Journey in Being
Orientation to the narrative
Anil Mitra, Copyright © January 2008
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Document status: January 16, 2008
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1. The journey… 2. Thus, although the journey is not intended to be in the realm of ideas alone, ideas are pivotal… 3. The universality of the journey… 4. For individuals who have experience with the topics of the narrative… 5. An unfamiliar and surprising point of view… 6. Understanding the point of view… 7. What is metaphysics?… 8. A logical proof of—the validity—logic?… 9. A powerful point of view… 10. Equivalent points of view… 11. Doubt… 12. ‘What does not destroy me…?’… 13. A view that appears to be at odds with what is real… 14. A view that is entirely new?… 15. The theory of objects… 16. The breadth of the view… 17. Technical character of the discussion… 18. Length of the narrative… 19. On meaning… 20. On the difficulty… 21. On the simplicity of the arguments… 22. Style…
The following thoughts, developed in depth in the essay, may be helpful to readers
Sent to temp2008\introduction:
The journey begins with an individual who wanted to know the world, to experience whatever adventure might be possible. Along the way, the idea of being was encountered as pivotal to the adventure and the goals grew to include transformation of being. The journey came to include study—research—of the bases experiment with transformation and its possibilities, with what may be feasible, and with what may be valuable
Although ‘being’ is sometimes seen as an esoteric concept, it is simple: whatever exists falls under the concept of being. There are subtleties to the idea of existence but it is also simple: something exists when the verb ‘is’ is applicable to it. Despite esoteric connotations, being is supremely simple. It is in this simple sense that being is used in this narrative
Whatever exists—that thought makes no distinction between what may be immediate and known and what is remote, unknown and perhaps even unimagined. That gives some indication of why being may be simple as an idea but may harbor difficulties that may require effort to even recognize—and why being may, perhaps, be a idea of great power. These issues are dealt with in the narrative where being is found to be truly simple if it is seen in an appropriate perspective—that is where the difficulty and the power lie
Sent to temp2008\journey material:
It was through ideas that awareness arose of what is possible. However, the narrative relates a journey in being—in ideas and transformation—the transformation of an individual—any individual—of a society, of the universe. Although ideas are developed and used, often in new and powerful ways, and may appear to stand independently, that is not their main objective. The ideas are a form of the journey but a secondary form; the main form is transformation of being—which is seen as a journey rather than as a linear progression. The ideas serve and stand in relation to that end
Sent to temp2008\journey material:
The trajectory of the universe through its phases of being may be conceived as a journey. This conception is perhaps better than the idea of a linear progression through known phases
Sent to temp2008\on the difficulty:
Because the ideas are pivotal and because they are so well developed in relation to actual transformation, it may seem that the narrative is about ideas. As already said, though, the ideas are, largely, a means to transformation. This explains the amount of attention paid to ideas which, given the goal of the journey, may otherwise be misleading. For those who read the narrative seeking ideas in metaphysics, cosmology and so on there is the following potentially confusing or misleading consequence. Since ideas are felt to be important, there is an attempt to have them stand independently, i.e., by empirical criteria of being grounded in the real and by rational criteria of deriving non-empirical results by logical means. The philosophy of science teaches us that that is not possible—that the generalizations of science have a hypothetical character and that the accepted theories are not those that have been proven right but those that have not been proven wrong. The narrative shows that—and how—there is no and can be contradiction between science and the metaphysics developed here, for (1) even though it is sometimes thought that science reveals the edge of reality, careful analyses of science and its history, show that the most that can be positively claimed by science is that it reveals reality within definite boundaries of various kinds, (2) there can be no disagreements between the metaphysics and science within those boundaries for the disagreement would result from science being illogical, (3) whereas science must be hypothetical because it is concerned with all patterns, the metaphysics is, at root, concerned with the most universal of ‘patterns’ concerning the immediate and remote and this pattern, named Logic, requires no empirical verification because it refers only to the necessary empirical facts of which the prime examples are being, all being, domain and absence of being… However, since it is being itself, its transformations that are the ultimate goal of the journey and since it is felt that it is being that is of ultimate importance ideas are secondary to being. There is therefore a track that is parallel to the independence of the ideas and in this second but most important track, an idea may be held in high esteem if it is estimated to be transformational. It might be argued that it is the independently standing idea that is most transformational. However, the narrative argues that this is not known to inevitably be the case and that the greatest outcome may be the result of allowing both tracks in parallel without the principles of either one being invariably held dominant over the principles of the other. It is to be emphasized that the tracks are kept separate and not confused; however, the point to this mention of the issue is to warn the intellectual whose primary interest may be in the ideas against the potential confusion. It may occur to the reader that the second track is a kind of pragmatism in which the nature and therefore the justification of knowledge lies not in the relation of knowledge and known but in the relation between knowledge and outcome. It is valid to ask, however, whether there is an essential difference between justification in terms of the relation between an idea and the world and justification in terms of the relation between an idea and outcomes. Regardless of any concern with pragmatism, it should be noted that the second track is not a pragmatism because it does not pretend to justify ‘knowledge’ but is, rather, a state of being in which ideas and action remain fused without any definite possibility of separability. It is reasonable to think that this state of being comes before and includes the discrete case in which knowledge or knower and action are distinct and the question of ‘justification’ may arise
Sent to temp2008\on the difficulty:
In comparison with typical modern perspectives—secular, scientific, humanist, religious or alternative—the view of the universe developed here—the metaphysics and the cosmology—may be strange and unexpected. It reveals the universe to be of the greatest possible extent, duration and variety; i.e., the only ‘objects’ that are not in the universe are those whose conception contains an essential contradiction. The view is based in what is necessarily empirical and developed according to logical principle—in fact, the development sheds light on the nature of logic—and is not at all speculative (doubt, however, is not suppressed.) The universe must contain whatever is true in science, religion; it shows the necessity of this and an infinity of other worlds and explains them in terms of the introduced concept of the normal; and it shows that the only fictions are logical contradictions; it reveals that the world as seen in the common perspective is relatively infinitesimal in extent and variety. The reader who anticipates speculation or fantasy, whether based in flight of fancy or extrapolation from the edge of science, may expect to feel disoriented in reading the narrative; however, where the basic principles are applied speculatively the fact is not suppressed. Finally, the view is not a stand alone metaphysics; its development is part of the journey; and it is applied to a number of fundamental human concerns and conceptual topics
The reader who does not regard him or herself as well read in the topics developed, many of which are listed in the contents, may think that the unfamiliarity of the ideas is due to his or her lack of exposure. All readers should know that the development is largely original and perhaps difficult and that even people who regard themselves as experts in metaphysics and related subjects may have difficulty understanding and absorbing the ideas if familiar terminology should lead them to expect that they will cover familiar ground
Sent to temp2008\on the difficulty:
Following the narrative is perhaps the best if laborious way to grasp and understand the view. Here is a way to quick but incomplete understanding. Remember, though, that a view from one angle does not reveal the whole unless the whole is already known—a shadow reveals a man wearing a hat only if we have seen men with hats; the whole is known, more or less, when it has been seen in many of its aspects—and then the aspects may appear to derive from the whole, which is now in intuition, instead of constructing it. Consider the progression of scientific theories in a given scientific discipline. Over time, the viewpoint in fundamental science has become broader; that is, later theories validly describe domains or realms of phenomena that are more extensive or that have greater variety than earlier ones. One aspect of the development requires giving up familiar but narrower views of the nature of the universe that project from the local to the universal. An example is the change from an earth centered view of the solar system to a view in which the sun is at the center. What is gained is that, in the non-local perspectives, the description of things becomes simpler and this is an enormously enabling factor in the advance of science. The reader is now invited to ask what might result in a perspective that is most universal, i.e., least dependent on any perspective. Putting the question another way, what part of our way of seeing or describing things is it that will remain when all perspective has been relinquished? Perhaps the only aspect of description that cannot be relinquished is not that of physical or other natural law but that of something that is prerequisite to—comes before—the law or nature of this world, of all worlds. Let us work into this idea by way of an example. In the local physical geometry a square is distinct from a circle. It is possible to imagine a less crisp geometry in which ‘squares’ and ‘circles’ are not distinguishable. However, a geometry in which a square is not a square—something is not what it is and not merely not what it may seem to be—would be impossible in any world—this consequence is independent of any particular nature of the local cosmos. There is a discipline whose business it is to exclude contradiction—it is logic. This suggests that the perspective of logic cannot be transcended—and simultaneously suggests that logic is what is prior to natural law and raises the question of the nature of logic. Sometimes logic is seen as dry—not particularly relevant to the lived life—even if it is useful and even if modern or post-Aristotelian logic is a work of depth and beauty. However, the thought so far suggests another perspective on logic. Is logic what we have learnt that it is over the intellectual history of the human race or should we define logic as what is left over when all perspective has been relinquished? The narrative addresses this concern but enough has been said to show how logic is universal—in the narrative the term will be capitalized: Logic will be what is universal, i.e., common to all being and logic will be, roughly, what is researched and taught in schools and universities. We will anticipate that while logic is argument and deduction, Logic is the form of all being and, further, there is some clarity to the relation—surely there should be some relation between deduction or proving and the form of all being. If your thought is illogical it may be mistaken and the mistakes you make may or may not have consequences and you will still be loved; if your being is ill-Logical, you do not exist, you cannot exist, and you are neither loved nor hated
The ‘argument’ of the previous paragraph is not intended to be a proof of the metaphysics—the world viewpoint—developed in the narrative. It is instead intended to show that the metaphysics is plausible. Proof is given later. However, although proof should be more persuasive than plausibility, the present argument has suggested why logic may be the single law of being—the universe—and is therefore, perhaps, more intuitively persuasive
Is not metaphysics the study of the occult, of the remote? How is it possible to promote a metaphysics as a world view? Metaphysics does have a meaning in which it is equated to the occult arts. The other meaning of metaphysics is, roughly, the study of what is—most—real. This is the meaning of metaphysics in this narrative. In this sense there is a tradition in the study of metaphysics in western philosophy that dates back at least to 600 BC. Some ancient names associated with the study of metaphysics are Plato and Aristotle. The scholastics studied metaphysics, often for theological purposes. Recent stand out names in metaphysics are those of A.N. Whitehead and Martin Heidegger although, of course, there are many, many others
In reflecting upon what is most real—this is of course just one characterization of metaphysics—it is clear that that should include what is immediate and immediately experienced and what is remote and occult or hidden. Here, as will be seen, lies the power of metaphysics; here lies its character as the study of the real
It seems paradoxical that logic should be logically derived—if logic were derived by logic, the conclusion, speaking simply, would be the premise; nothing would have been derived. However, that is not what is done in the proof—explicitly or in effect. What is done is to show that there can be no constraint on the states accessed by the universe. The only ‘constraint’ could be, for example, that of contradiction which is not a constraint at all. ‘A ball cannot be red and not-red’ is not a constraint. To think that it is a constraint is rather like the ‘constraint’ that the universe must be the universe. The previous sentence could be a constraint if the meanings of ‘universe’ in its two occurrences were different but it would not be a constraint on either of the individual meanings. Thus the no-constraint idea is identified with logic. Now the modern history of logic has revealed that there are many logics. Even though some of those logics, e.g. the propositional calculus, are more basic than others, this presents the idea that logic is the one law of the universe with a problem. There is a further problem that unless the axioms of logic are specified with care, logic will be paradoxical rather than ‘logical.’ The way out of this concern has already been suggested. The notion discussed here provides a concept of logic and that is why it has been labeled Logic. The concept is specified implicitly and work has to be done in order to see the relation between Logic and the logics. Further, the concept of Logic is shown to provide a benchmark for logics. This thought has not yet been developed to its full potential but there are some suggestions for how it might work and one key point is that, Logic must have definite reference to the world in the same way that science or the statement ‘that apple is red’ has reference to the world with the exception that while science and ‘that apple is red’ have application to a limited part of the world, Logic has no limit of application
Since Logic is so general, it might be thought that there should be some ‘price’ to pay for thinking that Logic is the universal law. First, of course, the idea that there is a price to pay for knowing the truth in matters of science, knowledge, and metaphysics is mistaken. Importantly, though, the narrative has been able to develop the primitive idea involved into a powerful instrument with momentous consequences. Some suggestion as to the breadth and depth of these consequences has been shown earlier; however, there is little point to providing further elaboration of the consequences here since they are developed in detail in the narrative
The discussion so far has suggested the truth of the following equivalents to the metaphysics. Logic is the one law of the universe. All possible states are actual (all actual states are obviously possible.) The universe is absolutely indeterministic, i.e., from any state, any other state—even if only known as possible—is and must be accessible. The void which is the absence of being exists and contains no object, form, pattern or law; it is this equivalent that is shown and provides demonstration of the metaphysics. The final equivalent is that the universe is absolutely non-cosmomorphic. This last equivalent has the meaning that the only features the entire universe in all its being shares with the local cosmos are the necessary features of the necessary features of the local cosmos
As noted above, doubt is not suppressed. The viewpoint is sufficiently unfamiliar and the consequences of such great magnitude that generalized doubt is natural—over and above actual doubts regarding the validity of the argument. Over time, even though the viewpoint has become familiar, doubt remains—this is natural enough since doubt was one of the engines of development of the viewpoint. Although doubt may make the reader uncomfortable with the argument, he or she is not expected to relinquish doubt for doubt can only sharpen understanding of valid argument—by spurring clarification, refutation, and validation of the argument and the doubts and by motivating indirect validation of the argument in seeking ramification and application
The reader may think that the suggestion is being made that doubt is being encouraged because the arguments and positions of the narrative are held to be beyond doubt and that the encouragement to doubt shows confidence in the view and the thought that when the reader sees the truth he or she will fall into acquiescent agreement. That is not the case. Indeed there is confidence in the narrative but the confidence remains laced with doubt. To some extent this is in the nature of a writer who psyche has always, it seems, been characterized by confidence and doubt regarding most affairs. Perhaps, it might be hoped, confidence and imagination have spurred new ideas and the energy to continue on while doubt has eliminated dead end ideas and, therefore, the arguments of the narrative have, at least, some degree of reasonableness. This has truth but it is not the entire truth. The rational doubts are raised and critiqued in the narrative. Then there is the doubt regarding the magnitude of the conclusions already noted. There is a related empirical-like doubt, not mentioned above, that for the intellect to inform the organism as to its possibilities seems to upturn the order of things—however, it should be remembered that this is precisely one place where the power of science lies. Again, though, science includes ongoing interaction between prediction and verification. This is a reason for the turn in the journey from ideas to experiments in transformation—the primary reason for the ‘turn,’ however, is that transformation concerns entire being. Occasionally there is a feeling of entrapment in the commitment to a journey and a writer wonders why he should not be living a ‘normal life’ or, perhaps, commitment to more immediate, more pressing ideals—problems of want and immense injustice, opportunities of beauty. The writer remembers, though, that the journey is ultimately rewarding despite sacrifice and it is also, perhaps, the writer’s supreme creative contribution. Still, such a writer might feel a sense of freedom—and loss—if the main ideas of the narrative were proven convincingly wrong. However, this reason to encourage doubt is self-centered. Some might see this line of thinking as self-destructive but here it is seen as the result of a desire to experience life itself—not that the journey is not life but, simply, that it is not all of life. Also, doubting a writer’s work pays attention to the work; it is better to have one’s writing criticized than ignored. However, the basic reason to encourage doubt is, it is hoped, that, even if it is naïve to think so, truth is a process and it is a combination of confidence and doubt, imagination and criticism that best serve truth. Given the magnitude of the ideas of the narrative and the ambitions of the journey, perhaps even the errors of a writer’s thoughts may be or spark contribution
In the previous paragraphs, the doubts concerned the demonstration of the new view and the magnitude of its consequences. Earlier, it was noted that the new viewpoint appears to be distant from the common views, e.g., from everyday affairs and from science. However, it was also noted that the new view or metaphysics was based in deduction from what is necessarily empirical. Most readers will be familiar with the idea of deduction but what does it mean for something to be necessarily empirical? Is not empirical data necessarily subject to error? The point is analyzed in the chapter Being. The analysis, briefly and approximately, is this. Although the content of observation may be doubted, to doubt that experience of a world exists is to misunderstand the meaning of both experience and existence. It may be doubted that there is an external world or a subject but this is not asserted; what is asserted is, simply, that there is experience and that it is of some world whether external or not. It may be doubted that the alleged objects of experience exists but it cannot be doubted that there is experience of objects whether real or delusional or merely constructed in experience. This is—part of—the necessary empirical base from which development of the metaphysics proceeds. It could be argued that the conclusion is trivial and indeed it is in its claim regarding what exists but it is non trivial in demonstrating some existence and, as shown in the chapters Metaphysics and Cosmology, and as suggested by the foregoing discussion, it is of ultimate depth and breadth in its further consequences. Perhaps, then, it is science and common sense that are wrong. However, this is not what is asserted. The metaphysics agrees with science and common sense within their domains of validity—in fact the metaphysics confirms, in a sense that is explained in the narrative, the necessity of domains of valid science and common sense, in general and in the particular case of this world. Further, the valid part of the picture of being from science—as well art and the valid parts of religion—are pivotal in the elaboration of the Metaphysics, which, in turn has illuminating consequences for what may be valid in science, faith and religion as well as for some aspects or ways of seeing artistic truth
From the histories of ideas and of science it seems unlikely that ideas of such magnitude should be entirely new. In fact the ideas are not altogether new and there must have been individuals from time to time who had intuitions similar to the present one. The intuitions occur in the Vedanta of Indian philosophy, among the mystics of the west, may be regarded as being part of some of the ‘great’ religions provided that their texts are interpreted metaphorically. On the formal side, the thought of Leibniz, of Hume and of Wittgenstein had a number of logical points of contact with the present metaphysics. However it does not appear that the view has been previously developed with the logical foundation that is provided here, with the present insight into its significance, or with the depth and breadth of its present systematic development and systematic application
There are undoubtedly further influences. To begin with there is the negative influence of substance theory and what are perhaps its two primary metaphysical instances—materialism and idealism. Experience with these and other metaphysical positions led to dissatisfaction. Something more was sought. It is not clear when the transition occurred—there was of course no precise point. Further, it is not precisely a transition in terminology, e.g. from materialism to a focus on being. As discussed in the narrative, provided that ‘matter’ is appropriately understood it makes no distinction whether the term used is ‘mind’ or ‘matter’ or ‘being.’ This will of course be disputed but it is requested of those who would do so to first read what the narrative says on this subject. As has been mentioned, the study of being has a tradition in western philosophy. This may of course have been an influence. Among those who studied being, notably Aristotle, Plato, Whitehead and Heidegger, struggled with the idea recommend it—not, it is hoped out of perversion but, instead, out of identification with the struggle to understand. The scholastics wrote on being and essence with what appears in retrospect, despite the brilliance of a St. Augustine and a Thomas Aquinas, to have been a confusion. Those writers may be forgiven by posterity for they knew not what they wrote; if, however, they did they would have known that they wrote apologetically in favor of dogma. A cast of modern writers is harder to forgive but respect for the fellow being prevents the mention of the famous existentialists of the 20th century—except Heidegger. In retrospect, Heidegger stands out because of his quarrel with ‘2000 years of substance theory.’ It is not clear to what extent Heidegger set up the present dissatisfaction with and absolute rejection of substance theory but the rejection was not imported—it involved a struggle, a wrestling with ideas, before the dawn of clarity. Further, it appears that Heidegger did not go all the way with the rejection, for as shown in the narrative, it is rather impossible to logically reject substance theory without also rejecting determinism which must harbor some at least occult substance
One consequence is that it is pivotal in developing a theory of objects. The problem of external objects is that the experience of the object and the object are distinct and there is no way to guarantee faithfulness of the experience or concept to an object. Of course, since we live in the world there has to be some practical faithfulness but how is that to be understood and is there nothing more than approximate faithfulness. The theory of objects that is developed shows that there are two classes of object that may be labeled ‘necessary’ and ‘practical.’ The necessary objects are those whose being is guaranteed by experience as being defined in experience. Examples are being itself, the universe or all being, the void or absence of being, and domains of being, i.e., parts of the universe. Though the examples are trivial, each example forms the basis of profound consequences that are explored in Metaphysics. Regarding the practical objects of everyday experience whether common or scientific—a mountain, an apple, the objects of quantum theory—it is argued that practical acquaintance is good enough; this argument is reasonable enough and should be surprising. However, it is further argued, and by this point the argument is able to assume a trivial form, that where practical knowledge is all that is to be had, to expect more is unreasonable, and that the limit on practical knowledge is ‘good’ in that it shows doors to further discovery and adventure. There is a non-trivial part to the argument and that occurs in showing without reference to the science of perception or quantum theory that, in an absolutely indeterministic universe, there must be limits to the faithfulness of knowledge in general. However it is also observed and shown that it is only in an indeterministic world that form and knowledge may arise as a matter of course, i.e., with some degree of probability; that in an absolutely indeterministic world, form and knowledge must arise; and that in a deterministic world, if form and knowledge are not given at the outset, they cannot arise
The metaphysics enables the development of two further aspects of the theory of objects. The first concerns the nature of abstract objects and their distinction from concrete objects. While a mountain is a concrete object and ‘one mountain’ appears concrete enough, what kind of a thing is the number ‘one?’ Can the number ‘one’ be touched, seen or located in space? Apparently not. If the number ‘one’ is an object, e.g. if it is more than an idea, it must be abstract. Some thinkers doubt that ‘one’ is an object—they doubt that it exists. However, the metaphysics shows that every consistent concept must have reference, i.e., to every consistent concept there must correspond an object in the universe. This shows, first, that numbers do exist and, second, that any categorical distinction between abstract and concrete objects is illusory. There are of course subtleties to the argument—it should explain where an abstract object is located and this and other concerns are addressed in the narrative. More importantly, the conflation of the concrete with the abstract appears absurd as well as to contradict the tradition of thought regarding abstract objects. Surely, there is some difference between the kind of thing that a mountain is and the kind of thing that a number is. Some subtlety is required to address this question but what is shown is that the distinction is not one of kind but one of the approaches to study. Both abstract and concrete objects can be studied empirically or conceptually but abstract objects lend themselves to conceptual study and are, therefore, studied conceptually while concrete objects are best studied empirically. However, one could study the concept of an apple conceptually even though the study might not reveal much. The case of number is interesting. It is probable that before the idea of number came the idea of one thing, two things and so on. In all likelihood the properties may have been studied empirically—one apple and one banana make two fruit and so on. At some point though it was discovered that the study of number could not get very far empirically and that conceptual study led to much empowerment. Thus began the symbolic study of number, at first perhaps only as iconic representations in the mind of the thinker or perhaps as marks on the ground. Much later it was seen how to develop number systems axiomatically and the abstract study of number took off. The metaphysics however, shows that if the axiomatic study is consistent it must have representation. That the study of ‘abstract’ objects need not be ever symbolic or conceptual is seen in the return to empirical study of number in computational approaches to number theory and the computational approach shows not only the empirical side to what has to all intents become abstract but it also shows how the power of the conceptual approach can, perhaps unexpectedly, be rivaled by the empirical
The point the distinction between the abstract and the concrete is that abstract objects lend themselves to conceptual study and concrete objects are best studied empirically should, perhaps, restated so as to emphasize what has been learned. There is no distinction among intrinsic kinds of objects but when an object is best studied empirically it may be labeled concrete and when the best study is conceptual the object may be labeled abstract. It may be added as a peripheral point that scientific theories are neat in that they are—often—best studied with a combination of conceptual and empirical approaches
The second consequence of the metaphysics for the theory objects is that, together with a study of the categories of intuition, it enables the development of a system of classes of object. That is, the metaphysics enhances enormously the study of the variety of objects
Although there are specialized discussions the total view has what is termed an ultimate breadth and, although the amount of detail varies, the development addresses the entire range of general disciplines and general human interest. This is important to know for the reader who is expecting a specialist treatment of some specialized topics may be disoriented by his or her misleading expectation
Since the developments have not been reported in earlier work, it is necessary to employ careful definition and use of concepts. The technical character of the work may be suppressed in a future work that emphasizes the meaning, significance and implications of the narrative
Although the length of the work is not excessive in comparison to other texts, it seems clear that it can be significantly shortened without omitting content. It is hoped that a greater efficiency may be introduced into the narrative at some later date
The narrative employs common words but it is expected from the foregoing that the meanings attached to the words is often new and it is important for the reader to be aware of this. The psychology of stable word meaning and stable grammatical forms is an illusion with stability being relative and one side of meaning; the other side is fluid and it is in fluidity that meaning adapts to aspects of the world previously unknown and un-conceived
Most of the foregoing issues contribute to an intrinsic difficulty in understanding the arguments—multiply plural—that may be experienced by ‘experts’ and ‘novices’ alike. It is hoped that the forewarning and the words of explanation will be helpful to readers. It is also hoped that in some future edition a greater efficiency of expression and accessibility of the language and the ideas may be achieved. It is hoped that readers may see the power in the development that the author has seen. It is hoped that the reader may experience and resolve doubt as has been experienced in writing this narrative, perhaps to have doubt remain, for it is in resolution that there is understanding and it is in doubt and confidence in interaction that one may be alive. Finally, it is hoped that the reader may experience for him or herself the great sense of adventure that has given the labor purpose
Drawing back from the details it is seen that the argument is supremely simple. There are there are two parts to it. The first is necessary demonstration in which conclusions follow logically from necessary facts involving simple ideas such as being, all being and absence of being. This results in what may be labeled pure metaphysics. The second part is probable demonstration in which what we know of the local world from experience of its details is used in combination with the pure metaphysics. The conclusions may have an extremely high degree of probability but are not certain. The source of the lack of certainty is the uncertainty regarding knowledge of details. What is certain, however, is that such conclusions cannot be certain and when that is recognized, certainty is seen as undesirable and uncertainty as adventure and opportunity
Along the way there has been developed a metaphysics of ultimate breadth and depth, resolutions of deep concerns regarding the nature of objects, logic, meaning, mind and human being and human issues. It may seem that the writer is advertising his thought. Perhaps so. However, the attitude is this. The writer has long had an ambition to make a fundamental contribution and to that end practiced doubt and humility along with diligence, application, energy, thought, living and adventure. The humility may have had a certain honesty but it was also recognized that doubt and humility served the goals well. Therefore, it was a ‘realistic’ humility and not a retiring one. Somewhere along the path it was recognized that there was the potential for ultimates. It was an intuitive thought and the writer sought to realize the intuition in explicit terms and developed by reason. Further along the path the author accepted that, while something of worth had been accomplished, the core intuition remained at the level of intuition. It was therefore a surprise and an infinite delight when, in 2002, the insight that enabled the logical turn occurred in the shadows of the mountains of Northern California. Since 2002, the original insight has been elaborated into a logical system of metaphysics, a cosmology of ultimate breadth and the numerous other developments noted above and elaborated in the essay. The system sometimes appears to the writer to be that of a stumbled upon strange and beautiful landscape. One further development may be noted. Although the system has always been seen as necessary, the clear nature of its also empirical character has recently been seen—as noted earlier and elaborated in the narrative. Although the writer is indebted to others for inspiration and although there has been originality of thought, it often seems as though it is the ideas themselves that are the driving force. There is a sense that what is most in flux is most firm. Despite doubt and over above reason, this independence of the ideas enhances the sense of their truth
In the end, it is hoped that the reader would be left with this thought that the ideas of the narrative are supremely simple, that any apparent complexity is neither inherent in the ideas nor the result of a writer’s pretension but is perhaps due, on the one hand, to the influence of certain characteristic and finally misguided modes of modern thought and on the other hand to a writer’s inadequacy in expression or, to express the thought sympathetically, to the fact that a writer is struggling with a vision whose clarity and contour, and depth and elaboration continue to emerge as he writes
…
Concerns of the ego and mode of argument—‘I’ vs. ‘they’ and, later, a cast of characters. Suppression of ‘I’ was used in a previous version of the narrative and may be used in a future version. In this version, formal language has been used to achieve the same effect but this approach is felt to be undesirable because the nature of the narrative is not entirely impersonal