be progress toward a goal
He admits that science does deepen but it
also becomes specialized. I suppose he regards this as a canceling out. And, in
this he is / was looking at a discipline and not science as a whole. Further
some successor paradigms are deeper, of broader application, and more accurate
within the domain of validity of he earlier
The remainder of the section is a rambling
account of an analogy between science and Darwinian evolution focusing on the
lack of directness. As in evolution, he says, there is no progress in science
as a whole
It seems that on the human plane, progress is
in the eye of the beholder. Further, it is not only dependent on the lens in
his eye but also in his motivations and where he chooses to look… and where
he consciously avoids looking. Any absolute notion of progress must depend on
the eye of the universe… and to that science and philosophy assume we are
not privy. Therefore, in the realm of Kuhnian argument, in the realm of
epistemology and sociology we cannot conclude the existence or lack of progress
Kuhn asks why the evolutionary process should
work, what must nature including man be like that science and evolution be
possible at all. He concludes that the question “What must the world be
like in order that we may know it - was not created by this essay… it is
as old as science itself, and it remains unanswered”
ANIL MITRA PHD, COPYRIGHT 1994,
REVISED 2002, REFORMATTED June
4, 2003
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