ࡱ> 5@ œbjbj22 .XX(d d d d 44484,6d,6p6(&7&7&7GRDH`H#%%%%%%$R"I SfDGSSId d &7&7@ ^_Y_Y_YS.d &7 &7#_YS#_Y&_YY6_" `&76 0ِ4Si` \t0`@_W8` :d d d d ` d<pHL_YNPpHpHpHIID"V3dXjV3Note: this is a very temporary document  HYPERLINK "../../../" Home | HYPERLINK "writing%20Journey%20in%20Being%202007.html"Writing Journey in Being 2007 Use  HYPERLINK "Journey%20in%20Being-New%20World-being.html" Journey in Being-New World-being for material once the outline of this document is complete Being The primary objectives of this section are to lay out and motivate some basic ideas for a foundation / framework for an ultimate journey into understanding and transformation and to explain why, from among these, the idea of being is fundamental to the development. Here, understanding includes knowledge but is more than knowledge of the worldthe universeor even the nature of knowledge itself. Understanding includes a sense of the nature of being-in-the-world and what is important to itor, at least, a recognition that this sense is significant together with an intent to develop the sense and a habit of being concerned with it Some basic concepts of the narrative are essence, substance, mind and matter, existence, concept and object, experience and forms of experience, being, meaning, sense and reference The primary and foundational concepts are, perhaps, experience and being. Experience is fundamental in that it is immediatethat experience is immediate is, perhaps, an understatement for while the experience of an external object is different from the objectit is an experience, the experience of experience is an experience. Substance is not a central concept of the narrative but is important because it has been so significant in the tradition. Here, substance as foundational is rejectedit is found that substance must be rejected as a foundation for any ultimate understanding of the world and what is learned in seeing the necessity of this rejection is immense. Essence, mind, and matter have a similar negative importance to the development What now follows is an early stage of the systematic and precise development of the meaning and significance of the concepts. A more complete development occurs in the subsequent chapters of Theory of Being in which the concepts are developed and elaborated as the basis of a coherent system of understanding. The development follows in the subsequent divisions of the narrative, in which the system is further elaborated and is applied to topics of interest the goals of the journey Concepts for a foundation. This chapter introduces ideas or concepts for a foundational framework for an ultimate journey into knowledge, understanding and transformation The core of the framework is developed in Metaphysics and its elaboration continues in the remaining chapters of the division Theory of Being The framework did not arise at once but is the result of an iteration of insight and criticism Reasons and motives for adoption of some ideas and rejection are given. However, a fuller understanding of the concepts and reasons for retention or rejection of the concepts is developed subsequently in Theory of Being and especially in Metaphysics Essences. In attempting to provide a foundation the question of the essence of thingsof the worldmay arise. What is essenceor, since concepts do not arise in final form at once and for all time, what may it be? Is the essence of a thing distinct from the thing? Are there essences? Substance. The history of the idea of substanceprimarily in western thoughtmay be seen as an extended and varied investigation into essences There are two broad uses of the word substance in philosophy. The first is a general use in which substance is the ground, being, or essence of things. Thales of Miletus suggested that the fundamental substance was water and the idea of stuff, of which water is a kind, is a primary instance of substance as the essence of all things. Thales, of course, did not anticipate that water would be found to be made of even more basic entities. The second use of substance arises in asking, for example, what the essence of a particular thing may be, e.g., what is the essence of being a mountain. The two meanings of substance are, of course, connected and an adequate development of the first kind may found a development of the second kind. In developing a metaphysics it is primarily the first meaning of substance that is of interest There have been a variety of reasons for an interest in substance theory and, accordingly, substance has been held to have a variety of characteristics. Reasoned lists of such characteristics have occasionally been regarded as marking the criteria that any conception of substance should satisfy. This approach is rather ad hoc and is against the spirit of the idea of substance. It is, perhaps, only by accident that such an approach would result in a coherent concept of substance and a proper substance theory. Proper substance theory is not a constituent concept of the approach What might constitute a coherent approach? If the idea of substance is to be significant in revealing the nature of the world, it will be a constituent concept of a coherent metaphysics that would stand or fall not only on the criteria of coherence but also on applicability. That is, the metaphysics would say something about the world, what it would say would be true and nothing that it said would be untrue. As will be seen world is also a concept whose meaning will be specified even if the specification is simple. The notion of substance and its nature will fall out of study and therefore the characteristics that mark substance must be variablesperhaps only implicitlyof the theory A primary motivation to metaphysicssubstance or otherwiseis to understand the world. If the terms of the metaphysics, explanatory or predictive, are more complex than the world itself, the metaphysics can hardly be regarded as understanding. Therefore, substance should be simple. From simplicity, it does not follow that substance will be known or even knowable. However, if substance were not even intelligible, e.g. through intuition andor conception, the resulting metaphysics would hardly count as understanding to an individual. Plato suggested that actual things are rough copies of forms that resided in a world whose ideal character made the forms intelligible or knowable even if not available to sense perception The thought that sense perception constitutes evidence but not knowledge may be one motive to explaining knowledge in terms of an ideal world. However, though Platos theory is elegant, it introduces two kindsthe form and the thing even if it does not go so far as to introduce a separate world of ideal forms. Understanding would be better served if there were but one kind, one world, in terms of which the problem of knowability or intelligibility could be resolved. Therefore, another desirable characteristic of substanceof the terms of any satisfactory metaphysicsis that there should be one kind which, since there are actual things, must be the actual kind. Another way of saying this is that substance should be of the one world The desirable characteristics of substance, then, are simplicity, intelligibility and worldliness The characteristics are not necessarily independentworldliness may enhance, though not guarantee, intelligibility and simplicity. Their formal interdependence will vary according to metaphysics and, therefore, the true interdependence will depend onwhat emerges astrue metaphysics It is not clear that any metaphysics can satisfy all three characteristicsespecially since a metaphysics that were not comprehensive over all things would hardly be a metaphysics. In the extreme of simplicity, it seems that there would be but one substance that would be uniform and unchanging. The world and its variety would come from that substance. However, the becoming itself should be simple or intelligible and, it is perhaps deterministic rather than indeterministic becoming that satisfies both simplicity and intelligibility However, that variety and change should be the deterministic result of uniformity and stasis is incoherent Although Heideggers insight into the untenable character of substance theory is intense, in neglecting to note that determinism is the implicit twin of substance, the rejection of substance as foundational remained incomplete. Despite the explicit rejection of substance, the habit of substance thinking was retained Is there a metaphysics that can replace substance thinking and still be counted as foundationaland simple, intelligible, and fully within the one world? The metaphysics of immanence developed in Metaphysics satisfies these criteria. It rejects substance in any strict sense but is foundationalit will be seen that while foundations and rejection of substance have been traditionally regarded as incompatible, the alleged incompatibility is the result of an assumption of a deterministic universe and that a non-substance is possible and is developed as metaphysics of immanence in Metaphysics. The rejection of substance is not a hypothesis but the consequence of an empirically founded metaphysics which is therefore of the world. Although demonstration waits until Metaphysics, the idea of the universe as all being is empirical and this idea among other demonstrated empirical ideas results in a metaphysics that is ultimately simple, yet ultimate in depth. Further, the depth is a result of the simplicity The metaphysics of immanence retains the idea of form but not of form of being as a kind that is other than being or residing in another world; it is a metaphysics of immanent formof form as being of what is formed. The metaphysics eliminates need for andlogicalpossibility of substance of substratum and sortal kind, which are the two kinds noted earlier In the metaphysics of immanence, the foundation of the world is the world itself. Thus it is not an idealism or materialism or any kind of restricted-ism. How such a metaphysics mayand doescount as metaphysics and how it is simple awaits Metaphysics The demonstration that the metaphysics of immanence yields intelligibility while referring toand only tothe one universe begins in Metaphysics and is completed in Objects In Metaphysics it is shown that the idea of theoneuniverse as all being is more than a definition in that there can be no part of all that there is that cannot interact with any other part For further treatment of substance, see  HYPERLINK "Journey%20in%20Being-New%20World-substance-temp.html" Substance, HYPERLINK "../../../Journey%20in%20Being-New%20World.html"Journey in Being-New World, and the discussion of substance in  HYPERLINK "http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html" Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Alternatives to substance. In the foregoing, the notions of property, impression or sense data, and event as alternatives to substance or, in a loose interpretation, other kinds of substance, have not been taken up. However, as in the case of substance, it is preferable, as far as possible, to develop the metaphysics and see what falls out of it as fundamental rather than to set up a system of ad hoc even if reasonable explanationincluding criteria for explanationsin advance. In the present time, philosophy is often taken to have the characteristicperhaps among othersthat its content is conceptual rather than merely empirical and the concepts and their subject have not yet become definite as, for example, in science. Therefore, there may not be the luxury of criteria that are more than ad hoc and reasonable, i.e., it is not given that a philosophy or a metaphysics may be systematic and realistic. It is remarkable, therefore, that the metaphysics of immanence is systematic and realistic and that its formulation and concepts permit its own evaluation as well as an evaluation of the concepts of substancewhether abstract or in the mode of stuff, property, impression, fact and event Reflections on the nature of philosophy and metaphysics in the later chapters, Philosophy and metaphysics and Problems in metaphysics, show that while it is natural that metaphysics encompasses philosophy and that while there should be domains within it that are not characterized by the nature or definiteness of science, the thought that all metaphysics and all areas within philosophy should lack such definiteness cannot obtain Mind and matter. The foregoing discussion suggests that mind and matter cannot be substances. In Metaphysics it is seen that in their common meanings mind and matter are too restricted and definite to serve as universal substances even though they may be substantial to this cosmological system. However, it will also be seen that if the common meanings of mind and matter are sufficiently loosened then either mind or matter may be foundational but to regard them as universal substances would also require a loosening of the concept of substance. Further, although these possibilities illuminate the character of the metaphysics, they do not particularly illuminate understanding of the world and might be confusing on account of the possibility of conflation of common and extended meanings The treatment of the problem of substance is left to Metaphysics where, as noted, it is found that there are and can be no fundamental substances in the stricter meanings of substance. If there are no substances there remains thepotentialproblem that there are no simple explanations. Of course, if this is the way things are then it is not a true problem. What, however, could function as a basis of explanation yet not be a simple substance? Existence. Perhaps the most immediate and basic character of things is that they arethat they exist, i.e., that they are or have being. It is not at all clear, however, that existencebeingcan form the basis of a simple system of explanation. The possibility is shown and realized in Metaphysics. Here, it will be appropriate to discuss existence and to consider some problems that have been associated with the concept of existence and its possibility as the basis of an explanatory system To say something exists is to say that it is there. To say that something is there appears to suggest that it exists in space. However the use of there in there is a mountain called Everest is not spatial but is used to avoid the awkward construction is a mountain called Everest. Allowing some awkwardness of construction, to say Mt. Everest exists is to say Mt. Everest is Although it may seem that everything that exists must exist in space this is not necessarily the case. For example one apple exists in space but where does the number one exist? Does it exist? The machinery with which to answer these questions is developed in Metaphysics and Objects and therefore question of whether there are non-spatial objects is deferred to those chapters. However, it may be important to keep the possibility of non-spatial existence open at this point in the narrative because objects that exist in a non-spatial framework and objects that exist but in no framework at all have not been ruled out. Therefore, the grammatical form X is is important to indicate, first, existence and, second, to indicate the possibility of existence in non-spatial frameworks Local and global modes of description. The history of the universe may be viewed as having a trajectory through time or as being a trajectory over time. In the first view, the history is seen as a motion; in the second view it is seen as an object. Spatial description is implicit in the term trajectorythe trajectory is that of a spatial distribution. It is convenient to switch among the coordinate or spatio-temporal description and the non-coordinate description in which the history of the universe is seen as an object. An immediate concern with this thought is that it is not clear that spatio-temporal description is possible for every part of the universe or that space and time are the only possible coordinates of description. From the coordinate point of view, the universe could be seen as different patches. From the non-coordinate view, the universe would be the collection of patches. In view of the indeterminacy and possible incompleteness of description in terms of space and time, the terms coordinate and non- or supra-coordinate may be replaced by the terms local and global, respectively. The global mode allows for objects or domains that are not and, perhaps, cannot be coordinated in terms ofotherobjects The primitive character of existence. Therefore, existence is a very simple and immediate concept. It is associated with one of the most primitive of language constructs, the verb to be one of whose forms is is In the above most primitive use, is indicates nothing other than existence. Other uses are less primitive. In saying, the mountain is its atoms, it is meant that the mountain is made of its atomsthat the atoms constitute the mountain. In saying that the mountain is tall, is functions to connect the mountain to its property of tallness. The less primitive uses may be regarded as asserting existence and something else, e.g., constitution or having a property. The uses are relatedthey may seen as having a common stem-use, that of being. In X is itself the constitutive use reduces to the stem. Bundle theory is the view, attributed to the philosopher David Hume but not adopted here, that an object is precisely its collection of properties; on this view, X is its properties, e.g., the mountain is its mass and its shape and its color It is clear that there is a difference between the kinds of propertymass is thought to inhere in the object but an object has color only in interaction and, if it were the intent to discuss or argue bundle theory, it would be necessary to make this distinction As noted, the use of is that indicates being or existence isperhapsits most primitive use. That existence has the meaning of the most primitive use of a most primitive linguistic construct points to the primitive character of existence, i.e., of being. The depth of the concept of existence or being lies, not in remoteness or esotericism, but in this primitive and immediate character It is not being said that the grammatical form, X is, implies existence but that it expresses the linguistic meaning of existence That existence is simple and immediate does not imply that it will be easy to explain its meaning. What does it mean that something should exist? It is the very immediacy of existence that makes it hard to explain. There areperhapsno simpler and more immediate concepts in terms of which it can be explained. Many fundamental ideas are like that. They can be knownit seemsbut not explained and therefore knowledge of them is doubted. Often, however, the reason for the difficulty with explanation or definition is that there is nothing more fundamental in terms of which to explain or define the idea. This upturns the order of things. What is less immediate is thought to be known or understood because it can be defined. What is most immediately known is thought to be difficult to know because it is hard to define. Existence is like that. It ought to be sufficient to say that Mt. Everest exists means Mt. Everest is That is not to say that there are no issues or concerns regarding the concept of existence Since everything exists it has been argued that existence is not a conceptit says nothing. This concern is addressed below under the topic concepts and objects. Another concern is that though existence may be a concept it is trivial. In a sense it is trivialeverything existsexistence makes no distinctions as, for example does redness: some things are red, others are not. Existence is profoundly trivial and profoundly shallow and it is seen in Metaphysics that this triviality is the source of its depththat makes it suitable as foundational for a metaphysics of ultimate breadth and depth In a sense, existence is essence but this essence is one that is immanent, that is not separate from things In saying that something is rather than seems to be, it is suggested that it exists independently of being perceived or known. This is implicit in the idea of existence but the discussion of concept and object below will clarify the idea and make it more explicit. Immediately the question arises, does anything that is seen exist as it is seen? This is the problem of appearance and reality which is taken up in the topic concept and object below but whose treatment continues through Objects Does anything exist? This question is distinct from the issue of whether anything exists as it is known. To doubt all existence as an intrinsic dimension of the psyche may be a neurotic condition Of course there is existenceor else, for example, these words would be neither written nor read. Even if it is thought that the perception of the world is an illusion, the illusion exists. The fact of existence is empirical. It is not required to further check existenceit is in the meaning of existence that the existence of perception, whether real or illusion, is given However, the philosophical contemplation of the question whether anything existsand related questions, especiallywill be seen to contribute to, first, clarification of the nature of knowledge and of existence and, second, to the development of powerful tools of analysis What things exist? The question has at least two aspectsmay be seen to contain two questions. In asking whether Mt Everest exists, it is being questioned whether there is a concrete thing named Mt. Everest. An important aspect of this question is the sub-question What does it mean to say or know that Mt. Everest exists. Earlier, it was suggested that existence may not be analyzable. However, an analysis is taken up in the discussion below of concepts and objects. The discussion will show that the question whether something exists, at least for concrete things, is primarily a question of the meaning of existence. That Mt. Everest is made of various elementary particles is a clarification of the nature of material things but does not typically confirm existence. The second question concerns the existence of such non-concrete or non-material things such as number and morals. Where is the number one? Where is the value justice or the color red? It might appear that these abstract things do not exist in spacebut if they do not exist in space, do they exist at all or are they merely ideas? The meaning of the question is not yet clearwhat could it mean that something does not exist in space but may exist as an idea? There is a vagueness behind these issues. The machinery of concept and object whose discussion begins shortly is instrumental in the analysis of abstract objects but real clarification awaits Objects. It is perhaps useful to note that in pondering the existence of abstract objects it is possible to begin a chain of reasoning that covers worlds of ideas, mental space, whether something that exists must be material It will turn out that such reflections might take the thinker into much vagueness without satisfactory resolution. Such speculation will not be indulged here because it is unnecessary. In Objects, the nature of abstract objectsand whether they reside in space, whether they have material naturewill be resolved. Worlds of ideas and mental space, could be given meaning but this will not be done as the ideas are not particularly significant or useful. What is significant is that while some elucidation of the nature of concrete objects is relatively simple, the treatment of abstract objects must await the development, in Metaphysics, of the metaphysics of immanence. The outcome, however, may be stated simply enoughthe distinction between concrete and abstract objects is not one of kind but is according to whether the object ismost convenientlystudied empirically or conceptually Existence versus essence. In the history of thought the following distinctions have been made. Existence is the mode of being in interaction, e.g., in being known. Essence or ens is the mode of being of a thing in itselfof being without qualification. To be clear about these meanings and their distinctions it would be necessary to clarify being without reference to either existence or essence. The line of thought leads to what may be experienced as freely morphing meanings that have no final stability. In the absence of a picture of the world, a metaphysics, nothing more can be expected; and for any something more to be certainly groundedvalidthe metaphysics would have to be necessary. In the metaphysics of immanence, which, with its necessary and ultimate character, are developed in Metaphysics, the distinction of existence and essence is seen to vanish Existence and being. Being is derived from the verb to be, i.e., being is, roughly, that which is or which exists. The word roughly was used because the source of a word does not necessarily indicate the range of uses that a word may come to have. Since being is a core term of the metaphysics that will be developed in the next chapter, what it shall signify in this narrative is at least as much a result of the development as it may be of what is received from the history of use. Roughly, however, it may be said that the ideas of existence and being have near identity. This identity implies that what has been said about existence carries over to being. However, it will be convenient to discuss concepts, objects and experience before introduction of being The philosophical contemplation of the questions Does anything exist? What has being? is be taken up in the discussions, below, of concepts and objects, and of experience and continued throughout the narrative. The ideas of the concept and of experience are related and the term experience will be used informally in discussing concepts before its more formal consideration Concepts and objects. Among the meanings of concept are (1) something conceived in the mind, i.e., mental content and (2) an idea that may be more or less abstract and that may either refer to a single significant entity or may be generic in being generalized from particular instances While these meanings are well established, the versions above have augmentations to the traditional forms. In the first meaning mental content is a term often used in modern cognitive science and its inclusion here emphasizes that concepts include what is very basicthe most primitive experience is conceptual; this is important in that if talk of concepts is to be a basis of experience and meaning, the concept should, at root, be primitive and inclusive. In the second meaning the phrase significant single entity has been added to the traditional generic idea because, e.g., the idea of universe, which is crucial to the present narrative, is not generalized from instances. It is the second meaning that includes the significant ideas from the history of thoughtincluding the idea of the concept The primary connotation of (1) may be iconic conception and that of (2) symbolic. However, these connotations are not necessary and, therefore, (2) is a case of (1) The significance of the inclusion is that the significant and the esoteric are not seen as essentially distinct from the primitive and the immediate. Significant concepts may be seen as articulated systems of primitive concepts Concept has the occasional connotation of intentional concept. Intentionality is an important modern term that characterizes the way in which a mental state has reference toan object inthe external world. In recent philosophy there have been a number of areas of disagreement about intentionality. One issue is whether intentionality is especially mentalwhether it can or cannot be recognized in matter or, perhaps more precisely, in material descriptions. Although these concerns are not of primary interest to this narrative, subsequent reflections, especially in Mind, may provide some resolution to it. There appears to be a natural if sometimes unreflective tendency to assign various kinds of special status to mind that is a consequence of characteristics such as having subjectivity and making intentional reference that, it appears, mental states have but material ones do not. From the natural tendency as well as from the explanatory efficacy of such assignments, it does not follow that there are no alternative, valid, descriptions that do not invoke any special status to mind, e.g., that are neutral with regard to any mind / matter distinction. Particularly, whether intentionality can be understood in material terms depends on what conception of matter is used and what powers of analysis are available. If there is some future final conception of matter, i.e. one that at least implicitly contains a description of the universe, it would have to contain account, perhaps implicit, of intentionality. It is not clear, though, whether todaysquantumphysics is anywhere close to a final physical theory or, at least, one that contains intentionality or whether the matter of such physical theories would be recognizable as matter in todays terms. Related concerns will be further discussed in Mind Since there have been proposals that mind is, effectively, a computer program or algorithm running in the brain, a question discussed in the recent literature is whether arunningcomputer program is capable of intentionality or even consciousness. Since the set of states of a computer that are implicated in the implementation of a program are a minute fraction of the physical states of the machine, the thesis that mind is a computer program appears to imply that mental states are a very superficial function of material statesthe mental states of a computer would be a superficial function its material states and the mental states of an animal would be a superficial of its brainbodystates. It seems, however, that the mental states in the brain / body of an animal are far deeper in terms of layering, far more varied with regard to mode, and far closer to detailed physical structure than are the differences in physical state of a computer that define a running algorithm. This argues that machine implementation of algorithms are minimally, if at all, mental in nature. In other words, while the positions taken in the literature appear to be that mind is / is not a computer program, the proper ascription of mental states to material states may, in addition to complexity, depend on the factors of layering, depth, variation and there may also be thresholds below which it might be said there is no recognizable mind here. Simply, if computer programs are mindsmentalthey are massively primitive, disconnected from environment and one dimensional. A corollary to this conclusion is that real mindsthose that are instrumental in negotiating and being creative in a complex environmenthave deep embedding in or are high level manifestations of a complex material organization, e.g., a brain. Additionally, real or intrinsic intentionality grows out of the organism in evolution and in growth and is not imposed or built in by an external agent. These thoughts regarding embedding, here illustrative and without proof, has resonances and proofs in Mind where it will be seen that the apparent polar oppositesmind is / is not a computer programs and computer programs do / do not have deep embeddingare points on a continuum In relation to concepts, the present concern with intentionality is that while some but not all concepts have intentionality, i.e. intrinsic reference to objects. Pre-conception is conception evoked in mind or marked on some medium from past experience, i.e., from memory and that is be intended or hoped to have future reference to an object. Preconception is also conception but is not intentional. What may be called free conception, e.g. pure expression without a present or future intentional object, is also conception. Intentional conception, preconception, and pure expression all fall under conception and their distinctions, in fact, are neither precise nor eternal, e.g. what is conceived freely may become a pre-concept and a pre-concept may become intentional The instruments of knowledge have been regarded as perception and reason (thought) and these have an interpretation in the modes of concept and their interplay. It has sometimes been thought that knowledge may be constructed from primitive perception and thought. On this account, knowledge, if at all possible, would be immensely primitive; for humananimalknowledge they require placement within a biological framework of that enables perception of and reason about the forms of the world. This framework has been called intuition A percept is a concept. While not all concepts are percepts, the recollection of past experience is, perhaps, part of all conception. When past experienceconcepts including perceptionsare laid down in memory, they are not laid down as indivisible wholes, and therefore constructed concepts may contain combinations of parts of a number of experiences. Although perception is instigated by present experience, past experiencememorymay be and probably usually is involved in the production of the percept as exemplified by the forms of perception which are acquired in growth and by the perception of wholes from data that is partial (most data is partial) In both meanings, items 1 and 2 above, concepts shall here refer primarily to mental content and secondarily marks, iconic or symbolic, on other media such as paper, canvas, dirt, and computer memory or screen. While the first meaning evokes the fact of mental content or of marks on recording media, the second meaning evokes the structure of the mental content or marks The first meaning, that of mental content is the meaning emphasized here but, because of the inclusion, the discussion also applies to the second meaning. However, the discussion is not especially about significant concepts The discussion of concepts and what they refer to (objects) is important to the analysis of meaning which is significant to understanding the present narrative because many of its terms are common words that take on enhanced andor altered meaning. The discussion is also important because it contributes to the idea of meaning which has a formal place in Metaphysics. However, the discussion is introduce at the present point because it is pivotal in clarifying the concept of existence and in clarifying the meaning of and, then, addressing the questions Does anything exist? and What things exist? Concepts, objects and existence. What does it mean to say Mt. Everest exists? If a person is looking at the mountain and has an image of it then Mt. Everest exists means that there is something real that corresponds to and has some kind of likeness to the image or concept The individual may have seen Mt. Everest or read about it and seen pictures of it. Then the idea or concept of Mt. Everest is a recall of its image or picture. When the mountain is not in view, saying Mt. Everest exists means that there is something real that corresponds to and has some kind of likeness to the idea or concept To say that an object X exists is to say that there is a concept x and there is an object X that corresponds to and has some kind and degree of likeness to x In day to day affairs it is typically unnecessary to distinguish concept and objectand instead of using X and x, it is typical to use one sign, X to refer to both concept and object or, even one sign to refer to a symbol whose constituents are word or name and concept and object. In fact, the conflation of word, concept and object is common and usually results in economy of thought and communication. Occasionally, the same word may refer to distinct concepts and, therefore, distinct objects and, while this may be confusing, it is an aspect of language competency to normally straddle such potential confusions. However, there are confusions and paradoxes that arise when the distinction of word and object or concept and object is not made Three paradoxes of the concept of existence: the paradox of non-existence, the paradox of faithfulness, and the paradox of solipsism, i.e., of the logical possibility of there being no external world The paradox of non-existence. The unicorn is a mythological animal referred to in the myths of many cultures. Since there are some people who believe in unicorns it should be noted that for the purpose of this discussion unicorns are taken to be non-existent. Now consider the statement unicorns do not exist. An obvious response is precisely what is it that is asserted to not exist? In other words, since there are no unicorns, unicorn appears to have no meaning and therefore unicorns do not exist also appears to have no meaning. This is the paradox of non-existence that is frequently raised in discussions of the concept of existence. It should be noted that, regarding any hypothetical creature, X, the assertions X does not exist and X exists are equally paradoxicalequal in meaning or lack of meaning status. Even if a creature X is actual, X exists, on these terms, though not paradoxical, appears to be meaningless because X exists seems to be saying some equivalent of an object, X, that exists, exists. The paradox, which for non-existence is one of absurdity and for existence is one of triviality of meaning, is resolved quite easily in terms of the concepts of concept and object. The meaning of X exists is that there is an object X that corresponds to the concept Xthe same symbol is used for concept and object in a convenient but occasionally misleading conflation. Similarly, the meaning of X does not exist is that there is no object X that corresponds to the concept X The paradox of faithfulness of the concept. Except on the view that there is no external world the concept is not the object. A problem that then arises is whether concepts are faithful to objects. Since the concept is not the object, i.e., since there is no identity of concept and object, every attempt to verify faithfulness is and must be in terms of some further concept which is or includes some enhanced concept of the object but whose faithfulness must also be in question. It therefore appears thateven if there is faithfulnessfaithfulness of concepts to objects cannot be established or known One resolution to this question was given by Alexius Meinong who argued from the absence of faithfulness that there is no object in the world of sense experience even though objects have properties. Thus the concept was identified by Meinong as the object and labeled the concept-object. What was thought to be the object is in fact the noumenon of Kant which does not exist in sense experience Meinongs explanation is appealing. In making a conflation of concept and object, the problem of faithfulness is eliminated. However, unless it is necessary to resort to this explanation to confront the problem of faithfulness, it cannot be the most satisfactory resolution Kants earlier resolution to the problemdiscussed in greater detail in Objectssuggests the line of approach adopted here. Kants solution may have been suggested by the thought that, in attempting to verify faithfulness, it is impossible to get outside concepts. Yet, the individual is able to negotiate and be creative in the world via concepts and, therefore, there must be some intrinsic adaptation of cognitionand, perhaps, of emotion and of any other function of psycheto the world. From the vast and precise success of the mechanics and the geometry of his day, Kant assumed that Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics had encapsulated the forms of space, time and motion or causation. Further, since the individual perceives the world in these terms, Kant thought that the intrinsic adaptation of perception is a precise intuition of the forms of space, time and motion or causation. Then, the sciences of geometry and mechanics were developed in logical terms, which are also a capability, from the intuition It is known, today, that the mechanics and geometry of the world are only approximated by the science of Kants time and, therefore, the intuition is only approximate. However, the interpretation of this approximate character as a limit can be turned around. First, it may be recognized, from the non-identity of concept and object, that no absolute faithfulness can be guaranteed. However, even though an absolute faithfulness of knowledge has been an ideal of human knowledge perhaps since a time before history, it is neither to be expected nor in any way necessary. Therefore, especially on account of the gap between concept and object, faithfulness seems to be a near impossible ideal and what is impossible cannot be an ideal. In observing that although the ideal appears to be impossible, it makes for the possibility that knowledge may have advance and, depending on perspective, this reflect a nicer world than one in which knowledge is already ideal Thus while Kant overstated the abilities of cognition, the actual lesser ability may be seen as positiveit is an embedding in the world rather than an absolute capability from a vantage point that is experienced as external to the world Use of terms lesser and greater ability have a value driven component that has irrelevance to the individual / society-in-the-world Although there may be no absolute faithfulness to the object, there is a practical and sufficient faithfulness. In saying this, it may be noted that, even in practical terms, there is an arbitrariness to the question what is the object? It is typical to think of two mountains as two objects. However, why can the two mountains not be thought of as a single object? This freedom exists and depending on circumstances, many objects can be regarded, even seen, as one or one as many; this freedom is itself a form of practical and useful faithfulness that may, according to perspective, be seen as lack of faithfulness or a kind of adaptable faithfulness. Perhaps one half of one mountain and one half of the other can be seen as a single object. The possibility exists but appears to lack utility. There is in fact a theoretical arbitrariness to the identity of the object that, however, is resolved by adaptability in the actual situation. If flying between two close near vertical walls, it may be useful to see them as one canyon. In entering a very unfamiliar situation it may be required to negotiate the new environment, to experiment with it, before the arbitrary combinations resolve into definiteness of objectsthe process of resolution is adaptation of cognition in process and the theoretical arbitrariness of objects may be seen as a feature of the world which has no intrinsic value but which is deployed to cognitive advantage It remains true, though, that there is, in general, a necessary and absolute gap between concept and object. Are there any objects that exist as conceived? It will be shown below that there are necessaryand significantobjects whose being conforms to their conception. The practical faithfulness of conceptsof experienceand the necessary faithfulness of concepts of the necessary objects provide reasons for not adopting Meinongs concept-object to the problem of faithfulness and for not limiting metaphysics, as did Kant and Wittgenstein, to a metaphysic of experience Kants noumenon can be conceived but not, according to Kant, experienced and is therefore, as far as is known, lacking in differentiationsome thinkers have taken this to imply that the noumenon itself is lacking in differentiation. In Metaphysics, it will be possible to go beyond this degree of knowledge of the noumenon. The essential point to this possibility is that in experiencing there is experience of the noumenon. This claim appears to be paradoxical for what has been said above amounts to experience being phenomenal and not noumenal. The error in the paradox is that while it holds for detail, it does not hold for what is general, i.e., what is necessary in experience, i.e., in experiencing a world, the phenomenon and noumenon are identical I.e., in this way, experience transcends the concept The solipsists paradox. Solipsism is the position that the entire world is the mental space of the individual. That is, if the reader were a solipsist he or she would think, there are no things as such, there are no other minds, there is just my experience. To be consistent, that reader would not think I have a body but there is an experience of this body; he or she would not think there are others who have bodies and minds but other and others' minds and bodies are but points in experienceit would be invalid to think points in my experience. In fact the solipsist would think what is labeled the world is the set of points in experience and what is labeled the external world is a subset of points in experience. I.e. the solipsist is committed to the non-existence of an external world. To be solipsist in fact, would be a psychopathological condition; however, to entertain solipsism is useful as a challenge to realism as belief in a world independent of mind and, in addressing this challenge, to be an occasion to sharpen the concept of realism and commitment to it as well as occasion to develop powers and tools of analysis. Solipsism is taken up in Metaphysics where it is seen that solipsism may be logically consistent in a very simple world, at most immensely improbable in this world, and logically impossible if certain properties of this world are taken as given On meaning. The comments on meaning in this chapter are preliminary. However, a primary concern here is that an understanding of meaning is important to understanding how words and concepts are used in the narrative. As an example, the importance of paying attention to meaning was evident above in discussing existence Another other objective of the discussion is to set up the later formal treatment of meaning in Logic and meaningand, therefore, the discussion is more complete than it would need to be in order to guide a reader through the narrative. In the later treatment, meaning is given a place in the metaphysics Meaning itself has a number of meanings as in I have been meaning to tell you how much I value your friendship, The meaning of a human life is a function of human freedoms, especially the freedoms of choice, action, and symbolic thought, and Specifying the meaning of the word existence is difficult even though we feel we know intuitively what it is for something to exist. The meaning of meaning is its use in the last of these examples, i.e., word or, more generally, linguistic meaning. In this discussion meaning centers around linguistic meaning but, as will be seen later, in order to specify linguistic meaning it will be necessary but not sufficient to focus on language A problem encountered in setting up a system of thought is that elements of the system are interdependent and it may be necessary to raise the understanding of each element iteratively. This particular concern would not be resolved by a formal axiomatic development for as long as development is ongoing, an axiomatic expression might require iterative modification It may be natural to place some preliminary observations on meaning immediately after discussing concepts and objects for the relations between concepts and objects is one of meaning. However, what is said immediately below on meaning learns from the development of the system of ideas of the narrative and the reader will find confirmation of the comments on meaning in the subsequent developments. However, although these comments may depend, in part, on the subsequent developments for their inspiration, the validity of the comments stands independently The placement of the discussion of concepts and objects is necessary in order to avoid conflict that may otherwise arise in the use of the important terms, especially experience, existence, being, universe and so on. One significance of this point is that it is essential to be aware of the meanings of terms as used here in order to understand the development and appreciate its power and significance Sense and reference in meaning. When may it be said that a concept is understood? Even though a concept refers to an objecta class of objects may be regarded as a complex object and so the singular term object is appropriateit has sense. Roughly, sense is what the concept connotes to the conceiver. Although the sense may seem to be different from the object, perhaps sense is nothing other than the intuition that is built up in using the concept in formal and informal contexts. E.g., in reflecting what sense the sense of a particular concept may be the individual may have a variety of mental pictures that contribute to the sense. In Logic and meaning, sense will come to mean potential or possible reference; however, at present the idea of sense is left with the foregoing intuitive specification. The meaning of a concept is often regarded as sense as just described. However, in the present specification, sense is open ended and clearly not definite. The meaning of the meaning of a concept would become definite if the class of objects to which it refers were specified. Thus it was Freges thought that meaning should be as a combination of sense and reference This specification of meaning may appear to be an awkward combination of different kinds. However, as noted, the kinds are not different if sense means potential or possible reference and, so, sense and reference need not be understood as different kinds Some observations on meaning now follow In any context meaning resides in the system of concepts and in their possibilities of combination, i.e., grammar For example, since a context in which there are only actions or processes is imaginable, the grammar of verbs must surely depend on the language in which it occurs In a language in which there are things and processes, the possibilities of meaning must depend on the kinds of relation that thing and process are allowed Although it is a mistake to think that system meaning implies all rules of grammarsince the same content has different forms in different languagesthere must, for stability and faithfulness, be some invariants of grammatical form The residence of meaning in a system of concepts is perhaps most evident in axiomatic systems in logic and mathematics and in scientific theories Is the meaning of the term Mt. Everest dependent on the environment? Ask, is the peak of Mt. Everest white? If the peak appears pink at sunset, is it a fact or a convention that the peak should be regarded as whiteif it is so regarded. And, is its color part of the concept of Mt. Everest? Although the example is trivial, cosmology suggests that the properties of local objects may depend on the structure and extent of the cosmological system but, as long the effect is relatively constant, the local objects will appear to be constant in their fundamental physical properties Therefore, individual concepts are not completely understood in isolation However, metaphorically, meaning may be focused in the concepts while it also resides in the system That meaning is focused in the concepts is effective and may be a result of selection of perceivers and perception within a selected environment. There may also be selection or experimentation in the formation of free concepts There is no implication that in having a system of meaning, perfection has been achieved or has significance There are different contexts of meaning. The same word in different contexts has a different meaning. It might be more accurate to say that the different contextual meanings of the same word have no basis of comparison If the contexts overlap, it may be possible to formulate a basis of comparison of meanings in the different contexts As a context changes or moves, meaning shifts. The change in context may be a lateral drift, or, perhaps, a broadening of context As contexts change, old terms take on new though perhaps similar meaning. New terms with previously unrecognized meaning may be introduced as a result of introduction of new objects of reference andor experiment with sense Net meaning, i.e., system meaning shifts Thus meaning has a fluid aspect but must also have stability in order to be usable It appears that there are times of stability in meaning and times of rapid change whether the context is limited or general. A study of the occasions and factors of change may be interesting butexcept for suggestions that may be implicit in the discussionwill not be taken up here Generally, etymology, provides no more than clues to meaning. This is true, perhaps, even of dictionaries. Though dictionaries are useful and etymology may be enlightening, they may be misleading if employed as definitive The word progress may refer to cases in which a new context includes an old one In progress, the context of reference grows Even in its valid context, the old system is not the same as the new. However, in that context, the two systems may have equivalence. By taking into account the characteristics of the old context, the new may reduce to the old in the old context Scientific theories are a prime example of such progress. The domain of application of relativistic mechanics is broader than that of classical mechanics and the classical theory is the low velocity limit of the relativistic theory. Although the meaning of the basic terms (concepts) of the mechanics are not identical in the classical and relativistic theories, the reduction provides some basis of comparison. This stands against Thomas Kuhns thought that successive theories of science are incommensurablewhat may be the case is that the new theories have a sense of incomprehensibility to some scientists who were educated under the older paradigm From the reduction of a new scientific theory to an older one, it does not follow that such reduction is possible for all expansions of context and even if possible, the reduction in one case may not show how the reduction is to be accomplished in another If one context includes another, the meaning of the contained system may be derived from the containing system. However, if there is no containing system, there is no other system in terms of which meaning may be derived. That is, without a containing system, meaning cannot be specified lexically In absence of a containing system, meaning is implicit in use which must mean application or deployment Application anchors meaning and is its source of stability However, even though there is no containing system for the given context, the context may be capable of growth and therefore, stability of meaning does not imply finality of meaning Since a metaphysics intends to be a system that has no present containing system, these thoughts definitely apply to metaphysics Even in the common arena of meaning, there is change. This may be seen most clearly in small communities that must continually adapt to changing contexts and in the origin of pidgin dialects Given an isolated community, there is no, larger, containing or inclusive community. The agents of linguistic change are the members of the community and their experience In the modern world, all individuals have the potential to participate in change, even though change may be concentrated in a few individuals and in institutions Explicit rules of languagee.g. grammarmust have come after language even though they may be implicitly present at the beginning of language innon-uniquelyexpressing necessities of meaning. Formal rules may be necessary to stabilize meaning in large societies where context is isolated from necessity and in order to standardize communication. However, the value of standardization may be an illusion. Further, standardization may be an impediment to growth and change, and may encourage stagnation and degeneration and a mechanical view of meaning The stability of meaning-as-reference is confused by meaning-as-power, i.e., by appropriation of meaning to political ends that include influence by one individual or group over another Experience. It was earlier seen that the concept of substance cannot be the basis of a foundation of a framework for an ultimate understanding of things and the idea of existence was suggested as an alternative. Existence is recommended, not only by its inclusion of what is immediate but also by its lack of distinction of the immediate and the remote, the esoteric and the mundanei.e., by its shallow or trivial character. An appeal to existence is, in effect, an explanation of things in terms of the things themselvesi.e., of the universe in terms of itself. It is trivially clear that this explanation will be successfulevery thing is itself. It seems equally clear that this explanation should be uninformative; however, it has been noted that existence can form the basis of a metaphysics of ultimate depth and breadth. While there are some thoughts toward the development of the metaphysics in this chapter, especially in what follows, the systematic development is deferred to Metaphysics. The questions Does anything exist? and What things exist? were pointed out as significant but have not yet been fully addressed. It was suggested that perception of things is a form of existence even if the thing perceived is a hallucination or there is an illusion involved in the perception for the percept itself exists regardless whether it is real or illusory or hallucinatory The concept of experience will be used to strengthen and elaborate the earlier argument. In their primitive meanings, experience and concept are near identical. However, the idea of concept is used to suggest that there may be an object that corresponds to the concept but experience focuses on the concept itself, on what is sometimes called the subjective side of knowing The discussion will first focus on experience itselfon what it is. Then, even though there appears to be no doubt that there is experience, that doubt will be raisedfor two reasons. The primary reason is that expressing and resolving doubt takes the argument further from the level of the ad hoc and into reason and so improves confidence in the argument itself and reinforces demonstrative toolsthe analysis of meaning and what is given and the use of proof. The analysis of meaning and of what is given is especially important for, while it is often neglected or assumed without question, focus on it will, in the present discussion, show clearly what may be regarded as given and will resolve foundation in either substance that is not capable of further analysis or in infinite regress. The second reason to raise the doubt regarding the existence of experienceof consciousnessis that the doubt has been raised in the recent literature on the philosophy of mind and that resolution of the doubt will need to analyze the reasons for the doubt and, in this discussion, resolve those reasons and show the doubt regarding experience to based in confusion of the nature of matteri.e. that what is not seen or not explicit in theory must be absent The discussion will show that there is experience, i.e., that something does indeed exist. Then, experience will be used to address the question What things exist? At this point, the existence of experience itself will have been established but, except for experience itself, the existence of the seeming objects of experience will not have been established. The idea of the forms of experience will be used to investigate what exists. It will be seen to be possible to properly class the forms as two kindsthe necessary forms of experience and the contingent forms. It will be shown in the discussion that the necessary forms do and must correspond faithfully to objects that may be labeled necessary objects. One of these forms is experience itself; some others are the universeall that existsand the void or absence of existence. The study of the necessary forms and their consequences is developed at length in Metaphysics. The contingent forms concern the external worldthe world that exists independently of its being experienced but that exists, roughly, as experiencedand its variety of things or objects. In Metaphysics it is shown that although the contingent forms of experience do not invariably have corresponding intentional objects, there must, provided that no inconsistency is entailed, be corresponding objects somewhere in the universe. The existence of objects that correspond to the contingent forms is taken up in Objects where it is argued that it is normali.e., roughly speaking, immensely probablefor the contingent forms to be practically faithful to objects The external world is not experience but includes it, e.g. in regarding ones own mind as an object or in other mindsthe question of other minds and their existence as instrumental in removing doubt and in sharpening demonstrative tools is introduced above and discussed further in Metaphysics and Objects. It was just said that the external world is not experience. However, in metaphysical idealism, perhaps the significant alternative to materialism in the history of thought, mind is thought to be a more fundamental feature of the universe than is mattere.g. everything is mind and that matter is one of its forms. Idealism and its denial, e.g. that the world is not experience, are not meaningful unless the nature of matter and mind are carefully specified. There is a common concept of matter as in modern physical science and a common concept of mind as in the seat of mental content or experience. In the common concepts, it is frequently thought that it is difficult to see how mind could be a form of matter because mind is so seemingly immaterial. However, it is not unreasonable to think that if sufficient powers of calculation were available that mind could fit into a quantum mechanical framework and that the subjective or apparently immaterial aspect of mind is an implicit aspect that frameworksubjectivity is not excluded in the material description but its absence is often taken as exclusion. If mind cannot fit into the present quantum theoretical framework, there must be some extended frameworkit does not follow that normal human powers are sufficient to its discoverythat does; this follows from the necessity of the existence of experience / mind that is addressed in this chapter. In Mind it will be seen that, although in its common concept, experience is only a part of being, there is and must be an extended concept of experience or mind that extends to the root of being, that includes all being including matter and its forms. In the dual extension to the root of both mind and matter the two concepts arewill beseen as identical, the extension of meanings results in neither true idealismor pan-psychismnor true materialism. Instead, what is revealed is that there is no more fundamental character of things than the things themselves which, as noted earlier, will be seen, perhaps against expectation and common sense, to be the basis of an ultimate metaphysics What is experience? A prototype of experience is the experience of an object. In seeing a rose one has experience of its shape, its color, its fragranceand these constitute the experience of the rose. Experience is the qualitative, or subjective or feeling side of things. It is equally present in emotion, e.g. the feeling of happiness, and in the perception of things both smalla roseand grand, e.g. a sunset over the ocean. Experience is immediate but, perhaps, that is an understatement for experience is not what is most immediately known, it is the form and mode of knowing As noted earlier, experience and concept have near identity except that the concept is typically associated intentionally with an object but, in its meaning or sense, experience has no intended association with an object. Experience is not something that is other than the conceptit is part / mode of concept. However, just as a concept may have intentional correspondence to an object, may lack actual correspondence but may have potential correspondence to an object, may have no intentional correspondence actual or potential, may be a perception, a recall, a reconstruction from recalliconic or symbolic as in thoughtexperience may also be all these things It is possible to talk of concepts from an objective point of view as, e.g. a structure in the bodybrainof an organism and, experience seems to not lend itself to this kind of description and there is thus an apparent gulf between experience and this way of seeing concepts; however, this apparent distinction will be dissolved in the subsequent narrative, especially in Mind In attempting to explain what experience is the terms employed are terms of experienceexperience itself, perception, feeling, the subjective side This is because experience is so fundamental that there is no more fundamental thing in terms of which to define it; and, experience does not seem to be like the objects of the external world and, so, it seemingly cannot be defined in terms of external objects. Some things can be defined in terms of experiencegiven experience, it may be possible to define kinds of experience such as the experience of sadness, of warmth, of color and so on. As a result, in the paradigm of definition in linguistic terms, sadness, warmth, color and so on may seem to be clearer in their nature than experience itself. Although we know what experience is it is difficult to define. The case is similar for many fundamental conceptsthe fundamental concept is difficult to define because there is nothing other or more fundamental in terms of which to define it and so, while the more advanced concepts may be defined the fundamental concepts are difficult to define. When thinking analytically, then, there may be vagueness attached to what is fundamental. In fact, however, to think this way is to be deceived by the clarity of analytic thought: whatever is vague about the fundamental concept is also vague about the derived concepts but, because they may be defined analytically, it may be thought that they are clearly understood. This is perhaps most extreme for experience for which there are alternative terms, feeling and so on, but no terms that are more fundamental and therefore it is not merely difficult to define experience analytically, it is perhaps, as a result of its most immediate character, impossible to define it analyticallyand while this may result, under the analytic paradigm, in a feeling of vagueness about its character and questions about its existence, this feeling is misplaced: among all things experience is most immediate, most clear, most real It may be thought that existence of things is being made to depend on being experienced. That, however, is not the case. Experience is identified as a fundamental mode of existence, though not the only mode. For a sentient being, experience is the way of knowing existence but not as the condition of existence of objects; and experience will be the basis of demonstration of the existence of necessary and contingent objectsbelow in discussing the forms of experiencebut not the condition of their existence. The argument has concerned, not the dependence of existence on being experienced, but the reality of experience itself This reality is emphasized by the fact that while the experience or concept of an object is in a different category than the object, experience and experience of experience are in the same category. Or, since experience of experience is experience but is also experience of an object, when experience is the object, experience and object are not in different categories Thus it is in the meaning of experience and existence that experience existsthe meanings of experience and existence are intertwined though, of course, they are not identical for it is not being suggested that experience is the only thing that exists. (If experience were all, the meanings of experience and existence would be intertwined; which shows that while there is some similarity to their senses, the reference of experience lies within the range of reference of existence.). In a sense, the fact of experience demonstrates its existencei.e., that something exists. The demonstration is, of course, not a proof from premise to conclusion but in the analysis of what is most immediategivenand of meaning, i.e., there is an analytic component to the demonstration that, however, lies in the analysis of a linguistic meaning and not in the construction of one The content of the previous paragraph may be stated formally. It was seen that the meaning of X exists where X is a concept is that there is an object X to which the concept is faithful. So far only the practical faithfulness of concepts to objects has been established and this faithfulness obtains when the concepts have a certain usefulness. However, experience is conceptual and thus the concept of experience is of the same kind as experience and thus in conceiving experience there is no absolute gap between concept and object as there is between concept and external object Thus, although, on account of its apparently immaterial nature, and on account of a natural tendency to doubt the subjective, it may be natural to doubt that there is experience, this doubt is now revealed as unreasonable. Experience is the fundamental case of definite existence and this fact is not capable of further analysis although, of course, it is capable of illumination That is, experience is itself, the first necessary concept and the first necessary object Still, for the reasons stated earlier, the existence of experience will be subject to doubt Since demonstration of the existence of experience has been given, to address doubt all that is necessary is to allay itthis will be accomplished by identifying doubts and refuting them A first reason for doubt is, as stated above, the apparently immaterial nature of experience, of feeling. The question may arise Where does experience exist? This question may be elaborated The brain occupies certain states and undergoes certain processes in having a concept but where is the experience itself? Materialism itself has not been established and, as will be shown, it cannot be establishedexcept erroneouslyand, therefore, the immaterial nature of experience, whether apparent or real, is not an argument against the existence of experience; this point is elaborated in Mind. The resolution of any paradox regarding objects that do not have location or clear location is left to Objects, and the question of the location of experience itself is left to Mind There is, therefore, no principled objection to the existence of experience from the apparently immaterial character of experience A second set of reasons to doubt the existence of experience comes from scientific materialism. (In talking of scientific materialism, it is not asserted that a commitment to science is a commitment to materialism even though the majority of scientists are, perhaps, materialists. In fact, the commitment of persons is not a logical factor at all but the point is mentioned here because it is often treated as though it is) From the fact that certain features of mind have no demonstrated explanation in terms of modern theoretical physics it is often assumed that they cannot fit into a materialist framework and therefore they do not exist or, perhaps, even if they exist, have little significance in the working of the world. Such features include intentionality, the causal efficacy of mind, and experiencemind itself. This objection has been addressed above and is treated and defused in greater depth and detail in Mind. I.e., the objection from scientific materialism do not hold. A part of the argument will be that experience is not other than brain / body process and there is therefore no logical argument from materialism to non-existence or insignificance of the features of mind It appears to be the case that human beings vary significantly in the richness and variety of their inner lives. Perhaps it is not that some persons have a necessary poverty of experience but that they attach less significance to it. It is not clear how the truth of the claim might be demonstrated but it has been suggested as an explanation of the quickness with which some thinkers are persuaded by the materialist argument to deny experience. There is an argument from power to the denial of experience and it is not clear how the power motive might be distinguished from poverty of experience. Perhaps power is a substitute for poverty of experiencean aspect of the introvert / extravert continuum. Perhaps the power motive may overcome richness of experience. The point being made in the present paragraph is not a logical one but is an attempt to explain the puzzling aspects of the denials by some of something that seems to others to be central to human beingand, it may be noted, those who deny experience and consciousness have explanations as to why others might entertain such beliefs. The logical point to this paragraph, then, is that psychological analysis of belief does notgenerallyprove or disprove the belief and has no place in logical argument even though it may be used as an instrument of persuasion Having dealt with objections to the existence of experience, it no longer remains to demonstrate existence for demonstration has already been given. However, there may be ways to further secure and illuminate the demonstration. The fundamental principle of metaphysics from Metaphysics, shows the necessity of experience since it is possible and the concept of the normal from the same chapter shows that it is immensely likely that human and other animals have experience. As proof, this approach is less secure that the demonstration given above; however, it clearly and definitely defuses any disproof of experience on materialist / scientific grounds; further, it may be useful as a source for further reflection / demonstration The forms of experience. Concepts include percepts whether real of illusory, and recollected images whether whole or part or reconstructed, whether iconic or symbolic, i.e. imagery and thought, and whether real, potential or delusional. Concepts may be simple as in a sensation in a single sensory mode, complex as in percepts and thought, and compound as in hypotheses and theories and, even, entire narratives, even the entire tradition of thought. Thus it is typicalillusions and delusions being exceptionalthat concepts correspond intentionally to an object whether actual or potential. Experience and concept are identical except, first, that experience emphasizes the concept without particular reference to an object and, second, that in talking of experience the subjective aspect is emphasized where as in talking of the concept there is no preference for the subjective or first person aspect or the objective or third person point of view. The forms of experience are the contents of experience or concepts regarded in their experiential aspect. That is, in talking of the forms of experience reference is being made to mental content, to concepts, but without regard to whether the concepts in question have any kind of reference to something elseto an object. That is, the forms of experience are regarded in themselves and as of interest in themselves The significance of the forms of experience. The forms of experience may therefore be regarded as a form of play, a theatre, in which the constraint of reality, if present at all, is not in the foreground. The variety of the forms of experience is at least as rich as the sum of human knowledge and imagination. The first significance of the forms of experience is that they are, as play, a source of creation. I.e., the forms of experience are pre-critical. However, if all forms of mental content are to be included, criticism itself is included but, primarily, as play. Figuratively, criticism is permitted among the forms of experience but it does not typically wear a stern faceto yield to a temptation to say that criticism is never stern when regarded as a form of experience would, perhaps, be rather stern. This process of equivocation could be unending but judgment intervenes at some point and finds that other avenues of play with the forms of experience may be more productive. Thus, criticism is never altogether absent and this raises an interesting question whether it is possible to be altogether uncritical The present idea of the forms of experience is similar to Husserls insight that the study of foundations must or should begin with an analysis of experience. At present, the forms of experience are not, however, sufficiently developed to be regarded as a ground for metaphysics but may, instead, be regarded as a source. It is interesting that the idea of the forms of experience occurred independently of any recollection of Husserls thought and this suggests that there is convergence in realistic thought that stems from the real itself, from intuition of the real and from immersion in traditional thought The present narrative has many points of contact with the traditionsome of whose representatives are Kant, Schopenhauer, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and Heideggerthat attempts to straddle the empiricism / rationalism dichotomy. A number of these points of contact may be found in the concept and variety of the forms of experience Classification: the variety of the forms of experience. The forms of experience may be classed, at outset, as necessary versus contingent versus impossible. The following contains a preliminary discussion of necessary and contingent forms of experience; the impossible forms are discussed in Metaphysics and in Objects which continue the discussion of necessary and contingent forms. Cosmology emphasizes necessary formsgeneral cosmologyas well as contingent formslocal or physical cosmology and Human World emphasizes the interaction of the necessary / universal forms with the contingent forms of the human world The necessary forms of experience are those whose intentional correspondence to an object follows from the form itself. I.e. the correspondence to an object is determined by logic where logic is understood to include necessary analysis of meaning. The objects to which the necessary forms of experience correspond necessarily exist and are therefore called necessary objects. Since the necessary form of experiencenecessarilycorresponds to a necessary object, it suffices to use the word necessary to refer to both form and object. As has been seen it is in the meanings of experience and existence that there is experience and experience is necessary; similarly, existence is necessary. It is not being said that there must be existence (beingsee the discussion of being below) but the necessity of existence (being)i.e., there cannot be eternities of nothingwill be demonstrated in Metaphysics. The other primary necessary forms include the following. From existence (being) it follows that there is the universe, i.e., all existence (all being;) from the experience of difference and change it follows that there are difference and change which must be necessary; the necessity of extension / duration follows from the necessity of difference / change; from difference, it follows that domains are necessary and from domains, it follows that domains necessarily have complements, i.e. all that is not in the domain The necessity of the void or absence of existence (being) may now be demonstrated. (i) Since the universe is all being it must contain all objectsall Form, Pattern and Law which, from the concept of the universe, cannot lie outside it. (ii) Define the void as the complement of the universe. (iii) If the void exists it contains no Objectno Form, Pattern or Law. (iv) The universe is a domain and therefore it has a complement which must exist. Since, from item ii, the complement of the universe is the void, the void exists. Combining this with item iii, it follows that The Void Exists and Contains no Objectno Form, Pattern or Law It will be seen in Metaphysics that there is a necessary character to the contingent forms in that even though they may not reside in any particular worlddomain of the universethey must, of logical necessity, reside somewhere and when in the universe The contingent forms of experience. (A) There is experience of I or this center of experience. However, it does not follow from the experience of I that there is an I. More generally, it does not follow from the existence of an external world that there is an external world. Doubting the existence of antheexternal world or an I is not a practical doubt but serves to clarify the concept of the external world, the nature of domains in which there must (practically) / need not be an external world, and to develop tools of demonstration and analysis. In Objects, identitywill be developed as an object in a way that reveals the merging of individual identity in higher / universal identity without relinquishing individual identity (B) Concepts of particular entities whether concrete entities or things such as rocks or abstract such as number and other mathematical objects. The nature of the concrete object has been introduce above and it is further clarified in Metaphysics and in Objects. Concrete objects include not only things but also relative intangibles such as air, parts and collections-as-entities. Events, processes and facts are also concrete. While there are some preliminary considerations of the concrete / abstract distinction in this chapter and in Metaphysics, the distinction is taken up and a number of issues regarding the abstract object resolved in Objects. It will be seen that the distinction is more one of convenience of study rather than, as is usually thought, one of kind. As will be seen the approaches to study of facts, Forms, Patterns and Laws straddle the concrete / abstract distinction The form of experience include (C) sense and feeling, percept and concept, intuition (in the sense of Kant) and explicit knowledge, acquaintance and description (due to Russell,) iconic and symbolic (including verbal) knowledge. These forms are pertinent to questions of epistemology. In Human being, the forms of intuition are extended to include symbol, reason and humor. As the capacity to respond to what is unknown and what may be unexpected, humor is especially significant for it is a form of transcendence of the limits of reason and encompasses all being in potential / principle though not in fact / detail. Humor includes the idea that if encompassing all being in fact and in detail is logically inaccessible to a mode of being then encompassing all being in fact and in detail cannot be desirable to that mode of being. Death makes sense in a variety of ways; in humor death is accepted without its making sense; alternatively, in humor, death makes sense without there being explicit sense Also recognized among the forms of experience are those that are significant in science and that arise in consideration of (D) this cosmological system. As will be subsequently seen, this cosmos is a highly localized and specific form of being relative to the universe (all being.) Therefore the objects of scienceas well as those of common knowledge from which science stems by experiment and criticism, and by discovery and concept and law formationare contingent objects and the questions of their being and nature are both theoretical and practical Another local form of experience, (E) may be called the human condition. In addition to the detailed particulars, the phrase sometimes connotes the affective rather than the cognitive side, the limits rather than the possibilities, frailty rather than strength, context over time and history Such connotations are included but their contrary forms are not excluded. The representation of D and like forms and E is found not only in the sciences but also in the humanitiesin philosophy, in history, in art, in literature, in drama and music. Exploration, adventure and transformation are expressions of the form E. Aesthetics and ethics, in human being, as well as in the human comprehension of any ultimate form to aesthetics and ethics, are contained in the form E. In Objects, it will be seen how value may be understood to be an object Two further kinds may be mentionedtheir explicit definition and elaboration as forms or experience and related conclusions will be taken up later. These kinds are (F) inference and (G) category as in, e.g., Kant, Schopenhauer and the present narrative; while these topics have been taken up in themselves it is their elaboration as forms of experience and any related conclusions that are left for further reflection. Regarding G, since there are facts beyond assumptionas will be seen, existence cannot be eternally non-manifestit will be interesting to see whether there are rules of inference beyond assumption (H) Judgment is a form of experience that may be instrumental in a transition between experience as play and experience that would have an intentional object Being. Being is that which existsin its entirety, or has existencein its entirety The phrase in its entirety is important on account of the fact that objects are known via concepts The phrase in its entirety is used so that a compound concept will not be granted existential status under the definition when only some of its parts exist. The need to not have any dangling non-reference will be further explained in Logic Given that existence is entire, there is no distinction between existing and having existencebetween being and having being Although there is an identity between existence and being as used here, it was desirable, before revealing the identity: to discuss and resolve some problems of existence; to introduce the symbol triad of word, concept and object; to introduce experience; and to introduce the necessary forms of experience The following topics, discussed earlier, are pertinent to discussion of being and could be placed here: the verb to be including is and its usesexistential, constitutive, and connective; that the character of existencebeingmay be regarded as primitive to meaning and that the form X is or X is / has being do not imply existence but express the linguistic meaning of existence / being which, on account of their necessity, require no further semantic regress; the possibility of spatio-temporal and non-spatio-temporal existence, of concrete and abstract objectslater, in Objects, the question of where abstract objects reside and whether they are indeed non-spatial andor non-temporal will be taken up and resolved; local and global modes of description; the immediacy of existence; that the deep character of existence / being lies in its immediate / trivial character and not in any esoteric sensebeing / existence is not esoteric but must contain whatever may be esoteric, i.e., being makes no distinction between the esoteric and the mundane; introductions to the questions Does anything exist? and What things exist? and their significance; existence versus essence; concepts and objectsand symbols; meaning, sense and reference; the paradoxes regarding the concept of existence; experience, the forms of experience and the necessary forms of experience What has being? The preliminary discussions enable a first answer but a fullmore completeanswer continues through Metaphysics, Objects, Logic and Meaning, Mind, and Cosmology The necessary objectstheir existence, empirical character, and properties:      Details of existence of the Void     A full set of necessary objects. Note that while the notion of object has not been clearly specified yet, the existence of the necessary objects is necessary. The existence of an infinite variety of objectsincluding objects such as those that appear to exist in this cosmological systemwill be shown in Metaphysics. Of course, not all appearances will correspond to realities. Knowledge of objects and the question of appearance and reality is further taken up in Objects. Objects and Cosmology will complete the discussion of the variety of objects Also observe that the existence of the necessary objects is empirical. First note that their conceptual character is not at all a mark of existencethis issue has been resolved earlier in discussing concept and object and the paradoxes of the concept of existence. Second, whereas the empirical character of objects in general may be in question, the empirical character of the necessary objects follows from experienceand experience itself is empirical even though its intentional objects need not be. Prior to the analysis it might, as is often the case, be thought that the source of theallegedempirical character of the objects of the world must be uniform; however, the analysis shows that the empirical character of the necessary objects lies in their meaning Why being? That is, why does the metaphysics to be developed take being as its core concept? A number of reasons may be given. However, it is important to note that, at least at a theoretical level that deploys explicit concepts, it is the development of the metaphysicsthe possibility of the metaphysics, its ultimate yet empirical characterthat, over and above extra-metaphysical reasons, that justifies adoption of being and gives final elucidation to its character In the previous paragraph, reference was made to a theoretical level that deploys explicit concepts because there is a pre-theoretical level at which the organism that is immersed in being has an experience of being and, necessarily of all-being, without recourse to symbolic concepts. If that organism does not possess the symbolic capability, it has no need for the symbolic-conceptual level. If it does possess symbolic capability, it should have no compulsory need for the symbolic-conceptual level to have and experience being-in-the-world-of-all-being It is significant that while there is a certain pre-theoretical power to the idea of being, that power alone is not the source of the metaphysics. Rather, it is a variety of areas of diligence in imagination and criticism that are especially instrumental in the development of the metaphysics. These include imagination and criticism, in seeing the various aspects of the metaphysicssuggested, perhaps, by the history of thought and by paradigms from science; in bringing various divisions of knowledge into the fold of the metaphysics; in seeing that the metaphysics reveals limits of other and not only prior divisions of thought and knowledge but also agrees with those domains within their limits; and in eradicating pre-judicial and limiting habits of thought such as substance thinking and determinism and other kinds of essentialism with regard to common categories of thought such as the nature of the object versus the property and the subject-predicate form and its implied distinctions Thus, in Metaphysics, the metaphysics of immanence, follows, first from experience and its forms, to the existence of certain necessary objectsespecially being, the universe, the void and the domainand their characteristics, and from these, by logic, to the develop of the pure aspects of the metaphysics. The pure metaphysics that reveals a universe with far greater variety than might otherwise be even reasonably imagined or hypothesizedwhich in turn has implications for the nature of actuality, possibility and necessity and for the causal versus non-causal and deterministic versus indeterministic character of the universe. In parallel with development of the pure side there has been a study of the pure metaphysics in interaction with specific domains of knowledge such as physical cosmology, the theory of evolution, and the nature of human being. In the interactive study or applied metaphysics, the specific domains of study suggest but are not instrumental in demonstration of the pure metaphysics while the pure metaphysics has implications for foundation and content of the specific domains The ultimate character of the present development is evident, then, in its having an empirical and a logical side that are marked by certain characteristics. In beginning with experience, the empirical side does not require the existence of an external object for its foundation and, therefore, there is no room for empirical error. The characteristic of the logical side is not merely that the development is derived logically from the empirical foundation but that it founds a new concept of Logic as the one law of the universeof which the traditional concept of logic is an interpretation and the different logics chapters. A question that may arise and that is addressed in the narrative is the apparent circularity that it must be some kind of logic that lies at the root of the metaphysics that the metaphysics founds Logic The discussion, here, talks around the ultimate character of the metaphysics. This ultimate character of the metaphysics is manifest in Metaphysics and Objects The metaphysics has been brought to an ultimate levelone that has been glimpsed in the history of thought e.g. by Leibniz, Hume and Wittgenstein who saw some aspect of it but provided neither demonstration nor systematic development of a whole system nor development of a system of implications. Some aspects of the system have been imagined in Indian Philosophy, especially in Vedanta, but, here too, what has been seen is similarly though not identically deficient It turns out that although the metaphysics implies the existence of an immense variety of objects, the pure side is empty with regard to the intentional location of the objects with respect to an individual perceiver. This intentional location is one of the topics of Objects. The metaphysics demonstrates the necessity of such location but not with regard to every individualthus the metaphysics is partially instrumental in addressing topics on which it is initially silent. Another topic addressed by Objects is the question of the nature and differences between concrete and abstract objects. Here, the metaphysics is instrumental in a definitive and rather surprising resolution to the nature of the concrete versus the abstract and the ultimate character of the metaphysics is essential to this development, i.e., while the result may be imagined or conceived independently, it cannot be demonstrated without the metaphysics or an equivalent Thus in bringing the metaphysics to an ultimate level, the theory of objects, has, in consequence, been brought to a level that exceeds its status in the history of thought If these claims are true, and it is the intent of the narrative that the truth of the claims should be manifest in it, then not only is the metaphysics ultimate but, since they have been raised to the same level, there must also be an ultimate character to the present study of Objects, of Logic and Meaning, of Mind, and of Cosmologyand other lesser but significant topics The topics of Logic and meaning, Mind, Cosmology, Human World, and Method, have, in fundamental directions, also been brought to levels that exceed their prior status. The level achieved is ultimate in certain directions and these developments include conceptualizations or re-conceptualizations of Logic, Mind, Cosmos, Human beingespecially the nature of freedom, and Method that have an ultimate character and incorporate and validate the valid aspects of older conceptions Diligence in development of being and related concepts has been instrumental in these developments Thus, while beingbeing-in-the-world as well as the received concepthave power, being, as developed in this narrative, is also a receptacle for diligent and critical imagination regarding the universe and its variety The origins of the metaphysics and related developments. It is interesting to inquire about the sources of the ideas adopted in the narrative. A fundamental sourceperhaps the original oneis, of course, the common traditionsthose of everyday use and the history of ideas and thought. However, the meanings to be established here are notand, as will be seen, cannot beprecisely those of the traditions. The question about the origin of the present forms of the ideas can be sharpened to a question about the entire selection of ideaswhat is included, what is excluded, what is newand about the arrangement, the meshing and the unfolding of the ideas. The simple answer is that what has been arrived at is the result of experiment and tinkering with ideas, reading and reflection, putting ideas together as interactive systems, attempting to understand and resolve both peripheral and central issues of philosophy and other disciplines, attempting to come up with a comprehensive system of understanding. Ideas and systems have come, some gone, some remained. The character of the system has morphed through several incarnations or perspectives or world views. There have been experiments with materialism, evolutionism, idealism, and a vague absolutism, each worked out systematically. There has been tinkering with lesser isms from the tradition. Each development has been rejected, not so much as wrong but as slanted andor inadequate. The present view which may be seen, in some ways, as amounting to the idea that foundations are not hidden or remote required the establishment of an conceptual apparatus that allowed the world as its own foundation to be ultimately simplewhile allowing complexity. It is not impossible, of course, that the present development should suffer the fate of the previous ones; however, its necessity isor appears to bemanifest in the development itself and not referred to something else or to some unfounded foundation. This present perspective may therefore be described as an anti-perspectivethe world, not something else, is foundationand has gone through roughly seven versions in which, along with new insights and applications, the entire system of ideas has gone through incremental and interactive revision that entailed bringing the level of precision and depth of each of the major topics up to the level of the fundamental metaphysical core The question of the power in the received concept of being is now addressed What are the manifest characteristics of being that make it the basic concept of a metaphysics? It may be noted that there is no precise distinction between what is received and what has been developed; the following characteristics are contained in the idea of being but, typically, become manifest only after dedicated reflection Being does not distinguish between immediate and ultimate or between appearance and reality, or between categories such as process and state or the concrete and the abstract Because being makes no distinction of mode or category, it encourages and makes possible transcendence of mere perspective at the core of the metaphysics Therefore, being is not a dedicated concept in the way thatthe common conceptions ofmind and matter are categorially dedicated Because of the lack of intrinsic distinction, being plays the role of unknown in the metaphysics. That is, the role of being in metaphysics is analogous to the role of the unknown in algebra, i.e. being permits talk of the unknown without having to trace the perimeter of the unknown. The power in the idea of being includes that it enables an analytic or symbolic treatment of metaphysics over a merely iconic treatment While the idea of being has been criticized as being flat, shallow or trivial, it is the very triviality that is a source of its depth and its inclusive character The depth lies, at least in part, in that the world is not referred, for its understanding, to something else. That reference to itselfwhich is not self-referentiality of a conceptshould permit the development of the metaphysics of ultimate simplicity that emerges in Metaphysics may be surprising. However, it is not surprising in that reference to something else already necessitates infinite regress of explanation for explanation without dissatisfaction. It may also be surprising that, as will be seen in Metaphysics, that reference to all being is instrumental in the development of the power of the metaphysics. However, as has already been seen, this reference is empirical. Even though the empirical character is innate, its recognition required diligent reflection on the meaning of being and of all being In its superficiality, the metaphysics of immanence is similar to the thought in analytic philosophy that it is desirable to seek explanations in superficial termsand not necessarily, as in some parts of science, in terms of depth. However, in developing metaphysics of immanence it will be seen that what is superficial is not necessarily obvious. That what is not obvious may be superficial has already been seen to be implicit in the idea of being Although it is sometimes regarded as esoteric, being is in fact both conceptual and empirical. I.e., being is a low level concept and the empirical / low level character together with its lack of distinction that make for its power The idea is simultaneously symbolic and embedding. That is, being is instrumental in seeing human being as in and of the world rather than alien to or remote from the world in its mundane and esoteric aspects. Use of the idea of being, rather than the ideas of mind or matter, is a return to robust being-in-the-worlda return to a robust view of the real that contrasts what has been called the hypothetico-deductive character of science without rejecting what is powerful in science Finally, use of the word being encourages adoption or adaptation of what may be seen as valuable from the tradition of thought on the real nature of things that falls under the idea of being     PAGE 1 PAGE 31 There is Experience There is being There is all being There is absence of being Being the Universe that contains all Form, Pattern and Law the Void that contains no Form, Pattern or Law Details below I.e., domains exist Without difference there can be no experience of difference Domains have complements, i.e., every domain has a complement that exists There are domains There is difference Experience of difference Relative complementthe complement of a domain A, relative to another, B, is what is in B but not A 1. 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Anil Mitrai7absolute impossibility proof, absolute object, abstract object, academic philosophy, action, actual, actual object, actual transformation, actuality, adaptation, aesthetics, Albert Einstein, Alexius Meinong, Alfred North Whitehead, Alfred Russell Wallace, all being, Amartya Sen, ambition, analytic philosophy, annihilation, arching, Aristotle, Arthur Schopenhauer, atman, atomism, attachment, attitude, attributes, awareness, awareness of awareness, axioms and methods of proof, being, Benedict de Spinoza, Bertrand Russell, binding problem, bonding, bound icon and symbol, Brahman, Brentano, bridging, Brouwer, Carl Gustav Jung, Cartesian, categories of intuition, causation, cause, charisma, Charles Darwin, choice, civilization, cognition, cognitive science, commitment, complete minimal set, concept, concept object, concrete object, connotation, consciousness, consistency, constitution, constraint, context, continental philosophy, contingent, coordinate, cosmological variety, cosmology, creation, David Hilbert, David Hume, deduction, definition, Democritus, denotation, depth, designated function, determinism, determinism and the unconscious, divides, dominant time, doubt, drive, dynamic form, dynamics of being, east, economics, education, Edward Burnett Tylor, electromagnetism, elimination of substance, emotion, entity, epistemology, ethics, ethics and objectivity, evil, exceptional achievement, exclusion, existence, existence as, experience, experiment, extension, extrapolation to the ultimate, fact, faith, faith and doubt, faithfulness, fantasy, feasibility, feasible, feeling, fiction, form, formal commitment, formalism, formlessness, foundation, foundationalism, free icon and symbol, freedom of will, fundamental principle of the Theory of Being, general cosmology, George Moore, global, God, Good, Gottfried Leibniz, Gottlob Frege, Greek philosophy, group bonding, group project, growth, Hans Reichenbach, Hegel , Hendrik Lorentz, Henri Poincar, higher emotion, history, human being, hypothesis, idealism, identity, immanence, immanent, Immanuel Kant, impossibility, indeterminism, Indian Philosophy, individual, induction, influence, inspiration, integration, intension, intentionality, intuition, intuitionism, Isaac Newton, journey, Karl Popper, karma, Kurt Gdel, language, lateral, legend, life, limit, literal, literature, local cosmology, logic, logic and law, logicism, logics, logos, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, materialism, mathematics, matter, Max Weber, meaning, meaning function, mechanism, memory, mental causation, mental function, metaphysics, metaphysics of absence, metaphysics of immanence, mind, modality, modern philosophy, morals, more than mere being, multiple times, myth, nature of human being, Necessity, necessity of indeterminism, neoteny, Newtonian Mechanics, non existent object, normal, normal mechanism, novelty, number, object, object constancy, objecthood, objectivity, ontological commitment, ordinary language analysis, origin of complexity, originality, originality, outer limit, outer limit, paradigm, paradox, partial object, particular, pattern, Paul Dirac, percept, personality, perspective, phenomenal concept of mind, phenomenalism, philosophy, piecemeal, Plato, Platonic world, Platonism, political realism, politics, possibility, power, precision, primal mind, principle of non contradiction, principle of the excluded middle, principles of thought, probability, probability of incremental change, proof, psyche, psychological concept of mind, psychology, quantum, real, recent philosophy, recurrence, reference, reference and paradox, reflexivity, relativistic theory of gravitation, religion, Ren Descartes, Roger Bacon, sameness, scholastic philosophy, science, secularism, sense, sense of history, sentience, shared commitment, sharing, showing, Sigmund Freud, significance in being, social, Socrates, soul, space, special theory of relativity, spirit, stability, story, substance, supervenience, symbol, symmetry, system of consistent description, system of human knowledge, tautology, Thales of Miletus, the good, the highest ideal, the real, theories of physics, theory, theory of being, theory of depth, theory of evolution, theory of identity, theory of mechanisms, theory of possibility, theory of variety, Thomas Kuhn, Thomas Nagel, time, time-space, transcendental, transcendental argument, transformation, truth, unconscious, understanding, unity of consciousness, universal law, universals, universe, value, variety, virtual transformation, voice, void, voidism, war and peace, west, western philosophy, what it is like, Willard van Orman Quine, William of Ockhambsojourney in being simple.dotANIL MITRA PHDg232Microsoft Word 10.0@̩UC@\c@ :@u;U՜.+,D՜.+,P  hp|  \!A $JOURNEY IN BEING: NEW WORLD-OUTLINE Title0 8@ _PID_HLINKSA$x5(http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html e )..\..\..\Journey in Being-New World.html5c /Journey in Being-New World-substance-temp.html]K&Journey 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