What might be a focal concept for a metaphysics, for an understanding of the world? The following characterization can be exhaustive because it is extremely coarse grained

The focal concept would be either the world itself or something behind the world as it is experienced or known

The idea of something behind the world leads to the concepts of essence and substance—which have strong affinities

The world as itself versus the world as essence or substance are not exclusive. The world may be its own substance or essence. If substance or essence are regarded literally—think sub-stance, think essence as that which has the same effect—their linguistic meaning is metaphorical for there is no ultimate standing-under, no ultimate different thing that is identical to the thing. The world can be its own substance, its own essence—it must be its own substance though not necessarily in the exclusive sense that there can be no other substance

The search for simple understanding, however, may lead to the conception of a simple essence, a simple substance. This search has possible elements of power, aesthetics and hubris. Presently, however, concern is restricted to understanding. The extreme of simplicity might appear to lie in what may be labeled absolute monism—the world as a single substance that is uniform and unchanging but manifests as all variety and change

World as its own essence and absolute monism may appear to be exclusive but are not necessarily so; starting with world as its own essence or substance may—or may not—have monism as its outcome

However, to commit to simple substance at outset, especially to a specific substance such as matter, is to invite failure of understanding

On the other hand, world as its own essence—in an inclusive sense that allows substance—courts no failure. Substance—substances—may fall out of the lack of commitment in world as its own essence and, if so, substance theory will have been founded and strengthened. It will not be necessary to commit for substance theory will be manifest

It will turn out however, that substance or essence theories may have power in limited locales or contexts but that as foundation for metaphysics they are untenable

It would seem, then, that simple understanding shall not be forthcoming—that all that we shall ever have is the world with its variety and change as its own essence

It shall turn out, however, that the approach from world as essence leads to a metaphysics that is simpler and deeper than substance theory. It will be seen to be simpler in that it postulates no fundamental but hypothetical ground. It will be seen to be deeper in that it is generative of every valid local metaphysics. It will also be seen to be broader in that it explains not only every actual thing but in that it also shows every possible thing to be actual, i.e., that the universe could not be ‘greater’ than it is (the potential paradoxes, absurdities, and puzzlements that these assertions may seem to suggest will be defused)

Thus, world as essence is not only simpler, deeper, and broader… it is simplest, deepest, and broadest. It is simultaneously deep and superficial—the deepest and at the surface

World as essence is—will be seen to be—the basis of an ultimate metaphysics

World as its own essence suggests existence as the focal concept of metaphysics. It will be seen that the idea of existence as the focal concept asserts—almost—nothing; the concept will function as a container concept; its effective meaning will emerge as a result of investigation… and may, of course, be found to be remote or immediate—so immediate as to not require investigation

Aims of the discussion of being

Investigate and establish the meaning of being and existence and clarify the phrase ‘has existence in its entirety’

Show that being as existence is not an empty idea and establish some very general and necessary objects that have being. From a practical point of view the demonstration that follows may seem to be a pointless proving of obvious and not particularly useful claims. However, it will emerge that the claims are not obvious and what is established will be pivotal to the theory of being—whose centerpiece is metaphysics of immanence—which is of great, if not ultimate, theoretical or conceptual and practical significance. Additionally, the exercise will be the occasion to—begin to—develop extremely powerful methods of demonstration

Note that a distinction is made here between demonstration and proof. In proof, a conclusion is shown to follow from premises. A demonstration requires no premise. An example is the ‘demonstration’ of tautologies—assertions that are true in virtue of their meaning, e.g., ‘2=2.’ Tautology, even ‘2=2’ may have premises regarding the existence and nature of meaning but these are not premises of simple fact. Is the demonstration of any non-tautological assertion possible? The answer is affirmative and—extremely significant—examples will be given and some general principles of demonstration established. Note that although possibility of such demonstration has affinity Kant’s assertion that there are synthetic a priori propositions, the kinds of truth here demonstrated are of a different kind than the propositions claimed to be synthetic a priori

Begin to show the relation of—the concept and universe of—being to the nature and necessity of human and other living presence in the world

To set up some preliminary concepts and conventions for the development of the theory of being and metaphysics of immanence

Origin of and reasons for the interest in Being

If two entities, processes, scenes, contexts are similar then knowledge of one is, at least to some extent and in effect, knowledge of the other

Thus similarity enhances the efficiency of knowing and understanding. Formal identity has a similar outcome. When the contexts are practical the efficiency is a practical one. In fact the practical reason may be the underlying reason, for example an evolutionary reason, that human beings seek understanding, and thrill to the introduction of simplicity and efficiency in knowledge

What if the entire universe—all being—could be ‘reduced’ to something simple? This suggests itself as the source of essence or substance theory. The ideal case of substance theory from this perspective would be that of a single uniform and unchanging substrate that deterministically manifests as the world. The original notion of substance was perhaps that of ‘stuff;’ an early example, perhaps the first in Western philosophy, was Thales’ idea that the world is made of water. However a substance could process or relationship or, if we hesitate to say the world is as it appears, facts, ideas, or concepts could be regarded as substance

However, we prefer to not posit substance theory at the outset of investigation; reasons were given above—this approach is open to the real, i.e., to whether there is substance and if not then to what approach if any might address the goals of substance theory and if substance theory may obtain then in what form it may obtain

It will be seen below that substance of any kind, whether single or dual or many, is untenable except in the case that every entity at every instant is its own substance which is of course no explicit simplification and no true substance theory. It may be—and is—true, however, that there may be contexts in which substance may provide excellent practical understanding and power. An example, of course, is the domain of application of modern theoretical physics

What might be an alternative? While there is a strong tradition of substance theory there is also a history of opposition to substance. In modern times William Blake decried substance from a spiritual-romantic standpoint. Hume’s arguments were essentially anti-substance. As noted above Heidegger argued against substance—his actual arguments are one third of a repudiation since he did not exclude determinism which is an essential twin of substance theory, and though his insight into being may have been deep it did not go so far as to see the logic of a full theory of being as in the metaphysics of immanence. For this reason what has been called the fundamental problem of metaphysics remained refractory to Heidegger (as it does to the entire traditions of philosophy, east and west, until this ‘moment’)

Blake’s arguments decried the reduction of the world to mechanistic terms, the explanation of the world in terms of something else which in Blake’s vision diminished the world. Hume’s argument was logical; our reductions are based on limited observation and their practical utility—so far—is no guarantee of their logical—eternal—validity. Aristotle spoke of a science of being-as-being rather than, in effect, as a theory of things in terms of something else

Perhaps, then, instead of substance as standing behind the manifest world, we can see the world as the world, being-as-being. This perhaps a thought behind Wittgenstein’s well known attraction to ‘the world as I found it.’ That thought amounts to no theory or, more specifically, to no a priori theory or commitment. The thought involves no reduction and is not subject, therefore, to Blake’s aesthetic-spiritual critique. And it is not subject to the logical-reductionist critique

The thought to focus on the world and to engagement with or in the world, perhaps to adventure, is a thought that is neutral to substance theory

These thoughts are not at all an argument that the study of the world-as-the-world will introduce any positive understanding, any simplification, or any positive power of knowledge. All that has been said so far is that ‘world-as-world’ is not subject to the reductionist critique of substance (which includes the aesthetic critique as well as the logical critique of the untenability of substance.) At least, however, since ‘world-as-world’ says essentially nothing, it allows the possibility that some insight, some simplification, some power may emerge (it also allows for substance except, however, that substance is untenable)

On account of the trivial, even shallow character of ‘world-as-world’ it might be unreasonable to expect insight, simplification and power. However, as it turns out, it is precisely this shallowness, this trivial character, along with ‘necessary experience,’ diligence, and the ruthless eradication of all vestiges of substance and its correlates, that allows the emergence of a profound and powerful understanding of the world

The idea of Being is what exists, what is there. In talking of Being (-as-being,) there is no commitment. In talking of Being, we are talking of world-as-world. Provided that existence is understood properly, in talking of Being-as-existence, we are talking of world-as-world

This is then the origin of the thought to develop a theory of being. The problem of Being, then, is to develop the idea of Being so as to be true to the sentiment of the previous paragraphs—to avoid substance, to develop a theory of or around being that will provide the understanding to which allusion has been made. The phrase ‘to seek to develop a theory…’ might have been used instead of ‘to develop a theory…’ This was in fact the hope at the outset of study. However, now that the theory has been developed it is no longer to seek the theory itself. It remains true, of course, that there is a seeking—to further insight and use and to extend the journey into the realm of transformation

From the discussion it should be clear that ‘Being’ is at outset regarded as unknown as is existence and, therefore, introduction of the idea of Being is not an a priori commitment except of course to openness and journey

The problem of substance or essence—introduction

The problem of substance is an aspect of the problem of the nature of being

The approach of being uncommitted to essence at outset may be applied to itself and essence allowed a limited role

Though sometimes worse, a shaky bridge is sometimes better than none

The commitment to essence, even if in error, may be a valuable form of experimentation

If these thoughts have validity, what is the error in a foundation in an erroneous position? It is that in a contingent context, the function of a sentence or story is not always its literal content—but in the ultimate ‘context,’ the literal and the non-literal coincide

It is not the point to not have prejudice—which is unavoidable—but to recognize and overcome it

On substance theory

Substance theory is a strong thread in Western and Eastern philosophy

In one strong thread of Western and Eastern philosophy, metaphysics has been founded or based in an initial commitment to an ontology, e.g., to simple and enduring kinds of which the world—its variety and change—is ‘made.’ One such kind is substance which, in its simplest form, is uniform and unchanging. Some other kinds are, essence, process, relation, fact, property, and sense data. Note that there are kinds of kinds—substance, essence and process are entity-like; sense data are knowledge—like; and knowing and being intersect in the fact. In all cases the problems of the nature of entities (and relation and process,) knowledge, and their relations must be addressed even though it may seem that positing facts as fundamental cuts through the problem of the knowledge-world relation

Levels of commitment to ontology—that there is an ontology and that there is some specific ontology

There are two levels of commitment to ontology. At the general level there may be commitment to the idea of ontology—the idea that there is some kind that is the constitution of the world. There is also the possibility of a commitment to a specific kind (monism) or kinds (dualism.) A monism specifies that there is a kind but does not specify the kind itself is ‘neutral.’ Within the levels, various modes and degrees of commitment are possible

Metaphysics often begins by positing an ontology

Metaphysics is often presented as though it is based in a posited ontology even though the ontology may have been the result of reflection

There is an immense advantage to not making an initial ontological commitment

In the development of a metaphysics there is, as will become manifest, an immense advantage in not making any initial commitment to ontology

Absence of initial or a priori commitment does not rule out a posteriori commitment

Note that absence of initial commitment does not rule out kinds. The commitment is that the question of kinds and of specific kind will not be a premise but may be a conclusion of investigation. In the ensuing developments, the question of ontology itself—over and above the choice of ontological kinds—is recognized and treated as a fundamental and explicit problem

The appeal of substance

There is an immense appeal to the idea of substance. The promise of substance is that the variety and the changes in the world have foundation and explanation that is ultimate in simplicity—in terms of something that is uniform and unchanging. The present approach does not reject that promise at outset and, if it is true, can only strengthen it

The role of substance in understanding and explanation

Substance is often thought to stand behind manifestation, appearance and change, In Western Philosophy, there is a tradition of explanation in terms of substance—and, more generally, in terms of kinds. An appeal of this kind of explanation is its attempt to see variety and change in terms of simple and enduring substances—perhaps even one uniform and unchanging substance. There is another tradition that is critical of depth philosophy—of the thought that the nature of things is behind rather than inherent in them, deep rather than superficial. It is not at all clear—though it is often taken as given—that these two strains of thought stand in opposition. An approach from being allows both and it will be seen in the metaphysics of immanence that all things can be equivalently considered to be their own substance and to derive from something that can be regarded as to be prior to substance—the void that is conceptually even simpler than substance and may be regarded as substance but only improperly and whose nature and role in the development will not be posited but will emerge as the result of investigation. It will be seen that these two interpretations—things as their own substance and things as having no substance—can be held simultaneously and that neither is a true ontology of kind; rather, the resulting ontology is one that requires no ultimate kind whatsoever—it does however permit local kinds, as in science, as practical modes of explanation. These observations barely hint at the nature and power of the metaphysics that is established in chapters Being and Metaphysics and whose elaboration and application begins in these two chapters and culminates in the remaining narrative

Being as existence

Being is introduced as existence—the quality of being is that of existence; the mark of a being will be that it exists—that it has existence in its entirety

The early introduction of being, of being as existence—as well as the introduction of experience, universe, void—does not violate the intent to not commit to ontology

This early introduction of being and its nature may seem to contradict the intent to not make any initial commitment to an ontology. However, as conceived here, existence—and therefore being—will be seen to be sufficiently non-specific that no actual commitment is entailed

It is effective to introduce being and existence at outset

Additionally, although it is effective to introduce being and existence as pivotal at the outset of the narrative, there is and need be no original commitment to being or to its nature

Commitment to some traditional special connotations of and distinctions regarding being is avoided at outset—for what may appear to be a distinction before investigation may turn out to be vacuous

In the tradition, being has been seen as referring to being-in-itself rather than being perceived, as referring to deity… In the narrative, however, it will be seen that there is no special being or individual that is enduring in itself and that being and seeing—relationship or relating—are duals. This (again) shows the futility of preconception, e.g., of being as being-in-itself. Being has occasionally been seen as a special concept—as referring to deity… Here, being is not seen as special at the outset of study. Therefore, the traditional treatments must, in some sense, lie within the boundary defined by the present conception and may be useful to the present development. Investigation of the relation between the metaphysics developed here and traditional metaphysics (plural) is an occasion for application and elaboration of the present metaphysics and clarification—and correction—of the traditions

Approach to study: identify and address a coherent and complete set of problems regarding being and existence

The problem of the nature of Being

Being as existence—and the problem of this apparently ad hoc introduction

The problem of substance or essence—introduction

The problem of existence and its meaning—an introduction

The problem of the nature being and existence is a problem of meaning. However, it must be understood that linguistic meaning is not merely analytic but also empirical

The problem of the non-existent object

The first existential problem of being. Does anything exist?

Experience and its nature

(What does it mean to ask whether something exists? This should already be in the meaning of being)

The second existential problem of being. What exists, i.e., what things exist?

The forms of experience

The problem of the nature of Being

It is intended that being shall be the founding concept of the metaphysics of immanence. If matter—or mind and so on—is fundamental then matter is being. However it is not given that matter is fundamental. Matter is an example of substance—and it is not given that substance is fundamental

Although there is a problem of the nature of being, this first discussion will not do full justice to the problem or any resolution. It is perhaps impossible to set it all out in the beginning. In any case, it is most efficient to allude to the problem at outset and to let its definition—that of the problem—become clearer as the resolution of the problem and its application and elaboration emerge… and this process will not be that of a point by point conceptual analysis of the different concepts but will involve the elaboration of an articulated-system-in-process

What is fundamental is not given in advance of investigation—this is pivotal to the approach. Thus ‘being’ is a variable—the unknown as in algebra. This cuts out so much vacuous argument, so much commitment to limited positions. This is one of the sources of power of the idea of being—others being tradition and what is put into the concept through reflection, building up ideas and system, criticizing, breaking system, reflection, reconstruction…

The materialist, idealist, essentialist, determinist, anti-determinist… have no logical argument against this approach—they might argue that it is a waste of effort but they cannot argue that it is illogical—for if their position is correct it should fall out of analysis which would found the position rather having it be ad hoc or contingent upon limited experience

An essence of the position of the substance theorist—the materialist and so on—will be seen to be that ‘the world is as I experience it’ where ‘experience’ is not only immediate experience but also what ‘I learned from science and all the accumulated knowledge of the world.’ It is, of course, essential to this view that matter is something specific even if remote as in, for example, modern physical theory; without such specificity, commitment to matter is no commitment at all and materialism is an empty ontology. What is so limited about this position? Has not the materialist, after all, incorporated the entire world and knowledge of the world in his or her position? The limit is this. Experience, at least in this way of looking at it, goes to the edge of my world but is not known to go the edge of the world. Science is not known to extend to the edge of the universe, to the boundary of being. We create an illusion of experience and of science extending to the edge by using the phrase ‘the universe’ rather than the proper phrases ‘the known universe.’ It is, perhaps, a natural illusion born of what is perhaps a natural tendency to conflate ‘my world’ or ‘our world view’ with the world. Perhaps the world revealed in science—the inflationary big-bang cosmology of the local cosmos as one of many bubble-cosmological systems—is the world; this world is, after all, so much more vast than the world revealed by science of a hundred and fifty years ago which is so much more vast—we may think—than the worlds of ancient philosophy and primitive mythology

Being as existence—and the problem of this apparently ad hoc introduction

As discussed and as will be seen, this is not ad hoc. Being was not introduced at the outset of investigation but in the process after much experiment, reflection, reading and analysis. These experiments in ideas… will become apparent in the narrative. In presenting the ideas, however, it is convenient to introduce at the beginning what was found in process and to then justify what has been introduced. The advantage to exposition is that the reader is afforded a handle, a grasp on what is being discussed and is not required to retread the unsure process from indefinite to definite ideas. In fact, given that Being is initially treated as a variable, he or she is afforded at most a convenient name and is not asked to assume what is to be demonstrated. The process is analogous to naming the unknown in algebra. By introducing the symbol ‘x’ there is no assumption that the unknown in known; however, use of the symbol affords immense power over the struggle with the intuition of an unknown quantity

Note, though, that the introduction of being as existence is in the process of analysis and not at its end. After the justification of its introduction, the position is used to found the powerful developments and methods that follow, the elaboration of a world view in the union—as will be seen—of empirical, analytic and constructive method… and this gives further confirmation to existence as a logical fulcrum and at the center of the foundation of the metaphysics of immanence of ultimate depth and breadth—in the sense that it must contain all other metaphysics consistent with logic and experience—depth—and must contain all being—breadth

Being is introduced as existence. While this is suggested by tradition and meaning—the meaning of ‘to be’ is close to that of ‘to exist’—this is not at all enough to establish the primacy of this sense of being. The idea of being as existence as foundational is the result of a search in many directions, in the construction of many systems, in the adoption and refinement of many ideas. At the end—this point—of the analysis there results one set of ideas: a system centered on the idea of being. What follows is a systematic version, made possible in retrospect, of a trial and error development

Introducing being as existence requires the address of a variety of questions, first of which are the questions of whether the introduction—definition—is fundamental and not ad hoc and whether it is significant. Both questions will be answered affirmatively but the full answer lies in the developments that follow and not in imported meaning. Additional concerns include the variety of uses of being from the tradition and their significance and the claims of mind and matter to be fundamental substances. These concerns are addressed in the development

Being is that which exists. A being exists or has existence in its entirety. Existence is not exclusive—not an attribute—and this may seem to show up being as trivial but is in fact its power, e.g., over materialism or idealism and over substance and determinism

The problem of existence and its meaning—an introduction

Discussion of existence and the verb to be, e.g., ‘is;’ discussion of local and global meanings of verb to be and so of existence. Although being as existence may appear to be a trivial characterization (1) in that, apparently, ‘everything exists’ and (2) nothing is proved, e.g. what appears to be proved is the tautology ‘being is,’ it will turn out that being / existence yields ultimate depth and existence—the fact and the existence of the object categories and their completeness—can and will be proved beginning in this chapter, with an essential complement in Metaphysics, and refinements in subsequent chapters of Theory of being

The allegation that ‘existence’ is trivial, that it is not a concept

In the allegation, the argument is that since everything exists, existence and therefore being are trivial in content, perhaps not even concepts

There is a philosophical tradition in the analysis of being and existence in which the concepts have been argued, on the one hand, to be pivotal to metaphysics and, on the other hand, to be trivial and even paradoxical. The present development must respond to these charges of triviality and paradox—and doing so will be occasion for refinement of ideas and development of tools of analysis and demonstration (see the earlier comments on demonstration)

The present narrative will respond to the charges that being and existence are vacuous concepts

The allegation is true—existence is profoundly trivial… but this is the source of its depth—‘everything’ has being and, therefore, being makes no mistaken distinction as may matter

‘Is’ is simultaneously trivial and profound

In the immediacy of what exists, being makes no distinction between immediate and remote

The power of the concept of being depends, not only on what it allows, but what is put into it—by way of recognition of its empirical character, by way of analysis of its meaning… and what is excluded by way of over-specification, premature specification and in demanding that it conform to preconception instead of the conditions that it should satisfy emerging, along with the concept itself, as part of the analysis

Regarding the allegation that it is not a concept, note the two meanings of concept (1) mental content, (2) the significant concept defined in terms, e.g., of genera and difference—being is the intensional idea that recognizes no difference and universe is the corresponding extensional idea

The problem of the non-existent object

The problem of the non-existent object—requires analysis of the meaning of ‘existence’ and, simultaneously, the meaning or concept of the ‘concept’

The simultaneous analysis of the meaning of some particular term and the meaning of ‘meaning’ is extremely useful and powerful. Acknowledgements of the importance of meaning and general analyses of meaning about but are often forgotten in the immediacy of analyzing meanings of particular terms and in such cases, the analysis of meaning remains theoretical. The simultaneous or dual, two-level analysis is powerful and practical—the analysis of the particular term benefits from the general reflections on meaning and the general reflections may be refined and errors cleaned up. In the absence of the two-level dual analysis the individual analyses tend to be static, dusty and error prone—achieving clarity and applicability of meaning is a process. As will be seen the simultaneous analysis of meanings at the practical level—reference to the world rather than reference to reference—is also powerful; since the world is a whole, it is reasonable to expect that the language used to describe the world will not be made up of terms whose meanings are altogether independent. Additionally, even if the world were static, since discovery is a process, it is to be expected that not all meanings will be timeless

The first existential problem of being—whether anything exists

Does anything exist? Experience as a first and important example

Although the problem appears to be trivial—we do not practically doubt existence, its resolution is one of the threads in the development of a powerful metaphysics and powerful tools of demonstration—of empirically founded analysis

Such foundation, attained at minimal cost, is simultaneously fluid and solid—unlike, as will be seen, the materialist foundation that appears to be rock solid but in its lack of fluidity has no adjustment of concept to world

Experience

Detour on an alternate presentation that begins with experience

In an alternate presentation, experience could be introduced at outset as—something like—our most immediate connection to the world

This might be a more direct approach to the study of being and it might be more instructive. However, it might suggest that being depends on experiencing. The latter is not the case for there is no dependence relationship; the relation is closer to that of identity

How would the discussion of experience go?

‘Experience’ has a number of meanings—is a number of symbols—and, so, as below, the first topic would be The present connotation of experience

In experiencing there is being. This is given at outset. How? Objections come fast. Experience of an object does not imply existence of the object! But that is not what is said. All that is said is that experience itself exists. Experience is the flimsiest of things; it cannot exist! There is no proof of the existence of experience—nor is proof necessary; experience is the name for the most immediate aspect my life. This reformulation at once ‘demonstrates’ the existence of experience, shows that it is only on other accounts that it is regarded as flimsy, and sweeps away all arguments that there is no experience

Is standalone experience possible? The suggestion is that experience lies only at the surface of being and that in standing alone it is only that which is superficial exists without material support. In thinking of standalone experience, therefore, there is already commitment to ontology—experience is of such and such character and that it requires support. If we start without commitment to ontology, with the idea that any ontology will emerge, then the idea that standalone experience is possible says nothing about the character of being or that it is or is not material in nature (to say that it is / is not material seems to suggest something but it does not unless the nature of the material is also explicit.) Experience entails distinction and relationship; experience is the inner aspect of relationship

If, now, a consistent metaphysics is developed it is seen that experience may extend to the root and is one face of being—another being the external / material aspect

With memory and symbol, experience and concept become identical. Original experience is a case of concept

What do we learn already? Through the example of experience we learn about being and about method. We learn that the study of being and the method of study arise together; are inseparable. We learn that the immediacy of our being lies above the conventional remoteness of science in the primacy of being. We learn that meaning is crucial. We learn that meanings are in flux. We learn that systems of ideas stand together and provide a greater completeness of meaning in their mutuality and extension to the root

The present connotation of experience

The present connotation of experience is that of direct experience. When I see an object, the content of my immediate apprehension of it is experience. Experience is a joint product of perceiver and perceiver but it lies in the perceiver. If, as is the typical and unreflective case, experience is regarded as characterizing the object, experience can be correct (or mistaken.) In itself, experience, does not have the quality of correctness. It is not said of primary and original experience-in-itself that it is correct or that it is mistaken but, rather, that it is. In the object, shape, size, color, quality stand as equals; it is perhaps characteristic of experience that, in it, quality is primary

A remark will be made only when using a connotation of experience other than the one immediately above. Mention and use this practice as a general one

Somewhere, the following concern is to be addressed. Is a world of pure experience possible? Must not experience be a kind of relation? Is not difference required? Then, is not the idealist-solipsist puzzle defused by noting that it is only on some given—but perhaps tacit and dualist—ontology that it is a puzzle at all. Is not the puzzle dissolved in metaphysics of immanence in which there is no a priori (external) ontology at all

Enter a note on the ‘subject’

Why experience?

I see an apple. A primary question of the correctness of the perception is ‘is the apple there…’ or ‘does my experience of the apple guarantee the existence of the apple?’ The answer is that it normally does

However, from the fact of hallucination and illusion, the perception does not guarantee the—existence or characteristics of the—percept. The issue of distortion of perception has significance, e.g., in science but is not the primary concern here

Analysis introduces a further and fundamental doubt. The experience is not the apple and, so, it is reasonable even though not certain that something is there, how can I know that the apple-as-I-see-it is there—either as I see it or even at all?

The first interest in experience is that while its objects may be questioned, experience itself is given and is, therefore, in itself, a first and certain example of being—of something that exists

Concerns such as the issue of whether anything exists at all and the relation between the character of experience and the character of the object may have no great and immediate practical interest (except, e.g., as in science and measurement.) However, the importance of such issues is profound in a number of ways. There is a conceptual or philosophical interest in that the concern arises at the beginning of the analysis of being, i.e. at the beginning of metaphysics, and without a proper response metaphysics is doomed to having no connection to the world. Such concerns have been an Achilles Heel for metaphysics throughout its history and, in this narrative, their address leads to a real and—ultimately—metaphysics. The practical and human interest of such ‘theoretical’ issues is that their implication—the metaphysic, its elaboration and application in the remainder of the narrative—is of profound immediate and ultimate interest

Characterization

Experience and concept

Significance

It is in experience that there is significance to being and transformation and significant knowledge; later this sense of experience will be extended, without loss of the experiential aspect of experience, to all knowledge and even being—the reader is asked to hold doubt regarding fact and meaning in abeyance till the conclusion of this division, Theory of Being—especially knowledge that is not—normally—encountered in experience or as conscious

Identity of being and knowing will be seen to lie consistently—and necessarily—in the sense of experience. This sense will be an extension of the sense of ‘experience’ to the root of being

Determine placement of the following—To deny being is to misunderstand experience and existence

Its given or necessarily empirical character

The necessarily empirical character refers to the fact but not the object of experience. I.e., the given character is and therefore necessarily entails existence or being—the being of experience—but not that of the external world, of external objects

Necessary and contingent objects

One exception to the absence of necessary entailment of the necessary entailment of the object regards experience itself. I.e., experience is a necessary object

A necessary object is one whose existence follows from experience

Are there necessary objects other than experience itself? The ‘necessary forms of experience,’ below, will be shown to entail the existence of corresponding necessary objects

A contingent or conventionally empirical object is one whose existence requires evidence or argument beyond the experience of an object. It will be seen in Metaphysics that the distinction between necessary and contingent objects breaks down. This breakdown occurs regarding the conceptual distinction, i.e., relative to all being; a practical distinction—relative to a context or locale—will remain

The common objects of our world are contingent objects

The second existential problem of being—what exists

…or, what concepts are faithful to some object?

Requires elaborating the analysis of the meaning of ‘to exist’

What exists, or, what concepts have objects faithfully? Experience and the other necessary objects—the existence of these objects can be established immediately; the necessary objects and the necessary limits of experience… practical objects and Kantian and post-Kantian resolutions—the existence of the practical objects including that of the external world, the categories of the world including that of object, space, time, causation is not immediate and begins and is significantly completed in Metaphysics and has a contingent and probabilistic aspect as well as—surprisingly—a necessary aspect… critique of knowledge as knowing and subsumption of the general case of the concept under the practical object… the empirical character of the developments and, next, of meaning

Contemplation of what things exist may begin with a discussion of the forms of experience

The forms of experience

Characterization

The patterns of experience—spatio-temporal and other—are its forms

General significance

The patterns of experience are the first place of meaning (as significance.) It is not necessary to go beyond the forms or patterns of experience to find meaning

Significance for being

The forms of being can be derived from the forms of experience

The necessary forms experience and being

Some forms of experience entail the existence of a corresponding object. Such forms of experience are necessary forms of experience and the corresponding objects, external or identical to the experience or external to it, are necessary forms of being. A necessary object was conceived one whose existence is entailed by experience. The necessary forms of being are necessary objects; i.e., the necessary forms of experience entail necessary objects. A first example of a necessary object has been seen to be Being—since experience is a case of being. Further examples of necessary forms are all experience, experience of difference and duration, and experience of parts. The corresponding necessary objects are universe, space and time, and domain. It should be noted that the objecthood of space and time does not at all entail the objecthood of space and time as characterized by the space and time of our cosmological system

The necessary objects follow of necessity, without further argument, from the forms of experience. Demonstration is founded in necessary empirical fact—which employs analysis of meaning—and derived rationally. Such objects are known indirectly—without the objects, the necessary forms of experience could not exist. Such indirect knowledge is necessary because of the logical foundation from necessary fact. Such kinds of argument have also been labeled ‘transcendental.’ It is remarkable that knowledge from indirect or transcendental argument may be clearer and more certain than direct knowledge, e.g., perception and overlaid conception. Examples of the necessary objects are: experience—being, all being—the universe, difference and duration, domain, absence of being—the void

It has not been shown that the necessary objects are external objects or that there is an external world. This demonstration will be undertaken in Metaphysics. The value of such demonstration is not showing ‘what we already know’ but in the consequences and implications as, e.g., elaborated in the narrative

…

Here, the universe is defined as all being. Talk of parallel universes, of our cosmos as the universe, of bubble universes… invokes another meaning of ‘universe.’ Although the point is near trivial, it will be seen to be crucial in its consequences. In this essay, ‘universe’ shall mean all being

It follows that the universe must contain not only all things but, also, all objects, all creation and creators, all form, all pattern, all law

From universe and domain, it follows that the complement of domain is a necessary object

Conceiving the void as the complement of the universe relative to itself, it follows that the void is a necessary object

It follows of necessity that the void contains no things, no objects, no creation or creators, no form or pattern or law

…

Even when the word universe is formally treated as all being—all that there was, is or will be—the intuition may continue to function differently. The idea that the universe has a creator is a logical commitment to there being something outside the universe. In the meaning of universe of this essay the universe includes creators and creations. Whether there is god depends on the meaning ‘god;’ however, regardless of the meaning, all gods lie within the universe. If it is paradoxical for the universe to have created itself from an absence of being, then it is also paradoxical for any god to have created it

What is the meaning—in the sense of significance rather than of linguistic meaning—of our being? Surely, in this sense, the meaning of being does not—cannot—lie outside being. However, the loss of meaning experienced in the nineteenth through twenty-first centuries is the result of an attribution of meaning to something else. The thought parallels the idea that there is something outside all being, outside the universe

The—significant—meaning of being must lie in being itself. Celebration is not the celebration of something else; celebration is the recognition of intrinsic meaning. In the narrative an understanding of intrinsic meaning will emerge

The universe contains all significant meaning. Literally, the void contains no significant meaning. Metaphorically, however, it will emerge that significant meaning may be assigned to the void

The contingent or practical forms of experience and being

The establishment of these objects or forms of being requires further argument. The probability of their——objecthood immense, the difference from certainty infinitesimal; however their external being is not necessary

The treatment of these forms and objects must be deferred until the main theses of the metaphysics of immanence has been established in the chapter Metaphysics

They may be necessary on certain conditions, e.g., given the physical structure of this world

Review the following examples—the self and the external world, the common objects, identity, the intuition: sense through concept, this cosmos, the human condition, inference, category, and judgment

Identity and external world are contingent forms relative to particular cases but necessary to the universe

Should the following be done here? Raise the question of the distinction between the contingent and the necessary and whether it is contingent upon restriction to the known universe. Observe that it may turn out that all consistent concepts may have objects in some worlds and that this would eliminate the distinction—with profound consequences. Briefly note that this will be established in Metaphysics

On meaning

In the sense of linguistic meaning, ‘meaning’ is a crucial element in many of the analyses of the narrative. In fact, in recent thought ‘analysis’ and ‘meaning’ are closely connected

There is a formal discussion of meaning in Logic and meaning. However, because attention to meaning has been and remains crucial to the developments, a preliminary discussion of meaning may be critical to understanding

When a sign—a word, a phrase and so on—is experienced as a linguistic element it is a symbol, i.e., has meaning which may be regarded as sense, the concept, and reference or object. The bare sign is not a linguistic element and has and can have no meaning. One sign can correspond to more than one—to many—symbols or meanings. The meanings may be related, i.e. come in groups or families and shadings. There may also be entirely distinct families corresponding to one sign

It should be noted that while attention to meaning is critical, such attention cannot be the mere analysis of meaning in terms of meaning for there must come a point where meaning comes face to face with the empirical. Analysis and synthesis cannot be ever discrete. Therefore, when it may seem that analysis of meaning has resulted in positive conclusions about the world, those conclusions are empirical or, rather, contain elements of the empirical

The concepts of the concept—the ‘concept’ is a concept—and its object are instrumental to the discussion of meaning

Modern education may have left the reader with the impression that lexical or dictionary meaning is all there is to linguistic meaning. Despite their uses, dictionaries have essential limitations as defining meaning

The system of meaning in a dictionary is ultimately circular; the stability and change of meaning lies in use—in life—and the function of the dictionary is to attempt to capture this system. A dictionary is an experiment

The best dictionaries show some of the limitations. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary shows not only current uses of words but also their historical uses. From the history of use, it becomes clear that the ‘meanings’ of words change over time. Why is that? It is because environments of meaning—contexts—change: sometimes there is growth, sometimes narrowing, and sometimes ‘lateral’ shift. Occasionally the growth or shift is so significant that the new meaning could not be contained in the old. Further, in the transition to the environment, it is use that defines new meaning—language must have degrees of adaptation. A good dictionary is, therefore, an ongoing project and while it will, of course, be exquisite in its capture of current use, it will also show its limits

A dictionary may show the multiple families corresponding to each sign, e.g., word. Since we are in a process of discovery and learning, words come and go, new words are added, some words and forms dropped, and words that are retained may undergo transformation in meaning

It might seem that final meaning may never be achieved. That would likely be true if an ultimate understanding of the world could never be achieved at all—even at the coarsest level of description. However, we do not know that ultimate understanding cannot be achieved. The traditional wisdom that it cannot is based in the apparent fact that it has not. However, it is invalid to conclude a necessity from what is contingent (this was the basis of Hume’s critique of any logical foundation of science.) Additionally, as has been remarked and as will be seen, an ultimate metaphysics is possible—not only will this be demonstrated but various objections, e.g. the Humean, will be raised and countered

Meaning and metaphysics are not independent

Another aspect of meaning is that it is not contained in words alone. The meaning of ‘apple’ derives from the meaning of ‘fruit’ which derives from ‘plant.’ Meaning forms a web and total meaning lies in the total system. This is seen very clearly in science, whose power derives partly though significantly from treating the elements of systems as interrelated / interacting in space and—when dynamic—over time and whose theories are, therefore, interactive webs of concepts whose significance become full only in the system as whole

Another aspect of system meaning lies in grammar. Consider the sentence ‘The boy kicked the ball.’ In another language the order of words might be different, e.g., ‘Boy ball hit’ which, though it sounds awkward in English, is grammatical and this shows that grammar may have arbitrary conventions as far as meaning is concerned—note, of course, that the ‘arbitrary’ conventions may be determined by cultural factors according to whether a particular society is action oriented and so on. However, beyond the differences, the forms have common elements and these include action, subject—the agent of action, and the object of action. This structure of grammar reveals a structure of the world—which is of course marked by a degree of relativism for in a culture that was less focused on instrumental concerns, the distinction between subject and object might be muted and the language of things and actions might have some degree of fusion. The subject-predicate form should not be regarded as universally representing the form of the world. It should be noted that in this paragraph, ‘subject’ and ‘object’ have meanings that are local to the immediate discussion and do not pertain to the remainder of the narrative

It is thus seen that, while there may be arbitrariness to its rules, grammar is not merely about the arrangements of sentences. Just as individual words may refer to things in the world, so grammatical forms may have reference to, may depict, things or states of being—including process… and the meaning of a word is not necessarily independent of a sentence in which it is found. It would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for a dictionary to make explicit the perhaps infinite range of possibilities

In a stable context, meanings have a degree of stability and the idea of absolute atomism or independence of meaning is not debilitating; use carries on happily without excess regard for theories of use. In attempting to understand all being, the situation is different. In the stable context, it is use and its adaptations that may be stabilizing. In the universal or otherwise new context, adaptation is not given but is sought. Here it is crucial to recognize that existing meanings may be inadequate, that meanings are experimental and interconnected, and that, while new terms may be introduced, it is natural to use old terms in extended senses of meaning—which may be a source of confusion

That there can be stability of meaning in the universal and that this meaning has empirical ground and immediate application is one of the foci of this narrative

The idea of concept and object is critical to meaning. When it is recognized that the concept and object are distinct and that the concept is rarely fully faithful—in any sense—to the object, the following ideas are seen as natural: the idea that meaning should be in flux when environments or contexts are changing, either laterally or in time, that, since the world has interconnection, meaning should lie in system

The German nineteenth century logician, Gottlob Frege, suggested that meaning lies in sense and in reference. Clearly, sense is related to concept or experience and reference to object. This brief reference to the structure of meaning is taken up further in Logic and meaning

It is important for the reader to be aware that the discussion of meaning is very pertinent to an understanding of the present narrative. First, it is necessary to be aware that while the words used are often common words or words that have established technical uses, the meanings here may be shifted, expanded or otherwise altered. It is therefore necessary to give attention to the sense of the terms as used here. Of course, other meanings may be a source of insight and suggestion and an awareness of the variety of meanings that have been attached to a term may be useful in various ways. Second, it is important to recognize that the terms of the narrative constitute a system and that this system is necessary to the development, elaboration and application of the Metaphysics. The system has been experimental and thus it is not necessary to tie down every meaning but as the system matures further, the degree of specificity of the general terms may increase

The discussion of being is largely a discussion of meaning… however it should be remembered that meaning has concept and an object or empirical side

Discussion of meaning is not non-empirical; this follows if meaning—sense—has structure to which the object must have conformation if there is to be reference

Being—that which exists. In this generic use, the grammatical form of ‘being’ is similar to that of ‘matter.’ The grammatical form in which something may be said to be of being is the same as the form in which something may be said to be of matter

A being is an entity that exists or has existence in its entirety. Two aspects of this idea require explanation. The first, ‘has existence’ suggests that existence is a property but not that in having the property some class of entities, those that do not possess the property, are excluded—for all entities possess the ‘property.’ The second, ‘in its entirety’ is made clear from the conceptual side of meaning—a concept that has only partial reference does not specify an entity even though the partial reference, if isolated, would do so. This apparently trivial point will have profound consequences in the study of meaning, grammar, objects and logic

If ‘X exists,’ means that, to X, there corresponds an object then ‘everything exists’ does not mean that to every concept there does or even can correspond an object for there can be no object that corresponds to an illogical concept

The following interesting question arises—does every consistent concept have a corresponding object? It would seem not but how would one prove this? Logical and analytical proof is ruled out by the nature of the case; empirical proof is ruled out by the fact that we do not know the end of the universe or its variety. Thus it must be admitted that it may be true that every consistent concept specifies an actual object even if that object is not found so far in the empirical universe. This question is of the deepest importance and will be taken up in Metaphysics where the conclusion will be surprising and of momentous consequence

The tradition of the meaning of Being

There is a rich variety of meaning of being in the traditions. Since clarity of meaning is important, should traditional meanings, meanings that could detract from precision, be rejected? The tradition of meaning will be retained for its richness and suggestive character. However, there must be care regarding its use. While a traditional meaning cannot have automatic use in the system that is developed, when the system encounters difficulty or an open area of investigation the tradition may be a source of insight