JOURNEY IN BEING
OUTLINE
Introduction… Method… An outline of Human World… Aims—all aims for Human world are currently at this level… Aims—functions of an understanding of the Human world in the narrative… General aims – intrinsic and utilitarian… The approach. What this should involve and entail. Some dimensions of study… Aims: details. 11… Co-development of ‘Theories of being and of human being’
The nature
of Human being…
Human freedoms… The
organism…
Psychology: introduction… Experience,
attitude and action?… Function.
Derivation from the character of organism and world (universe)… The intuition… Growth,
personality and commitments. Atman… Psychoanalysis,
determinism and the unconscious…
Introduce Dynamics… Growth,
personality and commitments. Atman… Love… Language…
Achievement and disorder… Interest
to this narrative of the nature of human being from ‘06… Organization
of the section from ‘06…
The organism. Microscopic and macroscopic
elements. Life and mind from ‘06… The nature of
Human being from ‘06…
Psychoanalysis, determinism and the unconscious from
‘06…
Function. Feeling. Integration of the ‘elements’ of
Mind. Icon and symbol: free and bound from ‘06… Experience,
attitude and action? From ‘06… Intuition. The
categories of intuition from ‘06… Growth,
personality and Commitments from ‘06… Atman. The end
of growth from ‘06…
Language from ‘06… Exceptional
achievement and disorder from ‘06
Institutions and culture… The institution of culture… Social groups… Morals… Economics… Politics… Action and politics from ‘06… Morals, economics and politics from ‘06… Law… Dynamics
Introduction from ‘06… Introduction. Aims primarily regarding the role of religion… Aims primarily regarding the nature of religion… The argument regarding abuse… The nomads… Attitude toward fundamentalism… Significance of faith. Faith and doubt from ‘06… Faith and secularism from ‘06… Meaning (literal and non-literal) and non-meaning functions of faith from ‘06… The nature of Faith. Its place in the modern world from ‘06… What are the possibilities for the concept of Religion? from ‘06… Limits to faith and secularism have sources in polarization from ‘06… Bridging. Resolution of the tensions is not given from ‘06
Human World
This division is a study of human being and the human world
Human world does not exclude animal world, the world of living being, the local cosmological system i.e. what may be regarded as the empirically known universe. The human is emphasized because that is, at least in the beginning, what we are and how we see
A focus on the human world does not imply that human being is seen only as distinct from our displaced from its context in the animal world and the local cosmological system. Certainly, the idea of superiority to other animals has no place in the narrative—the idea may be seen to have neither metaphysical nor moral meaning; not only is there no need for the idea—it stems from insecurity and ignorance—it severely diminishes human being and possibility
From ‘06
An alternative title to this division might contain the word ‘anthropology.’ The section might then be seen as focusing on ‘psychological and social anthropology.’ The method of the section favors the conceptual or philosophical rather than the historical and empirical. It may be recalled that concern with meaning and concepts includes the empirical at least indirectly for (1) meaning encodes experience and (2) the cumulated experience of the thinker or writer may inform and constrain reflection
…
This division of the narrative develops and elaborates a picture of Human being and the human world. As noted, the development contains both necessary and contingent aspects
Metaphysics provides some framework for viewing some traditional ways of seeing the human world – the individual and the institutions of society. There is an attempt to show how these institutions form a complete and dynamic picture. There are limits this picture. Consideration of whether an alternative, perhaps necessary, picture is possible remains open. The dynamics is primarily qualitative. Yet, as dynamics it goes beyond mere appreciation and proper enumeration of the institutions
Mind provides further framework. The chapter Mind focuses on the nature of mind and general concerns regarding mind—the nature of mind; mind, self and world; reflections on mind from experience and object as developed in Metaphysics of immanence, from reflections on metaphysics of substance, from relations between indeterminism and structure, from evolutionary genesis, from the necessary fact of novelty in human and animal life; and to study some general aspects of mind e.g. free will, consciousness and the unconscious, originality or creativity, and attributes
In this division, Human and animal mind are studied under Human being. Here the focus is on the general characteristics and the detailed character of this occurrence of mind, its grounding, its significance for Human World and the journey
The ‘method’ of—approach to—deriving necessary aspects of a special concern—i.e. special relative to metaphysics—is of general interest and as such deserves special mention. The first element of derivation of a necessary aspect is some necessary aspect of the Theory of being. The second element is a necessary fact regarding human being. An example concerns human freedom. Necessary facts include that the human world has origin and structure—mutual adaptation of organisms and environment. Beyond a certain level of structure, environment may provide occasion but organism must provide essential novelty. Classical determinism suggests that this is impossible and a common view holds that indeterminism does not permit structure to emerge. The indeterminism of Theory of being is necessary and necessarily permits structure to emerge. Experiments suggest that consciousness is not implicated in choice. This does not show that consciousness is never implicated—in non-routine endeavors neither conscious nor unconscious are original but are in interaction; in any case, there is no experimental demonstration that human being does not have freedom and, since, expression of freedom may occur over even a life time it is difficult to imagine a laboratory experiment that could demonstrate absence of freedom. While human freedom is necessary, the manifestation and variety of freedoms and the mix of freedom and binding (some binding is necessary) are seen to be contingent. Another necessity is as follows. That cognition and emotion are aspects of the human psyche appears to be an empirical observation. However, from the fact of an organismic (e.g. body) and an external realm (environment,) from the fact of binding and freedom of the psyche, a deduction may be given, not of the detailed structure of the psyche, but of a blueprint that templates cognition and emotion and their essential natures and interwoven character (at root the interwoven character is not of mere relatedness but of at least, in the healthy psyche, a near universal co-occurrence with cognition being e.g. the information and emotion the quality and force of the information)
Even when the derivations are not necessary, conclusions may occasionally follow with high degree of probability which may be argued or empirically shown; in some cases the conclusions may be tentative. There may be significant illumination and insight in consequence of the following. (1) Application of the Theory of being. Such application may include that some aspect framework of the theory is incorporated into the framework of the particular topic. (2) Continued meditation on the nature of Human being or some aspect thereof. Such aspects may be taken from the history of science and philosophy and the meditation may involve not only their factual character but their meaning and their possible place in relation to a family of such meditations that may concern Human being in particular or the general environment as reflected in the sciences and other elements of thought. (3) Interactive reflection on the foregoing and testing of resulting schemes for logical coherence (internal and external) and agreement with observation (past and ongoing)
These ‘methods’ are general and may be used in studying topics of Human World such as the Social world and its institutions, the topics of Theory of Being and subtopics such as the concept and theory of evolution and the nature of space and time. Elements of the approach were employed at an intuitive level in developing the Theory of being –especially the Metaphysics– itself except of course that during that development there was no prior necessary metaphysics
However, to insist that the method described is the one and only method or that it has here received its ultimate formulation would be a kind of substance thinking that is endemic to the dance of the academic world
This point is made explicit because, even though it has been shown that there is and can be no substance, it is all to easy to relapse into the habit of substance
It is significant that a consistent attempt has been made to avoid the study of the Human world in terms of substance. This includes avoidance of commitment at the outset to viewing the Human world in terms of fixed or received paradigms and theories. The attempt to eliminate the habit of substance thinking infuses the approach to study as well in which each topic is viewed in elementary terms, as far as possible necessary, to which necessary principles and facts are applied and which makes it possible to eliminate at least some ad hoc elements of the study (the details of which process are often eliminated from final presentation)
‘Human world’ contains the result of two interacting endeavors. The first is reflection on a comprehensive range of topics about human beings and their world. An important example is reflection on the ‘elements’ of human mind that include perception, thought and emotion in which it has been important to properly conceptualize these ‘functions’ and to ask whether there is some root element that elaborates as the higher functions. Another example is a reflection on evolution. The second endeavor is a two way interaction between the general system or metaphysics and the particular topics –and among the topics– from which both system and topic have gained immensely. As an example, consideration of human freedom –it is acknowledged that the issue is not without controversy– suggests that the human form must contain an element of indeterminism. This is one source of the idea that the universe must also be indeterministic. The latter idea was independently demonstrated in Metaphysics. In turn, the development of the Metaphysics provides a framework for understanding the Human world and enables a clearer view of the nature and necessity of human freedoms
The place of the Human World in the narrative is to provide some foundation for the journey, especially for Transformation. In this, it complements Theory of Being. While the theory illuminates the (way to the) ultimate, Human World illuminates the immediate and first steps
The level three headings in this section are for bookkeeping and may be eliminated in published versions
Human World is also presented as a contribution to thought in the areas of the study of psyche (psychology) and its nature, of the nature of intuition and the categories of intuition, to society and its institutions (in preliminary form,) to ethics, to ideals and to an understanding of faith and religion… and to the meaning and place of faith in a world where reason has limits
…
A natural organization is to first take up Human being and then the Social world and its institutions. There will also be concern with a dynamics based in principles
Human being is primarily the study of the human psyche i.e. of mind and its forms as they occur in human being. Psyche is important not only as an instrument but also because it the place where meaning (in the sense of significance and ability to appreciate) lies. The ‘nature’ of human being… The study of psyche starts with the observation that human being is capable of knowing that it has a place in being, that that place is neither ultimate nor merely accidental, that it is possible to conceive and aspire to ‘greater things,’ even to the ultimate things, that such aspirations are not completely lacking in any basis but, for given individuals and societies are not guaranteed. Human beings ‘know and know that they know.’ The study takes up the nature and necessity of normal and ultimate Human freedoms and limits. Significance (‘meaning of life’) is thought to lie at the process intersection of freedom and limit. Although psyche is primary, the Organism deserves and receives some attention for its potential usefulness in understanding psyche and in transformation. The study then takes up the following topics that are developed as far as possible in necessary and comprehensive terms that employ other studies –ad hoc or otherwise– for their suggestive character: the essential characteristic(s) of psyche; the functions; the intuition and its categories, and the unconscious; personality, growth and commitments; and language and the symbolic capability. The study attempts to display the normal characteristics –limits and abilities– of human being that are the initial framework of a journey…
In Social world, the ideas of society, culture and institution are developed from enumeration of the possible kinds of group interaction in light of the Metaphysics and the nature of Human being. The significance for the journey is that the group, the Social world is, in the elaboration of its nature, the object of interest – the object that undertakes a journey, and for the individual it is both ground and support
War and peace addresses a panorama of issues that is broader than the title might suggest. This is necessary since the variety of human concerns interact in essential ways. Thus, War and peace is the beginning of a meditation on ‘Our world.’ It is also a meditation that suggest that ethics is not separable from instances, that isolate examples are not effective illustrations of ethical principle, and that an ethics that regards its principles as immune to metaphysical (possibility,) economic (feasibility,) and political (process,) concerns is likely to be an impotent ethics
The idea of civilization may be derived from an awareness of history. In Civilization and history, the first concept of civilization adopted rejects views of the human world as apart from and other than the animal world… The concept adopted is that of a connected view of the human world that is inseparable from and not apart from or above or below the stream of being and of human ‘greatness’ as use of human ability in the broadest experience of the stream. The Theory of being makes it possible to reasonably contemplate a generalized Civilization as an interconnected matrix over all being whose origin for every civilization (not only on earth) may lie in seeking or in being found
The idea for the concept and study of the Highest ideal is simple and two-fold. First, is that the ideals of the past – and the present – justice, mercy, the Good, peace and so on are significant (1) for their value even though they may lack in absolute character, and (2) for their suggestive power. Second, the Highest ideal is an end rather than a given. This may be translated into immediate and realistic terms in the thought that ‘the endeavor or search for ideals, including the Highest ideal, is included in the Highest ideal’
The fundamental idea for Faith is that faith is not a given attitude but it is the attitude or set of attitudes that is most conducive of quality of life, selection of ends, and outcomes of (human) endeavors in view of the unpredictable character of the world and in view of limits to reason. Faith may include ‘reverence’ for the world but rejects any necessity of reverence for given ideas or dogma. One significance to the emphasis to limits of (human) reason is that while limits are frequently acknowledged, it is a common attitude that, especially in the tradition of thought but also in common thought, that the only worthy action is action based in full reason. It is shown that this idea is essentially limiting of (human) possibility. It is also argued that subscription to an idea whose basis may be in imagination and partial reason is most productive of possibility whereas subscription to ‘ignorance’ is not productive at all even though it permits the thinker and the actor varieties of satisfaction. The cultivation of action may result in anxiety but the primary source of such anxiety is the habit of reliance on certainty; this anxiety is not an essential anxiety. A corollary to these thoughts is that the characteristic ‘angst’ of modern man is based on error and the error lies in the attitudes that may be called the modern world view. The pervasion of the view is such that even the religious fundamentalists tend to subscribe to this view when thinking on matters that do not concern religion. These errors are often those that if explicitly articulated would be immediately seen as erroneous but often populate common thought as a facile tendency to critical rejection of whatever lies outside the world view. The Theory of Being is of significance in this discussion since it shows up the immense distortions that are constitutive of the modern view. The discussion of Faith is a natural place to consider the concept (as contrasted to the examples) of religion, the possibility of an ideal religion or faith, the significant even if problematic place of the actual religions in the modern world and an address of the problematic concerns
For the journey. Showing an initial path. With Theory of being, showing an approach to the ultimate
Rounding out the cosmology
Reconceptualization of Human being and various concepts such as economics as the study of feasibility, and religion as the negotiation of all being by the entire individual andor group…
War and peace is, first, a reflection on the stated topic. It shows, secondly, that various topics of ‘applied ethics’ are not separable and that applied and ‘pure’ ethics are not distinct. The section is therefore, a reflection on the problems of value with emphasis on the modern world and on the nature of ethics
Derive the nature of the Human world (Human being and Social world) from empirical necessities and the Theory of being. Derive the (nature and extent of the) interactivity of the aspects of Human being and the Social world. Develop any dynamic aspects from the same considerations – perhaps by modification of ad hoc dynamics
The sections, Civilization and history and The highest ideal are reflections on openness toward ideals and their significance simultaneously with ways to retain ideals, i.e. the idea or ideal of the ideal. In Civilization and history, concern is with the sequences or histories of societies. In The highest ideal, concern is with the individual and / amid the group
A contribution
Journey – a path to the ultimate is seen in the nature of human being. The role in the journey is immensely enhanced if the knowledge of human world is articulated with the Theory of being. This is satisfied by the following
While the Theory of being provides a general framework and shows both possibility and necessity for the journey, ‘Human world’ shows illuminates the range from the immediate to the limits of the normal and, in that range, shows some paths and approaches and shows why we may travel, why we aspire to transcend and seek ultimates in being… Here, a foundation of a bridge to the ultimate may be seen… Here is one anchor of the bridge or, in another way of seeing, in Human being (since it is human being who is here seeing) is a lens to ultimate
Narrative – as illustration and one direction of completion of the Theory of being, especially the considerations that began with Being and Metaphysics and continued through Cosmology. Implications for the Theory of being
The study does not –and cannot– complete the cosmology but it may stand as prototype for study of a class that is broader than human being
As emphasized by Heidegger, for human being the human individual is a most exquisite instrument for the study of being. It is however possible for the study of human being as study of being to assume an exaggerated or neurotic proportion
As an illustration of the Theory of being, provided that it is pertinent to the study, it is desirable to see the general principles of the theory having the powers of necessary consequence and illumination. Necessary consequence will be revealed in seeing what properties of a general class of beings that include human being must have in light of the Theory of being. Illumination occurs, for example, in seeing the immanence of metaphysical necessity in the detailed nuances of human life and in the grand designs of man
The pure or intrinsic interest – ‘knowledge for its own sake.’ This must mean the following kinds of thing. (1) Knowledge is intrinsically interesting andor elegant andor beautiful. It shall not mean, however, that knowledge is power. (2) In knowing the world we express and respond to wonder and mystery
A significant question arises. It is not about the pure interest itself but the ability to have this interest. Why do human beings have the ability for pure interest, the capacity of curiosity, to see beauty in knowledge?
It is immediately acknowledged that the ability is possessed and cultivated to different degrees. Some are repelled by the idea, others revel in it – these extremes define a spectrum. As always, explanations may be found in neurosis – those who revel are subject perhaps to neuroses defined by sensitivity and avoidance of ‘real work’ and those who are repelled are perhaps defined by insensitivity and avoidance of reflection i.e. the judgmental neuroses. However, while neurosis may define individual disposition it does not explain the capacity for innate sensitivity to ideas and to mystery. It is near necessary that the ability should be an adaptation within –or contributes to defining– human contexts. The neuroses are individual ‘adaptations’ within those contexts. The spectrum of ability and cultivation is perhaps also an adaptation
Pure interest and application are not altogether distinct in their function
Specifically, knowledge of the human world and of human being, should have an especial pure interest to human beings. Self-knowledge, omitting neurosis, does not merely affect quality but, in some sense or according to some real value, is quality of being. Similar comments may be made about knowledge of the human world
For the kinds of reasons noted above –balance and adaptation– the pure interest would not be restricted to knowledge of human being but would be of the world, of human being and the place of human being in the world. In having interest in the human world there is no exclusion of the animal world or the world of living beings and, especially, there is no suggestion that the interest is an expression of superiority (or that such superiority should have any absolute or a priori meaning)
The utilitarian or applied interest – knowledge as power. The individual may lead a more purposeful, realized life. I.e. in knowing the human world and its place in the world we express and respond to wonder and mystery… again, the Theory of being and the specific concern are enhanced by their mutual articulation. ‘Know yourself’ has long been regarded as a value in the West. Why? If the quality of life is determined by the quality of experience, then knowing oneself may enhance the quality of life or, in the neurotic case, diminish it. In the robust case self-knowledge and knowledge of being are duals… Application to the purposeful life, the good society and a legion of specific applications in psychiatry, economics, politics, morals, education…There is at least a hope that understanding of the human world may have some input into understanding and effecting a good society e.g. through psychiatry and sociology… While these are western interests, there are other expressions of the use of self-knowledge in other cultures. The possibilities of specific application are legion. The limits on such application is a function of the limits of knowledge including value and the limits of efficiency – which is understood as the effectiveness with which ends can be realized. ‘Chaos’ is a limiting factor but is included in ‘ignorance’
Regarding hubris of knowledge and the potential for fall, it may be noted that limits of knowledge and efficiency may be seen as good. If the limits were contingent the lament regarding the fall of man from the center of being since the time of Copernicus might have significance. The necessity of the very probable normal character of the limits of knowledge and efficiency places man squarely and inescapably in and among being. Here is paradise – lost and regained… lost in misconception and gained through knowledge. Additionally, capacity for initiative, effort and inspiration are perhaps in the adapted nature of human being. Even if human being is inefficient, he or she can react, learn, adapt and, occasionally, see that the efficient outcome is undesirable while a non-efficient one is desirable i.e. the criteria of efficiency may be misplaced
Hubris knows two sides. The side suggested above is the hubris of knowledge. There is also the hubris of the critic – and the false humility that is a façade for the loss of hubris (pride) of a wounded psyche. As has been seen, in Metaphysics, absolute knowledge may be found where it has been least expected
It remains to be seen what consequences the revelations of the Theory of being (metaphysics…) may have for knowledge of human being. Regarding ultimate concerns it is already known that overcoming the normal is possible in every occurrence (since the possible = the actual, why is this not paradoxical) and necessary in some occurrences of an individual-as-individual – as Atman, overcoming is universally given… It is known that efficient negotiation of the normal –leave ultimate concerns– has difficulty: the perhaps immense dual difficulty of insight and action. Regarding immediate concerns, the limits of knowledge and efficiency will be a function the of the normal or very probable and contingent limits on the understanding of the human world and not on any limits on the general Theory of being… in fact the Theory of being sheds light on the nature of the contingent and the (possible though difficult) nature of their overcoming
It is hoped that establishing a flexible framework from which to view the human world and developing a picture of that world may hope to be a contribution to thought and, perhaps, to society
An ultimate interest. Given the possible though very difficult overcoming of normal limits and the less though still difficult negotiation within the normal, it follows that it is practical to share resources among the two implied aims even when they may be in competition. Given that the aims are not always in competition, e.g. if there is a value to respite from labor, a pursuit of the ultimate may be seen as productive of the practical. Further, it is often thought though not the case that the two aims are invariably in competition; with judgment, they are as mutually enhancing
Do or integrate:
One approach study relates the general to the particular. Theory of being is a general framework. The particular is the topic under study i.e. human individuals and groups. Therefore, the approach is to derive the fundamental characteristics of Human being and Human world from interactive study of (1) Theory of being. There will be interest in global and local descriptions. (2) Canonical-empirical observations about Human being and society.
This approach will permit a principled rather than merely ad hoc derivation of fundamental psychology and (new) sociology and their interaction
Some dimensions of study. The study may be seen in terms of a number of oppositions that derive from the Theory of being and from experience… this approach avoids the habit of substance thinking… even if human being has a single (one) distinguishing characteristic, that number, one, and that characteristic should fall out of the investigation
The development involves an interactive study of Theory, Individual, and Group
Necessary implications are those that follow from necessary parts of the theory and necessary characteristics of the Human world e.g. that there are individuals, that there is knowledge of empirical necessity…
Make a principled list of the empirical and other characteristics of human being – necessary and normal or reasonable
There are no a priori essential characteristics. An essential characteristic would be a substance theory applied to human being; therefore there are not taken to be any a priori essential characteristics of human being. Note however, that if necessary aspects of the Theory of being entail characteristics then those characteristics will be necessary and if the necessary aspects of the Theory conditions certain characteristics then the conditions will be necessary
Further note that we become blinded to the character of the empirical from common use in which we think of the instrumentally known atomic facts as characteristically empirical. There are however necessary empirical elements to the Theory of being e.g. that there is being (while this is contingent on e.g. the fact of perception in local description it is not contingent in the global description.) An example of a necessary empirically known characteristic of Human being is knowledge of empirical necessity
Round out these necessities; consequent necessities; and necessities relative to hypotheses
Incorporate comments about the blinding to the denotation of ‘empirical’ to the discussion of the empirical elements of metaphysics in Metaphysics
Some possible characteristics may be suggested. (1) Characteristics suggested on the basis of acquaintance. (2) Conditions (on items 1) and characteristics entailed or suggested by the Theory of being
Introduce here the idea that form and process are in interaction and that the forms of Idea and Action remain in interaction and that the idea of the independence and separate being of the idea leads to distortion
Round out the following
Characteristics deriving from Theory of being. Free-bound aspects of certain characteristics. If an organism had an indeterminate number of digits and could manifest digits at will then the manifestation of a digit would be free; the forms of the digits e.g. generic shape, number of joints and articulation –aligned versus opposed– might be bound. The next example is real. If there is freedom of the will or of thought and of concept formation, there must in the normal case also be bound elements e.g. action that is constrained by unconscious motives and bound elements of cognition such as perception or feeling which normally have degrees of object-binding – in contrast to the oppositions of fixed versus absence of binding. The Theory of being shows that freedom is possible and is necessary for organisms that negotiate fresh physical or conceptual environments
Characteristics suggested on the basis of acquaintance. 1. The organism. 2. Psyche which is an aspect of and not distinct from the organism. Inner-outer, afferent-efferent, element-variety, memory trace-symbol, bound symbol-free symbol, primitive symbol-reflexive symbolic capacity and language… reflex: knowledge of knowledge which includes knowledge of at least a primitive idea of the ultimate; thought about thought which entails reason and logic… modularity-integration and the essential freedom, integration and integrability of inner-outer feeling i.e. of emotion and cognition
Need to integrate drive
Also integrate Maslow 1-4 and capacity and need for faith (5-6) and nature of and capacity and need for ‘entertainment’
Human being as the most exquisite instrument (available to human being) of knowledge of being (Heidegger’s idea)
Complete the following with regard to institutions and process (dynamics)
1. Organization or structure. 2. Process and dynamics. What are the basic approaches?
1. Ad hoc and traditional. The group is subject to constraints e.g. physical and environmental. While economics is the study of feasibility and includes study of constraints, the Economics are the feasibilities and constraints. While Morals name innate and institutional condition on action and guides to constructive choice that are consequent upon freedom and that serve to prevent harm and enhance what is good, ethics is the study and elaboration of Morals – and, therefore, contains meta-ethics. While morals appeal to the character and sensitivities of the individual, social Law is the expression of group sanction regarding constructive choice and social action; there is no absolute divide or identity among morals and laws; and the distance between law and morals is a function of the size of the group and the degree to which its functions are specialized and formalized. While politics is the study of group decision and action, the Politics names group action and decision making in process and in its structures and institutions. Other aspects organization may be named – Culture is the common expression of psyche of all kinds whether seen as having intrinsic interest e.g. language, drama, art… or utilitarian interest e.g. science, technology, economics… Note that culture and its institutions include convention (is this word appropriate) which here means only the common ways of expression of and cohesion in culture, discovery or creation or origination, and transmission including education and archive. Religion and play are part of culture. ‘Play’ includes entertainment which is perhaps a degenerate form of enactment with degrees of spontaneity. While the foregoing concern Institutions at large, the institutions of Social Organization concern the structure and process of groups within society. These may contain their own (sub) sections – economics, morals, politics… The institutions as just conceived are not thought to be hermetic departments that have no interaction or overlap. 2. Systematic. An example is social dynamics. A second example is found in the development of sociology which seeks valid ways to understand the social world and valid ways to deploy the resulting knowledge. A systematic approach to be taken up here lies at the intersection of organism, group and the necessities (theory) of being and involves their enumeration, mutual or co-illustration and co-implication or co-constraint e.g. the capacities of the organism required for the characteristics of the group. A first example of a systematic approach is to see how the characteristics of the organism or individual stand in relation to the ‘standard’ social processes and institutions i.e. economics, morals, politics, law, and culture… and are ‘contained’ within the environment that has physical, ecological and other characteristics. Examples of interaction between organism and necessities (theory) of being and organism and group have been given; include… examples of group-necessity interaction shall be developed and all examples (group-necessity, organism-necessity, organism-group, and even perhaps organism-group-necessity) rounded out and any systematic andor necessary facts and patterns that emerge cataloged
The institutions are the institutions of culture and the institutions of action and organization
The institutions of culture include the following
Convention including language, religion and morals and ritual and play, and drama and art, and science and the humanities…
Discovery or creation and origination
Transmission including education and archive
The institutions of organization and action include
Social groups; and the immanent structures or forms of the groups – economics, politics, law
Objectives. From first principles
To define the nature of the institutions e.g. Economics as arrangements of feasibility, Politics as group action, Law as a form of order and perhaps a code of Morals
To derive completeness and necessity of the institutions
To develop whatever dynamics may inhere
Place in social world?
The Institutions of a society will depend on the character of its individuals or organisms. It is a given that there are degrees of co-development and the Institutions are not merely an expression of an a priori character of the organism. Although the differences between human societies may appear to be independent of any core character of human individuals, the kind of human society that is possible and its range has co-development with the nature of human being as distinct from other kinds of organism
The forms of the Institutions of a given (kind of) organism will be a function of size, circumstances of geography and history, culture and conception within the culture of the institutions. Institutions do not arise merely ad hoc but are also a function of a (kind of) society
Even when institutional forms and actions appear to be degenerate, difficulties in re-structuring and the conception of restructuring may be immense; and attempts at restructuring may be (transitionally) worse than degeneracy – they may be hazardous
In considering difficulty and hazard, it is not at all universally the case or to be expected that outcomes of designs will be as intended. Any universal resistance to restructuring (change) is arch-conservatism (conservatism itself is emphasis on recognition and preservation of the good; liberalism is emphasis on recognition of deficiency –evil, a greater good– and motion toward good. Surely there is a rationalism whose expression in traditional terms is a tension between liberalism and conservatism and whose equilibrium is a function of circumstance.) In the realm of the contingent, where the present discussing lies, there is no absolute knowledge; inaction and conservatism has its hazards as much as may action and change. Action may be desired over inaction at least in that individual and society become engaged and energized over being alienated and apathetic. The ‘success’ of action has dependencies on insight and chance. For these reasons there can be no universal prescription for or against thought and action toward social restructuring
That one kind of society may impose its institutional forms on another has no guarantee. Since the institutions are a form of structure and the absence or breakdown of institutional structures is likely to give way to lack of structure i.e. chaos, the imposition of institutional form will tend to be destructive of culture and may have (at least transitionally) hazardous outcomes
Continue development
Introduce reference to Mind
Expand:
See comments above on essence and substance
Discuss ‘Why elephants have no trunks!’
Freedom – freedoms of idea-icon-symbol-thought-will-manipulation-action and their relations, originality or creativity, love, mind and experience... and attitude and action, the intuition and its categories
Note that material on Human freedoms will be shared among chapters Metaphysics, Mind and Human world as discussed in The present edition. Use free will
At the root of the free feeling is the free or indeterministic neuronal event that they labeled the spark
Examples of the free concept are the free feeling – the root of all animal freedoms, free image, the free symbol, free symbolic concept, and the free symbolic system
It is an error to think that to be free is to be entirely free. Every significant freedom is integral with bound form. That is to say that the expression of freedom in formation of structure (form) builds upon and has continuity with existing form
… relation to Freedom and free symbol
Refer to Mind? Is Originality or creativity the best title?
The concept of freedom as freedom of the will
Free will is the ability to conceive alternative outcomes, choose from among given and or conceived alternatives, and to have at least partial causal efficacy in the direction of chosen outcomes
Make a note that here is the relation to free symbol and thought
Freedom of the will is distinct from social freedom. Social freedom, however, presupposes freedom of the will
Freedom does not imply (1) that, as some liberal thinkers appear to have thought, any outcome can be effected, (2) that any particular outcome, especially a worthy one, will be easy to effect, (3) that there are no drives and unconscious motives that may be difficult and in some cases practically impossible to overcome, (4) that the exercise of freedom is isolated and a simple case of conception, choice and action; even in the isolated case there may be difficulty and failure, and learning may be required as to what outcomes are realistic and as to the means of causal or partially causal implementation… In the general case, the exercise of freedom is a project over a life and over time with regard to understanding what outcomes are possible and worthwhile or desirable and how such outcomes may be effected; further, the understanding of what is possible may grow, considerations of what is worthy may change over time and with experience and ‘maturity,’ and when actual outcomes are different from intended ones, the learning involved may be a recognition of the desirability or otherwise of what was not intended
Freedom of the will is contingent upon indeterministic elements in the human being and the human environment
The first question is ‘What is Freedom of the Will?’ The meaning of the phrase is not definite
Does will concern willpower? Can the individual will to will? Can they will what they will?
These thoughts confuse issues because will has a meaning as choice and a meaning that sits next to willpower
What is freedom? Does use of the word suggest that the individual is free to do anything at all? Anything that is within their physical capacity – even if, for example, it violates survival and moral imperatives? And even remaining within the bounds of such imperatives, does it suggest cultivation of the freedom is easy? Does use of ‘freedom of the will’ suggest that the individual knows or can easily know what their physical, survival, moral and other limits and possibilities are?
Therefore ask what is intended by the phrase as a whole and not what is meant by the combination of the individual word meanings
Perhaps there is no fixed intention. Perhaps there are senses of what is intended but this requires cleaning up
First, the intention behind the word freedom, here, is not to suggest that one can do anything one wishes… or that one will execute anything that is physically possible. A simple example. An individual is suicidal. He or she decides to jump of a bridge. There is wavering. Some individuals give in to the fear and do not jump. The idea that there is a freedom is not intended to suggest any of the following
That it is easy to come up with novel alternatives
That novelty will ensure that an alternative will be worthwhile
That it is easy to choose from among alternatives
That it is easy to execute a chosen alternative
That there are no blocks to execution – fear which is a negative drive is one block; other blocks may be unconscious including sources of fear and poorly conceived morals
Further, the exercise of choice is a project and a commitment. Often, resources must be marshaled toward execution and by the time resources are becoming available, some other choice may have been seen and the original choice lost its imperative
The arguments against freedom of the will derive force (though not logical force) from the confusion of meaning and the occasional liberal stance that exercise of freedom is a routine activity
This of course does not prove that humans have freedom of the will
Note that freedom of concept formation and freedom of will and action are related (freedom of action and of will may be differentiated)
Also note that an implication of unconscious processing does not violate the idea of freedom. There may be an interaction between the conscious and the unconscious in which the conscious feeds the unconscious with information, the unconscious adds an original element and re-presents ideas to the conscious which then analyzes the modified idea
From the Theory of being, it is clear that an organism cannot be entirely deterministic in its external and internal responses (the internal include the mental.) However, the structure of the organism and the environment may be regarded as determinate. The response is indeterministic to the extent that it is variable when the determinate conditions are the same. It is free to the extent that the determinate and the indeterministic interact in the production of the indeterministic response
Freedom of concept formation and freedom of will occur when the determinate elements include the conscious especially as it is has effect toward some end
Observe the phrase ‘has effect’ rather than ‘is effective.’ A variety of other conditions may have effect so that the effect of the conscious is neutralized: the organism may lose consciousness, the muscles of the organism may suddenly tear, a physical condition such as an earthquake may make an otherwise easy action difficult or impossible
How might it be shown that humans have freedom of concept formation and freedom of the will? Either by showing the freedoms to be necessary or by showing their absences to be impossible. Theory of being shows that some freedom must obtain. Is that a cheap argument? Perhaps. A global argument for freedom is the emergence and interwoven character of the unconscious and the conscious over 5 billion years. The human organism can certainly recognize change. The recognition of change enters consciousness; consciousness affects concepts, choice and action…
Provide explicit ‘proof(s)’ of freedom of the will
Reference to psychology
Place here considerations on deriving a fundamental psychology
Discussion of fundamental character of feeling
Primacy (and meaning) of feeling
Secondary though significant character of attitude and action
What is to be derived. Function… Cognition. Emotion. Elements and essential integration
Framework of derivation. Organism
Manipulation-flow
Sensory modalities-intuition (form)
Evolution-structure (layering)
Modularity-integration®elaboration: niche exploration and creation
Modularity-integration: specialization-layering
Direct-reflex
Feeling (inner-outer)®bound integral emotion-perception®free integral emotion-cognition
Degrees of independence
Drive?
Icon-symbol®symbolic niche formation and formability i.e. ability to form
Symbol-language
Identity-identification
Framework of derivation. World
Inner-outer
Afferent-efferent
State-process: being-becoming®memory
Passive®active; bound®free (memory)
Interaction-intentionality (aboutness)
Framework of derivation. Organism-world
Physical modalities-senses
Conscious-unconscious
Discussion of the human
unconscious is currently placed in The intuition
…and its categories
Add necessary derivation if possible… is this needed
The unconscious. Although the unconscious has been discussed in Mind introduce aspects of the unconscious that are appropriately discussed here. These include (1) The significance of the unconscious for the nature and existence (sense and reference) of freedom of will. (2) General influence of unconscious on psyche, behavior and intention (and motivation.) (3) Role of conscious and unconscious processes in originality or creativity. (4) Charting the territory of the unconscious. (4) A variety of issues centering around dreams. What is the evolutionary origin of dreams? Do dreams have intrinsic organic and psychic functions? What are they? Given the alternation between deep sleep and dreaming is there credence to the idea that while deep sleep is rest, dreaming is a withdrawal from ultimate rest – that the cycles have a (not the) function in allowing deep but not ultimate repose? Introduce partial derivation from the idea that equilibrium of the organism cannot be stasis! Is dreaming discharge of unnecessary data or firming up of neural pathways? Why or whence the (reistic) form and (dissociated…) content of dreams? Effect on waking life – as a source of emotion, possibility and choice? Is the interpretation of dreams intrinsic or assigned? What is the significance of interpretation? In what way, organically and psychically, do dreams reflect the unconscious? What evaluation may there be of the Freudian –and other– connections? Is there an ultimate distinction between sleeping and waking experience and their interpretation if any? Why does dreaming occur primarily in sleep i.e. not only with regard to evolutionary but also in organic origin? What are the relations or similarities and dissimilarities among dreams and waking hallucinations of various kinds and etiologies?
Note that the order here is changed. Combine Psychoanalysis, determinism and the unconscious, Dynamics and Growth, personality and commitments. Atman?
Human identity and Atman (Should the case of Atman be placed earlier?)
… And other stuff… is this needed or appropriate? If so, introduce some material. Consider:
The cases against and for analysis. Over-analysis
The concept of language
Language and freedom
Includes drama…
The first question is ‘What is Language?’
Here again is an example of alteration of meaning
Language includes its subjunctives of picture and feeling
Language is a system of symbols which are signs that designate concepts
Concepts are bound and free
Mathematics and science land man on the moon… but
Language is perhaps man’s most exquisite instrument
In language man appreciates and expresses his being (mathematics, science and logic are expressed in language)
Is mathematics language? In what sense and to what extent
Consider the alternate title: Function and dysfunction
The nature of exceptional achievement. Its relations to disorder. What may be learned from exceptional achievers and disorder?
Change the replacements for the following eliminated titles consistently
Notice the change of title to Social world
Consider alternative titles are Society, Human society, Society and its institutions…
Consider the following words for incorporation are society, social, world, human, animal, institution, culture, structure, form, process, and dynamics
In continuing to build the Cosmology, there are a number of places to start: comprehensively (in the concept of universe,) microscopically (from the elements of being,) and from self-knowledge. Therefore, regardless of the ‘intrinsic’ importance, to a human being, knowledge of human being (self-knowledge) is important in building a picture of the cosmology. Self-knowledge is an approach available to any being to knowledge of all being. Further:
To organisms capable of it, self-knowledge has intrinsic interest
The patterns of growth of the individual and of society and civilization provide initial direction in an endeavor to know and experience all being
Given the interest and the intent that this narrative be brief, there is no intent, here, to write comprehensively of human being. Instead the intent is to be comprehensive with regard to concepts that are and may be useful to the general purposes of the narrative – present and later
In the following, separation of ‘organism’ (mostly biology) and ‘nature’ or ‘character’ which emphasizes psyche is not intended to imply that organism and psyche are distinct
The Greek word ‘psyche’ referred to Mind, soul and self. The connotation of psyche here is that it is more particular than mind: it possesses structure and organization, it is subject to integration and disintegration, its integration includes what is (experienced as) the self. Since soul is a kind of substance, its introduction is unnecessary – an ad hoc introduction of ‘soul’ would be logically alien to the character of the narrative. The role played by soul is achieved by concepts introduced earlier, primarily those of Identity and Atman (the latter is clarified later.) Similarly the idea of ‘spiritual’ versus ‘mundane’ is approximated by the concepts of the Possible (the Actual) versus the Normal
The following topics are outlined in ‘telegraphic brevity’ because they may assist the understanding sought in the narrative but are not central to it
Life and evolution. Human being lies squarely in the process of evolution; recognition of this is good for it puts (at least some) possibility in human hands especially when it is recognized that limits due to the theory of evolution are normal limits. Human is not other than animal being; culture tends to suppress the animal – to what advantage and to what detriment? What recognitions and expressions of the (suppressed) animal in the human are there that may be liberating of the finite and infinite aspiration?
Relation between life and the microscopic elements of nature; significance of the separation in physical size; significance of the possibility of a large amount of genetic information stored in a small space – in (near) every cell. More generally, what does the manifest Variety in the world imply for the size and variety of micro elements? (Which, in the local cosmological system, appear to be the elementary particles and forces)
Degrees of autonomy and centralization. Organization of the brain – the ‘triune’ structure makes possible autonomous function; and, relative to organism and environment, binding and freedom, both described below. Modular and integrated function: the functions are both modular and distributed; this enhances specialization and compensation
Language appears to be rooted in specific areas of the brain. This strengthens the thought, encouraged by language itself, that Language is a ‘modular’ function and is, perhaps rooted in specific organs or areas of the brain. However, as will be seen, this conclusion is not necessary
Life and mind. It is not unexpected that the elaborate instances of mind that are possessed of bright consciousness and self-consciousness will be found in animal organisms (versus apparently inert matter e.g. as in a rock)
Human being – some characteristics of the organism. Extended infancy (neoteny) and childhood: the possibility of enculturation (language, social roles, degrees of freedom and originality in Creation of the elements of culture including knowledge and Art, importance of family and of Education and educational institutions) and therefore the possibility of extensive culture and determination by culture. Bipedalism, manual dexterity; size of brain, language, memory of instances – not just of generic situations, and culture which is enhanced by written language; adaptability as a form of adaptation; ‘hairless’ and, therefore, perhaps adaptable to varying climates; color vision
Disease and well being. Well being as norm; disease as exception; classes of disease – incomplete and improper formation, invasion e.g. trauma and microbes, degeneration. Healing, medicine, psychosomatic aspects of well being and healing
Human beings are capable of knowing that they are more than mere being and that they are not (manifestly) ultimate. The effect on human awareness of self and on human Commitments (higher motives and projects) is not deterministic (and not univalent) – it may result in feeling a lack of significance in being especially if the individual’s self-perception is that of an alien in the universe; alternatively it may result in centering or a sense of place – and a sense of possibility. The effect on commitments is manifold but what is significant is that there is a fundamental effect e.g. in the building of monuments (whether of ideas or of stone,) in religion and Faith, in the affirmation of the present, in searching for ultimates
Human freedom – there is a history of debate regarding ‘freedom of the will.’ It is probably efficient to attempt to understand what the freedom of the will is (including the question of how much freedom there is,) its possible sources, how it may manifest and how it may be cultivated (again on the assumption that there is freedom) in parallel with asking whether there is freedom of the will. Why? Misunderstanding of human freedoms may lead to a complete rejection of the idea or, alternatively, to unrealistic expectation. For example, in considering the Theory of Being it was shown that any consistent system of descriptions is realizable; this obviously implies that human being is unlimited (recall that transformation of Identity is required.) However, that is not part of normal human experience. The word ‘normal’ is critical. It was not implied that transcending normal limits is feasible – the improbability may be colossal. (One implication, though, was that contemplation of the infeasible including what has been thought impossible –except the logically impossible– is not only reasonable but desirable)
One of the objectives to this section on human being is to provide initial directions for ‘transcendence.’ Is human being necessarily free? Yes; in the Creation of new ideas, new ways of being in culture, new technology, in the ability to create and make choices. Why is the presence of this freedom necessarily true? As far as earth is concerned, five billion years ago there were no ideas and so on. Therefore, the ideas must have come from sources internal or external; it appears impossible (except on divine intervention) that they should have come entirely from an external source and it is therefore necessary that the source for Language and ideas must have some internal loci. In the life of a culture, there are new ideas (e.g. science.) Even if ideas are Platonic, the realization of an idea must have some original component (somewhere in human-cultural evolution.) Thus it is clear that human beings can create, recognize and exercise choice. It is nowhere in this narrative implied that such choice (especially significant choice) is easy in its recognition or execution. The negotiation even of normal limits should be constitutionally difficult
Sigmund Freud (b. 1856, Freiberg, Moravia, Austrian Empire) thought of human development and personality as deterministic i.e. that the individual and his or her choices are largely determined by biology and development and that the individual is subject to unconscious influences that control but are not amenable to control. However, if there were no choice whatsoever there would be little point to research in psychology (except perhaps as entertainment) for it seems unreasonable that a psychology of a deterministic organism could have application by that organism (the case of natural science is different.) In the absence of (some) choice there would be no point to psychoanalysis or any psychotherapy. The foundation of any practice of psychoanalysis includes the precept that choice and its recognition are difficult
It is altogether expected –based in day-to-day knowledge of individuals and in the need for a degree of conformity– that the personality and boundaries of behavior of an individual should, normally, present as (relatively) unchanging. It is not clear that exceptions should follow any statistical pattern. Apparently, however, human personality is plastic under duress. It is reasonable to expect some balance, perhaps some rough adaptive optima, between freedom and necessity
A number of later psychoanalysts made a break with Freud because of their disagreements with him; Carl Gustav Jung (b. 1875, Kesswil, Switzerland,) in particular, had a greater notion of human possibility though not necessarily a more realistic one. What Freud may be thought to have shown is that choice may be extremely difficult first in recognizing and creating the occasion of choice (option) and then in executing some options (incrementally and in interaction with knowledge of options.) As will be seen, the existence of choice is what makes for a moral animal and, further ‘moral’ does not mean ‘morally Good’ but capable of moral choice and therefore capable of right and wrong
When issues are closer to the core of the individual, recognition and execution of options will be difficult, the likelihood of success may be less, the time required greater. This may be experienced as determinism. In pathological cases choice and change may be extremely difficult. Extreme remoteness of the core of self-knowledge and awareness of option may be a mark of (certain kinds of) pathology
The following (through the topic ‘Exceptional Achievement and Disorder’) continues the discussion of ‘the nature of Human being’
Although the characters of the various aspects of mental function are different, it is convenient to use ‘feeling’ to cover the variety of elements; in doing so, ‘feeling’ is used in sense that is distinct (though inclusive of) from its common meanings (inner feelings, feeling of touch and so on; the present case may include these)
The following discussions are relevant to the discipline of psychology. There is a hesitation in using the word ‘psychology’ that stems from a distinction –made with near paradigmatic character in twentieth century psychology, and by thinkers in philosophy and cognitive science– of a phenomenal concept of mind concerned with (subjective) experience or ‘feeling’ and a ‘psychological’ concept of mind concerned with behavior or what mind does. Further, while behavior is seen as objective, ‘feeling’ is regarded as subjective and is therefore held by many thinkers as a topic that is not fit or not amenable to scientific study. A contrary position –that has been gaining adherence for some time now as of 2007– argues that although feeling is subjective experience, its existence and nature is objective (if its existence were a subjective issue, the claim that its nature is subjective would be beyond objectivity.) The reader may deduce that the sympathy in this narrative lies with the latter view. The view, here, as has been seen, goes beyond the case for the objectivity of the existence and being of experience and finds that, with appropriate extension to the primal root, there is an identity between the ‘material’ and ‘ideal’ character of being
Primitives. Feeling, then, is the primitive element of mind. Feeling has a variety of distinctions. The following distinctions are included for their general or present significance: quality, valence (positive or negative,) intensity, internal-external or body-environment, direction i.e. afference-efference, focus-background, and free-bound. The distinctions among external sensory modalities are included in quality. Valence (like-dislike or attract-repel) may be included in quality. The ‘internal’ include pleasure, pain, basic drive, elementary emotion, and the kinesthetic. Perhaps focus-background may be reduced to degree of intensity. The nature of afference (input) and efference and relation to attitude (the aboutness quality of some Experience) and action is subtle (here their understanding is incomplete but this lack is not –yet– significant in the present endeavor.) The free-bound distinction is most important. ‘Bound’ means ‘bound to’ an object; for example, the sensation of color is strongly bound to the properties of the Object (which includes lighting.) Thus, perception is usually bound (hallucination is unbound perception.) Elementary emotions (which are kinds of elementary feeling) and basic drives are bound (usually) to the state of the organism (when unbound there may be dysfunction.) ‘Free’ means not bound or, perhaps, weakly bound. Free feeling arises in the stimulation of memory (perhaps by association.) Thoughts (here regarded as symbolic or linguistic and imagistic) are free; ‘higher’ emotions and drives have a free component. It is natural that bound sensations should be more intense (otherwise e.g. thought would dominate attention to environment; inversion of the spectrum of intensity however is not invariably dysfunctional e.g. in originality and in dreaming.) Bound thought, bound higher emotion and higher drive, inversion of the relative intensities of bound and free sensation may indicate dysfunction. (As will be elaborated, what sometimes appears as dysfunction may otherwise appear as functional)
Originality (introduced earlier in the section ‘Mind’) as understood in the generic sense may be seen as lying at the intersection of the ‘determined’ (e.g. so far) and the indeterministic component of (the brain or mind of) the organism. The specific physical locations(s) and process (‘occasion’ is perhaps a better term) of originality remain (they thought) undetermined. The occasion in ‘conceptual space’ may be hypothesized to include the situation where determinate thought does not quite mesh with experience and or other determinate thought and a novel but elementary idea permits adjustment. Such adjustments may occur frequently in day to day affairs and need not have great significance but are in fact true cases of originality. Significant originality occurs, for example, in the continued application of elementary cases in building systems of determinate thought; the application of the elementary case likely occurs in multiple levels and regions and not in simple linear sequence
Integration. Functions are not elementary but are integral forms of elementary feelings. Integrations include shape and size of objects. There are interesting problems of integration. If the perception of an Object is a bundle of feelings (sensations) how is it that objects are perceived as wholes (this is called the binding problem.) A detailed answer is complex but a simple answer lies in unconscious and intuitive (Kantian) action of the brain; in adaptation – objects come as objects, therefore perception is attuned to objects; in individual adaptability – objects do not come as absolute constants e.g. a ‘tree’ may be seen as a tree or alternatively as 10,000 leaves and so on and the object can, as a result of adaptation, be seen in both ways; or in evolution – a source of adaptation (culture is another locus of adaptation for what is perceived as an object in one culture is not in another.) Another problem of integration is ‘object constancy;’ imagine viewing an Object getting closer or rotating; its size and shape do not appear to change. Why? The response is similar to the case of binding. The ‘Unity of Consciousness’ is similarly explained though enhancement by focus and memory are likely necessary. Perception is integrated bound external sensation. Thought is integrated free sensation. There appear to be thresholds of intensity below which perception and thought lack valence. Higher emotion is (hypothetically) a mutually conditioned mix of elementary emotion and thought. Primitive or elementary emotion is bound, internal, valent sensation
Since binding is a function of memory, and since memory associations may fade or be strengthened – and altered, it is not theoretically correct to think that emotional responses are fixed. This is also observed in fact. Since emotional response does change (as a result of reconditioning, interpretation and reinterpretation, weakening of general response e.g. with stress, illness and age,) change may be cultivated. Joy cannot (may not) be willed in the instant but may be cultivated over a period of time (and misery may be cultivated e.g. for secondary gain)
Of especial interest is the integration of the psyche – of perception, thought and emotion. There is no full integration – nor, due to freedom, can or need there be: there is a necessary balance of integration and integration and integrability – and disintegrability. However, adequate integration is essential – at all levels. The principle is the appropriate integration of freedom and binding. At a basic level the binding of emotion and perception connects individual to environment and others; without such binding perception and, especially, emotion ‘freewheel’ and there is no connection (perhaps there is a relation of these somewhat hypothetical thoughts to autism and Asperger’s syndrome.) At a higher level emotion provides binding to others and to Commitments (possible explanation of the non contributory lives of individuals with antisocial personality; and possible explanation of the importance of integrity of the psyche in adjustment, commitment and contribution – in addition to, perhaps over and above, the importance of raw ability)
The categories of intuition, below, are integral forms
All of these integral functions as well as those of personality fall under Identity, treated earlier (that treatment considered personal identity and the of identity of objects as such and in time as similar)
The unconscious. Memory (relative strength of association) and focus-background are implicated in the unconscious. Additionally, lack of integration or splitting is also implicated (this concern is significant in ‘neuroses’ and disintegration or disorder of personality.) The unconscious enters also as the Form of intuition which conditions perception and conception but is not itself normally seen
‘Intentionality,’ the aboutness character of (some) experience is not currently discussed in detail because, despite its importance in understanding mind, it is not presently important to the narrative (intentionality was briefly discussed above under ‘Mind’ and the problem of intentionality on a materialist account is discussed in the section ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’ of the next division, ‘Journey in Being’)
In the recent (perhaps since about the mid-nineteenth century but with greater emphasis since the mid-twentieth century) literature ‘experience,’ ‘attitude,’ and ‘action’ have been said to be the marks of mind. The tri-polar continuum marked by experience, attitude and action is a practical classification of things mental but is it fundamental? Experience (feeling) has been extended to the primal root and must be the sole theoretical mark of the mental while attitude and action, which also involve experience but not necessarily the recognition of experience, are practical marks. However, to set experience on the same level as and yet apart from attitude and action is to introduce an implicit or tacit Cartesian divide. It is therefore necessary to reject attitude and action as independent markers of mind; given experience, however, they may be regarded as markers of a certain (advanced in comparison to the primal case) level of mind. Therefore, at the human or animal level, it may be reasonable (practical) to regard experience, attitude, and action as three poles in the continuum of mental phenomena
An example of a category of intuition is perception in spatial terms. It is easy to imagine that without the special brain organization –partly genetic and partly developmental– that makes for perception of the world as spatial, such perception would be impossible. However, spatial perception, if primitive in human infants, is well if not fully developed by the time the individual begins to walk. Spatial perception is an example of (Kantian) intuition. The concept of intuition was discussed earlier; here will be listed some categories that are an enhancement over the traditional ones (and which vary according to author)
The following are categories of intuition in the Kantian sense that they are characteristic modes of perception, thought and emotion – of the psyche. However, the actual categories listed below deviate significantly from those of Kant and derive, in part, due to a suggestion of Arthur Schopenhauer (b. 1788, Danzig, Prussia.) The inclusion of humor as a category derives from the following thought. While, space, time and cause are intuitions of regular behavior, the world, as seen from the Theory of Being, is essentially indeterministic (which implies also that it is necessary that there be phases of near or quasi-determinism and quasi-causation.) Regarding the common meaning of humor to have source in the unexpected, they chose ‘humor’ as a label for the human intuition of the unexpected (the thought to use ‘humor’ came from an acquaintance who enjoyed making the pronouncement ‘humor is the highest form of wisdom.’) Originality and humor overlap. The classes of intuition are the existential, the physical and the biological, and the psychosocial
The categories of intuition. Existential: Being, (Becoming, Being-in, …) Humor (the intuition of indeterminism and chaos.) Physical: Space, Time, Causation, Indeterminism. Biological: Life Forms. Psychological or Psychosocial: Image-Concept, Icon-Symbol (and Artifactuality and Language,) Emotion, Humor, Communication, Value, Identity…
They recognized ‘impediments’ to realization. These included normal impediments e.g. constraints of intelligence, time, affection, resources… They recognized the lack of (at least initial) definition of goals – this, it was recognized, is essential to the endeavor. However, they also recognized characteristic styles of self-perception, relations to life – including others and environment and ambition, how they accommodated criticism and success and failure – how they conceived success and failure… These overlap ‘personality’
Classic approaches to personality (these perhaps straddle a number of cultures) include factors and dynamics. A preliminary organization of factors is according to freedom and constraint (in which biology is significant.) These include affective and cognitive style. Dynamics pertains to the interactions among these factors and to action and choice. Here, dynamics further pertains to fixity, flexibility of dynamics, recognition of the factors (including the unconscious,) cultivation, and reflexivity applied to change
What factors mark personality and what are its dimensions? It is reasonable to think that personality is a function of overall integration of psyche (the suggestion a near tautology.) It is also reasonable to think that the overall integration is a result of the interaction of experience and the functional system (including the categories of intuition.) Therefore, an effective approach to classification (to be synthesized with observation and experience) may include consideration of the varieties of integration – the differential development of the various functions and their interactions (e.g. and roughly, prominence of emotion would mark a different kind than would prominence of cognition. The ratios of binding and freedom and their intensities are also significant)
These issues remain an ongoing concern
They observed that, roughly, growth follows an (overlapping) sequence of development: natural, social, psychological, universal
Cultivation of self is important; compensation (in addition to change) but not overcompensation (which requires recognition) is also significant
Charisma may, perhaps, be cultivated
Is there an end of growth? In the normal theories of growth, death is an ultimate limit
The Theory of Being shows that death cannot be such a limit and, in discussing Identity it was shown that Individual Identity merges (must merge) in a higher (more comprehensive) identity
Brahman is taken to be the entire real in its actual and potential relative to the absence of being and Atman is regarded as the ultimate in Identity for any individual. It then follows that:
Atman is the Experience of Brahman in the Individual
First set up some characteristics of language proceeding intuitively and informally (‘definition’ will be taken up later)
Language is symbolic i.e. although its roots may be iconic, particular icons (sounds, images) come to have a significance that is over and above their iconic content; perhaps simultaneously there are simplifications to the icons. How language comes about in the spoken stage (it is assumed that, initially, language is spoken language) is not clear (some aspects of origins will be addressed below.) It seems that first written language is (mostly) iconic. The origin, in temporal sequence, with causes identified, of word (and Meaning) and syntax and of alphabet and word construction is not clear. However, it may be reasonably assumed that the end (and intermediate) results have adaptive characteristics but are not entirely adaptive for the idiosyncrasies of (and freedoms in) cultivation must be among factors that make it erroneous to expect that all characteristics of languages are determined by optimality (in any sense) and or adaptation
Syntax arises perhaps because facts have a standardized form – the ‘subject-predicate’ form. Thus, the valid forms of syntax have adaptation. There is also freedom as seen in the variations in syntactic form that correspond to the subject-predicate form (e.g. in some languages ‘They went home’ is rendered ‘They home went.’) However, it may be that adoption of subject-predicate form is a limitation on the kinds of Fact that may be expressed (perhaps one mark against rigid rules of syntax. It may be interesting to speculate whether ‘natural’ rules preceded syntax)
[It is not being suggested that all uses of language concern factual or propositional expression –of states of affairs– and its variants: assertion or question, and the variations – direction, commission, expression and declaration regarding which there is a standard analysis that purports to show that these variations exhaust the variations on communication of states of affairs. It is not suggested that these exhaust language – or that language is exhaustible; however, further ‘uses’ will be taken up, perhaps in future editions of this narrative, as they become of interest to the endeavor]
Whereas thought is iconic at root (and has the dimensionality of the associated sensory mode,) in the case of a linguistic animal, thought (in language) is highly symbolic and linear. Literal spoken language is necessarily linear; therefore, written language is (typically) linear since, perhaps, it might be inefficient or even burdensome for common spoken and written language to be distinct. Especially spoken language is not altogether linear since it is accompanied with what may be called ‘dramatic effect’ i.e. volume, pitch (and overtone,) rate, cadence and inflection, variability in form or syntax including poetry and ‘non language’ factors such as gesture, posture and affect. Still, both spoken language and written language are highly linear and symbolic whereas the environment of language is highly iconic and contextual. Thus in producing language there is a reduction in the ‘physical information content.’ Speech provides some context through drama; written language by elaboration and poetry. That the speaker and listener may be in the same room (not the case of media) or culture provides some context; writers and readers in the same language are likely to have some common context
However, it is also characteristic of language that it expresses and evokes context; and, although the expression and evocation must suffer attenuation of context, this characteristic is among the factors that make language an instrument of human communication i.e. that language may communicate, even if incompletely, degrees and modes of information that exceed the literal information content (perhaps made possible as a result of standardized –common, routine– contexts.) Perhaps it is standardization of context (e.g. human species, culture) that makes expression-evocation possible. Perhaps language is some roughly optimal mean adaptation to the multiple requirements of thought, communication, and (in story and written form) preservation
Written language enables communication, even when not intended, over space and time and across cultures (a greater loss of written context may contingently evoke a wider variety of interpretation)
As a result of linear form, language also provides the following ‘adaptation.’ It is well adaptable to the requirements of precise expression and processing (thought) – especially in precisely defined contexts (strictly syntactic, logics, mathematics, and science.) Language does not attain the precision of such contexts outside them; nor need it: precision in communication or reflection is not a universal Value over all (conscious) mental process
Although thought and language (thought in language) do not appear to be identical, there does not appear to be a (distinct or root) ‘language of thought’
[Many persons act as though precision of being –know yourself– and of communication –being known to others– is the end of being. Note of course that these ends are not said to lack value; and that there are settings where some degree of precision must be inherent. There are also contexts where precision must be relaxed as the constitution of that context. Two such contexts are the intimate or personal relationship that stands between friends and the context of discovery. ‘Contexts of discovery’ are typically associated with science but are also pertinent to most reasoning including logic and mathematics. Additionally, if someone had an insight that there may be forms of language better adapted to processing, communication and preservation it would at first be necessary to relax the standard forms. This appears to occur routinely in poetry, a variety of prose forms, in mathematics and science. Although the scientific view has been criticized when it pretends to model being, it provides significant analogy and metaphor]
[It is first necessary to say what is meant by the ‘scientific view.’ The basis of their metaphorical approach from science has origins in the ‘great’ theories of physics and evolutionary biology. There is a view from physics in which the Universe is seen as an interconnected system moving in space, through time and in mutual interaction. Darwinian Theory supports such a view applied to life but also adds the mechanism of incremental variation and selection. These views entered their thought as metaphor; but not as exclusive metaphor; this metaphor and reflection on its necessities or otherwise and alternatives led to the Theory of Being of ultimate depth. They experienced to some degree what seemed as though it were a private language – perhaps a language with private elements whose translation into public form required a translation from intuition to language… Is there a language of metaphor – and is it more than a few new symbols or a few new forms e.g. poetry? The expression of multi-dimensional intuition in linear form –even if affect is excluded– appears to involve omission and distortion of information. Omission is compensated by context and distortion by adaptation. However such compensation is, in the normal case, incomplete and in-process. Language appears to have a metaphorical character at its root]
It is now appropriate to ask ‘What is language?’ ‘Definition’ can be restrictive or expansive. Human being arrives at a stage – the present stage. ‘Language’ has been a particularly human instrument and in language, ‘language’ is recognized. ‘Language’ has variations – the ‘languages’ of the world with their syntactic forms and uses; formal ‘languages’ and so on. ‘Language’ then is distinct from iconic thought (that ‘iconic thought’ has a degree of remove from the ‘thing,’ provides an approach to seeing thought in language and thought in images as lying on a spectrum.) This appears to be a fact of human existence and thought; yet it also becomes a theory of human existence as soon as, beyond thought and expression, someone says, pointing, that is language, this is the correct usage of language (even if adaptation and cultivation play a role in what has come about.) The situation is complex since, in the modern world, it is the academic who tends to reflect on language, whose notions enter into school curricula; but the nature of ‘language’ is also determined in human transaction, law and politics. The line of argument here is informal; a way is being felt. Relaxation of the idea of language (e.g. by relaxing distinctions among the concepts of thought and communication, linear speech and drama, icon and symbol) might result in less precision but greater content (value – in intimate, formal and political contexts.) Persecution of linguistic groups might end or diminish (this is of course a dreamy speculation, ‘Language-as-it-is-known is constitutive of Human being,’ comes a possible response to the present line of thought. Yet, even the improbable –when seen even vaguely to have significance for being– deserves consideration.) Recall the earlier discussion in which an essential indefiniteness in the Definition of human artifacts was identified. It appears to be characteristic of the (human) psyche to ‘see’ definiteness where there is indefiniteness. Since language is (if only partially) an artifact, these thoughts apply also to language. In regarding language to be what is given in the (Kantian) intuition of language there may be gain in apparent precision but loss in realism
Among the general topics considered in the earlier discussion of ‘Mind’ are attention, consciousness, awareness, aspects of the unconscious, and focus. The topics on mind in this section ‘Human being’ include an ‘existential’ component – the self-knowledge that human being is not ultimate but is more than mere being; human freedom; feeling as element of mind; elements of function – perception, thought, emotion and, briefly, drives (basic and higher;) psyche as integrated or integrable and disintegrable; the nature and significance of the integrations for Object-perception and object-thought; the significance of the integration of cognition and emotion; the categories of intuition (in its Kantian meaning – the characteristic modes of perception, thought and emotion of the psyche, also seen as modes of integration;) contexts of Necessity of and of freedom from the intuitions; growth, personality, Commitment, and charisma (effect on the other based in the person rather than in institutions;) and language. These topics may be supplemented by moral considerations; morals are taken up later. Some topics pertinent to ‘disorder’ such as learning, and a variety of concerns such as sex and sleep that have a ‘mental component’ have not been considered as lacking immediate interest to the narrative. (In saying that sex does not have immediate interest to the narrative the thought is of physical sex but not of the pervasive effect of sex in the psyche)
The foregoing list may be regarded as ‘aspects of mind’ and as such is relatively complete. It is natural to expect that the varieties of disorder of the psyche will correspond to the various modes of psyche (elementary or integrated.) Thus what are considered to be the (standard) major mental illnesses (in psychiatry, 2007) may be read off a simple list of functions: perception, thought, and emotion. The ‘major mental illnesses’ are dysfunctions of cognition (psychoses including schizophrenia,) and emotion (mood disorders – depressive and manic-depressive or bipolar, and anxiety disorders…) That the list from which these disorders has been read is very simple implies, of course, that ‘psychosis’ and ‘mood’ contain numerous variations, subtleties and interactions and, therefore, that the variety that is explicit, here, in the major mental illnesses is very incomplete. The intent here is not to achieve completeness but to see that, roughly, dysfunction correlates with function
[It is remarkable that in the modern clinical concept of disorder it has been found useful to avoid reference to ‘normal’ psychology. Diagnostic criteria are set up so that recognition of a disorder is integral with practice rather than driven by definition. Referring to an earlier discussion of the nature and significance of definition it was seen that, even in highly formal fields, definition is practice driven to a significant degree. Therefore, while definitions have importance, they are evolving elements of disciplines and practices. The idea of definition as the driving element in concept development may be attributed to some practices of Education]
Among the disorders of modern psychiatry are the ‘disorders of personality.’ There is no intent here to effect a classification or attempt a complete treatment…It is possible to see some aspects of personality disorder in dysregulation of affect (emotion) and others in disruptions and aberrations of cognition (the following examples are undoubtedly simplistic.) For example, dysregulation of affect in relation to self might, in cases of excess and instability, result in behavior that is highly chaotic and self-destructive; dysregulation of affect in relation to others might, in cases of deficit and lack of response to affect in others, result in uncaring, callous attitudes and cruelty
It has been suggested (Edward M. Hundert, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Neuroscience: A Synthetic Analysis of The Varieties of Human Experience, 1989) that the mental illnesses are breakdowns or disruptions of the categories of intuition. Since those categories were introduced as tentative integral forms of the elementary mental forms (feelings,) it may be better to suggest that the mental illnesses are breakdowns in the integral forms and, perhaps, also of the elementary forms. This, of course, suggests that the ‘illnesses’ are interactive or integral rather than compartmentalized; this interactive character extends to the distinction between the major and the personality disorders and to various factors that contribute to disorder
A significant question regards the relative roles of biology and development in the formation of personality disorders. In addition to the intrinsic interest, the question is significant for treatment and as illustration of the body-mind (and nature-nurture) issue. While, in any instance, the differential roles of biology versus environment may be difficult to discern, it is necessary that the extremes of human behavior will be a joint product of extremes of biology (e.g. affective instability) and of environment during development (the self may be considered to be part of the environment.) I.e. the population of individuals with a given personality disorder will include a range of contributing proportions from ‘innate’ and environmental factors. There is a temptation to assert that these conclusions are logically necessary; however, further factors may be identified. The first is the presence of other conditions (that makes generalization regarding a specific disorder difficult.) The second factor is that of individual choice which, in addition to the deterministic factors of biology and growth make also result from idiosyncrasies of choice. A third factor (that may be considered environmental) is the selective power of institutions – the tendency of the affectively unstable behavior to be selected, even cultivated by the modern psychiatric hospital; and the tendency individuals who exhibit affective disengagement from even the extreme distress of others to be selected by prison systems
If it is argued that only an ‘unhealthy’ individual –one whose actions are determined by lack of choice– would harm others and that a healthy individual would not, it is a valid question to ask whether there is true human evil. (That harmful behavior is not evil in intent does not mean that it should be tolerated or go without consequence. ‘Forgiveness’ and tolerance, they thought, should result from goodness rather than from absence of evil.) True evil is, perhaps, possible in a view of health that is not deterministic but rather a balance between moral intent and ‘forces of decadence.’ Examples of such forces are the idiosyncratic, social pressure e.g. to racism, and temptation e.g. to profit from the loss of others. If the moral intent is not sufficiently strong, immorality (evil) may grow insidiously
Disorders and culture – it is not altogether clear whether it is the disorders or their manifestations that are distinct among cultures. Different behaviors are differentially encouraged or discouraged, tolerated, interpreted and amplified. Perhaps there is a core set of disorders (with variant manifestations) on which are superposed cultural variations
The effect of the individual’s social network (including family, peer, work and hospital settings) and the response to unusual behavior on the emergence and course of a disorder is a question with practical and theoretical interest
Attention now turns to Exceptional achievement. There is an asymmetry between exceptional achievement and disorder. Although exceptional achievement is dependent on ability it is perhaps more dependent on circumstance and nurturing than is disorder. Whereas disorder is typically dependent on simple but severe disintegration, ability is typically dependent on more than simple integration and on crossing thresholds (of degree and integration.) Some thoughts on the cultivation of ability are found in ‘Principles of Thought’ below
The savant syndrome is perhaps atypical in that a specific talent is extraordinarily realized while most abilities are under-realized. It may not be altogether clear whether the talent of the savant is a compensation for a general lack of ability or whether the lack of most abilities frees the one special ability (or whether there is a fortuitous combination of one talent and a general deficiency.) Experiments suggest that ‘normal’ individuals may develop savant-like abilities under the proper circumstances. Thus, perhaps, one manifestation of the savant is due to release. More interestingly, all talent may be generally latent and require conditions of release (perhaps innately satisfied in ‘talented’ individuals)
There are relations among disorder, talent and achievement. Such relations are perhaps both ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ or causal and correlative. Given individuals of equal ‘innate’ mathematical talent a paranoid individual may realize the talent due to isolation (and obsession) whereas the ‘adjusted’ individual may lack these external motivations. In this example the relationship is correlative or (perhaps) indirectly causal (if talent is generally its own driving force, the example may also be atypical.) The contribution of mania to the achievement of a talented individual –or to talent itself– is directly causal. If ‘mania’ is abundant energy then it is not a disorder; however since abundant energy requires a spectrum, the outer range of the spectrum may be energy to excess or dysfunction. Abundant energy, the lesser relative of mania, is contributory to achievement (biographical and anecdotal evidence appears to show that achievement may involve struggle between productivity and uncontainable energy.) Similarly, compensation for depression may be a spur to originality. It is thus that threads of originality and affective problems (disorders) tend to run in parallel in certain families
Considerations of integration of the psyche clearly have implications for the ‘fractured psyche’ of schizophrenia, dislocations of mood, and of social and self relations i.e. dislocations of personality; and for relations between fracture and enhancement of psyche. One way in which the intuition may be enhanced is by (partial) disintegration and reintegration. The sensitive psyche may therefore lie in a divided continuum with potential for disintegration and reintegration on one side, massive and irreversible disintegration on the other and conditional outcome in between. Although these thoughts are simple and tentative they suggest that relations between disorder and originality may be both correlative and causal. Some relations may be compensatory. However, it should not be thought that originality, i.e. freedom of the psyche, is inevitably connected to disorder; rather, in the variety of ways in which the freedom may occur, some ways are connected to a disposition to disruptions of the psyche
In small (hunter-gatherer) societies, ‘shamans’ have been (it is said) the diviners of ‘truth’ and protectors of psychic and social integrity. The (‘true’) shaman appears to be a psychically sensitive and charismatic but perhaps physically robust individual who is initiated e.g. by crisis into and completes a journey of discovery into ‘other’ worlds (which may be interpreted as a journey into the self.) The initiation is disintegration and distrust and fear, the completion is reintegration into trust of being-as-it-is i.e. trust even amid the real chaos of the world (which is its natural condition.) It has been suggested that schizophrenics are shamans in the making whose journey is terminated by ‘treatment.’ It has also been suggested that the ‘psychotic’ experience of the shaman has alternative origins in exceptional sensitivity (under crisis or stress) and not in the (sometimes) degenerative effect (character) of schizophrenia and that the psychotic breakdown is preliminary to reconstruction in light of the Real
It is pertinent to ask whether the future ‘inspiration’ of the modern world lies only in institution, patriarchalism and normalcy or whether it may lie also in charisma (whose roots may lie in sensitivity and ability)
Discussion of Human being and society continues in the sections from ‘Morals and society’ through ‘Faith’
Replaces Morals and society and Action and Politics
Place here considerations about deriving a fundamental sociology and its relations to the psychology
Be consistent in introduction of the level 3 headings through Politics
List the institutions and modify the following
Include discovery and archival, transmission and education, religion and ‘high’ culture
Since this topic is significant to transmission of the goals of the narrative its inclusion is necessary. Since it is peripheral to the present concerns of the narrative it must be essentially brief. A more complete discussion may be taken up in later editions or in a supplementary narrative
It is natural that education should concern ‘the elements of and relations among the elements of (human) freedom.’ These concerns include the established (stable) elements of society and culture
Therefore, the needs of education include both tradition (established knowledge, institutions and other cultural elements) and the cultivation of the ‘freedoms’ – originality in various endeavors mentioned above in ‘Ethics as elements of and relations among the elements of (human) freedom’
…and ethics and meta-ethics
…
From ‘06
The narrative thread now enters into consideration of the individual in the world and, particularly, in society. A (more inclusive than usual) conception of ethics, i.e. Ethics, weaves together the particular threads. The objective is to be inclusive of human-social concerns; however, the discussion is not uniform in its degrees of elaboration or definitiveness. One purpose is to see the various topics in a new light under the Theory of Being and the approach that avoids a priori Commitments – of allowing the ‘commitments,’ e.g. as to the nature of being and morals, to emerge in reflection. Another purpose aims at contribution. An overriding goal is to continue to build up a complete picture of the Metaphysics, and within it of the human-social world. This is, it is hoped, a contribution to the general foundation of Understanding. More particularly, in locating the individual within culture and society, in civilization and history (as well as nature,) it is hoped that there is initial grounding and direction for the discovery and realization (‘the journey’) of being (with both roots and goal in Being as revealed by the Theory of Being i.e. the metaphysics.) These are among the concerns that informed the selection of topics regarding human being and the present section
A concern with morals finds occasional expression in seriousness of attitude, preoccupation with moral concerns, adherence to given morals, preaching, preoccupation with an avoidance of dissipation and, occasionally an angry outlook on the world
They preferred lightheartedness of approach, enjoyment even to occasional dissipation, humor. What are the appropriate balances in attitude? This question, as well, can be taken with seriousness to excess. Intuition and flow are perhaps fundamental and require only occasional supplement. Silence and mental quiet (in what might be serious concerns) are a virtue
…
Why do human societies have morals and moral codes? So much has been written on morals and ethics there is a valid question whether that literature is useful. Surely, in questioning value, it is valid to question the value of the academic interest in value. They saw that there is value to brevity in expression whose roots are in careful thought – generally and especially for morals
Are morals a human invention? Consider ‘Who invented the modern automobile?’ An automobile has various subsystems. The invention of a key subsystem, the four stroke internal combustion engine, is associated with N. A. Otto, a German engineer who constructed such an engine in 1876. However, the wheel dates back to antiquity. The integration of the various subsystems is ongoing. Adaptation to ‘needs’ is a factor in selection; some aspects of automobile design have little relation to designated function. No particular individual is ‘the’ inventor of the automobile nor may any group of individuals over time be said to have invented the automobile. Rather, the source of the ‘invention’ is the creative contribution of all those individuals in interaction with ‘necessity,’ drive and occasion
Undoubtedly there are some elements of moral intuition present in animals. Perhaps too little is understood about non human animals to know whether the individual animal is morally creative. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that moral systems emerged and developed over time, with creative input and with adaptation to changing contexts; and, perhaps, that there is some continuity of moral intuition between human and non human
Morals are made Possible and are
‘required’ by the same facet of human nature – the freedom in behavior and
thought. It is assumed to be obvious that Human beings (except in pathology)
have instincts that, even if the label ‘moral’ does not apply, are conducive to
moral behavior. However, the freedom includes an attenuation of the degree of
psychological necessity of the ‘instincts.’ Simultaneously, greater freedom in
thought, especially thought in Language, makes a moral vocabulary and moral
systems possible while the freedom of behavior makes morality (moral systems)
adaptive. It is unlikely that what are today recognized as moral traditions
sprung up at once. Rather, it is likely that morals experienced a variety of
phases, each having an adaptation appropriate to its cultural context. The
degree of incrementalism and the degree of contingency (versus adaptation) in
the growth of human morals is not clear. Freedom (free will, originality) has
been debated in theology and philosophy (and in more specific contexts such as
crime and punishment;) the essence of the argument for freedom is in the
earlier discussion of originality. Is originality in morals a relatively new
invention or is it coeval with the form of human being and human groups?
Negative evidence from study of small scale groups is necessarily inconclusive
because they lack institutionalized systems of morality. However they do
possess the ‘institution’ of language that is a medium of moral expression. Studies
of small groups suggest that, for them, morals are more negotiable and less
ends in themselves; their function appears to be the enhancement of personal
relationships. In modern society, morals tend to be ends: they are less
negotiable; personal relationships are less important – stability derives from
institutionalization of various functions. This suggests the opposite of what
might be expected from the existence of reflective moral traditions (east and
west) associated first with the religious traditions and then with reflective
or philosophical ethics. The expectation might be that modern individuals are
more creative in morals. Instead, the generation and negotiation of morals is a
day to day affair in smaller societies and groups (prior to the larger
societies made possible e.g. by agriculture)
Freedom of will and originality follow from Necessity. They reflected that what is more interesting and valuable than debates on free will and so on might be an illumination of the nature of the freedom. There is no implication that freedom is the ‘highest of values’ even though it is what makes Value possible and necessary. There is no implication that the freedom means that the individual can do, even within reason, ‘whatever he or she wants to do.’ There is no implication that the individual is not subject to forces of the psyche and socialization that are difficult to surmount – even when it may be desirable to do so. The freedom involves two (interactive) parts. First, is the recognition of what may be of worth and second is an attempt to realize what has worth. The parts are interactive in that an attempt at realization provides, simultaneously, insight into feasibility and ‘failure’ may suggest, through reflection, alternatives and ‘success’ may suggest additional possibilities that build upon what is achieved. The process is reflective, constructive and cumulative. In parallel with the process described, the individual faces questions of ability, resources, value, and doubt – originating in criticism by self or others, human imperatives. In facing these concerns, initiative is at least as important as fortitude. Expression of freedom is not at all without personal cost, not at all one that is ever natural, not at all standing above all values. However, it is possible, has value, and may be nurtured and cultivated
Morals are prescriptive (and proscriptive) in the form of e.g. general codes, guiding principles or rules (prescriptions) for conduct or rules for special situations; morals cover virtue e.g. the desirable characteristics of a moral individual; and morals may be constructive. Constructive morality is Commitment to building contributions over a period of time e.g. a lifetime. ‘Building’ refers to the thought that the nature of the goals, the understanding of what Value is and what constitutes a valuable contribution and what may be feasible develop in parallel with the contribution itself (even while values at the most general level such as an intent to contribute or a search for what is of high value may remain unchanged)
They found, as a principle of thought, that open specification of meanings at the outset of an investigation is productive of creative and realistic understanding. They observed that often in the history of thought discovery has been marred by premature Commitments to meaning – especially to ontological kind and category. (The sense of realism which includes the intuition is among factors that encourage premature commitment – especially as the intuition may effectively and implicitly define the real. Although often counterproductive of realism, early commitment may occasion original thought in attempts to compensate for it.) A primary explicit example of the principle occurred earlier in saying that ‘being is that which exists.’ Since the meaning of existence (what it is, what things exist, commitment to matter or Mind or substance at all as fundamental) was unspecified at outset it remained open to discovery (and originality.) Similarly, though not as explicitly, the idea of mind was not identified as mind-as-humans-and-animals-have-it (especially at first blush.) This too was productive of originality. They adopted this approach to the development of the idea of ethics. The approach appeared to be unconventional at first but was found to effectively connect to the traditions of ethics – and more: it was productive of binding or integration among the traditions and to binding among morals and the other elements of society (the institutions of social form, culture including knowledge and Art and religion, economics, and politics which they thought to include law
Now, Ethics will be conceived the system of relations among the elements of (human) freedom; the primary elements of freedom are values, action and knowledge. It seems that values and action should complete a list of the elements of freedom. Why is knowledge included? First, although being is given, the Object (what is known) is not. Some objects appear constant but others are in a process of Creation (e.g. what is ethics?) Second, while knowledge (Metaphysics) should obviously have power in determining the nature and contents of ethics, Value (as has been seen) is implicated in considering what shall be knowledge. This seems to imply that ethics and knowledge are relative. If they are taken individually, this may be the case; if they are taken as a totality, there is no necessary relativism. ‘Knowledge’ includes metaphysics (the Theory of Being) and may be generalized to all elements of culture (whose meaning is discussed earlier) that constitute knowledge in some way
Here are some implications of these thoughts on ethics – this conceptualization of Ethics (it is not at all necessary for a ‘new’ conceptualization to be ‘consistent’ with the past; it is reasonable to expect there to be continuities in meaning – as there are; however, as far as the logic of a new system of ideas is concerned what is necessary is self-consistency and truth or correspondence to the world)
The system of (human) freedoms is Ethics; ethics is the study –perception and conception– of Ethics
As understood in ‘Western Ethics,’ ethics is often seen as including or overlapping aesthetics (since both concern value, this is natural.) The present conception of Ethics goes beyond this. What are the dimensions of (human) freedom? Knowledge may be extended to ‘culture’ (in the sense of Edward Burnett Tylor, b. 1832, London, in his Primitive Culture, 1871) and action whose arenas include the individual, society and civilization. The dimensions of Ethics, then, may be identified as values including Morals, traditional ethics and aesthetics; culture including knowledge and its traditions and institutions e.g. the academic institutions; information including media, publishing; art, literature, music, myth… and religion;) action and its arenas (ethics, aesthetics which are repeated and economics – especially feasibility, politics – here regarded as including law, and change –dynamics– and institutions of social form)
In its traditional meaning, ethics is moral philosophy (the study of morality) and morality – morals and systems of morals whether specified in ‘codes’ e.g. the code Hammurabi (moral codes may be expressed in law,) religious systems (Buddhism, Christianity…,) or philosophical systems (natural law, deontology, consequentialism…) Metaethics is the study of ethics – the nature of ethics, ethical argument, the objectivity and foundation of ethical judgment. In its present conception, Ethics includes metaethics
Ethics is Real; ethics, naturally, has elements of subjectivity (a goal in ethics is the elimination of avoidable, unnecessary or mere subjectivity)
Learning from the Theory of Being. Primal origins of being include (1) ‘Random’ elements in origins and selection for self-adaptation, (2) Conditioning of further change by current state or configuration, (3) Indeterminism which remains a source of form (formation) and decay
Ethical contexts. (1) The seat of morals in psycho-social integration (of which integration of the psyche is a special case discussed earlier;) which implies that the moral sense or nature (relatively unconscious) is unlikely to be effectively replaced by moral systems (the traditions and, then, reflective or philosophical ethics.) Mere replacement of the moral sense (which can only happen on paper) would undoubtedly lead to an unmooring of morals. A supplement to moral sense, however, has degrees of appropriateness and necessity; necessity arises on two accounts. First, that morals have social dimensions (this is obvious) that constitute the individual and the group interaction with moral systems. Second, in the ‘breakdown’ of any social system, there is occasion and some necessity for reflection and its expression in further system or changes in system (traditional and or reflective.) This process is a continuation of the transformation from non human to human animal. There remains some question about the utility of the traditional systems (e.g. Buddhist, Christian morals) and philosophical ethics. Certainly these do not result in a ‘perfect’ world or even perfect clarity regarding morals; perfection has no meaning except as an ideal. Change builds upon what is given. A state of perfection is neither possible nor desirable. The possibility of ‘error’ and of adaptation to circumstance (and possibility) have the same root and are essential to being (in becoming)
A second ethical context involves, (2) That supplement of the moral sense by moral system is incomplete. It is true that in transformation from a traditional world to new contexts made possible by new social freedoms and new technologies, the individual moral sense and even traditional systems may be not merely inadequate but may even say nothing regarding new moral occasions. Therefore, a more complete integration of psyche (the bound moral sense and the ‘free’ elements of system especially the expression of reason in reflective ethics) may provide improvement over mere ‘supplement’ of moral sense by reflection. Modern philosophical ethics appears to aim at a rational foundation for choice. However, a choice between its systems (e.g. deontology vs. consequentialism) cannot always be clearly made (debate continues) and is not clearly necessary, except perhaps if there is an unrealistic demand for moral determinism. In metaethics some reflexive clarification is possible but does not (has not) removed the issue of conflicting and incomplete determination. It is not clear, from the complexity and Variety of the world and of moral contexts that complete rational determination is possible. It is precisely here that integration of the psyche and its instruments appears to be essential. Real contexts are unique in the sense that no logic of morals established in other contexts (theoretical, invented example, or real) are guaranteed to be applicable. Moral determination in real (and new) contexts may be enhanced by ‘system’ but system is insufficient; binding to the moral sense is necessary. In simple terms, individual and integrity remain essential
Finally, (3) Ethical contexts display the dynamic characteristics of and arise out of primal being. Ethics is ‘Real’ but must adapt (change) to different situations and scales and incorporate considerations of feasibility (economics) and group concerns (politics.) Despite realism (what may be labeled ‘theoretical objectivity,’) the moral system remains in interactive change and therefore requires balances among the theoretical tendencies e.g. deontology (the ethics of right action) and consequentialism (value in ends) that may not be calculable and ‘must’ be supplemented by psycho-social integration and ‘experiment.’ There is a ‘realism in process.’ System is a phase of realism in process. From a practical perspective there is no absolute control or absolute moral knowledge – which in any case are undesirable given the nature of being since ‘absolutes’ would be frozen and though the actual world has danger (‘evil’) it also has great promise (the ‘Good;’ what is Real must be –or be part of– what is good)
It is now possible to develop some objective assessment of the question of ‘political realism,’ the view that national interest comes before individual interest. Is it proper for nations to disregard individual interest in questions regarding national ‘interest’ e.g. survival and dominance? It is clear from the foregoing that both individual and nation (group) have Value. Therefore, both political and ‘individual realism’ are in error (if the individual is regarded narrowly.) Further, reflection will reveal that there is no ‘calculation’ of values that may replace moral intuition and debate among persons and groups even though calculation may enter into process
It follows that Morals at an individual and small group level do not arbitrarily generalize to e.g. a national or global level. Simultaneously, at the more inclusive level the values concerning the individual (in opposition to naïve political realism) remain important
It may be said that the argument opens the way for abuse. However, it is not clear that a ‘calculus’ of values based in the (human or animal) individual as the sole possessor of intrinsic value is a reasonable enterprise; the contrary has been argued above. (Investigation may show that the enterprise is logically or contingently impossible.) Again, moral (Ethical) intuition and dialog should not be circumvented in any reasonable approach to morals (Ethics;) to do so is to relinquish responsibility to a calculus – to say, at some time, that here dialog ends and that all subsequent action shall be based on what has been said before
Ethics has been identified earlier as the system of (human) freedoms – value, action and knowledge (culture.) A connection between knowledge and action was noted earlier. While, in domains where, due to local adaptation, specialization is reasonably possible, knowledge may be separated from its (immediate) ties to the world, the separation is not possible in the general case. That it may seem that this is generally possible is due to the fact that typical domains of action are (naturally) linked to domains of (specialized) knowledge. Generally, however, knowledge does not separate itself from objects or from action. Various ways in which objects are possible have been seen. Some of these are precise; others are approximate (which has been seen to be positive relative to the possibilities of knowledge.) An alternative (underlying) view is one in which knowing, action, and world remain in intimate contact; at this level there is no separation or need for separation of knowledge and action; at this level, knowledge is not knowledge-of but knowledge-in-interaction-with-action-or-outcome. The relevance of Ethics, here, is to note that knowledge-in-interaction is neither ‘superior’ nor ‘inferior’ to but includes and lies at the base of discrete and concrete knowledge
The meaning of objectivity: of the Object – not possession of the object. Often, ‘objectivity’ is used as if it meant possession of the object
Realism introduces objectivity but reason lays open its own inadequacies
Objectivity is reintroduced in special symbolic cases (Theory of Being;) or by relinquishing full faithfulness
But why should faithfulness not be full? It never is in contingent and detailed issues! And it would not be worth much if required universally (its utility otherwise is not questioned)
Realization, not faithfulness is the way of being (faithfulness is a means)
Objectivity is reintroduced by introducing Value (alternatively process)
But how can criteria of knowledge be determined by value? Either knowledge is not what it is normally considered to be (knowledge-of) or it does not have what is normally considered to be its worth
Under Ethics, knowledge attains objectivity
Value, process, discovery are not outside or imposed on being. In discovering a value or an instance of a value it is justified. If it is not justified, its discovery is not complete (what does this say about discovery and justification – perhaps that justification does not stand outside and is not imposed on being)
Consider the immense consequences of the Theory of Being, of Identity, of the Cosmologies developed… In reflection, they felt as though they had encountered a New World. And even though this vision was bound in necessity, they could not (altogether) escape doubt. There was further doubt regarding their ability to apply this vision to the ambition: the realization of the ultimate in (from) the present. Doubt, they reflected has many manifestations. Among these is ‘essential doubt.’ Essential doubt is integral to (sentient) being as part its being; its source is the essential indeterminism at the root of being. Pushed to an extreme in emotion it is neurotic doubt; to an extreme in an attempt to uncover unassailable principles it is rational, even radical doubt (which, too, may have a neurotic component if it becomes the attempt of a being to found itself in its discrete manifestation. If permanently disengaged from knowledge and its process, doubt becomes absurd.) Even essential doubt, however, is not static. It fluctuates and must fluctuate since realization is not constant; even apparent stasis is founded on equilibrium between non static elements. What is it then that can ‘justify’ Faith? Faith has some justification in Understanding but also in Morals. The individual believes (perhaps places hope) in some vision; that it has (possible) value is also a root ‘justification.’ This is no justification for any particular faith; the faith in question should have withstood criticism with regard to truth, feasibility and value before value is justification. However, as has been seen truth, feasibility and value are Ethical dimensions
Economics is the study of feasibility (especially in human affairs.) It is implicit in the conceptualization of Ethics (here) that Economics ‘impacts’ Ethics (and Politics; the aspects of the social world are interactive.) Feasibility, desirability (Value,) and metaphysics interact at the ‘highest’ of levels. Metaphysics shows what is Possible. Feasibility shows what is reasonably possible. Among what is possible there is a range of feasibilities. At the low end there are ‘feasibilities’ that are sufficiently remote that they might normally be regarded as unworthy of effort (and other resources.) However if they are sufficiently desirable, e.g. realization of All Being (and even lesser objectives,) the value of the outcome may make them worthy of attention (if a fraction of resources or an individual’s ‘personal’ time are deployed there is no detraction from more immediate needs – in fact, in some perspectives, there is a potential enhancement of immediate needs since the understanding of being and of possibility illuminates individual lives.) Practically, considerations of feasibility show various ‘ideal’ political and moral goals (that are otherwise commendable) to require (at least) reconsideration. In large societies with unprecedented access to resources it is easy to forget or not see that resources are finite; even among worthwhile goals (in any perspective) there is ‘competition’ for the finite resources. What is the ‘best’ distribution of resources among material, human and other ends? It is not clear that there is one but the question of resource distribution, which may otherwise be worked out without explicit attention to the various concerns, deserves attention
The idea of interaction among feasibility and ethics (that economics and ethics are not altogether separable) is not new and has recently been emphasized in the writings of Amartya Sen (b. 1933, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India) and others
Politics of fear. When most run scared, government will be run by the most scared
Introduce:
Charisma, patriarchalism and institutional forms
Charisma and action
Nature and role of faith (another example of language degeneration under the influence of mass patriarchalism)
Introduce the following level 3 headings here?
Political process is the process of group decision. Political institutions are the institutions of political process. Politics is constituted of the process and its institutions. Political theory is the empirical study of politics; and theoretical study of interrelations among aspects of politics by ‘law’ i.e. correlation, causal connection or other relation; and the use of theory in relating institutions to (political and other) ends. Political philosophy includes the study of and (original) reflection regarding (1) The nature of politics and political theory, (2) Kinds of institutions and their intrinsic values, (3) Relations among institutions and other considerations – Morals, economics, (4) The nature of political philosophy
In this section, the following topic is covered: charisma, society and translation of individual attitudes to group attitudes and action. Other topics relevant to society are taken up in earlier considerations of economics; politics; ethics and society; and following topics through the discussion of faith
‘Change’ satisfies a diverse group of ‘constraints’ and ‘forces’ that may be labeled Ethical – or, more specifically, moral, economic and political. In the following paragraphs regarding action, concern is with the powers that are available to individuals and groups as agents of design
Those who regard themselves as effecting ends rather than affecting directions of change may experience diminished significance in being. Perhaps there is some (varying) balance between effect and affect
The resources available to an individual or group in affecting (and reviewing) ‘ends’ may be labeled ‘patriarchal’ and ‘charismatic.’ The former are the resources that are built into or available in society and whose precise nature depends on the form of society: they will vary according to e.g. political system. However, having a voice, being part of a group, attempting to persuade are (almost) always available. ‘Charismatic’ resources are (dynamic) qualities of an individual. They include the powers of vision (required when patriarchalism falters,) of persuasion, and of action. The powers of charisma have been said to be innate (to the individual.) The degree to which this is true is not altogether clear for circumstance and opportunity are likely often among the ‘causes’ that are assigned to charisma. Additionally, it is often the case that an individual will not know what powers he or she may have until power has been cultivated and brought into the open (requiring perhaps an appreciation of both power and limits)
These thoughts on Charisma owe a debt to the writings of Max Weber (b. 1864, Erfurt, Prussia (Germany))
Consider the following interactions among morals, economics and politics. Political arrangements have (or may be seen as having) intrinsic moral Value. It is a mistake to think that the moment an individual enters the political arena he or she is no longer an individual; and (the opposite extreme) to think that a political institution has no intrinsic worth. In small societies the institutions of politics are also the expressions of the individual. While it is true that in large societies there is a separation of the realms, that separation is not necessary; and even its practical manifestations are only necessary on certain political arrangements. Some arrangements have intrinsic moral value because they are (may be) a form of universal individual expression (possible in a small community; requiring, perhaps, careful arrangement in a large one.) Perhaps, the political arrangement that is a ‘high’ form of individual expression detracts from other moral values; this is, then, simply an example of the ‘competition’ of different moral values for ‘resources.’ It is therefore, an economic concern. Within medicine, more resources applied to technology result in fewer resources available for human concerns (technology and human concerns have only partial overlap.) At a higher level, more resources applied to tighter international borders may result in less resources available within the borders (but perhaps, since the population may be lower than with loose borders, greater resources for each individual; still since the incremental cost is ‘steeper’ with additional control there will, from a purely material resource perspective, come a point of optimum control. This formulation ignores human costs and the question of political stability.) (The variety of concerns is basic even when their labels –material, human, economic and so on– are specialized; the continued use of the vocabulary is justified in a number of ways. First, in that in the most basic meanings the specific concerns are interactive; and, second, even in their most specialized meanings there is interaction among compartmentalized concerns.) Specialization allows (even promotes) the development of intellectual machinery whose precision is made possible by the very specialization. In a simple vocabulary, individual, group, and resource concerns are interactive
A criticism of the line of argument of the previous paragraph is that there is no fundamental principle in terms of which competing alternatives may be evaluated. An example of such a principle may be that the individual is the final measure of all group (political) and economic arrangements. However, such principles are not free of their own difficulties. First, precisely what aspects of the individual are to be taken as ‘measures’ (since, as measure, ‘the individual’ is vague.) Second, what is an individual? Is an individual a hermetically sealed bundle of sentience? Or, alternatively, are the system of relations and ties that bind the individual to the world part of the individual? May a married couple be considered to be an individual (ontologically and not merely for political or economic purposes?) In some ways it might seem that, if there is a join of the sentient system of the two persons, then a couple may be an ontological individual (this seems to violate the discrete character of individuation but the this discrete aspect has already been seen to be ‘relative’ i.e. discrete-for-certain-purposes in earlier discussions of identity.) Then: what is true of partnership in marriage may also be true of larger groups. Another question regarding ‘ultimate value residing in the individual’ is whether the natural world has intrinsic value i.e. are values of oceans, continents, forests and non human animals independent of reference to human individuals? A practical system of values might suggest that the non human should be assigned value; however, the question here regards intrinsic value. The discussion of manifestly sentient forms may, as will be seen, be based on a consideration of the apparently non sentient forms the understanding of whose nature is modified to account for sentience
Therefore, the argument that follows will address only the (apparently) non sentient forms: deserts, lakes, rivers, trees, forests, continents… earth. These entities are not normally regarded as sentient and it has been argued that all Value resides in sentience. A non sentient Universe may contain no value; however, the universe contains sentience. From the Theory of Being, there is one universe and it must contain sentience (the Theory argues that even what is not normally regarded to be sentient has, in fact, primal sentience but the present argument will not refer to that fact and will depend only on sentience-as-recognized-by-human-being.) Given normal sentience, then, it appears that the assignment of value is made by normally sentient beings. However, this does not mean that only those capable of assigning values have value. If value is objective, perhaps assignment is recognition. It has been seen that values have an objective character. Subjective-value is assigned value; objective-value is value that promotes well being; adaptation implies that there must be some identity of the objective and subjective. Here, of course the question arises ‘What is well being?’ It may be noted that every attempt to reduce questions of value to something more fundamental will crumble for the mistake that is being made is to think that there is something fundamental outside of moral intuition that will make value definite and objective. However, this is not the case. It is not necessary for value to be definite. There may always be question and debate and this is part of the evolution and assignment of value and it is seen once again that value cannot be divorced from the intuition and that any ‘theory’ of value shall not stand independently of the intuition but shall stand in integration with it each enhancing and modifying the other. Allowing indefiniteness, allowing process is one approach to objectivity
In the argument just made there is a distinction between normal and primal sentience. The distinction is not absolute i.e. is not one of fundamental kind. Normal sentience refers to the focal, self-aware sentience. Primal sentience, as has been seen in the discussion of ‘Mind,’ earlier, is the necessary but non-focal un-self-aware sentience that lies within the constitution of all (at least manifest) elements of being. Value may be seen as objective in saying that both normal and primal sentience have intrinsic value. The idea that the value of the apparently non-sentient may be referred to the sentient of the value of the non-human may be determined only by reference to the human is a limited idea based in a false even if normal view that the sentient and the apparently non-sentient and the human and the non-human are other. This objective view may be recast in terms of ‘respect’ and ‘mutual dependence’
Change from subsection to section because this is essentially ‘applied ethics’… and incidentally change location. Ensure that this is done consistently
The place of this section in Human world is discussed in the aims of the chapter. Ensure that the discussion is adequate
To
discuss the topic of the title and related moral concerns… and perhaps more
importantly to show that (and how) the single important concern entails others
Consider
a range of universal and modern (moral) concerns regarding quality of life and
inequity. Show the interactivity of the issues
…To
show that the panorama of ‘ethical’ problems do not stand independently. They
are not independent in a moral sense perhaps because of interacting –competing
and cooperating– moral imperatives. Practically, addressing one issue has
implications for others; solving one problem may have impact on others.
Therefore, a degree of holism is also desired. In other words solution of
problems in isolation is not desirable; also, the use of contrived examples
–isolated problems removed from or devoid of context– to make ethical points
may be questioned
Solutions?
No substance:
Consider
expectations regarding ‘solution.’ Expectation that solutions are guaranteed,
that there is a grand solution is analogous to substance theory… and is a
source of ineffectiveness and nihilism. Consider principles of solution, issues
of inertia, culture, respect, communication, dependence on technology, adequate
vs. advanced technology… and solutions and solution patchworks
To
consider the separation of ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ ethics – the idea that ethical
principles can stand altogether in the abstract e.g. that there is an absolute
distinction to be made between deontological and teleological ethics. It is not
clear that there should be a separation of ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ ethics
To
consider (further emphasize) that moral or ethical concerns are not completely
separable from economic, political and other concerns – in both conceptual and
practical terms. How is this accounted for in practice? By developing an
interactive framework or, perhaps, by regarding some concerns as constraining
others… by case by case analysis… by combinations… (remember the issue of
substance thinking)
To consider and develop expertise in the problem of terrorism. A problem of conceptualization may be stated in the following form whose motivation is that it encourages the most effective understanding and address of concerns. Either:
(a) There is a problem of terrorism, or
(b) As understood, the problem involves misconception or distortion
To see how the form encourages effective understanding and resolution, ask the following question. What is the most effective conception (i.e. one that will bring peace and prosperity) that will make (a) true? This will include the possibility that the word ‘terrorism’ has no sense. (In avoiding the habit of substance thinking, in this case the thought that the problem is well understood before it is addressed, an effective solution is enhanced.) I.e. what is the concept and the point to the concept of ideas of terrorism, of war and other forms of violence. In asking ‘what is the point’ it is suggested that definitions may have agendas but of course this is not the only point. Clearly, though, there may be a political agenda to labeling one activity ‘war’ and another ‘terrorism’
An important modern ‘ethical
concern’ is that of war and peace. The concern is broader than the stated one
for war and peace are related to questions of aggression and of terrorism.
Additionally, an adequate treatment of war and peace requires examination of
the ‘causes’ of war and the probable prerequisites of peace which include the
human psyche (aggression) and social behavior (especially politics,)
population, and resources (especially, c. 2000, energy.) Thus, in considering
war and peace a variety of ethical and other concerns are entailed and will be
taken up. The discussion will attempt to illustrate ‘ethical principle,’
relations among the different aspects of Ethics and relations among individual
and group Morals (in the question of translation of individual attitudes into
action) and among realism (in the question of definition below) and
circumstance
Access to resources is one (not
always stated) root of war and increase of populations results in a greater
need for resources. In the long term, avoiding war may be promoted by
conservation and by addressing the population concern. Appropriate energy (and
other resources, especially food) is also important. Energy research is
probably vital – current expenditures on energy development and research,
however, are a fraction of the cost of access to oil (‘access’ includes war and
occupation)
There is a variety of lines
that energy research may take. Renewable energy (solar, wind, small scale
hydropower) is generally cleaner energy. A number of parts of the world have
large coal reserves; research into making the use of coal clean is important
(at least) because as oil becomes scarce, nations will face economic pressure
to use coal. Research in using energy reserves (oil, coal, nuclear…) to produce
clean fuels is important (free hydrogen is not naturally occurring and requires
energy to produce it and the currently practical ways that might be used to
produce hydrogen for large scale production release carbon dioxide which is the
‘greenhouse’ gas implicated in global warming.) Research in controlled nuclear
fusion should receive greater emphasis. Research into use of the energy of the
‘quantum vacuum’ remains in a primitive and conceptual stage and lacks any
definite estimate of the practicality of the potential; it is clear, however,
that the magnitude of this possible source dwarfs all conventional, renewable
and nuclear sources and it is this magnitude that is a source of the potential
which includes the possibility of cataclysmic destruction e.g. of the known
universe… Energy access indirectly affects population. While a large amount of
attention is paid to oil rich nations, other nations that face a variety of
severe problems including internal war (and genocide) are ignored and even
apart from the obvious ethical issue, ongoing poverty may be destabilizing to
politics and population. Resource and energy consumption have a variety of
probable effects – desertification and deforestation, change in atmospheric
composition and, consequently, probable and possibly catastrophic climatic
change. As of 2007 many persons may object to reference to climatic change as probable.
There may be two reasons to prefer reference to probability; the first is that
even quantitative correlation does not imply a causal connection (and to think
that the connection is necessary may ignore non-included factors that may make
the situation ‘worse’ than is implied by necessity i.e. a causal connection.) A
second reason is that an exclusive emphasis on necessity implies that action
need not be undertaken when connections are merely probable… It is not clear
that an adequate solution to any single issue or to each issue separately may
provide an adequate response to the constellation of issues. If there is a single
approach to the multi-dimensional concerns, it may lie in human awareness and
will and their application; perhaps these should be regarded as equal or prior
to the economic (conservation) and technological approaches
What is war? What is terrorism?
What is genocide? These all come under the heading of wide spread aggression
and it is not clear that definitions are necessary (and, in any case,
definitions can be used to put ethical concerns aside e.g. torture has been
justified by claiming that prisoners taken are not prisoners of war.) Regarding
war, there is a point of view called ‘political realism’ according to which
morals that apply to individuals do not apply to nations and that the
responsibility of a government is to further national self-interest at all
costs. What justifies a war of aggression – for whatever reason? Is there a
valid point of view according to which even self-defense is unethical? Is a war
to eliminate an abusive regime or a terrorist base in another nation justified?
What is the moral authority of the ‘nation?’ (Why should the people of West
Bengal, in eastern India be more responsible to the
people of Maharashtra in the west than to the people of Bangladesh
which is adjacent to West Bengal? What has been established
naturally carries weight but should this be absolute and constitutional?) Does
international sanction make war morally right – or merely more diplomatic? If a
nation is suspected of harboring ‘terrorist groups’ or stockpiling instruments
of war and destruction, must certainty of evidence be necessary for invasion?
When does evidence justify invasion? It must be asked that since moral concerns
seem to be routinely ignored, what the Value of moral considerations may be. A
proper response includes that the presence of morals cannot be expected to be
altogether effective but have some direct effect (on decisions) and indirect
effect (on the intent to do Good;) in addition to enquiring of the efficacy of
morals already in place, it is also significant to reflect on the possible
outcomes of an absence of morals. In the absence of a moral sense (or in its
exclusion by apathy, by disregarding the humanity of certain populations, or by
routine denial of human rights concerns in government) formal considerations of
morals are likely to have little effect
They would like to suggest that
war is invariably wrong (not right.) There are, however, two hesitations. The
first concerns self-defense – is self-defense wrong? Is self-defense war? The
questions have practical and symbolic aspects in addition to the obviously
moral aspect and it is perhaps more important to remain aware of the concerns
than to give answers – perhaps such awareness will be more instrumental toward
good than the provision of answers. The second concerns their awareness of the
limits of their thought and their emotional being and their values; this
admission, they hope, may encourage into negotiation those who feel that their
positions are irrevocable
The following, then, are
morally important. First, cultivating and sustaining moral intuition; and
addressing institutions that may suppress or avoid it including education,
philosophy, and rational or systematic ethics. Moral intuition should be
cultivated so as to include questions of feasibility. Second, translating
individual attitudes into (large scale) group attitudes and action. A necessary
preliminary to action is the careful and open acquisition and examination of
situation-specific information. Action itself should (generally) begin with
diplomacy and the least harmful means. ‘Sanctions’ are not intrinsically clean
and result in enormous but often invisible hardship and suffering. These are
causally prior (to the specific moral concerns) and their cultivation is likely
to encourage ethical Understanding and attention to the specific concerns
Related thoughts appear in the
later section ‘Faith’
This section and The highest ideal, next, are ‘question marks.’ The topics may be interesting yet thought to be marginally relevant to the present day. In this narrative, it is sought to provide meaning or frameworks of meaning for these old ideas that may have core relevance to an attitude that is not shy of human culture but does not seek to see culture as above or below nature – i.e. the animal and the natural world
The place of this section in Human world is discussed in the aims of the chapter. Ensure that the discussion is adequate
To suggest a sense to the ideas of civilization of history that derives from the but is removed from its aberrations
To recall that the view from the past suggests uniqueness and greatness in which the greatness stems entirely from uniqueness, entirely from the idea that a particular human world is absolutely above the remainder of being
To suggest an alternate metaphor in which greatness stems from novel –perhaps new, perhaps unique– forms that are connected to (the stream of) being
That the metaphor should be sufficiently unspecified to not be any kind of essentialism, determinism, or substance theory… which view does not (cannot) avoid occasional definiteness of form but emphasizes that such forms must fall out of reflection and that they may have transience
The value attached to being ‘civilized’ may have reached its apex in the nineteenth century; it was an idea in which humankind was seen as set apart from nature, higher and unique. However the idea of civilization used here is one in which the human world is inseparable from the stream of being
There is a classical view of humankind as special and great in which the greatness is given and derives from being apart from the mundane world – especially animal being; such kinds or conceptions of greatness are, naturally, fragile and, likely, more a defense against fear than a love of (one’s own) being. In such views the world is essentially alien and hostile. The views of the special character of Human being and the alien character of the world, ingrained in certain cultures, sustain one another…
The idea of civilization here is not defined by advanced culture or technology but is one of a connected view of the human world that is inseparable from and not apart from or above or below the stream of being. A view of human greatness, if ‘greatness’ is indeed the idea that is sought, is that it involves the use of human ability, unique or common, in the broadest experience of the stream… A society is ‘civilized’ when, even as it is unique, it is connected to –when it forms a braid with– the stream
That is, the meaning of ‘civilization’ consists in the development of individual, perhaps unique, features and yet not seeking ultimate escape from all being
Civilization may involve those elements of culture and technology that enhance connection; that make the idea of connection realistic. Although the idea of civilization is possessed of realism, its expression may be invested in religion, Art and myth… The present attitude commits to seeing the human world in the stream of being – not necessarily as entirely homogeneous with it but perhaps as an island or a chain of islands (or for those who abhor any suggestion of superiority a line of ocean trenches; for others who love or fear individuation a range of mountain peaks thrust above clouds.) The idea of civilization does not commit to an ideal of social uniformity or cultural homogeneity; and there is no intent to suppress horror and antagonism; yet it sees and finds realism in threads of continuity and common Morals among human being, and with roots in the animal world, among continents and nature – in all being
History is a (reconstructed) story in which civilization acquires life and a sense of realism. This does not imply that the best attempt at realism in history is unnecessary for realism is, regardless of virtue, a prime source of the sense of realism – but history is also a story and as story it is another source of a sense of realism
…
The value attached to being ‘civilized’ may have reached its apex in the nineteenth century; it was an idea in which humankind was seen as set apart from nature, higher and unique. However the idea of civilization used here is one in which the human world is inseparable from the stream of BEING
There is a classical view of humankind as special and great in which the greatness is given and derives from being apart from the mundane world – especially animal being; such kinds or conceptions of greatness are, naturally, fragile and, likely, more a defense against fear than a love of (one’s own) being. In such views the world is essentially alien and hostile. The views of the special character of Human being and the alien character of the world, ingrained in certain cultures, sustain one another…
The idea of civilization here is not defined by advanced culture or technology but is one of a connected view of the human world that is inseparable from and not apart from or above or below the stream of being. A view of human greatness, if ‘greatness’ is indeed the idea that is sought, is that it involves the use of human ability, unique or common, in the broadest experience of the stream… A society is ‘civilized’ when, even as it is unique, it is connected to –when it forms a braid with– the stream
That is, the meaning of ‘civilization’ consists in the development of individual, perhaps unique, features and yet not seeking ultimate escape from all being
Civilization may involve those elements of culture and technology that enhance connection; that make the idea of connection realistic. Although the idea of civilization is possessed of realism, its expression may be invested in religion, Art and myth… The present attitude commits to seeing the human world in the stream of being – not necessarily as entirely homogeneous with it but perhaps as an island or a chain of islands (or for those who abhor any suggestion of superiority a line of ocean trenches; for others who love or fear individuation a range of mountain peaks thrust above clouds.) The idea of civilization does not commit to an ideal of social uniformity or cultural homogeneity; and there is no intent to suppress horror and antagonism; yet it sees and finds realism in threads of continuity and common Morals among human being, and with roots in the animal world, among continents and nature – in ALL BEING
History is a (reconstructed) story in which civilization acquires life and a sense of realism. This does not imply that the best attempt at realism in history is unnecessary for realism is, regardless of virtue, a prime source of the sense of realism – but history is also a story and as story it is another source of a sense of realism
The place of this section in Human world is discussed in the aims of the chapter. Ensure that the discussion is adequate
The highest ideal as a combination of given ideals and search for the highest ideal includes possibility of revision of the given ideals
The given ideals include not only the ideals of the past, The Form of the Good, the greatest good, justice, the Christian ideals… but also the immediate vs. the present…
And while there are positions regarding these factors e.g. the piety of the here-and-now, the position here is that while all views have weight, none is given absolute weight in advance… to give absolute weight in advance would be a substance theory… the practical rejection of that approach is its actually destructive presence
That no view has absolute weight in advance includes that the view that emerges may not already be known and that there is no demand that any emergent view shall have or not have absolute weight
It has been seen that the question of absolute weight depends on the kind and manner of view
Introduce the Idea of the Ideal
To observe that there is a tradition of thought regarding high ideals, of the highest ideal. A prime example is the Good that Plato regarded as the highest of forms. To further observe that in placing an ideal as the highest –the most real– of forms, the idea of value is being said to be real and that things are perhaps instances of value
If the highest ideal were to be the Good of Plato, the idea (sense, reference) of the Good would fall out of reflection and experience. Why, then, use the example? Because understanding does not arise afresh with an individual thinker –growth of understanding has historical elements– and therefore, to use and lie in the tradition is to have available the suggestive power of the history of human thought
To question how that can be and to recall from Objects that the idea of value as real has been encountered before and that it requires reconceptualization of object, of value and of thing
To observe that while the tradition of high ideals –the good, the dialectical materialism, the individual, nature and so on– is suggestive, an open approach, i.e. one that avoids the habit of substance thinking, may be the highest approach to the highest ideal
The italicization ‘may be’ suggests that an open approach without specification at all is too open. A thought is that search for the highest value may be the highest (in-process) value
That this is the source of the idea below that begins, ‘The highest value is a search for high value joined to tentative acceptance and valuation of the inherited values…’
There is a tradition in ethics that concerns discussion and establishment of higher (human) values. The question arises, ‘What is the highest ideal or system of ideals?’ It is not clear that this question has meaning. Various possibilities have been suggested – the Real as the Good, the integration of the psyche, the integration of psyche and social systems. Some aspects of classical systems have been mentioned in the narrative but their values have not been prominent (or even mentioned.) Truth has been mentioned but its character as a value remains implicit. Values not mentioned (so far) include justice, equality, liberty (in the search for and expression of Value,) beauty, self-determination and sharing… These values are not held to be as important in the modern world as they may have been regarded in the past. The death and decay of ‘old’ moral systems makes it seem as though values are lost. What is the meaning of justice in a world where there is no ground of values and all individual values are thought, at least in caricature, to be in material comfort or achievement?
The concept of human value independent of external measure may be reestablished by regarding the highest value as including a search for the highest Value
The highest value is a search for high value joined to tentative acceptance and valuation of the inherited values (the real and the good, truth, equality, liberty, justice, beauty, self-determination, caring, sharing… values thought to be invested in social, educational, and political arrangement and process)
Another name for the highest value may be Morals (though not morals)
What may be learned about the highest Value from the Theory of being? First, that a search for the highest value is a search in the Universe i.e. a search in the Real. Second that the search does not reveal the ideal in a moment – it is a process that starts in the present and involves transformation in Identity. Therefore the elements of psyche (e.g. cognitive-affective) that yield information about ideals in this normal cosmological system and that moral information do not, of necessity, extrapolate to the high limit. In the limit morals and (perhaps a sub-domain of) the Real coincide; in this world there may be a gap between moral information and morals; therefore, there is an even greater gap between present moral information (the outcome of cognition-affect) and Morals. However, morals have reality and Morals are Real
Summary of the discussion of Ethics. A conception of Ethics shows the integration of ethics, action and Metaphysics (whose details are given above.) Ethics is contained within metaphysics but if metaphysics is considered merely as knowledge without significance in being then Ethics spills over the boundary walls of metaphysics and requires its redefinition (as discussed earlier regarding objects where it was seen that as far as Value is concerned incomplete faithfulness may be constitutive of an Object.) The conception of Ethics entails, for its complete understanding, the scope of (human) freedoms, action, metaphysics and society
There is a tradition in ethics that concerns discussion and establishment of higher (human) values. The question arises, ‘What is the highest ideal or system of ideals?’ It is not clear that this question has meaning. Various possibilities have been suggested – the Real as the Good, the integration of the psyche, the integration of psyche and social systems. Some aspects of classical systems have been mentioned in the narrative but their values have not been prominent (or even mentioned.) Truth has been mentioned but its character as a value remains implicit. Values not mentioned (so far) include justice, equality, liberty (in the search for and expression of Value,) beauty, self-determination and sharing… These values are not held to be as important in the modern world as they may have been regarded in the past. The death and decay of ‘old’ moral systems makes it seem as though values are lost. What is the meaning of justice in a world where there is no ground of values and all individual values are thought to be in material comfort or achievement? The concept of human value independent of external measure may be reestablished by regarding the highest value as including a search for the highest Value
The highest value is a search for high value joined to tentative acceptance and valuation of the inherited values (the real and the good, truth, equality, liberty, justice, beauty, self-determination, caring, sharing… values thought to be invested in social, educational, and political arrangement and process)
Another name for the highest value may be Morals (though not morals)
What may be learned about the highest Value from the Theory of Being? First, that a search for the highest value is a search in the Universe i.e. a search in the Real. Second that the search does not reveal the ideal in a moment – it is a process that starts in the present and involves transformation in Identity. Therefore the elements of psyche (e.g. cognitive-affective) that yield information about ideals in this normal cosmological system and that moral information do not, of necessity, extrapolate to the high limit. In the limit morals and (perhaps a sub-domain of) the Real coincide; in this world there may be a gap between moral information and morals; therefore, there is an even greater gap between present moral information (the outcome of cognition-affect) and Morals. However, morals have reality and Morals are Real
Summary of the discussion of Ethics. A conception of Ethics shows the integration of ethics, action and Metaphysics (whose details are given above.) Ethics is contained within metaphysics but if metaphysics is considered merely as knowledge without significance in being then Ethics spills over the boundary walls of metaphysics and requires its redefinition (as discussed earlier regarding objects where it was seen that as far as Value is concerned incomplete faithfulness may be constitutive of an Object.) The conception of Ethics entails, for its complete understanding, the scope of (human) freedoms, ACTION, metaphysics and society
The discussion of faith is brief. Its purpose is to understand the nature of faith, its possibilities, reasons for its endurance in the modern world despite the reasonable pronouncement of Nietzsche (over one hundred and twenty five years ago) that ‘God is dead’ i.e. despite the expectation that reason and science had made faith unnecessary and therefore would displace it. If faith is belief without complete reasons then one of its clear sources or bases is that, in much that is significant, complete reasons do not exist and or that reasons are incompletely known or knowable; and that there is no final ‘foundation’ for human affairs in complete reason. The practical limits of reason, in relation to certainty in knowledge and especially in relation to determining outcomes of actions, are well understood in modern thought e.g. in Models of Bounded Rationality, Volume I: Economic Analysis and Public Policy, 1982, Herbert A. Simon (b. 1916, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U.S.) However, it remains perhaps the modern delusion that complete reason, if not immediately forthcoming, can and should be (and is) the ideal regarding knowledge, design and planning, and (course of) action in all details and affairs
Faith persists (perhaps) because, in addition to the inertia and despite abuses of institutions, it has significance (below) which may include appeal and, perhaps, adaptation or self-perpetuation. As far as belief is concerned a function of faith has always been to doubt the limitations of ‘common sense’ (which includes science) and to provide alternatives. This is true of common and special faith and of private and public faith (that a system of faith should suffer abuse is not a fault of faith itself.) The modern alternative to faith is secularism; both faith and secularism suffer abuses. What resolutions may there be?
This section and the next are not independent
… And some interchange of material may be appropriate
A preliminary goal is to discuss the especially modern problems of any analysis of faith and religion. That this concern has a center around the nature of the relevance of religion. There is a universal concern with the abuse of the institution of religion. For many, religion –at least formal religion– is irrelevant if not dead. Reactions from such people may range from boredom to raised eyebrows to amusement to suspicion. For others religion is private and their reactions may range from mere tolerance to resistance to anger. For many, religion is more or less as it always has been and their reaction to a reasoned discussion of religion, may be one of puzzlement or resistance or hostility or even violence. The reaction may of course depend on the particular faith since some religions extol tolerance and others promote openness
They were not sure what their reaction to these concerns might be. However, truth and the importance of doubt in approaching truth was one ideal in which the journey was grounded. This required and encouraged openness in principle to the possible truths of religion and truth or otherwise of the value of religion. It required that the question could not be merely brushed aside even if there was no formal religion in their background. They might learn something useful from the religions. It is clear that there is the expression of beauty and mystery is a part of religion. Should the issues of modernity negate these positive expressions?
A second concern regarding religion is that it is influential in the world. The fundamental oppositions of modern Christianity and modern Islam may well set the political tone for the next one hundred years and beyond. Here figures perhaps the great conflict of the twenty first century. Somewhere in the oppositions, to which the engines of modern economy may be added, lies the potential for conflict and resolution that may define the future of man. Thus religion is important in its political implications; therefore, an understanding of the forces and faiths involved may be useful and the practical question of how to approach the cultures of religion arises. May it be one of opposition or one of respect, one of openness and trust? And if trust may be destroyed, at what point may that occur?
A third concern is that of opportunity. In the turn away from religion as lived to one that is either dead or merely a political instrument (of ideological enslavement andor action,) is something lost? Importantly if something is lost, is there lost potential and does modern culture restore that potential? An answer to this question will of course depend on the individual's view of the world and modern secular-humanism suggests that its views are an adequate realistic response even though lacking some of the grand vistas of earlier philosophy, and of traditional myth and religion… It is obviously pertinent that (they saw that) the metaphysics of this narrative contains the greatest vision in a rational mold
In the modern world, it seems that any universal response to the questions of religion and faith will be a non-dogmatic one even though it may be dogma that binds billions to faith. Perhaps, even if there are potential and possibility, the connotations of ‘religion’ are undesirable. Perhaps work for wages and expenditure of wages on entertainment have become the essential hypnotic-opiate of the world. Perhaps there is an antidote, some amalgam of art and mystery, in the making. Perhaps there is no enduring universal medium between comfort and strife
Import material from The concepts, immediately below
A primary goal is to understand the psychological and social dynamics of religion. Some observations should be made. First, though faith is a convenient occasion to consider religion this implies only overlap but not identity of faith and religion. Second, it is not expected that the psycho-social dynamics is identical among individuals and cultures; although there may be universal elements, this should be the result of study. It is important to not over-generalize not only from religion to religion but from group to group e.g. Judaism, Christianity and Islam to Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism and from religions of one kind of society to religions of another e.g. from the agriculturalist (includes the modern industrial world) religions to hunter-gatherer religions
A related concern is to identify the sense of the concept or religion. No doubt there is a range (family) of sense. How is the sense to be identified? There is first the reference or range of the idea of religion; this would include, of course, the religions of the world. Here it might be interesting to consider whether a practitioner of a particular religion is to be defined by the canon or whether a better definition in terms of sense and reference that allows for variant forms and that includes the sense of religion and the historical canon might be studied to real advantage. Then there is the experience and effect of religion which is multi-dimensional since the experiences include those that may be labeled ‘mystery’ and ‘moral imperative’ and the effects are not only the experience but also in behavior, and in society and culture. Is religion the result of search for meaning? Is it an expression of a cosmology – local and perhaps practical andor universal and perhaps grounding? Is it a positive instrument of social bonding or a negative political instrument of enslavement? Perhaps all and perhaps the negative aspects may not be said to be inessential… To consider the thought that (ideal) religion is the orientation of the entire being or individual (andor society) to the entire universe (and how this may be seen as a progression e.g. of science – philosophy and thought – the entire being including the foregoing emotion, ritual, mystery, myth… remember that reason is not always most conducive to positive initiative and the passive stance of modern man in relation to being and destiny as well as to many lesser imperatives
A second goal is to consider modern culture as a whole. Considering the many moderns who practice no formal religion or private spiritual practice, are there activities that function as religion? Can the practice of culture (in its more specific meaning that, as an example, includes cultivating the arts) be considered to have elements of religion? While science and reason are not religions, is there a point at which the practice of science may function as religion? Alternatively, does the practice of science and the scientific view of the universe function as religion? What of philosophy e.g. liberal humanism, existentialism or rationalism?
A third goal is to consider the place of religion in the world. Given abuse, is there a case to eliminate religion? Notice that the question is presumptive in a number of ways. First, of course even given abuse, any attempt at elimination of religion may be or cause even greater harm. Second, since most institutions suffer abuse, the question issue of abuse should give weight to positive and negative factors. Third, who is it who presumes to judge? In other words is there any group of individuals who have the authority to judge? What are the standards by which to judge? Is the way of science and reason better? Has religion outlived any usefulness that it may have had? Practically of course it appears that religion is here to stay. Is not the best course of action one of mutual regard among believers and non-believers? Also, the argument regarding abuse in no way applies evenly to all religions at all times. If it is argued that requiring someone to believe the literal truth of a set of articles on faith (regardless of actual truth) is abusive (and this is perhaps the most benign of the abuses) then, certainly, not all religions are equally abusive; some recant all unnecessary beliefs and metaphysical positions, others merely tell stories
Another primary goal that is related to the previous question is to consider the possibilities of religion in the world. Even though given religions may suffer degeneration, is their a place for a religious function? Is this function best performed by the artifacts of modern culture mentioned earlier e.g. science, reason, art…? Alternatively is there a place for an ideal religion? Could presence of such a religion be an improvement? What would its elements be? (Expand the elements of grounding metaphysics whether myth or reason, local practical cosmology, morals, celebration, ritual, text…) What would a framework for the ideal be? Certainly no claims are made that the journey and its narrative are or contain anything like religion but the metaphysical framework and other elements of the narrative might form a scaffolding
Should the following thought be placed or copied elsewhere? Possible locations are in discussions of action and thought, limits to rationality regarding contingent affairs
Add a comment wherever limits to reason are discussed that the limits –perhaps only generally– concern the contingent
A final thought. Consider the realism of such talk as though ideas and individuals can mold the human world. Note of course the huge significance of the effect of the history of ideas on the world and that it seems that is not only the idealist concern with truth but also the concern with action and change and force that has had effect (but that it is not always the intended effect that transpires or that those whose concern has been with design and action have been most effectual)
The final thought regards the general issue of social change, planning and design. Regardless of theory and motive it appears to be an element of human nature to try to change, to not let things be. It is not said that there are no opposing elements. It is not said that action shall produce intended change (or that there is always intended change.) It is not said that intention to change is good or that all intentions are good. Action does not require reasons even though there may always be conflict about actions and reasons
The argument requires (1) noting a history of abuse of various kinds and (2) obvious lack of truth content
I believe that a valid response is to not argue faith versus knowledge in general but to look at various kinds of religion and faith. Thus the faith of peoples called ‘nomadic’ is often oral and contextual, and even when not literal, that it is contextual and functional in context: as long as the style of life remains it is functional – if the faith is destroyed, the life may be destroyed and if the life style is destroyed the faith may lose local context. Even though the scriptural tradition (originally pastoral vs. hunter-gatherer) becomes formal, degenerate, and abusive in local context and empty if there is insistence on literal interpretation of parable, myth or legend these tendencies are not universal. Consider then that the science based campaign of Richard Dawkins and other intellectuals against religion. They argue that it would be better all religion were eradicated and that while adults may be free to believe what they want (Ravi thought that this is not altogether true – that truth itself is a value and therefore the freedom of belief may be a political but not a moral one,) the inculcation of religion in children should be a legal offense (one argument against Dawkins’ thought is that the Creationists could argue that Dawkins should not teach his children about evolution and Dawkins might answer that he is not forcing his children to believe in evolution but giving them the opportunity to understand and to criticize it but if it is given that what can be taught to children can be legislated then there can be no one authority who will determine what can and what cannot be taught; while it is hazardous to universalize, Dawkins’ best approach might be to present the arguments about ideas and cultural values but to tolerate the instruction of children in views that he abhors but that others might believe… it may be reasonably said however, that if a parent is not convinced of the truth of some canon, then to present it as certain to children is a form of abuse. Should this concern extend to cultivation of magical thinking e.g. Santa Claus?) Given the multi-dimensionality of the entire context of science, faith in modern pastoral and modern hunter-gatherer communities it seems reasonable to assert that while moral persuasion may be acceptable, political persuasion is not (it is interesting that in hunter-gatherer communities, there is instruction in myth there is a predominant lack of persuasion) … science itself should depend on this freedom
In general the argument from abuse of a system to its eradication is dependent on an assumption of uniformity and universality of abuse and is therefore suspect. What is desired may be the elimination of the abusive practice and the method that might be adopted should depend on the kind, severity and extent of the abuse
Hugh Brody, The Other Side of Eden, 2000, says that the modern agricultural-industrial societies and the earlier pastoral-agricultural communities are the true nomads (consider the modern attitude that here is home but that I may at any time pick up and find something better, consider the vast population movements of recent and Biblical history) while the past and present hunter-gatherer communities have a greater sense of permanence and place that their nomadism is a movement to find resources within a traditional boundary and that while the hunter-gatherers do migrate, their migrations occur on a much longer time scale and typically with different reasons and sentiments than the migrations of the agricultural-industrial societies. In fact, one of the reasons for the movement of the hunter-gatherer is their displacement from fertile lands by the agriculturalists in their search for new land. Brody says that the universal need for new sources of resource is built into the pastoral-agricultural-industrial way of life; and that in the hunter-gatherer this need is not universal or incessant that the norm is that the traditional land is home. The displacement of the hunter-gatherer also explains why the remaining hunter-gatherers have come, in the modern world, to occupy the more inhospitable places on earth (however the hunter-gatherers themselves do not generally find or experience these places as hostile or inhospitable, it is us who generally find the extreme environments to be inhospitable)
It has been shown that there is truth to the logically consistent narrative system and that this assertion has significance against the background of the universe which is infinitely in dimension and variety relative to any given cosmological system. Therefore, ‘Jesus Christ is risen from the dead’ holds in countless cosmological systems. However, the ‘number’ of actual cosmological systems is a higher order of infinity than those in which some Jesus Christ arose from the dead in normal fashion… i.e. there is little support from the metaphysics-cosmology of this narrative for the belief that the rising from the dead did occur on this earth. The question of rising from the dead must on this earth must therefore be ‘semantic,’ rational and historical. The semantic content is very simple – what is meant by ‘dead’ and what is meant by ‘rising.’ I.e. was Christ altogether dead or in a state of diminished vitality? In either case ‘dead’ must mean contingently but not logically dead. As far as ‘rising’ is concerned, did Christ rise on his own power or the power of some other material agent or…? Given the status of historical knowledge there is not much point discussing these issues. Although well known scholars have made pronouncements and such scholars have been quoted (with reference to the intellect of the scholar) it seems first that any such argument must circularly depend on the veracity of the account used and second that it is the argument and not the scholar’s intellect that should be the issue. What remains is the rational concern. It is obvious that there is no necessary rational argument against a rising from a contingent death but there is a probable rational (perhaps a contradiction terms) one
The argument is left in an uncertain state. There is no necessary conclusion. There are probable ones but these have no necessity
The question arises – why has the issue become one about logic and sophistry? Why promote a local myth (myth does not mean untrue) above all other local myths (including the myth of the science of this cosmos projected to the entire universe – note here the circular aspect of science as myth: science is universal myth only if its projection is true i.e. only if science is universal myth)? There was probably an original excessive-abusive dependence on a fundamentalist-literal account (not that such accounts have no figurative value) that became displaced by science. However, if religion-faith is not literal-fundamentalist there is no displacement by science to be had especially remembering that science-projected is also myth (note from the metaphysics-cosmology that projection of science occurs in kind and in micro- and macroscopic extension and it is therefore invalid to argue that science provides even a full local cosmology… and, of course, here ‘science’ means some interpretations of some standard accounts…)
Without fundamentalism there is no reason to think about political persuasion. With fundamentalism, we may think about political persuasion but it is not clear except in extreme cases that political persuasion is necessary. And if moral persuasion is indicated what kind should it be? Should it be praise of moral superiority or should it be an implicit living of one’s faith without its too loud and too persistent proclamation?
In the previous version of the narrative, there was little disposition to the fundamentalism of the religions of the agriculturalist especially Judaism and Christianity whose original flourishing was among fertile land set against vast desert. In this version, in light of an understanding of the significance of contextual faith which is generally that of the hunter-gatherer, there is less disposition toward modern fundamentalism
Yet a focus on respect and bridging remain. The sources of this focus are the intrinsic value of respect and bridging and the practical value regarding world community and peace. There are of course no absolutes and there may be situational limits to openness and bridging (respect may remain.) It cannot be absolutely clear that success is to be had in the endeavor of community and peace and it cannot even be altogether clear that community and peace are absolute values even when they seem to be
As a part of their development in understanding and, so, in transformation, they questioned the nature of faith and Religion and their place in the world. Even in the face of the spread of reason, faith has not withered to an extent that may have been expected. Faith remains a presence – perhaps unexpected given the spread of ‘reason.’ The factors are complex. Faith exists in the presence of limits to reason. Negotiation of the world (known and unknown) optimally requires doubt and faith. ‘Faith’ occasions strength of commitment, social bonding and mutual support – intensity of faith may be seen as a function that is distinct from content (intensity may derive from sincerity regarding content.) Faith has literal significance – as demonstrated by the Theory of Being. The literal aspect may appear to be but is not necessarily absurd – the absurdity may also be a source of appeal, of bonding of suggestion that the world according to reason is incomplete. Faith has non literal significance ‘rising from the dead’ speaks to a limit to the common understanding of the nature of death; but, even though the literal implication may be unlikely, without its possibility there would be no metaphorical significance. There are non-Meaning functions e.g. bonding; resistance to the tyrant (in the war of 1939-1945, in Germany, persons of simple faith harbored the persecuted.) Although there are criticisms of ‘faith,’ secularism too (despite its proclamations) perpetuates abuse; and ‘faith’ has vision where pure secularism has none (traditional faith stands in the shadow of being and is therefore incomplete as is secularism)
Few persons are altogether ‘agnostic’ with regard to working beliefs. One attitude of the ‘rational’ person is that if something is not contained in reason it does not exist (positivism) or, at least, should remain unspoken (implicit positivism.) Now, insistence on such silence lacks rationality for it is in speaking of, especially in error, that knowing may come about. It may, however, be natural though not necessary for a rational (rationalistic) individual to think that the essence of the Universe has been seen in reason or in science. Further, (implicit) positivism may be productive in science and reason and may be the rationalist’s defense against ‘absurdity.’ The rational person may go further and find loneliness and therefore heroism in her or his view. While it is possible for scientists and others to be agnostic toward the absolute character of science the typical responses, even of scientists, are a mix of doubt and faith. Thus even ‘rationalism’ is complex in its ways. An analysis of the psychology of a belief provides neither proof nor disproof of content – there may be ‘illicit’ reasons for believing what is true and for disbelieving what is not. One point to psychological analysis of belief is to show that, commonly, what is held as true is held reasonably i.e. it is assumed e.g. from the robust character of a society and its institutions that proof exists even though the individual has not seen proof or worked through the multifaceted details of foundation; and that what is held as untrue has a similar status
In general, then, while belief is held to be a matter of rationality, much common belief is in fact subscription to common belief –to paradigm– but lacks proof. ‘Everyone’ believes in a proof that, it is thought, is demonstrated somewhere but, in fact, may be demonstrated nowhere (e.g. materialism in the world of the twentieth century and articles of religion in earlier times.) What is the hold of religious faith? Is its apparent hold magnified due to the vocal and militant character of ‘followers?’ What is the ‘meaning’ of faith? The literal meaning often strains the imagination – not ‘the sun rises in the East’ but ‘Christ is risen from the dead!’ A psychological significance is the suggestion that truth, the nature of the Universe, our nature exceeds what is seen in the common or secular view. It is the fact that the imagination is strained, that there is a suggestion of the absurd that gives the article of faith (some of) its significance. The figurative Meaning depends –in part– on the burden that literal meaning places on belief. This is also a source of group bonding – ‘the sun rises in the East’ is hardly a source of cohesion or group identity but ‘Christ is risen from the dead!’ is. This discussion has been in the way of Understanding but not of proof – although theologians may seek proof and though proofs may be given, proof is not the essence of faith (perhaps even for the intellectually inclined, proof might clear doubt but it is doubtful that it would secure faith)
These reflections suggest an alternative or enhanced meaning to ‘faith’ as follows
They found the following concerns regarding faith to be significant. (1) The suggestion that an approach to knowledge and transformation is not in construction alone or criticism alone but in their interaction. In discovery and becoming, there are combinations; there is ebb and flow of doubt and faith that is efficacious. (2) Regardless of doubts regarding religious faith, its roots appear, at least at present, to be established; and although the history of religious faith is one of ebb and flow, here, a rational foundation to the occurrence of faith has been given. Rationalizing faith away e.g. on the grounds that some faiths are absurd, is a typical form of ‘liberal’ magical thinking. Religion provides a positive force in various ways but is also seen as negative. Should there be a secular response and what might that response be? (Whether there ‘should’ be some response will depend on what responses might be imagined.) The secular response is easily polarized – ‘We are pure; they are evil!’ Some limits of ‘secularism’ – as a way of life and in government have been seen earlier. A first step is to accept both self and other; to embrace rather than divide – remembering, of course, that it is not given that any principle (even the golden rule and its philosophical variants) shall be universal. (3) Is there a place in the world for religion? What is that place?
A thought – Religion, they thought, is the negotiation of all Being by the entire being of the individual (and community.) What directions might a ‘new religion’ take? A common form of religion is to provide a Metaphysics, an ethics, and a way of life – the paths; and its style may be a mix of story and prescription (and gathering and ritual.) A Religion might begin with the knowledge that ‘There is more in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in a philosophy’ or ‘the world is the void.’ They found it natural to hesitate to suggest that there is value to the idea of a new religion; there are particular doubts – is not the common modern ‘secular pluralism’ (secularism and the present system of faiths) enough, what form might a religion take, is not the time of religion past; and general doubts – to suggest ‘religion’ may be to suggest a ‘solution’ from the past to concerns of the present, and doubts regarding the nature and desirability of change or attempted change that originates in an idea – but: is not the occasion of the idea an effect upon change? What might an individual journey contribute? They wondered whether there were aspects of a journey that might be useful
Some ‘limits’ have been seen – to faith and to secularism, to modern science and to modern philosophy. These limits are not exclusively inherent in the endeavors but also inhere in the attitudes of Human beings that then become invested in the endeavors. Faith is set against faith; secular society against secular society; and faith against secularism. One characterization of the attitudes is that they tend to become polarized without grounding into concern with the immediate-crawling and with the ultimate. The tendency to polarization may not be universal but it is sufficient to create a culture of impoverishment. A challenge becomes apparent – to depolarize the attitudes, to join them so that faith and secularism may coexist, so that the immediate grounds the ultimate, the ultimate lifts the immediate out of mere crawling
These thoughts are both general and ideal. The ‘world’ may perhaps be capable of improvement but it may be that problem and opportunity are essentially bound together
It is important while being guided by optimism to remember that the world has no necessary regard for even the best of designs. Realism, hope, design and action may remain in interaction; formula does not effectively replace engagement
Given these thoughts it seems that an approach is to join ideals with realism – to live well and to (begin to) build bridges while guided by ideals and understanding but not being ruled by practical limits