ABOUT THE DEFINITIONS—the definitions are naturally short; some are accompanied by an explanation just below the definition. Main concepts are in capitals, secondary concepts are underlined. The concepts contitute a coherent system from the essays, especially The Way of Being (comprehensive version in process). While definite in that context, the context itself, though mature, is and must be evolving. Though informed by received conceptions, the definitions are neither the received nor intended to capture received: growth of meaning (and knowledge) is a search in “a triple space of words, concepts, and objects” (this thought is derived from the ideas of Herbert Simon, Nobel Laureate in economics, 1978). The definitions begin with ‘Being’.

BEING (capitalized) is existence; beings are existents.

That is, ‘Being’ implies no distinction other than that of existence—no other descriptor is more neutral while having reference. This neutrality has led to Being described as trivial, designating nothing at all. We find that Being is foundational; which derives precisely from the neutrality—no assumption is made in a foundation in Being (which we develop) as in the case of ‘substance’ such as matter, mind, or other proximate candidate for foundation, for example process or interaction (this neutrality may be emphasized by referring to ‘existents’ rather than ‘objects’: that which has existence is an existent; and then ‘object’ is a synonym for ‘existent’). Of course, distinctions are crucially important too and are considered under “kinds of Being’’, below.

The neutrality can be elaborated. ‘Being’ derives from the verb to be, of which an example is ‘is’. The verb to be usually refers to some specific tense while place is implicit. Here, ‘Being’ is understood as at least neutral with regard to tense and place, i.e. to spacetime. However, we shall not even assume space and time; this will be seen below in discussing “difference, sameness, and their absence”.

Herein lies a deficiency of many languages—they are over specific or under-specific with regard to the real. Their specificity obtains at a limited though practical set of levels. For exploration beyond the “empirical or immediate experiential’’ what is needed is a hierarchy of levels of specificity; then a subset of that hierarchy could be designated as ‘standard’.

Being does not make distinctions of substance or substance vs non substance; of lower or higher; of self or other; these distinctions may be found within Being (or not according to the case)

The hypothetical being that affects not and is unaffected by any other being is non existent (except of course for the universe, defined below). Being is relational.

KIND OF BEING refers to distinctions within Being, beginning at a level of generality just under that of Being.

The idea of a highest level of kinds describes the concept of the categories.

EXPERIENCE is consciousness, i.e. subjective awareness.

The word ‘experience’ emphasizes consciousness in its pure, attitudinal, and agent forms. Thus experience is relational for even the pure form has internal relation and ‘potential’ external relation, which by the metaphysics of the way is realized as actual.

Experience is the place of significant, concept, and linguistic meaning; it is the place of Being-human (though not limited to the human). It is the place of personal and object (or existent) identity (defined later).

A substance is an irreducible kind, usually introduced in conceptual terms with the intent to found all existence; more than one substance may be allowed but irreducibility rules out interaction between substances and therefore the universe, if founded in substance, must be founded in precisely one substance—i.e. the universe would be monistic. It is not known on scientific grounds that the universe is a substance universe. However, if the universe is monistic, it cannot be strictly materialist (all matter and mind no part of matter) for then experience would be impossible. If the universe is monistic, the one substance must manifest as material and experiential phenomena.

From its relational character, experience is of something (i.e. some object or existent). At the highest level that something is the entire ‘world’ or universe (defined below). Experience itself is part of the world—experience is of the world which contains experience (the longer version from the essays founds experience and establishes the world from it in an analysis that has commonalities with Descartes' ‘cogito’ analysis). The first categorial level of the way, then, divides as Psyche and Universe. Then, in the essays, universe is analyzed as (Psyche), Nature, Society (and civilization), and the (unknown aspect of the) Universe. These dimensions of Being, with the acronym PNSU, are inclusive of other categorial systems. I.e., categorial systems are not unique. However PNSU is sufficient to the way and its perfect metaphysics (below); it is not exclusive of other or sub-categories.

A CONCEPT is a mental content.

(This is a primitive meaning of ‘concept’; distinctions within this conception are introduced below.)

As experiential beings we do not get outside our experience (even if we ‘refer outside’). However, within experience there is the experienced and the experience.

By agreement among senses and experiencers, some aspects of the experienced are ‘existentive’ (objective) which identifies ‘existents’ (objects); which may be pragmatic or perfect (as seen in the essays). Thus there are concepts and objects. A concept is any mental content or experience (experience is two sided—concept on one side, object on the other—but both are existents).

The hypothetical being that ‘affects’ no experience, i.e. that manifests in no way in any experience at all, is effectively non-existent.

A percept is a concept intended as and actually bound to an object.

A free concept (‘concept’ in a more common sense) is not bound to an object but may be intended to be bound or bound by hypothesis or identification. Pure concepts are free concepts that are not intended to be bound but of course may be bound. Thus pure concepts and hypothetically bound concepts are different only by intention. A concept binding is hypothetical when the intended extent of binding exceeds the known extent; thus theories have two aspects—hypothetical when intended to be extrapolated but factual in the restricted domain of verification. Concepts may be simple or compound. Simple concepts bound to (simple) objects are usually regarded as factual. Compound concepts bound to compound objects are usually regarded as theoretical—verified or hypothetical.

Referential CONCEPT MEANING is a concept and its actual and possible objects.

Referential linguistic meaning is the triad of sign-concept-object and is adequate for the metaphysics developed here (other kinds of meaning can be described in referential terms).

Concept meaning is distinct from significant meaning—meaning as in “the meaning of life” (yet these denotations are related).

The sign-concept is a symbol. The concept is necessary for a bare sign (when you are told that ‘sher’ is the Hindi word for ‘tiger’ the visual concept arises in one's mind and acquires open ended meaning and closed meaning once it acquires or intends an existent). Signs are simple or compound; compound signs have further meaning in virtue of their structure; such structure has conventional and metaphysical aspects (i.e. the structure of the sign has at least some purchase on the structure of the real). The signs themselves are existents but their significance is that they signify. Language makes for effective representation and communication but at the cost of losing some specificity and richness. On the other hand, the symbolic nature of language makes for precision where precision is needed; see the definition of mathematics later; such precision is symbolic rather than referential precision.

Dictionaries are sources of primitive meaning. But some words in a dictionary must be undefined; their meaning arises from use in the historical community of language users. Ordinary use does not have the apparent precision of formal use. But formal use often lacks the precision it appears to have; this is especially true at the forefront of knowledge, e.g. in philosophy, and in branches of mathematics and physics that are currently only tentatively developed.

KNOWLEDGE is meaning realized.

The nature of knowledge is covered by the nature of meaning as defined above. But this does not address the question of the validity of knowledge claims. For the purposes of the development in this site, this question is addressed below via the concepts of abstraction, tradition, and the perfect metaphysics.

Derived as it is from Being and experience, the concept of knowledge makes no reference to means or criterion. Is knowledge of the object; and if so, is it empirical or rational? Or is knowledge instrumental? We will find that both objective and instrumental knowledge play role in the metaphysics to be developed. We will also find that the rational and the empirical are not essentially distinct and that the rational includes the sense data.

ABSTRACTION from a concept-object is a filter on the concept that omits detail.

With sufficient abstraction, the residual concept may be faithful to the object. Faithfulness will be understood unless otherwise stated. Thus abstraction in the present sense is direct and empirical, not remote. Is abstraction an empty conception? Being and experience without further qualification, are abstract. Abstraction from (and of) experience is a way of perfect knowledge—and so the perfect abstract metaphysics defined below.

Some essential perfect concept-objects (below) of the abstract metaphysics are sameness-difference-identity, universe, void, natural law, possibility (and necessity), and logic (and mathematics, science, and reason).

The distinction between the empirical and the rational is not absolute; they constitute a continuum; the rational may be seen as inclusive of the empirical; this is because it is concerned with concepts and percepts (the empirical) are concepts.

RELIGION is exploration of the trans-secular but not trans-empirical region in all dimensions of Being.

The common forms of religion are often stagnant and often corrupted. In demonstrating the perfect metaphysics it is shown that in this conception, religion is definite activity with deep significance (the abstract metaphysics; the perfect is grounding. This is neither justification for the cosmologies or other aspects of the traditional religions nor intended as justification. Yet, the perfect metaphysics implies is shown that even the most unlikely cosmologies must be realized subject only to consistency. Their actual realization is most probably unstable and insignificant; yet they may have symbolic significance, even under explicit literal interpretation. Further some religious cosmologies are and will be shown stable and of deep significance.

PRIMITIVE EXPERIENCE of the world is in terms of sameness-difference as immanent in Being.

Sameness and difference are primitives, and as immanent in Being; they are precursors to and inclusive of space-time-substance.

Extension is extended sameness-difference. It may be coordination but the concept itself does not imply coordination or measure. It is primitive to and includes spatial or spatiotemporal extension. Note that ‘extension’ has a different meaning in relation to concepts and their objects

Self is sense of locus of control and awareness as distinct from the remainder of experience. IDENTITY is sense of sameness of existent, including self.

Change—time—is marked by sameness of identity with difference. Space is marked by differing identity without sameness. Space and time thus defined are not absolute, eternal, or distinct; they are immanent, coeval with Being, and interwoven.

TRADITION is what is at least pragmatically valid in the knowledge and practice of all (human) cultures.

Tradition includes modern culture with its academic disciplines and professions.

PERFECT METAPHYSICS (1)—is the join, as follows, of the abstract and tradition.

The abstract is perfect as faithful to its objects, which includes the universe as the greatest possible object and identity in which all identities merge, it illuminates and guides tradition.

Tradition illustrates the abstract and is the perfect (even though ‘only’ pragmatic—because it is the only instrument… and because it is suited to the task) instrument toward the ideal revealed by the abstract. The perfect metaphysics is both metaphysics and epistemology; it is an epistemology with dual criteria: faithfulness for the abstract, pragmatic for tradition. It revises but does not displace the significance of traditional epistemology.

It has been seen in discussing Being that there is some perfect metaphysics. Perfect metaphysics is taken up again later.

The UNIVERSE is all Being over all sameness-difference of Being…

…and absence of sameness-difference.

There is one and only one universe. The universe is not created by another being (there is no other being). If the universe has a cause, it is not and cannot be another being. If the universe has a cause, it must be distinct from cause as understood as the contiguous being-being cause of common experience and refined in physical science. One candidate cause is possibility. However, mere possibility allows that the existence or manifest Being of the universe could be otherwise—it is accidental. That leaves one case of possibility—i.e., necessity. Necessity would be a valid (kind of) cause—but does it obtain? The perfect metaphysics demonstrates it. This can be understood heuristically by assuming that the existence of the universe has an explanation. As seen, it cannot be explained as the effect of another being. Also as seen, the explanation cannot be in terms of possibility, except its special case of necessity. Leibniz held that everything in existence has a cause in the sense of the causation of common experience and named this the principle of sufficient reason. It is now evident that Leibniz principle does not hold; however it does hold if cause is interpreted as necessity.

The VOID is the absence of Being.

Does the void exist? Perhaps the simplest demonstration is that its existence and nonexistence are equivalent. While existence of the void is self-consistent and not contradicted by science or experience, the demonstration may be questioned. When the magnitude of its consequences is encountered, there will be an imperative to doubt. Therefore, from its significance and consistency, existence of the void may be regarded as a universal law (initially to be regarded as hypothetical), necessary fact, or existential principle of action.

A PART of the universe is either the universe itself or a sub-part.

Except perhaps for the void, the parts are clearly beings.

There is no significance other than existence to the appellation ‘being’. What, then, may we make of the ‘profound’ analyses of Martin Heidegger and other existential philosophers? We have seen that Being as Being is ‘profound’. The analysis of Being is significant—distinction and sameness are both important—and is taken up under kinds of Being.

A naive idea of POSSIBILITY is something that can obtain.

This requires clarification for precision and elaboration.

Knowledge may err (1) in internal inconsistency among its concepts, (2) in inconsistency between concepts and percepts or facts. The first defines logical possibility (incompletely) and the second defines empirical and scientific possibility. The definition of (deductive) logical possibility is completed as follows—it is the condition on concepts without which realization is possible under no circumstance. Logical possibility is a precondition, often unstated because built in, for scientific possibility. Scientific possibility, e.g. possibility according to the laws of physics, is a subset of the logically possible. Logical possibility is the greatest possibility—i.e. it cannot be ruled out without contrary evidence and it cannot be exceeded.

Scientific possibility is expressed in terms of conceptual systems called theories. Theories begin as hypothetical predictive or explanatory systems for data, observations, and phenomena (some of which may be expressed as lower level theories, already established). Thus theories are essentially empirical.

Theories are hypothetical when extended to the entire universe but factual in their domain of validity (the fact in question is compound). They are often thought to describe the entire universe but this is because the latest theory is not just valid over the entire empirical domain but also our best way of understanding the universe so far. Thus we can see how Newtonian Mechanics is limited because we have later theories (e.g. quantum field theory and general relativity) that show its domain of validity and are realistic outside that domain. However we have no current guide to similarly illuminate the latest theories.

On other hand we often think of our logics, and therefore logic itself, as necessary and a priori. But logic too can be seen as empirical in the following ways.

First, as defined above, logic is not just a set of necessary truths of inference, but a certain relation between concepts (usually expressed symbolically) and objects; this is empirical (understood as including the experiential) even though the apparent necessity of logic tends to hide the source. Thus while the law of non contradiction seems necessary, the law of the excluded middle may be contingent.

A second way in which logic is empirical, at least not a priori, is as follows. Perhaps the most basic system of logic is the propositional calculus. Here the structure of sentences is irrelevant; sentences are treated as wholes. The logical values of sentences lie in the ‘space’ {True, False}; and the calculus deals with “truth preserving relations between sentences”, particularly the if-then form. But it is appropriate to as Is even part of reality defined thus—i.e., does the propositional calculus have application? It certainly seems so but note that at least the question may be raised. But clearly, also, even if part of reality is so defined, does that extend to all reality (even understood as captured by the referential form)? This is a source of multi-valued logics.

There is also the extension of the propositional calculus that takes up “necessary truth” and “strict implication”; this is the source of modal logics.

Next in the classical logics regarded as about bare truth and falsity, after the propositional, is the predicate calculus (calculi) with quantification (the syllogism is a special case); it deals with sentences in the “subject-predicate form”. That there may be other sentence forms of interest renders logic as potentially empirical in just that way.

The first form of the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF METAPHYSICS is the assertion that the void is a being.

That is, the void exists.

This is demonstrated from the properties of the void. Naturally, doubt arises. See The Way of Being for discussion of doubt and alternative ways to look at the fundamental principle. These alternates start with the observations that there are alternative proofs and heuristics for the principle; that the principle is self (logically) consistent and consistent with experience (science); and that it is of fundamental significance. The alternatives are to look at the principle as a universal law-hypothesis open to experiment with as an existential action principle (the second alternative).

A natural LAW is a pattern in a part of the universe.

A law is really a concept (the reading of the pattern) and an object (the pattern). Laws are found empirically and are therefore local.

The laws have Being—i.e., they are beings: as immanent in Being, the patterns are abstractions from Being; they are concept-objects, which specify beings (consistency is regarded as given).

The second form of the fundamental principle of metaphysics is the assertion that the one universe is the greatest possible.

This form is demonstrated from the first form and the Being of the laws.

From this form of the principle, it follows that the universe is the realization of the logically consistent or possible. Thus the greatest possibility and logical possibility are identical.

It now follows that all beings interact and an earlier statement may be modified—The hypothetical being that ‘affects’ no experience, i.e. that manifests in no way in any experience at all, is non-existent. It is not being said that experience ‘creates’ the object; rather, the universe is effectively experiential and essentially relational.

An IDEAL ABSTRACT OBJECT is the concept-object pair for a concept that is sufficiently abstracted for perfect faithfulness to be meaningful and fulfilled.

From the fundamental principle the system of logical concepts is realized. This defines an abstract metaphysics—the abstract metaphysics (of the way).

This enables (vast) extension of the perfect metaphysics.

Perfect metaphysics (2)—light font indicates repetition of earlier content—is the join, as follows, of the abstract and tradition.

The abstract is perfect as faithful to its objects, which includes the universe as the greatest possible object and identity in which all identities merge, it illuminates and guides tradition.

Tradition illustrates the abstract and is the perfect (even though ‘only’ pragmatic—because it is the only instrument… and because it is suited to the task) instrument toward the ideal revealed by the abstract. The perfect metaphysics is both metaphysics and epistemology; it is an epistemology with dual criteria: faithfulness for the abstract, pragmatic for tradition. It revises but does not displace the significance of traditional epistemology.

Now, the metaphysics shows the universe to be the greatest possible; it is ultimate in that sense but also in the implicit sense that it captures that ultimate universe. This ultimate character is revealed by the abstract analysis of Being. Now tradition is revealed as a perfect instrument of realization. Though pragmatic, no more is necessary and no more possible in relation to the concrete; it is the instrument of movement from cosmos to cosmos in approaching the ultimate.

An ABSTRACT OBJECT is one which abstracted sufficiently that it is not seen as concrete.

But his now shows that ‘abstract’ - ‘concrete’ distinction is not absolute but one of a continuum (it may seem absolute to human beings because their perceptual system is attuned to a level of abstraction that they naturally find ‘concrete’). However the distinction is not of kind, but of (most convenient) way of knowing—it is convenient to know the concrete empirically, i.e. by the senses, and the abstract symbolically or conceptually, which when subject to logic, is rational.

MATHEMATICS—a preliminary and incomplete definition of mathematics is that it is a collection of consistent axiomatic systems.

This is rather similar to Bertrand Russell’s definition (it begins—mathematics is the class of propositions of the form if p, then q…) but it has the same problem as Russell's definition—it gives us no clue as to what identifies a set of primitive terms, definitions, and axioms as mathematics, e.g. why are pieces, board, and rules of chess not seen as mathematics? And intuitionists and constructivists would reject this definition outright—but to begin, let us accept it as a framework for definition of mathematics.

From the fundamental principle, all mathematical systems are realized (since they are consistent). Mathematics is about the real, as are the sciences of physics, biology, mind, and society. We may say that sciences are abstract or concrete. Mathematics is an example of the abstract; the just mentioned sciences are concrete. But the abstract and the concrete fall under one umbrella as the concept side of the real.

All mathematical systems are realized. But what is mathematics? Clearly, it is a subset of the logically consistent system of concepts (usually linguistically or symbolically expressed). But what subset?

This is of course the critical question—elusive, and only incompletely answered to the satisfaction of mathematicians and philosophers. It has to do with form, structure, and change in the world (geometry and dynamics); it has to with number and order (e.g. arithmetic and number systems); it has to do with abstraction of and from the foregoing (algebra). The characterization remains very partial. Let us leave the definition of mathematics at that because it is as much a question of practice as it is of defining.

But there is a residual question. Is symbolic expression, which implies that the results of a definite system are countable, adequate to the task? First, it is admirable in being suitable to formalization, discrete inspection, and proof and provability, and therefore to a greater degree of certainty (all characteristics of mathematics) than in the concrete sciences. On the other hand it may be incomplete because of the limitation to countability. This is more problematic than often realized for it casts a shadow over all systematic symbolic knowledge that has not been demonstrated complete. One resolution is to realize that though the results of a given system are countable, the number of such systems is not; given an incomplete system, a related one may be found that patches up some of its gaps. Another is to recognize the importance of intuition, particularly since it is not necessarily limited to the countable (and since it is part of the world, it is possible that it may measure the world). This may be one way of future mathematics and knowledge. It may be a way forward for Being-in-the-universe. It is important to note that we ought not to oppose intuition and the formal but to see that they may and do complement each other.

Mathematics begins (historically: began as) empirical; by generalization and systematization it became axiomatic, perhaps originally with Euclidean Geometry. Though originally regarded as the science (study) of space, it was already at least implicitly abstract with Euclid. Then, over two and a half millennia, mathematics emerged as abstract. But now with intuition and computation the empirical side rises again and perhaps axiomatization and proof and empirical study are finally poised to become equals.

SCIENCE is critical and imaginative study of the real, based in and keeping close empirical contact to the real..

This is an evolution relative to the earlier preliminary definition.

The critical is understood as experimental and rational.

The sciences are abstract and concrete. Examples of the concrete were given above. The abstract includes mathematics, linguistics, computer science, and (deductive) logic. But via the perfect metaphysics, deductive logic can be extended to an earlier meaning of general effective but not only certain inference. Then the sciences and logics are structures within logic.

REASON is the entire effective system of relations between concepts and existents.

That is, reason is the system of effective relations between thought and the world (with thought seen as including perception and feeling—and therefore value and values).

Thus reason includes the perfect and the pragmatic; and attitude and action; it is the perfect metaphysics (in action but the perfect metaphysics in action is imaged in the perfect metaphysics).

An appropriate term for reason is logos (roughly as understood, not in the Christian representation of Christ, but in the philosophy of ancient Greece, but extended as the perfect metaphysics). In the extended sense just above under science, logic and logos are the same.

The BRAHMAN of the Vedanta and Aeternitas of Thomas Aquinas are the logos.

Atman is the true experiential self of individuals. From the perfect metaphysics, Atman realizes Brahman; there are effective paths to individual and collective—civilization—realization (essays.html, particularly The Way of Being).

An essential problem of realization is pain; in reflecting on pain, note that it has function and therefore cannot be ‘turned off’ even where non-functional as in pain while dying or the pain of the innocent. How should real pain be addressed? It should be addressed where possible, in the immediate; the afflicted must be supported; but the goal of focus, except when pain makes it impossible, is realization; without which pain is unnecessary suffering.

COSMOLOGY is the study of the variety and extension of Being. General cosmology is study of cosmology under the most general principles—i.e. the abstract metaphysics which sees the universe as the realization of logic.

Every fiction of the world, even the religious texts, is realized in a phase of the universe (subject of course to logical constraint). The significance of this is discussed below.

Under general cosmology the universe has identity; the universe and its identity are limitless with regard to variety, extension, peaks of Being (and their variety, quality, and magnitude) and dissolutions; particularly, the universe and its identity have manifestation as limitless arrays of cosmos over extension—which have limitless varieties in ‘physical law’ the individual is limited in this form, but the limitation is the result of ‘natural’ but not absolute limits to perception and conception; the individual has no absolute limits—i.e. the individual inherits the limitlessness of the universe; that is, death is real but not absolute.

Given a being, there is a greater sentient being.

Under general cosmology the universe is absolutely indeterministic in that given a being, e.g. a cosmos, its contiguous evolution is not at all predictable or given (even though there is predictability and givenness if it follows its nature or laws). It is also absolutely deterministic in that given a being in some state, it will assume all states.

Let us define the block universe—or a block view of the universe (putting aside contemporary conceptions of the total vs unfolding block universe). We might define it as the universe over all extension. However, that is just the earlier definition. The block universe is just the universe (but the phrase reminds us of the block view). Given absolute indeterminism, the region—trajectory—of a being in the block intersects multiple versions of the being… and other beings as well. The merging and separation of identities and the peaking and dissolution of phases of the universe occur within the block and this is one way of understanding them.

Consider an individual in a cosmos. What we have said above is that the individual has limitless freedom (though limited in this world as discussed earlier). But if the block is given, how can the individual be free? To discuss this, the concept of determinism must be re-viewed and carefully defined. If a being is determined by a part, the being is deterministic with respect to the part. Thus if the universe were spatial and temporal and a temporal slice determined the entire future, the universe would be temporally deterministic. Given a cosmos, it has a degree of determinism but also indeterminism (under the perfect metaphysics). The block is in no way determined by the cosmos; thus individuals finding themselves limited in the cosmic perspective have limitless freedom (except that illogical conceptions are not realized; but this is not a true limit) in the block perspective. Thus individuals have freedom of will—the ability to make and create and execute choice—and determination. Is freedom of will possible under either determinism or indeterminism? We take this up below.

The COSMOLOGY OF FORM AND FORMATION is the study of formed beings and their formation against the background of general cosmology.

How is form and formation possible? The perfect metaphysics requires it. Why then do we not see every possible kind of form, from the small to the large, intersect our cosmos? The perfect metaphysics requires that too. But we would like to understand form in more traditional terms (the reader may want to review the concept of ‘tradition’). Where may we find mechanisms of form and formation other than the necessity of the general abstract necessity of the pure metaphysics? We look to our scientific theories. Theoretical physics provides descriptions of form—the dynamical systems of quantum field theory and general relativity—QFT and GR; but they do not speak to reasons and origins of those forms (the perfect metaphysics requires them but provides no explanation beyond necessity). Evolutionary biology gives us an account of the history of life; it does not go back to the origins of life from non-living matter but it does explain of some forms from others. The mechanism is interesting. Cutting to the essentials there are indeterministic variations that are selected by and when they have stability (adaptation within an environment). Must the variations be indeterministic—yes if there is to be true novelty. Can they be indeterministic given determinism? We are not given determinism for even if QFT is, for QFT is not the final theory (while the conclusion is likely from science, it is necessary from the perfect metaphysics). That is, while indeterminism and determinism are not individually adequate to formation, their intersection is. Darwinian evolution provides a model for formation. The general model may turn out to be extended to abiogenesis; and to creativity in thought; expression of free will occurs at the intersection of determinism and indeterminism, which removes the objections of pure indeterminism and indeterminism; it also clarifies that ‘freedom’ does not mean absolute or unimpeded freedom as may be seen from relative limits in the local perspective (that the freedom should be unimpeded results from focus only on the term ‘free’ and not ‘will’). It may also provide a model for formation of cosmoses from the void; and from one another. But the perfect metaphysics requires that it be a model though not a universal one. A major point to the model is that it is an explanation of the stability and numerical preponderance of systems formed according to it. Thus fictions may be realized but may also be insignificant relative to the ‘stable formation’ under the extended Darwinian model that has been named self-adaptive systems theory.