Abbreviations and conventions
C—concept
A—assertion (argument)
P—proof
D—definition
CA—counter argument or assertion
DCA—deep counter argument
CC—counter (to) counter argument
Concept—experience—and object
The concept—the primitive not the significant concept—is any mental content; but to say this at the outset may be to assume ‘mind’ and ‘content.’ Therefore begin more primitively
The visual experience of a mountain is part of the concept of a mountain but is not necessarily faithful to ‘the mountain’
The concept—experience—does not imply existence of a corresponding object and if there is a corresponding object, the concept is not necessarily faithful to it i.e. the form of the concept or experience may only approximate the object (if there is a corresponding object there must be some faithfulness because being is part of form i.e. the fact of experience is part of the form of experience and if the re is being, the fact of being is part of the form of being)
As concept, concept is not given to be in the same category as object
Object and being
However, experience and experience of experience are not in different categories
There is experience—(some) experience is an object
Experience—the concept—is a first object
Counter: illusion—the being and form of an object may be illusory
Counter-counter—in saying that the concept is a first object, it is not said that there is a corresponding object. It is, however, the case that there is the concept—whether ‘real’ or ‘illusory’
It is in experience that it is known that there is being. This is incontrovertible. It is not being said here that experience is necessary for being. It will be seen later that with appropriate extension of the meaning of experience, manifest being must be associated with experience (that experience is—must be—associated with being has just been seen.) I.e. every element of manifest being has—as part of its constitution—experience; every element of experience is—manifest—being
There is being (could this come first and be repeated here?)
From the fact of being—alternatively, from the fact of experience—it will be seen that there are certain necessary objects—being, all being
From the forms of experience there are certain necessary objects—from difference there is part or domain
It follows that there is complement and void
From the forms of experience there are certain normal or contingent objects. From difference and change—duration and extension; from the experience of identity and alien identity—self and other. The character of these normal objects and the immensely probable objectivity of their concepts—i.e. that the concepts imply the being of the objects—is later elucidated. Further, even though the implication—from concept to being of object—is probable, the being of normal objects—except the contradictory—is necessary
Intentionality
Intentionality follows from the location of an object in a scene—e.g. in a world